• One main issue being address by SSR is in the defence sector where there were functionally three armies. The Republika Srpska had its own army, while the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina was divided into a Bosniak force and a Croat force (Marijan, “Orthodox” 11). The internationally-led SSR has created one unified - albeit still ethnically divided - state army to bring Bosnia more in-line with other sovereign states and to reduce the likelihood of re-emerging infighting.
• The police force was also divided along ethnic lines and was too large for a country at peace (Vandemoortele 202). Many police officers were not adequately trained or equipped, and the police force was heavily politicized (Vandemoortele 202). There is low citizen trust of the police force due to the atrocities committed during the war, given that an estimated 70% of which were perpetrated by the police, an issue that needs to be addressed in order to ensure cohesion between the police and citizens (Marijan, “Orthodox” 13).
• Sub-state level judicial structures had to be replaced with more centralized state judiciary institutions for successful judicial reform (Marijan, “Orthodox” 11). Even the process of lawmaking was significantly decentralized to the cantons, and needed to me unified along the state level (Marijan, “Orthodox” 16). Political interference in, and political appointees to the judiciary is still a significant problem that persists (Marijan, “Orthodox” 16).
• The creation of a state border service was also a priority, as none existed in Bosnia before SSR, with competency for border police split between the two main policing forces (Marijan, “Orthodox” 14). Bosnia's 1600km porous border was easily crossable by organized crime groups at any of the over 400 known illegal crossing points (Hills 191). Border security that targets illegal immigration and trafficking from Bosnia to other parts of Europe is now a top priority for international actors (Hills 192).
  

• Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina
  • Ministry of Defence of BiH
    • Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina (OSBiH)
  • Ministry of Human Rights and Refugees of BiH
  • Police
    • Border Police of Bosnia and Herzegovina
    • the State Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA)
• Bosnian Serbs (Muslim majority, Bosniaks)
• Catholic Croats
• Orthodox Serbs
  • Army of Republika Srpska (VRS): The Serb secessionist army that perpetrated the 1995 Srebrenica Massacre among other crimes. In 2006 it was integrated into the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Gaub 324).
• Civil Societies:
  • Žene Ženama: Women's rights, empowerment, and advocacy NGO that focuses on education, social rights, security, peace, and gender equality (Bećirević, Šulc, and Šoštarić, 3).
  • Atlantic Initiative (in Bosnia and Herzegovina): Established in 2009, AI conducts security and justice policy research and promotes open and informed debate (Bećirević, Šulc, and Šoštarić, 3).
  • Žene sa Une: The civil society organisation that seeks to ensure democracy, human rights protection, the elimination of prejudice, and equal opportunities for marginalized groups, with a specific focus on vulnerable women and children (Žene sa Une).
  • INFOTEKA: The voluntary and independent civil society organisation that focuses on improving the quality of life of women and children in Bosnia by guaranteeing the constitutional rights set in the Law on Gender Equality of Bosnia & Herzegovina (FundsforNGOs).

• Yugoslav Army: de facto controller of the Bosnian Serb Army (Burg 191).
• United Nations (UN)
  • United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR); United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR): Assisted in peacekeeping duties such as arranging ceasefires and assisting in the delivery of humanitarian aid. There were 23,000 troops by April 1994 (Burg 146).
  • International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY): Established by the UN in 1993, the ICTY holds those most accountable for the atrocious crimes that took place during the conflicts in the Balkans in the 1990’s (ICTY).
• European Union (EU)
  • European Commission; European Union Force Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR): Supports the collective and combined training of the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina and supports them in achieving NATO standards (About EUFOR).
  • European Union Special Representative (EUSR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Mandated by the Council of the European Union to reinforce EU’s policy objectives in Bosnia. Offers advice and facilitation support to institutions at all levels to ensure European political priorities are secured, particularly for the rule of law and Security Sector Reform. Responsible for EU communication in Bosnia (EUROPA).
• North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO): Gradually disarmed both sides and enforced the Dayton peace agreement, primarily through SFOR: the NATO-led Stability Force operation (Burg 145).
• Office of the High Representative (OHR): Created to oversee Bosnian institutions and nation-building efforts. Intervened to resolve deadlock between ethnic groups, to remove obstructive officials, and to enforce controversial legislation (Dobbins et al. 138).
• International Police Task Force (IPTF): Created by the Dayton Accords, the IPTF examined officers from 1996-2002 and banned 793 of 18 000 police officers (Burg 147).
• Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF): Assists states in developing laws, institutions, policies, and practices to improve security sector governance (Gender and Security Sector Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina).
• Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) mission in Bosnia: Undertakes arms control, SSR, war crimes processing, political and educational reform, gender equality initiatives, good governance policies, media reform, civil society support, and human rights initiatives. Its principle aim is to promote regional stability and reconciliation alongside political, economic, and social integration. (The OSCE is a global organisation for regional security consisting of over 57 states from North America, Europe, and Asia) (What We Do).

• There are too many international actors with differing goals and ideas involved in the SSR process who are often pursuing different policies (Marijan, “Orthodox SSR” 10, 12). International actors also present solutions and requirements to the local populations without much meaningful consultation, leading to local resentment and resistance (Marijan, “Second Generation” 9).
• Reformists, in an attempt to reform rather than remake security institutions, must also contend with the low citizen trust of the existing security institutions (Marijan, “Orthodox” 11). This is compounded by the perceived and real interference in the reform process by rampant organized crime, Bosnian elites, and local political parties fighting for their own interests (Marijan, “Orthodox” 12; ISSAT).
• The most severe challenge to the SSR process in Bosnia is the continued ethnic tension between Croats, Bosniaks and Serbs (Marijan, “Orthodox” 12). This essential issue permeates every aspect of the security sector, as the atrocities committed during the war contribute to their insecurity, resulting in the communities seeking to ensure their own security (via security services) over that of the others. It also prompts demographic and power-sharing fears in institutions like in the judiciary sector (Marijan, “Orthodox” 19). Reconciliation is absolutely necessary to overcome the distrust, anger, and hatred between Bosnia's three main ethnic communities.
• The lack of a strong centralized government is a problem that is compounded by Republika Srpska's resistance to reforms and its insistence on maintaining its independence and security, especially with its focus on maintaining its own justice system and army (ISSAT; Marijan, “Orthodox” 19). This is compounded by the international community’s self-inflicted obstacles, including the fact that the new constitution - written up as part of the Dayton Accords - does not mention state control of the security sector and even reinforces the rights of the various armies to provide security for their citizens (Marijan, “Orthodox” 12).

Following the conflict and genocide in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the UN and later the EU and NATO established various programs of Security Sector Reform (SSR) to strengthen justice and security institutions with the aim of protecting the rights of all citizens while building trust, promoting social cohesion, and ensuring economic welfare (“Security Sector Reform”). Yet to this day, the SSR process remains incomplete in Bosnia. This essay will analyse the effectiveness of SSR in the defence, policing, and judicial sectors. This analysis argues that despite some success, Security Sector Reform in Bosnia was somewhat ineffective because critical institutions were undermined by corruption and political manipulation, and due to a lack of local will, trust, consultation and participation.

Following international intervention in the Bosnian conflict, the EU spearheaded efforts for SSR to bring Bosnia more in line with other European states in terms of institutions and governance structures. Many top-down reforms were designed and implemented by the imposing international presence with minimal local input (Marijan, “Orthodox” 7). A continuous stream of international aid has slowly been diminishing as donors have become pessimistic about Bosnia’s future (Pasic). Bosnia is one of the poorest countries in the region, with high unemployment, low salaries, and a weak economy, exacerbated by rampant corruption (Marijan, “Orthodox” 31). Very few locals understand the SSR process, and it has produced uneven results across different sectors (Marijan, “Orthodox” 31).

The SSR process in Bosnia was effective in certain sectors, especially in the defence sector. There have been a number of successes within the defence sector, including successful military downsizing while maintaining a reasonable ratio of ethnic representation within it, despite the disproportionate male-to-female ratio (Marijan, “Orthodox” 28). Also, there has been much emphasis on overcoming military division resulting from the conflict (Vetschera and Damian 28), but more needs to be done since battalions are still based on ethnicity, which can easily result in the dissolution of their integration (Marijan, “Second Generation” 27). As for the security sector, the Ministry of Security has reported a reduction in crime, although hate crimes appear to persist and are underreported (Marijan, “Orthodox” 27-28). Post-war stability is also an overlooked achievement (Marijan, “Orthodox” 27). In terms of the judiciary sector, judges are now well paid, thus curbing albeit not halting corruption (Marijan, “Orthodox” 29). In the police sector, the border police appear to be quite efficient, despite the complaints of mistreatment and a lack of due process (Marijan, “Orthodox” 29). Thus, SSR has great potential to rebuild and centralize Bosnia’s critical infrastructure to reduce corruption and to ensure peace.

Despite these successes, the SSR process in Bosnia had many more shortcomings and failures. It is a short-term reform system that has lacked institutional coherence, adequate capabilities and expertise, and local ownership (Juncos 96). Its top-down approach neglects local agency (Juncos 96) and lacks transparency (Marijan, “Second Generation” 26). The EU has been criticized for enabling Bosnia’s overreliance on international funds as a political tactic to coerce the country into EU membership (Marijan, “Orthodox” 7). Thus, positive peace cannot be ensured with the current model of SSR if the public good in Bosnia is not prioritized, especially for the long-term. Reforms have also been slow as they have been resisted and reversed by self-interested local political elites (Juncos 95) as well as certain locals who despite the limitations that liberal peacebuilding imposes on their sovereignty (Juncos 98-102). In fact, since the institutions are still fragile, any liberal institutional reforms are more likely to fail due to a lack of general acceptance and solid foundations.

More specifically, the security sector suffers from weak oversight and accountability, with many members of the security force suspected of being corrupt (Juncos 101). The judiciary sector is fraught with corruption, and while indictments of corruption have increased, prosecutions have decreased, demonstrating the lasting institutional flaws and undermined public confidence resulting from poor SSR (Marijan, “Orthodox” 28). The police are still seen as  political instruments to be used by various ethnic groups rather than as impartial enforcers of the law (Juncos 101). In addition, political parties have great influence within the police hierarchy (Juncos 101). This inability to prevent political intervention has weakened police oversight capacity (Marijan, “Orthodox” 30). Furthermore, abuse of power among police is common, resulting in prisoners who suffer from overcrowding and a lack of resources and support staff (Marijan, “Orthodox” 29).

In summary, there has been progress within the security reform in Bosnia, yet challenges persist in building strong and coordinated institutions. While Bosnia is stable, high levels of corruption, unemployment, and ethnic distrust coupled with political interference undermine the goals of SSR.  After twenty years of over-reliance on international support with few incentives for the elites to allow for effective change, Bosnia's population has become disenchanted with reform, making the prospect of sustainable reform highly unlikely in the short-term.

“Bosnia: Army Lieutenant General Patrick Hughes Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Senate Armed Services Committee.” 1996 Congressional hearings Intelligence and Security, 1 Aug. 1996, www.fas.org/irp/congress/1996_hr/s960801h.htm.

“Dayton Peace Agreement.” Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, 14 Dec. 1995, www.osce.org/bih/126173.

“Decisions Taken at the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Permanent Session.” North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, 9 Feb. 1994, www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c940209a.htm.

“Dragan Obrenović: Guilty Plea Statement”, United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Uploaded by ICTY, 30 Oct. 2003, www.icty.org/en/content/dragan-obrenović.

“The Prosecutor of the Tribunal Against Radovan Karadzic Ratko Mladic.” The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, case no. : IT-95-18-I, 14 Nov. 1995, www.icty.org/x/cases/mladic/ind/en/kar-ii951116e.pdf.

“The Prosecutor of the Tribunal Against Radovan Karadzic Ratko Mladic.” The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, case no. :IT-95-5-I, Jul. 1995, www.icty.org/x/cases/mladic/ind/en/kar-ii950724e.pdf.

“Radislav Krstic becomes the First Person to be Convicted of Genocide at the ICTY and is Sentenced to 46 Years Imprisonment.” United Nations: International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 2 Aug. 2001, www.icty.org/sid/7964.

“Removal from Office of Nikola Poplasen.” Office of the High Representative, 3 May 1999, www.ohr.int/?p=55123.

“Resolution 827.” United Nations Security Council Resolutions, 25 May 1993, www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Statute/statute_827_1993_en.pdf.

“Selected Reports of the Secretary General.” United Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina: United Nations Documents, 1995-2002, www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unmibh/unmibhDrp.htm.

“Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, of the other part.” European Communities, No. 4, 16 June 2008, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/228868/7743.pdf.

“25th Report by the High Representative for Implementation of the Peace Agreement to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.” Office of the High Representative, 3 Mar. 2003, http://www.ohr.int/?p=46419.

Hills, A. “Crossing Boundaries: State Border Services and the Multidimensional Nature of Security.” Bosnian Security After Dayton, edited by Michael A. Innes, 1st ed., Routledge, 2006, pp. 191-208.

Alice Hills is a professor in conflict studies at Durham University, specialising in police development, post-conflict policing and sub-state security. This chapter is part of a collection of chapters by leading scholars on SSR in Bosnia after the Dayton Accords. This chapter deals with the complexities of arranging border security in Bosnia and Herzegovina given that it was once part of the former Yugoslavia, facing regional cynicism and international pressure riven by internal divisions. Hills concludes - with reference to Bosnia’s State Border Service - that Bosnian security is based on competing assumptions, social realities, and functional necessities operating within a security space. This conceptualisation raises questions over the boundaries of Bosnia as a political community and the interactions between national, regional, and international security actors.

Marijan, Branka. “Assessing the Impact of Orthodox Security Sector Reform in Bosnia-Herzegovina.” Centre for Security Governance, no. 9, Fall 2016, pp. 1-57. secgovcentre.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Assessing_Orthodox_SSR_in_Bosnia_Sept_2016.pdf. Accessed 15 Mar. 2019.

Dr. Branka Marijan specialises in security sector reform and peacebuilding research and is a Program Officer at Project Ploughshares in Waterloo, Ontario. Her paper acknowledges the necessity of international actors designing and enacting SSR due to a lack of local consensus, but challenges the sustainability of such policies due to the continuation of competing local views. Furthermore, it analyses the misappropriation of the SSR process by international actors who use it as a tool of Europeanisation and centralisation, jeopardising and politicising current and future reforms, particularly in the judicial and police sectors. This paper is not only useful in understanding the specifics of the shortcomings of the ongoing SSR in Bosnia but also in evaluating the problems associated with orthodox norms and principles.

Marijan, Branka. “The Gradual Emergence of Second Generation Security Sector Reform in Bosnia-Herzegovina.” Centre for Security Governance, no. 13, Winter 2017, pp. 1-33.  secgovcentre.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Second-Generation-SSR-in-Bosnia-Herzegovina-January-2017.pdf.

Dr. Branka Marijan specialises in security sector reform and peacebuilding research and is a Program Officer at Project Ploughshares in Waterloo, Ontario. This article explores the still nascent bottom-up, second-generation SSR in response to concerns over the sustainability of top-down, internationally driven SSR processes.  The article proposes some possible entry points to develop second-generation SSR which has been sidelined due to the politicisation of SSR in Bosnia and due to a lack of local political will. These proposals include community policing and wider civil society engagement as well a focus on working within existing political frameworks instead of using SSR as a political tool.

Juncos, Ana E. “EU Security Sector Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Reform or Resist?.” Contemporary Security Policy, vol. 39, no. 1, 2017, pp. 95-118, doi: 10.1080/13523260.2017.1391625

This article is by Ana Juncos from the School of Sociology, Politics and International Studies at Bristol, whose area of expertise is in European Union politics. In her analysis of security sector reform in Bosnia, Juncos moves away from the traditional dichotomy of international and local actors and seeks to analyse the power relations between the two. Taking a Foucauldian approach, SSR is viewed as an expression of neoliberal rationalities and the paradoxical power relations are broken into four categories of counter-conduct (struggle against governance); upholding European standards, using the local ownership trap, simulating reforms, and lowering the bar. This article adds to SSR literature by unveiling the impact of variable resistance by local actors on EU policies, enabling a more nuanced review of the shortcomings of SSR policies.

Padurariu, A. “The Implementation of Police Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Analysing UN and EU efforts.” Stability: International Journal of Security and Development, vol. 3, no. 1, doi: http://doi.org/10.5334/sta.db.

Amelia Padurariu is an Associate Research Fellow at the Free University of Brussels, specialising in the implementation of police reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina and is also a policy analyst at the European Commission. This article analyses the role of international actors - particularly the EU and UN - in implementing police reform. It explores the reasons for which the process remains unfinished by analysing the police force before and after the conflict, including the consequences of UN and EU policies. Padurariu concludes that for police reform to have long-term success, the EU must pay attention to local politics which present the majority of obstacles for institution-building via budgetary controls as well as the staffing and director appointment choices for newly created institutions.

 Slobodan, Perdan. “Security Sector Reform: The building of security in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Conflict, Security & Development, vol. 6, no. 2, 2006, pp. 179-209, doi: 10.1080/14678800600739226.

Perdan Slobodan is an independent researcher based in the United Kingdom who has published on development issues, security, and development in South Eastern Europe. This article assesses the success of SSR in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Slobodan argues that despite success in the main objectives of SSR, new security risks have been created inadvertently, raising the questions of whether Bosnia’s security has truly been enhanced due to the SSR processes. Slobodan identifies the lack of local ownership and the Dayton constitutional arrangements as the primary hindrances for further progress in SSR and concludes that Bosnia will remain a weak and marginalized country until these two issues are addressed. This will enable Bosnia to overcome insecurity, internal divisions and adversity.

Vandermoortele, Antoine. “Adaptation, Resistance and a (Re)turn to Functionalism: The Case of the Bosnian Police Restructuring Process (2003–2008).” European Security, vol. 21, no. 2. 2012, pp. 202-218, doi: 10.1080/09662839.2012.665884.

Antoine Vandremoortele, from the department of Social and Political Studies at the European University Institute critically analyses the police reform undertaken in Bosnia from 2003-2008. A major area of concern at the end of the war was the twofold problem with the police force; firstly, there was a practical lack of competencies and organisation, and secondly, the politicisation of the force existed along ethnic divisions. Vandremoortele suggests that while the design was the result of EU and UN preferences, the outcomes were influenced by local preferences coupled with the EU’s inability to adapt to local resistance. Vandermoortele describes this compromise that resulted in two new coordination laws as muddling through dynamics. This analysis aids in understanding the representations of actors and their different strategies of adaptation and resistance, providing a preliminary framework for review of current SSR policies.

Vetschera, Heinz, and Matthieu Damian. “Security Sector Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina: The Role of the International Community.” International Peacekeeping, vol. 13, no. 1, Summer 2006, pp. 28-42. Taylor & Francis, doi: 10.1080/13533310500424694

Dr. Heinz Vetschera was part of the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1996-1997 and 2002-2003, was a member of the Defence Reform Commission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and holds various other defence and security sector positions. Matthieu Damian is a PhD candidate currently working at Ecole de la Paix in Grenoble.  The article focuses on defence reforms undertaken since 2002. Firstly, the authors make an argument for the necessity of addressing defence reform early in the SSR process, citing the de facto military division resulting in two armies in Bosnia and Herzegovina as a result of a failure to adequately address defence issues.  The article concludes that defence reform was too focused on merging the two armies at the expense of understanding the local resistance who feared the loss of perceived sovereignty. This article is relevant to understanding how to better balance international objectives and expertise with local values, sensitivities, and perceptions through consultation.

“About EUFOR.” European Union Force in BiH: Operation Althea, www.euforbih.org/eufor/index.php/about-eufor/background. Accessed 27 Mar. 2019.

"About the ICTY." International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, www.icty.org/en/about. Accessed 19 Mar. 2019.

Bećirević, Majda, Željka Šulc, and Maja Šoštarić. “Gender and Security Sector Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina.” DCAF, 2011, www.dcaf.ch/sites/default/files/publications/documents/2011_12_07_Gender%20and%20Security%20Sector%20Reform.pdf.

“Bosnia and Herzegovina SSR Background Note.” International Security Advisory Team: Democratic Control of Armed Forces, www.issat.dcaf.ch. Accessed 20. Mar. 2019.

Burg, Steven L., and Paul S. Shoup. Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention: Crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1990-93. New York, Routledge, 1999.

“Delegation of the European Union to Bosnia and Herzegovina & European Special Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina.” European Union, www.europa.ba. Accessed 28 Mar. 2019.

Dobbins, J. Jones, S. G., Crane, K., Chivvis, C. S., Raddin, A., Larrabee, F. S., Bensahel, N., Stearns, B. K., and Goldsmith, B. W. “Bosnia.” Europe’s Role in Nation-building: From the Balkans to the Congo. Rand Corporation, 2008, pp. 139-172.

“Dobro Došli na Web Stranicu Udruženja, Žene sa Une.” Žene sa Une, www.zenesaune.org/. Accessed 19 Mar. 2019.

Gaub, Florence. Military Integration after Civil Wars: Multiethnic Armies, Identity and Post-Conflict Reconstruction. New York, Routledge, 2011.

“Gender and Security Sector Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina.” Democratic Control of Armed Forces, www.dcaf.ch/sites/default/files/publications/documents/2011_12_07_Gender%20and%20Security%20Sector%20Reform.pdf. Accessed 28 Mar. 2019.

"INFOTEKA – Women’s Information and Documentation Center." FundsforNGOs, www.fundsforngos.org/all-listings/infoteka-womens-information-and-documentation-center/. Accessed 19 Mar. 2019.

Juncos, Ana E. “EU Security Sector Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Reform or Resist?.” Contemporary Security Policy, vol. 39, no. 1, Winter 2017, pp. 95-118. Taylor & Francis, doi:10.1080/13523260.2017.1391625

Marijan, Branka. “Assessing the Impact of Orthodox Security Sector Reform in Bosnia-Herzegovina.” Centre for Security Governance, no. 9, Fall 2016, pp. 1-57. secgovcentre.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Assessing_Orthodox_SSR_in_Bosnia_Sept_2016.pdf. Accessed 15 Mar. 2019.

Marijan, Branka. “The Gradual Emergence of Second Generation Security Sector Reform in Bosnia-Herzegovina.” Centre for Security Governance, no. 13, Winter 2017, pp. 1-33. secgovcentre.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Second-Generation-SSR-in-Bosnia-Herzegovina-January-2017.pdf. Accessed 15 Mar. 2019.

Pasic, Lana. “Bosnia’s Vast Foreign Financial Assistance Re-examined: Statistics and Results.” Balkananalysis.com, www.balkanalysis.com/bosnia/2011/06/21/bosnia%E2%80%99s-vast-foreign-financial-assistance-re-examined-statistics-and-results/. Accessed 19 Mar. 2019.

“Security Sector Reform (SSR).” United Nations and the Rule of Law. www.un.org/ruleoflaw/thematic-areas/access-to-justice-and-rule-of-law-institutions/ssr/. Accessed 15 Mar. 2019.

Vetschera, Heinz, and Matthieu Damian. “Security Sector Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina: The Role of the International Community.” International Peacekeeping, vol. 13, no. 1, Summer 2006, pp. 28-42. Taylor & Francis, doi: 10.1080/13533310500424694

“What We Do.” Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, www.osce.org/mission-to-bosnia-and-herzegovina/what-we-do. Accessed 28 Mar, 2019.

Wiebes, Cees. Intelligence and the War in Bosnia, 1992-1995: Volume 1 of studies in intelligence history. New Jersey, LIT Verlag, 2003. ISBN 9783825863470