From June 2001 - August 2003 the Peruvian TRC (CVR) reported on instances of extreme violence in the twenty years starting in 1980, carried out by the Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso), the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA), the Peruvian military, and the police.
The conflict began when the Peruvian Communist Party - SL (PCP-SL) started an armed revolution, which came to a halt with the end of Alberto Fujimori’s rule in Peru. In order to repress the Shining Path, Presidents Terry, Garcia, and Fujimori carried out counterinsurgency campaigns that included practices of political torture, arbitrary executions, disappearances, and massacres. The conflict in Peru had a racialized element which involved greater violence against the Quechua-speaking population, particularly the indigenous Peruvian population in the region of Ayacucho. “Many of the victims had no involvement with either the Shining Path or the MRTA and were instead targeted due to racialized disdain toward rural indigenous Peruvians.” [i].

The CVR’s mandate was to determine why the violence occurred, the extent of victimization, reparations, and discussions around responsibility. There were multiple actors at play in the internal armed conflict that plagued Peru for the last two decades of the 20th century. With these different actors came differing conceptions of justice, and of what constituted the individual and the collective good. Therefore, it was important for the CVR in Peru to take into account these differing conceptions which challenged “the supremacy of liberal models of justice and the dichotomy they construct between retributive and restorative forms of justice” [ii]. The CVR produced a 9-volume, 8000 page analysis of the violence in its final report.

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[i] Heilman, Jaymie. “Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Peru.” Latin American History. June 25, 2018.

[ii] Theidon, Kimberly. “Intimate Enemies: Violence and Reconciliation in Peru.” University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012. Project MUSE muse.jhu.edu/book/19465.

The CVR found a significant relationship between poverty, social exclusion, and the probability of being a victim of violence. It found that roughly 40% of the cases of violence were concentrated in the Ayacucho region. It further found that the peasant (campesina) population were the main victims of violence. Of reported victims of violence, 79% lived in rural regions of Peru. The CVR revealed the ethno-cultural inequalities that existed in Peru. It was found that 75% of the victims of violence spoke Quechua or other native Peruvian languages. This is particularly telling when put in perspective with the fact that only 16% of the Peruvian population at the time spoke those languages.

The CVR also aimed to understand the responsibility of state entities in the violence during the armed conflict. The CVR asserted that the police initially lacked intelligence on the activities of the PCP-SL and the MRTA. As a result of the lack of intelligence, the police engaged in the practice of sending “inappropriate” officials to far away regions. As a result of this, there was increased violence in regions further away from the city.

The CVR also examined the excesses conducted by the military, and attributed the increased violence at the start of the conflict as a result of pressure from the civilian government to end the conflict quickly. While the final report of the CVR briefly condemnds the practices of sexual violence carried out by the military, there does not seem to be an overt focus on the gendered element of violence in the conflict. The final report suggested structural changes the national military, community reparations for infrastructure, and educational reform [ii].

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[i] Cueva, Eduardo Gonzalez. "The Contribution of the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission to Prosecutions." Truth Commissions and Courts: The Tension between Criminal Justice and the Search for Truth. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Sold and Distributed in North, Central and South America by Kluwer Academic, 2004. Print.

[ii] Paulson, Julia. “From Truth to Textbook: The Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Educational Resources, and the Challenges of Teaching about Recent Conflict.” In Reconstructing Memory: Education, Identity, and Conflict, University of Britsol Press, January 2017:294

Izquierda Unida (United Left, IU)
An alliance of left-leaning parties in Peru. “The IU served as a channel for political representation for social movements to be included on the national agenda”[i]. The alliance limited the advance of the Sendero Luminoso in some parts of the country.

The Legislature
The legislature was represented by a majority of the ruling party in each Presidential term. Despite that, the Parliament did not propose investigations into the violence in Ayacucho, Apurimac, and Huancavelica from 1980-1985.

Police
The police were found to be responsible for some of the violence in the internal armed conflict. At the same time, there were tensions between the police and the National Intelligence Service over investigative jurisdiction.

Campesinos/Ronderos - The sections of the peasantry who were initially allies of the Shining Path. Their subsequent alienation due to the PCP-SL’s violence created a presence in Peru which limited the growth of the Path in rural areas.

Communist Party of Peru - Shining Path (PCP-SL)
The PCP-SL led the revolution in 1980. Its ideology was widely spread and they had the support of the campesinos until they were alienated due to the violence they faced from the Shining Path and state forces.

Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA)
In 1984, “the MRTA initiated its own armed struggle against the State.” [ii]. The MRTA held ties with the PCP-SL and some other groups. It openly claimed responsibility for its actions, using uniforms and other identifiers to differentiate themselves from the civilian population.

Peruvian Armed Forces
The Peruvian Armed Forces were accused of human rights violations against Peruvians. It was advised that legislation be passed to limit the power of the armed forces in a state of emergency. “Recommendations for the development of a national security policy and establishment of civilian authority over military intelligence services were issued, as well as to determine respective jurisdictions between the Armed Forces and the Police”[iii].

National Intelligence Service (SIN)
The SIN, along with President Alberto Fujimori and his advisor Vladimiro Montesinos were “held criminally responsible for assassinations, forced disappearances, and massacres led by the Colina death squad”[iv].

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[i]Truth and Reconciliation Peru. “Final Report: Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación.” November, 2003. https://www.cverdad.org.pe/ingles/ifinal/conclusiones.php. Accessed November 2, 2020

[ii] Ibid.

[iii] Amnesty International. “Amnesty International Report 2004; Peru: The Truth and Reconciliation Commission – a first step towards a country without injustice.” August 2004. https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/412de7fb4.pdf. Accessed November 2, 2020.

[iv] Human Rights Watch "Q & A: Trial of Former President Alberto Fujimori of Peru." Human Rights Watch. 28 Oct. 2009. Web. 30 Nov. 2020. .

The United Nations
The United Nations Development Program signed an agreement with the Peruvian government for the TRC to receive funding. The agreement gave the UNDP authority over the allocation of funds, management, and auditing services.

Amnesty International
Amnesty International was actively involved in the foundation of the TRC in Peru. AI also urged the Japanese government to return Fujimori to Peru to pursue judicial proceedings regarding the widespread human rights abuses that were committed during his presidency[i].

Inter-American Court
The IAC’s 2006 ruling on the Cantuta case “urged the Peruvian state to continue pursuing legal and diplomatic measures to ensure Fujimori’s extradition[ii].

Human Rights Watch
Human Rights Watch played an important role before the findings of the Peruvian TRC were published. HRW criticized the offense of "advocating terrorism" for being so vague and broad as to permit the imprisonment of people for exercising free speech. In January 2003, the Constitutional Court declared several provisions of Peru's anti-terrorism laws to be unconstitutional, including this one.”[iii]

Japanese Government
After being forced from office, Former President Alberto Fujimori fled to Japan, upon which Peru requested his extradition. Since former President Alberto Fujimori was a Japanese citizen, “and because Japan refuses to extradite its citizens to other countries, Fujimori was not extradited from Japan.” [iv]

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[i]Amnesty International. “Amnesty International Report 2004; Peru: The Truth and Reconciliation Commission – a first step towards a country without injustice.” August 2004. https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/412de7fb4.pdf. Accessed November 2, 2020.

[ii] Burt, Jo-Marie. “Guilty as Charged: The Trial of Former Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori for Human Rights Violations”, International Journal of Transitional Justice, Volume 3, Issue 3, 1 November 2009, Pages 384–405, https://doi.org/10.1093/ijtj/ijp017

[iii] Human Rights Watch "Peru: Truth Commission Under Pressure." Human Rights Watch. 12 Aug. 2003. Web. 30 Nov. 2020.

[iv] BBC News "AMERICAS | Japan Refuses to Extradite Fujimori." BBC, 02 Mar. 2001. Web. 30 Nov. 2020.

Barrier 1: Complexity of Information Gathering

Information gathering is an essential part in facilitating an effective TRC process, and this effort was hindered at the start for Peru’s CVR. A number of complexities contributed to the lengthy and extensive information and data gathering process. First, a multitude of combatants, including the Shining Path, Tupac Amaru, Campesinos, government security forces, and other small factions created difficulties in coordination in the commission. The majority of human rights abuses occurred in the rural Andes mountains, often being difficult to access for researchers[i]. Further, the conflict occurred over a twenty-year period, meaning that some of the official records, especially in the rural areas, were outdated and inaccurate[ii].

Barrier 2: Unwillingness to Involve the Shining Path in Establishment of CVR

While not necessarily an inherent barrier to the government’s establishment of the CVR, a lack of political willingness to include the Shining Path group is a barrier to the peace process. Throughout the establishment of the CVR, legitimacy issues were raised. Some members of the Shining Path questioned the lack of their direct involvement with the commission, while many urban citizens felt the entire organization should be effectively recognized as terrorists[iii]. Whereas comparatively, many TRCs included representation from all belligerents, the CVR was met with legitimacy issues from the start due to its lack of inclusion.

Barrier 3: Inability to Initially Prosecute President Fujimori

Towards the end of the conflict, ex-President Alberto Fujimori fled Peru, seeking political asylum in Japan[iv]. Fujimori, who served from 1990 to 2000, was directly responsible for thousands of arbitrary political arrests, and in many cases, the executions of opposing groups[v]. However uncooperative, Fujimori would have served as a critical witness and perpetrator of these crimes. The inability for the commission to initially incarcerate and prosecute Fujimori hindered the CVR efforts, and served as a barrier to initial peace building.

Barrier 4: Uncooperative Members of the National Security Force

Throughout the Peruvian civil conflict, many members of the national military, the National Security Force, felt justified in their actions in stopping ‘terrorism. After the commission was initially announced, “a fear existed,” that cooperating would lead to prosecution or self-incrimination[vi]. While the military did create an internal branch as a dedicated liaise to the committee, immunity had to be given to soldiers in exchange for information and testimonies of military human rights crimes[vii]. Many members of the military outright refused to cooperate, hindering the collection of information used in the prosecutions of senior generals[viii].

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[i] Center for Justice Accountability. “Peru – CJA Litigation.” https://cja.org/where-we-work/peru/. Accessed November 2, 2020

[ii] Amnesty International. “Amnesty International Report 2004; Peru: The Truth and Reconciliation Commission – a first step towards a country without injustice.” August 2004. https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/412de7fb4.pdf. Accessed November 2, 2020.

[iii] Paulson, Julia. “From Truth to Textbook: The Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Educational Resources, and the Challenges of Teaching about Recent Conflict.” In Reconstructing Memory: Education, Identity, and Conflict, University of Britsol Press, January 2017: 294

[iv] Arce-Arce, Gerardo. “Armed Forces, Truth Commission and Transnational Justice in Peru.” International Journal on Human Rights, no. 13, December, 2010: 3

[v] Espinosa, Augustín, et al. “Between Remembering and Forgetting the Years of Political Violence: Psychosocial Impact of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Peru.” Political Psychology, vol. 38, no. 5, 2016: 849

[vi] Arce-Arce, Gerardo. “Armed Forces, Truth Commission and Transnational Justice in Peru.” 3.

[vii] Ibid. p. 4.

[viii] Ibid.

The CVR is seen internationally by many as a successfully run TRC, able to effectively collect decades worth of information, and provide objectively good recommendations for peace building within many facets of Peruvian society[i]. However, there is a significant distinction between success with the TRC itself, and the success of implementation and policy changes enacted by the government of Peru. While the state did attempt to implement some reconciliation recommendations, such as educational reform, and infrastructure construction in targeted communities, a lack of political will has hindered efforts at true peace building[ii]. This lack of will manifested in issues, including stalled prosecutions and low public support for the CVR in urban communities[iii]. The CVR in Peru demonstrates that despite how effective a TRC may be at both recognizing and recommending changes to systemic human rights abuses, they serve usefulness only in a unilateral effort with the state.

By the accounts of many international organizations and scholars, the commission achieved one of its primary goal in seeking truth[iv]. Researchers and other commission members uncovered thousands of human rights abuses stemming back to 1980. Among the various ‘truth-seeking’ processes included 17,000 testimonies from National Security Forces, the Shining Path, and civilian victims[v]. 27 public hearings were held in areas most affected by the conflict, and broadcasted over the radio, creating a ‘national witness testimony’[vi]. The final report contained the names of over 40 individuals recommended for prosecution, including ex-president Alberto Fujimori[vii]. The report also recommended changes to the structure of the state military, a national museum of memory, and acknowledged a gendered element of violence detailing the effects of sexual assault and rape on vulnerable communities[viii].

Initially, moderate efforts were made by the Peruvian government to facilitate parts of the Comprehensive Reparations Plan outlined by the CVR. Between 2006 and 2011, over 1600 communities across Peru received some form of compensation. These were most often in the form of infrastructure projects, safe water initiatives, and agriculture equipment. While extremely slow, individual reparation claims were starting to be addressed by state programs and courts[ix]. The Museum of Memory, in conjunction with a Memory Park were established, and indigenous children were offered grants for housing on request of the commission. In at least the first few years, “the general public…believed that the CVR had performed its task well”[x].

Despite some initial success, significant issues with the implementation of the CVR’s recommendations would become evident over the next few years. Public support for some TRC recommendations limiting the power of the state were, “highly controversial inside Peru,” and some felt that these recommendations were too forgiving to the Shining Path and Tupac Amaru[xi]. In 2006, the government of Peru significantly cut the budget to the Unique Victims Registry, responsible for delegating funds to victims[xii]. The government refused to include members of the Shining Path as eligible for such compensation, including some sympathizer villages[xiii]. Much of the promised community infrastructure was either nonexistent, or regularly scheduled maintenance, and so were unnoticed by many citizens in affected villages. In terms of prosecutions, three years after the CVR report, only three individuals had been formally charged, and there are “state perpetrators of human rights abuses have largely escaped punishment by the courts”[xiv]. This is can be attributed to a both a lack of cooperation in the military for these investigations, and lack of justice branch in Peru dedicated to human rights abuses[xv]. The significant backlog and lack of prosecutorial will means that many of these individuals may never be tried for their crimes. Numerous scandals, such as a 2008 oil corruption investigation leading to the resignation of the entire Peruvian cabinet, have generated political turmoil, sidelining other efforts at redress[xvi]. Educational reforms, intended to impartially teach children the consequences of conflict and human rights abuses, have been challenged by the government. For example, in 2005 the government attempted to remove sections of textbooks detailing crimes perpetrated by the military, with the minister of education noting, “we cannot openly present information against the state”[xvii]. This censorship creates serious precarity in the ability for peacebuilding in the future.

The lack of government implementation at the CVR’s recommended peacebuilding measures is no more evident than the current state of Peru. The government consistently clashes with indigenous groups continue today, many of which were the principal victims of human rights violations[xviii]. The Shining Path continues to operate in some areas of the country, and political fragmentation between pro/anti-government citizens is a significant issue[xix]. A 2004 Amnesty International Report highlighted a need for significant implementation of recommendations to build peace, stating “(Recommendations involve radical structural reform…and will therefore need a long term program of reforms”[xx]. Despite the success of the CVR’s efforts at recognizing truth and providing recommendations, the lack of will on behalf of the government demonstrates a failure in true peacebuilding potential.

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[i] Ríos, Jerónimo. “Narratives about Political Violence and Reconciliation in Peru.” Latin American Perspectives, vol. 46, no. 5, Sept. 2019: 45

[ii] Theidon, Kimberly. “Justice in Transition: The Micropolitics of Reconciliation in Postwar Peru.” Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 50, no. 3, 2006: 435

[iii] Sarmiento Barletti, Juan Pablo, and Lexy Seedhouse. “The Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Law of Prior Consultation: Obstacles and Opportunities for Democratization and Political Participation in Peru.” Latin American Perspectives, vol. 46, no. 5, Sept. 2019: 113

[iv] Amnesty International. “Amnesty International Report 2004; Peru: The Truth and Reconciliation Commission – a first step towards a country without injustice.” August 2004. https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/412de7fb4.pdf. Accessed November 2, 2020.

[v] Heilman, Jaymie. “Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Peru.” Latin American History. June 25, 2018.

[vi] Ibid.

[vii]Espinosa, Augustín, et al. “Between Remembering and Forgetting the Years of Political Violence: Psychosocial Impact of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Peru.” Political Psychology, vol. 38, no. 5, 2016: 850

[viii]Heilman, Jaymie. “Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Peru.” Latin American History. June 25, 2018.

[ix] Acevdeo, Juan Pablo Pérez-Léon. “Reparations and Prosecutions after Serious Human Rights Violations: Two Pending Issues in Peru’s Transitional Justice Agenda.” Oxford Transitional Justice Research: Past Debates, March, 2010.

[x] Amnesty International. “Amnesty International Report 2004; Peru: The Truth and Reconciliation Commission – a first step towards a country without injustice.” August 2004.

[xi] H Heilman, Jaymie. “Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Peru.” Latin American History. June 25, 2018.

[xii] Acevdeo, Juan Pablo Pérez-Léon. “Reparations and Prosecutions after Serious Human Rights Violations: Two Pending Issues in Peru’s Transitional Justice Agenda.” Oxford Transitional Justice Research: Past Debates

[xiii] Arce-Arce, Gerardo. “Armed Forces, Truth Commission and Transnational Justice in Peru.” International Journal on Human Rights, no. 13, December, 2010: 5

[xiv] Heilman, Jaymie. “Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Peru.” Latin American History. June 25, 2018.

[xv] Acevdeo, Juan Pablo Pérez-Léon. “Reparations and Prosecutions after Serious Human Rights Violations: Two Pending Issues in Peru’s Transitional Justice Agenda.” Oxford Transitional Justice Research: Past Debates

[xvi] BBC News. “Peru Profile – Timeline.” April 3, 2018. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-19928907. Accessed November 2, 2020.

[xvii] Paulson, Julia. “From Truth to Textbook: The Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Educational Resources, and the Challenges of Teaching about Recent Conflict.” In Reconstructing Memory: Education, Identity, and Conflict, University of Britsol Press, January 2017: 293

[xviii] Sarmiento Barletti, Juan Pablo, and Lexy Seedhouse. “The Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Law of Prior Consultation: Obstacles and Opportunities for Democratization and Political Participation in Peru.” 114.

[xix] BBC News. “Peru Profile – Timeline.” April 3, 2018. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-19928907. Accessed November 2, 2020.

[xx] Amnesty International. “Amnesty International Report 2004; Peru: The Truth and Reconciliation Commission – a first step towards a country without injustice.” August 2004.

Amnesty International. “Amnesty International Report 2004; Peru: The Truth and Reconciliation Commission – a first step towards a country without injustice.” August 2004. https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/412de7fb4.pdf. Accessed November 2, 2020.

Guillermopreito, Alma. “Letters from Peru- Down the Shining Path.” The New Yorker. February 1, 1993. https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/1993/02/08/down-the-shining-path

Human Rights Watch. “Human Rights Watch World Report 1993 – Peru.” January 1, 1993. https://www.refworld.org/docid/467fca672.html. Accessed November 2, 2020.

National Cable Satellite Corporation. “Fujimori Speech – Politics in Peru.” June 8, 1993. https://www.c-span.org/video/?42773-1/politics-peru. Accessed November 4, 2020

The Advocates for Human Rights. “Peru Photo Gallery – The Conflict in Peru.” 2002. https://www.theadvocatesforhumanrights.org/peru_photo_gallery. Accessed November 2, 2020.

The National Security Archive. “Defense Intelligence Agency, Cable: Commando Execution of Two MRTA Hostage Takers and ‘take no prisoner’ Order.” June 10, 1997. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB237/document1.pdf. Accessed November 2, 2020

The National Security Archive. “US Embassy Cable to Washington, Systematic Human Rights Violations Under Fujimori.” June 30, 1997. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB237/document4.pdf. Accessed November 2, 2020.

The 59th General Session of the United Nations. “President Alejandro Toledo Manrique Addressing Past Injustices.” September, 2004. https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/517/75/PDF/N0451775.pdf?OpenElement. Accessed November 2, 2020

The Inter-American Court of Human Rights. “Case of J. V. Peru.” November 27, 2013. https://www.corteidh.or.cr/corteidh/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_275_ing.pdf. Accessed November 4, 2020.

Truth and Reconciliation Peru. “Final Report: Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación.” November, 2003. https://www.cverdad.org.pe/ingles/ifinal/conclusiones.php. Accessed November 2, 2020

1. Arce-Arce, Gerardo. “Armed Forces, Truth Commission and Transnational Justice in Peru.” International Journal on Human Rights, no. 13, December, 2010, pp. 1-8.

Gerardo Arce-Arce is a researcher with a specialized knowledge of securitization and defense in Latin America. His article outlines the interactions between the Peruvian military and the CVR. He recognizes that the military initially played a significant role in cooperation with the commission, as a separate branch was enacted to communicate with requests for information/data. He also notes that many individuals, especially at the higher level of leadership, were unwilling to cooperate as it could affect the prosecution of their colleagues in the military. Arce-Arce comments on this important interaction, and how it shaped the commission both before, and after the final report was released by the CVR.

2. Amnesty International. “Amnesty International Report 2004; Peru: The Truth and Reconciliation Commission – a first step towards a country without injustice.” August 2004. https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/412de7fb4.pdf. Accessed November 2, 2020.

The Amnesty International 2004 report on Peru is significant as a primary document as it predicts issues with implementation of the CVRs recommendations. The document outlines the successes of the CVR in collecting data and publishing its findings, including significant strides in cumulating twenty years worth of human rights abuses into specific recommendations. Amnesty International also praises the effectiveness of the CVR in releasing and spreading this ‘truth/knowledge’. Importantly, this report states that there may be significant hindrances on long term peacebuilding as a result of an apparent lack of government will, and structural social issues. This prediction remains relatively accurate, as short term recommendations were partially met, but long term change has not occurred at a structural level yet.

3. Acevdeo, Juan Pablo Pérez-Léon. “Reparations and Prosecutions after Serious Human Rights Violations: Two Pending Issues in Peru’s Transitional Justice Agenda.” Oxford Transitional Justice Research: Past Debates, March, 2010

Juan Pablo Pérez-Léon is a professor in law, specializing in international criminal tribunals. Pérez-Léon discusses two issues that have hampered reparations and justice in post-conflict Peru. He argues that financial reparations in the form of infrastructure and individual payments have been stagnant due to a lack of political will. While some efforts have been made by the Peruvian government for symbolic reparations, they remain as marginally noticeable. Second, he notes that the Peruvian justice system has been unable to swiftly prosecute human rights abusers partially due to a lack of dedicated court system. Pérez-Léon’s work adds context into the lack of peacebuilding outcomes in Peru.

4. Burt, Jo-Marie. “Guilty as Charged: The Trial of Former Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori for Human Rights Violations”, International Journal of Transitional Justice, Volume 3, Issue 3, 1 November 2009, Pages 384–405, https://doi.org/10.1093/ijtj/ijp017

Jo-Marie Burt is a senior fellow at The Washington Office for Latin America (WOLA). She specializes in state violence, social movements, and transitional justice. Her recent work focuses on the ways in which postconflict societies address demands for justice and accountability. She directed Rights Peru, which was a collaborative research project on prosecutions in Peru. Burt provides a detailed analysis of the process of holding former-President Alberto Fujimori accountable for the human rights violations under his rule. Her work examines the global conditions that made Fujimori’s extradition possible, commenting on the process and outcomes of his trial.

5. Cueva, Eduardo Gonzalez. "The Contribution of the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission to Prosecutions." Truth Commissions and Courts: The Tension between Criminal Justice and the Search for Truth. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Sold and Distributed in North, Central and South America by Kluwer Academic, 2004. Print

Eduardo Gonzalez Cueva is an expert on transitional justice. He played an important role in the world campaign to establish the International Criminal Court and in the work of Peru’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Cueva’s work serves as an informative source when trying to understand the political context within which the TRC was established due to his position at the heart of the Commission’s establishment. The article establishes the general scope of the TRC’s mandate while examining the ways in which the cooperation between a TRC and judiciary bodies can be understood.

6. Heilman, Jaymie. “Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Peru.” Latin American History. June 25, 2018. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780199366439.013.495

Jaymie Patricia Heilman is an Associate Professor of History at the University of Alberta. A large portion of her research focuses on Latin America and indigenous political activism. Her interest in Peru emerged from her interest in Chinese history as she found a convergence of her interests in Peru’s Maoist Shining Path. Heilman discusses and critiques the work of the TRC in Peru through an intersectional lens. The article also provides an analysis of the impact of the TRC in Peru, providing a nuanced discussion on reparations and the controversial nature of the TRC. Her work aims at clarifying popular misconceptions that are generated by the media as she focuses on the marginalized individuals who exist at the lowest levels of the drug economy.

7. Paulson, Julia. “From Truth to Textbook: The Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Educational Resources, and the Challenges of Teaching about Recent Conflict.” In Reconstructing Memory: Education, Identity, and Conflict, University of Bristol Press, January 2017, pp. 291-311.

Dr. Julia Paulson is a professor in peace and conflict, including the production or research in conflict zones. Paulson’s article examines educational changes in the aftermath of the CVR’s recommendations, including mandated textbooks and curriculum. She notes that one of the challenges is holding the government accountable, as was evident by the numerous attempts to remove mention of government wrongdoing in teachings. This leaves open the potential for future censorship, where this conflict is not understood as a series of human rights abuses, but a simple civil conflict. Paulson’s work comments on the relationship in ‘memory production’ and peacebuilding methods.

8. Theidon, Kimberly. “Intimate Enemies: Violence and Reconciliation in Peru.” University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012. Project MUSE muse.jhu.edu/book/19465.

Kimberly Theidon is a medical anthropologist at Tufts University’s Fletcher School who focuses on Latin America. Her research focuses on political violence, transitional justice, post-conflict interventions and gender studies. Intimate Enemies is a multisite ethnography that incorporates local testimonies from individuals at the center of the violence in seven Andean communities in Peru. The book serves as an important source when studying the TRC in Peru as it provides non-institutional insight into the plight of Peruvians during the two decades of violence. The book is a good source as the author conducted interviews with the help of young local research assistants, therefore ensuring that information that can be lost in translation is minimized.

Acevdeo, Juan Pablo Pérez-Léon. “Reparations and Prosecutions after Serious Human Rights Violations: Two Pending Issues in Peru’s Transitional Justice Agenda.” Oxford Transitional Justice Research: Past Debates, March, 2010.

Amnesty International. “Amnesty International Report 2004; Peru: The Truth and Reconciliation Commission – a first step towards a country without injustice.” August 2004. https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/412de7fb4.pdf. Accessed November 2, 2020.

Arce-Arce, Gerardo. “Armed Forces, Truth Commission and Transnational Justice in Peru.” International Journal on Human Rights, no. 13, December, 2010, pp. 1-8.

BBC News. “Peru Profile – Timeline.” April 3, 2018. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-19928907. Accessed November 2, 2020.

BBC News. "AMERICAS | Japan Refuses to Extradite Fujimori." .BBC, 02 Mar. 2001. Web. 30 Nov. 2020

Burt, Jo-Marie. “Guilty as Charged: The Trial of Former Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori for Human Rights Violations”, International Journal of Transitional Justice, Volume 3, Issue 3, 1 November 2009, Pages 384–405, https://doi.org/10.1093/ijtj/ijp017

Center for Justice Accountability. “Peru – CJA Litigation.” https://cja.org/where-we-work/peru/. Accessed November 2, 2020

Cueva, Eduardo Gonzalez. "The Contribution of the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission to Prosecutions." Truth Commissions and Courts: The Tension between Criminal Justice and the Search for Truth. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Sold and Distributed in North, Central and South America by Kluwer Academic, 2004. Print.

Espinosa, Augustín, et al. “Between Remembering and Forgetting the Years of Political Violence: Psychosocial Impact of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Peru.” Political Psychology, vol. 38, no. 5, 2016, pp. 849-866

Heilman, Jaymie. “Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Peru.” Latin American History. June 25, 2018. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780199366439.013.495

Human Rights Watch "Peru: Truth Commission Under Pressure." Human Rights Watch. 12 Aug. 2003. Web. 30 Nov. 2020.

Human Rights Watch "Q & A: Trial of Former President Alberto Fujimori of Peru." Human Rights Watch. 28 Oct. 2009. Web. 30 Nov. 2020. .

Paulson, Julia. “From Truth to Textbook: The Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Educational Resources, and the Challenges of Teaching about Recent Conflict.” In Reconstructing Memory: Education, Identity, and Conflict, University of Britsol Press, January 2017, pp. 291-311.

Ríos, Jerónimo. “Narratives about Political Violence and Reconciliation in Peru.” Latin American Perspectives, vol. 46, no. 5, Sept. 2019, pp. 44–58, doi:10.1177/0094582X19856890.

Sarmiento Barletti, Juan Pablo, and Lexy Seedhouse. “The Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Law of Prior Consultation: Obstacles and Opportunities for Democratization and Political Participation in Peru.” Latin American Perspectives, vol. 46, no. 5, Sept. 2019, pp. 111–127, doi:10.1177/0094582X19857153.

Shadle, Matthew. “Theology and the Origins of Conflict: The Shining Path Insurgency in Peru, 1980-2000.” Political Theology, vol. 14, no. 3, Spring 2015, pp. 284-303

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