Demobilization in the Great Lakes Region
Rwanda needs to address the issue of Non-State Armed Groups (NSAGs) to ensure security across the country. Currently, Hutu-led NSAGs are operating in the Democratic Republic of Congo, along with various other groups from different countries. There are approximately 25 armed groups within the Great Lakes Region, which consists of 8 countries, including Rwanda (1). Unfortunately, Rwanda’s attempt at demobilization within the country has no effect on these NSAGs, making them unpredictable and dangerous. Furthermore, insecurity within the region greatly affects insecurity in Rwanda. Conducting regional peacebuilding must be the next step for the Rwandan Government if they want to create peace and security within the country.

Integration
Rwanda must also focus on the social and economic reintegration of demobilized NSAGs of Rwandan nationality. Although Rwanda has already shown they are willing to and capable of carrying out these integration processes, it will be an ongoing task that the country must face to prevent future conflict within the country.

Degree of Democracy
Although Rwanda routinely conducts democratic elections, the government seems to be a one-party system. The following issues raise concern in regard to the degree of democracy in the country: ban on political grassroots initiatives, unequal media coverage of other candidates due to the nature of state-run media, lack of competitive elections - Paul Kagame has been President since 2000 (2). To prevent future uprising or conflict, this issue must be addressed.

Inclusion
It could be argued there is a lack of inclusion when it comes to Security Sector Reform in Rwanda. For instance, Rwanda’s military, the Rwandan Defense Force (RDF), is fundamentally the same group as the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), which is mainly comprised of Tutsis. There has been a “de-tutsification” of the military at the lower levels, leaving the Tutsi ethnic minorities to lead the military (3). Similarly, in the government, there is a majority of Tutsi in office and even the President, Paul Kagame, was the leader of the RPF. To ensure there is no ethnic divide, positions throughout the military and the government must be open for all citizens in the country.

1. Podder, Sukanya. “Non-State Armed Groups and Stability: Reconsidering Legitimacy and Inclusion.” Contemporary Security Policy, vol. 34, no. 1, 2013, pp. 33., doi:10.1080/13523260.2013.771029.
2. Kiwuwa, David Emmanuel. “Democratization and Ethnic Politics: Rwandas Electoral Legacy.” Ethnopolitics, vol. 4, no. 4, 2005, pp. 445., doi:10.1080/17449050500348568.
3. Jowell, Marco. “Cohesion through Socialization: Liberation, Tradition and Modernity in the Forging of the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF).” Journal of Eastern African Studies, vol. 8, no. 2, 2014, pp. 279., doi:10.1080/17531055.2014.891715.

Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR)
The Rwandan Armed Forces (Forces Armée Rwandaises), or FAR, is the military of the former Hutu-dominated government, in power prior to the 1994 genocide (1). FAR was one of the main groups involved in the genocide, and there have since been efforts to demobilize and reintegrate FAR combatants into Rwandan society (2). However, this is difficult to achieve because many now reside in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Rwanda has accused them of continuing to destabilize the country from the DRC (3). It has also been difficult to convince many members of FAR to return home to begin the DDR process (4).

Interahamwe
The Interahamwe is a Hutu civilian militia unit which, under the previous Hutu government, was trained to attack Tutsi civilians (5). Like the FAR, they were involved in committing the 1994 genocide, and have since been difficult to demobilize and reintegrate due to their escape into the DRC (6). They have also been accused by the Rwandan government of attempting to destabilize Rwanda from the DRC (7).

Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda (FDLR)
The Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda (FDLR) is a Hutu rebel force primarily located in the North and South Kivu provinces of eastern DRC (8). Members of the FDLR were involved in the 1994 genocide (9), and although they are no longer considered a military threat to Rwanda, the group continues to operate in DRC (10). Currently, the Rwandan Demobilization and Reintegration Commission aims to demobilize and reintegrate members of the FDLR by creating programs which encourage members to defect and return to Rwanda so they can be reintegrated into the country (11).

Rwanda Patriotic Army/Rwandan Defense Forces (RPA/RDF)
The Rwanda Patriotic Army (RPA) was a rebel group, predominantly composed of Rwandan Tutsis (12). The RPA’s invasion of Rwanda in 1994 ended the genocide, and the group took control of the country, with the associated political party remaining in power today (13). However, the group has been accused of committing human rights abuses during their invasion (14). The first stage of the Rwandan Demobilization and Reintegration Commission primarily focused on demobilizing the RPA, although, due to a lack of funding, little support was provided for reintegration (15). Today, with civilian control of the military institutionalized in Rwanda, the RPA has been renamed as the Rwandan Defense Forces (RDF) (16).

Government of Rwanda
The Government of Rwanda is the major domestic actor in security sector reform and has created the Rwandan Demobilization and Reintegration Commission to oversee DDR processes in the country (17). It has also undertaken efforts to reform the police service (18), and control small arms in Rwanda (19). However, the government has been accused of authoritarian practices (20) and only placing Tutsis in higher leadership positions, which could reignite tensions in the state (21).

Ministry of Internal Security
The Ministry of Internal Security is responsible for protecting security and rule of law in Rwanda, and so has been involved in security sector reform efforts (22). In particular, it oversees both the Rwanda National Police and the national prison system, and so has participated in work to reform both these areas (23).

Rwandan Demobilization and Reintegration Commission (RDRC)
The Rwandan Demobilization and Reintegration Commission (RDRC), established in 1997, oversees the planning and implementation of the Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Programme for ex-combatants (24). It assists with the demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration of members of all armed groups into their communities (25). The RDRC is involved in many areas of the DDR process, including creating programming which encourages current combatants to defect (26), offering courses on how Rwanda has changed since former combatants left the country (27), and helping ex-combatants to reintegrate by providing health services (28), employment training (29), help obtaining a job (30), and monetary assistance to ex-combatants (31).

Rwanda National Police
The Rwanda National Police was created in 2000 when the government merged the three previously existing police forces (the Gendarmerie Nationale, the Communal Police, and the Judicial Police) into one (32). As part of the demilitarization process of the country, it has been the target of reforms to professionalize its officers and ensure greater gender equality (33). However, it has also been accused of threatening journalists who criticize the government (34), and, due to the small number of police officers, is still reliant on community policing in more remote and rural areas (35).

Pro-Femmes/Twese Hamwe (PF/TH)
Pro-Femmes/Twese Hamwe (PF/TH) is an umbrella organization which works for the advancement of women, peace, and development in Rwanda (36). It has assisted with the work of the RDRC, successfully leading reintegration programs for over 3000 ex-combatants as well as providing counseling services to former combatants (37).

Rwanda Peace Academy
The Rwanda Peace Academy offers training and research programs related to challenges which may emerge post-conflict in Africa (38). It works towards conflict prevention and management and so has offered courses on security sector reform, including in 2012 when it hosted a security sector reform course that drew participants from regional military, police and civilian institutions from nine countries (39).

1. Nelson Alusala, Disarmament and Reconciliation: Rwanda’s concerns, Institute for Security Studies, 2005, Web, reliefweb.int/report/rwanda/disarmament-and-reconciliation-rwandas-concerns.
2. Alusala.
3. Alusala.
4. Alusala.
5. Phil Clark, “Bringing Them All Back Home: The Challenges of DDR and Transitional Justice in Contexts of Displacement in Rwanda and Uganda,” Journal of Refugee Studies, vol. 27, no. 2, 2014, pp. 234-259, Oxford University Press, doi: 10.1093/jrs/fet051 240-241.
6. Alusala.
7. Alusala.
8. Clark 241.
9. Clark 241.
10. Ingrid Samset, “Building a Repressive Peace: The Case of Post-Genocide Rwanda,” Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, vol. 5, no. 3, 2011, pp.265-283, Taylor and Francis Online, doi:10.1080/17502977.2011.566485 268.
11. Clark 241.
12. Lars Waldorf, Transitional Justice and DDR: The Case of Rwanda, International Center for Transitional Justice, 2009, Web, www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-DDR-Rwanda-CaseStudy-2009-English.pdf 8.
13. Alusala.
14. Alusala.
15. Waldorf 9-10.
16. Martin Edmonds, Greg Mills and Terence McNamee, “Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and Local Ownership in the Great Lakes: The Experience of Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of Congo,” African Security, vol. 2, no. 1, 2009, pp. 29-58, Taylor and Francis Online, doi:10.1080/19362200902766383 41.
17. Edmonds, Mills and McNamee 41.
18. ISSAT, Rwanda SSR Snapshot, 2015, https://issat.dcaf.ch/Learn/Resource-Library/Country-Profiles/Rwanda-SSR-Snapshot.
19. Alusala.
20. ISSAT.
21. Nina Wilén, “A Hybrid Peace through Locally Owned and Externally Financed SSR-DDR in Rwanda?” Third World Quarterly, vol. 33, no. 7, 2012, pp. 1323-1336, Taylor and Francis Online, doi: 10.1080/01436597.2012.691833 1329.
22. ISSAT.
23. ISSAT.
24. Edmonds, Mills and McNamee 41.
25. Waldorf, 9; Edmonds, Mills and McNamee 41.
26. Molly Karna Lynderup Cohen, Conflict Resolution through Defection Programming: The Case of Rwanda and the Forces Démocratiques Pour la Libération du Rwanda / Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, 2017, Tulane University, PhD Dissertation, ProQuest, search-proquest-com.ezproxy.library.ubc.ca/docview/2001284066?pq-origsite=summon 13.
27. Alusala
28. Clark 242.
29. Waldorf 10.
30. Alusala
31. ISSAT.
32. ISSAT.
33. ISSAT.
34. ISSAT.
35. Bruce Baker, “Post-War Policing by Communities in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Rwanda,” Democracy and Security, vol. 3, no. 2, 2007, pp. 215-236, Taylor and Francis Online, doi:  10.1080/17419160701483753 215.
36. Peace Insight, Pro-Femmes/Twese Hamwe (PFTH), 2017, https://www.peaceinsight.org/conflicts/rwanda/peacebuilding-organisations/pro-femmes/.
37. Peace Insight.
38. ISSAT.
39. ISSAT.

Although various intergovernmental organizations assisted Rwanda with SSR, the presence of international actors was limited. Various states and organizations have donated funds, however, Rwanda is known for taking local ownership over the process of SSR (1).

World Bank
The World Bank created and completed two projects within Rwanda to help with SSR. The first project, the Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Project, focused on the demobilization of ex-combatants, supporting social and economic transitions for ex-combatants and promoting reallocation of Government funding to social and economic sectors (2). The other project, The Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project, aimed to demobilize members of armed groups from Rwanda and the Rwandan Defence Force. In particular, it focused on reintegration of the individuals, especially female, child and disabled ex-combatants (3).

United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR)
The United Nations also played a significant role in Rwanda. UNAMIR was intended to monitor the ceasefire agreement, establish a demilitarized zone (DMZ), begin the process of demobilization and provide security for refugees or displaced persons (4). However, once the genocide began, UNAMIR troops quickly began to leave Rwanda, allowing the genocide to continue without international help.

The United Nations Development Programme
The UNDP for the Justice Sector Support Programme contributed US$ 1.3 million to mend Rwanda’s justice system in the following areas: protection of human rights, increasing the justice system’s accessibility for vulnerable groups, and developing better connections between law enforcement and the justice system (5).

Financial Donations
There were many financial donations made by international actors to the domestic program: the Rwandan Demobilization and Reintegration Program. Most notably, the World Bank (US$ 27 million), Multi-Donors Trust Fund (US$ 14.4 million), Department for International Development (US$ 8.8 million), and Germany – Kreditanstalt fuer Wiederaufbau (US$ 2.7 million) (6).

1. Nina Wilén, “A Hybrid Peace through Locally Owned and Externally Financed SSR-DDR in Rwanda?” Third World Quarterly, 33(2012): 13294, 6 February 2019. DOI: 10.1080/01436597.2012.691833.
2. “Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Project,” The World Bank, online, 10 February 2019. Available: http://projects.worldbank.org/P075129/rwanda-demobilization-reintegration-project?lang=en.
3. “Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project,” The World Bank, 10 February 2019. Available: http://projects.worldbank.org/p112712/second-emergency-demobilization-reintegration-project?lang=en.
4. “UNAMIR.” United Nations, Sept. 1996, online, 15 February 2019. Available: www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unamir_b.htm.
5. ISSAT, “Rwanda SSR Snapshot,” ISSAT, 2015, online, 6 February 2019. Available: https://issat.dcaf.ch/Learn/Resource-Library/Country-Profiles/Rwanda-SSR-Snapshot.
6. ISSAT, online.

The Role of International Actors

The role of international actors has greatly harmed Rwanda’s SSR process, especially in the beginning phases. For instance, in the Arusha peace talks of 1993, France wanted to be seen as a third-party mediator, however, they continued to provide weapons to the Hutu-led government (1). As a result, the Arusha Agreements failed to provide security due to France’s involvement in supporting the Hutu led government. Additionally, the lack of involvement by the UN and UNAMIR led to the failure of the Arusha Agreements and the continuation of the genocide. The UN clearly refused to be involved in the conflict, particularly when the UNAMIR leader, Roméo Dallaire, request for more support was denied, and in return troops were taken out of Rwanda (2).

Political tensions in Rwanda

By the end of the Rwandan Civil War, Rwanda was a weak state. Wanting more power, President Habyarimana’s dictatorship did not respect the Arusha Agreements and eventually broke the ceasefire. If the government was more inclusive for both Hutu and Tutsi citizens, further conflict may have been prevented and the country could have begun a successful peace process and SSR. Even today, Rwanda’s politics and government have been accused of being anti-democratic and being Tutsi-dominated, which could create future conflicts or uprisings.

Ethnic Division of Rwanda

The ethnic divide between Hutus and Tutsis made it hard for reforms and peace to be implemented within Rwanda. Various media outlets, such as Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines, demonized the Tutsi population and ultimately assisted in the spreading of the genocide. Overall, this barrier to successful reform was caused by the ethnic division of Rwanda and demonstrates how media sources further promoted the divide among citizens.

A Wrong Interpretation of Democracy

Prior to the genocide, the Hutu-led government shared a harmful interpretation of democracy - where majority rules in the idea that the ethnic majority rules. Since ethnic Hutus citizens made up a majority (80%) of the population, they felt that they had the legal right to control and persecute the Tutsi population. Although this is not so much a current issue, this understanding was one of the major barriers to successful reform before the genocide.

1. Schirer, Antoine, “Génocide au Rwanda : quel rôle a exactement joué la France?” Le Monde, 26 October 2018. https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/video/2018/10/26/genocide-au-rwanda-quel-role-a-exactement-joue-la-france_5374967_3212.html
2. Dallaire, Roméo, and Brent Beardsley. Shake Hands with the Devil: the Failure of Humanity in Rwanda. Arrow, 2004.

Since the 1994 genocide, Rwanda has become a relatively peaceful country (1), however, ongoing structural issues still need to be addressed for one to say security sector reform (SSR) has been entirely successful. Rwanda largely accomplished its goals related to SSR in certain areas, such as domestic control over the process (2), and internal disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) (3). Yet, SSR has been less successful regarding DDR outside the country, ongoing inequality, and a semi-democratic government (4).

Rwanda’s experience of SSR is notable, and was in part successful, because the process was primarily locally controlled (5). Few international actors were involved in SSR other than providing funding (6), allowing it to be designed to best suit the country’s needs. Often, international actors have preconceived understandings of best practices and will attempt to implement them everywhere (7). However, these strategies may not be the most successful due to differences between countries which external actors may not understand (8). In Rwanda, the government fought to have control over SSR, and this enabled it to tailor the process to best suit its needs, ensuring it did not conflict with local values (9). Consequently, the process was more successful, and through the government’s methods, such as the gacaca courts (10), or locally operated centers of DDR (11), peace was able to be created internally (12).

One aspect of SSR which worked well in Rwanda was the gacaca courts which addressed the lower level perpetrators of the genocide (13). By taking a process which previously existed in communities to deal with local grievances, and applying it to the genocide, the state was both able to work towards greater reconciliation in the country (14), as the community run process is much more about dialogue than a traditional court (15), and reduce the number of people imprisoned (16). Since there were so many people involved in the genocide, attempting to try and imprison all of them would have put an enormous strain on the justice system (17). As well, it would have promoted a more retributive form of justice, and consequently undermined reconciliation (18). Instead, the gacaca courts were able to deal with those involved in the genocide, and help communities reconcile, making them extremely important because they were able to help resolve widespread violence (19).

Additionally, DDR within Rwanda has been effective because the process has been completed for those who remained in Rwanda after the genocide (20). Initially, there were concerns about ex-combatants being fully accepted by the community, and able to support themselves (21). These issues are no longer as widespread since most ex-combatants have, through the education process and state assistance, been able to support themselves, and have become accepted by the communities in which they live (22).

However, DDR has not been entirely successful because many armed groups outside Rwanda still threaten the state’s security (23). This includes Rwandans who fled the country after the RPA gained control and could destabilize the state through cross-border attacks (24). Although Rwanda has attempted to entice these combatants to voluntarily demobilize (25), and continues to run its DDR process for new defectors (26), a significant number of combatants in the DRC have not been demobilized (27), and so threaten to undermine the region’s security (28).

As well, underlying issues could lead to future violence. Due to the fact the Tutsi-controlled RPA ended the genocide by taking control of the country (29), many high-level positions in the government and military, including the justice and police sectors, are occupied by Tutsis (30). Consequently, the historical ethnic distinction is reinforced, and although officially prohibited today (31), it could lead to violence if Hutus begin to feel oppressed. This is particularly likely since Rwanda is only semi-democratic (32). The country’s current leader, Kagame, has been in power since the end of the genocide, and elections are not entirely free or fair (33). As a result, the government’s composition may not accurately reflect society. If Hutus demand greater representation, there could be ethnic violence which would undo all that has been achieved since the end of the genocide.

Overall, while SSR in Rwanda has been successful at creating a relatively peaceful country (34), this has primarily been achieved by reinforcing the historical distinction responsible for the genocide (35). The DDR and gacaca processes have helped reduce violence in the country, and promote reconciliation (36). However, combatants outside the country (37), and the predominantly Tutsi-controlled government and military could mean that if something reignites ethnic tensions, the situation could quickly become out of control (38). Ultimately, to ensure Rwanda remains peaceful, the structural issues that contributed to the genocide need to be addressed, including more equal representation in the security sector.

1. Ingrid Samset, “Building a Repressive Peace: The Case of Post-Genocide Rwanda,” Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, vol. 5, no. 3, 2011, pp.265-283, Taylor and Francis Online, doi:10.1080/17502977.2011.566485 265.
2. Nina Wilén, “A Hybrid Peace through Locally Owned and Externally Financed SSR-DDR in Rwanda?” Third World Quarterly, vol. 33, no. 7, 2012, pp. 1323-1336, Taylor and Francis Online, doi: 10.1080/01436597.2012.691833 1324.
3. Phil Clark, “Bringing Them All Back Home: The Challenges of DDR and Transitional Justice in Contexts of Displacement in Rwanda and Uganda,” Journal of Refugee Studies, vol. 27, no. 2, 2014, pp. 234-259, Oxford University Press, doi: 10.1093/jrs/fet051 241.
4. Nelson Alusala, Disarmament and Reconciliation: Rwanda’s concerns, Institute for Security Studies, 2005, Web, reliefweb.int/report/rwanda/disarmament-and-reconciliation-rwandas-concerns.
5. Marco Jowell, “Cohesion through socialization: liberation, tradition and modernity in the forging of the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF).” Journal of Eastern African Studies, vol. 8, no. 2, 2014, pp. 278-293. Taylor and Francis Online, doi: 10.1080/17531055.2014.891715 280.
6. ISSAT, Rwanda SSR Snapshot, 2015, https://issat.dcaf.ch/Learn/Resource-Library/Country-Profiles/Rwanda-SSR-Snapshot.
7. Wilén 1324.
8. Wilén 1324.
9. Antonia Does, Inclusivity and Local Perspectives in Peacebuilding: Issues, Lessons, Challenges, Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation and Geneva Peacebuilding Platform, 2013, Web, www.gpplatform.ch/sites/default/files/PP%2008%20-%20Inclusivity%20of%20Local%20Perspectives%20in%20PB%20July%202013.pdf 2.
10. Does 2.
11. Wilén 1330-1331.
12. ISSAT.
13. Lars Waldorf, Transitional Justice and DDR: The Case of Rwanda, International Center for Transitional Justice, 2009, Web, www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-DDR-Rwanda-CaseStudy-2009-English.pdf 11.
14. Samset 265.
15. Waldorf 4.
16. Alusala.
17. The contribution of the Gacaca jurisdictions to resolving cases arising from the genocide: Contributions, limitations and expectations of the post-Gacaca phase, PRI, 2010, Web, cdn.penalreform.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/Gacaca_final_2010_en.pdf 15-16.
18. The contribution of the Gacaca jurisdictions to resolving cases arising from the genocide 29-30.
19. The contribution of the Gacaca jurisdictions to resolving cases arising from the genocide 29.
20. The contribution of the Gacaca jurisdictions to resolving cases arising from the genocide 19.
21. Waldorf 4.
22. Martin Edmonds, Greg Mills and Terence McNamee, “Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and Local Ownership in the Great Lakes: The Experience of Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of Congo,” African Security, vol. 2, no. 1, 2009, pp. 29-58, Taylor and Francis Online, doi:10.1080/19362200902766383 41.
23. Edmonds, Mills and McNamee 41.
24. Martin Bishop, “Reintegration of demobilized soldiers,” The New Times, 17 June 2011, www.newtimes.co.rw/section/read/97709
25. Alusala.
26. Alusala.
27. Molly Karna Lynderup Cohen, Conflict Resolution through Defection Programming: The Case of Rwanda and the Forces Démocratiques Pour la Libération du Rwanda / Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, 2017, Tulane University, PhD Dissertation, ProQuest, search-proquest-com.ezproxy.library.ubc.ca/docview/2001284066?pq-origsite=summon 13.
28. Edmonds, Mills and McNamee 41.
29. Edmonds, Mills and McNamee 41.
30. Alusala.
31. Alusala.
32. Wilén 1329; ISSAT.
33. ISSAT.
34. ISSAT.
35. Jason Burke, “Paul Kagame re-elected president with 99% of vote in Rwanda election,” The Guardian, 5 August 2017, www.theguardian.com/world/2017/aug/05/paul-kagame-secures-third-term-in-rwanda-presidential-election; Samset 275-276; ISSAT.
36. Samset 265.
37. Wilén 1329; ISSAT.
38. Edmonds, Mills and McNamee 41; Waldorf 4.

“DR Congo: group of Rwandan ex-milita still missing but repatriation continues.” UN News, 11 February 2009, news.un.org/en/story/2009/02/290792-dr-congo-group-rwandan-ex-militia-still-missing-repatriation-continues.

“EDPRS: Tackling security sector reforms in Rwanda.” The New Times, 8 February 2009, www.newtimes.co.rw/section/advertorial/45.

“Ex-combatants tipped on how to re-integrate with ease.” The New Times, 6 March 2015, www.newtimes.co.rw/section/read/186625.

“Over 78, 300 reintegrated by demobilization commission.” The New Times, 25 December 2012, www.newtimes.co.rw/section/read/61177.

“RDRC wants ex-combatants re-integrated in local administration.” The New Times, 15 June 2008, www.newtimes.co.rw/section/read/46341.

“Reintegration of demobilized soldiers.” The New Times, 17 June 2011, www.newtimes.co.rw/section/read/97709.  

“Returnees: Daunting issues related to reintegration.” The New Times, 16 February 2009, www.newtimes.co.rw/section/read/43442.

Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission (RDRC) and Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (RDRP). Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project (SEDRP): Revised Project Implementation Manual. Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission (RDRC) and Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (RDRP), 2015, demobrwanda.gov.rw/fileadmin/templates/demoba/Coo/Special_Documents/final_PIM_SEDRP.pdf.

Rwanda. LAW N°50/2015 OF 14/12/2015 ESTABLISHING RWANDA DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION COMMISSION (RDRC) AND DETERMINING ITS RESPONSIBILITIES, ORGANISATION AND FUNCTIONING. Official Gazette, vol. 4, 2016, pp. 31-49. 197.243.22.137/rlrcgov/fileadmin/user_upload/Laws2/LAWS%20PUBLISHED/RWA%20LAWS%20PUBLISHED%20IN%202015/RWA%202016%20%20LAW%20N0%2050-2015%20%20%20LAW%20ESTIBL%20RDRC-%20RWANDA%20DEMOBILIZATION%20AND%20REINTEGRATION%20COMMISSION-RESPONSIBILITY-ORGANIZATION-FUNCTION%20-%20OG%20N0%2004%20%20OF%20%2025%20JAN.%20-2016.pdf.

Rwanda. 16/06/2000 - LAW N° 09/2000 OF 16/06/2000 ON THE ESTABLISHMENT, GENERAL ORGANISATION AND JURISDICTION OF THE NATIONAL POLICE. Rwanda, 2000. www.vertic.org/media/National%20Legislation/Rwanda/RW_Law_09_2000_National_Police.pdf.

Umurengezi, Régis. “Ex-combatants complete re-integration course.” The New Times, 19 November 2018, www.newtimes.co.rw/news/ex-combatants-complete-re-integration-course.

World Bank. Rwanda demobilization and reintegration project. World Bank, 2002, reliefweb.int/report/rwanda/rwanda-demobilization-and-reintegration-project.

Baker, Bruce. “Post-War Policing by Communities in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Rwanda.”  Democracy and Security, vol. 3, no. 2, 2007, pp. 215-236. Taylor and Francis Online, https://doi-org.ezproxy.library.ubc.ca/10.1080/17419160701483753. Accessed 13 March 2019.

        This article compares post-war policing in Sierra Leone, Liberia and Rwanda, focusing on community-based policing. The author argues the conflict helps shape the form and function of community-based policing, as factors such as the outcome of the conflict, the ideology of the new regime, the stability of the peace, and public attitudes toward policing following conflict experiences, all impact the structure of the police. Baker makes it clear community-based policing is rarely as separated from the state as may be believed, although he largely ignores the fact the interaction between the two police systems may not always be cooperative.

Burgess, Stephen F. “Fashioning Integrated Security Forces after Conflict.” African Security, vol. 1, no. 2, 2008, pp. 69-91. Taylor and Francis Online, https://doi-org.ezproxy.library.ubc.ca/10.1080/19362200802479772. Accessed 6 February 2019.

Burgess examines the post-conflict creation of integrated security forces in African countries. He argues state strength, external involvement and assistance, the professionalism of contending militias and management of the integration process affect a state’s success in integrating their security forces. Successful countries include Zimbabwe, Namibia, South Africa, Mozambique, and Burundi, whereas Angola, Rwanda and Sierra Leone have failed to integrate their security forces. The use of many case studies makes Burgess’ argument compelling, however, it could be strengthened by including additional countries which have recently attempted to integrate their security forces to determine whether his argument remains true.

Clark, Phil. “Bringing Them All Back Home: The Challenges of DDR and Transitional Justice in Contexts of Displacement in Rwanda and Uganda.” Journal of Refugee Studies, vol. 27, no. 2, 2014, pp. 234-259. Oxford Academic, https://doi-org.ezproxy.library.ubc.ca/10.1093/jrs/fet051. Accessed 6 February 2019.

        Clark critically examines the coordination of the processes of DDR and transitional justice, arguing the methods used in Rwanda and Uganda were not effective in creating lasting peace and security. In particular, he highlights how those displaced during conflict are both victims and perpetrators, and argues systems of DDR and transitional justice must address both groups. His in-depth field research strongly supports the main claims of the article. However, Clark fails to propose solutions to the current problems in Rwanda, instead describing what should be done in other post-conflict countries, limiting the usefulness of the analysis for Rwanda.

Edmonds, Martin, Greg Mills and Terence McNamee. “Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and Local Ownership in the Great Lakes: The Experience of Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of Congo.” African Security, vol. 2, no. 1, 2009, pp. 29-58. Taylor and Francis Online, https://doi-org.ezproxy.library.ubc.ca/10.1080/19362200902766383. Accessed 6 February 2019.

        This article discusses the DDR processes in the Great Lakes Region of Africa, highlighting Rwanda’s distinctiveness because the process has been locally owned. The authors argue DDR in Rwanda has been most successful largely because of the local ownership of DDR. While the argument is compelling, the emphasis on Rwanda’s success masks the country’s ongoing issues related to DDR. The article makes it appear as if the process has been entirely successful and effective, when this is not completely accurate, and so the argument would have been strengthened by a more critical examination of the current situation in Rwanda.

Jowell, Marco. “Cohesion through socialization: liberation, tradition and modernity in the forging of the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF).” Journal of Eastern African Studies, vol. 8, no. 2, 2014, pp. 278-293. Taylor and Francis Online, https://doi-org.ezproxy.library.ubc.ca/10.1080/17531055.2014.891715. Accessed 6 February 2019.

This article seeks to understand the development of Rwanda’s national army (RPF) after the genocide by examining the interaction between socialization experiences and processes of military integration. The author describes several factors which have affected the military’s current structure and argues for the important influence of the ongoing balancing act between tradition, liberation and modernization. Additionally, he discusses the role of education, welfare and control, as well as actual experiences of combat in integrating and socializing the armed forces. Overall, the author provides a comprehensive and in-depth account of the different institutions involved in restructuring and reforming the national army.

Samset, Ingrid. “Building a Repressive Peace: The Case of Post-Genocide Rwanda.” Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, vol. 5, no. 3, 2011, pp. 265-283. Taylor and Francis Online, https://doi-org.ezproxy.library.ubc.ca/10.1080/17502977.2011.566485. Accessed 13 March 2019.

Samset challenges the common understanding that peacebuilding and democracy must always be linked, by examining Rwanda’s post-genocide peace. She argues Rwanda demonstrates that peacebuilding does not require democracy, although this leads to a repressive peace, and may not be stable in the long-term. Instead of democracy, Samset claims the country focused on security, economic recovery and statebuilding, and the elections actually reinforced authoritarian tendencies. Although the arguments are compelling, providing a comprehensive overview of Rwanda post-genocide, as Samset acknowledges, further research is needed to determine the stability of Rwanda’s peace long-term, as well as the possibility for future democratization.

Verwimp, Philip and Marijke Verpoorten. “‘What are all the soldiers going to do?’ demobilization, reintegration and employment in Rwanda.” Conflict, Security and Development, vol. 4, no. 1, 2004, pp. 39-57. Taylor and Francis Online, https://doi-org.ezproxy.library.ubc.ca/10.1080/1467880042000206859. Accessed 6 February 2019.

        In this article, the authors take a critical approach to the DDR process in Rwanda, arguing it has been too focused on the security aspect of demobilization. The authors claim the Rwandan government must also focus on development issues, such as employment and education, in order to create a sustainable peace in the country. Drawing on interviews from those working in the demobilization programme, donors and ex-combatants, the authors make a compelling case for an increased focus on development, and greater support for ex-combatants. However, as the article acknowledges, the findings are limited by the small sample size.

Wilén, Nina. “A Hybrid Peace through Locally Owned and Externally Financed SSR-DDR in Rwanda?” Third World Quarterly, vol. 33, no. 7, 2012, pp. 1323-1336. Taylor and Francis Online, DOI: 10.1080/01436597.2012.691833. Accessed 6 February 2019.

        This article examines the peacebuilding process in Rwanda through the lens of SSR and DDR. Wilén argues the situation in Rwanda is a hybrid peace between state building and state formation due to Rwanda’s actions domestically to build negative peace, as well as the external funding it has received and its international peacebuilding efforts. The author also highlights flaws in the local process typically celebrated by the international community, thus critiquing the trend toward greater inclusion of local actors. Ultimately, the article successfully demonstrates how Rwanda has resisted international norms, meaning locally-driven SSR may not have created a sustainable peace.

Alusala, Nelson. Disarmament and Reconciliation: Rwanda’s concerns. Institute for Security Studies. 2005. reliefweb.int/report/rwanda/disarmament-and-reconciliation-rwandas-concerns.

Baker, Bruce. “Post-War Policing by Communities in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Rwanda.” Democracy and Security, vol. 3, no. 2, 2007, pp. 215-236, Taylor and Francis Online, doi:  10.1080/17419160701483753 215.

Bishop, Martin. “Reintegration of demobilized soldiers.” The New Times. 17 June 2011. www.newtimes.co.rw/section/read/97709

Burke, Jason. “Paul Kagame re-elected president with 99% of vote in Rwanda election.” The Guardian. 5 August 2017. www.theguardian.com/world/2017/aug/05/paul-kagame-secures-third-term-in-rwanda-presidential-election

Clark, Phil. “Bringing Them All Back Home: The Challenges of DDR and Transitional Justice in Contexts of Displacement in Rwanda and Uganda.” Journal of Refugee Studies, vol. 27, no. 2, 2014, pp. 234-259, Oxford University Press, doi: 10.1093/jrs/fet051 240-241.

Contribution of the Gacaca jurisdictions to resolving cases arising from the genocide: Contributions, limitations and expectations of the post-Gacaca phase. PRI. 2010. cdn.penalreform.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/Gacaca_final_2010_en.pdf 15-16.

Dallaire, Roméo, and Brent Beardsley. Shake Hands with the Devil: the Failure of Humanity in Rwanda. Arrow, 2004.

Does, Antonia. Inclusivity and Local Perspectives in Peacebuilding: Issues, Lessons, Challenges, Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation and Geneva Peacebuilding Platform. 2013. www.gpplatform.ch/sites/default/files/PP%2008%20%20Inclusivity%20of%20Local%20Perspectives%20in%20PB%20July%202013.pdf 2.

Edmonds, Martin, Greg Mills and Terence McNamee. “Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and Local Ownership in the Great Lakes: The Experience of Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of Congo.” African Security, vol. 2, no. 1, 2009, pp. 29-58, Taylor and Francis Online, doi:10.1080/19362200902766383 41.

ISSAT, Rwanda SSR Snapshot, 2015, https://issat.dcaf.ch/Learn/Resource-Library/Country-Profiles/Rwanda-SSR-Snapshot.

Jowell, Marco. “Cohesion through Socialization: Liberation, Tradition and Modernity in the Forging of the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF).” Journal of Eastern African Studies, vol. 8, no. 2, 2014, pp. 278–293., doi:10.1080/17531055.2014.891715.

Karna Lynderup Cohen, Molly. Conflict Resolution through Defection Programming: The Case of Rwanda and the Forces Démocratiques Pour la Libération du Rwanda / Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. 2017. Tulane University, PhD Dissertation, ProQuest,

Kiwuwa, David Emmanuel. “Democratization and Ethnic Politics: Rwandas Electoral Legacy.” Ethnopolitics, vol. 4, no. 4, 2005, pp. 447–464., doi:10.1080/17449050500348568.

Peace Insight. Pro-Femmes/Twese Hamwe (PFTH). 2017. https://www.peaceinsight.org/conflicts/rwanda/peacebuilding-organisations/pro-femmes/.

Podder, Sukanya. “Non-State Armed Groups and Stability: Reconsidering Legitimacy and Inclusion.” Contemporary Security Policy, vol. 34, no. 1, 2013, pp. 16–39., doi:10.1080/13523260.2013.771029.

Samset, Ingrid. “Building a Repressive Peace: The Case of Post-Genocide Rwanda.” Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, vol. 5, no. 3, 2011, pp.265-283, Taylor and Francis Online, doi:10.1080/17502977.2011.566485 268.

Schirer, Antoine. “Génocide au Rwanda : quel rôle a exactement joué la France?” Le Monde. 26 October 2018. https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/video/2018/10/26/genocide-au-rwanda-quel-role-a-exactement-joue-la-france_5374967_3212.html 

United Nations. UNAMIR. United Nations. September 1996. www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unamir_b.htm 

Waldorf, Lars. Transitional Justice and DDR: The Case of Rwanda, International Center for Transitional Justice. 2009. www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-DDR-Rwanda-CaseStudy-2009-English.pdf 8

Wilén, Nina (2012) “A Hybrid Peace through Locally Owned and Externally Financed ssr–ddr in Rwanda?” Third World Quarterly, 33:7, 1323-1336, DOI: 10.1080/01436597.2012.691833

World Bank. Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Project. http://projects.worldbank.org/P075129/rwanda-demobilization-reintegration-project?lang=en.

World Bank. Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project. http://projects.worldbank.org/p112712/second-emergency-demobilization-reintegration-project?lang=en.