Marginalized Youth and Child Soldiers

Prior to the conflict erupting in 1991, there were very few education and job opportunities for youth in Sierra Leone, which caused them to become increasingly marginalized and alienated in society. As a result, many youths resorted to enlisting in the RUF rather than seeking the few employment and education avenues open to them. This led to the creation of the children’s component of the DDR program in Sierra Leone, which largely aimed to demobilize and reintegrate child soldiers back into their families and communities. This resource within the DDR program, that addressed the needs of child soldiers, was instrumental in the success of SSR in Sierra Leone.

Volatile State

The constant volatility and instability of the Sierra Leone Government throughout the entire war weakened the effectiveness of SSR that international actors, namely the UK, were working to implement. The lack of stable government led to a growing need for formal democratic elections, which were brought about through the SSR process due to the progressed ability of citizens of Sierra Leone to exercise their democratic franchise.

Diamonds

The abundance of diamonds in certain regions of Sierra Leone largely funded the RUF and provided an incentive and funding for violence. In order to slow and cut the economic lifeline of armed factions, namely the RUF, SSR needed to play a role in intercepting the illegal flow of diamonds and ensuring that the illegal trade in “blood diamonds” did not overlap with the legal mining and trade of diamonds. By doing this, SSR activities attempted to cut off the economic means that fueled rebels in the war.

Weak Security Structures

Sierra Leone’s lack of strong security structures lead to the breakdown of them altogether during the civil war. In order to reestablish state legitimacy, Sierra Leone’s SSR process required the restructuring and transformation of the country’s security structures and institutions, which in turn would strengthen and solidify internal security as to prevent future conflict from breaking out.

STATE:

Sierra Leone Armed Forces (SLAF)

Before the beginning of the civil war in 1991, the Sierra Leone Armed Forces were disorganized and weak. Due to insufficiency in equipment and lack of personnel, the army failed in protecting its people during the civil war. Recruitment into the SLAF was conducted without standard criteria. Therefore, many soldiers had criminal records. This resulted in gross violations of human rights by the SLAF throughout the course of the war, which consequently led to very little support of the military from the rest of society.

Sierra Leone Police (SLP)

By 1999, Sierra Leone Police (SLP) were unaccountable and ineffective. They failed to deliver effective policing services when human right violations occurred, and corruption was largely present within the police hierarchy.

Sierra Leone People's Party

Sierra Leone People’s Party was founded in 1951. It is one of the two dominant political parties in Sierra Leone. In the 1996 presidential election, Ahmad Tejan Kabbah was elected and the SLPP took power. The SLPP formed the government once again in 2002 when Kabbah was reelected.

NON-STATE:

Revolutionary United Front (RUF)

The Revolutionary United Front was a rebel military force that acted as the main opposer of the Sierra Leone government throughout the civil war from 1991-2002. Led by Foday Sankoh, the RUF committed gross atrocities that claimed some 50,000 lives and displaced two million people. They took steps to formally restore peace with the Sierra Leone government in both the Lomé Peace Agreement and Abidjan Peace Accord, but ultimately failed to follow the terms of each, therefore prolonging the civil war even further.

Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC)

The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council was a band of Sierra Leone rebels who banded together with the RUF following the overthrow of President Kabbah as a result of the Abidjan Peace Accord unravelling. The AFRC participated in many various armed attacks alongside RUF forces, but were ultimately left with no choice but to withdraw and disaram when the war finally came to a close in 2002.

National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC)

The National Provisional Ruling Council, led by Valentine Strasser, was a military junta that was established as a result of the military coup that overthrew President Joseph Momoh in 1992. The NPRC was in power until 1996, when they agreed to allow democratic elections to take place again. They then handed power over Ahmed Tejan Kabbah, the winner of the 1996 presidential election.

Civil Defense Force Kamajors

The Civil Defense Forces were a paramilitary group that supported President Kabbah and his government against the combined RUF and AFRC forces. Many CDF soldiers were Kamajors from the ethnic Mende group of Sierra Leone.

NGOS/CIVIL SOCIETY/GOVERNMENT AGENCIES:

United Kingdom Department for International Development (DFID)

The UK’s Department for International Development worked in coordination with DAI, an international development organization, to fund the Access to Security and Justice Programme (ASJP) in Sierra Leone from 2011-2016. By providing grants to over thirty civil society organizations, ASJP aimed to consolidate peace and stability by increasing access to responsive, accountable, and effective security and justice services, especially for the poor, vulnerable, and those living in remote and marginalized areas of the country.¹

International Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT)

ISSAT has provided significant support to the SSR process in Sierra Leone, which has continued past the completion of AJSP in 2016. ISSAT’s main focus is reform of the Sierra Leone Police, which it is supporting with investment to strengthen its systems and structures.²

Local Police Partnership Boards (LPPBs)

The Local Police Partnership Boards was established in each police division by the Sierra Leone Police force to create greater public trust and confidence in the security sector that has been lacking since the end of the civil war in 2002. The LPPBs seek to ensure more effective and accountable delivery of policing services, and most importantly, improved relationships, understanding, and trust between communities and local police in Sierra Leone.³

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

The United Nations Development Programme has worked in conjunction with the UK’s DFID to help shape the role and build the capacity of civil society in order to improve the security sector of post-war Sierra Leone through the support of grants and the provision of proper training.⁴

West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP)

In Sierra Leone, WANEP has contributed to SSR by coordinating and strengthening civil society and its relationship with the state to avoid future conflict and promote peacebuilding.

¹ “Sierra Leone-Access to Security and Justice Programme (ASJP).” · DAI: International Development, www.dai.com/our-work/projects/sierra-leone-access-security-and-justice-programme-asjp.

² Bangura, Ibrahim, “The Gradual Emergence of Second Generation Security Sector Reform in Sierra Leone” (2017): 15.

³ International Security Sector Advisory Team. “Sierra Leone: Local Policing Partnership Boards.”, issat.dcaf.ch/Learn/Resource-Library/Case-Studies/Sierra-Leone-Local-Policing-Partnership-Boards.

⁴ Bangura 12.

United Nations (UN)

The United Nations created the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone to assist parties in the implementation of the Lomé Peace Agreement. They were present from 1999 to 2005 and oversaw security sector reform, democratic elections and other post-conflict rebuilding.¹

Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG)

ECOMOG supplied forces, primarily Nigerian, to support the government and combat rebels throughout the conflict, most notably after the RUF-AFRC coup in 1997. They monitored the peace talks between the government and the rebels, and ensured the terms were enforced.²

Executive Outcomes (EO)

The Executive Outcomes were a private South African military company hired by the Strasser government to defeat the RUF. They were present in Sierra Leone from 1995 until shortly after the Abidjan Peace Accord in 1997.³

United Kingdom (UK)

The United Kingdom was a major supporter of peacebuilding in Sierra Leone, and following the unsuccessful implementation of the Lomé Peace Agreement, deployed troops to secure peace on the ground. They were also heavily involved in the post-conflict reconstruction of Sierra Leone.⁴

Guinea

Guinea accepted thousands of refugees from Sierra Leone into the country during the conflict. Guinea was also home to the exiled Kabbah government following the RUF-AFRC coup⁵ from 1997-1998.

Liberia

Liberian leader Charles Taylor reportedly supplied and supported the RUF in Sierra Leone, providing them with weapons and funds.⁶

¹ Osman Gbla, “Security Sector Reform under International Tutelage in Sierra Leone” (2006): 80.

² David H. Ucko “Can Limited Intervention Work? Lessons from Britain’s Success Story in Sierra Leone” (2006): 855.

³ Jeremy Ginifer, “The Challenge of the Security Sector and Security Reform Processes in Democratic Transitions: The Case of Sierra Leone” (2006): 790.

⁴ Ucko 853.

⁵ Gbla 82.

⁶ Ucko 853.

Weak and Undisciplined Sierra Leone Armed Forces

The Sierra Leone Armed Forces were politicized and unorganized. Inheriting the corruptive and interdisciplinary characteristics from the NPRC, the former ruling party of the pre-war period, the SLAF did not have a sufficient recruitment system in place, which lead to the enlistment of incompetent, unqualified, and undisciplined soldiers. The SLAF had very little power in the conflict as a result. When the RUF violated the ceasefire agreement and seized Freetown in 1999, the SLAF did not have the capacity to defeat the rebel forces. Because of Sierra Leone’s weak military, President Kabbah was ultimately overthrown in May 1997, forcing him and his government to flee to Guinea.

Lack of Funding and Staff in Sierra Leone Police

Before the eruption of war in 1991, the Sierra Leone Police force was relatively weak and ineffectual, and only had 3,500 staff in total to operate all police divisions across the country. Although proper police training was mainly conducted by the United Kingdom, the SLP still lacked the discipline that was required in an effective and accountable police force. The disregard and transgression that the SLP demonstrated caused the Sierra Leone people to have very little trust and confidence in them. During the war, in order to recruit more soldiers to join the anti-rebel force, the policing system adopted an inappropriately loose set of criteria, which led to the enlistment of ex-criminals. Many of these undisciplined soldiers had previously been involved in sexual abuses and corruptions. While training still proceeded,  and the SLP increased  police officers’ awareness of the importance of protecting human rights, it was still ineffective at protecting civilians due to a lack of funding. Without sufficient funding, there is not enough to pay decent salaries to police officers, or provide them with adequate weapons and equipment.

Youth Marginalization

During the civil war, many youths were engaging in the conflict both as combatants and victims. Although the DDR process was conducted while the conflict was ongoing and into the post-war period, the programme was not entirely effective in the reintegration aspect of former child soldiers. Many youths who were affected by or participated in the war failed to fully transition back into their communities even years after the conflict had ended. They struggled to find a place and purpose in society, many of whom entered the war as children but were leaving it as adults.

Incomplete Reintegration of Ex-combatants

The DDR programme was one of the greatest successes of the SSR process in post-conflict Sierra Leone. The programme succeeded in disarming 70,000 combatants, and then provided them with the proper skills training that were intended to help them reintegrate back into civilian society. However, studies have shown that a large proportion of ex-combatants encountered difficulties re-adapting to their community lives. Those who participated in the horrible violence and atrocities of the war were not always accepted back into their families and communities. Therefore, the incomplete reintegration of ex-combatants in the DDR programme created a significant barrier for, effective, successful SSR.

Security Sector Reform (SSR) in Sierra Leone has often been praised by the international community as being a large success. The United Nations have described Sierra Leone as a “shining model in West Africa and beyond”¹, and the state’s ability to hold democratic elections and not return to conflict are the focal point of success claims.² While maintaining peace is an important part of SSR, there still have been significant shortcomings in areas such as child soldier reintegration, police reformation, and economic stability that have hurt the SSR process. Post-conflict Sierra Leone has seen SSR to be successful and effective in creating security for the government and democratic process, however SSR has also been considerably less effective in addressing the security concerns of civilians.

Sierra Leone Armed Forces Restructuring:

The Lomé Peace Agreement put a strong emphasis on reforming and restructuring the SLAF in order to create a force that the government would be able to rely on to maintain stability, resulting in the Military Reintegration Program³. Led by British forces, military training courses were implemented that focused on effectiveness, accountability, weapons training, and laws of armed conflict, with additional training provided to commanders and sergeants on budget management, international humanitarian law, civil-military relations and regional security.⁴ To assist with civilian oversight, a new Ministry of Defence was established. Civilians were placed in senior positions, such as Deputy Minister of Defence and Director General, who are expected to communicate with parliament and report on the expenditure of public funds on defence.⁵ This reform has been largely effective, considering that only a few years before, the SLAF was unable to control any territory outside of Freetown. Therefore, the handing over of the Sierra Leone’s security operations to the government from the UN in 2004 was a major improvement.⁶

Despite improvements made in the SLAF’s capacity to provide security to the government, it has been less effective in gaining public support. There has been concern that the lack of screening of recruits employed soldiers who partook in crimes against civilians during the conflict, resulting in impunity and these individuals remaining in positions to potential abuse civilians again⁷. This remains one of the major problems with the restructuring of the SLAF, and has hurt public trust in the military.

Sierra Leone Police Reform

Similarly to the SLA, the Sierra Leone Police (SLP) went under major reform in the areas of transparency, accountability, and improving relationships with civilians. A Complaints, Discipline, and Investigation Department was created, as well as a Community Relations Department and a Family Support Units. These were established to handle sexual abuse against women and children, and new training was then initiated to include human rights education and transitional justice issues.⁸ These improvements have strengthened the commitment to democratic governance which has worked to increase the capacity of the government to operate democratically, including holding formal democratic elections.

However, similar to the SLAF, the weak recruitment screening of the SLP has resulted in former combatants employed in positions of power over communities they once abused, as well as allegations of corruption and extortion from civilians.⁹ The focus again seems to be on creating a security sector that supports a strong base for the government, at the expense of justice for civilians.

Combatant Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration

Disarmament and demobilization were seen as another big success in Sierra Leone’s SSR program. DDR centres were established where ex-combatants could come and surrender their weapons in exchange for cash and reintegration assistance, including skills training and educational programs.¹⁰ This program resulted in the disarmament and demobilization of an estimated 70,000 combatants¹¹, greatly lessening the number of armed insurgents that would be a threat to the new democratic government and therefore furthering state security progress.

However, reintegration efforts were considerably less successful. Far less resources were devoted to reintegration, and a 2005 survey found that the likelihood of ex-combatants reintegrating back into the community had little to do with their reintegration assistance and more to do with the level of abuse the community suffered at the hands of the former combatant group.¹² Another major shortfall of the DDR program was the exclusion of children and women in the process. To receive the full benefits of the DDR program, a piece of artillery was required to be turned over, while ‘eligible’ children would be sent to participate in a separate DDR process.¹³ Most children and women were not in positions to possess artillery or found ineligible for alternate programs due to funding constraints, leaving them out of the reintegration program.¹⁴ Unintegrated ex-combatants were seen as less of a threat to security than armed and mobile insurgents by many officials.¹⁵ Therefore,  the Sierra Leone government made little attempts to remedy this deficit in reintegration support despite the high rates of youth unemployment and undereducated workforce it created.

Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (IPRSP)

The Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper focused on the trickle-down effect of security on poverty. The first goal of the strategy focused on SSR that would allow for the implementation of anti-poverty programs.¹⁶ While the security provided did allow for more economic development than during the conflict, poverty, and unemployment are still rampant problems in Sierra Leone.¹⁷ Unemployed and restless youth remain a prominent issue, and provide a recruitment base for insurgents, as well as sources of civil disobedience and crime. Rural communities have also not seen the dividends of security reforms, and are still facing high levels of poverty, unemployment and lack of basic services such as power supplies and water.¹⁸

Democratic Governance

The SSR program in Sierra Leone allowed for democratic elections to be held consistently since 2002 without a relapse of violence. In this sense, the security provided to the government as a result of SSR programs, establishing strong security institutions, have been effective in Sierra Leone. However, in regard to the improvement of feelings of security by the civilian population, less positive results can be seen. This dissidence may be reflective of the purpose of SSR to achieve security for a democratic government as rapidly as possible, and as a result, this lets reforms for civilian security concerns fall behind.

¹UNOWAS, “The SSR Experience of Sierra Leone, a Shining Model in West Africa and Beyond” (2017).

² Jermey Ginifer, “The Challenge of the Security Sector and Security Reform Processes in Democratic Transitions: The Case of Sierra Leone” (2006): 791.

³ Mohamed Sesay and Mohamed Suma, Transitional Justice and DDR: The Case of Sierra Leone (2009): 12.

⁴ Osman Gbla, “Security Sector Reform under International Tutelage in Sierra Leone” 2006, 83.

⁵ Ginifer 799-800.

⁶ Adedeji Ebo, “The Challenges and Lessons of Security Sector Reform in Post-Conflict Sierra Leone” (2006): 482.

⁷ Ginifer 801.

⁸ Sesay and Suma 13.

⁹ Ginifer 803.

¹⁰ UNICEF, The Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Children Associated with the Fighting Forces (2005): 5.

¹¹ Sesay and Suma, 15.

¹² Sesay and Suma 15.

¹³ UNICEF 6.

¹⁴ Gbla 89.

¹⁵ Sesay and Suma 15.

¹⁶ Gbla 88.

¹⁷ Ebo 490.

¹⁸ Ebo 491.

UN Sierra Leone Peacebuilding Cooperation Framework 2007:

https://unipsil.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/old_dnn/PBCSLE9.pdf

Abidjan Peace Agreement 1996:

https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/sites/default/files/accords/Abidjan_Peace_Plan_1996.pdf

Lomé Peace Agreement 1999:

https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/SL_990707_LomePeaceAgreement.pdf

Official UNAMSIL Website:

https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unamsil/release2003.html?fbclid=IwAR1A_RRtcfiPpLeJ7acN1QXuLmXZ2e2qZ1OwP-P40ApTW1XEBc1qDFJvhUY

UNICEF Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration of Children Associated with Fighting Forces:

https://www.unicef.org/wcaro/WCARO_SL_Pub_LesLearntChildSoldiers.pdf

Abuja Ceasefire Agreement 1995:

https://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/fullpeace/SiL%2020001110.pdf

Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper:

https://www.imf.org/external/np/prsp/2001/sle/01/063101.pdf

Sierra Leone Defence White Paper:

https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/156808/SierraLeone.pdf

Human Rights Watch Report on Sierra Leone 2005:

https://www.hrw.org/legacy/wr2k5/pdf/sierra.pdf

Human Rights Report 1999:

https://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/sierra/SIERLE99.htm

1)   Albrecht, Peter, and Paul Jackson. 2015. Securing Sierra Leone, 1997-2013: Defence, Diplomacy and Development in Action. RUSI, 2014. Retrieved from: https://www-taylorfrancis-com.ezproxy.library.ubc.ca/books/e/9781317334460

This book examines how the state-building process through security sector reform evolved over time in Sierra Leone. By offering a comprehensive analysis of the UK’s contribution to the reconstruction of Sierra Leone that stretched from the very height of the war in 1997, through the post-war period and into 2013, Albrecht and Jackson demonstrate how UK intervention was instrumental and successful in the rebuilding and development of the nation. It highlights the impact of the UK’s engagement and how it has shaped the international intervention missions of other nations in Sierra Leone. This study allows us a more in depth look at the UK’s involvement in the Sierra Leone conflict, and additionally shows us how international actors can take to contribute, improve and sustain state-building efforts in Sierra Leone through SSR.

2) Baker, Bruce. Sierra Leone Police Reform: the Role of the UK Government. Retrieved from: http://www3.grips.ac.jp/~pinc/data/10-06.pdf

This article is written by Bruce Baker from the Coventry University. It focuses on the evaluation of the UK government’s role in Sierra Leone Police reform. In the article, Baker examines the SLP reform program through critical analysis and questions whether the reform was conducted in accordance to understanding of the local political context. He points out that Sierra Leone is a hybrid state rather than a failed Western society, and that ignoring this fact will lead the project in wrong directions. The article provides critical perspective on reform of the SLP in relation to the SSR process in Sierra Leone.

3) Bangura, Ibrahim. The Gradual Emergence of Second Generation Security Sector Reform in Sierra Leone. Centre for Security Governance, 2017, The Gradual Emergence of Second Generation Security Sector Reform in Sierra Leone. Retrieved from: secgovcentre.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Second-Generation-SSR-in-Sierra-Leone-January-2017.pdf.

This article is written by Dr. Ibrahim Bangura, an expert who specializes in DDR and SSR in Sierra Leone. Dr. Bangura mentions the initial SSR program in Sierra Leone, and how it focused on the transformation of state actors, such as the military and the police, due to the fact that the war was still ongoing while SSR was taking place. Bangura states that this first “generation” of SSR was instrumental in getting the SSR process where it is today in Sierra Leone, but also led to a number of problems, such as the corruption of state armed forces and police caused by a lack of monitoring from civilian society.  Bangura speaks of the importance of second generation SSR to help international actors and civil society organizations contribute to even greater success in future SSR missions in Sierra Leone. This academic source provides many insights on the weakness of first generation SSR, but more importantly, offers key resolutions to the current problems through second generation SSR.

4)   Ebo, Adedeji. 2006. “The Challenges and Lessons of Security Sector Reform in Post-Conflict Sierra Leone.” Conflict, Security & Development, vol. 6, no. 4, 2006, pp. 481–501. Retrieved from: https://www-tandfonline-com.ezproxy.library.ubc.ca/doi/abs/10.1080/14678800601066447

This article evaluates the main elements of the SSR process in post-conflict Sierra Leone, highlighting the most essential mechanisms that is required in an effective and responsible security sector. While Ebo speaks to the many significant successes of SSR in Sierra Leone in the post-war years, such as the restoration of public safety and reestablishment of state legitimacy by the strengthening of internal security, he also notes the gaps in SSR that have yet to be closed. Ebo cautions that SSR can be successful only as part of an “overarching democratic post-conflict reconstruction framework”. He implies that SSR must be ingrained into the democratic governance of the security sector in order to be successful, and if not implemented, conflict could actually arise as a result. This article shows us where SSR in Sierra Leone has gone right, but also where it has gone wrong in terms of its deficiencies and shortcomings. Most importantly, Edo calls our attention to the idea that SSR can perhaps only be fully effective if it is enforced by strong democratic governance, and stresses the importance of this framework in a post-conflict Sierra Leone.

5)   Ginifer, Jeremy. 2006. “The Challenge of the Security Sector and Security Reform Processes in Democratic Transitions: The Case of Sierra Leone.” Democratization, vol. 13, no. 5, 2006, pp. 791–810. Retrieved from: https://www-tandfonline-com.ezproxy.library.ubc.ca/doi/abs/10.1080/13510340601010693

This article uses the case study of Sierra Leone to demonstrate the intersections between democracy assistance and democratization, and SSR in relation to democratic transitions in conflict-prone countries. Ginifer suggests that SSR in Sierra Leone in particular, due to its lengthy and tumultuous history of past coups, abuse of civilians, and often volatile government, actually poses a risk to democratization and democratic reform. This is different take on SSR than we are used to hearing—we often speak of the SSR process as being purely beneficial to the state-building and development of countries struggling to regain their footing in post-war contexts. However, Ginifer depicts SSR as having a more of a negative connotation, and even goes on to imply that due to the growing disaffection in opposition parties and civil society towards the government, SSR actually acts as a disruptive factor to conflict. By looking at SSR through Ginifer’s more unconventional lens, we see where SSR can potentially cause more adverse effects than positive, especially in the case of Sierra Leone, but this can be resolved by adopting approaches that engage civil society and further civil protection in order to ensure more effective SSR in democratization.

6) Sesay, Mohamed, and Mohamed Suma. Transitional Justice and DDR: The Case of Sierra Leone . International Center for Transitional Justice, 2009, pp. 1–40, Transitional Justice and DDR: The Case of Sierra Leone. Retrieved from: https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-DDR-Sierra-Leone-CaseStudy-2009-English.pdf

This article, written by Sesay Mohamed and Mohamed Suma, evaluates the DDR process in Sierra Leone, specifically focusing on its impact on women and children in particular. The authors reveal that only a small proportion of female ex-combatants were engaged in the DDR program due to fear of abuse and systematic oversight. Sesay and Sumar also explore how many war-influenced children were not engaged in the DDR program because they did not possess the weapons that made them eligible for the program by handing them in, which they suggest as being one of the biggest downfalls of DDR in Sierra Leone. This article offers a closer perspective on the DDR program and its application on women and children specifically, highlighting where exactly it fell short. By looking into the drawbacks of DDR in the past, we were given a much better understanding of the overall success of the program in relation to women and children.

7)   Ucko, David H. 2015. “Can Limited Intervention Work? Lessons from Britain’s Success Story in Sierra Leone.” Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 39, no. 5-6, 2015, pp. 847–877. Retrieved from: https://www-tandfonline-com.ezproxy.library.ubc.ca/doi/abs/10.1080/01402390.2015.1110695

This article, written by David H. Ucko of the College of International Security Affairs at King’s College, speaks to the more limited approach of Western interventions in conflict-prone countries following the challenging campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. Ucko uses the example of British intervention in Sierra Leone to identify the conditions for effectiveness in Western interventions. He emphasizes the successes of this past mission in particular, but poses the question of whether or not a more limited approach would produce the same effectiveness in modern interventions. By looking closely at the factors that lead to the outcome of British intervention, Ucko ponders if limited intervention could achieve the desired political results as it did in the case of Sierra Leone. This article explores an alternative approach to intervention that international actors could take in future missions to Sierra Leone if conflict were to arise again, which would then, ideally, lead to effective and successful SSR just as it did the last time following the end of the civil war.

8) UNICEF, 2005. The Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of Children Associated with Fighting Forces. Retrieved from: https://www.unicef.org/wcaro/WCARO_SL_Pub_LesLearntChildSoldiers.pdf?fbclid=IwAR2P3f-H8TS6ZsWQrEubuj67Pd3NqcMcfdAasLzngOAIbMM_tIcgT05l2Ss

This is a report published by UNICEF, which provides specific details and critical analysis of the functionality and implementation of the child soldier DDR program in post-conflict Sierra Leone. It explains in great detail every component of child soldier DDR that was conducted in accordance with events that were occurring throughout the conflict, highlighting key steps in the process such as interim care, family tracing, and reunification. By providing compelling statistics and ample fact support, we were able to see just how successful and instrumental the children’s component of the DDR program was in helping the Sierra Leone civil war draw to a close.

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12. Ginifer, Jeremy. “The Challenge of the Security Sector and Security Reform Processes in Democratic Transitions: The Case of Sierra Leone.” Democratization, vol. 13, no. 5, 2006, pp. 791–810., doi:10.1080/13510340601010693.
13. International Security Sector Advisory Team. “Sierra Leone: Local Policing Partnership Boards.” International Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT), issat.dcaf.ch/Learn/Resource-Library/Case-Studies/Sierra-Leone-Local-Policing-Partnership-Boards.
14. Lagaida, Merryn. “Disarmament and Demobilisation in Sierra Leone.” Humanitarian Practice Network, June 2003, odihpn.org/magazine/disarmament-and-demobilisation-in-sierra-leone/.
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17. Sesay, Mohamed, and Mohamed Suma. Transitional Justice and DDR: The Case of Sierra Leone . International Center for Transitional Justice, 2009, pp. 1–40, Transitional Justice and DDR: The Case of Sierra Leone .
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