From 1991 to 2002, Sierra Leone was witness to a long and brutal civil war, one that included substantial human rights violations including mass killings, forced amputations, child soldiers and gendered violence (Doughtery 41). The conflict displaced 2 million people and resulted in 75,000 casualties (Doughtery 44). The inherent traumatic nature of the conflict and crimes committed, as well as the sheer number of victims and perpetrators that were entangled in the post-conflict rebuilding of Sierra Leone, spurred the United Nations and other key actors to establish the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission (SLTRC) in order to facilitate longstanding peace in Sierra Leone. There were two specific developments initiated in the process of establishing the SLTRC, namely, the establishment of both a special court, to trial of those who “bear the greatest responsibility of war crimes,” as well as a TRC, in order to facilitate truth telling and community healing( Lamin 301). After the Lomé Peace Agreement of 1999, which initiated a ceasefire in the region, but eventually deteriorated into violence once again, the SLTRC began taking statements in 2002 and commenced public hearings in 2003 (Shaw 1).These public hearings involved testimonials of both victims and perpetrators in full view of their community as well as the TRC commissioners, with the information revealed in the TRC being inadmissible in court (Kelsall 370).

Sierra Leone’s Truth and Reconciliation Commissions’ mandate was to “to address impunity, break the cycle of violence, provide a forum for both victims and perpetrators of human rights violations to tell their stories, get a clear picture of the past in order to facilitate genuine healing and reconciliation (TRC 1).” Of note is the emphasis on the perceived therapeutic effects of truth telling in a controlled environment in an effort to facilitate greater community healing. The SLTRC intended to bridge the gap between perpetrators and victims of conflict via the establishment of commonalities and vulnerability within the public hearings. Victims and perpetrators alike were encouraged to tell their stories in graphic detail in service of these hearings being demonstrative as well as representative, with these statements instigating “powerful public effect” (Kelsall 371). The SLTRC also established an “intention to build a historical record of the conflict and its causes (Kelsall 373),” in order to prevent possible “repetition of the violations or abuses suffered” through public knowledge and understanding (Kellar 375). However, while much emphasis has been on the healing nature of truth telling, some criticized the TRC’s lack of a tangible mandate to facilitate improved infrastructure and increased economic aid to vulnerable populations (Kelsall 363).While the importance of the TRC was not lost on the citizens of Sierra Leone, “the presentation of truth through public hearing had no discernible impact on the ability of such people to live a better life,” highlighting a disconnect between the desires of the Sierra Leoneans and the priorities of the actors who facilitated the TRC (Millar 517).

Residual Special Court for Sierra Leone (RSCSL)

Set up in 2002, with the request of the United Nations, the Residual Special Court for Sierra Leone (RSCSL) was the world's first "hybrid" international criminal tribunal. The role of the RSCSL is to prosecute and try those responsible for the greatest crimes committed in Sierra Leone. The mandate was set up to account for crimes committed after the failure of the Abidjan Peace Accord in 1996 (Sierra Leone 1). The RSCSL’s special outreach programs allow for witnesses to come forth and testify whilst being ensured under their witness protection program.

The Interim Secretariat 

The Interim Secretariat was established on March 25, 2002, along with the appointment of an Interim Executive Secretary. The Interim Secretariat played a crucial role in campaigning and raising awareness about the Truth and Reconciliation Commision (TRC). To further aid the TRC process, the secretariat is responsible for developing briefing material on issues related to Special court, children protection and development, women development, reconciliation process, and witness protection (Sierra Leone Volume 1 1). The Interim Secretariat supported the work of “six Sierra Leonean consultants who were responsible for the six operational units namely:  Media and Public Education; Reconciliation and Witness Protection; Research, Investigation; Legal Affairs and Finance (Sierra Leone Volume 1, 1).”

Truth and Reconciliation Commissioners 

The Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commissioners is built and operated by seven members, heads of their department and operations managers. Chairman Bishop Christian Humper is among the commissioners who played a prominent role in establishing and promoting a hopeful vision for the victims of the civil war. Among the many initiatives, the launch of the National Vision Exhibit, at the national stadium in Freetown, was crucial to the morale of the people as it highlighted different stories from victims and raised awareness to the emotional and psychological damage caused by the war (Sierra Leone 1).

Commissioners such as; Deputy Chairperson Hon. Justice Laura Marcus-Jones, Professor William Schabas, Ms. Yasmin Louise Sooka, Mr. Sylvanus Torto, Madam Ajaratu Satang Jow, and Professor John Kamara hold the responsibility to raise awareness of the injustices caused towards human rights, as well as maintaining and developing relationships with the Special Courts as a means to further establish accountability for conflict (Sierra Leone Volume 1, 1). The other side to a commissioner's job is designing and undertaking educational campaigns that focus on all perspectives of war and the implications on society and culture. Along with campaign and development, the commissioners make sure to ensure that the struggles of local districts are met by holding weekly meetings.

United Nations Development Program 

Alongside UNAMSIL, the United Nations Development Program helped the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission with “aadministrative and logistical support” during the establishment and realisation of the TRC (Kaldor 4).

United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL)

The UNAMSIL was instrumental in creating and establishing the Special Court for Sierra Leone  in an attempt to try individuals and groups for atrocious war crimes. UNAMSIL’s mission also assisted the government in setting up the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commision (UNAMSIL).

UN Security Council (UNSC)

The Security Council authorized the establishment of UNAMSIL, a new mission with a maximum of 6,000 military personnel, including 260 military observers, to assist the Government and the parties in carrying out provisions of the Lome peace agreement, in 1999 (UNAMSIL).

Office of the High Commissions of Human Rights (OHCHR) 

Between July and December 1999, the Office of the High Commissions of Human Rights (OHCHR) organised consultations and meetings with civil society and government representatives. Government and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) where “the preliminary issues related to the establishment of the Commission were canvassed”(OHCHR).

ECOWAS 

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was one of the only international bodies that was willing to intervene in Sierra Leone’s civil war. The objective was to ensure the restoration of the government of Kabbah and the return of peace and security in Sierra Leone (Sierra Leone TRC 2).

Liberia 

In 2006, newly elected Liberian President, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf formally requested the Extradition of former president and convicted war criminal Charles Taylor from Nigeria. Taylor was extradited from Calabar, Nigeria and detained in Sierra Leone by UN authorities (Britannica).

Nigeria 

The Nigerian government hosted the exile of former Liberian president, Charles Taylor. Nigeria was also responsible for providing the most military personnel for ECOWAS during the civil war. Unfortunately, due to “the poor economic status of its member countries,” ECOWAS was not able to maintain the early operations of its peacekeeping missions. (Sierra Leone TRC 2)

United Kingdom (UK)

The United Kingdom provided $865,000 towards the establishment and development of the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commision (Sierra Leone, 2). The aid was assigned and allocated to conduct sensitisation programmes about the truth and reconciliation process ahead of the establishment of the TRC itself.

United States (US)

The United States provided funds for development for Sierra Leone through the US Agency for International Development. The United States  also brought legal experts to Sierra Leone for short capacity building programs, and the development of Sierra Leone Supreme Court’s legal library (Sierra Leone 2).

Sierra Leone: Truth and Reconciliation

Barriers to Truth and Reconciliation

As to be expected with a TRC that deals with a variety of actors, the SLTRC faced a variety of barriers in its application. The first of these barriers revealed itself prior to the commencement to the TRC, with the commission being “plagued by serious mismanagement and staff recruitment problems in its preparatory phase (Doughtery 41).” This led to the hiring of “personnel [who] were unqualified or redundant,” ultimately hindering both the timely start of the TRC, as well as its effectiveness, as many of these staffing issues continued well into the commencement of the Commission (Doughtery 43). Another barrier to the commission was the cultural roots of truth-telling in Sierra Leone, namely, the prevalence of a “forgive and forget” approach to historical trauma (Shaw 1). This ideal directly contrasts the reconciliatory and open nature of the SLTRC, with many in Sierra Leone feeling forced to tell their stories. They may have preferred to participate in the customary “social forgetting of violence” that had occurred in Sierra Leone in the past (Shaw 1).This illustrates a disconnect between the SLTRC and the lived experiences of Sierra Leoneans. The UN-backed SLTRC were unable or unwilling to understand the cultural nuances of Sierra Leone and instead imposed Eurocentric ideals of reconciliation. The influence of this disconnect was further illustrated in the assumption that “testifying is a cathartic and healing experience” when some found it traumatizing, and initiated their own practice of social forgetting after the SLTRC had ended (Shaw 1).Finally, another barrier to the TRC was a lack of clear communication in regard to the actual mandate and purpose of the TRC. This confusion came to light in the reluctance for many to participate in the TRC, as they “feared that confessions to the TRC may lead to prosecution” even though the TRC had mandated that all evidence presented would be inadmissible (Kelsall 365). Many ex-combatants went into hiding when the TRC came to their area as they may not have been made aware of the difference between the Special Court and the TRC, hindering the ability for the SLTRC to gather comprehensive information on the true nature of the conflict (Shaw 1).

The barriers to the TRC were not easily rectifiable and led to mixed results. In their urgent pursuit of truth, the SLTRC may have obstructed long-lasting reconciliation. The commissioners heard, recorded, and preserved the testimony of the war’s survivors. While testimonials aspired to be inclusive, and were given by both those who had perpetrated and been victims of violence, this inclusivity occurred on the terms of the commissioners (Menzel 319). Women who had perpetrated violence were often also survivors of assault and rape, but conflated the TRC testimonial hearings with hearings of the Special Court, and were thus disincentivized from providing testimony (Menzel 319). This obfuscation adheres to a traditionally understood mutually-exclusive binary of victim-perpetrator, and the subsequent implication that someone must be either a victim or a perpetrator. Rather, the Sierra Leone Civil War was fought by those who had also been victimized, including women and children.
In addition to creating a truthful historical record of human rights violations, Sierra Leone’s TRC sought to create a “National Vision for Sierra Leone,” the ideals of which would guide the reconstruction of post-conflict Sierra Leone (“National Vision for Sierra Leone”). Sierra Leoneons wrote to the TRC, imagining an end to the poverty that had been pervasive in Sierra Leone long before the conflict began. The TRC’s ceasefire and disarmament efforts laid a foundation upon which peace could be built. The National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (supported by ECOWAS and the UN) surpassed their goal of disarming 45,000 combatants, and disarmed 76,000 combatants, including 6,000 children, before 2003 (Sesay and Suma 12). The success of NCDDR, however, was limited to disarming and demobilizing combatants. Reintegration attracted less fiscal and political attention, as unintegrated young people were a less immediate threat to the TRC and Sierra Leone than armed combatants (Sesay and Suma 14). This inadequacy exposes a critical inadequacy of the TRC: while the end of violent conflict is a necessary condition for peacebuilding, it is not sufficient.
In addition, the TRC was criticized for its emphasis on rhetoric. Many of the performative gestures of reconciliation and rhetorical embrace of post conflict peace neglect the lived realities of Sierra Leoneans. In their national visions, Sierra Leoneans articulated the end of poverty in Sri Lanka, improved infrastructure, education, and an end to corporate and government corruption (“National Vision for Sierra Leone”). Some of these hopes have been realized; since 2000, Sierra Leone has slightly increased its literacy rate, increased its percentage of people with access to safe drinking water to 61%, and cut the number of people living on less than USD1.90 per day nearly in half (“Sierra Leone Overview”). Nonetheless, the vast majority of Sierra Leoneans live on less than USD3.20 per day, and Sierra Leone has one of the highest maternal mortality rates in the world –– nearly 1 in 17 mothers have a lifetime risk of death associated with childbirth (Mason). Building peace amongst Sierra Leoneans is obscured by a more immediate concern: absolute poverty. One Sierra Leonean reminded a reporter that “whenever [a man] looks at his present plight, his mind is drawn back to what actually caused the problems … there is no logical conclusion to this day, so the healing process has not come to its conclusion yet” (Svärd).
These cleavages, including the stark urban-rural divide in terms of healthcare and education, and anti-corruption movements, motivated Sierra Leoneans to mobilize against the state at the war’s onset (“Revolutionary United Front”). The TRC aspired to remedy these disparities to “prevent future violations” of human rights (“The Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act 2000”). Nonetheless, perceptions of government corruption remain high in Sierra Leone, with more than two-thirds of the population believing their government to be corrupt (“Corruption in Sierra Leone”). Sexual and gender-based violence directed at women and children has skyrocketed, doubling in recent years (Thompson). The recommendation given by the TRC to establish institutions to combat sexual and gender-based violence has proven inadequate, as less than 1% of reports of sexual violence end with a conviction in Sierra Leone (Thompson).
The TRC’s success is not to be understated. Demobilizing and disarming tens of thousands of soldiers and establishing detailed, accessible archives of its findings and procedures help to establish a foundation upon which to build peace. The post conflict success of Sierra Leone in development is also not to be overlooked; since 2000, Sierra Leone has increased its life expectancy by 40%, and efforts have been made in terms of literacy and health (“Sierra Leone Overview”). Nonetheless, Sierra Leone today is a long way from the national visions Sierra Leoneans hoped for and those which are advocated for by the TRC, particularly as it pertains to corruption and gender equality.

“The Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act 2000” c. 2000. The Sierra Leone Web. http://www.sierra-leone.org/Laws/2000-4.pdf Accessed 29 November. 2020.

“Speech by the President of Sierra Leone His Excellency, Alhaji Dr. Ahmad Tejan Kabbah at the ceremony marking the conclusion of disarmament and the destruction of weapons” c. 2002. The Sierra Leone Web. http://www.sierra-leone.org/Speeches/kabbah-011802.html. Accessed 29 November. 2020.

“Revolutionary United Fronts Apology to the Nation” c. 1997. The Sierra Leone Web. http://www.sierra-leone.org/AFRC-RUF/RUF-061897.html. Accessed 29 November. 2020.

“President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah Remarks At the Signing of the Lome Peace Accord.” c. 1999. The Sierra Leone Web. http://www.sierra-leone.org/Speeches/kabbah-070799.html . Accessed 29 November. 2020.

Humper, Christian Joseph. “Witness to the Truth: Report of Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission Volume 1.” c. 2004. The Sierra Leone Web. http://www.sierra-leone.org/Other-Conflict/TRCVolume1.pdf Accessed 29 November. 2020.
http://www.sierra-leone.org/Other-Conflict/JCDDR-011702.html

“Communique issued by the Joint GoSL / RUF / UNAMSIL Committee on Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration.” c. 2002. The Sierra Leone Web. http://www.sierra-leone.org/Other-Conflict/JCDDR-011702.html Accessed 29 November. 2020.

“ A Statement made by his excellency Dr. Ahmad Tejan Kabbah made before the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.” c. 2003.The Sierra Leone Web. https://www.unicef.org/emergencies/files/SierraLeone-TRCReport.pdf Accessed 29 November. 2020.

Mann, Natalie. “Children and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission for Sierra Leone.”c. 2001. UNICEF. https://www.unicef.org/emergencies/files/SierraLeone-TRCReport.pdf Accessed 29 Novemeber. 2020.

Millar, Gearoid. "Local Evaluations of Justice through Truth Telling in Sierra Leone: Postwar Needs and Transitional Justice." Human Rights Review (Piscataway, N.J.), vol. 12, no. 4, 2011, pp. 515-535.

Millar utilizes first hand experiences in order to paint a picture of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s impacts on Sierra Leoneans. Through the use of interviews with Sierra Leoneans, as well as observations of the SLTRC itself, Millar provides a strong analysis of the apparent disconnect between the mandate of the TRC and the desires of the people of Sierra Leone. Specifically, they highlight the requests for assistance, both financial and social, that went largely unacknowledged in exchange for a restorative justice model that was not necessarily wanted by the people of Sierra Leone. Millar highlights that there is a disconnect of what constitutes true ‘justice’ and cites this disconnect as one that hindered the potential impacts of the commission.

Lamin, Abdul R. "Building Peace through Accountability in Sierra Leone: The Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Special Court." Journal of Asian and African Studies (Leiden), vol. 38, no. 2-3, 2003, pp. 295-320.
Lamin provides an extensive analysis of the events leading up to, as well as proceeding, the conflict in Sierra Leone. This information provides a good foundation for understanding the cultural intricacies of the conflict, and allows for a deeper understanding of the SLTRC. Lamin’s work is also particularly useful in its examination of the finer details of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, and the possible implications of these more nuanced mandates. These foundational details permit the reader to establish a comprehensive understanding of all aspects of the TRC, allowing for further analysis to be made based on these details.
Shaw, Rosalind, and United States Institute of Peace. Rethinking Truth and Reconciliation Commissions: Lessons from Sierra Leone. U.S. Institute of Peace, Washington, DC, 2005.
Shaw examines the SLTRC with a critical eye, and highlights some of the inherent misgivings that were present in the TRC even before its commencement. Shaw especially draws light to the inherent cultural barriers that made the truth telling and reconciliatory nature of the TRC potentially incompatible with Sierra Leonean culture. Specifically, Shaw effectively draws attention to the cultural custom of ‘forgiving and forgetting’ rather than healing through truth-telling. This enabled confusion and misinformation regarding the TRC to become rampant, despite the efforts of officials. Shaw also lends their voice to the TRC process, highlighting the hesitancy of many to testify for fear of retribution.

“The Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act 2000” c. 2000. The Sierra Leone Web. http://www.sierra-leone.org/Laws/2000-4.pdf Accessed 29 November. 2020.
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act incorporates the TRC’s existence into Sierra Leonean legislation. This Act establishes the commission and parameters for commissioners, the functions, mandate, and restrictions of the TRC, including meeting times, duration, testimonials, and subpoena power, and establishes the TRC’s administrative provisions and paid stipends. Lastly, the Act states that the TRC shall produce a report, and the government shall be responsible for timely implementation of recommendations. This Act put forth the institutional framework of the TRC, and provided for an avenue within which the TRC’s recommendations can be carried through into legislation.

Horovitz, S. (2009) Sierra Leone: Interaction between international and national responses to the mass atrocities, Domac reports/3.
Horowitz examines the capacity of international courts and their ability to end impunity. Through the analysis of Sierra Leone’s political, administrative, and legal system, Horowitz is able to essentialize the discrepancies in the relationship between the Special Court and the national justice system when addressing the mass atrocities of the civil war. Horowitz examines international trials and the positive impacts on national justice in Sierra Leone, and the impacts of war-related crimes on the political and legal system. The prominence of Horwitz’s report establishes key effects of international and national actors and proposes ways to maximize the efforts and processes through Sierra Leone’s national system or the international courts’ capacity.

Interrelationship Between the Sierra Leone Special Court and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Human Rights Watch, 18 April 2002.
The Human Rights Watch's (HRW) policy paper brings forth recommendations for how the Special Court and SLTRC should interact when addressing the mass atrocities committed in Sierra Leone. The policy paper further expands on the importance of developing guidelines for sharing information between the two institutions and the probable implications (positive) it could have on creating and establishing an efficient method of communication. The Human Rights Watch strives to establish and help understand the methodology used between two legal institutions. The impetus of the paper draws attention to the vulnerabilities of Sierra Leone’s legal systems. Furthermore, the “mechanisms for sharing information” recommended by the HRW provides an overview of what roles must be played by the actors and the interconnected nature of each position to the next.

Anne Menzel, “The pressures of getting it right: Expertise and victims’ voices in the work of the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC)”
Menzel examines the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commision as a case study of professional institutions (i.e. TRCs) engaging with non-professional narratives, individuals, and events. This examination of agency and ownership in transitional justice on a professional level concludes that the specific direction of attention paid to women and sexual violence in the “right” way led to an overreliance on established status-quo exports concerning the treatment and understanding of women and sexual violence. This then contributed to the overarching marginalization of victims, despite improved efforts at encouraging and placing importance on victims’ participation.

William Schabas, “Amnesty, the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Special Court for Sierra Leone”
Schabas analyzes the roles of two accountability mechanisms and their conclusions concerning amnesty. Sierra Leon’s Special Court, which ruled that the Lomé Agreement’s guarantee of amnesty for crimes against humanity was contradictory to international law, while the TRC’s pragmatic approach concerning amnesty did not explore the legality of amnesty, but encouraged its practicality. Schabas contextualizes amnesty within international law and the shifting condemnation of amnesty in the 21st century. The Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions Article 6(5), Schabas notes, promotes amnesty to prevent belligerents from fighting to the death and to encourage reconciliation, thus encouraging a balanced and nuanced perspective of amnesty not as a moral obligation, but a practical peacebuilding and conflict-prevention tactic.

Proscovia Svärd, “The international community and post-war reconciliation in Africa: A case study of the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission”
Svärd explores the role that the international community played in the Sierra Leone TRC, and explores the TRC as a product of international interest in enhancing reconciliation and democracy in Sierra Leone. In assessing the TRC’s merit, Svärd notes the perception of the TRC as an insufficient mechanism for reconciliation, noting that truth is only the first step of reconciliation, and must be followed by tangible efforts towards reconciliation. Thus, Svärd assesses a large gap between the rhetorical (and placating) merit of the TRC and its inadequacy in remedying the damages of the conflict it seeks to reconcile. Svärd concludes by recommending that the international community reorient its understanding of TRCs towards transparency and improving the wellbeing of the poor.

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Kelsall, Tim. "Truth, Lies, Ritual: Preliminary Reflections on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Sierra Leone." Human Rights Quarterly, vol. 27, no. 2, 2005, pp. 361-391.

Lamin, Abdul R. "Building Peace through Accountability in Sierra Leone: The Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Special Court." Journal of Asian and African Studies (Leiden), vol. 38, no. 2-3, 2003, pp. 295-320.

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Menzel, Anne. “The pressures of getting it right: Expertise and victims’ voices in the work of the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC).” International Journal of Transitional Justice vol. 14, 2020, 300-319.

Millar, Gearoid. "Local Evaluations of Justice through Truth Telling in Sierra Leone: Postwar Needs and Transitional Justice." Human Rights Review (Piscataway, N.J.), vol. 12, no. 4, 2011, pp. 515-535.

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