Humanitarian Access:

Over the seven year conflict, the domestic population of Syria has experienced vast amounts of trauma, violence, and displacement. Over half of the overall population has been displaced from their homes, as human rights violations are continuously committed by the al-Assad government. The need for humanitarian access for the displaced reached a head as reports began to reveal that the Syrian government elected to use chemical weapons on their own people. The epicenter of this humanitarian crisis is Eastern Ghouta, an area 40 minutes away from Damascus. Reports have stated there are over 400,000 people in need of aid in this particular area.The constant fighting has prevented aid workers from reaching those who require aid. Malnutrition is the main problem of the moment, however, humanitarian convoys carrying aid in the form of food and medicine are constantly under threat of Syrian government bombs and shelling, also killing innocent people in the process. The topic of humanitarian access has been a paramount issue in all of the Geneva peace talks, with unfortunately no complete solution being settled on over the multiple peace talks.

Cessation of Hostilities: 

The cessation of hostilities has been the top priority of every Geneva peace talk, evident in the Geneva Communique and Kofi Annan’s six-point plan (2012). However the notion of “violence” and “hostilities” have been terms disagreed upon in meaning by both the Syrian government and the opposition. The Assad delegation has framed violence as strictly “terrorism” on behalf of the opposition, while the opposition views “violence” as all war hostilities. Throughout the Geneva talks, every UN Envoy has highlighted the cessation of hostilities as a top priority, particularly for humanitarian access to reach civilians trapped in the seven-year long civil war.

Constitutional Issues

The drafting of a new constitution following the implementation of a transitional government has been a key issue in the talks. Key concerns include whether Syria should be governed under Sharia Law or as a Multi-Ethnic Democracy, as well as the existence of certain unchecked powers awarded to the president of the regime, which require amending in the new constitution.

Formation of Transitional Government

Throughout the talks, the UN has prioritized the establishment of a transitional government in Syria. The proposed plan includes a transitional period of 18 months, beginning with the resignation of the current leader, Bashar al-Assad, and the implementation of a transitional body with full executive powers. This body would then focus on the development of a new constitution and implement a free and fair election structure.

United Nations 

(Specifically the UN Special envoy to Syria: Koffi Annan (Feb-Aug 2012), Lakhdar Brahimi (Aug 2012-May 2014), Staffan de Mistura (July 2014-Present)

• Recognizes that change in Syria is necessary and avoidable. Syria’s political state will be led differently.
•  Each side in the Syrian conflict has extremely strong views, with the government claiming that this opposition groups are ‘terrorists’ and don’t represent much of the Syrian population.
•  Brahimi desired to bring both parties together but recognizes that he cannot create or force a solution. He stresses the importance of “listening” to both sides.
•   Brahimi stressed that the Syrian conflict is the largest threat to peace and security in the world. Vouches for the Syrian government and opposition groups to recognize the pain and suffering they are inflicting on their own population.
•  Both Brahimi & Mistura voice their refusal to allow the use of chemical weapons, claiming it as “outrageous”.
•  UN Envoy Mistura is supportive of Saudi-led efforts to create a unified opposition to exist (Riyadh 2.0 meeting) seeing this goal as important in future peace talks between Syrian Govvernment and Opposition.
•  UN Envoy Mistura aims to implement all UNSC resolutions and ensure that the Geneva Communique (2012) is acted upon.

United Nations Security Council (Led by the United States and Russia)

• (September 2013) The UNSC voted in favour of a resolution supporting the demand for Assad to destroy Syria’s stockpile of chemical weapons (although not punitive if Assad doesn’t comply).
•  (February 22 2014) UNSC passed a resolution to allow humanitarian aid to flow into Syria. Secretary General Ban-Ki Moon was not happy for the prolonged time it took, as he stated that humanitarian aid should be “allowed by virtue of international law”.
  •  However, no UN sanctions will be installed on any power in Syria who blocks the flow of aid (This is the reason why Russia signed onto it).

International Syria Support Group (Formed in 2016 for Geneva III)

ISSG is chaired by the Russia & U.S, and 19 other members. Aimed at finding a diplomatic solution to the Syrian Crisis.

• ISSG aimed for a 6-month time frame (Dec 2015 agreement) for a political transition process.
• Endorsed the 2012 Geneva Communique, and seeks words on paper to become action: Implementation of UNSC Resolution 2042 & 2043
  • Recommitment to a sustained cessation of armed violence
  •  Cessation of armed violence must be sustained with immediate, credible and visible actions by the Govt of Syria.
  • Govt must allow immediate and full humanitarian access to UN humanitarian organizations to areas affected by the fighting.
• ISSG understanding that a global approach (headed by the U.S & Russia) through diplomatic channels is the way forward for solving Syria’s crisis. Very different perspective to UN’s Special Envoy to Syria, Lakhdar Brahimi. 

The Syrian Arab Republic (led by permanent representative Bashar Jafaari)

• Seeking Syrian-Syrian discussions with the opposition groups, not led by global powers (against ISSG framework). Allowing the presence of UN envoys only as a “mediator”.
• (Jan 2014, Geneva II): wants to implement Geneva I commique , but views it as problematic as it calls for the removal of President Bashar Al-Assad from power, a removal seen as unacceptable from the Republic's perspective. Instead the Republic seeks proposes that peace can be accomplished in an alternative method.
  • Calls for the end of terrorism in Syria and the subsequent violence because a transitional political settlement cannot occur with terrorism occurring.
  • Desires the Arab League Observers and UN  (Kofi, Moon and Brahimi) to all support the clause against violence/terrorism, which they see as the opposition's primary for of violence)
• (Feb, 2017, Geneva IV)
  • The republic once again states that combating terrorism should be the main priority.
    • Requested UN Envoy Mistura to investigate and issue a statement condemning continuous suicide attacks by “terrorist” groups associated with the Syrian opposition (particularly by Jabat Al-Nusra)

High Negotiations Committee (21 members) – led by Naser al-Hariri during Geneva IV

National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces

•  Dedicated to establishing a civil state, under democratic rule.
• Does not desire to  have any discussions or negotiations with Bashar Al-Assad’s regime.
•  (Apr 2016, Geneva III): HNC is rigidly against Russian interference in Syria and lift blockades and stop ongoing sieges before it would return to UN-sponsored peace talks in Geneva (Note: HNC walks out on Feb 2nd 2016).
• The HNC aims to unify all opposition groups to the Assad regime, it has however lost the support of the Kurdish National Council after the conclusion of Geneva IV
•  (Feb 2017, Geneva IV, 2017): Pleads for countries who respect human rights to take political steps to pressure  Assad’s government and his foreign backers (Russia & Iran). al-Hariri claims that he hasn’t found any country who takes his plea seriously due to the inaction on ensuring Assad halts his military campaign.
  •  Claims that Iran has no ambition to ensure peace or reaching a political agreement for Syria’s conflict 
    

Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD)

The Kurdish Democratic Union Party has been excluded from the Geneva Peace talks on the basis of its connection with the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), which is listed as a terrorist organization by Turkey, the United States and the European Union. The PKK has been in dispute with Turkey since 1978, involved in a violent conflict that has claimed thousands of lives. Therefore as a result of this alleged connection, and in an effort to ensure the continued participation of Turkey, the PYD has been excluded from all Geneva talks. This has proved to be a contentious issue, as the military wing (YPG) of the PYD has been an effective force on the ground in the fight against the terrorist group the Islamic State (IS). However, although Salih Muslim, the leader of the PYD has dismissed any claims connecting his party with the PKK as false, and shown an interest in participating in the talks to determine the peaceful future of Syria, the PYD has yet to be included.

Islamic State (IS) & Jabhat al Nusra

The Islamic State (IS) and Jabhat al Nusra, also referred to as Tahrir al-sham – the Organization for the Liberation of the Levant or the Levant Liberation Committee, have been excluded from the talks based on their establishment as known terrorist organizations. In particular, Tahrir al-sham has been identified as a former Al-Qaeda affiliate, and has also been referred to as a reincarnation of Al-Qaeda. The official exclusion of these groups as members of the peace talks is arguably more of a formality, as neither group would be inclined to participate of their own volition, if given the option at all.

Civil Society Organizations

There are several civil society groups that have formed and persisted in the midst of the Syrian conflict and in the face of government restriction. These include organizations such as Save Our Syria, Syrian Women’s Movement, The Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR), and many more. These groups make an effort to prioritize humanitarian and civilian needs during the conflict. They have shown an interest in participating in the peace talks as overseers, in hopes to highlight the important issues experienced at the local level, which are often forgotten or ignored by elites, but have been excluded thus far. The UN has expressed reluctance to formally include civil society groups based on legal constraints as well as the general consensus among elite decision makers that civil groups fail to have any real impact.

   After several years and seven rounds of peace talks, the Geneva Peace Talks can be regarded as a failure. The focus of the Geneva talks was to put an end to the conflict and establish a new future for Syria by addressing several key issues, including the cessation of hostilities, ensuring humanitarian access, the formation of a transitional government and the drafting of a new constitution. Despite numerous attempts by the opposition and the regime, as well as local and international actors over the years to reach an agreement, these issues proved to be insurmountable, as talk after talk ended in stalemate – some after only a few days. The failure to reach an agreement regarding Syria’s path to peace has left the country embroiled in the same violent crisis that has plagued the region for almost a decade.

        The failure of the talks to reach an agreement and put an end to the hostilities left hundreds of thousands of people dead, and many more displaced as the war continued over the course of the Geneva peace talks. The use of violence against the population, including bombings and attacks in the form of chemical weapons, continued throughout the talks. As a result of the fighting and continued threat of bombings, aid workers were often unable to reach the population and provide proper care, and the sporadic access and availability of humanitarian aid, which constitutes another key unresolved issue, contributed to the steady increase in civilian casualties. As a result of the violence and lack of humanitarian relief, the world has experienced an outpouring of refugees from Syria as individuals are forced to abandon their homes as they seek to escape the conflict with their lives.

        The refusal of the Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to vacate his leadership position in order to make way for a transitional government, leading to the implementation of free and fair elections, presented a major obstacle throughout the Geneva talks. Without first being able to establish a transitional government, the goal of drafting a new constitution that would provide more effective checks on the power of the next Syrian ruler was also not achieved. Therefore, without reaching an agreement regarding new terms of governance, the democratic transition envisioned for Syria by the UN and other international actors within the talks could not be realized. As a result, Geneva brought Syria no closer to escaping the corrupt authoritarian regime that was personally responsible for countless human rights violations and the slaughter of its own people.

        Geneva is regarded as a failure because of the lack of results each talk produced on the key issues, and more importantly, because of the continued violence and persecution Syrian civilians continued to face throughout. The resulting number of deaths and displaced individuals is a testament to the lack of effectiveness these talks ultimately had. Succinctly, these talks are regarded as a failure because despite the years of negotiations, the peace talks in Geneva did not put an end to the violent crisis or human rights violations, or effectively establish a democratic path to peace for Syria.

Final communiqué of the Geneva I Conference

What is the Geneva II Conference on Syria?

Ambiguous Rebel Statements on the Geneva Negotiations

Main developments and differences between the Vienna (2015) and Geneva (2016) meetings

Geneva III: The Stillborn Conference and the Endemic Failure of the International Community

Syria’s Transition Governance & Constitutional Options Under U.N. Security Council Resolution 2254

The 3 problems that doomed the Syria peace talks

Geneva IV and the shifting shape of Syrian diplomacy'

Syria's "deescalation zones" explained.

UN Special Envoy Staffano de Mistura's statement on latest Syrian peace talks

Altug, Bayram. “Kurdish Group in Geneva Talks Excludes PKK/PYD.” Anadolu Agency, November 30, 2017. http://aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/kurdish-group-in-geneva-talks-excludes-pkk-pyd/986082

        In this source, Bayram Altug summarizes the situation surrounding the controversial exclusion of the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) from the Syrian Peace Talks at the end of 2017. The PYD, which had yet to be included in the talks at the time of this article, was excluded on the basis of their connection to the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). The PKK has been excluded on the basis of their involvement in a hostile conflict with Turkey, which has lasted several decades and claimed thousands of lives, as well as their globally recognized status as a terrorist group. As a result of their exclusion and the blatant rejection of their inclusion on behalf of all the opposition parties, the PYD took measures including the dismantling of all political parties not in support of them in the north of Syria, and the detainment of members of certain parties, namely the KNC.

Geis, Anna, and Gabi Schlag. "The Facts Cannot be Denied': Legitimacy, War and the use of Chemical Weapons in Syria." Global Discourse, vol. 7, no. 2-3, 2017, pp. 285-305.

This article takes a modern approach through the analysis of different forms of media to analyze how the use of chemical weapons by the Assad regime resulted in international intervention in the Syrian conflict. The international community, especially the United States in particular has an obligation to protect civilians who are not purposely being oppressed under their own government through the “right to protect” (RTP) protocol. However, the extent of such involvement is different on a case by case basis. The use of chemical weapons, and the subsequent media portrayals (social media pictures and YouTube videos) of such attacks significantly altered the perception of how much aid and military presence was needed in Syria to combat these atrocities. This is especially true for liberal democracies, who feel the pressure to get involved due to the clear juxtaposition against its own value system, and their beliefs about how governments should treat their citizens.

“Geneva Press Conference: Bashaar Jafari Syrian Representative to UN”. UN Webcast, January 20 2014. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KaqptxhLwlg&t=359s

This source depicts a press conference held by the UN representative from Syria, Bashaar Jafari who is discussing the priority of the cessation of hostilities and the importance of implementing the agreed principles set out by Kofi Annan during Geneva I talks. This speech clearly depicts an agitated Jafari who clearly endorses the view that Syrian opposition groups aren’t only acting outside the law by violently rebelling against Assad, but has labeled their acts as treasonous and terrorist in nature. This deep polarization by both sides clearly demonstrates (at the time) how far divided both the government of Assad is with the opposition group, viewing them as illegitimate actors, even going so far as to demand them to choose to “be firefighters or arsonists, but you cannot be both”. Most importantly, this speech depicts clearly the political reality of the Assad regime, viewing the conflict as a barrage of foreign-backed hostilities against the Syrian state who’s unwilling to compromise on issues relating to state sovereignty and stability (Ex. state institutions and the monopoly to use force against treasonous rebel forces).

Geneva Press Conference. “United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki Moon and UN Envoy to Syria Lakhdar Brahimi”. UN Webcast. January 22 2014

www.youtube.com/watch?v=BnYFH-cdLMk

This source is a crucial starting point for understanding the peace process taking place in Geneva. Both Ban Ki Moon and Brahimi describe the political situation and objectives held by the Syrian government and the opposition. The most important component of this press conference is the UN delegation presenting evidence that both groups are very far from achieving an agreement. This specific meeting took place during the Geneva Conference but at a time where all parties still haven’t sat face to face with another, demonstrating how strained these peace talks were from the onset. Critically, this source also presented information on the issue of terrorism and religious extremism in the Syrian conflict. Both Brahimi and Moon demonstrated great disdain and urgency to implement the Geneva Communique which aims to eradicate terrorism through the cessation of hostilities. However, such information certainly assures that even the UN recognizes the emergence of extremist elements within the opposition in Syria, which at the time of this press conference was a divided group comprised of various religious, ethnic and ideological backgrounds. Most importantly, this source represents a key piece of the Geneva peace talk timeline, particularly important for understanding the fluid dynamics associated with a conflict that continues to rage on seven years later.

“Kofi Annan: Syria need UN presence”. CNN, April 5 2012.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j8y8OXCZmtw

This source is early evidence by the UN to ensure that the cessation of hostilities is the top priority in regards to the Syrian civil war. This short speech by Kofi Annan, as UN-Arab League Envoy to Syria depict a mediator highlighting the importance of the implementation of a plan that allows humanitarian aid access to the millions of Syrians trapped in “no-mans land” due to violence between the Assad regime and the opposition. Annan presents his plan to address the Syrian conflict through the deployment of a “small and nimble UN presence” with a flexible mandate that can address the fluid military situation. Kofi Annan’s effort throughout his speech is to bring both parties to the table in an effort to achieve the goal of securing a ceasefire, known later as the Geneva Communique. Most importantly, this source is crucial for understanding the evolving policy of the UN regarding Syria when compared to subsequence attempts by UN Envoys such as Al-Brahimi and Mistura to produce positive and productive policy to ending the Syrian crisis.

Phillips, Christopher. The Battle for Syria : International Rivalry in the New Middle East, Yale University Press, 2016.

Christopher Phillips account of the Syrian conflict is a crucial source to understanding the international dynamic that influenced the beginning of the Arab Spring revolution in Syria and across the MENA region. Phillips through academic research depicts the 21st century phenomenon of utilizing proxy warfare as a method to achieving state interests by “Great Powers” such as the U.S and Russia. But Phillip also presents the humanitarian element of the ongoing Syrian conflict which he rightfully claims as the “worst humanitarian disaster in the 21st century”. In describing the opposition forces present in Syria, Phillips conducted profound  research to illustrate a fragmented opposition that’s composed of thousands of militias, usually based on a certain religious ideology, ethnic group or region, a phenomenon that has only fueled the inability by the opposition in Syria to achieve any single umbrella that’s able to defeat Assad in any possible manner. Research regarding the specific actors involved in Syria, particularly the opposition side is crucial to comprehending claims by the Assad regime of an opposition group comprised of extremist-elements, which in fact is very evident in Phillips research. Most importantly, when utilizing Phillip’s research it become clear that “Great Powers” in their ability to materialy support either side has made the Geneva Peace Talks not only obsolete, but an ineffective method to conducting peace negotiations in the 21st century.

Pitrof, Amanda. "Too Many Cooks in the Kitchen: Examining the Major Obstacles to Achieving Peace in Syria's Civil War." Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, vol. 15, no. 1, 2015, pp. 157-182

A main criticism of the Syrian Peace Process is the presence of too many foreign actors intervening. In addition, the author also critiques the apparent disconnection between the countries in the U.N Security Council, specifically the differences between the U.S and Russia. These two countries’ respective entrances in the proxy war have acted as an obstacle in the advancement of any peace negotiations. This dynamic amplifies the elevated tensions between the Syrian government and the opposition in the form of the High Negotiations Committee (HNC). The HNC in itself is composed of several different opposition groups, representing various communities that desire different things out of a peace agreement. The HNC itself has experienced fracturing within its own ranks, as leaders of different groups hold some parts of the peace process in higher regard than others. The author argues that these peace negotiations have become a game of picking-sides and grandstanding rather than accomplishing any significant progress.

Sprusansky, Dale. "Tackling Syria's Humanitarian Crisis." Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, vol. 33, no. 3, 2014, pp. 51.

This source focuses on the humanitarian crisis happening in Syria as a result of the Syrian civil war. At the moment, Syria is divided into different jurisdictions, according to the group that is control at the time. It is the civilians who have experienced the worst of it, as displacement of Syrians from their homes has been the most pertinent humanitarian issue that the international community has been facing. It is without question that significant amounts of aid are required to take care of those seeking refuge, but the ongoing conflict between the Syrian government and rebel groups have make it increasingly harder to administer the aid. In addition, the presence of terrorist organizations such as ISIS, specifically the establishment of checkpoints around their territory prevents aid and aid workers from coming through. As a result, the rate of malnutrition amongst the displaced has sky rocketed, as little to no food or resources are available to them as a result of the fighting. No matter the amount of aid supplied, the problems posed by the lack to access to aid has marred the region since the onset of the conflict.

“Syria Conflict: Opposition Unveils Transition Plan.” BBC News, September 7, 2016. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-37294532

        This source provides information regarding one of the key issues of the Syrian Peace Talks in Geneva, the establishment of a transitional government. The key features of the transitional plan include the stepping down of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, the implementation of a transitional government, the drafting of a new constitution, and the implementation of a free and fair election structure within 18 months. Negotiations surrounding this issue have been a continuous struggle as Bashar al-Assad declines to step down, and thus the effective implementation of a transitional government remains a priority for the UN and a key issue within the talks.

Tahhan, Zena. “The Voices Missing from Syria’s Peace Talks.” Aljazeera, March 23 2017. http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/03/syria-war-missing-voices-syria-peace-talks-170322073131728.html

        In this source, Zena Tahhan takes a nonconventional approach to the Syrian Peace Talks by introducing some of the Syrian civil society groups, and highlighting the issue of their exclusion from the talks. Unlike the major actors participating or not participating in the peace talks, civil society groups are non-profit, non-governmental organizations without political ties, made up largely of local individuals that focus on humanitarian and civilian needs. Civil Society groups are illegal in Syria, but regardless of the severe oppression they face, several organizations have developed throughout the duration of the war. The larger groups, such as Save Our Syria, are seeking a place in the peace talks, where they believe they could act as a mediator, and their knowledge and understanding of local conditions could be an asset in determining the direction of the talks.

Altug, Bayram. “Kurdish Group in Geneva Talks Excludes PKK/PYD.” Anadolu Agency, November 30, 2017.

CNN. “Syrian Civil War: Timeline and Fast Facts” https://www.cnn.com/2013/08/27/world/meast/syria-civil-war-fast-facts/index.html. Accessed: 25 March 2018.

Condult, Dara. ”Why Assad’s Military Gains don’t Translate into Success in Syrian Peace Talks.” The Conversation. March 9, 2017.  http://theconversation.com/why-assads-military-gains-dont-translate-to-success-in-syrian-peace-talks-74275. Accessed 21 March 2018

Geis, Anna, and Gabi Schlag. "The Facts Cannot be Denied': Legitimacy, War and the use of Chemical Weapons in Syria." Global Discourse, vol. 7, no. 2-3, 2017, pp. 285-305.

Geneva Press Conference. "Bashaar Jafari Syrian Representative to UN”. UN Webcast, January 20 2014. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KaqptxhLwlg&t=359s

Geneva Press Conference. “United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki Moon and UN Envoy to Syria Lakhdar Brahimi”. UN Webcast. January 22 2014 www.youtube.com/watch?v=BnYFH-cdLMk

Human Rights Watch “U.S, Russia: Investigate Attacks on Civilians” https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/05/16/us-russia-investigate-attacks-civilians. Accessed 25 March 2018.

Joujati, Rafif. “Women are Invisible at the Syria Peace Talks.” PassBlue: Independent Coverage of the UN. February 23, 2017. http://www.passblue.com/2017/02/23/whos-missing-at-the-syria-peace-talks-women/. Accessed 21 March 2018.

“Kofi Annan: Syria need UN presence”. CNN, April 5 2012. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j8y8OXCZmtw

Lund, Aaron. “Everything you need to know about the Latest Syria Peace Talks.” IRIN: The Inside Story on emergencies. February 21, 2017.
https://www.irinnews.org/analysis/2017/02/21/everything-you-need-know-about-latest-syria-peace-talks

Lund, Aaron. “The Road to Geneva: The Who, When, and How of Syria’s Peace Talks.” Carnegie Middle East Center. January 29, 2016. http://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/62631?lang=en. Accessed 20 March 2018.

Mroue, Bassem. “Syria’s Kurds Leave Geneva After being excluded from Peace Talks.” CTV News. January 30, 2016.  https://www.ctvnews.ca/world/syria-s-kurds-leave-geneva-after-being-excluded-from-peace-talks-1.2758480. Accessed 16 March 2018.

Phillips, Christopher. The Battle for Syria : International Rivalry in the New Middle East, Yale University Press, 2016.

Pitrof, Amanda. "Too Many Cooks in the Kitchen: Examining the Major Obstacles to Achieving Peace in Syria's Civil War." Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, vol. 15, no. 1, 2015, pp. 157-182

Reuters.“Scores of Rebels Killed in Syrian Government Ambush” https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-syria-crisis-ambush/scores-of-rebels-killed-in-syrian-government-ambush-idUKBRE9BQ07X20131227 . Accessed 25 March 2018.

“Save our Syria: Who we are.” Save Our Syria.  
http://www.saveoursyria.org/who-we-are.html . Accessed 23 March, 2018.

Sprusansky, Dale. "Tackling Syria's Humanitarian Crisis." Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, vol. 33, no. 3, 2014, pp. 51.

“Syria Conflict: Opposition Unveils Transition Plan.” BBC News, September 7, 2016. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-37294532 . Accessed 12 March, 2018.

Syrian Observatory For Human Rights. “Daily Reports” http://www.syriahr.com/en/. Accessed March 25th 2018.

“Syrian PYD Kurds not Invited to Geneva IV Peace Talks: Muslim.” Ekurd Daily. February 14, 2017. http://ekurd.net/syrian-kurds-not-geneva-iv-2017-02-14. Accessed 15 March 2018.

Tahhan, Zena. “The Voices Missing from Syria’s Peace Talks.” Aljazeera, March 23 2017, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/03/syria-war-missing-voices-syria-peace-talks-170322073131728.html. Accessed 17 March 2018.

“Tahrir al-Sham: Al-Qaeda’s Latest Incarnation in Syria.”  BBC News. February 28, 2017. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-38934206. Accessed 17 March 2018.

The Independent. “Syrian Civil War Timeline: Tracking Five Years of Conflict” https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/syrian-civil-war-timeline-tracking-five-years-of-conflict-a6929411.html. Accessed 25 March 2018.

The New Arab. “War in Syria: Timeline of Key Events” https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/news/2015/3/13/timeline-syria-4-years-of-devastation . Accessed 25 March 2018.

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Territory

• The civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina was ultimately fought between Bosnian Serbs and a coalition of Bosnian Croats and Bosniak Muslims for the partition of the territory which remained of the former Yugoslavian state. In response, the Dayton Agreement sets out the Inter-Entity Boundary Line which roughly transformed the military ceasefire lines as it existed at the end of the Bosnian war into permanent political divisions. This divided the country’s territory into 49% and 51% respectively between the Republika Srpska for the Bosnian Serb population and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina for the Croat-Bosniak Muslim alliance.

Constitutional Issues and Governance

• Annex 4 of the Dayton Agreement composes the constitution which established a consociational form of government in order to guarantee equal ethnic representation between the Serbs, Croats, and Bosniak Muslims. However, this also had the effect of institutionalizing the division between the major ethnic groups into the Bosnia-Herzegovinian state structure. It also resulted in a highly complex and decentralized system including a tripartite presidency, national Parliament and Cabinet – shares of power all allocated according to ethnicity. These structures are then also replicated on an entity level with further regionalization, each level of government granted significant autonomy.

Federation Agreement between Bosnian Croats and Muslims

• For there to be a single united Muslim-Croat entity alongside the Republika Srpska entity in the reformation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the tenuous alliance had to be solidified into the present-day Federation. The accord settles the matter regarding the authority – that was previously held by local governments in Croat or Bosniak military controlled areas – which would be ceded to the federation government. Extensive powers were granted to the federation government, including control over defence, justice, taxation, and internal affairs. Most crucially, the accord calls for the integration of Croat and Muslim military commanders into the Bosnian Army.

Criminal Prosecution of War Crimes

• Dayton contains several provisions that oblige the involved parties to cooperate and comply with entities appointed to investigate and prosecute war crimes committed – namely the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. In the negotiations, attempts to push for greater involvement of the tribunal were met with opposition by the negotiating Serb, Croat, and Muslim parties. Aside from prohibiting individuals who have been sentenced or indicted by the tribunal, few other effective mechanisms are ultimately included in the Agreement to actively assist or carry out the tribunal’s mandate.

Democracy

• Annex 3 of the Dayton Agreement establishes the objective to promote free, fair, and democratic elections. The tripartite presidency is elected through a separate direct plurality votes. The bicameral Parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina consist of a directly elected House of Representatives through proportional representation and a House of Peoples, whose members are indirectly elected from the entity’s separate legislatures. While Dayton guaranteed universal suffrage for adult citizens, it was ultimately agreed that refugee suffrage would be tied to their intention to return to Bosnia and Herzegovina to encourage their return.

Freedom of Movement and Refugees

• The principle of freedom of movement between the two Entities is enshrined in the Dayton Agreement, particularly for civilian refugees and displaced persons in Annex 7. The agreement states to allow displaced persons to return home and regain lost property or obtain compensation. To be enforced by the NATO Implementation Force (IFOR), this ensures the dismantlement of the many checkpoints that had been erected across the country throughout the war.

Enforcement

• To monitor and ensure compliance on the military aspects of the Agreement, Dayton establishes a multinational military Implementation Force (IFOR) under the command of NATO, with a grant of authority from the UN. In practice, this simply entailed transitioning the existing UN force into IFOR under NATO command. For civilian matters, the Office of the High Representative was founded to essentially held the task of building state capacities and institutions. It coordinated aspects of the peace settlement such as humanitarian aid, economic reconstruction, human rights, and the holding of free elections.

Serb (or Yugoslav), loyal to Republika Srpska and FR Yugoslavia

• Led by the President Slobodhan Milosevic
• Initially demanded 70% of land and said that anything less than 64% would be unjust
• Bosnians wanted control of Goradze.
• They wanted control of Brcko to increase territorial links
• Bosnian Serbs were not in favour of an integral Bosnia-Herzegovina as they wanted to establish a unitary state for all Serbs.
• Wanted to have institutions where they had equal rights with the Muslim-Croat side in order to prevent political oppression of the Bosnian Serbs by the Muslim-Croat federation
• Initially wanted the country to fully be divided but settled for a union
• Wanted to control a part of Sarajevo as they were concerned about the Serb minority living in Sarajevo
• Wanted the lifting of sanctions placed on Serbia

Bosnian (or Bosniak), loyal to the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina

• The Bosnians were headed by President Alija Izetbegovic
• Demanded the existence of two distinct entities within Bosnia, the Muslim-Croat federation and the Serb republic
• The Muslim side was mostly concerned about oppression by the Serbs after the genocide
  • Demands were made regarding the prosecution of war criminals, namely Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic

Croat, loyal to the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia and Croatia

• The Croatian delegation was led by President Franjo Tudman
• Initially demanded at least 51% of the land.
• Croat side wanted control of Goradze in order to connect the enclave to the rest of the territory.
• Croatia wanted to reintegrate Eastern Slavonia into its legal borders
• Croats wanted a peace solution based on sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia Herzegovina.
• Demanded the establishment if the legal and constitutional preconditions that would prevent Serb secession.
• Wanted the state to remain a republic as they wanted to keep an integral Bosnia
• Demanded to have an undivided Sarajevo under their control to control important communications and transportation sites.

USA and other Western allies

• Chief negotiator of the peace talks was Richard Holbrooke. There was a clear prominent involvement by the US during the peace talks. Only former Swedish PM Carl Bildt and some senior European diplomats participated in the peace talks, the others playing a static role in the talks. As has been pointed out, “United States took direct control over the peace process at Dayton, relegating other Western actors to subordinate roles”
• The contact group’s priority was a ceasefire and to avoid sending contradictory signals to the warring factions
• Also concerned with the final territorial divide of Bosnia
• Pursued a strategy of developing a draft United Nations Security Council resolution on the tightening of sanctions
  • US wanted to lift the arms embargo placed on the Bosnian muslims

Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats

• Although one of the main warring factions in Bosnia, the Bosnian Serbs were not directly admitted to the talks. As had been agreed upon, they would be a part of the Serbian delegation, thus accepting Milosevic’s authority and leadership. Similarly, the Bosnian Croats were represented by Croatian president Tudman. Only the Bosniaks would represent them autonomously.This took away the Bosnian Serbs’ and Bosnian Croats’ autonomy as even though they were involved in the peace talks, it was only under another entity which did not necessarily share the same values
• Significant individual actors such as former general Ratko Mladic and former politician Radovan Karadzic.
  • Mladic was excluded from the peace talks as he was found guilty of committing war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). He is held responsible for the Siege of Sarajevo and the Srebrenica massacre.
  • Similarly to Mladic, Karadzic was also excluded from the peace talks as the former president of Republika Srpska was found guilty of committing war crimes including genocide against Bosniak and Croat civilians by the ICTY.

Over 20 years later, the success of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina – commonly known as the Dayton Peace Agreement – continues to be debated according to various metrics. Agreed upon in 1995, Dayton ended the most brutal European conflict since the Second World War – the Bosnian War. As one of the most comprehensive peace agreements in the world, it is frequently held as an example of a skillful balance of diplomacy, political manoeuvring and military pressure to great success. However, the Dayton talks were also a prime example of exclusive Track I diplomacy; negotiations were controlled and dominated solely by international and political elites. In this sense, Dayton perhaps should not be characterized as a true peace process. While the Dayton Agreement has proved to be a successful peacekeeping tool with a legacy of over two decades of negative peace, it has not been conducive to true peacebuilding and post-war societal and state reconstruction in Bosnia and Herzegovina some had hoped it would be.

The negotiation talks of the Dayton Agreement was best typified by exclusivity, leading to descriptions of Dayton as an accord made “about the Bosnians without the Bosnians.” The negotiation process was open only to a very limited number of actors who were invited by the American lead negotiators, namely European and Russian diplomats and the representatives of the three ethnic groups – Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks. While the urgent situation necessitated this exclusive arrangement for the sake of efficiency, the closed nature of this negotiation leaves an insufficient peace process despite the comprehensiveness of the peace accord on paper. This process was a pure example in track I diplomacy – high-level formal talks occurring behind closed doors between state officials and elite representatives. However, without incorporating track II or III diplomacy or simply the lack of input from levels of society beyond the elites can lead to issues of real significance to everyday citizens going ignored. For example, the issue of boundaries in the 51-49 territorial split was decided with no input from those who lived in those towns and villages – the initial proposed map in fact being drawn by the Americans. This exemplifies the disconnect that was present between the peace process and the Bosnians who would be living under its consequences and be impacted the most.

Two decades later, the Dayton Agreement has succeeded in preserving the peace and ceasefire in Bosnia and Herzegovina, yet has also preserved the political climate with the same dynamic of ethnic politics continuing to fuel tensions. In essence, Dayton has frozen Bosnia in time. The complicated system that prioritized the equal representation of all three groups – Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks – in all state institutions has also made the government apparatus a massive and unwieldy structure. The layers upon layers of governments and levels of authorities makes change and reform highly difficult, ensuring the continued dominance of political elites. This has minimized the opportunities for the participation of the public and civil society in the process of policymaking. Consequently, the constitution as provided in Dayton has in effect also constrained the possibility for progress and reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In addition to its effect upon political and societal institutional growth, Dayton has also preserved the tense dynamics between the ethnic groups in its efforts to be a ‘multi-ethnic’ state. Instead of forging a common citizenship, the system has allowed political and ethnic leaders to take advantage of the state’s precarious union and encourage hostile ethnically-tinged rhetoric. Furthermore, the fact that places at all levels of governments are allocated according to ethnicity has also sidelined ethnic minorities who do not fall into the three major groups from political life in the country. Altogether, the complex system that was robust enough to satisfy the warring parties at the time of the conflict has led to a system of inertia – ill-equipped to handle the challenges of a post-war Bosnia.

The Dayton Agreement was essential to ending the deadliest conflict in Europe since the Second World War. However, what was instrumental in peacekeeping has not necessarily had the same amount of success when it comes to state-building. While successfully preventing the outbreak of more physical violence that had once consumed the region, Dayton has constrained Bosnia and Herzegovina from moving beyond the post-war stage and truly building a sustainable peace.

Final Dayton Agreement

Summary of the Dayton Peace Agreement on Bosnia-Herzegovina

Chronology of Events

Short Documentary Mapping the Path to the Dayton Peace Accords

Richard Holbrooke Interview on Milosevic and Dayton

Federation Agreement Between Croats and Bosniaks

Study of the Battle and Siege of Sarajevo

Bosnia - a matter of politics or humanity?

Bosnia War Crimes: The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and U.S. Policy

Bassiouni, M. Cherif. “Study of the Battle and Siege of Sarajevo.” University of West England Bristol.

• This source is an UN archive originally authored by M. Cherif Bassiouni. It is a study of the battle of Sarajevo. This is a firsthand UN report which outlines the Battle of Sarajevo in detail and in chronological order. One of the biggest battles in the Bosnian War, this event was an important moment in the conflict and this source goes into great depth in mapping what took place through daily, weekly and monthly reports from UN Protection Forces. The chronology is based on incidents reported in the database, source materials and media reports. This source gave a clear picture of the battle and helped in mapping the timeline and also a good understanding of the involvement of the various parties, which serves as context for the Dayton peace talks.

“Bosnia-Herzegovina Profile - Timeline.” BBC News, BBC, 30 Nov. 2017.

• The BBC is renown as a reputable news source which offers a centrist perspective on most issues. It is one of the oldest news corporations in the world. This article offered a somewhat detailed outlook on the happenings of the Bosnian war and is intended for a global audience. The article is well structured and breaks down the events into blocks. For example, it groups the war in one block, the Dayton agreements, and the arrest of key figures in another. It offers a wide array of events that happened during the war even some minor details. Its strengths lie in the article’s direct approach to the conflict and is to the point and succinct. One glaring weakness however, is how it fails to address the complexity of the situation.

Caplan, Richard. "Assessing the Dayton Accord: The Structural Weaknesses of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina." Diplomacy & Statecraft, vol. 11, no. 2, 2000, pp. 213-232.

• The main purpose of this article is to provide an overview of the Dayton Agreement itself and a brief evaluation of the inherent structural weaknesses present in the Accord. The author outlines all the major provisions that constitute the Accord, including the process which led to the agreement on territorial, military, and constitutional aspects included in the settlement. While providing a useful summary of the contents of the Accord, the date of the source also means it lacks perspective in its analysis and evaluation of the outcomes. However, this also provides a useful perspective on how little has changed. Despite the gap in time between this article and other sources, the same issues concerning the obstacle the Accord itself poses to peacebuilding is a common theme and continue to persist.

Janjić, Jovan (1996). Srpski general Ratko Mladić. Matica srpska. p. 15. Ратко Младић рођен је 12. марта 1943. године, у селу Божиновићи код Калиновика.

• This source documents the life of Srpski general Ratko Mladic. Janjic wrote this book as a means of historical information and someone interested in the events of the Bosnian war would benefit from reading this book due to its informative nature. The information on Mladic in this book gives historical understanding of his actions and what exactly those actions were that led him to be indicted as a war criminal. This source helped for the research on Mladic and the history behind his exclusion from the Dayton peace talks.

Keil, Soeren, and Anastasiia Kudlenko. "Bosnia and Herzegovina 20 Years After Dayton: Complexity Born of Paradoxes." International Peacekeeping, vol. 22, no. 5, 2015, pp. 471-489.

• This article addresses the common argument that Dayton contains inherent flaws and weaknesses that lead to the inertia that frequently characterizes governance in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It evaluates initiatives of state-building, democratization and reconstruction in the post-war period by both international and local actors. While concurring with other literature about certain structural weaknesses in the Dayton Agreement, it points out that the agreement is also undermined by local and domestic actors. Therefore, not only is the Dayton Agreement not solely responsible for the troubles that plague Bosnian institutions, but resolving these issues will require going beyond the constitution as well. However, this also means that there is hope for progress without reopening up the constitution – only requiring political will for smaller-scale action from both local and international leaders.

Leigh-Phippard, Helen. “The Contact Group on (And in) Bosnia: An Exercise in Conflict Mediation?” International Journal, vol. 53, no. 2, 1998, pp. 306–324. JSTOR, JSTOR.

• Leigh-Phippard’s article is concerned with the role played by the contact group in Bosnia peace talks. A discussion of the contact group’s activity throughout the period of the peace process is followed by an analysis of the reasons behind and the effectiveness of the mediation. The author provides historical context which helps readers understand the reasons behind the formation of the contact group and the potential difficulties faced. The analysis of the role of the contact group in Bosnia done in this article will allow readers to understand the role of the actors not directly involved in the conflict but are there to mediate. 

Malcolm, Noel. Bosnia: a Short History. Papermac, 1996. 

• Sir Noel Malcolm is an English political journalist and Author, He attended Cambridge and was knighted for his services to European history among other accolades. Bosnia: A Short History is written for the uninformed individual and gives an outsider a good understanding of the country since its inception. The book gives a neutral perspective on the conflict and goes straight to the point. It is an easy read and allowed me to quickly understand the complexity of the Bosnian War. One of the book’s main strengths is the author’s ability to explain a complex situation in simple terms without over simplifying the situation. One weakness I would note is that at times the book delved too much into the international view of Bosnia.

Nimet Beriker‐Atiyas, Tijen Demirel‐Pegg, (2000) "AN ANALYSIS OF INTEGRATIVE OUTCOMES IN THE DAYTON PEACE NEGOTIATIONS", International Journal of Conflict Management, Vol. 11 Issue: 4, pp.358-377

• Beriker-Atiyas and Demirel-Pegg uses Pruitt’s ideas on the five types of integrative solutions in order to analyse the integrative outcomes of the Dayton peace negotiations. In order for their analysis, the authors considered aspects such as negotiation issues, the parties’ positions and underlying interests, what the priorities of the parties were and how the negotiations ended. The authors provide a good analysis of the events leading up to and in Dayton through their exploration of the various parties’ demands and how the negotiations actually ended up. This source provides readers with important information regarding the parties’ positions going into the negotiations. The authors use numbers and statistics which help paint a clearer picture of the situation.

Stroschein, Sherrill. "Consociational Settlements and Reconstruction: Bosnia in Comparative Perspective (1995–Present)." The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 656, no. 1, 2014, pp. 97-115.

• This article describes and analyzes the implementation and results of consociational governance structures in Bosnia and Herzegovina working in conjunction with international aid and intervention in the overall picture of state-building. Firstly, it describes how consociational governance – the foundation of Bosnia’s constitution – works and its purpose. The author then compares the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina to post-conflict Northern Ireland. It concludes that the systemic obstacles to state-building in Bosnia cannot be resolved by mere international financial aid, but is in large part due to problems inherent in its consociational structures. Due to its focus on the effect of international aid and intervention, the author neglects the effect of internal and domestic actors. By comparing two fragile post-conflict societies, the challenges in Bosnia could be viewed in greater context and the contrast allowed the highlighting of certain weaknesses in Bosnia’s institutions.

“TIMELINE: What Happened during the War in Bosnia?” Reuters, Thomson Reuters, 21 July 2008.

• Reuters is another reputable news source that provides a lot of first hand sources. This article is a compilation of those sources in the form of a timeline. It is intended for an international audience and as such does a good job of explaining the main points of the conflict. The article is a good way to verify information from other sites and has a clearly laid out timeline of events. Its scope extends to well after the war today and allows the reader to see how Bosnia has fared in the aftermath of the war. Its main weakness is the fact that many of the dates differ by a day or two from what most other sources say. However, the information found within the site is reliable and informative.

Works Cited

• Bassiouni, M. Cherif. “Study of the Battle and Siege of Sarajevo.” University of West England Bristol.

• Borger, Julian. "Bosnia​'s bitter, flawed peace deal​,​ 20 years on." The Guardian, 10 Nov 2015.
• “Bosnia-Herzegovina Profile - Timeline.” BBC News, BBC, 30 Nov. 2017.
• Brunborg, H., Lyngstad, T.H. & Urdal, H. European Journal of Population (2003) 19: 229. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1024949307841
• Clinton, Bill. “Dayton Accords.” Encyclopædia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., 27 June 2013.
• Cohen, Richard. "Terms of Muslim-Croat Alliance Are Set at Dayton Talks.” The New York Times, 11 Nov 1995.
• Daalder, Ivo H. " Decision to Intervene: How the War in Bosnia Ended." Brookings, 1 Dec 1998.
• Hronesova, Jessie. " A flawed recipe for how to end a war and build a state: 20 years since the Dayton Agreement." European Politics and Policy (LSE), 14 Dec 2015.
• Janjić, Jovan (1996). Srpski general Ratko Mladić. Matica srpska. p. 15. Ратко Младић рођен је 12. марта 1943. године, у селу Божиновићи код Калиновика.
• Leigh-Phippard, Helen. “The Contact Group on (And in) Bosnia: An Exercise in Conflict Mediation?” International Journal, vol. 53, no. 2, 1998, pp. 306–324. JSTOR, JSTOR.
• Malcolm, Noel. Bosnia: a Short History. Papermac, 1996.
• Nardelli, Alberto; Dzidic, Denis; Jukic, Elvira. " Bosnia and Herzegovina: the world's most complicated system of government?." The Guardian, 8 Oct 2014.
• Nimet Beriker‐Atiyas, Tijen Demirel‐Pegg, (2000) "AN ANALYSIS OF INTEGRATIVE OUTCOMES IN THE DAYTON PEACE NEGOTIATIONS", International Journal of Conflict Management, Vol. 11 Issue: 4, pp.358-377
• Paczulla, Jutta. “The Long, Difficult Road to Dayton: Peace Efforts in Bosnia- Herzegovina.” International Journal, vol. 60, no. 1, 2004, pp. 255–272. JSTOR, JSTOR.
• Schuett, Oliver. "The International War Crimes Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia and the Dayton Peace Agreement: Peace Versus Justice?" International Peacekeeping, vol. 4, no. 2, 1997, pp. 91-114.
• “Serbs Stop UN Aid for Bombarded 'Safe Haven'.” HeraldScotland, 1 July 1993.
• Simons, Geoff. UN Malaise: Power, Problems and Realpolitik. Palgrave Macmillan, 2014.
• “Summary of the Dayton Peace Agreement on Bosnia-Herzegovina.” University of Minnesota, 30 Nov. 1995, hrlibrary.umn.edu/icty/dayton/daytonsum.html
• “TIMELINE: What Happened during the War in Bosnia?” Reuters, Thomson Reuters, 21 July 2008.
• Vitez, CHRISTOPHER BELLAMY in. “UN Lifeline to Bosnia Reaches Breaking Point.” The Independent, Independent Digital News and Media, 10 July 1993.

Key Issues and Final Outcomes:

1. Colombian Government and FARC-EP
   1. Rural Development
      1. Chapter 1 of the Final Agreement has an increased focus on integrating rural and urban populations through CRR
   2. Political Participation
      1. Chapter 2 of the Final Agreement recognizes FARC-EP recognized as a Colombian party eligible for congressional and presidential elections; a minority. This is seen as a way to enrich debate and consolidating pluralism.
   3. Drug Trafficking
      1. Chapter 4 of the Final Agreement has FARC-EP agree to the “Solution to the Illicit Drugs Problems” which includes the termination of drug crops used by the FARC-EP.
   4. Ceasefire and Rights of Victims
      1. Chapter 3 of the Final Agreement contains the rules of Ceasefire for both actors and emphasizes the protection of civilians as a key determinant of the agreement’s success in the long-term. Chapter 5 contains the “Victims” agreement whereby judicial mechanisms will be used to counteract impunity.
   5. Verification Mechanisms
      1. Chapter 6 of the Final Agreement outlines the creation of the “Commission for Monitoring, Promoting and Verifying the Implementation of the Final Agreement,” which is composed inter alia with National Government and FARC-EP representatives. They have agreed to ensure the promotion and monitoring of the implementation of the agreement’s laws.

2. Colombian Government and the ELN
   1. Civil Society Participation
      1. Although the ELN was not a part of the Final Agreement, the agreement’s success has set precedence for increased talks with the ELN. Outside of the Final Agreement, the ELN has begun to express interest in participation of the civil society through political participation.
   2. Rights of Victims
      1. The ELN has also began to acknowledge the importance of the Rights of Victims and appears to be willing to go through judicial processes.

List of actors that were invited to and that participated in peace talks:

1.     Colombian Government
   1.     Rural development: Pro; included in Comprehensive Rural Reform clause (CRR)
   2.     Political Participation: Pro-FARC-EP party creation subject to public electoral scrutiny
   3.     Drug Problem: FARC-EP must agree to cease all drug operations
   4.     Rights of Victims: Agrees to Truth & Reconciliation town halls (Named: “Comprehensive System for Truth, Justice, Reparations and Non-Recurrence”)
   5.     Judicial and Extrajudicial Mechanisms: Full-extent of the Colombian law
   6.     Implementation, Verification, and Support for Peace Agreement: Pro-UN Verification Mission in Colombia (established in UN Security Council Resolution 2366); and the creation of the bi-actor ““Commission for Monitoring, Promoting and Verifying the Implementation of the Final Agreement”
   7.     Disarmament: Pro-disarmament
   8.     Demobilization: Pro-demobilization
   9.     Reintegration: Pro-reintegration through social programs
   10.  Ending the Conflict: Seeks long-term ceasefire for peace
2.     FARC-EP
   1.     Rural development: Pro; included in Comprehensive Rural Reform clause (CRR)
   2.     Political Participation: Pro-FARC-EP party creation subject to public electoral scrutiny
   3.     Drug Problem: FARC-EP must agree to cease all drug operations
   4.     Rights of Victims: Agrees to Truth & Reconciliation town halls (Named: “Comprehensive System for Truth, Justice, Reparations and Non-Recurrence”)
   5.     Judicial and Extrajudicial Mechanisms: Want contextualized and case-by-case trials as well as members in the judicial commissions
   6.     Implementation, Verification, and Support for Peace Agreement: Pro-UN Verification Mission in Colombia (established in UN Security Council Resolution 2366); and the creation of the bi-actor ““Commission for Monitoring, Promoting and Verifying the Implementation of the Final Agreement”
   7.     Disarmament: Pro-disarmament
   8.     Demobilization: Pro-demobilization
   9.     Reintegration: Pro-reintegration through social programs
   10.  Ending the Conflict: Seeks long-term ceasefire for peace
3.     Government of Chile (Observer of CMPVI):
   1.     Disarmament: Pro-disarmament
   2.     Demobilization: Pro-demobilization
   3.     Reintegration: Pro-reintegration through social programs
4.     Government of Venezuela (Observer of CMPVI):
   1.     Disarmament: Pro-disarmament
   2.     Demobilization: Pro-demobilization
   3.     Reintegration: Pro-reintegration through social programs
5.     Government of Cuba:
   1. Host neutral country for current and future negotiations
6.     Government of Norway (Observer of UNMC and UNVMC):
   1. Observer and reporting country

Important Actors not involved in peace talks:

1. ELN:
   1.     Relevance: Second largest rebel group behind the FARC-EP; significantly smaller so not as large of a threat as the FARC-EP though has been a part of similar violence though at a smaller-scale
   2.     Rural development: ELN has active fighters even during the Cuba negotiations
   3.     Political Participation: ELN did not initially seek political participation
   4.     Drug Problem: ELN relies heavily on the sale of drugs for income
   5.     Rights of Victims: Agreed to Truth & Reconciliation if political demands met
   6.     Disarmament: Did not seek disarmament unless government reform occurs
   7.     Demobilization: Did not seek demobilization unless government reform occurs
   8.     Reintegration: Did not see reintegration as means to gain Marxist-end goal; sought governmental reform
   9.     Ending the Conflict: Did not express immediate interest
2. Civilians (Controversy):
   1. Relevance: There was controversy in terms of the kinds of civilian victims’ representatives that were chosen to attend the negotiations in Cuba. Some Colombians felt that the civilian representatives were too lenient of the FARC-EP and sought harsher representatives to attend the Cuban talks. Many victims’ groups were not satisfied with the candidates chosen by the Colombian National Government to testify.

Introduction

It is apparent that the history of the Colombian Peace Talks is a very complex one that is often at the mercy of the political environment and government of the day. With forms of peace agreements being sought after since the 1960s when the rebel groups formed, the most recent peace agreement signed in November 2016 has provided the most comprehensive and relatively successful establishment of peace to date. While occasional ceasefire breaks have occurred, the violence has generally died down [2]. Our research team has therefore deemed the Colombian Peace Talks of 2016 to be an overall successful endeavor, particularly in the areas of disarmament and political participation although some failures in the area of reintegration have been noted.

Disarmament – A Success

Although the disarmament process has been occurring since before the UN Mission in Colombia (UNMC) (established in July 2017), its formalization through Resolution 2261 allowed for a significant increase in “activities related to the laying down of weapons”; with weapons estimates being proportional to the number of weapons collected to date from FARC-EP and ELN combatants [2]. According to the UNMC press release The UN Mission Finalizes Activities of Neutralization of the FARC-EP Armament, there were a total of “8994 weapons” consolidated, including 1817 pistols and 6177 assault rifles, among other smaller weapons [2]. Yet, according to El Espectador and El Tiempo, both national Colombian newspapers, the FARC-EP was estimated to have a troop count of “13980” in 2016 whilst the ELN had up to “1380” combatants in 2013 [3,4]. Although these numbers may have changed significantly since 2016 and 2013, this is unlikely given that these numbers are estimated after the 2011 initial peace talks where very little disarmament occurred. It is also important to note that the UNMC only counted for weapons collected between March 1^st and September 22^nd, 2017, before the implementation of the current United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia (UNVMC); which suggests an impressive surge in disarmament as the peace process continues to be legitimized in the public sphere.

Political Participation – A Success

In terms of political participation, this aspect of the peace agreement was one of the most widely agreed upon clauses, yet one of the most controversial in the public sphere. Through the transitionary establishment of the FARC-EP as a political party from an active combatant, democracy has been strengthened in Colombia. Although the October 2016 plebiscite for the initial version of the peace agreement failed largely due to concerns of the FARC-EP being legitimized as a political party, the Colombian public now holds a more indifferent view considering how much of the party is a minority relative to those in opposition and in power such as President Santos’ Partido de la Unidad, which is the result its merge with the Partido Liberal Colombiano, creating a 76/102 seat hold of the Colombian Congress [5]. While not holding any seats since its inception, the FARC-EP party is up for congressional elections in 2018 as well as a Presidential election should they put forward a candidate.

Reintegration – An Ongoing Process

While the relative success in disarmament and political participation continues, there is qualitative and anecdotal evidence suggests that the agreement has failed to ensure “[combatant] protection” [6]. Failures in reconciliation have led to public distrust of combatants, and in particular, demobilized ex-combatants, as evidenced by the failed plebiscite, assassinations of the demobilized, and re-integrative services. It is the latter of these notions that is the most crucial aspect of DDR. Without reintegration, the level of peace in this conflict remains extremely fragile and long-term peace is out of the question. To date, the UNVMC has failed to fully reintegrate ex-combatants as evidenced by countless accounts and notable recent examples. The November 24^th, 2016 Final Agreement highlights notions such as the promotion of “civic values”, “the acknowledgement of different ethnic and cultural identities, equality of opportunity between men and women…social inclusion…and…the consolidation of democracy”; all of which are great notions in theory, but remain without practice [7]. As such, anecdotes such as “It makes me wonder if we made a mistake handing in our weapons” and “During wartime we lived hard but we had everything we needed. Here it’s very tough” have become widely publicized as the general sentiment of the demobilized population [8].

Conclusion

Overall, our research team has deemed the 2016 Colombian Peace Talks and its resultant Peace Agreement to be a success in terms of peace establishment. Although there are socioeconomic gaps that remain at civic levels, particularly for the demobilized, lives are saved as these peacebuilding processes move forward. The levels of disarmament, demobilization, and political participation have never been seen before in the history of Colombian-FARC-EP conflict, and as such it should be celebrated.

Key Documents

1. Final Version of the 2016 Colombian Peace Agreement (English Version):
   1. Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict and Build a Stable and Lasting Peace. PDF. http://especiales.presidencia.gov.co/Documents/20170620-dejacion-armas/acuerdos/acuerdo-final-ingles.pdf
2. Resolution 2261 (Establishment of the UNMC):
   1. United Nations Security Council Resolution 2261. PDF. United Nations Security Council, January 25, 2016. Accessed March 06, 2018. http://undocs.org/S/RES/2261(2016)
3. Resolution 2366 (Establishment of the UNVMC):
   1. United Nations Security Council Resolution 2366. PDF.
      United Nations Security Council, July 10, 2017. Accessed March 06, 2018.
      http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2366.pdf
4. Resolution 2377 (Addition of UNSG Recommendations):
   1. United Nations Security Council Resolution 2377. PDF. United Nations Security Council, September
      14, 2017. Accessed March 06, 2018.
      http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2377.pdf
5. Resolution 2381 (Ceasefire added to UNVMC Mandate):
   1. United Nations Security Council Resolution 2381. PDF. United Nations Security Council, October 6,
      2017. Accessed March 06, 2018.
      http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2381.pdf
6. Norwegian Government Report on Negotiation Progress:
   1. https://www.regjeringen.no/en/topics/foreign-affairs/peace-and-reconciliation-efforts/norways_engagement/peace_colombia/id2522231/
7. UNMC Agreement by both FARC-EP and the Colombian Government:
   1. Identical letters dated 19 January 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Colombia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council. PDF. United Nations Security
      Council, January 22, 2016. Accessed March 06, 2018. http://undocs.org/S/2016/53
8. Troop Contributing Countries to UN Missions Related to the Colombian Peace Agreement (UNVMC):
   1. Summary of Contributions to UN Peacekeeping by Country, Mission and Post.
      PDF. October 31, 2017. Accessed March
      06, 2018. https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/country_contributions.pdf
9. UN Report on Disarmament Progress:
   1. "The UN Mission finalizes activities of neutralization of the FARC-EP armament." UN Mission in Colombia. September 22, 2017. Accessed March 06, 2018. https://unmc.unmissions.org/en/un-mission-finalizes-activities-neutralization-farc-ep-armament.
10.  UNVMC Mandate Adds Ceasefire:
    1. “Security Council Extends Verification Mission in Colombia to Include Monitoring of Ceasefire Agreement, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2381 (2017) | Meetings Coverage and Press Releases." United Nations. Accessed March 06, 2018. https://www.un.org/press/en/2017/sc13017.doc.htm.

1.     Pico, Laura. Colombia, the Resilient Survivor: DDR, Elusive
Peace, and the Politics of Post-Conflict. Master's thesis, Pomona College, 2016. Claremont: Claremont
Colleges, 2016. 1-103.

2.     Segura, Renata, and Delphine Mechoulan. Made in
   Havana: How Colombia and the FARC Decided to End the War. PDF. New York: International Peace Institute,
   February 2017. Accessed March 06,
   2018. https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/IPI-Rpt-Made-in-Havana.pdf

3. Phelan, Alexandra Engaging Insurgency: The Impact of the 2016 Colombian Peace Agreement on FARC's Political Participation, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 2018. Accessed March 06, 2018: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1057610X.2018.1432027

4. Cairo et al. “Territorial Peace”: The Emergence of a Concept in Colombia’s Peace Negotiations, Geopolitics, 2018. Accessed March 06, 2018: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14650045.2018.1425110?journalCode=fgeo20

5.     Cardona, Angel. The Justice and the Colombia Peace Talks. Open Journal of Political Science, 2016. Accessed March 06, 2018:.http://file.scirp.org/Html/1-1670375_68023.htm

6.     Angelo, Paul. The Colombian Peace Process: Trial and Error: Survival ... Global Politics and Strategy, 2017. Accessed March 06, 2018: www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00396338.2017.1282680?src=recsys.

7.    Barkan, Elazar. Memories of Violence: Micro and Macro History and the ... Irish Political Studies, 2016. Accessed March 06, 2018:  www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/07907184.2015.1126922

8. On displacement/reintegration; Bilak, Alexandra. Global
   Report on Internal Displacement.
   PDF. Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, May 2017. Accessed March 06,
   2018. http://www.internal-displacement.org/assets/publications/2017/20170522-GRID.pdf

9.         Bank, World. Colombia - Peace Programmatic I : Demobilization and Reinsertion of Ex-Combatants in Colombia. , 2008. Accessed March 06, 2018 “https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/7836

1.     “Colombia Profile - Timeline.” BBC News, BBC, 10 Jan. 2018, www.bbc.com/1. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-19390164news/world-latin-america-19390164.

2. "The UN Mission finalizes activities of neutralization of the FARC-EP armament." UN Mission in Colombia. September 22, 2017. Accessed March 06, 2018. https://unmc.unmissions.org/en/un-mission-finalizes-activities-neutralization-farc-ep-armament.
3. "Desmovilización, principal arma contra las guerrillas." El Tiempo. September 22, 2013. Accessed March 6, 2018. http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/CMS-13077339.
4. "Las Farc tendrían 13.980 miembros." ElEspectador.com. August 12, 2016. Accessed March 6, 2018. https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/nacional/farc-tendrian-13980-miembros-articulo-648915.
5. Congreso Visible - Toda La Información Sobre El Congreso Colombiano En Un Solo Lugar, www.congresovisible.org/partidos/.
6. Segura, Renata, and Delphine Mechoulan. Made in Havana: How Colombia and the FARC Decided to End the War. PDF. New York: International Peace Institute, February 2017. Accessed March 06, 2018. https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/IPI-Rpt-Made-in-Havana.pdf
7. Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict and Build a Stable and Lasting Peace. PDF. http://especiales.presidencia.gov.co/Documents/20170620-dejacion-armas/acuerdos/acuerdo-final-ingles.pdf
8. Daniels, Joe Parkin. "'There's nothing for us': Farc rebels search for purpose a year after historic deal." The Guardian. December 05, 2017. Accessed March 6, 2018. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/05/farc-rebels-civilian-life-colombia-peace-deal-one-year-later.

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Key Objectives and Issues

The Camp David Summit focused on three issues: territory, refugees, and security. None of the objectives were achieved as no agreement was ever formalized.

Territory

-          Issues regarding the future of a Palestinian state and what it would physically consist of were the key focus of the talks

-          The issue of territory was multi-faceted, with solutions primarily sought for three issues:

o   Establish the territory and borders of a Palestinian state

•  It was clear for both Palestinians and Israelis that a Palestinian state would be created
•  This territory would be primarily made up of sections of the West Bank and Gaza, but the two delegations disagreed on what should all be included from these territories (particularly the division of the West Bank)

o   Evacuation of Israeli settlements

•  It was relatively clear that Israeli settlements would be evacuated from whatever territory would be handed over by Israel, but there was discussion about the timeline for this to occur

o   Sovereignty of Jerusalem

•  The most contentious issue of the talks and what ultimately ended the summit and chance for an agreement
•  Jerusalem would be divided, but boundaries of sovereignty were difficult to establish. Both parties defined the city limits and East Jerusalem differently
•  Discussions were expected to be heated due to the religious and historical value of sections of Jerusalem, such as the Old City and the Temple Mount

Refugees

-          The status of Palestinian refugees was a critical issue in the talks, even though it wasn’t seen as the top priority (especially for Israel).

-          The key ideas discussed in relation to the refugee situation were:

o   Palestine wanted Israel to express regret over the suffering of Palestinian refugees

•  Barak was willing for Israel to accept this and to release a statement

o   Israel to reabsorb some percentage of Palestinian refugees

•  Israel was willing to settle approximately 10,000 refugees under a family reunification plan
•  Palestine envisioned a much larger portion of the four million refugees returning to territories controlled by Israel

o   Funding, from Israel, for an international organization that focused on the rehabilitation and resettlement of Palestinian refugees outside of Israel

Security

-          Going into the summit, Israel had a worry that giving even some of the West Bank up would constitute a security threat, creating a gateway for an Arab attack. Thus, this aspect of the talks was primarily based on Israeli demands

-          Thus, certain assurances and related security topics were discussed, such as:

o   Ability for Israeli troops to enter Palestine in emergencies

o   Israeli access to Palestinian airspace

o   Timeframe for handing over military positions within future Palestine

o   Establishing Israeli warning stations within Palestine

o   Division of regional resources, such as water, between Israel and Palestine

o   The official end of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict

o   Some form of partial demilitarization for Palestine

o   International border security force

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• Actors Formally Participating in Talks
  • Israel as an actor
    • PM Barak seemingly wanted to negotiate but he also had some issues back home, which brings up the question of whether any agreement would’ve been legitimate back in Israel.
    • On Land
      • 92% was the best offer, which included 91% of the West Bank, plus 1% land swap from pre-1967 Israel
        • Some areas of East Jerusalem included
        • However, that was according to the Israeli definition of the West Bank, in the Palestinian sense it would’ve been 86%
      • Barak hoped to have a presence in the Jordan Valley for 6-21 years
        • Had dropped that plan in September 2000 according to Ben-Ami
      • On Security
        • 3 early warning stations and a demilitarization of Palestine
          • As well as one to two thin stretches through Palestine, which would break the West Bank into two to three parts.
        • On Refugees
          • Had accepted a small number of refugees under the family reunification program
            • But refused the right of return since they were afraid of no longer being a Jewish state
            • Right of return “a euphemism for the elimination of Israel”
          • Important: The Israeli offer only meant autonomy for Palestine, not sovereignty in many parts of East Jerusalem
        • Palestine as an actor
          • Lack of leadership, lack of response, lack of commitment to the summit
          • Do not recognize Israel’s right to exist
            • No deal including the two states would not be accepted? (Visions in Collision)
          • Refugee Issue
            • Right of return
              • Around 4 million Palestinians according to them have the right of returning to their former homes
            • Put their focus away from the right of return issue during 2000-2001, instead they focused on a 5-part compromise:
              1. The Israelis should acknowledge the theoretical right of return (even to pre-1967 Israel), in return for significant limitations on the implementation on said issue.
              2. Accepted that the right of return should be implemented in a way to protect Israeli security and demographics
              3. That Israel would only be one of several locations for the refugees
              4. That a cap would be put on the Palestinians allowed to return to Israel
              5. That both parties would accept the creation of a multibillion-dollar fund
              6. the PA negotiators accepted that the agreement on refugees would satisfy the Palestinian right of return in toto.
    • Land Issue
      • The offer "would have carved Israeli-controlled cantons out of the West Bank and dashed any hopes for a viable, territorially contiguous Palestinian state” (Visions in Colision)
  • US as an actor
    • The Clinton Plan
      • Accepted by both Israel and Palestine but both actors had their reserves. However, only Palestine actually did anything about them. (Visions in Collision)
      • Later became the foundations for the Taba talks
      • Land issues:
        • called for 97%, including 94-6% of the West Bank plus a 1-3% landswap from pre-1967 Israel
        • 6 years of Israeli presence in the Jordan Valley (Visions in Collision)
        • The Israelis would give up East Jerusalem and parts of the Old City, but their religious and cultural sites would be preserved
      • Security Issues:
        • Israeli forces should gradually withdraw over a period of three years. Meanwhile an international force would as well be introduced
        • Palestine, when founded, would “nonmilitarized”, but would make compromises to have an international security force as well making some security agreements with the Israelis.
      • Refugees
        • Palestine to be a renewed home for the refugees displaced in the 1948 war and onwards. A possibility would as well be that Israel would take some refugees. As well as an international compensation would be recommended by Clinton to help the refugees in many ways such as housing and hosting by other countries.
        • Palestinians would give up the absolute right of return

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• Important Actors Not Formally Participating in Talks
  • Jordan
    • Not invited
      • Understandable in a way. They had stakes in the talks but could not really contribute much, only comment on any results after they had been accepted by the main parties, Palestine and Israel.
    • Arab unity
      • Recalled and did not renew its ambassador to Israel following bombing on Palestine in 2000
      • Maintained its role as mediator
    • Camp David and the Al-Aqsa Intifada: An Assessment of the…
  • Egypt
    • Not invited
      • Understandable in a way. They had stakes in the talks but could not really contribute much, only comment on any results after they had been accepted by the main parties, Palestine and Israel.
    • Palestine’s closest ally among Arab leaders
    • Arab unity
      • Recalled and did not renew its ambassador in 2000
      • Maintained its role as mediator
      • Camp David and the Al-Aqsa Intifada: An Assessment of the…
    • Acted as an advisor of sorts to Arafat and therefore Palestine
    • Agitator and possible spoiler?
      • However also promoted the Clinton plan and Mubarak said he would encourage Arafat to accept them
      • Palestine’s responsibility to protect Muslim religious assets (inevitable dead end of the arab-israeli conflict)

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The Camp David Summit was initiated to solve one of the most complex questions in geo-politics and peace studies, how to create two states, which seem diametrically opposed, that live together in peace. In the end, it is apparent that the summit did not solve the Israeli-Palestinian problem at hand, and as of yet there has not been much progress in further peace negotiations. Yet, it is clear that the outcome of the talks at Camp David established parameters for peace and a framework for future dialogue,  enabling more constructive negotiations to take place. While no agreement was formalized, the existential question in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was answered, that both groups deserve legitimate states [3].

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is one filled with bloody events and unsuccessful negotiations, and while this conflict continues to this day, the Camp David peace talks helped establish firm parameters for further negotiations. The main issue in this conflict centered on territory, and to help illuminate and build towards possible solutions the PLO removed its claim to partitioned Palestinian land that the Palestinians were given prior to 1967 [2]. This, alongside Israel’s removal of its citizens and troops from most of Gaza and parts of the West Bank, show that both sides were, and are, willing to give up land for peace [2]. This issue of land for peace became non-negotiable regarding Jerusalem, with both sides wanting the Old City and separately defining the borders of that Old City [3]. The reason both sides felt this was non-negotiable is that the Old City contains some of the holiest sites in all three monotheistic religions. In particular, the Palestinians rue the lack of control over the Al-Aqsa Mosque, which is on the supposed temple mound of the temple of King David, while the western wall is also a hotspot for tension as one of the holiest sites in Judaism [3]. The religious feud over these two spots makes Jerusalem almost non-negotiable and highlights perhaps the most contentious point for any future peace talks..

Additionally, the refugee issue and the Palestinian ‘right of return’ was an issue that was a probable point of unavoidable conflict and continues to be a difficult barrier to overcome. Israelis often believed that a Palestinian ‘right of return’ would mean that Jews would be the minority in the Jewish state, with fears that this would lead to political discrimination from the Palestinians [2]. Consequently, Palestinians view the right of return as a non-negotiable issue because of their ancestral ties to the land, they want to return to cities and lands which were once their own [2]. While Israel attempted to compromise on this point of conflict by allowing a set number of refugees to be reunited with family in Israel, this was seen by the Palestinian delegation as a mere token gesture and not nearly extensive enough [6].

Thus, on the two most controversial and sensitive issues of contention, no clear solution was found at Camp David. What the talks did reveal was the willingness of both parties to discuss and compromise, within what they believed to be reasonable. The summit showed that noteworthy agreements, such as the establishment of a Palestinian state and the sovereignty over the Temple Mount, could be made [10]. While the breakdown occurred over the partition of Jerusalem [6], the deeper problem that may have caused the talks to fall apart might have been the timing. Prior to the talks, Palestinian officials warned that it was too early for peace talks as there had not been enough preparation and a lack of foundation [6], showing that the Palestinians neither seemed to be ready for a settlement nor able to make counter proposals [8][9]. The fact remains that neither side was or is able to reach a conclusion of the conflict without negotiations.

Thus, the promising outcome of the summit was the Trilateral Statement that came out even as the disappointing news of failure was released. It was an agreement between all parties that future discussions were necessary, and that they had to build off what had already been done. This dedication to further peace talks was seen through the Clinton Proposal and the Taba Summit, both of which occurred within six months of the meetings at Camp David [9]. While it may have just been an attempt at admitting total defeat, it provides a springboard for further action and a pledge to find a “just and lasting peace” [7].

At face value, the Camp David Summit was a failure. But even in its failure it was able to establish the basis of further negotiations, resolve the issue of whether to create a two-state system, and finally reveal the true stances of every party involved. As frustrating as the lack of agreement or peace was and continues to be, it confirmed Israel and Palestine’s desire for a long-lasting peace and offered hope for future negotiations. What continues to be perhaps the most complex geopolitical issue of our time will continue for the near future, but with sustained efforts and negotiations, these points of contention can hopefully be further whittled down and peace can be reached.

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1. Trilateral Agreement: https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/nea/rls/22698.htm
2. Israeli-Palestinian Background Info: https://www.vox.com/cards/israel-palestine/intro
3. Camp David Summit Information from Jewish Virtual Library: http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/background-and-overview-of-2000-camp-david-summit
4. Map of Israel’s Proposed Sovereignty Division of Jerusalem: https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/map-of-the-proposed-division-of-jerusalem
5. Video of Pres. Bill Clinton announcing summit: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=op-uHx2hw8w
6. Video from the opening of the summit: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6cG9CL7dia8
7. New York Times article from July 26, 2000, a day after end of summit: https://www.nytimes.com/2000/07/26/world/impasse-at-camp-david-the-overview-clinton-ends-deadlocked-peace-talks.html
8. Government website for Camp David: https://whitehouse.gov1.info/camp-david/
9. Brief Biography of Yasser Arafat: https://www.biography.com/people/yasser-arafat-9187265
10. Brief Biography of Ehud Barak: https://www.biography.com/people/benjamin-netanyahu-9421908
11. Brief  Biography of Bill Clinton: https://www.biography.com/people/bill-clinton-9251236

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Annotated Bibliography

Beinin, Joel, and Lisa Hajjar. “Palestine, Israel and the Arab-Israeli Conflict A Primer.” MERIP, Feb. 2014, www.merip.org/sites/default/files/Primer_on_Palestine         Israel(MERIP_February2014)final.pdf.

The article “Palestine, Israel and the Arab-Israeli conflict A primer” discusses the complex history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict from its inception to the situation in 2014 when this article was published. The group that published this article is the Middle Eastern Research and Information Project which is a group of academic scholars and administrators that dedicate their time to researching middle eastern issues and informing the public on them. The information presented here included most of the critical moments in the Israeli Palestinian conflict regarding violence and diplomacy. This source is very reputable not just in the presentation of verified facts but its willingness to engage in both sides of the conflict without being normative or taking sides. This source is extremely relevant because it covers the entire timeline of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict up to and past the Camp David Accord, which when considering that the assignment is a timeline of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is critically relevant to the assignment.  As it stands this source is comprehensive and informative in a descriptive way without accidentally becoming normative.

Hanieh, Akram. “The Camp David Papers.” Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. 30, no. 2, 2001, pp. 75–97.

The article “The Camp David Papers” by Akram Hanieh is one of the most fascinating sources on the Camp David Summit. A firsthand account of a Palestinian who attended the meetings in Maryland, it provides a much clearer and deeper image of the actions taken by the Palestinian delegation while also revealing the thought process behind such actions and how they interpreted the actions of the Americans and Israelis. As much of the published and reported firsthand accounts of the summit have come from non-Palestinian voices, this source provides an alternate view that balances out much of the popular western dialogue surrounding the meetings. This means that, despite its attempt at occasional academic analysis, the source is quite obviously biased towards the Palestinian plight. Regularly this would be a negative attribute, but within the context of the wider literature it ends up being beneficial for wider study of the Camp David Summit. Additionally, it provides comparatively detailed accounts of what happened in what were very secretive and opaque meetings. The aforementioned western perspectives do not get as specific and focused as this article, meaning it is one of the leading sources for seeing how discussions advanced or stumbled on a day-to-day basis.

Katirai, Negar. “HISTORY OF THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT.” Public Broadcasting Studio, Dec. 2001.

The article “History of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict” reports an overview of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict up until 2001 when the article was published. This article was published and the information was compiled by Public Broadcasting Station which is the partially-publicly funded news organization of the U.S. PBS delivers consistent descriptive reporting without attempting to prescribe a normative assessment of the situation. This article goes over all major events in this conflict timeline which is relevant to this assignment because this assignment is to compile all major events in this conflict timeline. This article’s main strength is its range of events and situations which it views as major events, not restricting itself to military, political, or social events. This allows the article to articulate the viewpoints of both the Palestinians and the Israelis in addition to the physical events taking place. However, at the same time while the breadth of information is relevant and informative, the compilation of information is missing some key events, that had they focused on one or two types of events they probably could have accounted for. This article is informative and important to anyone studying the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Lewin, Eyal. “The Inevitable End of the Arab-Israeli Conflict.” Cogent Social Sciences, no. 2, 26 Aug. 2016.

The article by Eyal Lewin, titled “The Inevitable End of the Arab-Israeli Conflict”, focuses on the Camp David Summit and what Lewin sees as the six primary issues that were discussed. He aims for his analysis of the issues, the stances each delegation took, and the outcome to create a potential framework for future analysis of the wider Arab-Israeli conflict. Lewin does an admirable job of looking at these six issues from both the Israeli and Palestinian perspective, breaking down each side’s platform, looking for why they took the stances they did and how each side saw the failure of the talks. He identifies how critical each side’s “national ethos” is critical to understanding the breakdown in talks, even using Nazi Germany to show how impactful such an ethos is. While this comparison appears somewhat crude considering the history of Israel, it may be effective to some degree for future analysis. Ultimately, the article serves to flesh out each of the six major issues for both parties and was helpful in highlighting the key objectives of the summit as well as the intentions of all those involved.

Myron J. Aronoff. ‘Camp David Rashomon: Contested Interpretations of the Israel/Palestine Peace Process’. Political Science Quarterly, vol. 124, no. 1, 2009, pp. 143–67, http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/25655613.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A43265f3094ef99811ec5aa5d155016c1.

The article “Camp David Rashomon: Contested Interpretations of the Israel/Palestine Peace Process” gave a greater insight into the conflict within each country so to say. Each actor/country had its own team behind them. What this article manages to do is to dive deeper into each team and tell the story behind scenes in a way, the politics that hid behind each actor. That the Israeli offer to Palestine was not something that was a given, and certainly not something that had complete unity behind. It tells the reader of all the complications of being the negotiator the US was as well as politics that were ongoing in Palestine and Israel as the negotiations were ongoing. The conclusion reached is that while no agreement was reached there were significant agreements on some parts of the Israeli proposal from the Palestinians. However, the Palestinians failed to make any counter proposals. This article contributes to the assignment by providing a greater insight into the “daily life” of the negotiations, the human part of the mediation. It highlights how even within each delegation there was conflict and harmony couldn’t be found even among allies.

Pressman, Jeremy. ‘Visions in Collision: What Happened at Camp David and Taba?’ International Security, vol. 28, no. 2, 2003, pp. 5–43, http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/4137467.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Afb7e5a74f4d395f3e3f797c7d0c75bae.

The article “Visions in Collision: What Happened at Camp David and Taba?” is a good general overview of the negotiation, mediation, as well as the Taba talks that followed the Camp David talks. The most important part of this essay is the different stories on how the talks went. Seeing as no official documents were released as part of the talks, what occured behind closed door is not clear. This article describes the statements of each actor involved and analyzes them, showing the reader what the different views tell us, what may be inaccurate about them and so on. The conclusion that is reached is that the main narrative, being the US/Israeli one, is inaccurate in many ways. However, the Palestinian narrative wasn’t entirely accurate either. What remains is that according to Pressman, the Palestinians were not ready to negotiate but the talks did manage to make some significant developments for future talks. As a whole the article was invaluable for the assignment, mainly because of its detailed descriptions and inclusion of both sides of the talks. In that way, it manages to remain quite neutral as well.

Schulze, Kirsten E. ‘Camp David and the Al-Aqsa Intifada : An Assessment of the State of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process, July-December 2000’. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, vol. 24, no. 3, Taylor & Francis Group, May 2001, pp. 215–33, doi:10.1080/10576100151130298.

The article “Camp David and the Al-Aqsa Intifada : An Assessment of the State of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process, July-December 2000” article offers a view of the Camp David from the perspective of the Intifada and its role around the mediation. Published in the fall of 2001 it also discusses the aftermath of the Camp David mediation in the end of 2000 as well as the possible future of discussions between Israel and Palestine. Its main strength, as well as possible weakness, is the focus on the Intifada which can be seen as too narrow. Its discussion on the role of other international actors is also something that was vital for the part on the important actors not involved in the peace talks seeing as that specific topic was extremely difficult to find. Moreover, the paper seems to be decently neutral in its discussion of the topic, which again was something fairly rare among academic papers in our research.

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Endnotes

1. Beauchamp, Zack. “What Are Israel and Palestine? Why Are They Fighting?” Vox, Vox, 31 Mar. 2014, www.vox.com/cards/israel-palestine/intro.
2. Katirai, Negar. “History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict.” Public Broadcasting Studio, Dec. 2001.
3. Beinin, Joel, and Lisa Hajjar. “Palestine, Israel and the Arab-Israeli Conflict A Primer.” MERIP, Feb. 2014, www.merip.org/sites/default/files/Primer_on_PalestineIsrael(MERIP_February2014)final.pdf.
4. “Chronology of Summit Talks at Camp David.” ABC News, ABC News Network, 20 July 2000, abcnews.go.com/International/story?id=83118&page=1.
5. “Camp David Timeline.” BBC News, BBC, 25 July 2000, news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/848968.stm.
6. Hanieh, Akram. “The Camp David Papers.” Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. 30, no. 2, 2001, pp. 75–97.
7. “Trilateral Statement on the Middle East Peace Summit at Camp David.” U.S. Department of State, State.gov, July 2003, 2001-2009.state.gov/p/nea/rls/22698.htm.
8. Myron J. Aronoff. ‘Camp David Rashomon: Contested Interpretations of the Israel/Palestine Peace Process’. Political Science Quarterly, vol. 124, no. 1, 2009, pp. 143–67,
9. Pressman, Jeremy. ‘Visions in Collision: What Happened at Camp David and Taba?’ International Security, vol. 28, no. 2, 2003, pp. 5–43, http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/4137467.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Afb7e5a74f4d395f3e3f797c7d0c75bae.

Full Bibliography

Beinin, Joel, and Lisa Hajjar. “Palestine, Israel and the Arab-Israeli Conflict A Primer.” MERIP, Feb. 2014, www.merip.org/sites/default/files/Primer_on_Palestine         Israel(MERIP_February2014)final.pdf.

“Camp David Timeline.” BBC News, BBC, 25 July 2000, news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/848968.stm.

“Chronology of Summit Talks at Camp David.” ABC News, ABC News Network, 20 July 2000, abcnews.go.com/International/story?id=83118&page=1.

Hanieh, Akram. “The Camp David Papers.” Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. 30, no. 2, 2001, pp. 75–97.

Katirai, Negar. “History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict.” Public Broadcasting Studio, Dec. 2001.

Lewin, Eyal. “The Inevitable End of the Arab-Israeli Conflict.” Cogent Social Sciences, no. 2, 26 Aug. 2016.

Myron J. Aronoff. ‘Camp David Rashomon: Contested Interpretations of the Israel/Palestine Peace Process’. Political Science Quarterly, vol. 124, no. 1, 2009, pp. 143–67, http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/25655613.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A43265f3094ef99811ec5aa5d155016c1.

‘President Clinton Reflects on 2000 Camp David Summit’. Jewish Virtual Library, http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/president-clinton-reflects-on-2000-camp-david-summit. Accessed 19 Mar. 2018.

Pressman, Jeremy. ‘Visions in Collision: What Happened at Camp David and Taba?’ International Security, vol. 28, no. 2, 2003, pp. 5–43, http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/4137467.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Afb7e5a74f4d395f3e3f797c7d0c75bae.

Sachs, Susan. ‘IMPASSE AT CAMP DAVID: THE EGYPTIANS; The First Stop on the Way Home: A Visit With Mubarak - The New York Times’. The New York Times, 27 July 2000, http://www.nytimes.com/2000/07/27/world/impasse-camp-david-egyptians-first-stop-way-home-visit-with-mubarak.html.

Schulze, Kirsten E. ‘Camp David and the Al-Aqsa Intifada : An Assessment of the State of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process, July-December 2000’. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, vol. 24, no. 3, Taylor & Francis Group, May 2001, pp. 215–33, doi:10.1080/10576100151130298.

“Trilateral Statement on the Middle East Peace Summit at Camp David.” U.S. Department of State, State.gov, July 2003, 2001-2009.state.gov/p/nea/rls/22698.htm.

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sources :  

(1) Asser, Martin. “Obstacles to Arab-Israeli Peace: Jerusalem.” BBC News, BBC, 2 Sept. 2010,       www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-11096293. (1)

(2)Asser, Martin. “Obstacles to Arab-Israeli Peace: Palestinian Refugees.” BBC News, BBC, 2  Sept. 2010, www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-11104284.

(3)Asser, Martin. “Obstacles to Arab-Israeli Peace: Water.” BBC News, BBC, 2 Sept. 2010, www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-11101797.

(4)Herzog , Micheal. Cracking the Israeli-Palestinian Security Challenge Is Possible, But It Requires Thinking Outside the Box. 16 Sept. 2016, www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/cracking-the-israeli-palestinian-security-challenge-is-possible.

(5)“The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict:” The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Interactive Database, ecf.org.il/.

Palestine/PLO/Palestinian Authority

• On the issue of Palestinian refugees, the PLO and the Palestinian authority advocated for the right to return for Palestinian refugees and an end to Israeli settlements in the Gaza strip and Jericho area.
• They saw these areas as historically claimed by Palestine(1).
• Additionally, advocated for the withdrawal for Israeli forces in these same areas whilst a Palestinian security force be established to takeover security in these Palestinian territories.
• On the issue of water, Palestine believed that due to Israeli occupation and military power in West Bank and the Gaza strip in particular, Palestinian citizens have been subjected to limited water resources. Often being forced to buy water for inflated prices from their Israeli occupiers (2)

Israel

• On the issue of borders, the Israeli government led by Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, promoted territorial compromises with the Palestinians concerning West Bank and the Gaza strip, however continually objected to the withdrawal to the 1967 borders.
• Continually emphasised the importance of Jerusalem for the Israeli people and as Israel’s undivided capital (3)
• On the issue of Palestinian refugees, the Israeli government saw the return of refugees as an existential issue that threatens the existence of the only Jewish state.(4)
• The government justifies the issue by arguing that Israel is the only Jewish state in the world whilst there are 22 Arab countries that the refugees can take shelter in.(4)
• On the issue of water, Israel claims that the proportion of water that is available is fair for both Israeli citizens and Palestinian citizens.
• Advocated for a two-state agreement and for peaceful coexistence between Israel and Palestine in order to mobilize both international and internal support for the peace agreements

US and the Clinton Administration

• The role of the US in these negotiations was fairly impartial
• The Clinton administration did not push the two sides to address key contentious issues (5)
• Additionally, the administration was not granted full monitoring responsibilities during the Oslo Accords, so simply channelled its efforts in defusing the crisis and helping the Palestinian Authority to be established, helping with economic aid and security assistance.  (6)
• However, the administration emphasised and pushed for stable security measures as they believed it would advertently lead to a stable political environment.

United Nations

• The United Nations sees Israel’s forceful push of Palestinian refugees out of the state as refusing to follow Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and UN General Assembly Resolution 194. Which states that refugees have an unconditional right to return and live at peace in their old homes or to receive compensation for their losses.(4)

Norway

• https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/49432/16Jun_Arca%20Henon_Santiago.pdf?sequence=1
• Another third party mediator in the Oslo Accords
• Crucial in ensuring the secrecy of the talks and negotiations

Sources:

(1) Avraham Sela, “Difficult Dialogue: The Oslo Process in Israeli Perspective”, Transformations, 2009: 105-138

(2) Martin Asser, “Obstacles to Arab Israeli Peace: Water”, BBC News, 2010

(3)Nimrod Rosler, “Leadership and Peacemaking: Yitzakh Rabin and the Oslo Accords”, International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 2016: 55-67

(4)Martin Asser, “Obstacles to Arab Israeli Peace: Palestinian Refugees”, BBC News, 2010

(5)Yashar Taheri-Keramati, “Recipe for Failure: the Impotence of the Oslo Accords.”, Nebula, 2010: 77-87

(6) “The Oslo Accords and the Arab-Israeli Peace Process”, Office of the Historian, 2017

(7)Santiago Arca Henon, “Styles of International Mediation in Peace Processes between States and terrorist organizations”, Calhoun, 2016: 1-71

HAMAS

• Background: Founded in December 1987, Hamas is a Palestinian Islamist political organization, stemming from the Muslim Brotherhood Society (MB), an Egyptian Sunni Islamist movement (3). Hamas’ charter states that its ultimate goal was to apply the rule of Islam over the whole of Palestine and to replace the Israeli state with Palestine, notably through the principle of jihad (2). Following the emergence of the first Intifada, Hamas established itself as the political stem of the MB and an alternative to the PLO, joining the political-military struggle against Israel, engaging primarily in demonstrations and protest strikes, and other violent activities, such as suicide bombings and kidnappings (1). Apart from these actions, Hamas also offers a network of social services to Palestinians, alternative to the PLO and the Palestinian Authority (PA).
• Non-Attendance: Since its establishment, Hamas has constituted a serious threat to the peace process, viewing the Oslo Accords between Israel-PLO and its subsequent establishment of the PA as a threat to its authority, escalating it’s use of violence prior to the 1993 accords, and continuing past the 1995 reiteration of the accords. This use of violence and hardline policy against the recognition of Israel has notably separated them from peace processes such as Oslo. Additionally, its policy throughout the Oslo process followed ‘representation without participation’, actively not seeking to be involved in the peace process, significantly due to a rejection of Israeli legitimacy, and its tension with the PLO (1).

Sources:

(1)Avraham Sela, Non-State Peace Spoilers and the Middle East Peace Efforts (Israel: Jerusalem 2005) 1-78

(2)Muhammad Maqdsi, “The Charter of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) of Palestine,” Journal of Palestine Studies 1993: 122-134

(3)Zack Beauchamp, “Everything you need to know about Israel-Palestine” Vox 6 Dec. 2017: 1-21

HEZBOLLAH

• Background: Hezbollah was founded in 1982, and is a Shi’ite-Muslim organization, political party and militant group, based in Lebanon (1). In 1985, Hezbollah announced its official establishment, and published an ‘open letter’ which delineated the US and the Soviet Union as the key enemies of Islam, and denounced the state of Israel, calling for their ‘obliteration’ due to their occupation of Muslim lands, and further, to ‘adoption of the Islamic system’ based on the choice of the people (2). Hezbollah also lacks formal organization, with various subgroups maintaining a divided existence, depending on charismatic leaders and their religious authority, and roots of family and clan relationships (1). Similar to Hamas, it offers community and social services, and further, it operates predominantly along its own interests as a Lebanese political party (2).
• Non-Attendance: They’ve been noted to have used violence, such as bombings, against Jewish and Israeli targets, and has been noted as a terrorist organization, from Western states and the Arab league, among others (2). Despite acting as a political organization, Hezbollah was not involved in the Oslo process. Based in Lebanon, they are further removed from the direct Israel-Palestine conflict, and thus unlikely to be considered for involvement in the process. Furthermore, their hardline, anti-Israel ideology, and notably violent past against Israel denotes their capability to interrupt the diplomatic process, thus leading them to be evicted from the peace process (1).

Sources:

(1)Avraham Sela, Non-State Peace Spoilers and the Middle East Peace Efforts (Israel: Jerusalem 2005) 1-78

(2)“Profile: Lebanon’s Hezbollah Movement” BBC News 15 Mar. 2016

PALESTINIAN ISLAMIC JIHAD

• Background: A smaller organization than Hamas, The Islamic Jihad in Palestine (PJ) was founded in October 1987 at the initiation of the first Intifada. PJ is predominantly a nationalist organization who adhere to the principle of jihad to violently contest the existence of the Israeli authority. They aim for the complete destruction of the Israeli state and for the creation of a ‘historic Palestine’ in accordance with Islamic law. To achieve these goals, they notably engage in violent attacks on civilian and military personnel, leading to them being labelled a terrorist organization by many state authorities, such as the U.S. State Department.
• Non-Attendance:  A key reason why PJ was not involved in Oslo or other peace processes was due to the fact that, unlike Hamas, they do not participate in the political process or any form of political dialogue, and thus have no intention to be represented in the Palestinian Authority.Their view is that violence is the only way to combat and remove Israel completely, and thus deny any agreement that would allow the coexistence of both Israel and Palestine, thus removing them from any potential peace talks.

Sources:

(1) Avraham Sela, Non-State Peace Spoilers and the Middle East Peace Efforts (Israel: Jerusalem 2005) 1-78

The Oslo Accords between Israel and Palestine was intended to generate peace between both constituent, through negotiating prevalent issues which have incited and prolonged conflict between each state. However, the Accords ultimately cannot be labeled as successful - issues which occurred during, and following the process have hindered its success to this state, placing the Accords in a seemingly permanent stalemate. During the negotiation process, issues such as the inability to reach successful agreements on key issues, and the lack of public support acted as obstacles to creating a stable agreement. Furthermore, the inability to implement their stated goals following the conclusion of the Accords, due to an excessively utopian outlook which drew the attention away from root issues ultimately obstructed the prospective success of the negotiations. Thus, we argue that the Oslo Accords was ultimately unsuccessful due its deficiencies during both the process and implementation of their agreements.

Various obstacles during the process of the Oslo Accords itself introduced problems to the resolution of the conflict between Israel and Palestine. The negotiations themselves failed to reach adequate agreements regarding important topics for each side - for the Palestinians, this included issues such as Jerusalem, Palestinian refugees, and the Palestinian state and its borders; and for the Israeli’s, the unwillingness or inability of the Palestinian side to end terrorism (1). This effectively hindered the process of reconciling issues vital to building mutual trust between each state. Other concerns regarding the content of the Oslo process were its terms - for example, the Accords arguably failed to detail what the Palestinian’s would gain from implementing their own promises, consequently damaging their incentive to comply in the primary stages of the negotiation process (2). Moving away from the internal complexities of the process also reveals impediments to the negotiations - most notably, the lack of public support (2). Although political leaders are the dominant actors in negotiations, public support is crucial for the implementation and sustainability of any agreement. During the process of the Oslo Accords, the public of each party could not see any significant, immediate benefits to going through with the agreements, and was thus unwilling to legitimize it (2). This absence of widespread support triggered internal conflict and diminishing popular support for the peace process, influence its later collapse and inability to implement state goals.

Sources:

(1)Oren Barak, “The Failure of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process,” Journal of Peace Research Nov. 2005: 719-736

(2)Robert L. Rothstein, How to Not Make Peace: “Conflict Syndrome and the Demise of the Oslo Accords (Washington, D.C 2006) 1-49

(3)Jodi Rudoren, “What the Oslo Accords Accomplished,” The New York Times 30 Sept. 2015

The Oslo Accords and the conclusions reached by both sides ultimately failed as Israel and Palestine were both unable to follow through with the implementation of the various issues addressed. Both sides adopted a very utopian and naive outlook on the peace processes during and therefore neglected the practicality of peace building negotiations. This was a crucial contributing factor to the inability to implement the promises and conclusions reached in the agreements. For example, one prolific moment during the negotiations was when both sides mutually recognized each other’s right to existence. Whilst this was a breakthrough in the relations of these two countries it was insufficient to actually implement practical conflict resolution because it was insubstantial and a whimsical process(1). Another example is the failure of the Palestinian Authority and the Israeli government to push for the programs and incentives they created for greater integration and trust between the Palestinian people and the Israeli people. These annexes that dealt with civilian cooperation were not implemented and therefore created another failed outcome of the Accords (1).

1. Jonathan Rynhold, “The Failure of the Oslo Process: Inherently Flawed or Flawed Implementation?”, Mideast Security and Policy Studies, 2008: 1-26.

In conclusion, the Oslo Accords cannot be labeled as a success because of failure from both the Palestinian side and the Israeli side during and after the peace negotiations. Both sides’ inability to cooperate with each other on key issues, the lack of public support for the negotiations and the failure to implement their stated goals all contributed to the failure of the Oslo Accords.

ISRAEL DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE

May 14, 1948

https://israelipalestinian.procon.org/view.background-resource.php?resourceID=000908

PALESTINIAN LIBERATION ORGANIZATION CHARTER

July 17, 1968

https://israelipalestinian.procon.org/view.background-resource.php?resourceID=000902

YASSER ARAFAT’S SPEECH BEFORE THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY

November 13, 1974

https://israelipalestinian.procon.org/sourcefiles/ispaldoc1974.pdf

HAMAS CHARTER

August 18, 1988

http://www.palestine-studies.org/sites/default/files/jps-articles/2538093.pdf

HEZBOLLAH OPEN LETTER

February 16, 1985

https://www-degruyter-com.ezproxy.library.uq.edu.au/downloadpdf/books/harvard.9780674067523/harvard.9780674067523.c8/harvard.9780674067523.c8.pdf

EXCHANGE OF LETTERS BETWEEN YASSER ARAFAT AND YITZHAK RABIN BEFORE THE SIGNING OF THE OSLO DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES

September 9, 1993

https://israelipalestinian.procon.org/sourcefiles/ispaldoc1993.pdf

DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES ON INTERIM SELF-GOVERNMENT ARRANGEMENTS (THE OSLO ACCORD)

September 13, 1993

https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/resources/collections/peace_agreements/interim_agreement_09282005.pdf

ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN INTERIM AGREEMENT ON THE WEST BANK AND THE GAZA STRIP (OSLO II)

September 28, 1995

https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/resources/collections/peace_agreements/interim_agreement_09282005.pdf

Eve Spangler, Understanding Israel/Palestine (Netherlands: Rotterdam 2015) 1-246

This source provides a concise, thorough entry point to understanding the complexities of the Israel/Palestine conflict, offering both a historical and analytical framework to exploring the chronology of events and the intrinsic concepts and ideas present in the conflict. It pays special attention to the historical background of the conflict and the root causes of the hostility between Israel and Palestine, delving into the motivations of both sides in pursuing the persistent rivalry between both actors. It further analyses the different frameworks that have been used to analyse and interpret the conflict and arguments presented by both sides. It concludes by providing suggestions of different possible ways to respond and address the current situation, giving examples of measures that have already been taken. Throughout the text, Spangler argues towards the conclusion that human rights provide the foundation for a just, fair resolution. The strengths of this text lie in its comprehensive, unbiased analysis of the conflict’s history and processes to date, providing a detailed, yet concise entry point into understanding the conflict. A fault of the text, however, is that despite offering well-explored suggestions for dealing with the conflict, these suggestions are only applicable from and American standpoint, narrowing the scope of possibility.

Avraham Sela, Non-State Peace Spoilers and the Middle East Peace Efforts (Israel: Jerusalem 2005) 1-78

This source explores the role of local and regional Islamic actors in peace processes within the Israel-Palestine conflict, and whether or not their methods have had any significant impact on preventing or spoiling settlements between Israel and the PLO. It delves into the background, motives and actions of significant Palestinian non-state actors, and the position that they’ve had throughout the conflict, assessing how they’ve responded to peace processes in the past (particularly the Oslo Accords). The exploration concludes by providing various possible reasons, given their deconstruction of the Palestinian groups involved in the conflict, that the war has persisted, as well as suggesting possible pathways to creating more productive negotiations between Israel and Palestine, given the presence of these potential spoilers. Although the absence of any potential Israel-allied actors creates a one-sided text, Sela’s thorough analysis into the non-state, Islamic groups who oppose Israel’s authority provides vital background into the deconstruction of various peace processes and their aftermath, and who influenced the succeeding events. Despite the fact that it’s focus is not on the Oslo accords, Sela’s text does contribute sufficient information into the peace process and the involvement of Palestinian non-state actors, before, during and after the accords.

Hallward, Maia. "Pursuing "Peace" in Israel/Palestine." Journal of Third World Studies, vol. 28, no. 1, 2011, pp. 185.

This source outlines the failures of previous peace talks that have taken place between Israel and Palestine. It takes a constructive look at other “mainstream scholarly and media coverage.” The lack of the understanding of peace in Israeli and Palestinian terms is highlighted. Peace for the Israeli people means something different than what the Palestinian people consider peace to be. This particular source argues that the word peace is now regarded negatively by the Palestinian and Israeli people, this is because of the failed peace processes such as the Oslo Accord. The existence of peace making efforts by civil society is emphasized even when there is no “official peace efforts.” This is a valid source as it allows for a look at the conflict from a different lens, the views and efforts of the people are highlighted and this allows for an understanding of the conflict at a deeper level. Instead of only looking at official peacemaking efforts one is able to see how the average citizen contributes to the peace efforts.

Roy, Sara. "Re-conceptualizing the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Key Paradigm Shifts." Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. 41, no. 3, 2012, pp. 71-91

This source argues that the Oslo peace processes have caused severe losses to the Palestinian people. Roy argues that the Palestinian people have suffered economically, socially and politically since the occupation of the Gaza strip and the West Bank. This source vigorously argues for the Palestinian state. The question of refugees, the Arab minority in Israel and the Palestinian territories are discussed at length. Finally the changing view of Palestine in the international sphere is highlighted along with the key issues discussed before. For example the campaign around the refugees right of return is argued and is backed by other scholars and media outlets.This source is helpful in identifying key issues that the Palestinian people advocate for. However, some of the issues are argued in a narrow one view way, the Israeli side is seldom acknowledged.    

Mellisa Boyle Mahle, “A Political-Security Analysis of the Failed Oslo Process”, Middle East Policy, 2005: 79-96.

This source analyzes the failed venture of the Oslo Accords and the effect that US influence had on the negotiation’s failure. It outlines the assumption that the US government made before and after the Oslo Accords, that an emphasis and focus on a stable security situation will therefore produce a successful political environment. Mahle argues that these negotiations did not start to fail at the start of the September 28, 2000 Intifada, but rather started to fail during the negotiations, through broken political agreements, missed deadlines and the continuous breakdown of trust and good faith between the Israeli and Palestinian leaders. The author includes multiple examples and pieces of evidence that point towards the failure of the negotiations. This includes the election of Benjamin Netanyahu and the way his administration completely spoiled the future of the peace processes, the violence that occurred in occupied territories, the differing views and definitions of security by both the Israeli and Palestinian government and US influence on both governments post-Oslo Accords.

Landon E. Hancock and Joshua N. Weiss, “Prospect Theory and the Failure to Sell the Oslo Accords”, Peace and Change, 2011: 427-452.

This source examines the way in which both the Israeli and the Palestinian sides mobilized rhetoric to garner support or opposition during the peace processes. The source expands on this argument by adopting the prospect theory, which frames the preferred choice or outcome as far more appealing and less risky than the alternative. The article also argues that because the actors in the peace process framed the negotiations and agreements largely on aspirational and utopian terms, it failed to practically frame the negotiations as a far better alternative to continued conflict. This article compares this act of framing in the Oslo Accords to the act of framing the peace processes to garner support during the Good Friday Agreements in the Northern Ireland conflict. Hancock and Weiss argue that the aspirational rhetoric that both sides used during the peace processes created more harm than good in the long run as it set both the PLO and the Israeli government for failure. Arafat promised that the Palestinians would have an established state and that suffering would end for the people, whilst Rabin emphasized the end of terror and violence in the conflict.

Works Cited

Asser, Martin. “Obstacles to Arab-Israeli Peace: Jerusalem.” BBC News, BBC, 2 Sept. 2010,       www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-11096293.

Asser, Martin. “Obstacles to Arab-Israeli Peace: Palestinian Refugees.” BBC News, BBC, 2 Sept. 2010, www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-11104284.

Asser, Martin. “Obstacles to Arab-Israeli Peace: Water.” BBC News, BBC, 2 Sept. 2010, www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-11101797.

Herzog , Micheal. Cracking the Israeli-Palestinian Security Challenge Is Possible, But It Requires Thinking Outside the Box. 16 Sept. 2016, www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/cracking-the-israeli-palestinian-security-challenge-is-possible.

“The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict:” The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Interactive Database, ecf.org.il/.

Avraham Sela, “Difficult Dialogue: The Oslo Process in Israeli Perspective”, Transformations, 2009: 105-138

Nimrod Rosler, “Leadership and Peacemaking: Yitzakh Rabin and the Oslo Accords”, International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 2016: 55-67

Yashar Taheri-Keramati, “Recipe for Failure: the Impotence of the Oslo Accords.”, Nebula, 2010: 77-87

“The Oslo Accords and the Arab-Israeli Peace Process”, Office of the Historian, 2017

Santiago Arca Henon, “Styles of International Mediation in Peace Processes between States and terrorist organizations”, Calhoun, 2016: 1-71

 Avraham Sela, Non-State Peace Spoilers and the Middle East Peace Efforts (Israel: Jerusalem 2005) 1-78

Muhammad Maqdsi, “The Charter of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) of Palestine,” Journal of Palestine Studies 1993: 122-134

Zack Beauchamp, “Everything you need to know about Israel-Palestine” Vox 6 Dec. 2017: 1-21

“Profile: Lebanon’s Hezbollah Movement” BBC News 15 Mar. 2016

Oren Barak, “The Failure of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process,” Journal of Peace Research Nov. 2005: 719-736

Robert L. Rothstein, How to Not Make Peace: “Conflict Syndrome and the Demise of the Oslo Accords (Washington, D.C 2006) 1-49

The Republic of Ireland’s Government

Key values:

• Focused on lasting peace on the island of Ireland.
• Some internal uncertainty on what outcomes the people of the Republic of Ireland would be willing to accept in a referendum, but a willingness to give up its constitutional claim towards Northern Ireland.
• Committed to working with all parties to achieve peace.
• Strong belief in the necessity of a referendum in the Republic of Ireland towards constitutional changes in relation to constitutional claim over Northern Ireland.

Primary objectives:

• A strong willingness to persuade the British government to change its position on self-determination for Northern Ireland.
• They believe the Unionist parties will only make compromises under significant pressure by the British government.
• Furthermore, they believe peace will only last with agreement between Unionist and Nationalist parties and paramilitary organizations.

• A commitment to Anglo-Irish intergovernmentalism with the Republic of Ireland, Northern Ireland and the rest of Great Britain involved in the political process

Social Democratic and Labour Party

Key values:

• The SDLP, led by David Hume, represent the values of moderate nationalism; they support power sharing and cooperation with the Republic of Ireland. Towards the latter years of the 1980’s, the party became anxious to maintain its support among Nationalists who found Sinn Fein’s more radical approach and philosophy to be more appealing.
• The SDLP advocate non-violence and equality of opportunity across sectors of society, having their primary support base in the Roman Catholic community of Northern Ireland, who felt aggrieved by their subjugation in Northern Irish society.
• The Party support Anglo-Irish cooperation, and campaign for Northern Ireland to remain part of the United Kingdom so long as the majority of the population agreed for it to be so.

Primary Objectives:

• To uphold the Principle of Consent: ensure any decision made in the talks were consented to by referendum by the Northern Irish people
• To establish North-South institutions with cross-border bodies to implement co-operation
• To ensure equality in Northern Ireland; strong reforms on employment, housing and representation

British Government

Key values:

• The British Government, lead first by Prime Minister John Major and then his successor Tony Blair, attempt to maintain peace in Northern Ireland and protect the unionists who believe Northern Ireland should be part of the United Kingdom
• As the first British Prime Minister to hold face-to-face meetings with the Nationalist party leaders, Tony Blair aims to halt the ‘troubles’ and reach an agreement in which a level of power sharing can be achieved between the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland

Primary Objectives:

• Ensure the inclusion of both Sinn Fein and the Democratic Unionist Party; peace will only be achieved if both sides are involved

Ulster Unionist Party

Key Values:

• Historically the largest Unionist party in Northern Ireland, the Ulster Unionist Party has strongly opposed a united Ireland and rejects Sinn Fein’s attendance in the peace talks
• The UUP had strong links to the British Conservative Party until the mid-1970s after which the ties were weakened
• The initial focus of the party was to unite all of Ireland with Great Britain
• Following the signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985, the UUP members of Parliament resigned their seats in protest of its establishing a consultative role for the Government of Ireland in the affairs of Northern Ireland
• Although reluctant, the UUP is willing to participate in talks with the British and Irish Governments along with the other Northern Ireland political parties

Primary Objectives:

• to insist upon the decommissioning of the IRA (on condition that this was carried out before it will accept Sinn Fein’s presence at peace talks)
• As internal division within the party increases, the UUP will both accept and reject the agreement

Sinn Fein

Key values:

• Political wing of the IRA focused strongly representing Republican interests.
• Committed to a future United Ireland. While understanding that a United Ireland was not an option on the table during Good Friday agreement negotiations
• Internal split between those who support a deal and those who view a deal as abandoning the cause for a United Ireland

Primary objectives:

• Maintaining unity in Sinn Fein and the IRA while bringing peace in the short term, while continuing toward the goal of a United Ireland.
• Acquiring the release of its fighters and political prisoners a confidence building measure to demonstrate the sincerity of the British government.
• No local parliament as it fears Unionist domination
• A new police force and withdrawal of British troops.
• A willingness to hold onto weapons. And the refusal of an admission of defeat.

Northern Ireland’s Women’s Coalition (NIWC)

Key Values:

• The NIWC was founded by Monica McWilliams, a Catholic scholar, and Pearl Sagar, a Protestant social worker. Since its founding, the NIWC has declined to declare a position on whether Northern Ireland should remain part of the United Kingdom. While supportive of the peace talks, the coalition’s main goal was to secure the representation of women in Irish politics.

Primary Objectives:

• As a cross-community political party, the NIWC had no set position during the peace talks. Some NIWC members supported a united Ireland while some supported Northern Ireland remaining part of the UK.
• Ensuring that women were represented in the peace negotiations was the coalition’s priority. The NIWC pushed for and achieved a recognition of the right of women to equal political participation in the agreement.
• The party also advocated for an inclusive negotiation process which considered all parties, including the DUP.

Northern Ireland Labour Party

Key Values:

• Composed of a coalition of labour and left-wing groups in Northern Ireland with a “working-class point of view” (Johnson).
• The Labour Party attributes the divide in Northern Ireland to class struggle, not religion.

Primary Objectives:

• The party wants a settlement which, they believe, will help to close the gap between rich and poor. Thus, they support a “yes” vote in the Northern Ireland referendum.

Alliance Party

Key values:

• As the first non-sectarian political party, the Alliance Party attempted to transcend the religious divide, pursuing mixed membership and representation from both religious groups.
• Based on non-sectarian unionism and liberalism, the Alliance Party considered the division between Protestants and Catholics to be the root cause of turmoil in Northern Ireland.

Primary Objectives:

• The AP’s main objective is to promote collaboration between Protestants and Catholics, Unionists and Nationalists.
• The party argued for a continued British presence in Northern Ireland, believing this would be a good compromise.

Progressive Unionist Party

Key Values:

• The Political wing of the Loyalist Paramilitary Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF)
• Focused on the maintenance of culturally, political and military unity with the rest of the United Kingdom.

Primary Objectives:

• With a leadership of former UVF prisoners they support the release of prisoners.
• Strongly interested in a political solution and understanding of the need for accommodation.
• Insistent the IRA should destroy or give up all weapons
• Desire for Ireland to give up constitutional claim toward Northern Ireland
• Pushing for a power sharing agreement giving maximum strength to an elected majority
• Avoid equality legislation that which too aggressively erodes the Britishness of Northern Ireland.

Ulster Democratic Party

Key Values:

• The UDP is a small loyalist, Protestant paramilitary group, the political branch of the Ulster Defence Association.
• They advocate for an independent Northern Ireland with an elected Assembly and Executive along with a Bill of Rights.
• The party values the principle of consent and wants it included in the Irish Constitution.

Primary Objectives:

• The party wants an agreement and with a ‘yes’ vote in the Northern Ireland Referendum. They are supportive of Northern Ireland remaining part of Britain but if they are allowed a devolved legislative parliament.
• The UDP cannot appear to be more accommodating to nationalist parties like Sinn Fein since many of its members already vote for the larger, more established Unionist parties.

US Government

Key Values:

• Publicly, the American government wants to appear even-handed and fair.
• The government wants to earn respect and maintain good relationships with all parties involved in the talks. Senator George Mitchell (who will serve as chairman at the talks) has already made strides here by participating in previous talks with several of the parties.
• Traditionally, the US has backed Britain however, the Clinton administration wants to empower the weaker parties including the Nationalists and the Irish government. This was evidenced by Clinton’s increasing the US annual contribution to the International Fund for Ireland.

Primary Objectives:

• The US government wants to push the parties to come to an agreement. This will advance their image as an objective and effective mediator. It will also reflect well on President Clinton’s office and on the American government in general.
• President Clinton expressed hope that the issue of decommissioning would be discussed at the talks.

UK Unionist Party

Key values:

• The UK Unionist Party, established by Robert McCartney in 1995, is a non-sectarian Unionist party formed as a breakaway group from the Ulster Unionist Party
• The UKUP withdrew from peace talks when Sinn Fein was admitted in 1997 and maintain an anti-agreement stance throughout negotiations
• In line with other Unionist parties, the UKUP supports British rule of Northern Ireland, however they do not support a Conservation ideology and propose more left-wing policies
• The UKUP believe that any agreement made at the peace talks would create a slippery slope towards a united Ireland, and lead to nothing but the appeasement of terrorists
• The UKUP would only participate if Sinn Fein abandons its objective of Irish Unity

Primary Objectives:

• Contest any agreement that proposed a move towards a united Ireland
• Reject the views of Sinn Fein and other nationalist groups who push for stronger North-South ties
• Strengthen Northern Ireland’s connection with the UK and eventually fully integrate

Democratic Unionist Party

Key values:

• As a hard-line faction of the Ulster Unionist Party, the Democratic Unionist Party strongly condemns any power sharing bodies and rejects the participation of Sinn Fein in peace talks, hence their boycotting of the talks when Sinn Fein was admitted in 1997
• Avoiding all contact with the Irish Government, the DUP strongly supports union with Britain and campaigns to prevent the dilution of British identity in Northern Ireland
• Despite rescinding violence like their opponents Sinn Fein, the DUP has a history of connections to Loyalist paramilitary groups such as the Ulster Resistance

Primary Objectives:

• Prevent the early release of nationalist paramilitary prisoners
• Reject any suggestion of compromise by the UUP leadership or British Government who are seen as being too willing to concede to the demands of Nationalist groups.

Canadian Chair of Decommissioning Talks

Key Values

• Presiding over talks focused on the monitoring of a ceasefire agreement with the IRA and the broader theme of decommissioning and disarmament.

Primary Objective

• Ensure that as the agreement is being finalized all terms and conditions of decommissioning and disarmament are met.
• Provide a third party actor for both parties to meet if further negotiations, clarifications or issues are raised.

“The disappointment comes not from the modesty of our achievements, which are considerable, but from the enormity of our expectations.” - Tony Blair, 2002[i]

Tony Blair’s words, four years after the Good Friday Agreement, capture the essence of the complex and problematic issues facing any post-conflict state. To this day, Northern Ireland still navigates a difficult path to peace.

In assessing the outcomes of the Good Friday Agreement, it is necessary to go beyond the absence of violence (negative peace) and consider the primary issues of governance and sectarianism which still permeate the collective conscience of Northern Irish communities. Might it be that Northern Ireland exists in the liminal space of “no war, no peace” characterized by social polarization?[ii]. The following evaluation will draw upon Kristine Höglund and Mimmi Kovac’s “Peace Triangle”, a development of the classical ‘Conflict Triangle’ of Johan Galtung, which takes actors as central to the analysis of incompatibilities, behaviour and attitudes in post conflict society[iii].

Höglund and Kovac demarcate post-conflict issues (incompatibilities) into the categories of “unresolved”, where the peace process has failed to manage core issues causing conflict, “restored”, where few political visions have been realized and little positive change has been achieved but peace is nevertheless secured, and finally, “contested”, where the terms of the peace accord facilitate future conflict[iv]. It is clear that the incompatibilities between the primary actors of the conflict continue to impact the political landscape of Northern Ireland; The Good Friday Agreement aimed to resolve the polarization on issues of governance and sectarianism, yet these issues, which formed the foundation of the agreement, remained unresolved after 1998.

The Agreement successfully founded the power-sharing systems, which have secured proportional representation to Unionists and Republicans, but this form of power sharing has encouraged and legitimized traditional “single identities” of Catholic-Irish and Protestant-British. It has also proved problematic given that hard-line parties benefited from their inclusion. Consequently, policy has been driven towards more extremist positions, at the expense of moderate parties such as the SDLP who have been progressively losing seats to Sinn Fein. This has caused the SDLP to lose all three of its Westminster seats in the June 2017 General Election. Moreover, the Protestant complaint that the treaty favoured Catholic interests rose from 50%, immediately following the agreement, to 70% in 2003, demonstrating an ideological return to the familiar polarization of the conflict shortly after the optimism of the Good Friday Agreement[v].

Höglund and Kovac measure behaviour in post-conflict environments under the classifications of “partial”, “regional” and “insecure’ peace”. A “partial” peace would be one in which one or more of the former warring parties continue to use violence as a political tool (but the peace still holds), “regional” peace refers to the geographical concentration of residual violence following conflicts, and “insecure” peace refers to the way in which violent and criminal activity fills the vacuums not filled by legitimate government[vi]. The Belfast Agreement was preconditioned by a ceasefire from the IRA and included clauses on militant disarmament, both of which have significantly diminished the threat of violence in the nation. Unfortunately, the actions of spoilers continued to be problematic, and behaviour did not change overnight. In July 1998, three young Catholic children were killed by the Ulster Volunteer Force and in August that same year, a bomb planted by dissident republicans killed 29 people[vii]. Though sporadic pockets of violence exist today, we may optimistically assert that Northern Ireland has moved beyond the aforementioned limited versions of peace.

In Höglund and Kovac’s peace triangle, “attitudes” refers to the presence or absence of conflict mindsets. They measure these attitudes according to three standards: “polarized peace”, where attitudes remain polarized following a peace settlement, “unjust peace”, where there remains a culture of impunity and lack of reconciliation, and “fearful peace”, where the absence of conflict is due to the force of a regime or political repression[viii]. Northern Ireland’s peace can be considered “polarized” due to the lasting and powerful sectarian divisions in recent years leading to the political landscape of Northern Ireland being referred to as a “political paralysis” since January 2017[ix]. This is believed to be due to the fact that the Democratic Unionist Party and Sinn Fein have consistently entrenched their divisions and resisted the proposals of the other, particularly on the issue of Brexit. The political sensitivities of Brexit were felt particularly strongly by Northern Ireland, given that Brexit caused a resurgence in Nationalist self-identification and attitudes. The majority of Ireland voted to remain in the EU but Nationalists, who consider themselves Irish Citizens and not part of the UK (which voted for “Leave”), felt that their autonomy would be jeopardized if Northern Ireland exited the EU.

[i] “The Full Text of Tony Blair’s Speech in Belfast.” The Guardian. Guardian News and Media, 17 Oct. 2002. Web. 15 Mar. 2018

[ii] Mac Ginty, Roger, Orla T. Muldoon, and Neil Ferguson. “No War, No Peace: Northern Ireland After the Agreement.” Political Psychology 28.1 (2007): JSTOR. Web. 13 Mar. 2018

[iii] Höglund, Kristine, and Mimmi Söderberg Kovacs. "Beyond the Absence of War: The Diversity of Peace in Post-Settlement Societies." Review of International Studies 36.2 (2010): 367-90. JSTOR. Web. 15 Mar. 2018.

[iv] ibid

[v] ibid

[vi] ibid

[vii] Walsh, Jason. "15 years after Good Friday Agreement, an imperfect peace in Northern Ireland". The Christian Science Monitor. Global News Blog. 10 April 2013. Web. 20 Mar. 2018

[viii] Ibid iii

[ix] Beesley, Arthur, and Mehreen Khan. "Power-sharing Is Least of Northern Ireland's Problems." Financial Times. N.p., 12 Feb. 2018. Web. 22 Mar. 2018.

The Belfast Agreement (Good Friday Agreement):

https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/136652/agreement.pdf

Addley, Esther. “British Troops Leave After 38 Years.” The Guardian. Guardian News and Media, 01 Aug. 2007. Web. 15 Mar. 2018.

This news article reports on the long-awaited end to the British military deployment in Northern Ireland in 2007. The last of the British troops left Bessbrook, Northern Ireland, marking the end of Operation Banner. The army’s presence in Northern Ireland between 1969 and 2007 contributed to the Northern Ireland conflict and is, therefore, featured in our chart of key issues. This source, written just a month after the withdrawal of the British forces, captures the excitement of the Irish folks, many of whom had long been opposed to a British presence in Northern Ireland. With quotes from former soldier turned Member of Parliament, Addley’s report explains how the withdrawal of the troops represented Britain’s acknowledgement (however late) of their expired claim to Northern Ireland, as decided by the Good Friday Agreement.

Ahern, Bertie. "The Good Friday Agreement: An Overview." Fordham International Law Journal 22.4 (1998): 1194-199. Web. 16 Mar. 2018.

The authors provide a surface overview of the Good Friday agreement outlining the historical background before delving into a selection of key areas in the agreement. One such highlighted section is establishment of North-South institutions in Northern Ireland which demonstrate a commitment for improved relations between the people of Northern Ireland, the government of the Republic of Ireland and the government of Great Britain. The text was useful to us in providing a succinct overview and historical framing of the peace agreement and also provided special insight into the critical role of the United States in the peace process. The work is useful as a historical document but as it was published in 1998 it does not have the benefit of the almost 20 years of history since the agreement. This text was helpful in unison with more recent and comprehensive texts.

Beesley, Arthur, and Mehreen Khan. "Power-sharing Is Least of Northern Ireland's Problems." Financial Times. N.p., 12 Feb. 2018. Web. 22 Mar. 2018.

This Financial Times article comments on the effect of Brexit on the DUP and Sinn Fein’s new power-sharing arrangement. Beesley and Khan argue that, since 20 years have passed since the Good Friday Agreement was signed, the time has finally come for the DUP and Sinn Fein to collaborate in government and face issues of language, gay marriage and Brexit. This source provides no background on either the DUP or Sinn Fein and assumes the reader is familiar with both the parties’ positions as well as the history (since before the Good Friday Agreement) of their relationship with one another.

Breadun, Deaglan De. “UDA Calls for Yes Vote in Support of Agreement.” The Irish Times. The Irish Times, 25 Apr. 1998. Web. 13 Mar. 2018.

This Irish Times news article explains the position of the loyalist paramilitary Ulster Defence Association. The political wing of the association, the Ulster Democratic Party, would attend the Good Friday talks on its behalf. The article succinctly explains the statements made by the UDA in anticipation of the talks, including its declaration of support of the Belfast Agreement as well as its call for a “yes” vote in the upcoming referendum on Northern Ireland’s status. This source lends much insight into the UDA’s perspective going into the talks. It also refers to several important interactions with other relevant parties including Sinn Fein and the Irish Republican Army days before the Good Friday conference. The article briefly notes the positions of a few other attendees including the Social Democratic and Labour Party, the Ulster Unionist Party and the Alliance Party but does not report on the positions of other parties expected at the talks.

“Constitutional Reform: Northern Ireland Good Friday Agreement. Peace Accords Matrix. University of Notre Dame, n.d. Web. 15 Mar. 2018.

This source is simply the written agreement (annex A and B) on constitutional reform in accordance with the Good Friday Agreement. It explains the British-Irish agreement to respect the choice of the Northern Ireland people, as decided by referendum, and related clauses including an affirmation of the Northern Irish people’s right to self-determination. It includes a useful timeline of the implementation of the constitutional reforms between 1998 and 2008.

Cox, Michael, Adrian Guelke, and Fiona Stephen. "A Farewell to Arms?" Google Books. Manchester University Press, 2006. Web. 15 Mar. 2018.

This text provides a comprehensive history of the conflict in Northern Ireland leading up to the 1998 Good Friday agreement leading up to the Good Friday agreement. Beginning largely in the 1960s the text delves into the dark statistics surrounding this blood conflict while also painting nuanced and comprehensive pictures of the actors and the rationales and ideologies that propelled these antagonistic groups. Further the book examines how concepts like victimhood, revenge, and and conflict became cyclical outcomes and the challenges posed in escaping the cycle of violence and distrust rampant in Northern Irish society. This text provided a large amount of useful information in broadening our understanding of the conflict in Northern Ireland.

Fearon, Kate, and Monica McWilliams. “The Good Friday Agreement: A Triumph of Substance Over Style.” The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. N.p., 1998. Web. 15 Mar. 2018.

The authors provide a meaningful overview of many of the significant elements of the Good Friday which distinguish the agreement from past peace attempts. Published in 1998 without the advantage of how the implementation of the agreement would occur. Even within these parameters the text provides a meaningful analysis of the negotiation process with special emphasis on the role of the Northern Irish Women’s Coalition and their role in the eventual peace agreement. This text was important for our group as it enriched our understanding of the  roles played by numerous actors in the negotiation process. Especially the role of the NIWC. All other actors were discussed only in passing and without the level of detail provided to the NIWC.

Höglund, Kristine, and Mimmi Söderberg Kovacs. "Beyond the Absence of War: The Diversity of Peace in Post-Settlement Societies." Review of International Studies 36.2 (2010): 367-90. JSTOR. Web. 15 Mar. 2018.

The authors discuss the concepts of negative and positive peace in the context of Northern Ireland and Cambodia. In their analysis of Northern Ireland, they move past the absence or presence of armed conflict. They focus on what is termed as the “Peace Triangle”, specifically the issues, behaviour, and attitudes in a post conflict state. Through their analysis they paint a thorough picture of the successes and challenges remaining for last and society-wide peace in Northern Ireland. One such area of difficulty is attitudes, as the authors lay out how both the Nationalist and Unionist sides of the Northern Irish conflict remain skeptical of each other, and the Unionists are especially skeptical of the Good Friday Agreement. A rise of extremist parties on both sides is also viewed as a sign of a fragile peace in Northern Ireland. The text provides little background on the conflict but, when combined with historical sources, it provides a sharp critical analysis and highlights the complexities of both peace and conflict in Northern Ireland.

Kumar, Radha. “Northern Ireland.” Negotiating Peace in Deeply Divided Societies: a Set of Simulations, SAGE, 2009, PP.1-64. Print.

Intended and written for use in a classroom simulation, this source provides readers with a basic background overview of the conflict in Northern Ireland. It gives a brief summary of the positions of each of the parties which were present at the Good Friday peace talks as well as a comprehensive and detailed conflict timeline. This timeline was extremely useful in the creation of our own timeline.

Larson, Per. “To Understand the Negotiations Leading to the Good Friday Agreement 1998.” Thesis. Lund University, n.d. Web. 15 Mar. 2018. <http://lup.lub.lu.se/luur/download?func=downloadFile&recordOId=2275657&fileOId=2275658>.

The author examines the psychological theories regarding the negotiations which led to the Good Friday Agreement. The approach is quite scientific and  analytical with a strong focus on the behavioral psychology of the negotiations. This paper serves as an excellent tool for those looking to understand the Good Friday Agreement from a perspective outside of the historical lens. To a reader trying to simply gain a background on the conflict and agreement this paper may not be the best resource. However, the paper benefited our group as it examined the agreement through a perspective we had not previously encountered therefore contributing to the depth and breadth of our understanding of the negotiation process and outcomes.

“Loyalist Party Split Over Peace Accord.” BBC News. BBC, 23 Jan. 2001. Web. 13 Mar. 2018.

This news article reports on the splitting of the Ulster Democratic Party (UDP) in January, three months before the Good Friday conference. The article lends useful insight into the UDP’s internal struggles leading up to the peace talks. While the UDP declared its support of the Good Friday Agreement, 14 branches of the UDP demonstrated their opposition to this support by quitting the party. The article includes valuable quotes from Party Chairman John White who characterized the split as worrying but not likely to affect the UDA ceasefire declared in 1994. Quotes by UDP leader Gary McMichael, who insisted only a third of the branches had left, suggest even more disagreement within the party. The article offers readers a look into the complicated workings of the UDP as it prepared to attend the talks in support of the Good Friday Agreement.

Mac Ginty, Roger, Orla T. Muldoon, and Neil Ferguson. "No War, No Peace: Northern Ireland After the Agreement." Political Psychology 28.1 (2007): 1-11. JSTOR. Web. 13 Mar. 2018.

The authors begin by outlining the multudinous areas where the Good Friday agreement has brought meaningful peace to Northern Ireland highlighting the ongoing ceasefire and improved governance and community relations. However, the authors make a clear point that Northern Ireland still has a long way to go before it can be understood as a harmonious democracy. Sectarianism among the two communities remains prevalent and at the time of this text, 10 years after the Good Friday Agreement. This source also provides a concise background of the conflict which added in our overall understanding of the Northern Ireland. The source was particularly useful in outlining some of the continued roadblocks to complete peace in Northern Ireland, especially when cross referenced with more recent sources, at which point we were able to paint a more nuanced picture of the current situation in Northern Ireland.

O’Rourke, Catherine. “Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition.” Encyclopedia Britannica. Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 20 May 2016. Web. 13 Mar. 2018.

This section of the online Encyclopedia Britannica provides a brief overview of the history of the Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition (NIWC) from creation in 1996 to disbandment in 2006. It also explains the coalition’s contributions to the Good Friday Agreement including its involvement in creating provisions for equality (for women) and human rights.

Taylor, Ros. “Who’s Who in Northern Ireland.” The Guardian. Guardian News and Media, 29 Jan. 1999. Web. 13 Mar. 2018.

Ros Taylor of the Guardian provides short summaries of all parties involved in the Good Friday Agreement. Taylor’s article begins with short definitions for frequently used descriptors for parties such as “loyalist” and “unionist”. He then writes short paragraphs for each party, including details about their histories, leaders, composition, values. While the source does not explain the parties’ positions or objectives going into the peace talks, it provides simple descriptions of each party, using the definitions listed at the beginning of the article.

"The Full Text of Tony Blair's Speech in Belfast." The Guardian. Guardian News and Media, 17 Oct. 2002. Web. 15 Mar. 2018.

Tony’s Blair’s speech captured the essence of the complex issues facing the parties post-conflict and post-agreement. His analysis of the outcome of the Good Friday Agreement, presented through this speech, mirrors our own analysis.

Tonge, Jonathan. “From Sunningdale to the Good Friday Agreement: Creating Devolved Government in Northern Ireland”. Taylor and Francis Online. Contemporary British History, 25 June 2008. Web. 15 Mar. 2018.

The authors in this text track some of the parallels between the 1973 Sunningdale agreement and the 1998 Good Friday agreement to how the peace process played out amongst almost 25 years of conflict between the two agreements. Special focus in the text is given to the issue of devolved government. With the views of the the prominent republican and loyalist groups demonstrated alongside that of the British government. The authors provide significant historical background into the failed Sunningdale peace agreement of 1973. Our group gained significant historical context from the text, while simultaneously enriching our understanding of the progression and at time regression of the peace process in Northern Ireland. The focus of the text on the issue of devolution is beneficial as the authors are able to clearly outline the complexities and nuances of what was both a significant issue in negotiations for the agreement and remains a significant issue in Northern Ireland today.

Wolff, Stefan. “The Road to Peace? The Good Friday Agreement and the Conflict in Northern Ireland.” World Affairs, vol. 163, no.4, 2001, pp.163-170. Web. 15 Mar. 2018.

The authors provide a background for the Good Friday agreement touching upon the history, key actors and previous attempts for peace. The text demonstrates the opposing understanding of the conflict within the Loyalist and Nationalist communities and in doing so aided our understanding of the key issues at work in the conflict. The text does not go into the key issues at length and is largely a surface historical account, but through the quality and concision the authors are able to provide a meaningful understanding of the conflict and peace process without going too deeply into the complexities of the conflict and peace agreement. The text outlines several key outcomes of the agreement and the saliency of these outcomes in the peace process of Northern Ireland. These outcomes proved useful in our analysis of the outcomes of the Good Friday agreement. Written in 2001 (three years after the agreement) the text provides three years of outcomes which we were able to build upon with later research to enrich our understanding of the eventual outcomes of the peace process and agreement, in the nearly two decades which have followed the Good Friday agreement.

A Belfast Man on Patrol for the Irish Republican Army, 1987. Digital image. ATI. ATI, 17 May 2016. Web. 22 Mar. 2018. <http://allthatsinteresting.com/the-troubles-northern-ireland>.

Addley, Esther. “British Troops Leave After 38 Years.” The Guardian. Guardian News and Media, 01 Aug. 2007. Web. 15 Mar. 2018.

Ahern, Bertie. "The Good Friday Agreement: An Overview." Fordham International Law Journal 22.4 (1998): 1194-199. Web. 16 Mar. 2018.

Beesley, Arthur, and Mehreen Khan. "Power-sharing Is Least of Northern Ireland's Problems." Financial Times. N.p., 12 Feb. 2018. Web. 22 Mar. 2018.

Breadun, Deaglan De. “UDA Calls for Yes Vote in Support of Agreement.” The Irish Times. The Irish Times, 25 Apr. 1998. Web. 13 Mar. 2018.

Burntollet March, 1969. Digital image. History Hub. History Hub, n.d. Web. 22 Mar. 2018. <http://historyhub.ie/why-was-there-a-civil-rights-movement-in-northern-ireland>.

“Constitutional Reform: Northern Ireland Good Friday Agreement. Peace Accords Matrix. University of Notre Dame, n.d. Web. 15 Mar. 2018.

Cox, Michael, Adrian Guelke, and Fiona Stephen. "A Farewell to Arms?" Google Books. Manchester University Press, 2006. Web. 15 Mar. 2018.

Fearon, Kate, and Monica McWilliams. “The Good Friday Agreement: A Triumph of Substance Over Style.” The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. N.p., 1998. Web. 15 Mar. 2018.

Good Friday Agreement. Digital image. BBC. BBC, 1998. Web. 22 Mar. 2018. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/events/good_friday_agreement>.

Guyoncourt, Sally. A British soldier drags a Catholic protester during the ‘Bloody Sunday’ massacre on 30 January, 1972. Digital image. The Independent. Independent Digital News and Media, 12 Nov. 2015. Web. 22 Mar. 2018. <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/bloody-sunday-ex-paratroopers-launch-legal-bid-to-halt-murder-inquiry-a6731031.html>.

Höglund, Kristine, and Mimmi Söderberg Kovacs. "Beyond the Absence of War: The Diversity of Peace in Post-Settlement Societies." Review of International Studies 36.2 (2010): 367-90. JSTOR. Web. 15 Mar. 2018.

Imbornoni, Ann Marie. Catholics and Protestants as a Percentage of the Population, 1991 (Map). Digital image. Crawford's World. N.p., n.d. Web. 22 Mar. 2018. <http://www.crawfordsworld.com/rob/apcg/UK/Father/Fatherchronology.htm>.

Kumar, Radha. “Northern Ireland.” Negotiating Peace in Deeply Divided Societies: a Set of Simulations, SAGE, 2009, PP.1-64. Print.

Larson, Per. “To Understand the Negotiations Leading to the Good Friday Agreement 1998.” Thesis. Lund University, n.d. Web. 15 Mar. 2018. <http://lup.lub.lu.se/luur/download?func=downloadFile&recordOId=2275657&fileOId=2275658>.

“Loyalist Party Split Over Peace Accord.” BBC News. BBC, 23 Jan. 2001. Web. 13 Mar. 2018.

Mac Ginty, Roger, Orla T. Muldoon, and Neil Ferguson. "No War, No Peace: Northern Ireland After the Agreement." Political Psychology 28.1 (2007): 1-11. JSTOR. Web. 13 Mar. 2018.

Mulberry Bush Pub Wrecked by Bomb in 1974. Digital image. Daily Mail. Daily Mail, n.d. Web. 22 Mar. 2018. <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3620905/Revealed-real-pub-bombers-coroner-orders-Birmingham-inquests-reopened-families-demand-killers-brought-justice-now.html>.

Murdered by the IRA. Digital image. Daily Mirror, 28 Aug. 1979. Web. 22 Mar. 2018. <https://i.pinimg.com/originals/43/10/bb/4310bb20bad8f19bbb8b035ce3885097.jpg>.

O’Rourke, Catherine. “Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition.” Encyclopedia Britannica. Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 20 May 2016. Web. 13 Mar. 2018.

Taylor, Ros. “Who’s Who in Northern Ireland.” The Guardian. Guardian News and Media, 29 Jan. 1999. Web. 13 Mar. 2018.

Tonge, Jonathan. “From Sunningdale to the Good Friday Agreement: Creating Devolved Government in Northern Ireland”. Taylor and Francis Online. Contemporary British History, 25 June 2008. Web. 15 Mar. 2018.

"The Full Text of Tony Blair's Speech in Belfast." The Guardian. Guardian News and Media, 17 Oct. 2002. Web. 15 Mar. 2018.

Walsh, Jason. "15 years after Good Friday Agreement, an imperfect peace in Northern Ireland". The Christian Science Monitor. Global News Blog. 10 April 2013. Web. 20 Mar. 2018

White, Connor. Sinn Fein Cartoon. Digital image. Unionist Voice. Unionist Voice, 3 Jan. 2018. Web. 22 Mar. 2018. <https://unionistvoice.com/2018/01/03/former-sinn-fein-ira-election-candidate-threatens-legal-action-against-unionist-voice/>.

Wolff, Stefan. “The Road to Peace? The Good Friday Agreement and the Conflict in Northern Ireland.” World Affairs, vol. 163, no.4, 2001, pp.163-170. Web. 15 Mar. 2018.

Global leaders are concerned about the withdrawal of North Korea from Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

Talks began after the fallout from the failed 1994 “Agreed Framework”, and North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT. Concerns over North Korea's increasing nuclear capabilities, combined with concerns over their leadership, spurred an international commitment to work on negotiating peace with North Korea. Currently, North Korea remains outside of the NPT but did disable nuclear reactor that produced plutonium for its weapons program.

North Korea wants normalized relationships with the United States and a non-aggression pact

As established in the first round of negotiations, a central issue for North Korea was that of creating normalized relationships with the United States, as well as a non-aggression pact. North Korea stated that without meeting these demands they would not consider dismantling their nuclear program. The United States previously rejected a non-aggression pact proposal and remained firm during talks, but later reached an agreement with North Korea. On October 11, 2008, during the sixth round of negotiations, the United States removed North Korea from its list of state-sponsored terrorism as well as removing North Korea from the Trading with the Enemy Act. This fulfilled one of North Korea’s demands of having a further normalized relationship with the USA.

The United States fails to provide aid to North Korea in a timely manner, sparking lost confidence in the negotiations

Another key demand of North Korea was that of receiving economic aid. After delays in the delivery of aid from the Americans, North Korea walked out of the negotiations. Failing to deliver aid in the agreed timeframe ultimately lead to lost confidence in the peace talks by the North. Rebuilding trust with the north has proven a difficult task since this round of deterioration.

Re-establishing Negotiations with North Korea

Currently, one of the key issues is simply trying to get North Korea to resume the peace negotiations. After failed negotiations in the sixth round, North Korea pulled out of the talks and began to resume their nuclear enrichment program. Despite this, South Korea recently reached a breakthrough when the North agreed to reopen dialogue with the South in 2018 during talks of North Korea’s participation in the Olympics held in PyeongChang.

1. The United States

• Disarmament nuclear arsenal

The United States has always been the leading promoter of a complete and irreversible dismantlement of the nuclear arsenal in North Korea. In consideration of North Korea's record of caprice and outright deceit, the U.S. insisted on a multilateral rather than a unilateral approach to negotiate, in order to impose international supervision on the DPRK. However, even though the U.S. was extremely resolute in disarming DPRK’s nuclear programs during the negotiation, from its national security tactics, the nuclear arsenal in DPRK is still used as an excuse for the U.S. to deploy its own antinuclear weapons in Korea and Japan to counter with the power of China and Russia. Thus, it is believed that the U.S.’s statement for nuclear dismantlement in North Korea was not sincere.

• Economic sanction on DPRK

Different than the diplomatic path with China in the 1970s, the U.S. preferred an isolation policy to North Korea without diplomatic recognition nor economic cooperation. However, the U.S. has promised to delist the DPRK as a supporter of terrorism and terminated the exercise of the Trading with the Enemy Act with DPRK in 2008. The U.S. also agreed to provide humanitarian aid with resources supplied if a complete and verifiable denuclearization is agreed to in North Korea.

2. North Korea

• Disarmament nuclear arsenal

The Kim family did not have the same economic strength and resources as China to have an open reform, therefore, they regarded military force as their only chip to defend the national ideology and a continued glorification of the family. They have learned lessons from the situations in Iraq and Libya, so they would not give up nuclear weapons unless a better relationship with America and other parties in security, diplomacy, and economy, can be guaranteed for the foreseeable future.

• The geopolitical relationship in Northeast Asia

Valuing regime survival above all else, North Korea has regarding their nuclear program as a weapon to deter a forcible unification with South Korea through the promotion of America. The DPRK remains extremely isolated, although maintains some relations with China and has kept a nuclear resources partnership with Iran and Pakistan.

• Economic sanctions

The illegal transaction of military weapons and technologies with the third world were believed to be DPRK’s major source of income. The economic sanction and isolation policy did little to terrorize the DPRK, which has a lower opportunity cost than Iraq and Iran because of a more autarkic economy – with fewer dependents on global trade and the international system. But, largely depending on the food and energy supply from China, North Korea might lower its head once this biggest trader has determined to stand with America in the case of denuclearization.

3. South Korea

• Disarmament nuclear arsenal

Bandwagoning with America, South Korea was the free-rider in the negotiation who has relied upon America to balance the powers in the East Asia and the threat from Kim’s regime.

• The geopolitical relationship in Northeast Asia

The historical issue between South and North Korea was the dynamic of the South to stand against the North in the negotiation, and also the biggest obstacle to establishing a peaceful system on the Korean peninsula. South Korea did want unification with the North, but prepared to wait after they realized the heavy cost. Concerning about the territory hegemons of East Asia, China and Russia, who also own their own nuclear programs, South Korea had no choice but accept its passive position in the relationship with America, and allow the U.S. to deploy its anti-nuclear programs (THAAD) in South Korea territory on the pretext of threatening the North.

• Economic sanctions

The South has little economic connection with North Korea and the economic sanctions were not a useful tool for the South to menace the North. Following the steps of America, South Korea showed its willingness to provide a certain amount of material and financial aids to the North with the processing of denuclearization.

4. China

• Disarmament nuclear arsenal

China was the host and mediator of the peace talks between the U.S. and DPRK. Despite sharing a border with North Korea, China did not believe the nuclear weapons in DPRK would ever hurt its national security. To China, the opposite sides in the negotiation were U.S. and DPRK, and North and South Korea. But, China still positively involved in the talk since recognizing that the possession of nuclear weapons might promote nuclear proliferation in the neighboring

• The geopolitical relationship in Northeast Asia

As both a historical friend and communist comrade, China has always kept a friendly relationship with the DPRK. The intense relationship with South Korea and Japan continues to threaten China’s position as regional hegemony within Asia, as a result, the key statement of China in SPT was a denuclearization in the whole Korean Peninsula. However, although China behaved positively in the SPT to reciprocate America for its favorable behaviors in the previous years, especially for its concession in the Taiwan issue, China opposed vehemently against America about THAAD for its threats to their national security.

• Economic sanction on DPRK

China is the DPRK’s largest trading partner. For instance, the exporting of coal contributed 30% of the trading income in North Korea. During the negotiations, China was worried that imposing economic sanctions on the North would cause economic damage that could lead to destabilization and potentially trigger conflict on Northeast Asian territory.

5. Japan

• Disarmament nuclear arsenal

Attended the negotiation as a great power in Asia, Japan was not actually involved in the conflict nor would they be affected by the result of the negotiations. Although they had been bandwagoning with the U.S. for its concern about national security, Japan did not really want a compromise from the DPRK, for which they might lose an excuse to deploy their own army and military instruments.

• The geopolitical relationship in Asia

Having stayed in an intense relationship with China for historical reasons, Japan has installed the US-developed Aegis ship-based anti-ballistic missile system in 2007 to defend the attack from North Korea while threatening China.

• Economic sanctions

Similar to South Korea, Japan had little commercial connection with the North but imposed harsh economic sanctions as the response to the call from America. Since 2006, Japan imposed a ban on North Korean ships from Japanese ports and import of products.

6. Russia

• Disarmament nuclear arsenal

Russia was not deeply involved in the conflict, Russia’s ambition was to play a constructive broker or moderate role in the strives of denuclearization. However, on the other hand, Russia provided technology to aid in the DPRK’s nuclear programs in the former Soviet period, it is believed that the dynamic of Russia in promoting denuclearization is similar with its partner China - aimed at the whole Korean Peninsula instead of to antagonize with the North.

• The geopolitical relationship in Asia

As another hegemony in Asia, Russia has always kept a close cooperdinationship with China. Owning the biggest nuclear warhead arsenal, Russia was invited to the peace talk mainly because of its powerful strength as a nuclear-armed territory hegemony, rather than any vested interests in the region. After the demise of the USSR, the Russian position in Asia has considerably declined especially since the rise of Far Eastern regions. In this circumstance, a multilateral structure in Northeast Asian security and cooperation was desirable for Russia to access the decision-making process for its own further interests. The problem of North Korea was a good entry path for Russia to improve its regional effects.

• Economic sanction on DPRK

Russia was the only member of the Six-Party Talks besides the United States that actually supplied heavy fuel oil to North Korea as was agreed in February 2007. Prioritizing the peace conditions in Northeast Asian territory in the first place of the whole negotiation, Russia was not active in imposing economic sanctions on the DPRK while impugning America’s “super-hardline policy” to force new concessions from Pyongyang without adequate reciprocity. Moscow was worried that a radical sanction might not only worsen the contradiction in the current nuclear problem, it might also cause the DPRK to become desperate, and trigger a security problem in the Northeastern Asian territory.

1. European Union

• Why they were not invited

As one of the biggest international powers, the EU was not invited to the peace talks simply because it had neither a direct interest in North Korea nor a considerable regional effect in Northeast Asia. However, with increasing commercial trades with Asian countries, such as China, the EU had actively engaged in the nuclear problem of the DPRK to improve its own influence in Asia.

• Disarmament of the nuclear arsenal and economic sanctions on the DPRK

The EU clearly stated its position with other participants in the SPT, insisting on the complete and irreversible denuclearization of North Korea, and has supported international sanctions against the DPRK. Lacking political ties with South Korea, the EU was a neutral civilian actor to the North. Supported EU’s request for enhanced observer status in UNGA and introduced more SEZs to promote trade, the economics of DPRK could be shocked heavily once EU strengthens the economic sanctions. Besides, EU had involved in KEDO construction with financial aid provided.

• Humanitarian aid to North Korea

Because the DPRK is not part of the WTO, they do not benefit from their programmes for developing nations under the EU's General System of Preferences (GSP). The EU had been providing humanitarian aid to North Korea’s agricultural sector since 1995 when severe famine afflicted the country, with a programme funded by the Food Security Thematic Programme of the Development Cooperation Instrument.

2. Iran and Pakistan

• Why they were not invited

Iran and Pakistan were not invited to the Six-Party talks because of its passive position in the Asian territory. Iran, like the DPRK, is also a violator of the NPT and was not invited to the peace talks about denuclearization.

• Disarmament nuclear arsenal in the DPRK

Allegedly in contact with North Korea and thought to have exchanged technology, Iran and Pakistan have been considered accomplices to the DPRK. Neither had made any clear statement about the nuclear programs in North Korea, nor promoted nuclear non-proliferation with other participants in the talk.

3. NATO

• Why they were not invited

There is no clear explanation about why NATO was not invited to the six-party talk, but the reason may be similar to that of the EU.

• The geopolitical relationship in Asia

NATO has been hoping to expand relations with South Korea since the early 2000s when South Korea was engaging with NATO to create a Security Partnership. However, this expansion has contained Russian and Chinese influence and it would not be worth it for South Korea to sacrifice relations with China and Russia by joining NATO as they are vital partners in de-escalating North Korean aggression.

• Disarmament nuclear arsenal and economic sanctions on the DPRK

NATO had always played a positive role in promoting denuclearization in North Korea while urging the interest-related countries, such as other participants in the SPT, to impose tougher sanctions on DPRK.

4. KEDO

• Why they were not invited
  

The Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) was established to implement the 1994 U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework, which entailed the construction of two light water reactor nuclear power plants in North Korea to replace North Korea's Magnox type reactors. The KEDO was a good step in freezing North Korea's nuclear programs by collective efforts of America, South Korea, and Japan. They were not invited to the SPT perhaps because all their members had already been involved in the talk to express their position previously, therefore it was not necessary for KEDO to attend as an actor. Furthermore, without a “sustained, high-level political leadership”, the light water reactor program had been closed in 2006. It is believed that the broken promise of the KEDO members had worsened the conflict between the oppositions in the SPT.

The goal of the Six-Party Talks was to peacefully negotiate the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Cooperating together, the six nations of North Korea, the United States, China, Russia, South Korea and Japan hoped to establish a dialogue that could create a greater level of peace and stability in the region. Ultimately, the peace negotiations fell apart during their Sixth Round, with North Korea leaving the negotiations indefinitely. Despite this, there has been some progress made since North Korea left the negotiation table that leads many to be hopeful that the talks may resume in the future.

North Korea’s missile program rapidly progressed in 2017, during which time it fired 23 missiles (Berlinger). These actions triggered concern throughout the international community, with the South Korean government stating, “We strongly condemn yet another provocation from the North,” (Manson et al.). The Americans also said that “all options are on the table” in response to a ballistic missile launch (Manson, Sevastopulo, and Harding). North Korea’s continued technological advancements and disregard of concern in the international community has only served as an added sense of urgency to resuming dialogue.

Despite an escalation in conflict in the Asian region recently, relations between North Korea and their southern neighbor have made some progress. In an unexpected move, North Korea asked to send delegated athletes to attend the 2018 Olympic Games held in PyeongChang.Their attendance was an unprecedented move, with South Korea diplomatically welcoming their athletes and establishing a formal dialogue for the first time in two years with North Korea (Stiles). Despite some international criticism, allowing the North to compete in the Olympics potentially offered a new sense of diplomacy between the two nations.

Under heightened tensions between the United States and North Korea the possibility of further talks have been renewed with North Korea sending an unexpected invitation of talks to the U.S. In a message delivered by South Korean diplomats to the United States stating that they wanted to reopen dialogue about the nuclear issue, President Donald Trump emphatically accepted their offer, stating that it was “very positive” (Cohen et al.). Additionally, after talking with the North, Seoul's national security chief, Chung Eui-yong, stated that the North offered to refrain from conducting nuclear and missile tests that while in talks with the U.S (Cohen et al.). These talks are expected to commence in mid-2018. The potential magnitude of these future discussions has yet to be seen and a resumption of the Six-Party Talks does not yet seem highly likely.

There has been a substantial lack of confidence in the North Korean regime and their ability to follow through on their statements of resolution. Although the idea of North Korea dismantling their nuclear program remains unlikely, the move towards more open communication, rather than their previous isolationism, offers some hope that peace talks could resume in the future. Until then, nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula are unlikely to go anywhere.

Statement by the Secretary-General on the Six-Party Talks
https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2008-06-26/statement-secretary-general-six-party-talks

US Department of State Archives on Six-Party Talks, 2001-2009
https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2008/may/104558.htm

American Policy regarding North Korea and the Six-Party Talks, from Bush to Obama
http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/obamas-north-korea-policy/

North Korea Taken off State Sponsored Terrorism List
https://www.cnn.com/2013/10/29/world/asia/north-korea-nuclear-timeline---fast-facts/index.html

Article on the background of Six-Party Talks
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/six-party-talks-north-koreas-nuclear-program

Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks, Beijing, 19 September 2005
https://www.state.gov/p/eap/regional/c15455.htm

Buszynski, Leszek. Negotiating with North Korea: the Six-Party Talks and the Nuclear Issue. Routledge, 2016.
Leszek Buszynski is a professor of International Relations. In his book, Buszynski examines the multilateral negotiations in the Six-Party Talks, with a focus on bargaining and negotiation. His focus on how negotiation shapes outcomes is an interesting addition to the literature surrounding the North Korean nuclear issue in that North Korea, being in strict isolation, is often seen as hostile and difficult to negotiate with. The importance of negotiating is a key component of peacebuilding, but as Buszynski there is difficulty is finding common ground between negotiators, with members of the Six-Party Talks having varying approaches to the issue. Another key idea that Buszynski addresses are the power dynamics that exist in negotiations, in particular that of the prevention of the U.S as being a “dominant player”, since they had to compete with China, who further had the support of Russia. This created difficulty in creating a resolution with North Korea. The ideas offered by Buszynski are of great importance when attempting to understand the difficulty of creating a denuclearized Korean Peninsula.

Millard, Andrew S., and Chae-Deug Yi. "The EU’s Potential Role in the Six-Party Talks and the North Korean Nuclear Crisis." Baltic Journal of European Studies, vol. 7, no. 2, 2017, pp. 247-283.
Millard and Chae examine the positions of the European Union in the SPT, and the relationship between EU and KEDO. This article listed EU and KEDO’s contribution to the denuclearization and reconstruction in North Korea provided a possible reason for them being not invited to the SPT.

Okano-Heijmans, Maaike. "Troubled Neighbours: Japan's Negative Economic Diplomacy Towards North Korea." European Journal of East Asian Studies, vol. 9, no. 2, 2010, pp. 363-394.
This research started from Japan’s tactics and policies in the DPRK issues, deeply analyzed Japan’s diplomatic relations with other five participants of the SPT, demonstrated Japan’s dynamic to bandwagon with America and cooperate with China for both the nuclear issue and the whole national blueprint.

Schneider, Mark. "The North Korean Nuclear Threat to the U.S." Comparative Strategy, vol. 33, no. 2, 2014, pp. 107-121.
Schneider introduced the characteristics of nuclear weapons in DPRK, Pakistan, and Iran indicated their illegal commercial connection for nuclear resources and technologies. This article is the base of the analyzation about Iran and Pakistan’s perspectives in the denuclearization of DPRK.

Shulong, Chu, and Lin Xinzhu. "the Six-Party Talks: A Chinese Perspective." Asian Perspective, vol. 32, no. 4, 2008, pp. 29-43.
Chu and Lin’s article expressed Chinese respective toward the nuclear non-proliferation in the DPRK and the relationship between these two communist countries. They indicated Chinese tactic and dynamics to promote denuclearization in the Korean Peninsula, deeply analyzed the state quo and power balances in Northeast Asia. All of their analyzation was derived from the diplomatic and economic connection between these six participants.

Snyder, Scott. "The Second North Korean Nuclear Crisis: Assessing U.S. and DPRK Negotiation Strategies." Pacific Focus, vol. 22, no. 1, 2007, pp. 47-72.
Synder’s article mainly discusses the relationship between America and DPRK, profoundly analyzed America’s tactic in promoting denuclearization in North Korea.

Suh, J. J. "three Failures of the Past, Three Structures of Peace." Asian Perspective, vol. 34, no. 2, 2010, pp. 201-208.
In this article, Such listed the obstacles the participants met in the SPT, concretely explained why they did not reach a workable agreement after the negotiation.

Tan, Ming H. "Multilateral Engagement of North Korea: An Assessment of the Six-Party Talks and the ASEAN Regional Forum." Asian Journal of Peacebuilding, vol. 5, no. 2, 2017, pp. 307-324.
This article also discussed the state quo and power balances in Northeast Asia. Besides, the author also provided a short but clear explanation about Kim family’s “military first” policy.

“The Six-Party Talks at a Glance.” The Six-Party Talks at a Glance | Arms Control Association”, Arms Control Association, July 2017, 
The Arms Control Association is a nonpartisan organization established in 1971 focused on providing public education and information on arms control policies. The information offered by this organization provides a clear analysis of the timeline of events in the Six-Party Talks. Beginning with the events leading up to the establishment of the peace negotiations, the article follows by summarizing each round of negotiations, one through six in brief detail. This organization offers valuable information about the issues being discussed in the Six-Party Talks, providing researchers a concise database of information.

Toloraya, Georgy. "the Six-Party Talks: A Russian Perspective." Asian Perspective, vol. 32, no. 4, 2008, pp. 45-69.
Toloraya made a similar analyzation about Russia as what Chu and Lin did about China. Russia’s relationships and interest conflictions with other five participants around nuclear problem were at the core of this article.

Berlinger, Joshua. “North Korea's Missile Tests: What You Need to Know.” CNN, Cable News
Network, 4 Dec. 2017.
Cohen, Zachary, et al. “Trump Touts 'Positive' Korea Talks but Wants Action.” CNN, Cable News
Network, 7 Mar. 2018,
Manson, Katrina, et al. “US Considering 'All Options' over North Korea Missile Launch.”
Financial Times, 29 Aug. 2017.
Millard, Andrew S., and Chae-Deug Yi. "The EU’s Potential Role in the Six-Party Talks and the
North Korean Nuclear Crisis." Baltic Journal of European Studies, vol. 7, no. 2, 2017, pp.
247-283.
Okano-Heijmans, Maaike. "Troubled Neighbours: Japan's Negative Economic Diplomacy
Towards North Korea." European Journal of East Asian Studies, vol. 9, no. 2, 2010, pp.
363-394.
Rozman, Gilbert. Strategic Thinking about the Korean Nuclear Crisis: Four Parties Caught
between North Korea and the United States. Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2007;2011;
Schneider, Mark. "The North Korean Nuclear Threat to the U.S." Comparative Strategy,
vol. 33, no. 2, 2014, pp. 107-121.
Shulong, Chu, and Lin Xinzhu. "the Six-Party Talks: A Chinese Perspective." Asian Perspective,
vol. 32, no. 4, 2008, pp. 29-43.
Snyder, Scott. "The Second North Korean Nuclear Crisis: Assessing U.S. and DPRK
Negotiation Strategies." Pacific Focus, vol. 22, no. 1, 2007, pp. 47-72.
Stiles, Matt. “North Korea Says It Wants to Go to the Winter Olympics in the South.” Los
Angeles Times, Los Angeles Times, 8 Jan. 2018,
Suh, J. J. "three Failures of the Past, Three Structures of Peace." Asian Perspective, vol. 34, no.
2, 2010, pp. 201-208.
Tan, Ming H. "Multilateral Engagement of North Korea: An Assessment of the Six-Party Talks
and the ASEAN Regional Forum." Asian Journal of Peacebuilding, vol. 5, no. 2, 2017,
pp. 307-324.
Toloraya, Georgy. "the Six-Party Talks: A Russian Perspective." Asian Perspective, vol. 32, no.
4, 2008, pp. 45-69.

Lebanon

• Come in with the stance with the willingness to end the 15-year civil war while maintaining sovereignty in the nation
• Wanted the full removal of Syrian and Lebanese military troops from Lebanon
• Included the surviving members of Lebanon’s 1972 parliament, fathered by Parliament Speaker President Hussein El-Husseini
• Lebanon was focused on political reform, especially in the abolishment of political sectarianism. There are currently 17 different sects in Lebanon and equality between Maronite Christians and Muslims was a big reason for this agreement as Maronite’s had more representation in parliament.

Syria

• “Syria, which is eager for Lebanon's security, independence, and unity and for harmony among its citizens, should not permit any act that poses a threat to Lebanon's security, independence, and sovereignty.” (Taif)
• Conflict of interest when it comes to giving Lebanon its freedom and sovereignty. Syria believed their militia presence in Lebanon provided necessary and positive influence in the country, therefore they did not want to withdraw fully. As a member in the negotiations overlooking the Taif agreement, Syria acted as a spoiler and prevented a direct date for full withdrawal being negotiated and therefore took their time to remove their presence from the country.
• Supporter in ending the civil war as Syria’s military was heavily involved during the conflict in the country and was therefore tying up many resources in trying to provide Syria with security
• Thought of themselves as a peacekeeper rather than a spoiler

Arab League Mediation Committee

Morocco

• An important actor in pushing for the equality of all Lebanese people
• Expressed interest in abolishing Political sectarianism and making a more balanced legislative assembly

Algeria

• Stood with Lebanon and Syria that Hezbollah was a terrorist organization

Saudi Arabia

• The host country for the signing and final agreement of the accord in the city of Taif, Saudi Arabia
• King of Saudi Arabia signed country into the Arab League Mediation Committee

Non-Arab League Actors

United States of America (USA)

• Considered an important ally for Lebanon during the negotiations. Lebanon believed the US could help provide the security and defense it needed to achieve liberation and freedom as well as sovereignty.
• Wanted Israel to withdraw from south Lebanon through the use of inter
• March 19, 1978: The United Nations Security Council adopts Resolution 425, sponsored by the United States which asked for the withdrawal of Israel from South Lebanon and for the UN to establish a 4,000-strong UN peacekeeping force in South Lebanon.
  The force is termed the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon. Its original mandate was for six months. The force is still in Lebanon today.
• Played a neutral role but ultimately became a defender of Lebanese president at the time, Amine Gemayel

Hezbollah

• The Taif agreement led to a stronger Syrian presence in Lebanon, an important ally for Hezbollah empowering the organization even further
• Wanted Lebanon to achieve their sovereignty and freedom. They fought in Lebanon against Israeli based groups
• Taif agreement allowed Hezbollah to become more than just a movement, they grew to become an important non-state actor

United Nations

• Provided Peacekeeping troops to Lebanon
• Opposed to Syria’s influence in Lebanon as they pointed out that Syria was major power-broker for Lebanon and they are overstaying in the country whilst using the Taif accord as an excuse. However, Syrian presence in Lebanon, invited by the government in Beirut at the outbreak of the civil war, was legitimized by the Taif agreement and supported by the Arab League, and the agreement also committed Syria to ensure Lebanon's national security before it could pull out its troops.

Peace Processes Outlook

The Taif accord/agreement in 1989 between Lebanon and Syria can be viewed as a moment where a hurting stalemate was the driver in pushing the talks to a final agreement. However, the inability to incorporate multi-track diplomacy in the negotiations while dealing with the presence of spoilers made the impact of the agreement minimal and a failure. Among the many political reforms, ultimately the agreement set about to accomplish two major factors; end the Lebanese civil war and abolish political sectarianism while allowing Lebanon to maintain sovereignty and identity. Over the course of 15 years, the Lebanese civil-war had killed more than “150,000 people and left another 300,000 wounded”[1] and also displaced millions of other Lebanese citizens. After 15 years of combat, there was mutual interest in ending the fighting as there was an increase in intolerance for violence. In addition, the Lebanese government determined that minimizing internal conflict in their country by promoting anti-sectarian tactics like equaling Christian and Muslim representation in political office rather than the Christian dominated one they had previously would lead to a less oppressive and structurally sound political system that would benefit all citizens.

Spoilers

Lebanon also suffered from spoilers during the negotiations. The strong military presences of Syria and Israel in Lebanon even post-civil war made the idea of sovereignty tough to achieve and underdeveloped the process that the Taif agreement set out to accomplish. While they did not necessarily prevent anything from being agreed on in the accord, the removal of troops from Lebanon from both countries was a slow process and dragged on. For example, On January 14, 1985, the “Israeli Cabinet voted to completely withdraw its troops from Lebanon” but they left soldiers in southern Lebanon to “control 325 square feet” [2] and ensure a safety guard. In addition, the presence of Syria at the negotiations proved to be cumbersome, as they believed they had an agreement to continue their presence in Lebanon, rather than withdrawing themselves from the country.

Political Sectarianism

Furthermore, the inability to deal with political sectarianism right away led to a paralysis of the government. A country like Lebanon who already suffers from a fragile political structure, underwent a 29-month absence of a president, leaving the country in even more turmoil. In addition, the turmoil of surrounding countries such as Syria and Israel have directly affected the domestic affairs of the Lebanese government leaving it difficult for Lebanon to claim and assert their sovereignty as a free, independent state.

Multi-Track Diplomacy

The outcome of the Taif agreement showcases how important multi-track diplomacy is in peacebuilding negotiations. Without all three levels, negotiations are often not completed successfully. In this case, track 1 negotiations took precedent with high elite actors, specifically, 58 out of the 62 political activists voted in favour of this agreement. While the actors were equal in Christian and Muslim representation, the impact of eliminating religious sectarianism did not transfer into other sectors of the agreement, such as “public jobs, the judiciary, the military, security, public, and joint institutions” [3] which was stated in the Taif Accord. The idea of abolishing sectarianism is great on the surface and provides a cosmetic change to the visual structure of Lebanon’s government, nevertheless, traditional sectarian practices stayed at the core of their system.

Endnotes:

1. "Introduction To Principles Of Negotiation: Part III Taif Agreement." Delma.io. N. p., 2018.

Web. 24 Mar. 2018.

2. Saseen, Sandra M. “The Taif Accord and Lebanon’s Struggle to Regain its Sovereignty”

American University International Law Review, vol. 6. (1990)

3. “Taif Accord.” Peacemaker.un.org. N. p., 2018. Web. 23 Mar. 2018.

Introduction to Principles of Negotiation: Part III Taif Agreement (2016)

http://delma.io/en/draft/introduction-to-principles-of-negotiation-part-iii-taif-agreement

Taif Accord (1989)

https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/LB_891022_Taif%20Accords.pdf

Timeline of Events

http://www.mtholyoke.edu/~hhrobert/timline.html

Timeline of the Lebanese Civil War, 1975-1990

https://www.thoughtco.com/timeline-of-the-lebanese-civil-war-2353188

Rosiny, Stephan. "A Quarter Century of 'Transitory Power-Sharing'. Lebanon's Unfulfilled Ta'if Agreement of 1989 Revisited." Civil Wars, vol. 17, no. 4, 2015, pp. 485.

Stephan Rosiny’s article touches on the importance of power-sharing and how multi-sectarian countries like Lebanon. He suggests transitory-power sharing arrangement as a theory to manage conflicts that erupted in these countries. It presents several provisions of this agreement that adhere to three different approaches of how to deal with such conflicts: the consociational and the centripetal models of power-sharing as well as the integrationist paradigm. It thereby seeks to develop a theoretical argument about chances and risks of transitory power-sharing in deeply divided societies and derives some general lessons for managing conflicts in the Middle East.

Geukjian, Ohannes. "From Positive Neutrality to Partisanship: How and Why the Armenian Political Parties Took Sides in Lebanese Politics in the Post-Taif Period (1989-Present)." Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 45, no. 5, 2009, pp. 739-767.

Following the Taif agreement, the abolishment of political sectarianism was a goal of the document. Ohannes Geukjian examines Armenian religious sect in Lebanon and their post-Taif agreement. All parties had to abandon the positive neutrality. However, the Armenian parties were not united over the goal of maintaining the Armenian bloc inside parliament. As they chose different policies to pursue communal interests they took sides with the ruling majority and the anti-government opposition. The Armenians were criticized by some Christian politicians for their partisanship and were expected to maintain their traditional neutrality in Lebanese politics. It is very likely that the Armenians will return to their neutral policy and support the President and the government once their group rights are protected. Something like this would be important to analyze because the failure to abolish sectarianism would leave the Taif agreement without much value.

Krayem, Hassan. "The Lebanese civil war and the Taif Agreement." Conflict resolution in the Arab world: Selected essays (1997): 411-436.

This article by Hasan examines the deficiency of a democratic system that the Lebanese held. While democracy tries to account for equal opportunities for citizens as well as political accountability and political responsibility of officials and institutions were lacking. Lebanon had and still maintains a confessional system based on a formula allocating political and administrative functions to the major sects. This article is important because it shows how an unstable democracy like Lebanon’s post-Taif, leads to conflict.

Salem, Paul. “The Future of Lebanon.” Foreign Affairs, vol. 85, no. 6, 2006, pp. 13–22. JSTOR.

Paul Salem takes a systematic and structural look at the historic events of Lebanon and what could become from the country of them. This article amplifies important actors and events during the pre and post civil war to give a more dynamic look at the current situation in Lebanon. He does a good job in bringing in political party Hezbollah who holds significant influence in the region now especially since they have increased their presence as an actor.

Gaub, Florence. "Multi‐Ethnic Armies in the Aftermath of Civil War: Lessons Learned from Lebanon." Defence Studies 7.1 (2007): 5-20.

Florence Gaub, author of “Multi‐Ethnic Armies in the Aftermath of Civil War: Lessons Learned from Lebanon” examines how countries that have multi-ethnic armies usually suffer from negative downfalls following a civil war. However, through his research, it seems that a country like Lebanon who went through an army reform after the Taif agreement noticed a successful restructuring. An article like this is important for understanding said goals of the Taif Agreement, especially the aspect of abolishing sectarianism promoting equality.

Saseen, Sandra M. “The Taif Accord and Lebanon’s Struggle to Regain its Sovereignty” American University International Law Review, vol. 6. (1990)

Sandra Saseen examines the relationship between Lebanon and the effects that occupying countries Syria and Israel have on its sovereignty and power relations. Saseen talks about how Lebanon is being used as a launchpad by other countries to reach their goals and aims. She also explains how the external dimensions of the crisis are the most important and the most pressing; foreign militaries have occupied Lebanon and foreign nations have interfered in Lebanese internal political affairs. It is critical to Lebanon's future political stability that foreign nations refrain from intervention in Lebanon's domestic affairs. This article ties in well to how Syria and Lebanese influence played a role in the negotiations of the Taif. Often acting as a spoiler and delaying the details of the agreement to come to fruition.

Wantchekon, Leonard. "Credible Power-Sharing Agreements: Theory with Evidence from South Africa and Lebanon." Constitutional Political Economy, vol. 11, no. 4, 2000, pp. 339-352.

Leonard Wantchekon interprets a model which exemplifies the structure of credible post-conflict power-sharing agreements. He specifically examines a case study on Lebanon and South Africa and shows the ways in which power-sharing is crucial in order to maintain a status quo within a democracy. He argues that agreements need to first reconstruct the coercive institutions of the state through the stability of negotiations in settlements of civil wars. This article articulates that the Lebanese Civil war was not necessarily generated by the lack of power-sharing but rather an unfair arrangement among the religious groups.

Makdisi, Samir, and Marcus Marktanner. "Trapped by consociationalism: The case of Lebanon." Topics in Middle Eastern and North African Economies 11 (2009).

This article by Economists Samir Makdisi and Marcus Marktanner portray Lebanon’s current consociational democracy has failed to prevent the outbreak of a long-lasting civil conflict and periodic political crises. They outline that this consociational democracy has resulted in vertical and horizontal inequality. This is an important aspect to consider as drawing the connection between economic status and political structure can often tell a lot about the power relations and sustainability of a government. In this case, Makdisi and Marktanner determine that this inequality is a root cause of armed conflict in Lebanon, whilst claiming that a move to a full fledged democracy will lead to less conflict.

Hudson, Michael C. "lebanon After Ta'if: Another Reform Opportunity Lost?" Arab Studies Quarterly, vol. 21, no. 1, 1999, pp. 27-40.

In this article Michael Hudson examines the ways in which the Taif accord has proven to be a lost opportunity for reform within Lebanon. He articulates and provides insight into where the accord could have been successful and outlines where the accord lacks when trying to create a reform. He argues that even after the Taif, Lebanon has continued to suffer from the imbalance of political power which needs a stronger political reform to ensure cross-confessional support amongst all political parties. He also highlights the ways how the Taif took the wrong approach to the peacemaking process.

Abdallah, Ghassan. “Lebanon's Political System: An Analysis of the Taif Accord,” ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, 2003.

In this Article, Ghassan Abdallah summarizes the outcome of the Taif Accord and highlights the importance of the characteristics of the Lebanese political system. More specifically, it features the variables that affect democratic development and the stabilization of societies. Abdallah argues that although the Accord establishes and outlines reforms of the political system, they are yet to be fully implemented. He proposes the importance of freer elections in order to fully implement the agreements from the Accord. This critique of the political system is crucial to consider when identifying the reasons why the Accord failed and how more reforms are needed to further succeed politically within the Lebanese system.

"25 Years Of Taif." Middle East Eye. N. p., 2018. Web. 27 Mar. 2018. http://www.middleeasteye.net/essays/25-years-taif-1817997266

"A Look At The Taif Accord." Aljazeera.com. N. p., 2005. Web. 27 Mar. 2018 .www.aljazeera.com/archive/2005/03/2008410135815459954.html.

"AUB: The Lebanese Civil War And The Taif Agreement." Ddc.aub.edu.lb. N. p., 2018. Web. 27 Mar. 2018. http://ddc.aub.edu.lb/projects/pspa/conflict-resolution.html

Bahout, Joseph. "The Unraveling Of Lebanon’S Taif Agreement: Limits Of Sect-Based Power Sharing." Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. N. p., 2018. Web. 27 Mar. 2018. http://carnegieendowment.org/2016/05/16/unraveling-of-lebanon-s-taif-agreement-limits-of-sect-based-power-sharing-pub-63571

"Introduction To Principles Of Negotiation: Part III Taif Agreement." Delma.io. N. p., 2018. Web. 24 Mar. 2018. http://delma.io/en/draft/introduction-to-principles-of-negotiation-part-iii-taif-agreement

"It's Been 25 Years Since One Of The Middle East's Most Consequential Peace Agreements." Business Insider. N. p., 2018. Web. 27 Mar. 2018. http://www.businessinsider.com/its-been-25-years-since-the-taif-agreement-2014-11

"Lebanese Civil War Facts, Information, Pictures | Encyclopedia.Com Articles About Lebanese Civil War." Encyclopedia.com. N. p., 2018. Web. 27 Mar. 2018. https://www.encyclopedia.com/social-sciences-and-law/sociology-and-social-reform/sociology-general-terms-and-concepts/lebanese#A

“Taif Accord.” Peacemaker.un.org. N. p., 2018. Web. 27 Mar. 2018. https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/LB_891022_Taif%20Accords.pdf

"Timeline Of The Lebanese Civil War From 1975-1990." ThoughtCo. N. p., 2018. Web. 27 Mar. 2018.https://www.thoughtco.com/timeline-of-the-lebanese-civil-war-2353188

"Timeline." Mtholyoke.edu. N. p., 2018. Web. 27 Mar. 2018. http://www.mtholyoke.edu/~hhrobert/timline.html

"Why Lebanon Is Fractured By The Conflicts In The Middle East." YouTube. N. p., 2018. Web. 27 Mar. 2018. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i_w3v6t3rjY

Weapons Disposal Plan

The Bougainville Peace Agreement weapons disposal plan took into effect after the constitutional amendments implementing the agreement were passed under the PNG Parliament. In order to prevent further delay, any lack of compliance would delay UN authorization of new elections for the Autonomous Bougainville Government (ABG). This led to the withdrawal of the PNGDF as well as arrival of international monitors to oversee Bougainville’s weapons disposal. The United Nations Observer Mission on Bougainville (UNOMB) verified that all parties acted in accordance with the agreed weapons disposal plan. The plan was declared complete in 2005. 

Autonomy Government

One of the objectives of autonomy in the peace agreement was to provide a democratic system of government for Bougainville that meets the standards of good governance– this includes elections. As planned, Bougainville’s first elections were held from May 20 to June 2, 2005. The Autonomous Government of Bougainville was established on June 15 2005, after fair and transparent elections were held, making Joseph Kabui ABG’s first president. Elections are also an important step on the road to lasting peace in Bougainville. 

Independent State of Bougainville

PNG and Bougainville leaders agreed that a referendum on independence would be deferred for 10 to 15 years. It would also be non-binding and subject to approval of the PNG Parliament. To assure that Bougainville’s concerns that this part of the agreement would not be ignored over time, PNG government implemented the referendum in its constitution. Presently, Bougainville’s independence referendum has been scheduled for June 15, 2019. Depending on the extent of ABG’s political success, this will determine outcome of the referendum.

Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA)

Autonomy Government

The BRA supported the idea of high autonomy as they considered it an important process towards independence. Having an autonomous state of Bougainville will allow progress in the domestic capacity of the state while also allowing consensus on independence to develop. An autonomous state will also give Bougainville strict control over the nation’s crucial Panguna mine resulting in growth economically and socially. Therefore, the BRA took the view that autonomy will be the initial process towards independence.

Independent State

The idea of independence from PNG was highly pursued by the BRA. The party’s main position going into the negotiation was obtaining a referendum regarding the independence of Bougainville. The BRA had strong supporters as a majority of Bougainvilleans had wanted independence. The argument for independence from PNG was appropriate considering the drastic differences of ethnic, cultural, and customary values between Bougainville and Papua New Guinea. The BRA had aspirations of uniting all factions of Bougainville through the creation of an independent state.

Weapons Disposal Plan

Due to the failure of many peace accords and ceasefire agreements from both parties, weapons were essential for either party to protect themselves. BRA has acknowledged that a disposal of weapons were essential towards a successful outcome towards the issue of referendum. However, they only agreed to disposing of weapons after satisfactory outcomes regarding the political issues of autonomy and independence.

Bougainville Interim Government (BIG)

Autonomy Government

The BIG was created by the BRA as a as a form of legitimate authority in Bougainville. Therefore, this party possesses similar perspectives as the BRA towards achieving an autonomous government.

Independent State

The BIG was created by the BRA as a form of legitimate authority in Bougainville. Therefore, this party possesses similar perspectives as the BRA towards achieving an independent state.

Weapons Disposal Plan

The BIG was created by the BRA as a form of legitimate authority in Bougainville. Therefore, this party possesses similar perspectives as the BRA towards weapons disarmament.

Bougainville Transitional Government / Bougainville People’s Congress (BTG/BPC)

Autonomy Government

The BPC was created as a representative body and it mainly composed of elected members from the BTG, therefore, they would possess identical perspectives. The BTG/BPC possessed a less radical stance than the BRA as they persisted after building bridges between the factions in Bougainville. Therefore, they strongly supported the idea of an autonomous government as it would resolve the localised conflicts.

Independent State

As the BTG/BPC are a more moderate party, the idea of independence was less favoured among the members. However, they conformed with BRA’s radical viewpoint towards achieving independence in order to garner their aspirations of an autonomous government.

Weapons Disposal Plan

The disarmament of weapons is an essential step towards building bridges between the factions of Bougainville and creating a safe reconciliation environment for the factions of Bougainville.

Bougainville Resistance Force (BRF)

Autonomy Government

The BRF was represented by the BTG/BPC during the peace talks. Therefore, they had identical perspectives as the BTG/BPC

Independent State

The BRF was represented by the BTG/BPC during the peace talks. Therefore, they had identical perspectives as the BTG/BPC

Weapons Disposal Plan

The BRF was represented by the BTG/BPC during the peace talks. Therefore, they had identical perspectives as the BTG/BPC

Papua New Guinea (PNG)

Autonomy Government

The PNG government was against the idea of an autonomous government for Bougainville as the PNG government were more concerned regarding the sovereignty of Papua New Guinea. However, the government positioned peace as the main goal through restoring civil services and disposing weapons which will allow the fragile state of Bougainville to rejuvenate before the discussions of autonomy unfolds.

Independent State

The sovereignty for PNG was the main priority going into the peace talks. However, they were opposed to the idea of independence for Bougainville. The PNG officials were against Bougainville’s demands because they believed that creating and maintaining peace should be the focus while political settlements such as independence will be discussed after re-establishing a stable nation.

Weapons Disposal Plan

Disposal of weapons were a crucial aspect of PNG’s negotiation position as they strived towards achieving peace between the two nations. The disposal of weapons by rebel groups will subsequently restore civil authority (police, courts, and prisons) and civil services leading to restoration of the fragile state of PNG.

New Zealand

Autonomy Government

As New Zealand was a third-party mediator, they had a neutral position regarding this issue

Independent State

As New Zealand was a third-party mediator, they had a neutral position regarding this issue

Weapons Disposal Plan

As New Zealand was a third-party mediator, they had a neutral position regarding this issue

Non - Political Groups (Women’s Groups, Church Leaders, Chief Leaders)

Autonomy Government

They attempted to provide unity and maintained pressure on the Bougainville and PNG governments to continue to search for peace. They did believe that autonomy for Bougainville will result in a peaceful resolution.

Independent State

The role of the non-political groups were to enable a reconciliation process upon the dividing groups. Therefore, they believe that a unity of all groups in Bougainville will result in peace illustrating that an independent state would be beneficial for the long-term.

Weapons Disposal Plan

As the women’s groups, church leaders, and chief leaders of Bougainville primarily focused on reconciliation and restoring unity between the dividing factions of Bougainville, they supported strongly of a weapons disposal plan

Australia

Autonomy Government

The Australian government played a significant role towards hosting the Cairns I talks and providing aid towards Bougainville. However, they were not formally invited in the peace talks. Nevertheless, they did not support the idea of Bougainville possessing an autonomous government. The Bougainville Copper Mine (BCL) was a subsidiary of Cozinc Rio Tinto, a influential Australian company. Therefore, the creation of an autonomous government would diminish Australian’s control over the Panguna mine.

Independent State

As they were opposed of an autonomous state of Bougainville, they did support the sovereignty of Papua New Guinea (PNG). If PNG continued to remain an independent state with Bougainville incorporated then it will be beneficial for the Australian government

Weapons Disposal Plan

Peace was an important concept that the Australian government focused on. A strong reaction occurred when mercernaries by the PNG were introduced into the Bougainville conflict. Although, the Australian government supports the PNG government, it is evident that they approved of a weapons disposal for both parties as a method of establishing unity between them.

A civil strife that has haunted the state of Papua New Guinea (PNG) has reached its anticipated conclusion through the rebuilding of trust between PNG and Bougainville. The process towards obtaining the Bougainville Peace Agreement contained a prolonged history of conflicts that included a devastating civil war, multiple peace talks, and the intervention of a third party mediator to arrive at its final state. Therefore, the Bougainville peace talks are undisputedly successful because of the ethical outcomes that were produced from this extensive history of conflicts. Furthermore, with the incorporation of Track I, II, and III diplomacies, the potential for a sustainable peace has been created. This paper will examine the resolution of the extensive history of conflicts which led to the creation of sustainable peace illustrating the success of the Bougainville peace talks.

The prosperity of the Bougainville peace talks was created through repairing the fractured relationship between Bougainville and PNG. The Bougainville conflict originated from the Bougainvilleans’ dissatisfaction towards a joint identity between the two nations after the effects of World War I. This led to colonial exploitation by Australia towards Bougainville’s Paguna mine which was a fundamental aspect in the local economic sector. The creation of the Bougainville Copper Agreement resulted in significant social, environmental, and economic disruption in Bougainville. As a result, the Bougainville Civil War commenced due to the landowners dissatisfaction towards the treatment of their land. This civil war prolonged for decades due to the failed agreement of eight peace negotiations. Considering the conflicting perspectives that PNG and Bougainville possessed, the success of the peace talks are definite as a resolution seemed unreachable during the process. Ultimately, PNG seeked for peace among the two parties due to the exhaustive state that warfare has situated themselves in. On the contrary, Bougainville achieved their objective of obtaining an autonomous government with the ability to have a non-binding referendum to vote for an independent state of Bougainville. Therefore, the settlement that was arrived at has brought PNG and Bougainville onto agreeable terms recreating unity between the two parties.

The satisfactory outcomes reached by Bougainville and PNG has created sustainable peace between the two parties. This sustainable and positive peace has been created through the usage of a multi-track diplomacy which incorporates all Track I, II, and III diplomacies (Ramsbotham 25). The incorporation of all three tracks allows the corporation between government level officials, non-governmental organizations, and citizens creating a mutual understanding between them. Therefore, this method creates the possibility for achieving a positive peace where all levels of the society are in agreement. The importance of achieving the highest level of track diplomacy was the pivotal moment in the peace talks. The continuous failed peace processes between Bougainville and PNG illustrated the idea of a hurting stalemate where there was a mutual deadlock creating disadvantages for both parties (Zartman 1). However, with New Zealand’s usage of a third party intervention, it eventually led to the creation of a ripe moment where unreachable proposals are obtainable due to the usage of a mediator (Zartman 1). Therefore, after the occurence of the ripe moment, Track I negotiations began between Bougainville and PNG which illustrated the turning point in the peace processes. It is evident that after the incorporation of Track I diplomacy, the efficiency of the peace talks between the two parties increased. Government officials are situated into discussion during Track I diplomacy allowing for discussion of important national issues regarding autonomy, independence and weapons disposal in a political arena. Subsequently, this allowed for Track II and I diplomacies to occur peacefully between the two nations. Church leaders among the nations, representing track II are cooperating while local citizens representing track III are uniting. With the participation and agreement between all three levels of diplomacy, a sustainable peace is able to develop as all levels of society are in unity. The illustration of multi-track diplomacy has created a positive peace in Bougainville.

The success of the peace talks is illustrated through the unity of Bougainville and PNG after decades of conflict. Disputes over identity, autonomy and independence created the foundation of the Bougainville conflict. Ultimately, it is the resolution of these unconquerable controversies which demonstrates the success of the peace talks. Additionally, the usage of multi track diplomacy creates agreement through all levels of society which has the potential for sustainable peace in Bougainville. The ability to resolve the conflict ridden history between Bougainville and PNG ultimately illustrated the substantial success of the peace talks.

Bougainville Copper Agreement(June 1967):

http://www.paclii.org/pg/legis/PG-consol_act_1986/mcaa344.pdf

Endeavour Accord(August 5, 1990)

https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/PG_900805_EndeavourDialogueServicesBougainville.pdf

Tambea Accord (August 27, 1994): https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/PG_940827_TambeaRecord.pdf

Honiara Declaration (January 23, 1997) http://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/fullpeace/PNG%2019910123.pdf

Burnham Declaration(July 18, 1997) https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/resources/collections/peace_agreements/bougain_19970718.pdf

Lincoln Agreement(January 23, 1998)

https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/PG_980123_LincolnAgreement.pdf

Arawa Agreement (April 30, 1998):

http://theirwords.org/media/transfer/doc/1_pg_big_bra_brf_1998_03-4f272744f60ed481787d5fe189c67ae4.pdf

Matakana and Okataina Understanding(April 22, 1999): 

https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/PG_990422_Matakana%20and%20Okataina%20understanding.pdf

Bougainville Peace Agreement(August 30, 2001)

http://www.abg.gov.pg/uploads/documents/BOUGAINVILLE_PEACE_AGREEMENT_2001.pdf

Hammond, Timothy G. “Resolving Hybrid Conflicts: The Bougainville Story.” Foreign Policy Jounal. 22 December 2012.

Hammond provides a summary of the Bougainville conflict, and describes the “hybrid” form of warfare that has waged on for years, portraying the complexity of the conflict. Despite the social and natural resource disruption, peace building mechanisms for the re-building and resource management of Bougainville was achieved due to the Western model of political order. Furthermore, Hammond states that peace-building is most effective and long lasting when it is valued by communities and individuals at the grassroots level. Grassroots movements legitimized the success of Bougainville by incorporating their own traditional and cultural norms into the western methods of peace-and-state-building. In addition, Hammond emphasizes the role women played in peace process as they were key actors in peacemaking and negotiations, and put aside their differences in order to come together to create one Bougainvillean voice. The case of Bougainville provides hope and possibility for the peaceful resolution of intrastate hybrid conflicts, as long as people remain innovative and dedicated.

“Chronology of Bougainville Civil War” Pacific Island Report. Pireport.org. Accessed 26 March 2018.

This is a brief timeline that shows the key dates of the Bougainville civil war up until 1998. It also includes how Bougainville got its name, and the Japanese occupation in 1942.

Lees, Sean. “Bougainville Peace Agreement, The Burnham I and II Dialogues” UNDP Pacific Center. Accessed 26 March 2018.  

This journal article on the Bougainville Peace Agreement, focuses largely on Burnham I and II talks. The chronological layout of the article is effective, starting with context, problem, process, actors, challenges, breakthroughs, and results and values. It explains the the issues pertaining to the mine and the already-existing conflict over Bougainvillean identity and sovereignty that ignited a rebellion which turned into a destructive struggle for power; thereafter the decades long civil war. It also provides a comprehensive, in-depth description of the main grievances that were caused by the conflict and how the peace process attempted to address the issues. While the article mainly presents an overview of the Bougainville problem and peace process, illustrates the many levels of actors from Tracks 1, 2 and 3 that made trust, unity and eventual peace possible in the region.

Phillips, Keri. “Bougainville at a crossroads: independence and the mine.”  2 June 2015. http://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs. Accessed 26 March 2018.

Phillips provides historical background of the Panguna mine to explain the present repercussions that still occur in Bougainville, as it leads up to the referendum on independence from PNG. She states that the island’s mining is controlled by the ABG, whereas the others are controlled by the national government. However, the island is still divided regarding the issue of mining as landowners are concerned about the reopening as well as environmental effects. The issue is yet to be determined; the government faces pressure how to proceed with the matter, especially with the impending referendum. 

“Papua New Guinea– Bougainville.” Conciliation Resources. 2002. http://www.c-r.org/accord/papua-new-guinea%E2%80%93bougainville. Accessed 27 March 2018.

The PNG Accord is a negotiated settlement and outlines the efforts made to succeed at bringing greater unity to the Bougainvillean government and ending the organized violence. It describes the indigenous peace process that was incorporated with the western peace model, drawing on the strengths of Melanesian traditions. By merging the two values, strengths from both benefited from the roles of third parties. The Accord also includes the chronology of events, agreements and profiles of key people and institutions involved.

“Joint Creation, the Bougainville Peace Agreement– and beyond.” Accord 12. 2001. http://www.c-r.org/downloads/Accord%2012_10'Joint%20creation'_2002_ENG.pdf. Accessed 27 March 2018.

Wolfers reviews the process of Bougainville’s legitimate and successful peace process (the Burnham talks). The reviews the principles and activities covered in the Lincoln agreement and how this impacted the public and private sectors. Many of the other journal articles speak positively of the progress made, however Wolfers also acknowledges subsequent misunderstandings, frustrations and modest confrontations that arose during the peace process. This is important because some articles provide the false perception that Burnham peace process onwards were smooth sailing. Wolfers highlights the small bumps in the peace process that were eventually overcome. While the Bougainville agreement was large achievement considering the region’s extensive historical conflict, Wolfers states that peace-building is an ongoing process that does not stop at the peace agreement. Permanent peace in the region requires ongoing process of consultation and cooperation in establishing, developing and operating the ‘joint creation’ established in the agreement.

Antonino Adamo (2017) A Cursed and Fragmented Island: History and Conflict Analysis in Bougainville, Papua New Guinea, Small Wars & Insurgencies, 29:1, 164-186.

No single factor can best explain the civil war; Adamo uses history, economy and traditional social aspects of the island, the effects of colonization, to identify the various factors that led to the civil war. The main assumption is that the conflict cannot be explained by just one reason. Adamo considers the ecological factor, further investigates this through the resource curse theory;– the presents of natural resources leading to economic failure; the existence of ethnic cleavages, etc.

Nisira, Patrick. “Leadership Challenges for the Autonomous Bougainville Government.” Australian National University. 2017

Based on the speech by Hon. Patrick Nisira, this paper discusses the leadership challenges of the ABG. Even though the bloody civil war has ended, there still various forms of conflict, tension and divisions that continue in the region. The paper states the various leadership challenges (and are of special importance to Bougainville’s future) such as divisions/factions, the infant Bougainville police force, capacity of the public service and the transfer of powers from the National Government to the ABG, etc. While the ABG faces these issues, the discussion sheds light on finding realistic ways to address them.

Carl, A. & Garasu, L. Weaving consensus, the Papua New Guinea–Bougainville peace process. Conciliation Resources. 2002

This article discusses the matrix of the Bougainvillean negotiation options and maps the major language groups of Bougainville. This article is particularly distinct from others because it discusses the perspective of a local Bougainvillean, James Tanis, in the peace building process. Tanis focuses his experience of reconciliation in his own Nagovisi community (southwest of Bougainville): conflicts can be passed down from one generation to the next, which would often be communicated to the other side through a mutual party. It was common for a conflict to escalate due to the involvement of other parties. His article this provides us the understanding of the nature of traditional conflicts and conflict resolution.

Carl, A. & Garasu, L. Weaving consensus, the Papua New Guinea–Bougainville peace process. Conciliation Resources. 2002

This document lists all the key texts and agreements relating to the PNG-Bougainville peace process. It starts with the Bougainville Agreement in 1976 and ends with the 2001 peace agreement. It even includes minor statements and letters by written by the President of the Security Council and the UN Secretary General. Furthermore, the document lists the role and status regarding the peace agreement.

Zartman, W. “The Timing of Peace Initiatives: Hurting Stalemates and Ripe Moments.” The Global Review of Ethnopolitics. September 2018. P8-18

In this article, Zartman recognizes the importance of timing of efforts for reconciliation. A ripe moment is often accompanied by hurting stalemate; parties are able to resolve the conflict only when they are mutually ready to do so. Zartman states that as the notion of ripeness implies, MHS can be a very fleeting opportunity, a moment to be seized lest it pass, or it can be of a long duration, waiting to be noticed and acted upon by mediators. Finding the ripe moment is a skill to be provided in negotiations.

References

Antonino Adamo (2017) A Cursed and Fragmented Island: History and Conflict Analysis in Bougainville, Papua New Guinea, Small Wars & Insurgencies, 29:1, 164-186.

“Bougainville Peace Agreement.” (August 2001).

Carl, A. & Garasu, L. Weaving consensus, the Papua New Guinea–Bougainville peace process. Conciliation Resources. 2002

“Chronology of Bougainville Civil War” Pacific Island Report. Pireport.org. Accessed 26 Mar 2018.

Hammond, Timothy G. “Resolving Hybrid Conflicts: The Bougainville Story.” Foreign Policy Journal. 22 December 2012.

“Joint Creation, the Bougainville Peace Agreement– and beyond.” Accord 12. 2001. http://www.c-r.org/downloads/Accord%2012_10'Joint%20creation'_2002_ENG.pdf Accessed 27 March 2018.

Lees, Sean. “Bougainville Peace Agreement, The Burnham I and II Dialogues” UNDP Pacific Center. Accessed 26 Mac 2018.   

“Matakana & Okatania Understanding” (April 1999). Accessed 25 March 2018.

“Mining(Bougainville Copper Agreement).” (June 1967) Accessed 25 March 2018.

Nisira, Patrick. “Leadership Challenges for the Autonomous Bougainville Government.” Australian National University. 2017

Nisira, Patrick. “Leadership Challenges for the Autonomous Bougainville Government.” Australian National University. 2017

“Papua New Guinea– Bougainville.” Conciliation Resources. 2002 http://www.c-r.org/accord/papua-new-guinea%E2%80%93bougainville. Accessed 27 March 2018.

Phillips, Keri. “Bougainville at a crossroads: independence and the mine.”  2 June 2015. http://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs. Accessed 26 March 2018.  

Spriggs, Matthew. “Endeavour Accord on Dialogue And Return of Services to Bougainville.”

(August 1990). 25 March 2018 Accessed.

“Tambea Accord.” (August 1994). Accessed 25 March 2018.

“The Arawa Agreement.” (April 1998). Accessed 25 March 2018.

UCDP. “The Honiara Declaration.” UCDP. (January 1991). Accessed 25 March 2018.

United Nations. “Lincoln Agreement.” Security Council. (March 2018). Accessed 25 March 2018.

United States Institute Of Peace. “Peace Agreements Digital Collection.” United States Institute

of Peace. (April 2002). Accessed 25 March 2018.  

Zartman, W. “The Timing of Peace Initiatives: Hurting Stalemates and Ripe Moments.” The Global Review of Ethnopolitics. September 2018. P8-18