*Different Ethnic Groups

Since coming to independence in 1962, Burundi has struggled to find peace in the region. In the succeeding years, there were struggles for power that was fueled by ethnic tensions between the Hutu and Tutsi groups. The instability within the region brought ethnic repression and violence which has led to mass migrations and mass killings. [1]

Military

If not constructed correctly the military can be a catalyst for repression and the protection of specific groups. Historically, the military has been dominated by Tutsis which are the minority group in Burundi. This set-up has not allowed for the fair treatment of citizen’s and the military has been responsible for specifically targeting the Hutu majority.[2]

Corruption and the Police Force

Corruption is a major issue in Burundi, in the past 12 months, 14% of public service users have paid a bribe in the past 12 months and police and judiciary members are the most likely to be involved in it. These bribes can be used to arrest people or to free those who have been committed of crimes. [3]

Disarmament

Due to the ethnic conflicts in Burundi, civilian armament had been on the rise for both personal protection and/or to join armed groups. There is a general distrust among the public towards the government and there is fear about criminal and political violence. In addition to this, there is a lack of confidence in the police to provide protection and uphold the law leading to a feeling of insecurity. [4]

 

 

[1] The Security Sector Reform (SSR) mandated that the political arena needed to be neutral and united and not be a tool for the security of a regime. For more information, visit the International Security Sector Advisory Team’s page for Burundi under “Overview of SSR in the Republic of Burundi.” https://issat.dcaf.ch/Learn/Resource-Library/Country-Profiles/Burundi-SSR-Background-Note#overview%20of%20ssr

[2] The military needs to be an institution of stability and protection from both internal and external forces. Similar to the corruption of the police, if the military is configured in a way that does not perform its outlined roles, then society can not progress. Being able to create long-lasting peace and having civilian protection is a crucial step for sustainable SSR in Burundi. For more information, see Kristina Powell’s paper on Security Sector Reform and Protection of Civilians, pages 23-39.

[3] One of the major reforms that needed to happen was the creation of a new and improved police force. In order to have a working society, the law enforcement needs to be free of corruption and so in turn, the personnel needs to be re-trained and the institutions need to be revamped. For more information on the corruption, visit Transparency International’s site under “People and Corruption: Africa Survey 2015.” For the details outlining the agreement, see Wilen Nindorera’s paper “Security Sector Reform in Burundi: Issues and Challenges for Improving Civilian Protection” on page 7.

[4] Disarmament is necessary for two specific reasons. First, it is fundamental that disarmament occurs in order for a reformed police sector to perform their duties. Secondly, the overall sense of security should increase if civilians do not have firearms. For more information, see Kristina Powell’s paper on Security Reform on page 40.*

*Domestic State

The Union for National Progress (UPRONA)

UPRONA is a majority led Tutsi party that was founded in 1960 and won their first election in 1961. [1] In 1966 the National Revolutionary Council declared UPRONA the only legal political party and took control of the government,[2] with rumours that UPRONA was just an instrument of a military dictatorship. [3] This groups was responsible for ethnic purges led by the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Historically, "military leadership and political civilian elites" were intertwined with UPRONA making the military overwhelmingly one-sided. Part of the SSR was established to eliminate this inequality.[4]

The Front for Democracy in Burundi (FRODEBU)

FRODEBU is a Hutu based political party that was formed in 1986. Melchior Ndadaye was the first President in 1993 and in an attempt to settle the differences between them and UPRONA, he named a UPRONA as Prime Minister. His leadership was one that Burundi had not seen in a long time and it brought harmony and peace to the country and wanted to promote human rights. However, their power did not last long and President Ndadaye was assassinated through a military coup. [8]

National Council for the Defence of Democracy (CNDD)

In 2010, the CNDD was democratically elected in, however, they allegedly got their grip on power through intimidation political violence through torture, kidnapping and murder to suppress opposition. The government got even more control in 2013 when they passed a law to stop the freedom of the press, which included articles about national defence, public safety and local currency. The day this law was passed was a "black day for freedom of information in Burundi". Six months later they instituted a law that restricted public gatherings, this was most likely done to suppress protests.[9] In 2018 Nkurunziza called a referendum to extend presidential limits, changing Burundi's 13-year-old constitution which was a product of the peace process after the civil war. Opponents have allegedly been abducted and killed by the youth wing aligned to the CNDD, Imbonerakure.[10]

Domestic Non-State

Tutsi

The Sans Échec, Sans Défaite, Sans Pitié, Sans Capote are all Tutsi youth militias which operate across Burundi. Comprised largely of children, these gangs use weapons to coerce and kill members of the public on behalf of Tutsi interests [11].

The Imbogaraburundi (FRODEBU) and Puissance Auto-défense Amasekanya (PA-Amasekanya) are Tutsi rebel groups who, when under Hutu rule, undertook attacks on the Hutu people of Burundi [12].

Imbonerakure is President Pierre Nkurunziza’s party’s “youth league” in Burundi. Similar to the other Tutsi youth militias, Imbonerakure has been responsible for horrendous human rights violations since 2018. They have “...carried out widespread human rights abuses... including summary executions, rapes, abductions, beatings, and intimidation of suspected political opponents” [13].

Hutu

The National Council for the Defense of Democracy-Forces for the Defence of Democracy (CNDD-FDD/Intagoheka) is comprised of Hutu rebels who opposed the Forces Armées Burundaises (FAB) who were the Burundi government’s Tutsi-dominated army [14].

The Front de Libération Nationale or Parti pour la libération du Peuple Hutu (also referred to as FROLINA, FLN, PALIPEHUTU) is a Hutu rebel group which, similarly to the CNDD-FDD, opposed the Tutsi dominated armed forces and was involved in war crimes across Burundi. These armed Hutu groups are also known as “‘bandes armées’ (armed bands), ‘maquisards’ (‘guerillas’) or more recently, Intagoheka (‘those who do not blink’)” [15].

 

 

[1] Prince Louis Rwagasore created the party and was the King's eldest son. See the United States Institute of Peace page 19 for more information.  https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/resources/collections/commissions/Burundi-Report.pdf

[2] Rwanda played a part in this by diplomatically recognizing the legitimacy of the NRC. The NRC consisted of a 12 Tutsi and 5 non-Tutsi army officials. For more information, visit https://www.sciencespo.fr/mass-violence-war-massacre-resistance/fr/node/2749 or view the University of Central Arkansas website under "Burundi (1962-Present)".

[3] Captain Michel Micombero was the de facto dictator at the time and had roots in the military. He was a Tutsi and carried out aggressive repression among the Hutus. When he overthrew the monarchy in 1966 he filled the officer corps and ranks of the army with Tutsis. See the United States Institute of Peace, page 20 for more information. https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/resources/collections/commissions/Burundi-Report.pdf

[4] The UPRONA aligned military helped keep the party in power, taking part in "selective genocide," banning Hutu militaries and killing Hutu civilians. The military was not neutral and came to be known as the "mono-ethnic Tutsi army". The repression went on for 15 years and highlighted that the army had an agenda and was not an independent institution. For more information, see Wilén et. al. paper "The Burundian Army's Trajectory to Professionalization and Depoliticization, and Back Again," page 124.

[8] President Ndadaye did his best to create a bi-partisan government. In addition to giving and UPRONA position of Prime Minister, he also granted 33% of the cabinet positions to UPRONA party members, and gave another 33% of cabinet positions to Tutsi members from both UPRONA and FRODEBU. He also appointed two UPRONA provincial governors. For more information, visit the United States Institute of Peace, page 22. https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/resources/collections/commissions/Burundi-Report.pdf

[9] The government's main claim for doing the restriction of the press was to not allow journalists to undermine issues of national security, however, journalists responded stating that they would challenge the issue in court. People who break this law and publish stories regarding any of the forbidden topics can face fines that range from $2,000-6,000, which are much more than the annual salary of most journalists. For more information, read the Reuters article. https://www.reuters.com/article/burundi-rights-idUSL5N0EG3FZ20130604

[10] Many unidentified bodies have been found after arrests made by police or by the National Intelligence Service (SNR) that is headed by someone who reports directly to the President. Imbonerakure allegedly "covers the country" looking for threats and handles them through intimidation. For more information, read the UN News. https://news.un.org/en/story/2018/06/1013292

[11] The Tutsi youth militias are instrumental to the Burundi political landscape. They operate as a cheap and expendable tool for those looking to impose their beliefs on a group of people. Amnesty International, 1995 explains in further detail the role of groups like the Sans Échec, Sans Défaite, Sans Pitié, and Sans Capote within Burundi.

[12] Imbogaraburundi is further expanded upon and Human Rights Watch, 2003. This piece details the ethnic composition of the group and also expands upon their involvement with other rebel groups in Burundi. Prunier, 1995 also explores the role of FRODEBU in Burundi.

[13] Human Rights Watch, 2019 does an excellent job at showing the connection between state officials and non-state domestic actors in Burundi. Specifically this connection is that of Imbonerakure and President Pierre Nkurunziza. This paper situates the non-state actors within the political landscape of Burundi.

[14] Particularly as it relates to police sector reform, DCAF/ISSAT, 2017 examines the role of rebel groups in the composition of the Burundian National Police (PNB). The PNB, established in 2004, included fighters from ex-rebel groups and other branches of the national police force and was comprised of members from both the Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups.

[15] Amnesty International, 1995 goes into further detail about the types of atrocities committed by the FLN in Burundi. It is critical in shedding light on the cycle of violence which is perpetuated by different rebel groups across Burundi. This piece also explores the relationship of the FLN with other African governments such as Rwanda.*

*United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi

The United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi was focused on supporting the Government of Burundi in strengthening the legal frameworks of national institutions, emphasizing the role of justice to build national unity and promote reconciliation. BINUB also worked on creating economic and financial policies that focused on peacebuilding, reducing inequality and advocating for resource mobilization.[1]

African Union Mission in Burundi

The African Union Mission in Burundi was meant to supervise, observe, monitor and verify the implementation of the Arusha Agreement, the ceasefire protocols, and the DDR program in Burundi. The AUNI was largely successful in managing the violent conflict and secured conditions essential to the implementation of the peace and ceasefire agreements, the DDR program, the UN deployment and future political progress and economic development in Burundi.[2]

Arusha Accords (Burundi)

The Arusha Agreement outlined how the political and military powers would be allocated following the conflict. The agreement specifically mandated democratic elections, amendments to the makeup of the National Assembly, as well as judicial and military reforms to aid in reconciliation and long term domestic security.[3]

 

 

[1] The United Nations Office in Burundi (BNUB) was in place from 1 January 2011 until 31 December 2014. Following its closure, the remaining responsibilities have been transferred to the UN Country Team which is tasked with similar roles to the UN Development Assistance Framework. For more information see https://bnub.unmissions.org/mandate.

[2] The mission was organized by the African Union with the supervising troops coming from Ethiopia, Mozambique, and South Africa. It was only active for one year until their responsibilities were taken over by the UN. For more information, see Grant and Hamilton, pages 165-168.

[3]The Arusha Agreement was signed on 28 August 2000 in Arusha, Tanzania and ended the Burundian Civil War. The points of agreement were all subsequently added to the Constitution of Burundi where their influence is still in effect. For more information, see Grant and Hamilton, pages 170-172.*

*Social Cohesion

Tensions between Burundi’s two major ethnic group, Hutu and Tutsi Muslims, have historically been very problematic in the small African nation. The Hutus represent roughly 85% of the population of Burundi whereas the Tutsis represent a mere 14% but are disproportionately represented amongst political and social elites. This salient division has proven challenging to the SSR process. Equal opportunity and representation in various socioeconomic realms is an issue where Tutsis do not want to concede and where Hutus are demanding more. Both groups need to work together and be consulted in conjunction with SSR actors in order to reach a situation where both groups are satisfied. [1]

Arms Reduction

The issue of demilitarization is another key barrier to SSR in Burundi. Estimates of the number of small arms accessible to a large proportion of the population of Burundi suggest that there is roughly “...one AK47 rifle, or equivalent,” available to every family in the nation. This has posed an issue for SSR in Burundi as the ability for the public to act aggressively and lawlessly is still too great for reform to be totally effective. Clearly, further disarmament is required in Burundi in order to reduce the public’s capacity for violence. [2]

Economic Reintegration

The socio-economic viability of Burundi for the average citizen is bleak. In order for the reintegration of refugees and militants into society to be effective, it must be sustainable. The economic opportunity for many of the conflict-affected individuals is actually poorer following the relative calming of violence in Burundi. Upon their return, people who have fled violent persecution in Burundi influx into concentrated areas, increasing the competition for land: a necessary asset to the agrarian economy. Obviously, this increases opportunities for violence and also discourages people from returning, both issues affect the efficacy of the SSR process. [3]

Food Stability

High levels of corruption and all around poor governance have often left the people of Burundi without a reliable source of food relief in times of desperate need. Due to this “failure of political accountability”, many people in Burundi are forced to search elsewhere for more dependable sources of food. Not only does this mean that people are leaving Burundi altogether, but they are also withdrawing to more and more rural areas and becoming less dependent on what little the government provides. This represents a barrier to SSR in that the public is less receptive to authority as a result of their autonomy (in which they have relative security). [4]

 

 

[1] Equal representation between Hutus and Tutsis is critical among the ruling elite in Burundi. The retaliatory attacks by both groups on the ruling elite has helped to promote economic and political instability in the region. In order for SSR to be successful in Burundi, the involvement of both ethnic groups is instrumental. See Burundi by George Barnette for further reading on the issue.

[2] Rule of law is only effective insofar as the public is willing to accept it. Fears of ethnic cleansing in regions of Burundi have instilled within the public a deep seeded distrust of security forces to prevent such atrocities and thus, the public feels secure in remaining armed. Without disarmament, neither group will feel safe enough to lay down their weapons as a confidence-building measure. See Edmonds et al. page 32 for more information.

[3] Even second generation returnees (those born in exile) have fewer economic prospects and report more severe poverty than prior to the outbreak of violence in Burundi. See Sonja Fransen’s chapter “The Concept of Sustainable return” for further insights into the economic issues of reintegration for migrants of Burundi.

As one of the most densely populated countries in Africa, Burundi faces food insecurity issues acutely. The lack of reliance and lack of trust in authority has created a public who is content on remaining somewhat withdrawn from these sorts of figures. Those who attempt the SSR process are confronted with this problem directly. For further information, see Vervesich et al. page 273. *

*Much of the success with Security Sector Reform in Burundi has been a direct result of the campaign to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate the former combatants back into communities in Burundi. Many of the combatants joined their respective fighting groups because they wanted to fight for a cause that was deeply important to them. As a result of that, once the fighting was over, many combatants voluntarily demobilized because the result has essentially been decided. This was a commonly held viewpoint by both ex-CNDD-FDD and ex-FAB members which helped to ease the process of demobilization.[1] While it should not be accepted as a unanimous viewpoint, the majority of Burundian citizens want the elements of ‘peace’ and ‘liberty’ to be present in society. Answers generally referred to a negative peace of the absence of fear and violence. Women, in particular, noted that the remaining presence of small arms caused insecurity.[2] There were widespread concerns with former combatants being responsible for increased crime which depending on location were accurate or fictitious. There have been successes and difficulties with the DDR process but progress is certainly being made on the community level. The issues with the police’s reputation and training show the limitations of the reintegration because while on paper a current police officer might be reintegrated, in reality, there are further barriers to be accurate.

The largest aspect of SSR is the development of a competent police force to keep local communities safe. Lack of trust in the police is prevalent and warranted given the current challenges in maintaining the police force. Many of the police officers are former combatants which have been helpful in reintegrating them into communities but they have received little to no proper training so they are largely unfit to serve in the communities. Corruption is also very prevalent and due to cultural differences, the idea is not widely understood as problematic as it is by many international actors. One noticeable improvement in police forces has been ethnic integration between the Hutus and Tutsis which has helped with reducing ethnic tensions in policing.

A less important group in SSR has been the Burundi military because their job is not local but national defence. The military is largely more supported than the local police because the most accomplished and respected of the former CNDD-FDD and FAB members were put in the military as opposed to the police which has contributed to the perception of the military being more capable than the police force.[3]

As a result of police distrust both at a local level and as a result of the colonial past, people still harbour unfavourable views of police and will choose to deal with securing their communities in other ways. To solve the problem, community members have taken matters into their own hands by delivering justice to accused persons with punishments determined on the local level. This highlights serious shortcomings in the efficacy of the police and serves to undermine the institutions of both the police and the justice system. Some NGOs have stepped in and filled the role of conflict mediator but without an established or widespread justice system which only serves to further delegitimize the local police forces and justice system.[4]

The disarmament aspect is essential to people feeling safe as well as preventing further violence from returning. As we have seen before, there is mixed success with some people voluntarily giving up weapons to aid in the reform while others continue to keep some hidden. Disarmed ex-combatants were frequently included in community policing and security plans which successfully helps with reintegration and community building. The downside is the same as the NGO mediation in that it is still not carried out by police as they are meant to do.

While there has been success with SSR there is a lot to be done and has largely not been effective. There remains a disconnect between the authority and competency of police forces and the communities they are meant to protect. While ethnic tensions have been reduced in policing, many women continue to feel disproportionately unsafe. The lack of communication between the police and citizens can only be improved through continued dialogue, the need for which is evident given the continuation of community-based policing which has several problems. The progress that has been made shows that there needs to be continued work with reintegration and build on the success that has been made on the community level.

 

 

[1]A large number of former combatants had ambitions to give up arms and reintegrate into society but there were too few material or economic incentives to do so. There was a strange balance between combatants wanting a different lifestyle but it was not attainable. For more information, see Willems et al, page 14.

[2]Women faced a greater threat of danger given the large number of small arms still easily available to former combatants. Insecurity for women also came from the lack of development which was responsible for inequality. Women had fewer opportunities to make money and avoid poverty while men sometimes had the option to resume fighting to avoid poverty. For more information, see Willems et al, page 39.

[3]Trust in the police has been a serious concern as reports of former combatants being involved in local criminal activities have served to erode public trust. The military does not have the same public perception problem because of its more professional composition and has fewer day to day interactions with citizens, meaning there are far fewer chances for positive or negative interactions with the military. Citizens first-hand accounts continue to reinforce the notion that public perception takes a long time to change and is affected by social stigma. For more information, see Willems et al, page 38.

[4]As SSR continues to advance in Burundi, the role of NGOs needs to be continually diminishing. The NGOs currently are well respected by the citizens and that respect needs to be gradually transferred to the local institutions. As communities begin to see that former combatants have valuable skills to offer the communities, they will be viewed less as burdens and more so as valued members. For more information, see Willems et al, page 49.*

*Advisory Services and Technical Assistance for Burundi - United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (2005)

http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/E/CHR/resolutions/E-CN_4-RES-2005-75.doc

An Assessment of Armed Violence in Burundi - Geneva Declaration (2009) http://www.genevadeclaration.org/fileadmin/docs/Geneva-Declaration-Armed-Violence-Burundi-EN.pdf

Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi (August 2000) https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/sites/default/files/accords/Arusha_Peace_Accord____.pdf

Burundi Government Forces Closure of UN Human Rights Office - Time (2019)

http://time.com/5545568/burundi-closure-un-rights-office/

Closure of BNUB - United Nations Office in Burundi (March 14, 2017) https://bnub.unmissions.org/closure-bnub

Connecting Community Security and DDR: Experiences from Burundi - Peace Security and Development Network (November 2010) https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/4BBDB2E419277B7D852577D5005A8A9A-Full_Report.pdf

Mines Advisory Group’s Physical Security and Stockpile Management Program - Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (2012)

https://www.gichd.org/fileadmin/GICHD/topics/development/ma_development-2/AVR/AVR-Burundi-MAG-case-study-Sep2012.pdf

Security Sector Reform Monitor No. 1 - Centre of International Governance Innovation (2009) https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/121177/SSRM%20Burundi%20No%201.pdf

Security Sector Reform Monitor No. 2 - Centre of International Governance Innovation (2010) https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/121189/SSRM%20Burundi%20No%202.pdf

Situation of Human Rights in Burundi - United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (2000)

http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/E/CHR/resolutions/E-CN_4-RES-2000-20.doc

There Are Signs of Renewed Ethnic Violence in Burundi - Washington Post (2015)

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2015/12/15/there-are-signs-of-renewed-ethnic-violence-in-burundi/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.14fe6b29b186

*

*Human Rights Watch. Everyday Victims: Civilians in the Burundian War, 22 December 2003.

The central focus of this paper is the role of the FDD and FNL combatants in their conflicts and also in the signing of the Pretoria Protocols. It exposes the violent extortion of Burundi civilians at the hands of both groups and details some of the atrocities committed on both sides of the conflict. Within this is the statement of PA-Amasekanya and their refusal to relent their fight against a government which they perceive as taking part in "a diabolical plan for exterminating the Tutsi." of Burundi. This paper also takes a look at the pursuit of justice by the Burundi government and the lack of substantive action undertaken by it.

International Security Sector Advisory Team. “Burundi SSR Background Note.” International Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT), DCAF/ISSAT, 2017.

This paper examines a broad spectrum of issues as they relate to the SSR process in Burundi. Central to this piece are the “Oversight Bodies” which govern the specific sector reform. Included in this is police reform, defence reform, justice reform, and prison reform, all realms in critical need of some sort of international SSR intervention. This paper situates the ethnic issues of Burundi within the wider realm of African conflict as seen in countries such as Rwanda. In its conclusion, the author takes a look at the future of Burundi and the recent escalation of violence as a call to international intervention in the region.

J.Andrew Grant, Spencer Hamilton. (2016) Norm dynamics and international organizations: South Africa in the African Union and International Criminal Court. Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 54:2, pages 161-185.

This paper looks at the role that South Africa has played in the African Union, specifically in regards to peacekeeping operations in Africa. South Africa was tasked with overseeing the African Union Mission in Burundi and the paper looks at the mission’s interests as they relate to South Africa’s greater interests. The paper provided valuable insight into the work of the AUMB as well as the political ramifications for the signing of The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement. While the course was not about Burundi specifically, the information is still well written and pertains to this project. The paper concludes by assessing the dynamics of South Africa’s commitment to the African Union and International Criminal Court.

Moore, Jina. "Burundi's Leader Can Extend His Term. His African Peer Take Notes." The New York Times, May 17, 2018. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/17/world/africa/burundi   president-nkurunziza-referendum.html?rref=collection%2Ftimestopic%2FBurundi

Moore’s article highlights what the political arena in Burundi looks like today. This article focuses on President Pierre Nkurunziza, who has been Burundi’s longest-serving president. However, not all citizens have like the way he has kept power. He held a referendum that allowed the leader to have longer term lengths and granted him another term. The referendum faced protests in the streets, a failed coup and forced thousands of people to leave the country. Moore’s article highlights that although a lot has been done insofar as SSR and ending the conflict, more has to be done to create power checks and balances among the state’s leaders to fully modernize the country.

Nindorera, Wilen. “Security Sector Reform in Burundi: Issues and Challenges for Improving Civilian Protection.” The North-South Institute, 2007.

This paper was very similar to Powell’s paper insofar as Nindorera believed that security forces were the main issue and catalyst for conflict in Burundi. Nindorera claims that a major issue that the police force was facing was in regards to the views that the citizens of Burundi had towards their behaviour. Nindorera goes so far as claiming that at the peak of the conflict, the military was the “nerve centre of power”, however, the current state of the army is much more subdued and is even viewed positively in the eyes of the public. This paper helped in narrowing down the issues that Burundi had during the conflict, and outlined the steps that they have taken in resolving it.

Powell, Kristina. “Security Sector Reform and the Protection of Civilians in Burundi: Accomplishments, Dilemmas and Ideas for International Engagement .” The North-South Institute, 2007.

Powell’s article delves into the idea that the central way to solve the conflict in Burundi is through Security Sector Reform (SSR). In particular, Powell focusses on how the military and police need a provision in organization, structure and composition that will make the security forces act in a professional manner and adhere to human rights norms to provide security to all Burundians, regardless of their ethnic make-up. She also discusses how the governments of both Tanzania and South Africa, as well as the Organization of African Unity, have taken on proactive roles to mitigate the Burundian conflict. She ends the paper by stating that although a lot has been done in Burundi insofar as reform, there are still areas for improvement, such as better coordination of the police and the continuation of civilian disarmament.

Willems, R.C. & Kleingeld, J & Van Leeuwen, Mathijs. (2010). Connecting Community Security and DDR: Experiences from Burundi.

The report is the result of ten weeks of field work done by the Peace Security and Development Network (PSDN) working group on community security and community-based Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR). The majority of the information came from interviews of locals who had DDR taking place in their communities. The report specifically examines the successes and failures of the DDR in the specific areas of security, judicial reform, and political reform. The report serves an important role in increasing understanding of how effective the people of Burundi perceive the reforms to be. In conclusion, the report explains why for the most part the reforms have been unsuccessful and gives recommendations for all sectors on how to continue improving Burundi. *

* Amnesty International, Burundi: Struggle for survival: Immediate action vital to stop killings, 1 July 1995, AFR 16/07/1995.

"Amnesty International Report 1994 - Burundi." Amnesty International, 1994. https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a9fc3c.html

Barnette, George A. “Burundi.” SAGE Knowledge: Encyclopedia of Social Networks, 2011.

"Burundi (1962-Present)." University of Central Arkansas. https://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/sub-saharan-africa-region/burundi-1962-present/

“Burundi.” CARE. 2017. https://www.care.org/country.burundi

"Burundi Enacts Media Law that Reporters say Curbs Press Freedom."  Reuters, June 4, 2013. https://www.reuters.com/article/burundi-rights-idUSL5N0EG3FZ20130604

"Burundi's Government Boycotts Peace Talks." Africa News, October 30, 2018.  https://www.africanews.com/2018/10/30/burundi-government-boycotts-peace-talks/

“Burundi.” International Criminal Court/Cour Penale Internationale (ICC/CPI).2017.

“Burundi Profile - Timeline.” BBC News, BBC, 3 Dec. 2018. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13087604

“Burundi SSR Background Note.” International Security Sector Advisory Team, 2017,https://issat.dcaf.ch/Learn/Resource-Library/Country-Profiles/Burundi-SSR-Background-Note#general%20overview

“Burundi: UN Rights Office Forced to Close.” Time, Time, 6 Mar. 2019.

Edmonds, Martin, Greg Mills, and Terence McNamee. "Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and Local Ownership in the Great Lakes: The Experience of Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of Congo." African Security, vol. 2, no. 1, 2009, pp. 29-58. p.32

Fransen, Sonja. "The Socio‐Economic Sustainability of Refugee Return: Insights from Burundi." Population, Space and Place, vol. 23, no. 1, 2017.

Gladstone, Rick, and Simons, Marlise. “We're Not Done Yet, Hague Court Tells Burundi's Leaders.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 9 Nov. 2017.

Human Rights Watch, Everyday Victims: Civilians in the Burundian War, 22 December 2003.

"International Commission of Inquiry for Burundi: Final Report." United States Institute of Peace, 2004, pp. 1-67. https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/resources/collections/commissions/Burundi-Report.pdf 

“Integrating Gender into Security Sector Reform in Burundi.” International Alert, 2011. https://www.international-alert.org/news/integrating-gender-security-sector-reform-burundi

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J. Andrew Grant, Spencer Hamilton. (2016) Norm dynamics and international organizations: South Africa in the African Union and International Criminal Court. Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 54:2, pages 161-185.

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