Key Issue	Outcome
Israel Security: Israel considers security to be a key issue as the country’s military is strong, however, Israel believes it is highly vulnerable due to geographical location. Another potential threat emerges from a future Palestinian state (such as an Islamist takeover)(4). As a result Israel may need to send troops into Palestinian territory when threats are emerging. Palestine argues for a full withdrawal of Israeli troops from the West Bank.	The issue did not get fully resolved during the Oslo Accords. However, Israeli troops were re-deployed from parts of the West Bank back to Israel.Palestinian police were deployed in those areas of the West Bank replacing the Israeli troops( mainly area A). There was a partial Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza strip. (4)
Border/ Palestinian Autonomy: In 1967 Israel captured the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem(1). Then drawing municipal boundaries that cut out some heavily palestinian populated areas. Palestine advocates for a separate state of Palestine in Gaza, Jerusalem and the West Bank. While Israel states its rights on the occupied lands. (5)	Palestinians who constitute the vast majority of the population in the occupied territories signed a deal with Israel giving them limited self-rule. This deal divided the West Bank into areas A, B and C. However, Israel did not accept Palestine as a separate state by the end of these negotiations. (5)
Water Access: In the 1967 war Israel gained exclusive control of the waters of the West Bank and the Sea of Galilee. The palestinian farmers would like access to the rivers which they argue is cut as a result of military power. The Israelis argue they do not use more water than before the occupation. (3)	The water issue was set aside to be dealt with in the "final status" Israel-Palestinian talks, which were never concluded. Hence the issue remains stagnant. (3)
Refugees: Since the creation of Israel and the occupation of the Gaza strip, there are thought to be millions of Palestinian refugees(2). Israel argues these refugees cannot return to what is now Israel and should instead be absorbed by Arab nations or the future state of Palestine.(2)	The Oslo agreement did not resolve the question of where the Palestinian refugees will be relocated to or if they may return to their original homes.(2)
Status of Jerusalem:  Both palestine and Israel claim Jerusalem as the capital of their state or future state and consider the city a holy and sacred location(1). Both Jews which comprise a large part of the Israeli population and Muslims which comprise a large portion of the Palestinian population regard the city as a key component in their respective religions (1)	The Oslo Accords did not find a solution to this problem. Both sides remain fixed in their position regarding the status of Jerusalem.(1)

sources :  

(1) Asser, Martin. “Obstacles to Arab-Israeli Peace: Jerusalem.” BBC News, BBC, 2 Sept. 2010,       www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-11096293. (1)

(2)Asser, Martin. “Obstacles to Arab-Israeli Peace: Palestinian Refugees.” BBC News, BBC, 2  Sept. 2010, www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-11104284.

(3)Asser, Martin. “Obstacles to Arab-Israeli Peace: Water.” BBC News, BBC, 2 Sept. 2010, www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-11101797.

(4)Herzog , Micheal. Cracking the Israeli-Palestinian Security Challenge Is Possible, But It Requires Thinking Outside the Box. 16 Sept. 2016, www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/cracking-the-israeli-palestinian-security-challenge-is-possible.

(5)“The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict:” The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Interactive Database, ecf.org.il/.

 

Palestine/PLO/Palestinian Authority

• On the issue of Palestinian refugees, the PLO and the Palestinian authority advocated for the right to return for Palestinian refugees and an end to Israeli settlements in the Gaza strip and Jericho area.
• They saw these areas as historically claimed by Palestine(1).
• Additionally, advocated for the withdrawal for Israeli forces in these same areas whilst a Palestinian security force be established to takeover security in these Palestinian territories.
• On the issue of water, Palestine believed that due to Israeli occupation and military power in West Bank and the Gaza strip in particular, Palestinian citizens have been subjected to limited water resources. Often being forced to buy water for inflated prices from their Israeli occupiers (2)

Israel

• On the issue of borders, the Israeli government led by Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, promoted territorial compromises with the Palestinians concerning West Bank and the Gaza strip, however continually objected to the withdrawal to the 1967 borders.
• Continually emphasised the importance of Jerusalem for the Israeli people and as Israel’s undivided capital (3)
• On the issue of Palestinian refugees, the Israeli government saw the return of refugees as an existential issue that threatens the existence of the only Jewish state.(4)
• The government justifies the issue by arguing that Israel is the only Jewish state in the world whilst there are 22 Arab countries that the refugees can take shelter in.(4)
• On the issue of water, Israel claims that the proportion of water that is available is fair for both Israeli citizens and Palestinian citizens.
• Advocated for a two-state agreement and for peaceful coexistence between Israel and Palestine in order to mobilize both international and internal support for the peace agreements

US and the Clinton Administration

• The role of the US in these negotiations was fairly impartial
• The Clinton administration did not push the two sides to address key contentious issues (5)
• Additionally, the administration was not granted full monitoring responsibilities during the Oslo Accords, so simply channelled its efforts in defusing the crisis and helping the Palestinian Authority to be established, helping with economic aid and security assistance.  (6)
• However, the administration emphasised and pushed for stable security measures as they believed it would advertently lead to a stable political environment.

United Nations

• The United Nations sees Israel’s forceful push of Palestinian refugees out of the state as refusing to follow Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and UN General Assembly Resolution 194. Which states that refugees have an unconditional right to return and live at peace in their old homes or to receive compensation for their losses.(4)

Norway

• https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/49432/16Jun_Arca%20Henon_Santiago.pdf?sequence=1
• Another third party mediator in the Oslo Accords
• Crucial in ensuring the secrecy of the talks and negotiations

Sources:

(1) Avraham Sela, “Difficult Dialogue: The Oslo Process in Israeli Perspective”, Transformations, 2009: 105-138

(2) Martin Asser, “Obstacles to Arab Israeli Peace: Water”, BBC News, 2010

(3)Nimrod Rosler, “Leadership and Peacemaking: Yitzakh Rabin and the Oslo Accords”, International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 2016: 55-67

(4)Martin Asser, “Obstacles to Arab Israeli Peace: Palestinian Refugees”, BBC News, 2010

(5)Yashar Taheri-Keramati, “Recipe for Failure: the Impotence of the Oslo Accords.”, Nebula, 2010: 77-87

(6) “The Oslo Accords and the Arab-Israeli Peace Process”, Office of the Historian, 2017

(7)Santiago Arca Henon, “Styles of International Mediation in Peace Processes between States and terrorist organizations”, Calhoun, 2016: 1-71

HAMAS

• Background: Founded in December 1987, Hamas is a Palestinian Islamist political organization, stemming from the Muslim Brotherhood Society (MB), an Egyptian Sunni Islamist movement (3). Hamas’ charter states that its ultimate goal was to apply the rule of Islam over the whole of Palestine and to replace the Israeli state with Palestine, notably through the principle of jihad (2). Following the emergence of the first Intifada, Hamas established itself as the political stem of the MB and an alternative to the PLO, joining the political-military struggle against Israel, engaging primarily in demonstrations and protest strikes, and other violent activities, such as suicide bombings and kidnappings (1). Apart from these actions, Hamas also offers a network of social services to Palestinians, alternative to the PLO and the Palestinian Authority (PA).
• Non-Attendance: Since its establishment, Hamas has constituted a serious threat to the peace process, viewing the Oslo Accords between Israel-PLO and its subsequent establishment of the PA as a threat to its authority, escalating it’s use of violence prior to the 1993 accords, and continuing past the 1995 reiteration of the accords. This use of violence and hardline policy against the recognition of Israel has notably separated them from peace processes such as Oslo. Additionally, its policy throughout the Oslo process followed ‘representation without participation’, actively not seeking to be involved in the peace process, significantly due to a rejection of Israeli legitimacy, and its tension with the PLO (1).

Sources:

(1)Avraham Sela, Non-State Peace Spoilers and the Middle East Peace Efforts (Israel: Jerusalem 2005) 1-78

(2)Muhammad Maqdsi, “The Charter of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) of Palestine,” Journal of Palestine Studies 1993: 122-134

(3)Zack Beauchamp, “Everything you need to know about Israel-Palestine” Vox 6 Dec. 2017: 1-21

HEZBOLLAH

• Background: Hezbollah was founded in 1982, and is a Shi’ite-Muslim organization, political party and militant group, based in Lebanon (1). In 1985, Hezbollah announced its official establishment, and published an ‘open letter’ which delineated the US and the Soviet Union as the key enemies of Islam, and denounced the state of Israel, calling for their ‘obliteration’ due to their occupation of Muslim lands, and further, to ‘adoption of the Islamic system’ based on the choice of the people (2). Hezbollah also lacks formal organization, with various subgroups maintaining a divided existence, depending on charismatic leaders and their religious authority, and roots of family and clan relationships (1). Similar to Hamas, it offers community and social services, and further, it operates predominantly along its own interests as a Lebanese political party (2).
• Non-Attendance: They’ve been noted to have used violence, such as bombings, against Jewish and Israeli targets, and has been noted as a terrorist organization, from Western states and the Arab league, among others (2). Despite acting as a political organization, Hezbollah was not involved in the Oslo process. Based in Lebanon, they are further removed from the direct Israel-Palestine conflict, and thus unlikely to be considered for involvement in the process. Furthermore, their hardline, anti-Israel ideology, and notably violent past against Israel denotes their capability to interrupt the diplomatic process, thus leading them to be evicted from the peace process (1).

Sources:

(1)Avraham Sela, Non-State Peace Spoilers and the Middle East Peace Efforts (Israel: Jerusalem 2005) 1-78

(2)“Profile: Lebanon’s Hezbollah Movement” BBC News 15 Mar. 2016

PALESTINIAN ISLAMIC JIHAD

• Background: A smaller organization than Hamas, The Islamic Jihad in Palestine (PJ) was founded in October 1987 at the initiation of the first Intifada. PJ is predominantly a nationalist organization who adhere to the principle of jihad to violently contest the existence of the Israeli authority. They aim for the complete destruction of the Israeli state and for the creation of a ‘historic Palestine’ in accordance with Islamic law. To achieve these goals, they notably engage in violent attacks on civilian and military personnel, leading to them being labelled a terrorist organization by many state authorities, such as the U.S. State Department.
• Non-Attendance:  A key reason why PJ was not involved in Oslo or other peace processes was due to the fact that, unlike Hamas, they do not participate in the political process or any form of political dialogue, and thus have no intention to be represented in the Palestinian Authority.Their view is that violence is the only way to combat and remove Israel completely, and thus deny any agreement that would allow the coexistence of both Israel and Palestine, thus removing them from any potential peace talks.

Sources:

(1) Avraham Sela, Non-State Peace Spoilers and the Middle East Peace Efforts (Israel: Jerusalem 2005) 1-78

The Oslo Accords between Israel and Palestine was intended to generate peace between both constituent, through negotiating prevalent issues which have incited and prolonged conflict between each state. However, the Accords ultimately cannot be labeled as successful - issues which occurred during, and following the process have hindered its success to this state, placing the Accords in a seemingly permanent stalemate. During the negotiation process, issues such as the inability to reach successful agreements on key issues, and the lack of public support acted as obstacles to creating a stable agreement. Furthermore, the inability to implement their stated goals following the conclusion of the Accords, due to an excessively utopian outlook which drew the attention away from root issues ultimately obstructed the prospective success of the negotiations. Thus, we argue that the Oslo Accords was ultimately unsuccessful due its deficiencies during both the process and implementation of their agreements.

Various obstacles during the process of the Oslo Accords itself introduced problems to the resolution of the conflict between Israel and Palestine. The negotiations themselves failed to reach adequate agreements regarding important topics for each side - for the Palestinians, this included issues such as Jerusalem, Palestinian refugees, and the Palestinian state and its borders; and for the Israeli’s, the unwillingness or inability of the Palestinian side to end terrorism (1). This effectively hindered the process of reconciling issues vital to building mutual trust between each state. Other concerns regarding the content of the Oslo process were its terms - for example, the Accords arguably failed to detail what the Palestinian’s would gain from implementing their own promises, consequently damaging their incentive to comply in the primary stages of the negotiation process (2). Moving away from the internal complexities of the process also reveals impediments to the negotiations - most notably, the lack of public support (2). Although political leaders are the dominant actors in negotiations, public support is crucial for the implementation and sustainability of any agreement. During the process of the Oslo Accords, the public of each party could not see any significant, immediate benefits to going through with the agreements, and was thus unwilling to legitimize it (2). This absence of widespread support triggered internal conflict and diminishing popular support for the peace process, influence its later collapse and inability to implement state goals.

Sources:

(1)Oren Barak, “The Failure of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process,” Journal of Peace Research Nov. 2005: 719-736

(2)Robert L. Rothstein, How to Not Make Peace: “Conflict Syndrome and the Demise of the Oslo Accords (Washington, D.C 2006) 1-49

(3)Jodi Rudoren, “What the Oslo Accords Accomplished,” The New York Times 30 Sept. 2015

The Oslo Accords and the conclusions reached by both sides ultimately failed as Israel and Palestine were both unable to follow through with the implementation of the various issues addressed. Both sides adopted a very utopian and naive outlook on the peace processes during and therefore neglected the practicality of peace building negotiations. This was a crucial contributing factor to the inability to implement the promises and conclusions reached in the agreements. For example, one prolific moment during the negotiations was when both sides mutually recognized each other’s right to existence. Whilst this was a breakthrough in the relations of these two countries it was insufficient to actually implement practical conflict resolution because it was insubstantial and a whimsical process(1). Another example is the failure of the Palestinian Authority and the Israeli government to push for the programs and incentives they created for greater integration and trust between the Palestinian people and the Israeli people. These annexes that dealt with civilian cooperation were not implemented and therefore created another failed outcome of the Accords (1).

1. Jonathan Rynhold, “The Failure of the Oslo Process: Inherently Flawed or Flawed Implementation?”, Mideast Security and Policy Studies, 2008: 1-26.

In conclusion, the Oslo Accords cannot be labeled as a success because of failure from both the Palestinian side and the Israeli side during and after the peace negotiations. Both sides’ inability to cooperate with each other on key issues, the lack of public support for the negotiations and the failure to implement their stated goals all contributed to the failure of the Oslo Accords.

 

 

ISRAEL DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE

May 14, 1948

https://israelipalestinian.procon.org/view.background-resource.php?resourceID=000908

PALESTINIAN LIBERATION ORGANIZATION CHARTER

July 17, 1968

https://israelipalestinian.procon.org/view.background-resource.php?resourceID=000902

YASSER ARAFAT’S SPEECH BEFORE THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY

November 13, 1974

https://israelipalestinian.procon.org/sourcefiles/ispaldoc1974.pdf

HAMAS CHARTER

August 18, 1988

http://www.palestine-studies.org/sites/default/files/jps-articles/2538093.pdf

HEZBOLLAH OPEN LETTER

February 16, 1985

https://www-degruyter-com.ezproxy.library.uq.edu.au/downloadpdf/books/harvard.9780674067523/harvard.9780674067523.c8/harvard.9780674067523.c8.pdf

EXCHANGE OF LETTERS BETWEEN YASSER ARAFAT AND YITZHAK RABIN BEFORE THE SIGNING OF THE OSLO DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES

September 9, 1993

https://israelipalestinian.procon.org/sourcefiles/ispaldoc1993.pdf

DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES ON INTERIM SELF-GOVERNMENT ARRANGEMENTS (THE OSLO ACCORD)

September 13, 1993

https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/resources/collections/peace_agreements/interim_agreement_09282005.pdf

ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN INTERIM AGREEMENT ON THE WEST BANK AND THE GAZA STRIP (OSLO II)

September 28, 1995

https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/resources/collections/peace_agreements/interim_agreement_09282005.pdf

Eve Spangler, Understanding Israel/Palestine (Netherlands: Rotterdam 2015) 1-246

This source provides a concise, thorough entry point to understanding the complexities of the Israel/Palestine conflict, offering both a historical and analytical framework to exploring the chronology of events and the intrinsic concepts and ideas present in the conflict. It pays special attention to the historical background of the conflict and the root causes of the hostility between Israel and Palestine, delving into the motivations of both sides in pursuing the persistent rivalry between both actors. It further analyses the different frameworks that have been used to analyse and interpret the conflict and arguments presented by both sides. It concludes by providing suggestions of different possible ways to respond and address the current situation, giving examples of measures that have already been taken. Throughout the text, Spangler argues towards the conclusion that human rights provide the foundation for a just, fair resolution. The strengths of this text lie in its comprehensive, unbiased analysis of the conflict’s history and processes to date, providing a detailed, yet concise entry point into understanding the conflict. A fault of the text, however, is that despite offering well-explored suggestions for dealing with the conflict, these suggestions are only applicable from and American standpoint, narrowing the scope of possibility.

Avraham Sela, Non-State Peace Spoilers and the Middle East Peace Efforts (Israel: Jerusalem 2005) 1-78

This source explores the role of local and regional Islamic actors in peace processes within the Israel-Palestine conflict, and whether or not their methods have had any significant impact on preventing or spoiling settlements between Israel and the PLO. It delves into the background, motives and actions of significant Palestinian non-state actors, and the position that they’ve had throughout the conflict, assessing how they’ve responded to peace processes in the past (particularly the Oslo Accords). The exploration concludes by providing various possible reasons, given their deconstruction of the Palestinian groups involved in the conflict, that the war has persisted, as well as suggesting possible pathways to creating more productive negotiations between Israel and Palestine, given the presence of these potential spoilers. Although the absence of any potential Israel-allied actors creates a one-sided text, Sela’s thorough analysis into the non-state, Islamic groups who oppose Israel’s authority provides vital background into the deconstruction of various peace processes and their aftermath, and who influenced the succeeding events. Despite the fact that it’s focus is not on the Oslo accords, Sela’s text does contribute sufficient information into the peace process and the involvement of Palestinian non-state actors, before, during and after the accords.

Hallward, Maia. "Pursuing "Peace" in Israel/Palestine." Journal of Third World Studies, vol. 28, no. 1, 2011, pp. 185.

This source outlines the failures of previous peace talks that have taken place between Israel and Palestine. It takes a constructive look at other “mainstream scholarly and media coverage.” The lack of the understanding of peace in Israeli and Palestinian terms is highlighted. Peace for the Israeli people means something different than what the Palestinian people consider peace to be. This particular source argues that the word peace is now regarded negatively by the Palestinian and Israeli people, this is because of the failed peace processes such as the Oslo Accord. The existence of peace making efforts by civil society is emphasized even when there is no “official peace efforts.” This is a valid source as it allows for a look at the conflict from a different lens, the views and efforts of the people are highlighted and this allows for an understanding of the conflict at a deeper level. Instead of only looking at official peacemaking efforts one is able to see how the average citizen contributes to the peace efforts.

Roy, Sara. "Re-conceptualizing the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Key Paradigm Shifts." Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. 41, no. 3, 2012, pp. 71-91

This source argues that the Oslo peace processes have caused severe losses to the Palestinian people. Roy argues that the Palestinian people have suffered economically, socially and politically since the occupation of the Gaza strip and the West Bank. This source vigorously argues for the Palestinian state. The question of refugees, the Arab minority in Israel and the Palestinian territories are discussed at length. Finally the changing view of Palestine in the international sphere is highlighted along with the key issues discussed before. For example the campaign around the refugees right of return is argued and is backed by other scholars and media outlets.This source is helpful in identifying key issues that the Palestinian people advocate for. However, some of the issues are argued in a narrow one view way, the Israeli side is seldom acknowledged.    

Mellisa Boyle Mahle, “A Political-Security Analysis of the Failed Oslo Process”, Middle East Policy, 2005: 79-96.

This source analyzes the failed venture of the Oslo Accords and the effect that US influence had on the negotiation’s failure. It outlines the assumption that the US government made before and after the Oslo Accords, that an emphasis and focus on a stable security situation will therefore produce a successful political environment. Mahle argues that these negotiations did not start to fail at the start of the September 28, 2000 Intifada, but rather started to fail during the negotiations, through broken political agreements, missed deadlines and the continuous breakdown of trust and good faith between the Israeli and Palestinian leaders. The author includes multiple examples and pieces of evidence that point towards the failure of the negotiations. This includes the election of Benjamin Netanyahu and the way his administration completely spoiled the future of the peace processes, the violence that occurred in occupied territories, the differing views and definitions of security by both the Israeli and Palestinian government and US influence on both governments post-Oslo Accords.

Landon E. Hancock and Joshua N. Weiss, “Prospect Theory and the Failure to Sell the Oslo Accords”, Peace and Change, 2011: 427-452.

This source examines the way in which both the Israeli and the Palestinian sides mobilized rhetoric to garner support or opposition during the peace processes. The source expands on this argument by adopting the prospect theory, which frames the preferred choice or outcome as far more appealing and less risky than the alternative. The article also argues that because the actors in the peace process framed the negotiations and agreements largely on aspirational and utopian terms, it failed to practically frame the negotiations as a far better alternative to continued conflict. This article compares this act of framing in the Oslo Accords to the act of framing the peace processes to garner support during the Good Friday Agreements in the Northern Ireland conflict. Hancock and Weiss argue that the aspirational rhetoric that both sides used during the peace processes created more harm than good in the long run as it set both the PLO and the Israeli government for failure. Arafat promised that the Palestinians would have an established state and that suffering would end for the people, whilst Rabin emphasized the end of terror and violence in the conflict.

Works Cited

Asser, Martin. “Obstacles to Arab-Israeli Peace: Jerusalem.” BBC News, BBC, 2 Sept. 2010,       www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-11096293.

Asser, Martin. “Obstacles to Arab-Israeli Peace: Palestinian Refugees.” BBC News, BBC, 2 Sept. 2010, www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-11104284.

Asser, Martin. “Obstacles to Arab-Israeli Peace: Water.” BBC News, BBC, 2 Sept. 2010, www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-11101797.

Herzog , Micheal. Cracking the Israeli-Palestinian Security Challenge Is Possible, But It Requires Thinking Outside the Box. 16 Sept. 2016, www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/cracking-the-israeli-palestinian-security-challenge-is-possible.

“The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict:” The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Interactive Database, ecf.org.il/.

Avraham Sela, “Difficult Dialogue: The Oslo Process in Israeli Perspective”, Transformations, 2009: 105-138

Nimrod Rosler, “Leadership and Peacemaking: Yitzakh Rabin and the Oslo Accords”, International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 2016: 55-67

Yashar Taheri-Keramati, “Recipe for Failure: the Impotence of the Oslo Accords.”, Nebula, 2010: 77-87

“The Oslo Accords and the Arab-Israeli Peace Process”, Office of the Historian, 2017

Santiago Arca Henon, “Styles of International Mediation in Peace Processes between States and terrorist organizations”, Calhoun, 2016: 1-71

 Avraham Sela, Non-State Peace Spoilers and the Middle East Peace Efforts (Israel: Jerusalem 2005) 1-78

Muhammad Maqdsi, “The Charter of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) of Palestine,” Journal of Palestine Studies 1993: 122-134

Zack Beauchamp, “Everything you need to know about Israel-Palestine” Vox 6 Dec. 2017: 1-21

“Profile: Lebanon’s Hezbollah Movement” BBC News 15 Mar. 2016

Oren Barak, “The Failure of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process,” Journal of Peace Research Nov. 2005: 719-736

Robert L. Rothstein, How to Not Make Peace: “Conflict Syndrome and the Demise of the Oslo Accords (Washington, D.C 2006) 1-49