• Sierra Leone Government:
  • Represented by key figures: Solomon Berewa - minister of Justice and attorney general; Sahr Matturi ( foreign minister); Sylvester Rowe ( permanent representative in the UN); Sheka Mansaray, ( National security advisor); Colonel Tom Carew ( senior army officer).
  • At that time under the regime of Kabbah. Characterized as weak, corrupted and badly held. Constantly threatened by military coups, previously ousted in 1997 by the AFRC.
  • Government initiative to propose full amnesty to the RUF members as an opening to the discussions and incentive to move things forward.
  • Truth and Reconciliation Commission: Pushed forward the UN led initiative which was meant to recommend prosecutions for the worst perpetrators and pointed out the RUF  as the only entity to face it.
  • The government was in favor of the Creation of a Special Unit for War Victims as part of the reparations plan.
  • Regarding power-sharing, the government was willing to give 2 of the ministries to the rebels which nearly collapsed the agreement. After talks with Nigerian representatives and the Lomé president, the government finally agreed on conceding 4 ministerial positions but maintained that the appointment of the ministries had to be done by the President and not through negotiations.

• Revolutionary United Front( AFRC - RUF alliance) 
  • Represented by: Solomon YB Rogers, loyal to Foday Sankoh; Allo Bangura ( foreign minister RUF); Omrie Golley ( legal adviser); Sahr Kalibanja ( education minister); Colonel Idrissa, Agnes Finoh ( higher ranking RUF combatant).
  • Wages war against government because of the political ideology, massive corruption, failure to represent the rural society.
  • Although AFRC was to be represented there were growing tensions between both parties especially after the Freetown attack in 1999 that increased the groups  unpopularity. The AFRC leader, Johhny Paul Koromah, was not invited for the preparatory meetings for the Lomé talks that produced most of their subsequent demands.
  • Lasting Peace in Sierra Leone: the Revolutionary United Front Perspective and Vision: demanded, a blanket amnesty for all RUF and AFRC fighters; the release of all prisoners; a power-sharing arrangement based on a four year transitional govt until the next elections; recognition of AFRC-RUF control over certain areas of the country; participation in a new Sierra Leonean army; the withdrawal of ECOMOG troops; and the creation of an independent peacekeeping force. It set a single pre-condition for the commencement of negotiations, the immediate and unconditional release of Sankoh
  • Truth and Reconciliation Commission: the RUF was against the idea as they felt targeted as the only party to be prosecuted, moreover it feared that it would serve as a Court. By the end of the negotiations they accepted the point due to the broadening of the language used in the agreement by the mediators.
  • Power-sharing: RUF demands transitional government, with the form of a national unity and requested half of the ministerial positions. They requested the expansion of the government cabinet to 20 members and for 11 ministerial and 4 deputy ministerial positions, including vice president, defence a finance, as well as 6 diplomatic posts such as ambassador to the US.  When the talks looked that were going to collapse, the role of the Nigerian Government representative to mediate both parts on the issue helped. The government agreed in conceding 4 ministry positions but the RUF could not appoint them.
  • Demanded ECOMOG withdrawal and a transitional government, at the end of the talks they retreated from this position in order to achieve peace. 
• Government of Togo:

1. • Official mediator of the Lomé peace talks. The Togolese foreign minister Joseph Koffigoh led the talks in a day-to-day basis.
   • Togo was the chair of ECOWAS and was perceived as a neutral country which was never directly involved in the conflict, therefore it was chosen to host the negotiations and assume the mediator role.
   • Gnassingbé Eyademá, President of Togo at the time, had a regular and active participation in the talks. Holding a neutral position was key in some critical moments. During the power-sharing part of the negotiations, Eyadéma contacted the Nigerian president Obasanjo, who was also interested in withdrawing the troops from SL, pulled the parties together to agree on Sankoh new position in the Commission for the Management Strategic resources. He also  took the idea to turn the conflict in regional diplomacy by contacting to more regional leaders Comparoé and Taylor to create balance and put pressures in the parties to compromise. The four parties agreed on Sankoh's new position, ECOMOG participation in peacekeeping, and afterwards met Kabbah and Sankoh to convince them to accept the deal.

• ECOWAS Countries:  ( Economic Community of West African states)

1. • Regional economic union formed by 16 West African countries.
   • Hold a neutral position also considered to have a mediator role. Even if it is supposed to be a strong supporter of the government not all the countries  hold the same position. The countries that were more relevant in the talks were Togo, Liberia, Burkina Faso, Libya and Nigeria.
   • ECOWAS was a key actor in the peace talks, having representatives in the mediation group, including ECOWAS General Secretary Lansana Kouyate and diplomats from the ECOWAS Committee of Six on Sierra Leone (Guinea, Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Liberia, Ghana and Mali) and Libya; and its diplomats also joined the ‘facilitating committee’ that formed during the talks. Subsequently, it became the chair of the Joint Implementation Committee, which was established by the Lomé talks.
   • Burkina Faso, Libya and  Liberia were secretly perceived  supporters of the RUF whist at the same time they were contributing to the ECOWAS troops, namely because of the diamond dealing and financing.
   • The leaders of Burkina Faso, Liberia and Nigeria had a key role in convincing to their allies in the conflict during the collapse of June 1999 to agree in the Power-sharing outcome of the agreement.

• Inter religious council of Sierra Leone ( IRCSL)
  • Formed by the unity of Muslims and Christians of Sierra Leone, who worked together to end the violence after the outbreak for the war.
  • This non governmental player between the warring factions and the population.
  • A first role on making the peace negotiations possible by convincing both parts to sit and open negotiations. They were invited to the talks as informal mediations to provide guidance.  
  • Throughout the process they remained neutral and supportive of the mediation prove, encouraging cooperation and return to the table.
  • During hard times where the main parties didn’t share the opinion such as power sharing, the Council were reported to preach to be resistant hard liners.
  • They important role during the process was recognized in the agreement by the creation of the Council of Elders and Religious Leaders. In the aftermath of the negotiations were also involved in reconciliation, human rights training, democratization and disarmament programs.
  • Didn’t share the amnesty  nor Sankoh’s pardon like the UN.

• UN
  • The UN had a neutral role in the Lomé talks and the Abidjan talks, taking the position as a moral guarantor and witness and representing human rights.
  • The UN senior representative was Francis Okelo who served as deputy chair of the Lomé talks and helped the draft of provisions relevant to different key issues. The UN peacekeeping mission UNAMSIL was a significant actor in the conflict, especially after 1999.
  •  Other representatives from the UN included officials from the UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.
  • The UN commission came with the Idea for a Truth, Reconciliation and Justice Commission. However due to the refusal of the RUF, the reference to justice was dropped to make the language broader.
  • A key and controversial issue for the UN was the provision of amnesty. The UN typed a document in 1999 which was mean to provide the representatives “the  Guidelines for the UN representatives on certain aspects of negotiations for conflict resolution”. This paper clearly stated that indicated that the UN “could not condone amnesty to war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide.” However, the UN representatives who hold a position against amnesty during the talks, agreed to sing in the end, against the guidelines provisions. Francis Okelo reported that he heard about the guidelines 2 days before the signing and if they refusal to sign would have collapsed the talks. At that point it considered more urgent.

• The US
  • Neutral position and mediating position,  the US ambassador to SL, Joseph Melrose, served as a chair in the final session of the talks.
  • US backed the controversial  amnesty proposal and the inclusion of 8 RUF leaders in the cabinet to the new government as to achieve peace. Clinton addressed the UN general assembly , "I know that some are troubled that the United States and others cannot respond to every humanitarian catastrophe in the world," he reiterated, "We cannot do everything everywhere." ( The Washington Post Company,1999).
  • Advocated for a dual track approach during the conflict: military and diplomatic to end the war.
  • Contributed to the 18th May ceasefire. Instigated by the Rev. Jesse Jackson, US Special Envoy for the Promotion of Democracy in Africa, whose intervention in Sierra Leone had been influenced by Donald Payne, the chairman of the US Congressional Black caucus.
  • Did not sign witness to avoid implying a commitment to resources of implementation.

• The UK
  • Really active role in the talks as Sierra Leone was an old protectorate of the region.
  • Often seen sympathetic to the Sierra Leonean government, the UK supported it before and after the 1997 coup; and important in  rallying the UN member states and international governments to support the elected Kabbah government.
  • Along with US, was one of the largest providers of humanitarian assistance to Sierra Leone; and also advocated for a dual track track approach in ending conflict.
  • Judicial reform effort, the Government committed to a major  judicial reform after the Lomé accord was signed.
  • Declined to sign as witness of the talks.
  • Major actor in putting international pressure to both parties to start negotiations by providing military aid on a commitment form from the SL government. Proposed a two track diplomacy, by suing dialogue but also military efforts.
  • Supported the Sierra Leonean Government even if they were meant to be neutral and represent democratization, rather than been partisan.
• Organization African Unity (OAU)
  • Represented by Adwoa Coleman.
  • Mediator role in order to ensure the continuation of Dialogue between the parties.
  • The OAU had been an important external actor during the Abidjan talks and Lomé talks during conflict, having sent delegations that tried to mediate between the government and the RUF on many occasions. This occurred frequently during 1995-1996, as it was  largely overseeing the Abidjan talks.
  • During the Abidjan talks the OAU they took relieve of the International Alert NGO.
  • The OAU was one of the key external actors, being one of the ‘moral guarantors’ of the talks and directly facilitated the Lomé peace agreement.
• Commonwealth
  •  Like the OAU, the Commonwealth was another important external actor that attempted to establish mediation between the two groups by sending delegations to Sierra Leone during the conflict. Also signed as a witness to the accord.
  • Even if was meant to be moral guarantor and mediator, it seems that  endorsed  Kabbah’s government during the duration of the talks.

• Women's Groups ( excluded from both talks)
  • The women’s organizations including the Sierra Leone Association of University Women, the Young Women’s Christian Association or the Women’s Association for National Development, within others, were not invited to the talks being marginalized from the Lomé agreement.  The RUF, the NPR and the Sierra Leonean government ignored their demands to be included in the Peace process.
  • This lack of representation is reflected by the negligence of women's issues in the talks, especially in terms of political and economic terms, although women were one of the primary victims during the war. There is only one reference to women, as being acknowledged as victims of the war ( Art XXVII). But there is no reference to their role in peace-building, political and economical reconstruction.
  • Outside the agreements they played a  crucial role to promote the agenda for the peace process. They were key for the National Consultative Conference held in august 1995 before the Abidjan talks.

• Regional groups: (other military groups)
  • Other groups excluded from the talks were the representatives of the provinces out of Freetown. One of the principle excluded groups were independent army combatants such as the SLA or the West Side Boyz. This resulted in the kidnapping  of around 40 people from the UNAMSIL civilian and military observers by former members of the SLA. They claimed that there were excluded from the Lomé Peace talks and presented some requests.
  • Within these, the incorporation of their soldiers to the new Sierra Leone army and the recognition of the promotions that the AFRC junta made during their position in power ( may 1997-February 1998). To satisfy these demands, the Lomé included the possibility of the ex combatants of the RUF and SLA to join the new army as stated in the Article XVII of Restructuring and Training of the Sierra Leone Armed Forces.

Peace, YES. But at what cost?

The 10 year-long Sierra Leonean civil war came to an end in the 2000s after a series of peace talks held between government of Sierra Leone and Revolutionary United Front (RUF). These talks resulted in the foundation of the newly designed democratic and constitutional state. While the conflict stopped, the agreement failed to develop the proper democratic institutions and political structure to help Sierra Leone transition in a functioning state. This essay argues that while the peace agreements stopped the fighting, there were many serious missteps that resulted in unequal representation, insufficiency in the rolls of the mediating parties, and too much concession given to those who committed crimes against humanity. By adopting a “peace at any costs” ideology, the peace agreements undermined the new government and constitution that was established, resulting in Sierra Leone falling back into cycles of political conflict and corruption.

        The exclusion of key actors throughout the course of the peace agreement caused many issues that played out in the aftermath of deal between the two opposing parties. Many of the groups left out of the peace negations were instrumental in the fostering of peace, with many of them representing side-lined communities that’s voices were lost in the wake of the negotiations. The lines of exclusion were regional, by putting too much focus on Freetown; gender biased, by excluding the Women’s representatives during the process and excluded the civil society initiatives.  The women’s organizations for instance, “played a crucial role in developing a non-partisan voice for peace and democratisation over the past ten years”[1] were largely left out of the peace talks resulting in women being marginalized in the Lomé agreement. The new legislation being put forward at the Lomé agreement “acknowledged women as victims of the war and the agreement provides that 'special attention shall be accorded to their needs and potentials” but they were left out of the “political and economic reconstruction of the country”[2].

       Civil society organizations and groups representing the traditional structures of the Sierra Leonean communities were also largely left out of the Lomé agreement. These isolated community structures were designed to help increase the involvement of the public into the creation of government policy and help the voices of the most marginalized be heard. These traditional structures involved using representative selected by communities that came together and help meetings to discuss potential policy. A large meeting was held prior to the Lomé agreement involving, “representatives from all the provinces who had emerged out of consultations chiefdom by chiefdom, district by district. Yet the recommendations from this meeting were ignored” [3] during the peace agreement.  

        Another critical misstep was the faulty role of the third-party mediator, the Government of Togo. As explained by Ramsbotham, “the entry of a third party may change the conflict structure and allow a different pattern of communication, enabling the third party to filter or reflect back the messages, attitudes and behaviour of the conflictants”[4]. Moreover, a mediator party should also ensure that the interests of the civil society are represented. In this case, it seems that the only goal of the Government of Togo and from other mediator parties such as the UN, was to achieve peace regardless of the terms of the agreement. The main issue at stake is the overlook at the civil societies request of justice to the war atrocities, which was ignored by both the parties, including the mediator, who quickly agreed on full amnesty instead of seeking for alternative solutions.

By observing the current situation of Sierra Leone, one can observe that the main drivers of the conflict back in 1991 are still present: there is frustration for government corruption, limited public services, high unemployment and unprecedented poverty. Solving these issues would be critical to developing a social and political culture that is invested in the legitimacy of the government. Having a functioning system of social infrastructure that could provide a legitimate means for people to live could have helped Sierra Leone get off of its feet and take strides towards being completely independent. Life expectancy is still only near the 50-year-old mark, and the GDP per capita is only at 496 USD. With a national GDP of only just over 3.5 Billion-dollar (4), Sierra Leone is one of poorest countries in the world. The serious lapses of judgement in the peace accords caused by the peace at any cost mentality has left sierra Leone in a position today where there is still inter-conflict between different groups of society, and high levels of political corruption and poverty.

The peace agreements that stopped the civil war in sierra Leone initially achieved their goal in stopping the bloodshed, but ultimately failed to foster a functioning state. While by stopping the conflict the peace agreements could be viewed as somewhat of a success, they failed to establish a function democratic state that has led to Sierra Leone being in a very weak position today. The “peace at any cost” attitude towards the peace agreements resulted in serious lapses of judgement and foresight, that has left Sierra Leone politically corrupt and socially distraught today.

• Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, signed at Abidjan on 30 November 1996

https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/SL_961130_PeaceAgreementSierraLeone-RUFSL.pdf

• Communiqué issued at Conakry on 23 October 1997 at the conclusion of the meeting between the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Committee of Five on Sierra Leone of the Economic Community of West African States and the delegation representing Major Johnny Paul Koromah

https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/resources/collections/peace_agreements/sl_10231997.pdf

• Peace Agreement Between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone Lomé, Togo, July 7, 1999

https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/resources/collections/peace_agreements/sierra_leone_07071999.pdf

• “Lasting peace in Sierra Leone: The Revolutionary United Front Sierra Leone ( RUF/SL) Perspective and vision”  11th may 1999

http://theirwords.org/media/transfer/doc/sl_ruf_08-8b0383b426906a2602263d3afda2c66d.pdf

• Abuja ceasefire agreement

http://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/fullpeace/SiL%2020001110.pdf

1)Barnes, C., Ph.D., & Polzer, T. (2000, September 27). Sierra Leone peace process: Learning from the past to address current challenges. Retrieved from https://reliefweb.int/report/sierra-leone/sierra-leone-peace-process-learning-past-address-current-challenges

This document was focused on the Lomé peace agreement through the eyes of international actors as well as individuals that were present. The document comes direct from Reliefweb.INT, the world leading website on humanitarian information regarding human crisis and natural disasters. The website is owned and operated by the UN office for the Coordination of Humanitarian affairs. The document itself is an expert summary report created following the signing of the Lomé peace agreement in 1999. It breaks down the strengths and weaknesses of the agreement, concentrating on using multiple viewpoints to paint a clearer picture of the successes and pitfalls of the controversial peace agreement. A strength of this document is the use of different viewpoints, giving contrasting points on view on different results of the peace agreement, painting a non-partisan point of view for the reader. Written by Catherine Barnes and Tara Polzer, both have extensive backgrounds in humanitarian and social service work within the African continent. Tara Polzer is a Ph.D. candidate, who studied at the London School of Economics and Political Sciences and Cambridge University. Catherine Barnes is a Ph.D. recipient, she holds a doctoral degree from the Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution and is an independent consultant on peacebuilding. The information in this document was key to highlighting the representation issue that plagued the Lomé peace agreement, showing the points of view of those included and those not included in the peace building processes.

2) Hayner, P. (2011, May 26). Negotiating peace in Sierra Leone: Confronting the justice challenge. Retrieved from https://www.ictj.org/publication/negotiating-peace-sierra-leone-confronting-justice-challenge

This document is a report focusing on the Lomé peace agreement and the impacts of the peace agreement on the 10-year civil war that tore through Sierra Leone. The document comes from the International Center for Transitional Justice, a website dedicated to bringing to the light the most brutal abuses of human rights violations and conflicts. The focus of the sight is to work with the victims, civil society groups and national and international organizations so ensure that the victims voices are heard and to prevent any further atrocities from happening. The documents highlights the implementation of the peace agreement and the results of the deals and commissions created throughout the accords. One of the biggest strengths of this document is its analytical work on the post peace agreement processes and how the agreement was implemented. Written by Priscilla Hayner, the Transitional Justice in Peace Negotiations at the United Nations; a highly awarded social scientist that was schooled at Earlham College, who went on receive a master’s degree in international Affairs and Human Rights from Columbia University. The focus on the post peace agreement applications of the commissions was critical to understanding where the failures and strengths of the Lomé agreement lay. This document provided detailed and essential inside information for our project.

3) Obita, J., Lord, D., Gberie, L., Rashid, I., Bright, D., Jusu-Sheriff, Y., . . . Fortune, F. (2015, July 27). Paying the price: The Sierra Leone peace process. Retrieved from http://www.c-r.org/resources/paying-price-sierra-leone-peace-process.

This 100 page document uses multiple authors to dive into great detail about the brutal Sierra Leone civil war that lasted 10 years. The document uses 8 different authors, each writing a chapter highlight each one of their areas of expertise. The document gives great background information of the conflict, which many other documents do not. As well as this, this document also focuses on the stories of those who were not involved in the conflict, giving light to minority groups such as the women’s civil society groups that were largely left out of the peace agreement negotiations. Financed by the independent Conciliation Resources organization, focused on working with victims of conflict, to help prevent future conflict and promote peaceful societies. Using multiple authors and insight from experts, this document highlights a complete look at the Lomé agreement, as well as the pre and post agreement landscapes of Sierra Leone.  This document was critical to finding the keys of the negotiation period. It specifically highlights how each of the keys were implemented and their results. It was an absolutely instrumental source of information, that covered areas that most of the other sources missed.

4) Kaldor, Mary. Vincent, James. (2006). “Evaluation of UNDP Assistance to Conflict-Affected Countries - Case Study: Sierra Leone”. Retrieved from http://web.undp.org/evaluation/documents/thematic/conflict/SierraLeone.pdf

This document provides an evaluation of the Sierra Leone conflict by the UNDP. After detailing the background of the conflict, the report considers how human security has improved since the peace negotiations, and contribution of international actors, the UN, and the UNDP in upholding human security in Sierra Leone. Mary Kaldor led the UNDP Evaluation team for conflict-affected countries, and James Vincent was the National Consultant for Sierra Leone in the team. A Professor of Global Governance  and the Director of the Conflict and Civil Society Research Unit in the London School of Economics Department of International Development, Mary Kaldor is well qualified in her field. On top of founding organizations such as the EUropean Nuclear Disarmament and Helsinki Citizens Assembly, and authoring books such as Global Civil Society: An Answer to War and Human Security: Reflections on Globalization and Intervention; she directs the Conflict Research Programme in her department that focuses on several countries in the Middle East and Africa, including Sierra Leone. She has also written several reports for the UNDP, including this one, which she co-authored with James Vincent. Accordingly, this report seems to have an academic viewpoint as well as a local one in evaluating the conflict.

6) Human Rights Watch - Sierra Leone - Human Rights Post. “Sierra Leone, Human Rights Development.” Africa 10 www.hrw.org/legacy/wr2k/Africa-09.htm 

This source provides a country profile in terms of human rights, for the Human Rights Watch tenth World Report, 2000. The Human Rights Watch is an INGO that conducts research and advocacy on Human Rights.  The reports’ focus is on the year 1999, and discusses several conflicts occuring in the continents of Africa, South America, Asia, Europe and Central Asia, the Middle East and North Africa, and the United States.It also details special issues such as Academic Freedom, Child Soldiers, Lesbian and Gay Rights, and Refugees, Displaced Persons, and Asylum Seekers.  The Overview on Sierra Leone focuses human rights developments and the involvement of international players, in light of the developments of 1999. It provides brief summaries of what they perceived to be key international players. This includes, ECOMOG and ECOWAS; the United Nations; the European Union, United Kingdom, and United States. Naturally focusing on the human rights aspect, its information on international actors did not seem substantial enough, but provided some useful statistics in terms of the aid they provided.

7)“The Road to Peace: Report of National Consultative Conference on the Peace Process in Sierra Leone” Organized by The National Commission for Democracy and Human Rights and Civil Society Organizations (1999, April) http://www.democracy.gov.sl/images/reports/THE%20ROAD%20TO%20PEACE.pdf

A report of the different consensus views expressed on the peace process of Sierra Leone during the Consultative Conference that took place from April 7-9, organized by The National Commission for Democracy and Human Rights and Civil Society Organization. The Conference occurred under the auspices of the Kabbah’s government and included 250 participants from different civic groups. Among them some groups were: Sierra Leone students, Religious Organizations, Sierra Leone Labour Congress and other Trade Unions, Chamber of Commerce and Indigenous Business Organizations, Local NGOs, Women’s Organizations, IDP Camps and other war victims, and Political Parties in Parliament. It details all the statements, remarks, presentations and discussions that occurred during the conference. Accordingly, it provides good insight to viewpoints of the civic groups who didn’t actively participate in the peace talks. While the resulting conference report wasn’t endorsed by the government, it was sent to the Togolese government who was mediating the Lome talks. Thus, the document presents relevant and contemporary information to the conflict. It has been relevant for our project to see what is the voice of different civil society groups that didn’t participate in the talks, and what was their position on the different issues.

8) Demirag, Elif Gizem. (2014) “Comparative Analysis of Peace Processes: Democratic Republic of Congo and Sierra Leone”.https://ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/dce2ffc1-1e3a-446e-8755-6673b1bd2c7d.pdf

Elif Gizem Demirag was a graduate student at Sabanci University, Istanbul, when this paper was written. Although, it’s credibility may be questionable it is strengthened by the fact that the paper was presented at the  Graduate Student Conference of European Consortium for Political Research in 2014. Moreover, Demirag has held many academic positions including, Graduate and Research Assistant and Training Assistant, and is now a PhD student at Koc University. His paper provides a unique perspective by presenting the Sierra Leone peace negotiations as relatively successful. Through the a comparative analysis of the peace processes in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sierra Leone, it argues that Sierra Leone was relatively successful; and this was largely due to the nature of third party roles and mediation in the process. Using Bercovitch’s mediation approach: the nature of the parties, nature of the issues and the nature of the mediator are interconnected and strongly affect the mediation outcome, the author analyses the nature of conflict and its mediation process. He concludes that peace outcomes are more likely to successful in cases such as Sierra Leone, where the mediator, the Togolese government, was not involved in the conflict. The article provides a positive outlook to the Sierra Leone peace negotiations, as an example of a good theoretical framework for mediation. The use of the paper was relevant for our project when it came to the analysis and assessment of the overall outcome of the conflict. It provided us with a different approach on the conflict that we could contest with our own opinions.

9) Mateos, O. (2009). " Construcció de Pau a Sierra Leone". Fundació Kontrast. Retrieved from http://www.fkontrast.org/documents/Ajut%20a%20la%20recerca%202008.pdf

Oscar Mateos holds a bachelor degree in Political Sciences and a masters degree in Peace Culture and International Relations. This document is part of his PhD thesis on the African conflicts. He worked as a teacher and researcher in the Department of Peace and Conflicts of the University of Sierra Leone in Freetown between 2006 and 2008. Today, he is a teacher at eh University of Ramon Llull in Barcelona.  This paper is part of a study he conducted in 2009 thank to the support of Kontrast Foundation. It gives the reader an analysis and insight of the construction of peace in Sierra Leone through the perspectives and opinions of the students of Peace and Conflict in the University of Sierra Leone. Three main issues are discussed: 1) which measures consolidated the peace process in Sierra Leone? 2) To what extent the idea of local appropriation is respected in the talks? 3) To what extent the reforms of peace construction are adapted to the local context. This source was relevant for our database project especially when we had to evaluate the success/ failure of the talks. It provided us with diverse opinions and perspectives on what might have been the shortages of the conflict to the mind of Sierra Leonean students, who have a first hand experience on the conflict and peace building.

10) BBC:“Sierra Leone Profile - Timeline.” BBC News, BBC, 7 Mar. 2018, www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14094419.

The British Broadcasting Corporation, is one of the best known and trusted world wide public service broadcaster as well as the world’s oldest national broadcasting organization. Since its foundation in 1922 it became a referent on the News and Media sphere. This specific publication provides an overall view on the Sierra Leonean conflict by listing the main events of the conflict and peace process from 1787 until 2016. It was essential for our project as it provided us with an general view on the conflict through which we could research more information as well as compare it to other documents and articles that provided us with similar but not exact timelines of the same issue.

AFRC-RUF. “Lasting Peace in Sierra Leone: The Revolutionary United Front Perspective and Vision”. Sierra Leone Web -  www.sierra-leone.org/AFRC-RUF/RUF-051199c.html

Barnes, Catherine; Polzer, Tara. “The Sierra Leone peace process: learning from the past to address current challenges”, Conciliation Resources (September, 2000)http://www.c-r.org/downloads/TheSierraLeonePeaceProcess_200011_ENG.pdf

BBC:“Sierra Leone Profile - Timeline.” BBC News, BBC, 7 Mar. 2018, www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14094419.

Dago, Jan. "Civil War in Sierra Leone." Alexia Foundation : Jan Dago. N.p., 2001. Web. 24 Mar. 2018.http://www.alexiafoundation.org/stories/civil-war-in-sierra-leone

Demirag, Elif Gizem. "Comparative Analysis of Peace Processes: Sierra Leone and Democratic Republic of Congo." Sabanci University, Istanbul, 2014. Web. 27 Mar. 2018.https://ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/dce2ffc1-1e3a-446e-8755-6673b1bd2c7d.pdf

Horn, Adrian, Funmi Olonisakin, and Gordon Peake. "United Kingdom-led Security Sector Reform in Sierra Leone." Civil Wars 8.2 (2006): 109-23. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13698240600877247?src=recsys

Hayner, P. (2011, May 26). Negotiating peace in Sierra Leone: Confronting the justice challenge. Retrieved from https://www.ictj.org/publication/negotiating-peace-sierra-leone-confronting-justice-challenge

Human Rights Post. “Sierra Leone, Human Rights Developement.” Africa 10, www.hrw.org/legacy/wr2k/Africa-09.htm.

Mateos, O. (2009). " Construcció de Pau a Sierra Leone". Fundació Kontrast. Retrieved from http://www.fkontrast.org/documents/Ajut%20a%20la%20recerca%202008.pdf

Obita, J., Lord, D., Gberie, L., Rashid, I., Bright, D., Jusu-Sheriff, Y., . . . Fortune, F. (2015, July 27). Paying the price: The Sierra Leone peace process. Retrieved from http://www.c-r.org/resources/paying-price-sierra-leone-peace-process.

Pickering, Jonathan, Policy Coherence in International Responses to State Failure: The role of the United Kingdom in Sierra Leone, July 2009, Development Studies Institute London School of Economics and Political Sciences http://www.lse.ac.uk/internationalDevelopment/pdf/WP/WP76.pdf

Ramsbotham, Oliver, Tom Woodhouse, and Hugh Miall. Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The Prevention, Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflicts. 3rd ed. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2016.

SIERRA LEONE: IRIN Focus on the Peace Process.”, University of Pennsylvania - African Studies Centre, www.africa.upenn.edu/Newsletters/irinw_111699.html

“Sierra Leone GDP 1960-2018 | Data | Chart | Calendar | Forecast | News.” Sierra Leone GDP | 1960-2018 | Data | Chart | Calendar | Forecast | News, tradingeconomics.com/sierra-leone/gdp

“The Road to Peace: Report of National Consultative Conference on the Peace Process in Sierra Leone” Organized by The National Commission for Democracy and Human Rights and Civil Society Organizations (1999, April) http://www.democracy.gov.sl/images/reports/THE%20ROAD%20TO%20PEACE.pdf

Mufson, Steven. “The US Backs Amnesty in Sierra Leone.” The Washington Post, WP Company, 18 Oct. 1999, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/daily/oct99/leone18.htm.

Voeten, Teun. "Newton, near Freetown, May 2000." Photography on War and Conflict in Sierra Leone and Liberia. N.p., 2013. Web. 24 Mar. 2018.http://www.teunvoeten.com/photography_conflict_sierraleone_liberia.php?selectedCountry=SierraLeone_Liberia&selectedPage=0

On August 18, 2003, the Liberian government, rebels, and political parties signed the Accra Comprehensive Peace Agreement to officially conclude the Second Liberian Civil War. The agreement was signed in Accra, Ghana. It was created after vigorous back-door negotiations, which commenced earlier on June 4 in Akosombo, Ghana, and the signing of a ceasefire agreement on June 17. The negotiations and subsequent agreement committed the signatories to an immediate ceasefire, cantonment, disarmament, demobilization. In addition, the negotiations also addressed long-term issues of rehabilitation and reintegration; security sector reform; release of prisoners and abductees; human rights; security guarantees for humanitarian activities; women and children rights; post-conflict rehabilitation and reconstruction programme etc. Charles Taylor was forced to leave Liberia as part of the peace settlement and was later brought to the Special Court for Sierra Leone. The warring parties, opposition parties, and civil society groups agreed to share ministerial portfolios and employment opportunities in the cabinet and parliament and elections were to be held no later than 2005. [1]

Source: Peace Accord Matrix. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame. [2]

The mediator for the talks was General Abdulsalami Abubakar, a former head of state of Nigeria. The talks were held under the auspices of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

Primary Negotiators

Government of Liberia

Ceasefire: [3]

• Charles Taylor would only consider stepping down once Taylor, other government leaders, and military commanders had been given international guarantees about their security.
• In response to the demand of resignation within 10 days of a ceasefire agreement, the government initially refused and said Taylor should stay in power until January.

Power sharing transitional government: [4]

• Taylor’s government demanded a constitutional transition.
• A constitutional transition would mean that Taylor’s Vice-President Moses Blah would take over the transitional government.

Amnesty: [5]

• Demanded amnesty for any actions committed during the civil war.
• Taylor attempted to pass an act that would grant immunity for all persons who committed crimes or acts during the civil war, although it was not legitimately passed.

Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and Model for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL)

The single issue the rebel groups would not compromise on was the removal and departure of Charles Taylor.

Ceasefire: [6]

• LURD and MODEL demanded that any ceasefire agreement would have to require Charles Taylor’s resignation and the establishment of a new broad-based government of national unity within 10 days.
• The rebels demanded that a U.S. or Western-led intervention force should monitor the ceasefire, rather than a West African or ECOWAS force.

Power sharing transitional government: [7]

• The rebel groups wanted President Taylor excluded from the transitional government and refused the proposal that Vice-President Moses Blah would take over the transitional government.  
• LURD and MODEL wanted to be included in the transitional government. The rebel forces had refused to sign one version of the peace agreement because it excluded LURD from top government positions.
• LURD and MODEL demanded that an interim president should be selected from political parties and civil society groups that did not partake in the conflict. LURD and MODEL should also hold two vice-presidential positions.

Amnesty: [8]

• Rebel factions initially demanded a tribunal for war crimes for justice.
• This demand was not strong because the rebel groups could also be accused of war crimes.

Constitutional reform: [9]

• LURD proposed the establishment of a commission to review the constitution, particularly in relation to presidential powers.

Signatories

Political Parties

• All-Liberian Coalition Party
• Free Democratic Party
• Liberian Action Party
• Unity Party
• All-Liberian Coalition Party
• True Whig Party
• Liberian People's Party
• National Patriotic Party
• National Reformation Party
• Labor Party
• Liberia Unification Party
• People's Democratic Party
• National Democratic Party
• Reformation Alliance Party
• United People's Party
• Liberia National Union
• Equal Rights Party
• Progressive Peoples Party
• The New Deal Movement

*18 political parties attended the peace negotiations. However, there is a gap in literature regarding their official positions. Some sources have suggested that about half of the parties were created by the Taylor government leading up to the peace talks.

International Actors

International Contact Group of Liberia (composed of members of the UN, ECOWAS, AU, World Bank, US, Ghana, Nigeria, UK, Spain, and Sweden)

Ceasefire: [10]

• Urged the government of Liberia and LURD to enter into a ceasefire immediately and without any preconditions.
• Called on the Security Council to authorize a monitoring mechanism for the ceasefire.

Elections: [11]

• Urged the government to create the conditions required for a free and fair election.
• In particular, they called for a ceasefire, security, a process of reconciliation, electoral reform, and respect for human rights before free and fair elections are possible.

U.S. Representatives specifically

Transitional government: [12]

• Held the firm belief that no faction representatives should hold positions in the transitional government.
• The initial draft of the peace agreement reflected this position.

Official Observers: Civil Society Leaders

Mano River Women’s Peace Network

All Components of new Liberian government: [13]

• Called for the inclusion of women within the executive, legislative, and judiciary structures.
• Called for 50% representation of women in transitional leadership.

Peace and Post-Conflict Processes: [14]

• Called for the group’s participation in the DDR process and for the inclusion of women in rehabilitation, reconstruction, and redevelopment process.
• Demanded more participation in ongoing peace processes, including being made official delegates (rather than observers) and have voting rights.

*The Inter-Religious Committee in Liberia, the Liberian Bar Association, and Members of the Liberian diaspora also attended the peace negotiations. The civil society actors involved in the talks likely had a significant role following the negotiation of the ceasefire. However, there is a gap in literature regarding their positions in the talks. For more information, see: Franzisca Zanker [15].

Due to the extensive nature of the peace agreement and vast involvement of the main warring parties and important representatives, it seems that there were no important actors that were excluded from the peace talks.

Our research team considers the peace talks and negotiations of the Accra Comprehensive Peace Agreement between parties involved in the Second Liberian Civil War to be relatively successful. The ‘success’ of this peace talk is based on the evaluation of the negotiated topics/issues and the process of implementation. To highlight the overall success, we will look at both the benefits and concerns with the Accra Peace agreement in general, such as its inclusion of a wide range of actors involved in the conflict, the problems with the power-sharing article, and the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commision.

The peace talks included a range of actors from civil society in both the negotiations and peacebuilding process. In particular, the Mano River Women’s Peace Network was influential in the negotiations while other women placed pressure from outside of the formal talks. For example, the Liberian Peace-building Network mobilized Liberian women living in refugee camps to protest outside of the conference room in Ghana [16]. Furthermore, civil society actors received formal roles in the transitional government. For example, seven seats were reserved for civil society groups in the legislative assembly [17]. The ministries of national security, education, gender and development, information, rural development, and youth and sports were also entrusted to civil society representatives  [18].

Furthermore, the peace talks led to the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) as a form of restorative justice following the mass abuses of human rights. Notably, Liberia’s TRC was the first TRC to include its diaspora community extensively, to investigate economic crimes as a principal source of conflict, and to provide a comprehensive mapping of human rights violations [19]. However, the TRC is also criticized for its lack of funding, inadequate staff and technical support, and the government’s lack of follow through on the recommendations [20].

A section of the peace agreement that has been critiqued is that pertaining to the power-sharing of different sectors between the respective actors. Within the agreement that the parties signed, it included dividing major public sectors between the major warring groups: LURD got justice, transport, labor, and finance etc. MODEL was given commerce, foreign affairs, mines, and energy etc, while the remnants of the Taylor government were tasked with health and social welfare, internal affairs etc. The problem with this section in the agreement is that instead of incentivizing cooperation between the previous warring factions, it divided key institutions and left avenues for the potential to “ siphon off state resources and thereby fund whatever they pleased” [21]. Another way to address this disparity is to share the authoritative power between other levels of government besides the three major warring parties. This would mitigate the potential for abusing power and also empower the local citizens to be active participants in the process, making for a more stable model for long-term peace. It could also relieve some “local-based ethnic disputes” that fueled the civil war on a grassroots level [22].

The peace talks also led to an agreement on disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) to help with post-conflict reconstruction. However, the overall effectiveness of Liberia’s DDR program is debated. There are mixed feelings among ex-combatants regarding the effectiveness of the reintegration and rehabilitation elements of the DDR program [23]. Meanwhile, the disarmament and demobilization were generally viewed favourably, particularly the cash for arms program and the UN’s presence [24]. The UN’s presence also highlights the significant role that international actors played in both the short-term conflict resolution and long-term peacebuilding process. In particular, international actors helped to promote an environment conducive to deeper structural reforms and to conditions that would allow for  free and fair elections [25].

“The Accra Comprehensive Peace Agreement,” Accra, Ghana, August 18, 2003. Retrieved from:
https://www.peacemaker.un.org/liberia-peaceagreementlurdmodel2003

“Agreement on Ceasefire and Cessation of Hostilities,” Accra, Ghana, June 17, 2003. Retrieved from:
https://www.peacemaker.un.org/liberia-ceasefire2003

“The Golden Tulip Declaration of Liberian Women Attending the Peace Talks in Accra,” Accra Ghana, March 15, 2003. Retrieved from:
http://www.peacewomen.org/sites/default/files/rep_goldentulipdeclarationliberianwomenpeacetalks_representvariouslibwomensorg_2003_0.pdf

“‘No to War!’ Statement by H.E. President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf at Commemoration of the 10th Anniversary of the Signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement,” Monrovia, Liberia, August 19, 2013. Retrieved from:
http://www.emansion.gov.lr/doc/20130819_President_Sirleafs_Statement_Decade_Peace_Ceremony_1.pdf

Republic of Liberia Truth and Reconciliation Commission. “Volume II: Consolidated Final Report,” Monrovia, Liberia, June 30, 2009. Retrieved from:
https://web.archive.org/web/20170515044651/http://trcofliberia.org:80/reports/final-report

United Nations Security Council. “Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on Liberia,” September 11, 2003. Retrieved from:
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2003/875

The Guardian. “ Liberian rebels sign peace deal,” August 19, 2003. Retrieved from:
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/aug/19/westafrica

Peace Accords Matrix. “Accra Peace Agreement,” August 18, 2003. Retrieved from:
https://www.peaceaccords.nd.edu/accord/accra-peace-agreement

Atkinson, Philippa. "Liberal Interventionism in Liberia: Towards a Tentatively just Approach?: Analysis." Conflict, Security & Development, vol. 8, no. 1, 2008, pp. 15-45.

This paper critically evaluates the role of the international community in Liberia’s conflict resolution phase and post-conflict phase. Philippa Atkinson begins by evaluating the liberal peace agenda and whether the international community’s intervention was justified. Next, Atkinson analyzes of the strengths and weaknesses of the international community’s intervention. This section is particularly useful because it provides a balanced overview of the international community’s impact. The paper concludes that the international community did indeed play a substantial role in longer-term peace processes, despite the international community’s shortcomings. Overall, this paper is useful in understanding the supportive role that international actors play in the peacebuilding process.

Debusscher, Petra, and Maria Martin de Almagro. "Post-Conflict Women's Movements in Turmoil: The Challenges of Success in Liberia in the 2005-Aftermath." The Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 54, no. 2, 2016, pp. 293-316.

This paper reviews the role of Liberian women’s advocacy in peacebuilding. First, the authors review the overall literature on women’s advocacy in conflict settings. The review helps to put the Liberian women’s advocacy in the context of the challenges facing women in peacebuilding. The authors then provide a short history of the Liberian women’s movement during the conflict and peace negotiations. This section is particularly useful in understanding how women were influential as actors both inside and outside of the formal Accra talks. Following this discussion, the authors seek to understand why the current women’s movement is weakening in post-conflict Liberia. In particular, the authors addressed this question by conducting interviews with gender activists involved in NGOs and government institutions. Overall, the authors provide a useful overview of the role and challenges of women’s advocacy. The authors suggest that there are important lessons to learn from the case of Liberia because civil society advocacy is essential for post-conflict reconstruction.

De Ycaza, Carla. "A Search for Truth: A Critical Analysis of the Liberian Truth and Reconciliation Commission." Human Rights Review, vol. 14, no. 3, 2013, pp. 189-212.

This paper provides a balanced overview of the Liberian Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Carla De Ycaza begins by discussing the history of the conflict. Next, De Ycaza reviews the establishment of the TRC, the proceedings, and the TRC’s findings and recommendations. The paper is thorough in its analysis because it refers to primary and secondary sources about perspectives on the TRC. It also includes qualitative and quantitative data about the effectiveness of the TRC. Furthermore, De Ycaza discusses the unique contributions that the Liberian TRC made to the field of transitional justice, the debates regarding the TRC, and its criticisms. Overall, the paper provides a succinct overview of the impact of the TRC and its limitations in restorative justice. This paper is significant in understanding the healing and reconciliation process in Liberia.

Jennings, Kathleen M. "The Struggle to Satisfy: DDR through the Eyes of Ex-Combatants in Liberia." International Peacekeeping, vol. 14, no. 2, 2007, pp. 204-218.

This paper evaluates the justification, formulation, and implementation of Liberia’s DDR program. First, Kathleen M. Jennings outlines the situation in Liberia and analyses its DDR program. Jennings provides a particularly useful analysis because she conducted qualitative fieldwork with ex-combatants in Monrovia, Liberia to evaluate the successfulness of the DDR program. Jennings identifies that the primary rationale for reintegration was to satisfy the ex-combatants but concludes through the interviews that this goal has not been met. This paper also successfully identifies issues with Liberia’s DDR process that relate to gaps in the overall literature in DDR programs. DDR is an important component of post-conflict reconstruction and this paper provides a solid understanding of the strengths and limitations of Liberia’s DDR program.

Mehler, Andreas. “ Peace and Power Sharing in Africa: A Not so Obvious Relationship.” African Affairs, Vol 108, no. 432, 2009, pp. 453-473.

This paper discusses the implications of peace agreements being signed in different African contexts. Mehler provides an objective critique of the Accra Peace agreement and why agreements that are made by simply dividing up power between the warring parties may not be the best solution on the pursuit for a more sustainable long term peace. Instead the author advocates for more broader based participation in the agreements so that the main beneficiaries, the citizens, can be empowered participants. This paper is relevant to our entry due to the fact that it highlights the problems that could be embedded within these larger peace agreements, and the implications of what ignoring these problems could lead to.

Pham, J. P. "Liberia and Sierra Leone: A Study of Comparative Human Rights Approaches by Civil Society Actors." Interdisciplinary Journal of Human Rights Law, vol. 1, no. 1, 2006, pp. 69-105.

This paper provides a useful comparison between Liberia and Sierra Leone to help understand the role of civil society actors, NGOs, and other members of the human rights community in peacebuilding. J. Peter Pham begins by comparing the histories and civil wars of Liberia and Sierra Leone. Next, Pham identifies the different roles that civil society played during the conflict in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Pham then identifies the different approaches that civil society took in the post-conflict phase. This section is particularly useful in understanding the role that civil society played during the talks and how this approach led to a formalized role for civil society representatives in the post-conflict phase. Overall, this paper helps to understand the role of Liberian civil society in both the conflict phase and the post-conflict rebuilding phase.

Zanker, Franziska. "Legitimate Representation: Civil Society Actors in Peace Negotiations Revisited." International Negotiation 19, no. 1, 2014, pp. 62-88.

This paper evaluates the representation of civil society actors in the Liberian and Kenyan peace negotiations. This paper is particularly useful because it creates an empirical model to understand “legitimate representation” based on subjective, substantive, and accountable representation. This model is used to compare civil society activism in Liberia and Kenya. Franzisca Zanker seeks to fill a gap in the literature regarding why and how involving civil society groups improves the legitimacy of negotiations. Zanker identifies how the involvement of civil society groups can make the negotiations and their outcomes more legitimate for the aggrieved. Zanker also identifies the limitations of this argument. As a result, this paper is highly useful in understanding why and how the inclusion of civil society was significant in the Accra talks.

1. "Secretary General's Report to the UN Security Council," United Nations Security Council (S/2003/1175), December 15, 2003.
2. Peace Accords Matrix. “Accra Peace Agreement,” Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, Date of retrieval: (3/15/2018),
   https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/accord/accra-peace-agreement
3. IRIN. “Liberia: Peace talks deadlocked over rebel demand for Taylor to quit.” Reliefweb, June 15, 2003. Retrieved from:
   https://reliefweb.int/report/liberia/liberia-peace-talks-deadlocked-over-rebel-demand-taylor-quit
4. IRIN. “Liberia: Draft comprehensive peace accord presented.” Reliefweb, July 18, 2003. Retrieved from:
   https://reliefweb.int/report/liberia/liberia-draft-comprehensive-peace-accord-presented
5. Hayner, Priscilla. “Negotiating peace in Liberia: Preserving the possibility for Justice.” International Center for Transitional Justice, November, 2007. Retrieved from: https://www.ictj.org/publication/negotiating-peace-liberia-preserving-possibility-justice
6. IRIN. “Liberia: Peace talks deadlocked over rebel demand for Taylor to quit.” Reliefweb, June 15, 2003. Retrieved from:
   https://reliefweb.int/report/liberia/liberia-peace-talks-deadlocked-over-rebel-demand-taylor-quit
7. IRIN. “Liberia - Taylor at Accra peace talks: “Honourable exit or extended mandate?” Reliefweb, July 22, 2003. Retrieved from:
   https://reliefweb.int/report/liberia/liberia-taylor-accra-peace-talks-honourable-exit-or-extended-mandate
8. Hayner, Priscilla. “Negotiating peace in Liberia: Preserving the possibility for Justice.” International Center for Transitional Justice, November, 2007. Retrieved from: https://www.ictj.org/publication/negotiating-peace-liberia-preserving-possibility-justice
9. Ibid.
10. UN News. “Liberia: International contact group urges Government and rebels to hold ceasefire talks,” March 1, 2003. Retrieved from: https://news.un.org/en/story/2003/03/60622-liberia-international-contact-group-urges-government-and-rebels-hold-ceasefire
11. Ibid.
12. Hayner, Priscilla. “Negotiating peace in Liberia: Preserving the possibility for Justice.” International Center for Transitional Justice, November, 2007. Retrieved from: https://www.ictj.org/publication/negotiating-peace-liberia-preserving-possibility-justice
13. “The Golden Tulip Declaration of Liberian Women Attending the Peace Talks in Accra,” Accra Ghana, March 15, 2003. Retrieved from:  http://www.peacewomen.org/sites/default/files/rep_goldentulipdeclarationliberianwomenpeacetalks_representvariouslibwomensorg_2003_0.pdf
14. Ibid.
15. Zanker, Franziska. "Legitimate Representation: Civil Society Actors in Peace Negotiations Revisited." International Negotiation 19, no. 1, 2014, pp. 62-88.
16. Debusscher, Petra, and Maria Martin de Almagro. "Post-Conflict Women's Movements in Turmoil: The Challenges of Success in Liberia in the 2005-Aftermath." The Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 54, no. 2, 2016, pp. 293-316.
17. Pham, J. P. "Liberia and Sierra Leone: A Study of Comparative Human Rights Approaches by Civil Society Actors." Interdisciplinary Journal of Human Rights Law, vol. 1, no. 1, 2006, pp. 69-105.
18. Ibid.
19. De Ycaza, Carla. "A Search for Truth: A Critical Analysis of the Liberian Truth and Reconciliation Commission." Human Rights Review, vol. 14, no. 3, 2013, pp. 189-212.
20. Ibid.
21. Mehler, Andreas. “ Peace and Power Sharing in Africa: A Not so Obvious Relationship.” African Affairs, Vol 108, no. 432, 2009, pp. 453-473.

22. Ibid.
23. Jennings, Kathleen M. "The Struggle to Satisfy: DDR through the Eyes of Ex-Combatants in Liberia." International Peacekeeping, vol. 14, no. 2, 2007, pp. 204-218.
24. Ibid.
25. Atkinson, Philippa. "Liberal Interventionism in Liberia: Towards a Tentatively just Approach?: Analysis." Conflict, Security & Development, vol. 8, no. 1, 2008, pp. 15-45.
    
26. Debusscher, Petra, and Maria Martin de Almagro. "Post-Conflict Women's Movements in Turmoil: The Challenges of Success in Liberia in the 2005-Aftermath." The Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 54, no. 2, 2016, pp. 293-316.
27. De Ycaza, Carla. "A Search for Truth: A Critical Analysis of the Liberian Truth and Reconciliation Commission." Human Rights Review, vol. 14, no. 3, 2013, pp. 189-212.
28. Hayner, Priscilla. “Negotiating peace in Liberia: Preserving the possibility for Justice.” International Center for Transitional Justice, November, 2007. Retrieved from: https://www.ictj.org/publication/negotiating-peace-liberia-preserving-possibility-justice
29. “The Golden Tulip Declaration of Liberian Women Attending the Peace Talks in Accra,” Accra Ghana, March 15, 2003. Retrieved from:  http://www.peacewomen.org/sites/default/files/rep_goldentulipdeclarationliberianwomenpeacetalks_representvariouslibwomensorg_2003_0.pdf
30. IRIN. “Liberia: Draft comprehensive peace accord presented.” Reliefweb, July 18, 2003. Retrieved from:
    https://reliefweb.int/report/liberia/liberia-draft-comprehensive-peace-accord-presented
31. IRIN. “Liberia - Taylor at Accra peace talks: “Honourable exit or extended mandate?” Reliefweb, July 22, 2003. Retrieved from:
    https://reliefweb.int/report/liberia/liberia-taylor-accra-peace-talks-honourable-exit-or-extended-mandate
32. IRIN. “Liberia: Peace talks deadlocked over rebel demand for Taylor to quit.” Reliefweb, June 15, 2003. Retrieved from:
    https://reliefweb.int/report/liberia/liberia-peace-talks-deadlocked-over-rebel-demand-taylor-quit
33. Jennings, Kathleen M. "The Struggle to Satisfy: DDR through the Eyes of Ex-Combatants in Liberia." International Peacekeeping, vol. 14, no. 2, 2007, pp. 204-218.
34. “Liberians Fail to Sign Comprehensive Peace Agreement.” GhanaWeb, 17 July 2003. Retrieved from:
    http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=39449. 
35. “Peace Accords Matrix.” Accra Peace Agreement | Peace Accords Matrix, Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame., 2015, Retrieved from:
    http://www.peaceaccords.nd.edu/accord/accra-peace-agreement.
36. Pham, J. P. "Liberia and Sierra Leone: A Study of Comparative Human Rights Approaches by Civil Society Actors." Interdisciplinary Journal of Human Rights Law, vol. 1, no. 1, 2006, pp. 69-105.
37. UN News. “Liberia: International contact group urges Government and rebels to hold ceasefire talks,” March 1, 2003. Retrieved from:
    https://news.un.org/en/story/2003/03/60622-liberia-international-contact-group-urges-government-and-rebels-hold-ceasefire
38. Zanker, Franzisca. "Legitimate Representation: Civil Society Actors in Peace Negotiations Revisited." International Negotiation 19, no. 1 (2014): 62-88.

Seven Party Alliance

   The seven party alliance members included; Nepali Congress, Nepali Congress (Democratic), Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist) who withdrew on May 3 2009), Nepal Workers and Peasants Party, Nepal Goodwill Party(Anandi Devi), United Left Front and the People’s front. Their main goal was to put an end autocratic rule. They made up the majority of the seats in The Nepalese legislature. The seven party alliance went into the talks with the notion of implementing full democracy in order to address long standing yet pressing issues that the Nepalese people have been struggling under for years due to both the past multi-party democratic governments and the instability of power/inter-party conflicts all of which delayed action on these issues. The seven party alliance therefore demanded solutions to issues revolving around class, caste, gender and region. Primarily this group sought to bring the autocratic government to an end and in turn restore democracy, peace and prosperity. To achieve this, they wished for the restoration of parliament.  

Maoists

The CPN (Maoists) when entering the twelve point agreement, held the position that the goal of peace and democracy can be attained by forming an interim government and called for a national conference of the seven party democratic forces. They also held the view that the only alternative to the previously discussed method of achieving democratic peace is through the force of the people’s movement. Maoists displayed responsibility for making their commitment to democracy and democratic values public and clear as well as allowing displaced peoples during the armed conflict to return to their places of origin safely and with dignity. Lastly, the Maoists approached the talks with the willingness to accept and respect humans rights norms and values as well as the acceptance of their past mistakes and commitment to avoid said weaknesses in the future. In terms of the CPA negotiations,  Because it was a solidification and slight revamp of the previous twelve-point agreement, the positions held by the Maoists and the GoN were relatively clear and similar as they had been previously hammered out. The Maoists approached this negotiation with the intent to refrain from further violence (in the form of aggression, kidnappings, or any other acts of harassment) towards neither the GoN forces or Nepalese common people. The Maoists came into the negotiations with the understanding (derived from the previous twelve point agreement) that their troops would remain in Cantonments monitored by the UN. Maoists also came into the talks supporting the notion that private property of any individual would not be taken over unless permitted by the law. This is something the Maoists would previously be in disagreement to (for they formerly had position to large amounts of countryside) but since the twelve point agreement, the standards are clear on both sides.Coming into the talks that resulted in the Seven Point agreement, Maoists wished for the rehabilitation of their combatants, including an economic package for those opting not to integrate into the national security system. For those integrating would receive proper training for the job.

Government of Nepal

The GoN’s main goal coming into the CPA  negotiations was to transform the temporary ceasefire that was currently being held into lasting, sustainable peace. They came into these negotiations with the understanding that their army shall remain confined within the barracks. The Nepali government was also pushing for the rationing of the Maoist combatants. The Government of Nepal was in agreement and support in adopting the necessary policies to ensure economic, political and social transformation in order to resolve remaining conflict in Nepal. The government of Nepal also backed initiatives to create policy for the rights for the average Nepali citizen to education, health, housing, employment and food security. The Government of Nepal stood for the rights of the individual in terms of speech, expression and peaceful gathering. With the cultivation of a new peace, the GoN came into the talks with visions of freedom of opinion and expression, freedom of movement and the right to take part in political activities peacefully. Regarding the AMMAA, Following the CPA, the Government of Nepal came into these negotiations with the awareness and support for the fact that their army would continue to be monitored and remain in the barracks with its weapons out of reach. Entering into the talks regarding the 7 point agreement, the GoN wished for a drafting of a new constitution that was fair, equal and backed by the nation.

United Nations

In reference to the (AMMAA) negotiations, The United Nations main role and position was to provide surveillance of all arms and combatant locations and activity. They aimed to create a Joint Monitoring Coordination Committee with representative members from the UN, NA, and Maoist army. The functions of this new committee would be to resolve military or operational disputes, to gain the trust of the parties/build confidence and lastly, to assist both parties in instilling this agreement (through arms surveillance).  The main chairman would be a delegate from the United Nation and the two vice chairmen would be from the Maoist and NA armies. The JMCC’s activities would be regularly reported to the Security-General through the Chairman. The United Nations entered into the negotiations which resulted in the twelve point agreement with intentions to be a mediator and overseer of any and all decisions made regarding a shift in power. Naturally, they were called upon to monitor the election of a constituent assembly to end the transition period between governments.

During Nepal’s vital peace negotiations in 2003, civil society organizations tried their best to lobby and pressurize the conflicting parties to make the peace process meaningful [but]... they were not given enough roles and press coverage. The process became a closed door business of key players from the government and the Maoist leaders” (Kattel 2004).

China’s relations during the Nepalese peace process were more distant, partly because of their lesser visibility in its dealings with Nepal and their long-held views on non-intervention in the affairs of others

• “With a critical perspective on the Maoists as an unruly force that besmirched the good name of Chairman Mao, this stance had translated into unfailing support of the government of the day.”
• China’s involvement grew, however, in 2005 as a consequence of Gyanendra Bir Bikram Shah Dev’s (the last king of Nepal from 2001-2008) efforts to mobilize support for his coup

“The United Nations was present first through an Office of the UN HIgh Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and later in a specialised political mission (UNMIN). However, neither the UN nor the other external actors supporting the peace process ever fulfilled a formal role of mediation”

There was a significant lack of female representation during peace talks and negotiations. There were no women assigned or trusted to facilitate discussions; “in the first round of peace talks two respected male facilitators were assigned but no additional female members included in the facilitators team. In the second peace talks more were added than in the previous two but all were men”. A lack of female members from both sides except in the first term of the 2003 discussions are discouraging, and conducive of a misrepresentation of a huge sector in the population.

The peace talks pertaining to the Nepali conflict proved to be successful, however, there were multiple drawbacks that hindered the process along the way including external actors, constrained participation of civil society, and having limited checks and balances.

The Seven-Point Agreement of 2011 contains aspects that Nepal adopted which embraces unique principles and ultimately, precedence for integration and rehabilitation.  Despite having support from the international community, the peace processes were dominated by a domestic, actors-led process. External actors advising the peace processes through critical perspectives provided international views and opinions on justice. However, they should have brought a broad range of experience to the peace talks. Confusion as to which actions to take can be attributed to the parties lacking basic knowledge about international experiences, appropriate aims and proper mechanisms and policies. This included truth commissions, disappearance commissions, the vetting of security forces, and possible amnesty and reparations.  Essentially, the government and main political parties involved began and concluded the peace processes within Nepal through internal technical reforms such as demobilizing, registering, and monitoring the cantonments and arms. It was the “political parties themselves envisaged the contents of the peace process and concluded processes according to the agreement”(Nepal Institute for Policy Studies, 2013).

Furthermore, Nepal’s violent conflict concluded through prolonged negotiation. The then armed rebellion party gave up the decade-long armed struggle by renouncing violence and embracing the fundamental tenets of peaceful democratic process through the CPA (Nepal Institute for Policy Studies, 2013).  The CPN dissolved its army to transform itself into a civilian party, which acted as a statement claiming that perhaps violence can be addressed through negotiation--through peace talks. However, rather than finding success after the predicted six months, it took Nepal six years. Evidently, peace processes can be weakened if the role of civil society is limited or too constrained.  Civil society representatives attended negotiations as observers but were unable to contribute directly to peace talks, instead providing input during informal side meetings. Unfortunately, there was a lack of official records stating how much of an input these representatives brought to the table and whether these ideas were implemented.

Under the Interim Constitution, there was the creation of the SC by the GoN, which was comprised of representatives from the major political parties including the UCPN (Maoist), the NC, the CPN-UML and the Madhesi Parties).  They were given the responsibility of completing the peace process, where the representatives of the political parties, security agencies and ex-combatants made the policy decisions. Further, the SC were essentially responsible for the checks and balances of the peace process by undertaking the role of supervising, integrating, and rehabilitating the combatants while monitoring the arms and cantonments.  This was a major breakthrough especially given that Nepal was deemed a “highly politically polarized society,” thus having this agreement across political parties ensured that all decisions had to be made through a consensus (Nepal Institute for Policy Studies, 2013). Consequently, the peace talk can be considered a success because they clearly addressed the issue of sustainability and showcased their desire for prolonged peace.  However, there was also limited to no follow up procedure on the ex-combatants in voluntary retirement. Essentially, there was a lack of knowledge for their integration into society, which means that there is no account for monetary assistance given to ensure it will be used properly. and their possibility of joining criminal groups

In addition, although there were extremely contrasting perspectives, goals, issues, and perceived ideal processes, the major political parties involved ensured that communication persisted.  In turn, this perpetual dialogue process ultimately contributed to settling to an agreement that addressed all key actors. For example, even when political parties had contradictory opinions and adamant stands in the given political context that resulted in widening and deepening their differences, the NA gave momentum to the process by proposing integration of the ex-combatants into a new National Security and Development Directorate under it(Nepal Institute for Policy Studies, 2013). Evidently, this peace talk would not be classified as successful should this constant communication not have been established.

The peace talks associated with the Nepali crisis was a process that took six years, rather than the originally anticipated six months due to the complications addressed above.  Significant progress has been made that sufficiently addressed the conflict in a manner that has proven to be sustainable thus far. Therefore, this peace talk process may be considered successful.

http://carnegieendowment.org/newsletters/SAP/pdf/nepal_modalities_agreement_nov_28_final.pdf

https://reliefweb.int/report/nepal/full-text-comprehensive-peace-agreement-held-between-government-nepal-and-communist

http://carnegieendowment.org/newsletters/SAP/pdf/nepal_modalities_agreement_nov_28_final.pdf7

https://issat.dcaf.ch/download/111494/2023947/Nepal's%20Peace%20Process_A%20Brief%20Overview_Eng%20(2).pdf

Krampe, Florian. “Empowering peace: service provision and state legitimacy in Nepal’s peace-building process”, Conflict, Security and Development, 2016. Vol. 16., issue 1, 53-73 doi.org/10.1080/14678802.2016.1136138

Krampe offers their critique on Nepal’s peace-building process through a perspective of state legitimacy and provisions of rural communities during the resolution process. By addressing the gap in service provisions as a part of the emerging post-war order and its role in peace, this paper questions how civil societies are affected regarding socio-economic inequalities and the dynamics of state provisional abilities. By focusing on a specific topic of how reintegration during and after the peace process impacted micro-hydropower development, it recognizes how it may not be a specific peace-building strategy but is representative of how peace resolutions should address “social, economic, and environmental concerns of rural communities” (Krampe, 54). Krampe conclusively recognizes how the challenges of development policies and state legitimacy run parallel, yet any short-term failure can be outweighed by long-term socio-economic gains in the future.

Navlakha, Gautam. “Nepal: Peace Process Heading South”, Economic and Political Weekly, vol. 44, No. 49. 2009, pp. 8-13. www.jstor.org/stable/25663851

Navlakha’s commentary on the Nepal Peace Process questions the aftermath of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2006 and India’s involvement with the Maoist agenda during the events of the conflict negotiations. This article reflects  on the possibilities of power takeovers following the Maoist mass protest movement, a “Bangladeshi-type coup”, or some form of national government led by the Maoists. Summarizing the events of the emerging Communist Party of Nepal as the single largest party in the CA in 2008, Navlakha questions the benefits and potential problems of coalition alongside the “truly staggering” (Navlakha, 8) extent of Indian influence over Nepal. There is a slight sense hesitation against the possibility of a true non-violent transformation lending credibility in India, but admits that those who want to “qualitatively transform the state and society along the socialist path must be prepared to negotiate their way forward from a position of strength or not at all” (Navlakha, 13).

Björnehed, Emma. “Ideas in Conflict: The effect of frames in the Nepal conflict and peace process”, Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis, 2012. , p. 257

This academic thesis provided a critical viewpoint on the 1996 Nepalese events in analysis of social representations involving the motivations behind actors and their choices. Björnehed presents two analytical lenses in which to view the beginnings of the Maoist insurgency: a terrorism frame during the conflict period and a peace frame, involving the period of conflict resolution. Unlike a traditional frame analysis regarding specific audiences and the manoeuvrability of political or non-state actors, this theses presents the effects of frames on those involved in the framing process and all enabling or restrictive ways. Altogether, Björnehed recognizes the effects of self-entrapment and the “coercive character of ideas in making actors perceive themselves as forced to take a certain action or position” (Björnehed, 4). This model is reflective of the actors on the side of the Maoists and the Nepalese government during the insurgency of the civil war, where several parties were required to adhere and manifest significant political changes. Björnehed acknowledges limitations of their “Four logic of actor effects” model in terms of generality. Björnehed suggests that the Maoist leaders were in fact knowledgeable of the implications of their demands in relation to the extent of peace and democracy, in their attempt to make the SPA comply with their terms.

Thapa, Ganga B., Sharma, Jan. “From Insurgency to Democracy: The Challenges of Peace and Democracy-Building in Nepal”, International Political Science Review, 2009. Vol. 30, No.2, 205-219, Sage Publications, Ltd. www.jstor.org.ezproxy.library.ubc.ca/stable/25652899

Thapa and Sharma’s analysis of the prospects for peace-building in Nepal reviews the challenges faced during the transformation from insurgency into a democratic society. They employ an outsider perspective on the optimistic and pessimistic viewpoints on Nepal’s potential for becoming a stable democracy through analysis of their evolution of indigenous government, their period of political and diplomatic isolation, and the aspects of monarchical rule. Using a thorough examination on motivations of actors and decision-making processes, such as the founding of the NC and CPN establishing their roots in the early 1900’s, Thapa and Sharma offer an open-ended answer to the possibility of a democratic future. Although public opinion is less than optimistic, several suggestions are included, such as the possibility of a new plurality in Nepal with political leaders cut from a different cloth, and far-reaching measures such as new statues for economic institutions.

The Economist; London, “Asia: In limbo; Nepal’s Peace Process”. Vol. 385, Iss. 8554, 2007: 87. search-proquest-com.ezproxy.library.ubc.ca/docview/224000546?OpenUrlRefId=info:xri/sid: summon&accountid=14656

This brief article from the Economist constructs a viewpoint of the year of 2007’s peace agreement ending the Maoist insurrection. Although illustrations of non-violence have been hoped for, the article recognizes that abductions and threats have not been eradicated, due to a string of militant and criminal groups in the Terai territory of Nepal. This article is representative of the setbacks and efforts during the extremely long peace-process stemming from political stalemates and the constant postponement of elections. The presence of a political limbo set in the backdrop of politicians’ short term gains and the failure of the Maoists to accept competitive politics is demonstrative of civilian involvement. This short outlook into UN potential involvement, specifically through UNMIN, recognizes the necessity for long-term solutions and the emphasis for military force and police efforts in restricting the potentiality for civilian casualty during peace processes.

Robins, Simon. “Towards Victim-Centred Transitional Justice: Understanding the Needs of Families of the Disappeared in Postconflict Nepal”, International Journal of Transitional Justice, Vol. 5, Issue 1, 2011. Pg. 75-98. doi.org/10/1093/ijtj/ijq027

Robins offers a view on a topic regarding the after-effects of Nepal’s peace process and the 160 families of people that disappeared during the decade-long Maoist insurgency. The reparations from the transitional justice process is analyzed in an attempt to study the psychological and mental well-being of the victim’s families. Specifically, economic support and the need for truth about the disappearances that occured. This topic is essential for the study on conflict and peace, as the main highlights typically involve the conflictual wars and resulting resolutions or constitutions emerging as a result in its conclusion. Little is offered in the way of civilians and the effects on their homelife, especially those who are unaccounted for through a human rights lens. The avoidance of the marginalized class of citizens and the expectations held by the victims is recognized by Robins, who suggests improvements on the process of reconciliation that allows “policies to be driven by the needs of those most affected”.

Potter, Antonia. “Gender sensitivity: nicety or necessity in peace-process management?” Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, OSLO forum, 2008.

Potter’s approach to peace processes and sensitizing gender presents an awareness of the role of gender in conflict mediation, a vital and necessary aspect for tract negotiations. Pertaining to the conflict in Nepal, despite Maoist commitments to equality, and the existence of a handful of politically powerful women, there was a recorded lack of women representation in negotiations and discussions. The marginalization of a prominent space for women in mediator teams discussing issues not only affecting women, but all political actors and networks of individuals further desensitizes the effects of peace processes. Sexual violence, rehabilitation, security, justice, and demobilization are just a few of the issues where the voices of women benefit the formation of constitutions and amendments during periods of conflict. Potter includes an example of the women’s health network in Nepal as providing a valuable means of communication “with rural communities on issues ranging far beyond health concerns” (Potter, 59), countering fears of confusion or resistance pertaining to women involvement in state developmental processes. This paper offers a broad analysis on gender and its roles in peace processes, bringing to light the potential for female political participation and how limiting minority roles in constitution only harms the future of peace-making processes.

Subedi, DB. “Dealing with Ex-Combatants in a Negotiated Peace Process: Impacts of Transitional Politics on the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programme in Nepal”, Journal of Asian and African Studies, 2013. Sage Journals, journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0021909613507537

The historic Seven-Point AGreement signed on November 1st 2012 was a national consensus document addressing the integration and rehabilitation of the ex-combatants during the Nepal peace process. During this period in time, discussion and compromise was demonstrated on the part of several major political parties representing the SC in line with the Interim Constitution of 2007, the CPA, and other subsequent agreements for international practices. Working towards a logical conclusion, the rehabilitation of ex-combatants demonstrated the significant features of the Nepal peace processes. Subedi’s paper investigates the nature of this transitional process and outcomes of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) program. He labels this program as unconventional due to its unique context-specific model led by national actors despite a lack of external intervention that offered no space for non-state actors to participate in the Maoist army management. Subedi’s valuable contribution recognizes the flaws and potential drawbacks in this period of negotiation processes, calling out the failure of political actors and their conflicting needs and interests severely politicizing this resolution. Although the outcome was in fact conclusive and implemented, this account is helpful in a way that critiques the processes in which these agreements are formed, and suggests ways of future improvement.

Bhatta, Chandra D. “Reflections on Nepal’s Peace Process”, International Policy Analysis, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2012. library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/08936-20120228.pdf

Gachcchadar, Bijay Kumar.  “The Seven Point Agreement”, 1 November 2011. http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/nepal/document/papers/12_Point_Understanding.pdf. Accessed March 15, 2018.

Government of Nepal Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction. “12-point understanding reached between the Seven Political Parties and Nepal Communist Party (Maoists)”, 2005. www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/nepal/document/papers/12_Point_Understanding.pdfAccessed March 2, 2018.

Kathmandu, “Timeline of Constitution Statis”, IRIN, 2012. www.irinnews.org/report/95754/nepal-timeline-constitution-statis. Accessed March 2, 2018.

Lunn, Jon. “Nepal’s Endless Peace Process, 2006-12” House of Commons Library, International Affairs and Defence Section Commons Briefing Papers. 2013. researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/SN04229

Nepal Institute for Policy Studies. “Nepal’s Peace Process: A Brief Overview” Policy Paper. Vol. 8, Issue 1., 2013. issat.dcaf.ch/download/111494/2023947/Nepal's%20Peace%20Process_A%20Brief%20Over view_Eng%20(2).pdf. Accessed March 9, 2018.

Upreti, Bishnu Raj., Sapkota, Bisnu. “Case Study on Nepal: Observations and Reflections on the Peace and Constitution-Making Process” Swiss Peace, 2017. swisspeace.ch/fileadmin/user_upload/pdf/Mediation/Nepal_Case_Study__National_Dialogue_Handbook.pdf. Accessed March 3, 2018.

Wanis-St. John, Anthony., Kew, Darren. “Civil Society and Peace Negotiations: Confronting Exclusion” International Negotiation, 13, 2008., 11-36, doi: 10.1163/138234008X297896

Whitfield, Teresa. “Masala Peacemaking: Nepal’s Peace Process and the Contribution of Outsiders”, Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum, 2008. www.wiltonpark.org.uk/wpcontent/uploads/nepal-peace-process.pdf