Governmental Issues: The absence of good governance practices and lack of political space, as it has contributed to a largely military dominated state (Kurtenbach). Furthermore, there is a strong need for the break-up of the current integrated system of state governance and repression, which constitutes the military, the police and the judiciary system (Kurtenbach). This is a crucial reform, as the conflict mobilized and broke out, due to the changes demanded of the current mode of governance, which was then answered with amplified violence (Kurtenbach).

Issues of Organized Crime: There is an evident need to decrease and combat the ever rising organized crime in El Salvador. The existence of continued corruption involving narcotics trafficking, has increased the fear among citizens, as growth is not being visualized in the knowable production sectors of the country (such as coffee, sugar and cotton) (Moodie). Most crime continues to not be reported to authorities, or mentioned in media sources, creating a continued feeling of distrust by the people (Moodie). This issue is important, as it continues a lack of trust in the core institutions of the society.

Issues in Security and Armed Forces: The disbandment, demobilization and rehabilitation of security forces, such as the National Guard, Treasury Police, and the National Liberation Front, etc. (Negroponte & Piche). These bodies created and continued a sense of fear and distrust among the people, and contributed to the escalating violent tensions in the country (Negroponte). Furthermore, to ensure a successful reform, there is also a strong need for the creation of a new civilian police force, to address the very problems that led to the civil war (Piche).

Issues in Judiciary Systems: There is a strong need to re-evaluate and reform the current judiciary system, as it plays a crucial role in the reduction, control and sanctioning of accountability and illegal violence (Kurtenbach). As El Salvador remains one of the most violent countries in the world, without reforms in the judiciary, efforts to change the police and military are in danger of being undermined and unsuccessful (Kurtenback).

Barrio 18

One of El Salvador’s most dominant gangs contributing to the need for security sector reform to combat the countries high crime and murder rates. Barrio 18 is both a domestic and international threat to security, active members of Barrio 18 remain across North America and Central America. However, Barrio 18 is one of the main actors necessary for domestic security sector reform in El Salvador to reduce the threat of safety and corruption within the country. (“El Salvador Country Profile”)

Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13)

MS-13 is one of the most dominant gangs in El Salvador, they are the rival gang of Barrio 18 who also dominate in El Salvador. MS-13 is both a domestic and international threat since MS-13 has active members in the United States, Guatemala, and Honduras. In 2012, MS-13 and Barrio 18 were able to agree on a ceasefire thanks to the mediation of the Catholic Church. However, despite the truce, extortion remains the main source of income for both gangs and they cannot commit to reducing (Negroponte). Further, MS-13 and Barrio 18 will need to be included in the security sector reform for tensions to be reduced to satisfactory levels (“El Salvador Country Profile”).

The National Civilian Police (PNC)

Created in 1992 Peace Accord which ended the civil war, the PNC was negotiated to replace the previous military police system and endorse a democratic policing style (Woods Jr.). The PNC would introduce new strategies for combating crime. There have been accusations on the PNC for misconduct for negligence, involvement in criminal activity, involvement in human rights abuses and following improper procedures. The intent of the PNC is to civilianize the police force (“The National Civilian Police”).

The Catholic Church

The Archbishop of the Catholic Church, Monsignor Fabio Colindres, was a key leader in facilitating security in El Salvador through mediating a ceasefire between MS-13 and Barrio 18 (“El Salvador Country Profile”). The church had a following and credibility in El Salvador as the predominant religion in the country. The church acted as a mediator and helped manage the procedural organization for meetings between actors. The Jesuit Priest of the church was a key mediator between the FMLN and the Conservative party during civil war negotiations (Negroponte). The main goal of the Catholic Church was to act as a non-partisan mediator since most El Salvadorans share value and trust for the Catholic Church.

Frent Farabundo Marti de Liberacion Nacional (FMLN)

The FMLN is one of El Salvador’s major political parties, they formed towards the end of the civil war as a paramilitary rebel group fighting against the El Salvadoran government who was backed by the US (“Truth Commission: El Salvador”). During the UN Peace Accords, the FMLN agreed to disarm and were later recognized as an official political party (Tikkanen). The main goal of the FMLN is to revolutionize the government towards democracy and military truce (Grenier).

Human Rights Commission of El Salvador (CDHES)

The CDHES began with the intention of documenting human rights violations in El Salvador. CDHES records document killings, executions, disappearances, and torture committed in El Salvador. The nature of the CDHES has put members in danger, several of their members have been assassinated. This organization played a significant role in domestic reconciliation between the main actors to combat crime and violence (Negroponte). The intention of the CDHES is to reduce and reform the high rates of violence, crime and corruption within El Salvador.

Francisco Flores

A key actor whose policies contributed to heightened domestic gang conflict. Flores initiated an aggressive anti-gang and anti-crime policy called the “Iron Fist Plan”. This policy promoted the arrest of Salvadorans for suspected gang crimes based on their appearance. The number of gang members in prison doubled which unknowingly strengthened the MS-13 gang (“El Salvador Country Profile”). Francisco Flores was a dominant actor who attempted to support anti-gang and anti-crime through his policies however, these ideologies proved to be damaging to gang conflict and must be addressed to prevent harmful domestic police-gang tensions.

Judicial System

Skepticism remains over the El Salvadoran judicial system as inefficiency and corruption continue to strain the court system. Additionally, the prison system is overcrowded and underfunded which led to a lack of control causing MS-13 dominance (“El Salvador Country Profile”). The judicial system in El Salvador is one of the main sectors in need of reform. The Central America Regional Security Initiative is currently working to support reform in the judicial sector.

Transportistas

Responsible for transporting illegal contraband from El Salvador across borders. Two networks of Transportistas are the Parrones and Cartel De Texas. Both of these actors had a significant contribution to the northward flow of illicit drugs (“El Salvador Country Profile”). Both a domestic and international threat to security. With efficient judicial reform, the threat that transportitas and gang violence cause on security will be reduced.

The United States

The US government played a significant external role as they supported the El Salvadoran government and military in the civil war (Negroponte). The US strengthened its immigration policies, many Barrio 18 and MS-13 members were deported to El Salvador which heightened gang conflict in El Salvador (“El Salvador Country Profile”). The US government funded social and political reform throughout the civil war as they tried to reform El Salvadoran policy to favour neoliberal ideologies (Quan).

International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP)

The United States sponsored the ICITAP program in El Salvador to aid in youth crime and gang involvement, combat police corruption and PNC human rights violations (“The National Civilian Police”). The United States uses the ICITAP program to support foreign countries in enhancing their domestic law enforcement. This program is implemented in many foreign countries including El Salvador with the intention of supporting domestic anti-corruption and crime initiatives (ICITAP).

UN Commission on the Truth in El Salvador

The Commission took place from 1992-1993 with the intent of addressing the nature and effects of the violence throughout the country. The mandate of the UN mediators was to recommend methods to promote reconciliation within the country (“Truth Commission: El Salvador”). The commission was led by three international jurists who investigated complaints of victimization and violence throughout the country. The final report was highly controversial (Negroponte). The commission was intended to combat the prevalent violence within the country.

Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI)

An international aid program supported by the US with the intention of strengthening the law enforcement and judicial system in Central American countries. CARSI is dedicated to engaging at-risk youth in employment through alternative social and economic programs (“Central America Regional Security Initiative”). Focused on alleviating the effects that gangs and criminal activity have on society and the economy.

National Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (COPAZ)

COPAZ was developed as a result of the Chapultepec Peace Agreement to establish the full responsibilities of each party. Copaz held responsible for monitoring the implementation of negotiation agreements until its expiration in January 1996. COPAZ was viewed as a success by most (“Peace Accords Matrix”).

National Dialogue (ND)

National Dialogue was one of the most prominent civil societies in El Salvador during the Peace Agreement negotiations. The main goals of ND were to advocate for increased democracy and to educate the public on the peace agreements (Nilsson).

National Debate for Peace

A committee dedicated to engaging members of society in peaceful dialogue and constructive debate on the conflicting interests of actors regarding the Peace Agreements. The National Debate for Peace would ensure there was fair representation at the table and facilitated action in negotiations. The committees’ success deteriorated when several conservative actors pulled out and the debates were no longer representative of all members of societies interests (Nilsson).

The Forum for Economic and Social Accommodation (FOCES)

A forum intended to foster communication between social and political actors to discuss social and economic topics to encourage open dialogue. This forum would be open to all actors involved in the social and economic sectors (Nilsson).

Inadequate Judicial Reforms: Most SSR’s only includes the reform of core state institutions, such as military and police force, but yet, ignore the need to reform the judiciary, and promote the overall rule of law (Kurtenbach). Despite the increased need for a more holistic and wide-spread SSR, the continued disassociation between institutional and the activities within the security and justice sectors, continues to be barrier to a successful reform (Kurtenbach). Furthermore, changes implemented sometimes do not include the accountability of political actors and allies, which can also contribute to prohibit establishing a true reform. Although there has not been direct war related occurrence since 1992, the high levels of interpersonal violence and increased state repression of the alleged perpetrators, increases the need for more peace-building and reconciliation.

Continued Corruption and Elitism: As most of the high body officials were not fully prosecuted, there still remains an unequal power divide between the elite and the rest of the Salvadorian society (Kurtenbach). There continues to be a strong “lack of political space for addressing critical socio-economic problems as the principle cause” of the conflict, which needs to be addressed in order for there to be a holistic SSR (Negroponte). For example, the legalization of the FMLN as a political party, despite unwillingness to demobilize and disarm, has resulted in continued distrust in governing bodies (Negroponte).

Insufficient Police Force Reform: Despite the initial reform of armed forces, due to political bargains, resistance within old institutions and authoritarianism, it has undermined the SSR process (Piche). Undoubtedly, it has also undercut the ability of the new police force to respond to the needs of the Salvadoran population and ensure security and order throughout the country (Piche) Although the core security institutions were dismantled, it did not directly dismiss the men who had trained and fought with them (Negroponte). Furthermore, the lack of proper vetting in the National Civil Police (PNC), has resulted in perpetuating the culture permitting corruption in institutions such as the police force, and these issues remain due to the admission of ex-combatants into the police force (Piche & Negroponte).

Abstract

In order to analyze the success of the SSR, we conducted an analysis of the prior security institutions that were in effect prior to the transition to democracy.  There were a few institutions that enforced security such public security forces known as Cuerpos de Seguridad Publica (CUSEP), which maintained the public social order in urban areas.  The National Guard was often deployed in more rural to assist large landowners and repressed labor sectors that resisted the existing work conditions (Amaya).  With a security apparatus that reinforced the current political and social status quo of “to disciple, dominate, and control the population” the core of this civil war was rooted in class distinctions.  The different guerilla organizations were inherently leftist or socialist movements opposing the landowning elite, the military increased their attacks through death squads causing an increased polarization in violence and the coalition of Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) (Moran).  With the creation of the FMLN, the military continued to commit large scale massacres killing at least 50,000 unarmed civilians during the 1980s (Stanley).  The FMLN had its own guerilla fighters that carried out their attacks however many of them turned to be futile. This enforced the need for peace reform rather than more violence leading to the beginning of El Salvador’s Security Sector Reform.  Following this, we will analyse the impact the political parties made on SSR, the police reform and its successes, and how international organizations recognized the peace negotiations.

Political Parties

The strong party system in El Salvador helped contribute to the initial success of peace negotiations between ARENA and the FMLN in regards to the SSR.  With the prior guerrilla fighters now viewed as a legitimized and sizable political party, the FLMN no longer felt taken advantage of by the military. With the governing party brokering peace talks with the FLMN, they were further legitimized and continued to gather the public support.  Their continued political success allowed them to monitor the implementation of the peace accords, seemingly benefiting the SSR (Moran, 63).

By having the two most powerful political parties supporting the accords, it seemed in both of their best interest to implement and enforce the agreements because anything less could be interpreted as a spoil of the peace overall. El Salvador has something that other SSR countries did not - highly institutionalized party system that created an environment conducive to peace due to the risks involved with anything else.  While the strong political parties contributed to the initial success of the SSR, it soon began to fail when there was was the inability to break the link between the SSR and its organized criminal elements.

Police reform

The key transformation for the peace accords in El Salvador was the transition from military security into civilian control.  Having worked in other SSR cases, the UN along side of other major countries assisted in providing “police training programs and reform projects” as well as an observer mission to monitor the SSR (Moran, 37).  The reform to internal security occured in tangent with the changing of political parties. El Salvador lacked a functioning police force leading to the initial efforts of establishing a interim security force then filling the security gap in the long term (Berkow, 200) However, it quickly became clear that civilian policing is not the same as creating a military force, a fact tend to be ignored by the international community.  Civilian policing takes longer to establish and requires key political agreements in order to allow for proper development. In El Salvador, the number of members in the security force was cut from 60,000 to 6,000 in the course of a few weeks (Moran). This cut was linked to a surge in crime and violence with the number of homicides increasing by 300%. Contributing to the distrust was the quota put on the number of FLMN ex-combatants could be involved with the PNC in order to ensure recruitment of civilians to limit politicization.  However, international organizations were denied access to lists of personnel to ensure these quotas were met (Pinche,13). The security force reduction was not the only factor in the failure of the SSR. The widespread culture of violence, the ease of access to weapons, as well a pervasive poverty and inequality all contributed to the vacuum of violence. One corrupt former security personnel noted that when one is “trained in the use of arms, organized into tightly knit groups, and familiar with the ways of crime … could easily turn into significant organized crime networks” (Bailey).   

International Organizations

The measures of the SSR to combat gang violence through police reform ended up creating a violence vacuum that created more harm than imagined.  The escalation of violence caused many international organizations to reconsider their role in El Salvador’s SSR. During the Civil War, the Salvadoran military was funded and trained by the United States while the rebel FLMN was receiving support from the Soviet Union (Piche,10).   Following the peace accords the contributions of peace operations by the U.N. and other actors was overall modest. However, this did not mean the external stakeholders were not involved in the monitoring of the reform. The U.N. initially issued ONSUAL as a peace operation for human rights issues, political, police, and military sections yet their role was to not be involved in traditional peacekeeping, but “observing and monitoring” (Pinche,15).  Eventually, in 1994 ARENA was elected and phased out majority of the external actors causing some concern. With the violence vacuum underway, international organizations became increasingly aware of human rights violations and discriminatory factors. In November 2016, the U.N. urged the Salvadoran government to end their extraordinary security measures, which failed to comply to international human rights standards (Nilsson, 3). The measures that were in practices included prolonged and isolated detention under inhuman conditions and prolonged the suspension of family visits to detainees (Amnesty International).  

Summary

Initially, the notion of the guerrilla fighters and governmental parties agreeing to peace negotiations instead of prolonged conflict was the step in the right direction for El Salvador.  A strong political system meant that both parties were held accountable to the implementation and execution of the components of SSR including the reduction in armed forces, the dissolution of rapid deployment forces, and the demobilization and integration of armed FMLN units.  However, the policies implemented in support of the SSR quickly facilitated the power of gang violence and caused more civilian lives to be at risk. The inadequate new Police Force began to resemble its own various of organized crime and the rate at which they incarcerated any potential gang member cause the influx of death squads and the necessity for them as community support. Finally, external actors and international organizations viewed the SSR even when the majority of Salvadorans claimed they needed more assistance in bringing down the homicide rate.  All in all, our analysis showcases that many aspects of the SSR were not approached in a manner that served the needs of the community and the country of El Salvador as a whole.

1. Amnesty International. “Amnesty International Report 2017/18: The State of the World’s Human Rights”.  2018. London, UK: Peter Benenson House. https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/POL1067002018ENGLISH.PDF  Accessed: March 27 2019
2. Betancur, Belisario. UN Security Council, Annex. “From Madness to Hope: the 12-year war in El Salvador: Report of the Commission on the Truth for El Salvador”. 1993. United States Institute of Peace, Jan 26 2001. https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/ElSalvador-Report.pdf . Accessed: March 28 2019.
3. Donadío, Marcela ed. “Índice de Seguridad Pública (Public Security Index): Centroamérica: Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, y Panamá.” Buenos Aires, Argentina: Red de Seguridad y Defensa de América Latina (Security and Defense Network of Latin America), 2013. https://www.resdal.org/libro-seg-2013/resdal-indice_seg.pdf Accessed: March 24 2019
4. Office of the President of El Salvador. “Plan El Salvador Seguro: Resumen Ejecutivo.” El Salvador: Presidencia de la Republica, San Salvador, January 15 2015. Accessed: March 27 2019 http://www.presidencia.gob.sv/plan-el-salvador-seguro-es-un-documento-de-accion-realmente-consensuado-representante-residente-del-pnud . Accessed: March 28 2019
5. OECD/DAC . “Security Sector Reform and Governance: Policy and Good Practice”. Paris, France: OECD, April 6 2006. https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264007888-2-en Accessed: March 28 2019
6. Office of the President of El Salvador. . “Presidente Sanchéz Cerén presenta Plan Quinquenal de Desarrollo ‘El Salvador Productivo, Educado, y Seguro.’” El Salvador: Presidencia de La Republica. San Salvador, El Salvador: President of the Republic, 2015. http://www.presidencia.gob.sv/presidente-Sanchéz-Cerén-da-a-conocer-plan-quinquenal-2014-2019/. Accessed: March 28 2019
7. Policía Nacional Civil.  “Distribución del Presupuesto Asignado por Rubro de Agrupación; Ejercicio Fiscal” 2013. Print. Accessed: March 28 2019
8. United Nations Human Rights Commision. “Human Rights in El Salvador”.  Mission to El Salvador. March 10 1993. http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/E/CHR/resolutions/E-CN_4-RES-1995-63.doc Accessed: March 28 2019
9. United Nations Human Rights Commision. “Report of the Working Group on the use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination”. Mission to El Salvador. March 5 2008. http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=A/HRC/7/2/Add.2&Lang=E Accessed: March 27 2019
10. United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL).  “Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador” New York, New York: UNSCR. February 16 1994. http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=S/1994/179&Lang=E Accessed: March 28 2019
11. United Nations Security Council. “Resolution 991”.  New York, New York: UNSCR. April 28 1995. http://unscr.com/files/1995/00991.pdf   Accessed: March 26 2019
12. United States Department of Justice.  “Western Hemisphere Programs: ICITAP El Salvador”.  Washington, DC: United States Department of Justice, July 31 2018. https://www.justice.gov/criminal-icitap/western-hemisphere-programs Accessed: March 26 2019
13. United States Congress.  Congressional Research Service. “Gangs in Central America: Report RL34112”.  Washington, DC: United States Congress, 2016. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34112.pdf Accessed: March 26 2019
14. United States Congress.  CARSI. “U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America: Policy Issues for Congress: Report R44812”. Washington, DC: United States Congress, 2019. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R44812.pdf Accessed: March 28 2019

Hutchful, Eboe.  “Security Sector Reform Provisions in Peace Agreements”.  Department for International Development, ASSN, 2009. https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/SSRProvisionsinPeaceAgreements_ASSN2009.pdf

This report was commissioned by the African Security Sector Network, which promotes human security and development.  In this specific paper, the ASSN demonstrates how crucial it is to integrate issues of SSR into peace negotiations initially or face high risks.  While the report analysis 8 countries from Africa, it also highlights the successes and failures of El Salvador. One point it notes is the fact that even when robust SSR is present like in the case of El Salvador, there is not always equal implementation of change.  In El Salvador, even with the implementations of SSR the violence reported following the SSR exceeded the fatalities of the civil war; the report urges future policy makers to be aware of this development. This report argues that the SSR in El Salvador fell short of what was anticipated from the peace accords.      

Kurtenback, Sabine.  “Judicial Reform - A Neglected Dimension of SSR in El Salvador”.  Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 13.1, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1080/17502977.2018.1517112

This journal determines an integral part of SSR that is usually underestimated - the Judicial System.  Kurtenbach argues that, using El Salvador as a case study, reforms in the judicial system are key for the reformation of violence and security in post civil war countries.  Prior to SSR, El Salvador’s security and justice were linked by the elite landowners and the military. This gave way to the revolutionary rise of the FMLN. During the civil war, Amnesty International provided evidence that 90 percent of the human rights violations were committed by the government and their allies. As reaction to this, SSR can not only de-mobilize the military but facilitate in the disintegration of a system of state repression such as the judiciary.  Though the journal considers the SSR of El Salvador a success, it examines how risky judicial reform can be if not properly sanctioned and implemented.

Moodie, Ellen. El Salvador in the Aftermath of Peace: Crime, Uncertainty, and the Transition to Democracy. University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 2011. https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0308275X12456648

This chapter in the book El Salvador in the Aftermath of Peace captures the narratives of post war violence urges the reader to reconsider the label of El Salvador`s SSR program as a success.  Moodie continues this narrative throughout the book by asking `what happened next`in order to suggest new models for a transition to democracy and by making sense of the various elements of violence. She makes the assertion that post-war was worse than war in El Salvador through first person accounts on the aspect of crimes.  The stories we are told are often `re-coded`violence where the official fiscouse recasts the violence as non critical. Violence then is place on the other bodies, such as the raced, classed, or gendered bodies (young, male, gang member) in order to validate their discriminatory practices.

Nilsson, Manuela. Civil society actors in peace negotiations in Central America.  Journal of Civil Society, Vol 14:2. 2018. https://doi.org/10.1080/17448689.2018.1484004

Nilson examines the connection between civil society actors and how international actors push heavily for their coordination.  Yet she argues that the connection between peace negotiations and civil actors is not as certain as major international organizations ascribe it to be.  In El Salvador, the article questions how important the civil society actors were in peace negotiations and she argues that their presence did not strengthen the implementation of SSR.  She notes that in the end, all though El Salvador had a strong presence of civil society actors who conducted various forms of diplomacy, the final accords were reached behind close doors in a different country.  These meetings focused on singular actors rather than civil society organizations as a whole. Yet the creations of COPAZ and FOCES shows the contention that these negotiations had to civil society, a strong win for SSR.

Paris, Roland. “At War’s End Building Peace after Civil Conflict: Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala: Reproducing the Sources of the Conflict”. Cambridge University Press, 2004. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511790836.009

This article compares the sources of conflict in three Latin American countries and how different factors contributed to their SSR in different manners.  The start of El Salvador’s civil war was based on the failed attempt to introduce social reform to change the unequal system of land. It outlines how many attempts for peace were made during the war but acknowledges how the Chapultepec Accord eventually caused the end of the violence.  Paris examines the context of the SSR from the detailed plan and how it provided the blueprint for future peacebuilding missions. This is one of the few articles we used which focused on the economic consequences of El Salvador’s SSR and how the economic liberalization policies worked against long lasting peace.

Piche, Gaelle Rivard.  “Assessing the Impact of Orthodox Security Sector Reform in El Salvador” Centre for Security Governance, CSG Paper No 10, 2016. Retrieved from: https://secgovcentre.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Assessing_Orthodox_SSR_in_El_Salvador_Sept_2016.pdf

This peer-reviewed paper is part of an ongoing research project on SSR.  Piche argues how although the SSR in El Salvador was a modest success, it lacked a long term and holistic vision of how the reform could have affected the country.  By the poor implementaion of the PNC which failed to meet quotas on both sides of the aisle, the contributed to a violence vacuum that put civilian security into the hands of organized crime.  Finally, Pinche addresses how the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Assistance Committee was a key stakeholder in the success of the SSR and thus had a heavy hand in the creation of the core principles for El Salvador's SSR.

Piche, Gaelle Rivard. “The Gradual Emergence of Second Generation Security Sector Reform in El Salvador” Centre for Security Governance, CSG Paper 14, 2017. https://secgovcentre.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Second-Generation-SSR-in-El-Salvador-January-2017.pdf.

This peer-reviewed paper provides various reports on the SSR in El Salvador and was crucial to our determination of success for the reform and for the various actors.  Piche discusses how following the SSR implementation (including that of a civilan police force), the country is still plagued by violence and crime. He continues to outline how SSR in El Salvador should address the violence with a local level lens that can inform the national level.  By recognizing the work of the Gang Truce in 2012 and the US CARSI, the Salvadoran Security sector can rethink how to provide protection.

Stanley, William Deane. “El Salvador: State-building before and after democratisation, 1980-95”.  Third World Quarterly,Vol 27.1, 2006. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436590500369311

Stanley examines how the support of the United States during and after the civil war affected the implementation of SSR as the US attempted to shape the norm of a democratically elected civilian political arena.  In this article, we focused on the later half which talks about democratization following the 1992 peace accords. The US backed political/military party, ARENA, initially did not want to support a national civilian police; one of the crucial components of the SSR.  Stanley also acknowledges how because of this, the quotas for the FMLN were not met so the force was even more heavily civilian than planned. This contributed to the initial spiral into disorganization. While the paper agrees that El Salvador following the peace accords was far more democratic than before, it argues at what cost.  Was the Salvadoran experience an attempt by an outside power to promote state reform at their own interest?

Carballo, Carlos A.  El Salvador crime prevention policies: From Mano dura to El Salvador Seguro.  MA in Security Studies. Naval Postgraduate School, 2009.

"Central America Regional Security Initiative." U.S. Department of State. N.p., 2017. Web. 15 Mar.2019.

"El Salvador Country Profile." International Security Sector Advisory Team. N.p., 2015. Web. 10 Mar.2019.

"El Salvador: The National Civilian Police (Policia Nacional Civil, PNC); Recent Attempts To Fight Police Corruption; Treatment Of Police Officers Suspected Of Being Criminals Or Involved In Criminal Gangs; Whether Complaints Against The Police Are Treated Seriously By Government Authorities (Updates And Replaces SLV37937.E Of 27 November 2001)." Refworld. N.p., 2019.Web. 13 Mar. 2019.

Grenier, Yvon. "Understanding The FMLN: A Glossary Of Five Words." Conflict Quarterly11.2 (1991): n. pag. Print.

"ICITAP." Justice.gov. N.p., 2018. Web. 13 Mar. 2019.

Kurtenbach, Sabine. "Judicial Reform - A Neglected Dimension of SSR in El Salvador."Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, vol. 13, no. 1, 2019, pp. 57-74.

McCartney, Clem, Martina Fisher & Oliver Wils. “Security Sector Reform: Potential Challenges for Conflict Transformation” Berghod Handbook Dialogue Series, no. 2, 2004.

Moodie, Ellen, and Project Muse University Press eBooks. El Salvador in the Aftermath of Peace: Crime, Uncertainty, and the Transition to Democracy. University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 2010;2011.

Moran, Patrick J.  El Salvador and Guatemala security sector reform and political party system effects on organized crime.  MS in National Security Affairs Thesis.  Naval Postgraduate School, 2009. pp 33-42.

Negroponte, Diana. Seeking Peace in El Salvador: The Struggle to Reconstruct a Nation at the End of the Cold War. Palgrave Macmillan, 2016.

Negroponte, Diana. "Seeking Peace In El Salvador." Google Books. N.p., 2012. Web. 13 Mar. 2019.

Nilsson, Manuela.  “Civil society actors in peace negotiations in Central America.” Journal of Civil Society, vol 14, no. 2, 2018, 135-152.

Piche, Gaelle Rivard.  “Assessing the Impact of Orthodox Security Sector Reform in El Salvador” Centre for Security Governance, CSG Paper No 10, 2016.

Piche, Gaelle Rivard. “The Gradual Emergence of Second Generation Security Sector Reform in El Salvador” Centre for Security Governance, CSG Paper 14, 2017.

Piche, Gaelle Rivard.  “The Salvadoran Gang Truce (2012-2014): Insights on Subnational Security Governance in El Salvador” Violence in Latin America and the Caribbean: Subnational Structures, Institutions, an Clientelistic Networks.  Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2017.

Quan, Adán. "Through The Looking Glass: U.S. Aid To El Salvador And The Politics Of National Identity." American Anthropological Association32.2 (2005): n. pag. Print.

"Review Of Agreement: Chapultepec Peace Agreement | Peace Accords Matrix." Peace Accords Matrix.N.p., 2015. Web. 18 Mar. 2019.

Stanley, William Deane. “El Salvador: State-building before and after democratisation, 1980-1985”.  Third World Quarterly, vol 27, no 1. 101-114.

Tikkanen, Amy. "Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front." Encyclopedia Britannica. Web. 14 Mar. 2019.

"Truth Commission: El Salvador." United States Institute of Peace. N.p., 2019. Web. 13 Mar. 2019.

Woods Jr., DeVere D. "THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE POLICÍA NATIONAL CIVIL OF EL SALVADOR." Policing in Central and Eastern Europe: Dilemmas of Contemporary Criminal Justice(2004): n. pag. Print.