Uranium Enrichment & Stockpile

In order for uranium to be considered weapons grade, and thereby used for nuclear weapons, it needs to be enriched to 90%. Under the JCPOA, Iran has agreed to reduce the number of centrifuges required to enrich uranium, as well as to reduce its uranium stockpile to under 300kg. However, Iran will still have enrichment capabilities, but enrichment will be limited to 3.67%. The Natanz nuclear facility will limit its centrifuges to 5060, reducing the capacity for enrichment. The facility in Fordow will, after the implementation of the agreement, not have any enrichment capabilities, but rather will be converted into a research facility (JCPOA 2015, 6-8).

Arak Heavy Water Plant/Plutonium

Under the agreement, Iran has agreed to redesign and rebuild the Arak heavy water research reactor, which will be used to conduct peaceful research. Similar to the facility at Natanz, plutonium at Arak will not be enriched past 3.67%, and any spent fuel and excess heavy water will be shipped out of Iran, with heavy water being made available to the international market. However, Iran will still be allowed to conduct medical and industrial research- and development activities (JCPOA 2015, 8-9).

Sanctions

With the successful and IAEA-verified implementation of the measures set out in JCPOA, the UN, US, and EU agree to relieve nuclear-related sanctions that have been imposed on Iran. Economic and financial sanctions will be lifted concurrently with the implementation of the agreement (JCPOA 2015, 11-17). However, sanctions targeting human rights abuses and terrorism, among others, will not be lifted (EEAS 2017).

Transparency and Confidence Building Measures

In order to ensure transparency, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will monitor the implementation of the nuclear-related measures set out in the agreement, and report back to the UN Security Council. Furthermore, Iran agrees to not “engage in activities...that could contribute to the development of a nuclear explosive device” (JCPOA 2015, 10).

Implementation Plan

The negotiations for the JCPOA were concluded on July 14, 2015, also known as Finalisation Day. The third stage of the agreement is Implementation Day, which, as laid out in the agreement, shall be the date the IAEA verify Iran’s implementation of nuclear-related measures, and the US, UN, and EU thereby begin lifting economic and financial sanctions. Termination Day, the fifth and final stage of the agreement, will be 10 years after Adoption Day, when the UN Security Council resolution endorsing the agreement will terminate according to its terms (JCPOA 2015, 18-19).

Iran

The main motivation for entering negotiations and ultimately signing the agreement was nuclear-related sanctions relief.
Sanctions imposed on Iran — notably by the US, EU, and UN — have crippled its economy, and it stands to gain much from the agreement.
The agreement will likely also help reduce tensions between Iran and the EU, US, and Gulf States, who have feared Iranian nuclear proliferation and destabilization of the region (Gibson 2014).
China

Doesn’t support sanctions levelled against Iran and thus explored constructive way of wanting Iran to sign the nuclear deal and be relieved of sanctions.
Want more trade with Iran in arms and oil.
Russia

Russia has had long-standing good relations with Iran, however, much like the other signatories to the agreement, it wishes to limit Iran’s nuclear capabilities, as well as nuclear proliferation in the region, in general.
The deal would likely also mean more trade between Russia and Iran, as well as a diplomatic boost for Russia.
Shortly after the agreement came into effect, Iran began exporting excess uranium to Russia; Russia will also “help [modify]” the facilities at Arak and Fordow (BBC 2015; Paulraj 2016).
United States

Prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapon.
Reduce Iran’s uranium enrichment by two-thirds.
Stop spread of nuclear program among regional actors led by Iran.
Germany

Germany has long enjoyed good relations with Iran, both economic and political. However, these relations became weakened and tense during the nuclear crisis in the 2000s.
German involvement in the agreement would likely help foster good relations between the two states.
Furthemore, Germany, like the rest of the EU3, also wishes to avoid nuclear proliferation and destabilization in the region.
France

Avoid further escalation toward war over Iran nuclear program.
Encourage more sanctions on Iran in an attempted to stop Iran’s ambition to make nuclear weapon.
French want to ensure the achievement of robust deal with Iran, a position that created tension between French and American officials.
United Kingdom

Share the same say with U.S. on Iran in an aim to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Make sure nuclear weapon is beyond Iran’s reach.

Israel

Israel has been a major geopolitical in the Middle East since 1948 often clashing with neighboring countries of religious and geographical differences
During the peace talks, the Israeli government’s official position was one of skepticism, and concern that Western governments even entertained the thought of negotiating with the Iranian government, view them a inherently unwilling to honor any agreement (Kaye 2016, RAND).
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was a prominent opponent to the deal, giving speeches against the peace talks in front of both the United Nations General Assembly.
This behaviour from a US ally, and major geopolitical actor can be seen as a potential spoiler that could have derailed the peace talks.
When the deal went into effect, the Israeli government softened its stance to the JCPOA, and quietly focused its rhetoric against Iran’s proxy wars in Syria and Iraq, and on its state sponsorship of terrorist groups, such as Hezbollah (Kaye 2016, RAND).
Hezbollah

Hezbollah is a major political actor based in Lebanon with a militant wing perceived by most as a terrorist group.
Hezbollah is a major benefactor of Iranian aid, and acts as their proxy in an unofficial manner.
Hezbollah has never taken an official position on the JCPOA. However, senior Hezbollah officials have made claims that the fact international nuclear powers have engaged in negotiations with Iran is a “recognition of their stature and role in the region” (Badran 2015, Weekly Standard).
Israel and Hezbollah have also engaged in conflict during the 2006 Lebanon War, which further complicates the geopolitical considerations of the region.
Jordan

Jordan was a previous adversary to Israel in the Six Day War, until they both signed a bilateral peace agreement in 1994.
Jordan joins the chorus of countries and actors who support the peace building efforts of the JCPOA and advocated for its eventual success.

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was agreed upon on July 14, 2015, officially known as Finalisation Day. The actors formally participating in the agreement are Iran, the European Union (EU), the United States (US), China, Russia, the United Kingdom (UK), France, and Germany. The JCPOA has vastly mitigated the likelihood of nuclear warfare. It is the conclusion of this team that the Iran nuclear talks and the agreement have thus far been successful.

The purpose of the JCPOA is to limit Iran’s nuclear capabilities and to ensure that any nuclear activities remain peaceful, in exchange for sanctions relief. This has been achieved through concrete measures as laid out in the agreement, which Iran has complied with and that have been verified, and are continuously surveilled, by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Iran has complied with the agreement by reducing its number of centrifuges and uranium stockpile, as well as committing to keeping enrichment levels at a maximum of 3.67%. These measures have significantly reduced Iran’s breakout time — the time it would take to produce enough weapons-grade uranium to obtain a nuclear warhead. Furthermore, in line with the spirit of the agreement, Iran agreed to convert the nuclear facility at Fordow to be used for peaceful research purposes only. The measures outlined are continuously monitored by the IAEA, which produces regular reports of its findings. The most recent report, published February 22, 2018, reports no violations, implying Iran’s continuing compliance (IAEA 2018).

The diplomatic process also seems to have been steady and without notable upsets. Overall, much like the implementation and adherence phase, the process seems to have been peaceful and cooperative, with all parties having strong incentives to reach a successful agreement. Furthermore, the formal actors involved in the talks have all consistently expressed their unwavering commitment to the agreement and its continued success — the only notable exception is the US. In fact, even Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, a potential spoiler, has expressed a positive outlook on the agreement, opposite to a previously sceptical, hard stance.

The JCPOA came to fruition in 2015 under the Obama Administration. However, President Trump, elected in 2016, has shifted multiple times in his stance on the agreement — from agreeing with international counterparts on its validity, to openly questioning Iran’s compliance. From a diplomatic standpoint, this could derail the peace building process and be a potential spoiler. Iranian President Hassan Rouhani has voiced his commitment to the agreement, saying that Iran “will continue to stick to the deal and to cooperate with the [IAEA],” but that “Iran will not hesitate” to scuttle the agreement, if others do so first (Cunningham 2017, WaPo).

Despite the seeming success of the JCPOA, it is not without its critics. Some have expressed concerns regarding the supposed possibility of instantaneously ‘slapping back’ sanctions, should Iran violate the agreement. There is uncertainty to the degree this is possible or legal under the agreement (Bridgeman 2017, FP). In addition, some actors question Iran’s trustworthiness in upholding its part; thus far, these fears have not been realized. Another major concern relates to the longevity of the deal. The agreement is set to expire 10 years after Adoption Day, in 2025, but what assurances will the international community have that Iran will not resume its pursuit for nuclear weapons? Some critics have argued that this dilemma is precisely why the JCPOA is a bad deal. On the other hand, one could argue that strengthening of Iran’s economy because of sanctions relief, in addition to improved diplomatic ties with other signatories, might negate Iran’s desire for nuclear weapons.

In conclusion, it is our opinion that the JCPOA has been successful, showing how Track 1 diplomacy can be a sufficient alternative to military confrontation. All major actors involved have praised the peace building measures this agreement has put forth, and how Iran has been complying with the measures set out in the framework agreement. In addition, major geopolitical actors not involved in the agreement, like Israel, have shifted their hard stances against the agreement, conceding its effectiveness in reducing the risks of nuclear warfare. Still, come Termination Day 2025, there is uncertainty as to how the US and Iran will proceed in their bilateral relationship.

Downloadable PDF-Version of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)

https://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/documents/world/full-text-of-the-iran-nuclear-deal/1651/
Comprehensive Timeline of Nuclear Diplomacy with Iran

https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheet/Timeline-of-Nuclear-Diplomacy-With-Iran
IAEA & Iran: Chronology of Key Events

https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/iran/chronology-of-key-events
Joint Statement by EU High Representative Federica Mogherini and Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif, July 14, 2015

http://collections.internetmemory.org/haeu/content/20160313172652/http://eeas.europa.eu/statements-eeas/2015/150714_01_en.htm
Statement by US President Barack Obama on Iran, July 14, 2015

https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/07/14/statement-president-iran
Statement by President of Russia Vladimir Putin following completion of negotiations on Iran’s nuclear programme, July 14, 2015

http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/49957
UK Prime Minister David Cameron’s Statement on Iran’s Nuclear Programme, July 14, 2015

https://www.gov.uk/government/news/prime-ministers-statement-on-irans-nuclear-programme
EU statement on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, October 16, 2017

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/10/16/iran-nuclear-deal-eu-jcpoa/
IAEA Director General’s Speech on Iran, the JCPOA and the IAEA, November 14, 2017

https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/director-generals-speech-on-iran-the-jcpoa-and-the-iaea
Statement by US President Donald Trump on the Iran Nuclear Deal, January 12, 2018

https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-iran-nuclear-deal/
NY Times' Collection of International Reactions to the Iran Nuclear Deal

https://www.nytimes.com/live/iran-nuclear-deal-live-updates/

Badran, Tony. “How Hezbollah Sees the Iran Nuclear Deal: We Win, You Lose.” The Weekly Standard , The Weekly Standard , 6 May 2015, www.weeklystandard.com/how-hezbollah-sees-the-iran-nuclear-deal-we-win-you-lose/article/940154.

Hezbollah is both considered a political actor, but by some, also a terrorist group, hence their exclusion to the talks. As a proxy and recipient of Iranian aid, they to seem interested in the success of the talks, reasoning that Western countries willing to negotiate with Iran show’s its geopolitical power and authenticity.
Davenport, Kelsey. “Timeline of Nuclear Diplomacy with Iran .” Arms Control Association , Arms Control Association , March 2018, www.armscontrol.org/factsheet/Timeline-of-Nuclear-Diplomacy-With-Iran

The Arms Control Association constructed a holistic timeline that detailed all the political, economic, and diplomatic interactions that the major actors of the United States, Iran, and others had from the 1950’s, to the lead-up of the JCPOA being signed. Key issues such as the Iranian Revolution and Stuxnet were discussed.
“European Union .” European Union , 18 September 2017. https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/iran/32286/nuclear-agreement_en
The EU collated specifics of sanctions into this database. This enabled easy access and understanding the various safeguards negotiators built into the JCPOA, if any violations are found. This helps further the notion of carrots, but readily available “sticks’ if worst comes to fruition.
Fathollah-Nejad, Ali. “German-Iranian Relations after the Nuclear Deal: Geopolitical and Economic Dimensions.” Insight Turkey, vol. 18, no.1, 2016, pp. 59-75.

The author argues that Iran and Germany have traditionally had good diplomatic ties that were strengthened after the deal, especially after a period of tension during the so-called Iranian nuclear crisis. The article provides an overview of German-Iranian relations, which gives insight to Germany’s interests in the agreement.
Gibson, Bryan R., “Implications of an Iran Nuclear Deal.” Middle East Eye. 22 November 2014. www.middleeasteye.net/columns/implications-iran-nuclear-deal-1541754

This article provides an overview of what some of the possible implications of the deal might be, as well as shedding light on some of the actors’ motivations and interests for the agreement. It places special emphasis on the strategic geopolitical implications of the deal and the US’ and Iran’s interests, as well as the Israeli perspective on the then-prospective agreement.
Gordon, Michael R. “US Lays out Limits It Seeks in Iran Nuclear Talks”. New York Times. 20 Nov 2014. www.nytimes.com/2014/11/21/world/middleeast/us-lays-out-limits-it-seeks-in-iran-nuclear-talks.html

Given the Track 1 diplomacy, all actors in the P5+1 and Iran had their own agendas and goals before entering negotiations. This article specifies the US one. Specifically, the lessen the number of centrifuges, as to shorten the possible breakout time towards an Iranian nuclear weapon. From a diplomatic standpoint, this could be considered a necessary demand that the US requires to be inserted into the final agreement.
Gov.UK. “Declaration by the Heads of State and Government of France, Germany and the United Kingdom”. Prime Ministers Office . 13 Oct 2017.www.gov.uk/government/news/declaration-by-the-heads-of-state-and-government-of-france-germany-and-the-united-kingdom

This Joint Statement details how major nuclear powers of France, Germany, and the UK released a joint statement. This shows how high level Track 1 diplomacy between actors eventually led to established alliances working together to reach peace.
IAEA, Director General. “Director General's Speech on Iran, the JCPOA and the IAEA”, Office of the Director General. 14 Nov 2017. www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/director-generals-speech-on-iran-the-jcpoa-and-the-iaea

Given 2 years after the passing of the framework agreement, the IAEA Director General offers remarks, reporting that Iran is fully complying within the framework of the JCPOA. This helped show the conclusion that the peace talks and resultant agreement are an overall success to de escalating, and preventing conflict in the Middle East.
JCPOA . “Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action .” Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action , 2015.https://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/documents/world/full-text-of-the-iran-nuclear-deal/1651/

The Washington Post published the official text of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, allowing our team to better understand and highlight the intricacies and policy details of the framework agreement.
Kaye, Dalia Dassa. “Israel's Iran Policies After the Nuclear Deal.” Israel's Iran Policies After the Nuclear Deal, 2016. RAND Corporation , doi: 10.7249/PE207.

As a major non actor in the Middle East, Israel has a vested interest in the JCPOA. Their official position was against it , but this article shows how the Israeli government has taken these peace talks as an opportunity to shift the national focus on other Iranian activity.
Paulraj, Nansi. “The JCPOA and Changing Dimensions of the Russia–Iran Relations.” Contemporary Review of the Middle East, vol. 3, no. 1, 2016, pp. 95-110., doi:10.1177/2347798916633294.

This article provides some insight into Russian-Iranian relations, before and after the JCPOA. It highlights the two states’ diplomatic relations and mutual interests, as well as the strategic geopolitical importance of Iran for Russia, especially in terms of the the potential threat the US could pose, as well as for the stability of the region.
Tiezzi, Shannon. “What Did China Bring to the Iran Talks”. The Diplomat. 23 July 2015. https://thediplomat.com/2015/07/what-did-china-bring-to-the-iran-talks/

Though not a geopolitical actor, China as a nuclear power and signatory of the NPT expressed support for the negotiations, and hoped for its continued success. What China brought to the peace talks was influence as a global superpower. Still, China has had previous arms exports with Iran and privately favored sanctions relief to continue this.
The White House . “Statement by the President on the Iran Nuclear Deal.” Statement by the President on the Iran Nuclear Deal, Whitehouse.gov , 12 Jan. 2018. www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-iran-nuclear-deal/.

The White House published these remarks by President Trump regarding the JCPOA. It was essential to the research because it represents the policy shift that the United States, as a chief negotiator, experienced from one administration to the other

Badran, Tony. “How Hezbollah Sees the Iran Nuclear Deal: We Win, You Lose.” The Weekly Standard, The Weekly Standard, 6 May 2015. www.weeklystandard.com/how-hezbollah-sees-the-iran-nuclear-deal-we-win-you-lose/article/940154.

BBC. “Russia Resumes Nuclear Trade With Iran as Sanctions Lifted.” 23 November 2015. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34899486.

Bridgeman, Tess. “Corker and Cotton’s False Promises Would Push Iran Toward Nuclearization.” Foreign Policy, 30 October 2017. foreignpolicy.com/2017/10/30/corker-and-cottons-false-promises-would-push-iran-toward-nuclearization/.

Council of the European Union. “Iran nuclear deal: EU statement on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action”, European Council, 16 October 2017. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/10/16/iran-nuclear-deal-eu-jcpoa/

Cunningham, Erin. “Iran’s President Fires Back at Trump on Nuclear Deal.” Washington Post, 13 October 2017. www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/iran-blasts-trumps-moves-against-nuclear-deal-revolutionary-guard/2017/10/13/f5d6c5de-aeba-11e7-9b93-b97043e57a22_story.html?utm_term=.8068c0e5319a.

Delegation of the European Union to the United States. “Statement by the High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) implementation”. European Union. 13 October 2017. https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/united-states-america/33919/statement-high-representativevice-president-federica-mogherini-joint-comprehensive-plan-action_en

“European Union.” European Union , 18 September 2017. eeas.europa.eu/delegations/iran/32286/nuclear-agreement_en.
Fathollah-Nejad, Ali. “German-Iranian Relations after the Nuclear Deal: Geopolitical and Economic Dimensions.” Insight Turkey, vol. 18, no.1, 2016, pp. 59-75.

Gibson, Bryan R., “Implications of an Iran Nuclear Deal.” Middle East Eye. 22 November 2014. http://www.middleeasteye.net/columns/implications-iran-nuclear-deal-1541754

Gordon, Michael R,. “US Lays out Limits It Seeks in Iran Nuclear Talks”. New York Times. 20 November 2014. https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/21/world/middleeast/us-lays-out-limits-it-seeks-in-iran-nuclear-talks.html

Gov.UK. “Declaration by the Heads of State and Government of France, Germany and the United Kingdom”. Prime Ministers Office . 13 October 2017. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/declaration-by-the-heads-of-state-and-government-of-france-germany-and-the-united-kingdom

Gov.UK. “Prime Minister’s statement on Iran’s nuclear programme”. Prime Ministers Office. 14 July 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/prime-ministers-statement-on-irans-nuclear-programme

IAEA, Board of Governors and Director General . “Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015).” Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), 22 February 2018. www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/18/03/gov-2018-7-derestricted.pdf.

IAEA, Director General. “Director General's Speech on Iran, the JCPOA and the IAEA”, Office of the Director General. 14 November 2017. https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/director-generals-speech-on-iran-the-jcpoa-and-the-iaea

IAEA. “IAEA and Iran: Chronology of Key Events.” IAEA. 2017. https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/iran/chronology-of-key-events

JCPOA . “Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.” Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action , 2015. https://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/documents/world/full-text-of-the-iran-nuclear-deal/1651/

Mogherini, Federica and Zarif, Javad. “Joint statement by EU High Representative Federica Mogherini and Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif Vienna, 14 July 2015.” European Union External Action. 14 July 2015. http://collections.internetmemory.org/haeu/content/20160313172652/http:/eeas.europa.eu/statements-eeas/2015/150714_01_en.htm

Kaye, Dalia Dassa. “Israel's Iran Policies After the Nuclear Deal.” RAND Corporation, 2016. doi: 10.7249/PE207.

Paulraj, Nansi. “The JCPOA and Changing Dimensions of the Russia–Iran Relations.” Contemporary Review of the Middle East, vol. 3, no. 1, 2016, pp. 95-110., doi:10.1177/2347798916633294.

Putin, Vladimir. “Statement by President of Russia Vladimir Putin following completion of negotiations on Iran's nuclear programme.” Office of President of Russia. 14 July 2015. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/49957

Shirvani, Tara, and Siniša Vuković. “After the Iran Nuclear Deal: Europe’s Pain and Gain.” The Washington Quarterly, vol. 38, no. 3, Mar. 2015, pp. 79-92., doi:10.1080/0163660x.2015.109902

Tiezzi, Shannon. “What Did China Bring to the Iran Talks.” The Diplomat. 23 July 2015. https://thediplomat.com/2015/07/what-did-china-bring-to-the-iran-talks/