Question of Autonomy for Bougainville
Bougainville’s citizens have always experienced themselves as distinct from the peoples of Papua New Guinea. One of the main pillars of the 2001 Peace Agreement between Bougainville and the PNG national government is autonomy for Bougainville, with a referendum for complete independence occurring within 15 years of the election of the first Autonomous Bougainville Government.[1]

Establishing an Autonomous Bougainville Police Unit
For the stability of Bougainville as a region, it was necessary to create a police force that was partly built on local customs and culture. The Bougainville police was divided into two parts, one being the Bougainville Police Service (BPS) and the other being the Community Auxiliary Police (CAP), where the CAP works in the rural areas of the islands and incorporates many traditional Bougainvillean community governance principles.[2]

Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration
To ensure stability and lasting peace after the 2001 Peace Agreement, rebel groups including the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA) and the Bougainville Resistance Force (BRF) had to be reintegrated into society, and their arms given to the UN Observatory Mission to Bougainville (UNOMB). Anyone involved in the conflict received amnesties from the PNG national Government. As there was significant divisiveness in society, Councils of Elders liaised with community members and communicated to the UNOMB when the population was ready for ex-combatants to be reintegrated into society.[3][4]

Natural Resource Management
One of the root causes of the conflict was the imposition of foreign/international actors on Bougainville’s resources, most notably the Panguna mine. To fully resolve the conflict, it is important to address the aspects that lead to conflict, as well as reconcile the existing differences in Bougainville.[5] Therefore, it is important that Bougainville acquires autonomy over resources on their land, to create lasting peace.[6]

 

 

Notes

[1] Autonomous Bougainville Government. “Referendum.” ABG, Autonomous Bougainville Government, www.abg.gov.pg/peace-agreement/referendum.

[2] Dinnen, Sinclair, and Gordon Peake. “More Than Just Policing: Police Reform in Post-Conflict Bougainville.” International Peacekeeping, vol. 20, no. 5, 2013, pp. 570–584., doi:10.1080/13533312.2013.853961.

[3] Autonomous Bougainville Government. “Bougainville Peace Agreement: Signed at Arawa, 30th August, 2001.” Bougainville Peace Agreement: Signed at Arawa, 30th August, 2001, ABG, 2001. 62-69.

[4] Spark, Natascha & Jackie Bailey. “Disarmament in Bougainville: ‘guns in boxes’”, International Peacekeeping, vol. 12, no. 4, 2005, pp. 599-608, DOI: 10.1080/13533310500202025

[5] Reddy, Peter. “Reconciliation in Bougainville: Civil war, peacekeeping and restorative justice.” Contemporary Justice Review, vol. 11, no. 2, 2008. pp. 117-130, DOI: 10.1080/10282580802057744

[6] Autonomous Bougainville Government. "Bougainville Peace Agreement" 22-23.

State:

Government of Papua New Guinea (PNG)
PNG gained control of the island of Bougainville after their independence from Australia in 1975. Ethnic tensions between islanders and mainlanders in addition to disputes over resource distribution from the Panguna mine sparked conflict in 1988. PNG responded by sending the army to invade Bougainville which resulted in violent conflict until the March 1990 ceasefire [1]. PNG’s contributions to the BPA include the payment of annual Restoration and Economic Development grants to Bougainville [2], and making constitutional amendments to recognize the autonomy of Bougainville until the referendum on independence [3].

Autonomous Bougainville Government (ABG)
Created on June 15, 2005, the ABG has been instrumental in implementing provisions of the peace accords including disarmament, security sector reform and education about the referendum [4].

Previous to this government there was the Provincial Government of Bougainville set-up by the PNG government in 1976, followed by the Bougainville Interim Government (BIG) set up by the BRA as well as the Bougainville Transition Government (BTG) set up by PNG and BRF during the conflict.

Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary (RPNGC)
The national police force of Papua New Guinea that was deployed to police Bougainville when conflict broke out in 1989. They are currently leading the security sector reform and police training for Bougainville Police Services (BPS), but have their own internal issues relating to corruption [5].

Bougainville Copper Limited (BCL)
A mining company mainly owned by Conzinc Riotinto of Australia who operated the Panguna Copper Mine along with the PNG government. Conflicts surrounding the Panguna mine including resource exploitation, environmental degradation and indigenous land ownership served as a catalyst to the outbreak of war. The mine has been closed since 1989 and issues around ownership and distribution of resources, as well as ethnic reconciliation between locals and mine workers from the mainland, are security sector problems that still require reform [6].

 

Non-State:

Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA)
An organized paramilitary group of traditional landowners who forcibly closed the Panguna Mine in 1989. Ex-combatants have participated in the disarmament process which has collected 1,025 firearms. Many ex-BRA members have also reintegrated into society as police officers [7].

Me’ekamui Defence Force (MDF)
A rebel group lead by Francis Ona. The MDF was originally part of the BRA but split off during the peace process, arguing that Bougainville was already independent via the 1990 Universal Declaration of Independence. The MDF did not participate in peace process or in the disarmament process, which has limited the overall collection of firearms [8].

Bougainville Resistance Forces (BRF)
Bougainville rebel group that emerged to assist the side of the Papua New Guinea national defence forces. Their participation in the weapons disposal program has led to the collection of 596 firearms [9].

Bougainville Community Integrated Development Agency (BOCIDA)
The main humanitarian organization that provided food, clothing and medicine to those in government and BRA controlled areas during the conflict. The group is currently engaged in peace education, critical literacy, and reproductive health [10].

Bougainville Inter-Church Women’s Forum (BICWF)
A women’s group established in 1995 to become a united voice for peace. The group currently focuses its work on small business training and capacity building for women, as well as critical literacy [11].

Council of Elders
Groups of traditional local leaders who guide disarmament in rural areas of Bougainville. They also have a large part in the reconciliation process based around local traditions and customs and have become the new system of local government [12].

 

 

Notes

[1] UNPO. “History of Bougainville.” UNPO. https://unpo.org/article/34

[2] Collin, Katherine.“Peacemaking Referendums in Oceania: Making or Delaying Peace in New Caledonia and Bougainville.” Ethnopolitics, vol. 18, no. 2, 2019, p.151, . https://doi.org/10.1080/17449057.2018.1513726

[3] “Peace Accords Matrix.” Bougainville Peace Agreement | Peace Accords Matrix, University of Notre Dame, 2015, peaceaccords.nd.edu/accord/bougainville-peace-agreement.

[4] Ibid, 2015

[5] Papua New Guinea Post Courier. “Young Bougainvilleans Making a Difference in Policing.” Papua New Guinea Post-Courier. 28 November 2018. https://postcourier.com.pg/young-bougainvilleans-making-difference-policing/

[6] Braithwaite, John; Hilary Charlesworth, Peter Reddy & Leah Dunn. Reconciliation and Architectures of Commitment: Sequencing Peace in Bougainville. ANU E Press: Canberra. Web. 2010, p. 12-13. http://epress.anu.edu.au/??_citation.html

[7] “Peace Accords Matrix.” Bougainville Peace Agreement, 2015

[8] Ibid, 2015

[9] Ibid, 2015

[10] Garasu, Lorraine. “The Role of Women in Promoting Peace and Reconciliation.” Conciliation Resources, 2002, p. 29 https://www.c-r.org/downloads/Accord%2012_7The%20role%20of%20women%20in%20promoting%20peace%20and%20reconciliation_2002_ENG.pdf

[11] Ibid, 2002, p. 30

[12] Dinnen, Sinclair, and Gordon Peake. “More Than Just Policing: Police Reform in Post-Conflict Bougainville.” International Peacekeeping, vol. 20, no. 5, 2013, p. 575. doi:10.1080/13533312.2013.853961.

 

 

 

United Nations
The United Nations has set up the United Nations Peacebuilding Fund for Papua New Guinea to support the upcoming referendum determining the status of the autonomous region of Bougainville, through a roadshow, educating citizens on their rights and the referendum process.  The fund also supports disarmament and peacebuilding measures in the region that had been engulfed in civil war for over a decade [1].

Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)
PNG is part of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), were it receives security assistance in terms of funding and support. In 2018 Australia provided US$94.2 million toward security for APEC states, a significant proportion which will have been distributed to ongoing peace efforts in PNG [2].

Australia
Australia is PNG principle security partner, with the neighbouring nation committing US$411.3 million worth of security funding in 2018/19.  Furthermore, PM Scott Morrison and PNG Prime Minister have fortified relations between the two nations by signing a joint defence agreement, collaborating on security cooperation [3]. Despite the level of aid Australia has contributed to the hardships in PNG through the involvement in the Panguna Mine and the refugees crisis on Manus Island.

China
While Australia is PNGs most significant security partner, China is set to become the nation's largest assistance donor, committing US$4 billion to build a road network in PNG. PNGs geographic positioning in the Pacific makes is significant ally to have for both Australia and China, increasing the willingness of each nation to provide assistance [4].

 

 

Notes
[1] Human Rights Watch, “PNG Events of 2018,” World Report. 2018.https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/papua-new-guinea 

[2] Human Rights Watch, “PNG Events of 2018.”

[3] Amy Remeikis, “Scott Morrison and PNG’s PM Agree to Joint Naval Base on Manus Island” The Guardian. 2018.https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2018/nov/01/scott-morrison-and-papua-new-guineas-pm-agree-to-joint-naval-base-on-manus-island

[4] Human Rights Watch, “PNG Events of 2018.”

Persisting Police Corruption and Brutality
With over 40% of PNG population living in poverty, police corruption and brutality is significant. The brutal assaults of criminal suspects by police are rarely investigated or held accountable for their actions. Abusing their power, police and officials in positions of power are hinder progress in reform processes, particularly in related to violence around political matters including the last PNG election and the upcoming 2019 referendum determining Bougainville's independence [1].

“Non-binding,” Postponed Referendum
A significant barrier to effective security sector reform is the ‘non-binding’, postponed referendum, determining Bougainvilles independence from PNG. The referendum, originally scheduled for June of 2019 has been postponed four months until October 17th.  Leaders of both sides, PNG Prime Minister Peter O’Neill and Bouganville President John Momis agreed upon the new date due to the inability of adequate voter registration, primarily from a lack of funding.

Once the referendum takes place, the resulting outcome is ‘non-binding’ according to the PNG Prime Minister, with the PNG government required to debate the matter and make a concluding decision. This non-binding outcome of this referendum leaves little motivation for voters to participate or value the referendum and places the the future of Bougainville ultimately under PNG authority. Furthermore, if the referendum is not managed carefully it could disrupt Bougainvilles current state of peace [2].

Women’s Rights
Bougainville and PNG have severely infringed the rights of women, denying equal representation of women in parliament and protection from violence under the law. In the Bougainville government, only 3 out of 33 seats are reserved for women, they are only granted one representative from each region, whilst PNG parliament had no participating females following the 2017 election. There are efforts being made toward change, including PNGs ‘Vision 2050’ plan, dedicating a quota system to equal gender representation, however the current gender inequality is hindering a fair system to achieving security sector reform. Furthermore, following the 2013 Family Protection Act creation, criminalizing women from domestic violence, many police and prosecutors still regularly ignore investigations and cases in court, resorting to alternate methods including mediation and compensation, denying court access to the law [3].

Lack of Education and a Lack of Knowledge of Rights.
Access to education for the children of PNG is restricted heavily by geography and financial means, with many children forced to work. Furthermore, violence against children both within the home and by figures of authority including police is significantly hinders their access to knowledge.  The wider population of all ages is also limited to education and knowledge surrounding their rights and the political climate in which they leave, impeding the progress and potential success of security sector reform [4].

 

 

Notes
[1]  Human Rights Watch, “PNG Events of 2018,” World Report. 2018. https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/papua-new-guinea

[2] Tom Westbrook, “Bougainville Independence Vote Postponed to October,” Reuters, 2019 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-papua-bougainville/bougainville-independence-vote-delayed-to-october-idUSKCN1QI3XI

[3]Human Rights Watch, “PNG Events of 2018.”

[4]Human Rights Watch, “PNG Events of 2018.”

According to the University of Notre Dame’s “Peace Accords Matrix,” the 2001 Bougainville Peace Agreement has been 89 percent implemented, thus it can largely be considered a success [1]. Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programs such as the weapons disposal program, in addition to Security Sector Reform (SSR) to establish an autonomous Bougainville police service have been successful [2]. ‘Bottom-up’ reconciliation processes based on local traditions of forgiveness have also begun, and contributed to sustainable peace between the local groups [3], however structural issues still remain acting as a barrier to achieving positive peace [4].

The autonomous province of Bougainville is also set to have a referendum for full independence by the fall of 2020, based on the fulfillment of two conditions; weapons disposal and good government [5]. However, a significant drawback of the referendum is the fact that it will be ‘non-binding’, meaning that the National Government of Papua New Guinea has the authority to decide whether or not Bougainville can be granted full independence [6]. In either case, the referendum may restart the violence again should one side be unsatisfied with the outcome.

In terms of DDR, the weapons disposal program to collect and destroy firearms from the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA) and the Bougainville Resistance Force (BRF) has resulted in the collection of 81 percent of the firearms [7]. However, the Me’ekamui Defence Force (MDF) has up until now refused to participate in weapons disposal. This has further limited the political reform progress, since the referendum cannot be held until the weapons collection is completed [8]. Additionally, the presence of armed MDF groups controlling ‘no go zones’ could be considered spoilers for the referendum [9].

In terms of SSR, police training initiatives for the Bougainville Police Service (BPS) in the urban centers, and the Civilian Auxiliary Police (CAP) in rural communities have been widely successful [10]. Police training programs have decreased structural inequalities by allowing people from rural areas access to education and job training [11]. CAP specifically has been successful integrating police work into rural realities to increase local engagement with the police and ensure that local perspectives are considered in liberal peacebuilding processes [12]. These security sector reforms have also seen more women enter policing through CAP, thus helping reduce structural inequalities [13].

In addition to security sector reform, the BPA has also seen success with political reform. Collin argues that the model of interim autonomy before an independence referendum has created stability before a potentially polarizing vote [14]. Regan further argues that the BPA’s structure of incentives for the PNG government to recognize Bougainville’s autonomy in exchange for Bougainville’s participation in weapons disposal has served as confidence building measures for both parties [15]. The creation of the interim autonomy under the Autonomous Bougainville Government (ABG) has provided an environment for a successful ‘hybrid’ peace process that combines traditional bottom-up reconciliation with top-down political reform to take place [16]. However, Collin notes the ABG has not significantly improved relationships with the PNG government, and argues that a referendum is unlikely to be the final step in the peace process [17].

Despite these successes, there are several issues that still persist in Bougainville. One of the big barriers to positive peace, meaning a society free of structural violence, that allows everyone in society to reach their full potential, [18] is that women, and women’s rights have been largely ignored in the peace process. Only 3 out of 33 seats in the Bougainville Parliament are reserved for women, “to represent the interests of women” [19].

Further, the 2001 Peace Agreement does not mention the Panguna mine at all, which indicates that this part of the conflict has not been entirely solved. Dinnen and Peake refer to the area around the Panguna mine as a ‘no go zone’, [20] where the Bougainville Police Service (BPS) are not allowed to operate. To this extent, the 2001 Bougainville Peace Agreement fails in addressing the very root causes of the conflict, and while activity at the Panguna Mine has been suspended since 1989,[21] it also signals how peacebuilding in Bougainville is stuck at a conflict resolution stage, with not enough focus on solving the root causes of conflict.

While reconciliation efforts in Bougainville have largely taken into account local traditions and customs, and are thus more likely to achieve lasting peace, [22] further reforms in Bougainville as well as in Papua New Guinea more generally are needed. New reforms should focus on access to, and quality of education, as well as strengthening women’s rights, as these are issues that are preventing the emergence of positive peace in the area, and are described as problematic by organizations like Human Rights Watch [23]. Education is especially important because it gives young people something to do, thus increasing the threshold for returning to violence.

 

 

Notes

[1] “Peace Accords Matrix.” Bougainville Peace Agreement | Peace Accords Matrix, University of Notre Dame, 2015, peaceaccords.nd.edu/accord/bougainville-peace-agreement.

[2] Ibid., 2015.

[3] Regan, Anthony. “Bougainville, Papua New Guinea: Lessons from a Successful Peace Process,” The RUSI Journal, vol. 163, no. 6, 2018, p. 50-51 https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2018.1562020

[4] Galtung, Johan. "Violence, Peace, and Peace Research." Journal of Peace Research, vol. 6, no. 3, 1969, p.183. http://www.jstor.org/stable/422690.

[5] Autonomous Bougainville Government. “Bougainville Peace Agreement: Signed at

Arawa, 30th August, 2001.” Bougainville Peace Agreement: Signed at Arawa, 30th August, 2001, ABG, 2001, p. 58.

[6] Autonomous Bougainville Government. “Bougainville Peace Agreement,” p. 58.

[7] UN News. “Post-conflict Bougainville’s disarmament is progressing well, UN says.” UN News. 6 May 2004. https://news.un.org/en/story/2004/05/102662-post-conflict-bougainvilles-disarmament-process-progressing-well-un-says

[8] “Peace Accords Matrix.” Bougainville Peace Agreement, 2015.

[9] Collin, Katherine. “Peacemaking Referendums in Oceania: Making or Delaying Peace in New Caledonia and Bougainville.” Ethnopolitics, vol. 18, no. 2, 2019, p. 150. https://doi.org/10.1080/17449057.2018.1513726

[10] Dinnen, Sinclair, and Gordon Peake. “More Than Just Policing: Police Reform in Post-Conflict Bougainville.” International Peacekeeping, vol. 20, no. 5, 2013, p. 575-576. doi:10.1080/13533312.2013.853961.

[11] Papua New Guinea Post Courier. “Young Bougainvilleans Making a Difference in Policing.” Papua New Guinea Post Courier. 28 November 2018. https://postcourier.com.pg/young-bougainvilleans-making-difference-policing/

[12] Dinnen & Peake, “More Than Just Policing: Police Reform in Post-Conflict Bougainville,” 2013, p. 575-577.

[13] George, Nicole.“Liberal–Local Peacebuilding in Solomon Islands and Bougainville: Advancing a Gender-Just Peace?” International Affairs, vol. 94, no. 6, 2018, p.1345, https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiy193

[14] Collin, “Peacemaking Referendums in Oceania.” 2019, p. 139

[15] Regan.“Bougainville, Papua New Guinea: Lessons from a Successful Peace Process.” 2018, p. 51.

[16] Braithwaite, John; Hilary Charlesworth, Peter Reddy & Leah Dunn. Reconciliation and Architectures of Commitment:Sequencing Peace in Bougainville. ANU E Press: Canberra. Web. 2010, p. 68, http://epress.anu.edu.au/??_citation.html

[17] Collin, “Peacemaking Referendums in Oceania.” 2019, p. 140

[18] Galtung, Johan. "Violence, Peace, and Peace Research." Journal of Peace Research, vol. 6, no. 3, 1969, p.183. http://www.jstor.org/stable/422690.

[19] Autonomous Bougainville Government. “Parliament.” ABG, Autonomous Bougainville Government, www.abg.gov.pg/government/parliament.

[20] Dinnen, Sinclair, and Gordon Peake. “More Than Just Policing: Police Reform in Post-Conflict Bougainville.” International Peacekeeping, vol. 20, no. 5, 2013,10. 578, doi:10.1080/13533312.2013.853961.

[21] “The Origins of the Conflict.” Conciliation Resources, 23 July 2015, www.c-r.org/accord-article/origins-conflict.

[22] Reddy, Peter. “Reconciliation in Bougainville: Civil war, peacekeeping and restorative justice.” Contemporary Justice Review, vol. 11, no. 2, 2008. pp. 117-130, DOI:10.1080/10282580802057744

[23] Human Rights Watch, “PNG Events of 2018,” World Report.2018. https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/papua-new-guinea

Constitution of the National Government of Papua New Guinea 

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Papua_New_Guinea_2014.pdf 

Bougainville Peace Agreement (2001)

http://www.abg.gov.pg/uploads/documents/BOUGAINVILLE_PEACE_AGREEMENT_2001.pdf

Autonomous Bougainville Government Constitution 

http://www.abg.gov.pg/uploads/documents/BOUGAINVILLE_CONSTITUTION_2004.pdf

Papua New Guinea Family Protection Act (2013)

http://cfcpng.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/FAMILY-PROTECTION-ACT-2013.pdf

Autonomous Bougainville Government: Fact Sheet for Referendum

http://www.abg.gov.pg/uploads/documents/Fact_sheet_-_BPA_JOINT_KEY_MESSAGES_-_English.compressed_%281%29.pdf

Bougainville Community Policing Program: Independent Evaluation 

https://www.mfat.govt.nz/assets/Aid-Prog-docs/Evaluations/2013/Feb-2013/Bougainville-Commuity-Policing-Project-BCPP-Independent-Evaluation-February-2013-Public-Version.pdf

Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Bougainville (Papua New Guinea)

https://search.archives.un.org/uploads/r/united-nations-archives/6/5/f/65f7e4dd7df2f50d13ae0342ba15f154a7e2c6a7e5114557bd5cf62ba3052ba3/S-1096-0051-10-00009.pdf

The Honiara Declaration (1991)

https://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/fullpeace/PNG%2019910123.pdf

Bougainville Mining Amendment Act (2016)

http://www.abg.gov.pg/uploads/acts/16-02_Bougainville_Mining_%28Amendment%29_Act_2016.pdf

Letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Papua New Guinea addressed to the President of the UN Security Council. 

https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/PG_971010_The%20Burnham%20Truce.pdf

Braithwaite, John; Hilary Charlesworth, Peter Reddy & Leah Dunn. Reconciliation and Architectures of Commitment: Sequencing Peace in Bougainville. ANU E Press: Canberra. Web. 2010. http://epress.anu.edu.au/??_citation.html

This e-book provides a historical overview of the Bougainville conflict and outlines the success of the Bougainville Peace Process (BPA) in areas such as disarmament, reconciliation and political reform. The book argues that Bougainville has successfully implemented a ‘hybrid’ peace process which integrates bottom-up traditional and Christian reconciliation practices with top-down political reforms in the government and security sector. The authors not only provide an in-depth overview of the challenges and successes of the peace process, but also provide smaller case analyses of local initiatives relating to reconciliation or security sector reform which does an excellent job of bringing local perspectives to the forefront.

 

Collin, Katherine.“Peacemaking Referendums in Oceania: Making or Delaying Peace in New Caledonia and Bougainville.” Ethnopolitics, vol. 18, no. 2, 2019, pp.139-157, . https://doi.org/10.1080/17449057.2018.1513726

This article outlines the benefits of the peacebuilding model that promotes interim autonomy prior to an independence referendum to create political stability with secessionists, using the cases of Bougainville and New Caledonia. In the case of Bougainville, Collin argues that interim ABG autonomy has allowed for reconciliation between islanders to occur and bring stability to the island, but has not greatly improved relations with the government in Papua New Guinea. This article does a good job at focusing on the importance of integrating the “local” in liberal peacebuilding but does not go into much detail on how this process would succeed without it.

 

Dinnen, Sinclair, and Gordon Peake. “More Than Just Policing: Police Reform in Post-Conflict Bougainville.” International Peacekeeping, vol. 20, no. 5, 2013, pp. 570–584., doi:10.1080/13533312.2013.853961.

The article does a good job of explaining how the Community Auxiliary Police (CAP) in Bougainville is a result of the ‘local turn’ in peacebuilding efforts. It explains how the CAP are built on community oriented principles of community governance and dispute resolution, and operates in accordance with the Bougainville Police Service (BPS). However, the article puts significant importance on the fact that New Zealand is the implementing donor and how the success of the CAP is New Zealand’s achievement. This speaks to the critiques of the ‘local turn’, that it may still promote neoliberal ideas and the locals are only brought in during implementation stage of a policy, instead of being involved in the whole process.

 

George, Nicole.“Liberal–Local Peacebuilding in Solomon Islands and Bougainville: Advancing a Gender-Just Peace?” International Affairs, vol. 94, no. 6, 2018, pp.1329–1348, . https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiy193

This article assesses local-liberal peacebuilding in the Solomon Islands and Bougainville through a ‘vernacular security lens’ to understand the roles of women can inform liberal peacebuilding. George explains how hybridized peace processes that integrate liberal institution building with local traditions can give women a greater role in grassroots peace processes for instance, but limit their roles in other contexts, such as government peacebuilding policies. Additionally, the author’s focus on traditional perceptions of women’s roles as ‘mothers of the land’ in Bougainville culture provides additional insight into the structural challenges women still face gaining legitimacy of their authority as peacebuilders.

 

Reddy, Peter. "Reconciliation in Bougainville: Civil war, peacekeeping and restorative justice," Contemporary Justice Review, vol. 11 no. 2, 2008, pp.117-130, DOI: 10.1080/10282580802057744

Reddy explores how reconciliation took place in Bougainville, and pays special attention to the different outcomes around when women were included and excluded. He further talks about ‘restorative justice conferences,’ or reconciliation ceremonies and the different ways that reconciliation occurs in traditional Bougainvillean cultures. He concludes by stating that without these homegrown reconciliation practices, Bougainville would still be in crisis, and that this way of practicing reconciliation can inform other societies as well, and help divided societies achieve peace. 

 

Regan, Anthony. “Bougainville, Papua New Guinea: Lessons from a Successful Peace Process,” The RUSI Journal, vol. 163, no. 6, 2018, pp. 44-54, . https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2018.1562020

This article outlines the successes of the Bougainville Peace Accord (BPA) 22 years after the deal was signed, to understand what lessons it holds for future peace processes. Regan argues that reconciliation practices built on local traditions have largely contributed to the BPA’s success and would be difficult to replicate elsewhere. However, he also argues that the BPA’s  incentive structures for PNG and the resistance groups to comply to the terms of the peace deal are positive lessons that can be utilized in other contexts. Regan’s focus on the local reconciliation process also highlights the important scholarly debate of how liberal peacebuilding models can integrate local perspectives to create a hybrid ‘local-liberal peacebuilding.’ However, I think Regan’s insistence on the intrinsic locality of Bougainville reconciliations falls short of thoroughly analyzing the benefits of reconciliation, and how it can be altered for new contexts to create sustainable peace.

 

Spark, Natascha & Jackie Bailey. “Disarmament in Bougainville: ‘guns in boxes’”, International Peacekeeping, vol. 12, no. 4, 2005, pp. 599-608, DOI: 10.1080/13533310500202025

Spark and Bailey explore the Peace Monitoring Group’s (PMG) ‘guns in boxes’ approach to disarmament that was used in post-conflict Bougainville. They argue that it is a narrow DDR approach, but that it was a fitting approach in this particular context. The authors critique the lack of grassroots involvement in this process, despite Councils of Chiefs/Elders guiding the process in rural areas. Further, the DDR process in Bougainville focused heavily on traditional reconciliation practices within Bougainville. The authors conclude that the PMG’s ‘guns in boxes’ strategy was too narrow as it did not involve grassroots leaders, but that the PMG did well in not infringing on Bougainville’s autonomy by avoiding participation in reintegration activities. Finally, they argue that there should have been more room for grassroots leaders in the peace agreement. The article does well in exposing the nuances of successful DDR, and explaining what the PMG did right, as well as how they can improve.

 

Sturzaker, Damian, Craig Cawood. “The Sandline Affair Illegality and International Law”. Australian International Law Journal. 1999. Pp. 214 - 224. https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?collection=journals&handle=hein.journals/austintlj16&id=230&men_tab=srchresults

Sturzaker and Cawood examine the controversial agreement between the PNG government and the international, private military company, Sandline. They recount the brief relationship established between to parties and the potential harm it would have caused the Bougainville community. They then adopt a critical lens to explore the legality of both domestic and international law in protecting the rights of Bougainville citizens in the case of external participation. This article was particularly useful for exposing a potential threat to security and the complications of international involvement in conflict.

 

Autonomous Bougainville Government. “Bougainville Peace Agreement: Signed at Arawa, 30^th August, 2001.” Bougainville Peace Agreement: Signed at Arawa, 30th August, 2001, ABG, 2001. http://www.abg.gov.pg/uploads/documents/BOUGAINVILLE_PEACE_AGREEMENT_2001.pdf

 

Autonomous Government Bougainville. “Bougainville Mining (Amendment) Act.” 2016.http://www.abg.gov.pg/uploads/acts/16-02_Bougainville_Mining_%28Amendment%29_Act_2016.pdf

 

Autonomous Bougainville Government. “Joint Key Messages: No. 2 Fact Sheet.” 2016. http://www.abg.gov.pg/uploads/documents/Fact_sheet_-_BPA_JOINT_KEY_MESSAGES_-_English.compressed_%281%29.pdf

 

Braithwaite, John; Hilary Charlesworth, Peter Reddy & Leah Dunn. Reconciliation and Architectures of Commitment: Sequencing Peace in Bougainville. ANU E Press: Canberra. Web. 2010. http://epress.anu.edu.au/??_citation.html

 

Collin, Katherine.“Peacemaking Referendums in Oceania: Making or Delaying Peace in New Caledonia and Bougainville.” Ethnopolitics,vol. 18, no. 2, 2019, pp.139-157, . https://doi.org/10.1080/17449057.2018.1513726

 

Conciliation Resources. “The Origins of the Conflict.” Conciliation Resources, 23 July 2015, www.c-r.org/accord-article/origins-conflict.

 

Dinnen, Sinclair, & Gordon Peake. “Bougainville Community Policing Project Independent Evaluation." https://www.mfat.govt.nz/assets/Aid-Prog-docs/Evaluations/2013/Feb-2013/Bougainville-Commuity-Policing-Project-BCPP-Independent-Evaluation-February-2013-Public-Version.pdf

 

Dinnen, Sinclair, & Gordon Peake. “More Than Just Policing: Police Reform in Post-conflict Bougainville,” International Peacekeeping, vol. 20, no. 5, 2013.pp. 570-584, DOI: 10.1080/13533312.2013.853961

 

Galtung, Johan. "Violence, Peace, and Peace Research." Journal of Peace Research. vol.6, no. 3, 1969. pp 167-191. http://www.jstor.org/stable/422690.

 

Garasu, Lorraine. “The Role of Women in Promoting Peace and Reconciliation.” Conciliation Resources, 2002,p. 29 https://www.c-r.org/downloads/Accord%2012_7The%20role%20of%20women%20in%20promoting%20peace%20and%20reconciliation_2002_ENG.pdf

 

George, Nicole.“Liberal–Local Peacebuilding in Solomon Islands and Bougainville: Advancing a Gender-Just Peace?” International Affairs, vol. 94, no. 6, 2018, pp.1329–1348, . https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiy193

 

Government of Papua New Guinea. “Papua New Guinea’s Constitution of 1975 with Amendments through to 2014.” constituteproject.org. 2015. https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Papua_New_Guinea_2014.pdf

 

Human Rights Watch, “PNG Events of 2018,” World Report.2018. https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/papua-new-guinea

 

Momis, John. “The Constitution of The Autonomous Region of Bougainville.”Autonomous Government of Bougainville. 2004. http://www.abg.gov.pg/uploads/documents/BOUGAINVILLE_CONSTITUTION_2004.pdf

 

Papua New Guinea. “Family Protection Act.” No.19. 2013. http://cfcpng.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/FAMILY-PROTECTION-ACT-2013.pdf

 

Papua New Guinea Post Courier. “Young Bougainvilleans Making a Difference in Policing.” Papua New Guinea Post-Courier. 28 November 2018. https://postcourier.com.pg/young-bougainvilleans-making-difference-policing/

 

Reddy, Peter. “Reconciliation in Bougainville: Civil war, peacekeeping and restorative justice,” Contemporary Justice Review,vol. 11, no.2, 2008. Pp. 117-130, DOI: 10.1080/10282580802057744

 

Remeikis, Amy, “Scott Morrison and PNG’s PM Agree to Joint Naval Base on Manus Island” The Guardian. 2018. https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2018/nov/01/scott-morrison-and-papua-new-guineas-pm-agree-to-joint-naval-base-on-manus-island

 

Spark, Natascha & Jackie Bailey. “Disarmament in Bougainville: ‘guns in boxes’”, International Peacekeeping, vol. 12, no. 4, 2005, pp. 599-608, DOI: 10.1080/13533310500202025

Regan, Anthony J. “Causes and Course of the Bougainville Conflict.” The Journal of Pacific History, vol. 33, no. 3, 1998, pp. 269–285. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/25169410.

 

Sturzaker, Damian, & Craig Cawood. “The Sandline Affair Illegality and International Law”. Australian International Law Journal.1999.pp. 214 - 224. https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?collection=journals&handle=hein.journals/austintlj16&id=230&men_tab=srchresults

 

UN News. “Post-conflict Bougainville’s disarmament is progressing well, UN says.”UN News. 6 May 2004.https://news.un.org/en/story/2004/05/102662-post-conflict-bougainvilles-disarmament-process-progressing-well-un-says

 

UN Security Council. 28 March 2005. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Bougainville (Papua New Guinea).” UN Archives. https://search.archives.un.org/uploads/r/united-nations-archives/6/5/f/65f7e4dd7df2f50d13ae0342ba15f154a7e2c6a7e5114557bd5cf62ba3052ba3/S-1096-0051-10-00009.pdf

 

UN Security Council. “Letter dated 30 March 1998 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Papua New Guinea addressed to the President of the Security Council.”  31 March 1998. https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/PG_971010_The%20Burnham%20Truce.pdf

 

University of Notre Dame. “Peace Accords Matrix.” Bougainville Peace Agreement | Peace Accords Matrix, University of Notre Dame, 2015, peaceaccords.nd.edu/accord/bougainville-peace-agreement.

 

UNPO. “History of Bougainville.” UNPO. 2 February 2004. https://unpo.org/article/34

 

Uppsala Conflict Data Program. “The Honiara Declaration,” UCDP, 23 Jan. 1991. https://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/fullpeace/PNG%2019910123.pdf

 

Westbrook, Tom, “Bougainville Independence Vote Postponed to October,” Reuters, 2019. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-papua-bougainville/bougainville-independence-vote-delayed-to-october-idUSKCN1QI3XI