Marginalized Youth and Child Soldiers

Prior to the conflict erupting in 1991, there were very few education and job opportunities for youth in Sierra Leone, which caused them to become increasingly marginalized and alienated in society. As a result, many youths resorted to enlisting in the RUF rather than seeking the few employment and education avenues open to them. This led to the creation of the children’s component of the DDR program in Sierra Leone, which largely aimed to demobilize and reintegrate child soldiers back into their families and communities. This resource within the DDR program, that addressed the needs of child soldiers, was instrumental in the success of SSR in Sierra Leone.

Volatile State

The constant volatility and instability of the Sierra Leone Government throughout the entire war weakened the effectiveness of SSR that international actors, namely the UK, were working to implement. The lack of stable government led to a growing need for formal democratic elections, which were brought about through the SSR process due to the progressed ability of citizens of Sierra Leone to exercise their democratic franchise.

Diamonds

The abundance of diamonds in certain regions of Sierra Leone largely funded the RUF and provided an incentive and funding for violence. In order to slow and cut the economic lifeline of armed factions, namely the RUF, SSR needed to play a role in intercepting the illegal flow of diamonds and ensuring that the illegal trade in “blood diamonds” did not overlap with the legal mining and trade of diamonds. By doing this, SSR activities attempted to cut off the economic means that fueled rebels in the war.

Weak Security Structures

Sierra Leone’s lack of strong security structures lead to the breakdown of them altogether during the civil war. In order to reestablish state legitimacy, Sierra Leone’s SSR process required the restructuring and transformation of the country’s security structures and institutions, which in turn would strengthen and solidify internal security as to prevent future conflict from breaking out.

STATE:

Sierra Leone Armed Forces (SLAF)

Before the beginning of the civil war in 1991, the Sierra Leone Armed Forces were disorganized and weak. Due to insufficiency in equipment and lack of personnel, the army failed in protecting its people during the civil war. Recruitment into the SLAF was conducted without standard criteria. Therefore, many soldiers had criminal records. This resulted in gross violations of human rights by the SLAF throughout the course of the war, which consequently led to very little support of the military from the rest of society.

Sierra Leone Police (SLP)

By 1999, Sierra Leone Police (SLP) were unaccountable and ineffective. They failed to deliver effective policing services when human right violations occurred, and corruption was largely present within the police hierarchy.

Sierra Leone People's Party

Sierra Leone People’s Party was founded in 1951. It is one of the two dominant political parties in Sierra Leone. In the 1996 presidential election, Ahmad Tejan Kabbah was elected and the SLPP took power. The SLPP formed the government once again in 2002 when Kabbah was reelected.

NON-STATE:

Revolutionary United Front (RUF)

The Revolutionary United Front was a rebel military force that acted as the main opposer of the Sierra Leone government throughout the civil war from 1991-2002. Led by Foday Sankoh, the RUF committed gross atrocities that claimed some 50,000 lives and displaced two million people. They took steps to formally restore peace with the Sierra Leone government in both the Lomé Peace Agreement and Abidjan Peace Accord, but ultimately failed to follow the terms of each, therefore prolonging the civil war even further.

Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC)

The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council was a band of Sierra Leone rebels who banded together with the RUF following the overthrow of President Kabbah as a result of the Abidjan Peace Accord unravelling. The AFRC participated in many various armed attacks alongside RUF forces, but were ultimately left with no choice but to withdraw and disaram when the war finally came to a close in 2002.

National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC)

The National Provisional Ruling Council, led by Valentine Strasser, was a military junta that was established as a result of the military coup that overthrew President Joseph Momoh in 1992. The NPRC was in power until 1996, when they agreed to allow democratic elections to take place again. They then handed power over Ahmed Tejan Kabbah, the winner of the 1996 presidential election.

Civil Defense Force Kamajors

The Civil Defense Forces were a paramilitary group that supported President Kabbah and his government against the combined RUF and AFRC forces. Many CDF soldiers were Kamajors from the ethnic Mende group of Sierra Leone.

NGOS/CIVIL SOCIETY/GOVERNMENT AGENCIES:

United Kingdom Department for International Development (DFID)

The UK’s Department for International Development worked in coordination with DAI, an international development organization, to fund the Access to Security and Justice Programme (ASJP) in Sierra Leone from 2011-2016. By providing grants to over thirty civil society organizations, ASJP aimed to consolidate peace and stability by increasing access to responsive, accountable, and effective security and justice services, especially for the poor, vulnerable, and those living in remote and marginalized areas of the country.¹

International Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT)

ISSAT has provided significant support to the SSR process in Sierra Leone, which has continued past the completion of AJSP in 2016. ISSAT’s main focus is reform of the Sierra Leone Police, which it is supporting with investment to strengthen its systems and structures.²

Local Police Partnership Boards (LPPBs)

The Local Police Partnership Boards was established in each police division by the Sierra Leone Police force to create greater public trust and confidence in the security sector that has been lacking since the end of the civil war in 2002. The LPPBs seek to ensure more effective and accountable delivery of policing services, and most importantly, improved relationships, understanding, and trust between communities and local police in Sierra Leone.³

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

The United Nations Development Programme has worked in conjunction with the UK’s DFID to help shape the role and build the capacity of civil society in order to improve the security sector of post-war Sierra Leone through the support of grants and the provision of proper training.⁴

West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP)

In Sierra Leone, WANEP has contributed to SSR by coordinating and strengthening civil society and its relationship with the state to avoid future conflict and promote peacebuilding.

¹ “Sierra Leone-Access to Security and Justice Programme (ASJP).” · DAI: International Development, www.dai.com/our-work/projects/sierra-leone-access-security-and-justice-programme-asjp.

² Bangura, Ibrahim, “The Gradual Emergence of Second Generation Security Sector Reform in Sierra Leone” (2017): 15.

³ International Security Sector Advisory Team. “Sierra Leone: Local Policing Partnership Boards.”, issat.dcaf.ch/Learn/Resource-Library/Case-Studies/Sierra-Leone-Local-Policing-Partnership-Boards.

⁴ Bangura 12.

United Nations (UN)

The United Nations created the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone to assist parties in the implementation of the Lomé Peace Agreement. They were present from 1999 to 2005 and oversaw security sector reform, democratic elections and other post-conflict rebuilding.¹

Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG)

ECOMOG supplied forces, primarily Nigerian, to support the government and combat rebels throughout the conflict, most notably after the RUF-AFRC coup in 1997. They monitored the peace talks between the government and the rebels, and ensured the terms were enforced.²

Executive Outcomes (EO)

The Executive Outcomes were a private South African military company hired by the Strasser government to defeat the RUF. They were present in Sierra Leone from 1995 until shortly after the Abidjan Peace Accord in 1997.³

United Kingdom (UK)

The United Kingdom was a major supporter of peacebuilding in Sierra Leone, and following the unsuccessful implementation of the Lomé Peace Agreement, deployed troops to secure peace on the ground. They were also heavily involved in the post-conflict reconstruction of Sierra Leone.⁴

Guinea

Guinea accepted thousands of refugees from Sierra Leone into the country during the conflict. Guinea was also home to the exiled Kabbah government following the RUF-AFRC coup⁵ from 1997-1998.

Liberia

Liberian leader Charles Taylor reportedly supplied and supported the RUF in Sierra Leone, providing them with weapons and funds.⁶

¹ Osman Gbla, “Security Sector Reform under International Tutelage in Sierra Leone” (2006): 80.

² David H. Ucko “Can Limited Intervention Work? Lessons from Britain’s Success Story in Sierra Leone” (2006): 855.

³ Jeremy Ginifer, “The Challenge of the Security Sector and Security Reform Processes in Democratic Transitions: The Case of Sierra Leone” (2006): 790.

⁴ Ucko 853.

⁵ Gbla 82.

⁶ Ucko 853.

Weak and Undisciplined Sierra Leone Armed Forces

The Sierra Leone Armed Forces were politicized and unorganized. Inheriting the corruptive and interdisciplinary characteristics from the NPRC, the former ruling party of the pre-war period, the SLAF did not have a sufficient recruitment system in place, which lead to the enlistment of incompetent, unqualified, and undisciplined soldiers. The SLAF had very little power in the conflict as a result. When the RUF violated the ceasefire agreement and seized Freetown in 1999, the SLAF did not have the capacity to defeat the rebel forces. Because of Sierra Leone’s weak military, President Kabbah was ultimately overthrown in May 1997, forcing him and his government to flee to Guinea.

Lack of Funding and Staff in Sierra Leone Police

Before the eruption of war in 1991, the Sierra Leone Police force was relatively weak and ineffectual, and only had 3,500 staff in total to operate all police divisions across the country. Although proper police training was mainly conducted by the United Kingdom, the SLP still lacked the discipline that was required in an effective and accountable police force. The disregard and transgression that the SLP demonstrated caused the Sierra Leone people to have very little trust and confidence in them. During the war, in order to recruit more soldiers to join the anti-rebel force, the policing system adopted an inappropriately loose set of criteria, which led to the enlistment of ex-criminals. Many of these undisciplined soldiers had previously been involved in sexual abuses and corruptions. While training still proceeded,  and the SLP increased  police officers’ awareness of the importance of protecting human rights, it was still ineffective at protecting civilians due to a lack of funding. Without sufficient funding, there is not enough to pay decent salaries to police officers, or provide them with adequate weapons and equipment.

Youth Marginalization

During the civil war, many youths were engaging in the conflict both as combatants and victims. Although the DDR process was conducted while the conflict was ongoing and into the post-war period, the programme was not entirely effective in the reintegration aspect of former child soldiers. Many youths who were affected by or participated in the war failed to fully transition back into their communities even years after the conflict had ended. They struggled to find a place and purpose in society, many of whom entered the war as children but were leaving it as adults.

Incomplete Reintegration of Ex-combatants

The DDR programme was one of the greatest successes of the SSR process in post-conflict Sierra Leone. The programme succeeded in disarming 70,000 combatants, and then provided them with the proper skills training that were intended to help them reintegrate back into civilian society. However, studies have shown that a large proportion of ex-combatants encountered difficulties re-adapting to their community lives. Those who participated in the horrible violence and atrocities of the war were not always accepted back into their families and communities. Therefore, the incomplete reintegration of ex-combatants in the DDR programme created a significant barrier for, effective, successful SSR.

Security Sector Reform (SSR) in Sierra Leone has often been praised by the international community as being a large success. The United Nations have described Sierra Leone as a “shining model in West Africa and beyond”¹, and the state’s ability to hold democratic elections and not return to conflict are the focal point of success claims.² While maintaining peace is an important part of SSR, there still have been significant shortcomings in areas such as child soldier reintegration, police reformation, and economic stability that have hurt the SSR process. Post-conflict Sierra Leone has seen SSR to be successful and effective in creating security for the government and democratic process, however SSR has also been considerably less effective in addressing the security concerns of civilians.

Sierra Leone Armed Forces Restructuring:

The Lomé Peace Agreement put a strong emphasis on reforming and restructuring the SLAF in order to create a force that the government would be able to rely on to maintain stability, resulting in the Military Reintegration Program³. Led by British forces, military training courses were implemented that focused on effectiveness, accountability, weapons training, and laws of armed conflict, with additional training provided to commanders and sergeants on budget management, international humanitarian law, civil-military relations and regional security.⁴ To assist with civilian oversight, a new Ministry of Defence was established. Civilians were placed in senior positions, such as Deputy Minister of Defence and Director General, who are expected to communicate with parliament and report on the expenditure of public funds on defence.⁵ This reform has been largely effective, considering that only a few years before, the SLAF was unable to control any territory outside of Freetown. Therefore, the handing over of the Sierra Leone’s security operations to the government from the UN in 2004 was a major improvement.⁶

Despite improvements made in the SLAF’s capacity to provide security to the government, it has been less effective in gaining public support. There has been concern that the lack of screening of recruits employed soldiers who partook in crimes against civilians during the conflict, resulting in impunity and these individuals remaining in positions to potential abuse civilians again⁷. This remains one of the major problems with the restructuring of the SLAF, and has hurt public trust in the military.

Sierra Leone Police Reform

Similarly to the SLA, the Sierra Leone Police (SLP) went under major reform in the areas of transparency, accountability, and improving relationships with civilians. A Complaints, Discipline, and Investigation Department was created, as well as a Community Relations Department and a Family Support Units. These were established to handle sexual abuse against women and children, and new training was then initiated to include human rights education and transitional justice issues.⁸ These improvements have strengthened the commitment to democratic governance which has worked to increase the capacity of the government to operate democratically, including holding formal democratic elections.

However, similar to the SLAF, the weak recruitment screening of the SLP has resulted in former combatants employed in positions of power over communities they once abused, as well as allegations of corruption and extortion from civilians.⁹ The focus again seems to be on creating a security sector that supports a strong base for the government, at the expense of justice for civilians.

Combatant Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration

Disarmament and demobilization were seen as another big success in Sierra Leone’s SSR program. DDR centres were established where ex-combatants could come and surrender their weapons in exchange for cash and reintegration assistance, including skills training and educational programs.¹⁰ This program resulted in the disarmament and demobilization of an estimated 70,000 combatants¹¹, greatly lessening the number of armed insurgents that would be a threat to the new democratic government and therefore furthering state security progress.

However, reintegration efforts were considerably less successful. Far less resources were devoted to reintegration, and a 2005 survey found that the likelihood of ex-combatants reintegrating back into the community had little to do with their reintegration assistance and more to do with the level of abuse the community suffered at the hands of the former combatant group.¹² Another major shortfall of the DDR program was the exclusion of children and women in the process. To receive the full benefits of the DDR program, a piece of artillery was required to be turned over, while ‘eligible’ children would be sent to participate in a separate DDR process.¹³ Most children and women were not in positions to possess artillery or found ineligible for alternate programs due to funding constraints, leaving them out of the reintegration program.¹⁴ Unintegrated ex-combatants were seen as less of a threat to security than armed and mobile insurgents by many officials.¹⁵ Therefore,  the Sierra Leone government made little attempts to remedy this deficit in reintegration support despite the high rates of youth unemployment and undereducated workforce it created.

Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (IPRSP)

The Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper focused on the trickle-down effect of security on poverty. The first goal of the strategy focused on SSR that would allow for the implementation of anti-poverty programs.¹⁶ While the security provided did allow for more economic development than during the conflict, poverty, and unemployment are still rampant problems in Sierra Leone.¹⁷ Unemployed and restless youth remain a prominent issue, and provide a recruitment base for insurgents, as well as sources of civil disobedience and crime. Rural communities have also not seen the dividends of security reforms, and are still facing high levels of poverty, unemployment and lack of basic services such as power supplies and water.¹⁸

Democratic Governance

The SSR program in Sierra Leone allowed for democratic elections to be held consistently since 2002 without a relapse of violence. In this sense, the security provided to the government as a result of SSR programs, establishing strong security institutions, have been effective in Sierra Leone. However, in regard to the improvement of feelings of security by the civilian population, less positive results can be seen. This dissidence may be reflective of the purpose of SSR to achieve security for a democratic government as rapidly as possible, and as a result, this lets reforms for civilian security concerns fall behind.

¹UNOWAS, “The SSR Experience of Sierra Leone, a Shining Model in West Africa and Beyond” (2017).

² Jermey Ginifer, “The Challenge of the Security Sector and Security Reform Processes in Democratic Transitions: The Case of Sierra Leone” (2006): 791.

³ Mohamed Sesay and Mohamed Suma, Transitional Justice and DDR: The Case of Sierra Leone (2009): 12.

⁴ Osman Gbla, “Security Sector Reform under International Tutelage in Sierra Leone” 2006, 83.

⁵ Ginifer 799-800.

⁶ Adedeji Ebo, “The Challenges and Lessons of Security Sector Reform in Post-Conflict Sierra Leone” (2006): 482.

⁷ Ginifer 801.

⁸ Sesay and Suma 13.

⁹ Ginifer 803.

¹⁰ UNICEF, The Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Children Associated with the Fighting Forces (2005): 5.

¹¹ Sesay and Suma, 15.

¹² Sesay and Suma 15.

¹³ UNICEF 6.

¹⁴ Gbla 89.

¹⁵ Sesay and Suma 15.

¹⁶ Gbla 88.

¹⁷ Ebo 490.

¹⁸ Ebo 491.

UN Sierra Leone Peacebuilding Cooperation Framework 2007:

https://unipsil.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/old_dnn/PBCSLE9.pdf

Abidjan Peace Agreement 1996:

https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/sites/default/files/accords/Abidjan_Peace_Plan_1996.pdf

Lomé Peace Agreement 1999:

https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/SL_990707_LomePeaceAgreement.pdf

Official UNAMSIL Website:

https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unamsil/release2003.html?fbclid=IwAR1A_RRtcfiPpLeJ7acN1QXuLmXZ2e2qZ1OwP-P40ApTW1XEBc1qDFJvhUY

UNICEF Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration of Children Associated with Fighting Forces:

https://www.unicef.org/wcaro/WCARO_SL_Pub_LesLearntChildSoldiers.pdf

Abuja Ceasefire Agreement 1995:

https://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/fullpeace/SiL%2020001110.pdf

Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper:

https://www.imf.org/external/np/prsp/2001/sle/01/063101.pdf

Sierra Leone Defence White Paper:

https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/156808/SierraLeone.pdf

Human Rights Watch Report on Sierra Leone 2005:

https://www.hrw.org/legacy/wr2k5/pdf/sierra.pdf

Human Rights Report 1999:

https://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/sierra/SIERLE99.htm

1)   Albrecht, Peter, and Paul Jackson. 2015. Securing Sierra Leone, 1997-2013: Defence, Diplomacy and Development in Action. RUSI, 2014. Retrieved from: https://www-taylorfrancis-com.ezproxy.library.ubc.ca/books/e/9781317334460

This book examines how the state-building process through security sector reform evolved over time in Sierra Leone. By offering a comprehensive analysis of the UK’s contribution to the reconstruction of Sierra Leone that stretched from the very height of the war in 1997, through the post-war period and into 2013, Albrecht and Jackson demonstrate how UK intervention was instrumental and successful in the rebuilding and development of the nation. It highlights the impact of the UK’s engagement and how it has shaped the international intervention missions of other nations in Sierra Leone. This study allows us a more in depth look at the UK’s involvement in the Sierra Leone conflict, and additionally shows us how international actors can take to contribute, improve and sustain state-building efforts in Sierra Leone through SSR.

2) Baker, Bruce. Sierra Leone Police Reform: the Role of the UK Government. Retrieved from: http://www3.grips.ac.jp/~pinc/data/10-06.pdf

This article is written by Bruce Baker from the Coventry University. It focuses on the evaluation of the UK government’s role in Sierra Leone Police reform. In the article, Baker examines the SLP reform program through critical analysis and questions whether the reform was conducted in accordance to understanding of the local political context. He points out that Sierra Leone is a hybrid state rather than a failed Western society, and that ignoring this fact will lead the project in wrong directions. The article provides critical perspective on reform of the SLP in relation to the SSR process in Sierra Leone.

3) Bangura, Ibrahim. The Gradual Emergence of Second Generation Security Sector Reform in Sierra Leone. Centre for Security Governance, 2017, The Gradual Emergence of Second Generation Security Sector Reform in Sierra Leone. Retrieved from: secgovcentre.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Second-Generation-SSR-in-Sierra-Leone-January-2017.pdf.

This article is written by Dr. Ibrahim Bangura, an expert who specializes in DDR and SSR in Sierra Leone. Dr. Bangura mentions the initial SSR program in Sierra Leone, and how it focused on the transformation of state actors, such as the military and the police, due to the fact that the war was still ongoing while SSR was taking place. Bangura states that this first “generation” of SSR was instrumental in getting the SSR process where it is today in Sierra Leone, but also led to a number of problems, such as the corruption of state armed forces and police caused by a lack of monitoring from civilian society.  Bangura speaks of the importance of second generation SSR to help international actors and civil society organizations contribute to even greater success in future SSR missions in Sierra Leone. This academic source provides many insights on the weakness of first generation SSR, but more importantly, offers key resolutions to the current problems through second generation SSR.

4)   Ebo, Adedeji. 2006. “The Challenges and Lessons of Security Sector Reform in Post-Conflict Sierra Leone.” Conflict, Security & Development, vol. 6, no. 4, 2006, pp. 481–501. Retrieved from: https://www-tandfonline-com.ezproxy.library.ubc.ca/doi/abs/10.1080/14678800601066447

This article evaluates the main elements of the SSR process in post-conflict Sierra Leone, highlighting the most essential mechanisms that is required in an effective and responsible security sector. While Ebo speaks to the many significant successes of SSR in Sierra Leone in the post-war years, such as the restoration of public safety and reestablishment of state legitimacy by the strengthening of internal security, he also notes the gaps in SSR that have yet to be closed. Ebo cautions that SSR can be successful only as part of an “overarching democratic post-conflict reconstruction framework”. He implies that SSR must be ingrained into the democratic governance of the security sector in order to be successful, and if not implemented, conflict could actually arise as a result. This article shows us where SSR in Sierra Leone has gone right, but also where it has gone wrong in terms of its deficiencies and shortcomings. Most importantly, Edo calls our attention to the idea that SSR can perhaps only be fully effective if it is enforced by strong democratic governance, and stresses the importance of this framework in a post-conflict Sierra Leone.

5)   Ginifer, Jeremy. 2006. “The Challenge of the Security Sector and Security Reform Processes in Democratic Transitions: The Case of Sierra Leone.” Democratization, vol. 13, no. 5, 2006, pp. 791–810. Retrieved from: https://www-tandfonline-com.ezproxy.library.ubc.ca/doi/abs/10.1080/13510340601010693

This article uses the case study of Sierra Leone to demonstrate the intersections between democracy assistance and democratization, and SSR in relation to democratic transitions in conflict-prone countries. Ginifer suggests that SSR in Sierra Leone in particular, due to its lengthy and tumultuous history of past coups, abuse of civilians, and often volatile government, actually poses a risk to democratization and democratic reform. This is different take on SSR than we are used to hearing—we often speak of the SSR process as being purely beneficial to the state-building and development of countries struggling to regain their footing in post-war contexts. However, Ginifer depicts SSR as having a more of a negative connotation, and even goes on to imply that due to the growing disaffection in opposition parties and civil society towards the government, SSR actually acts as a disruptive factor to conflict. By looking at SSR through Ginifer’s more unconventional lens, we see where SSR can potentially cause more adverse effects than positive, especially in the case of Sierra Leone, but this can be resolved by adopting approaches that engage civil society and further civil protection in order to ensure more effective SSR in democratization.

6) Sesay, Mohamed, and Mohamed Suma. Transitional Justice and DDR: The Case of Sierra Leone . International Center for Transitional Justice, 2009, pp. 1–40, Transitional Justice and DDR: The Case of Sierra Leone. Retrieved from: https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-DDR-Sierra-Leone-CaseStudy-2009-English.pdf

This article, written by Sesay Mohamed and Mohamed Suma, evaluates the DDR process in Sierra Leone, specifically focusing on its impact on women and children in particular. The authors reveal that only a small proportion of female ex-combatants were engaged in the DDR program due to fear of abuse and systematic oversight. Sesay and Sumar also explore how many war-influenced children were not engaged in the DDR program because they did not possess the weapons that made them eligible for the program by handing them in, which they suggest as being one of the biggest downfalls of DDR in Sierra Leone. This article offers a closer perspective on the DDR program and its application on women and children specifically, highlighting where exactly it fell short. By looking into the drawbacks of DDR in the past, we were given a much better understanding of the overall success of the program in relation to women and children.

7)   Ucko, David H. 2015. “Can Limited Intervention Work? Lessons from Britain’s Success Story in Sierra Leone.” Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 39, no. 5-6, 2015, pp. 847–877. Retrieved from: https://www-tandfonline-com.ezproxy.library.ubc.ca/doi/abs/10.1080/01402390.2015.1110695

This article, written by David H. Ucko of the College of International Security Affairs at King’s College, speaks to the more limited approach of Western interventions in conflict-prone countries following the challenging campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. Ucko uses the example of British intervention in Sierra Leone to identify the conditions for effectiveness in Western interventions. He emphasizes the successes of this past mission in particular, but poses the question of whether or not a more limited approach would produce the same effectiveness in modern interventions. By looking closely at the factors that lead to the outcome of British intervention, Ucko ponders if limited intervention could achieve the desired political results as it did in the case of Sierra Leone. This article explores an alternative approach to intervention that international actors could take in future missions to Sierra Leone if conflict were to arise again, which would then, ideally, lead to effective and successful SSR just as it did the last time following the end of the civil war.

8) UNICEF, 2005. The Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of Children Associated with Fighting Forces. Retrieved from: https://www.unicef.org/wcaro/WCARO_SL_Pub_LesLearntChildSoldiers.pdf?fbclid=IwAR2P3f-H8TS6ZsWQrEubuj67Pd3NqcMcfdAasLzngOAIbMM_tIcgT05l2Ss

This is a report published by UNICEF, which provides specific details and critical analysis of the functionality and implementation of the child soldier DDR program in post-conflict Sierra Leone. It explains in great detail every component of child soldier DDR that was conducted in accordance with events that were occurring throughout the conflict, highlighting key steps in the process such as interim care, family tracing, and reunification. By providing compelling statistics and ample fact support, we were able to see just how successful and instrumental the children’s component of the DDR program was in helping the Sierra Leone civil war draw to a close.

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12. Ginifer, Jeremy. “The Challenge of the Security Sector and Security Reform Processes in Democratic Transitions: The Case of Sierra Leone.” Democratization, vol. 13, no. 5, 2006, pp. 791–810., doi:10.1080/13510340601010693.
13. International Security Sector Advisory Team. “Sierra Leone: Local Policing Partnership Boards.” International Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT), issat.dcaf.ch/Learn/Resource-Library/Case-Studies/Sierra-Leone-Local-Policing-Partnership-Boards.
14. Lagaida, Merryn. “Disarmament and Demobilisation in Sierra Leone.” Humanitarian Practice Network, June 2003, odihpn.org/magazine/disarmament-and-demobilisation-in-sierra-leone/.
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17. Sesay, Mohamed, and Mohamed Suma. Transitional Justice and DDR: The Case of Sierra Leone . International Center for Transitional Justice, 2009, pp. 1–40, Transitional Justice and DDR: The Case of Sierra Leone .
18. “Sierra Leone Chronology of Events.” Security Council Report, www.securitycouncilreport.org/chronology/sierra-leone.php?page=all&print=true.
19. “Sierra Leone Profile - Timeline.” BBC News, BBC, 5 Apr. 2018, www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14094419.
20. “Sierra Leone-Access to Security and Justice Programme (ASJP).”  DAI: International Development, www.dai.com/our-work/projects/sierra-leone-access-security-and-justice-programme-asjp.
21. “Sierra Leonean Disarmament.” Sierra Leonean Disarmament, 23 May 2001, www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/203/39379.html.
22. “The Sierra Leone Web.” Sierra Leone Web - Abuja Ceasefire Agreement, 10 November 2001, www.sierra-leone.org/ceasefire1100.html.
23. “The SSR Experience of Sierra Leone, a Shining Model in West Africa and Beyond.” UNOWAS, 18 Aug. 2017, unowas.unmissions.org/ssr-experience-sierra-leone-shining-model-west-africa-and-beyond.
24. Ucko, David H. “Can Limited Intervention Work? Lessons from Britain’s Success Story in Sierra Leone.” Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 39, no. 5-6, 2015, pp. 847–877., doi:10.1080/01402390.2015.1110695.
25. “UN Deploys in RUF-Held Territory.” UN Deploys in RUF-Held Territory, Global Policy Forum, 15 Mar. 2001, www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/203/39358.html.
26. UNICEF, 2005, The Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of Children Associated with Fighting Forces, issat.dcaf.ch/download/33989/486204/Security System Transformation in Sierra Leone, 1997-2007.pdf.
27. “United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL).” ca, Government of Canada, 11 Dec. 2018, www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/military-history/history-heritage/past-operations/africa/reptile.html.

Police, Military and State Security Services

Serbia's police service, military and state secret service all played essential roles in enforcing and maintaining President Milošević’s nationalistic and authoritarian leadership up until 2000. The security services were essentially exempted from democratic control and thus operated without transparency or accountability, while the police force underwent structural and aesthetic militarization [1]. In the wake of civil and political democratization after the end of Milosevic's presidency in 2000,  security sector reform of the police, military and secret services is a major issue in order to ensure “a service for citizens with implementation of the law," that does "not safeguard interests of ruling elites as its primary function”[2].

 Justice and Institutional Security

Another major issue is the reform, demilitarization and democratization of state and government institutions in Serbia[3]. The existence of political elites acting for and under Milosevic as well as the lack of accountability and transparency, pervasive in all political and judicial institutions, are a continual threat and limitation to democracy and human rights [4]. SSR seeks to especially target widespread corruption in political elites through national judicial and public administration reforms [5].

Public Opinion

A key concern of SSR is to rebuild trust in the state and security sector as well as establish democratic values. Thus, public opinion and perception of the security sector in general is very important for the success of reforms. Moreover, another issue is the way in which both discourse in the general public and in political elites are exclusionary of specific regional and ethnic minorities, deeming Serbia’s state sovereignty to be under threat by these groups - especially Kosovo. “Kosovo Albanians and [their] national and international institutions […] are seen as the main enemies” of Serbia and its sovereignty, thus SSR focuses on establishing political relations and establishing army and police presence [7].

Human Rights

The Serbian state's inability to provide basic human rights to its citizens and especially to vulnerable and minority groups, is another major security concern as these perpetuate hatred and socio-ethnic division[8]. SSR is concerned with right-wing extremist violence towards minorities, corruption (state, political and individual) and national and international organized crime, as these are considered tangible threats to Serbia’s long-term stability[9]. Moreover, reform of the police force, military and state security services seeks to assure the end of systematic ethnic, political and sexual violence.

[1]Radovanovic, Gorana , et al. Context analysis of the security sector reform in Serbia 1989-2009. 

Belgrade: Belgrade Centre for Security Policy , 2011.

[2]Belgrade Centre for Security Policy. Belgrade Centre for Security Policy. 2018. 1 February 2019.

<http://www.bezbednost.org/National-Security/2495/Police.shtml>.

[3]Hadžić, Miroslav. "Achievements of Security Sector Reform in Serbia." Year: 2008 Security

Sector Reform: Achievements and Prospects. Belgrade: Centre for Civil-Military Relations, 2008. 174.

[4]SeCond Development Initiative Group. Country Assessment Report – Human Security SERBIA.

n.d.

[5]SeCond Development Initiative Group. Country Assessment Report – Human Security SERBIA.

n.d.

[6]SeCond Development Initiative Group. Country Assessment Report – Human Security SERBIA.

n.d.

[7]SeCond Development Initiative Group. Country Assessment Report – Human Security SERBIA.

n.d.

[8]SeCond Development Initiative Group. Country Assessment Report – Human Security SERBIA.

n.d.

[9]SeCond Development Initiative Group. Country Assessment Report – Human Security SERBIA.

n.d.

1. Serbian Armed Forces (SAF)
   1. Consists of the army, airforce, training command and guard for the Republic of Serbia. Has historically cooperated with KFOR under the Joint Implementation Commission (JIC) throughout the Kosovo conflict.[1]
2. The Belgrade Center for Security Policy (BCSP)
   1. An independent think tank that advocates for human, national, regional and international security. This organization focuses on security sector reform and security integration of Western Balkan states into the Euro-Atlantic community. Their work includes research, public advocacy, publications and education. [2]
3. Provincial Safety Council
   1. Advisory body within the system of the Republic of Serbia. Main competencies include: assessment of security situation, crime prevention, public awareness, and coordination of security institutions [3]
4. National Security Council
   1. Main competency is consideration of national security issues. Also coordinates and directs work of security services and advises government on security budgeting [4]
5. Defence and Security Committee of the National Assembly (DSC)
   1. Reviews issues related to the SAF and Serbian defense system in accordance with the law [5]
6. Anti-Corruption Agency of Serbia (ACAS)
   1. An independent, autonomous state authority with its main objective being the improvement and prevention of corruption in Serbia by cooperation with public authorities, the civil sector, media and the public.
7. Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA)
   1. An ethnically Albanian nationalist group that fought for the independence of Kosovo from Serbia in the 1990s. Following numerous conflict between the KLA and the SAF, the KLA would eventually transform into the Kosovo Protection Corps that was founded as a civilian emergency services organization in 1999.

[1] Serbian Armed Forces. “Serbian Armed Forces.” Serbian Armed Forces | Serbian Armed Forces,

www.vs.rs/en/units/serbian-armed-forces.

[2] “BCSP.” Bezbednost, www.bezbednost.org/BCSP/2001/Home.shtml.

[3] Petrović, N., et al. “Gender and Security Sector Reform in Serbia .” Belgrade Center for Security

Policy , 2010, pp. 36–39., doi:https://issat.dcaf.ch/download/4954/43684/2010 Gender and SSR in Serbia_EN.pdf.

[4]Petrović, N., et al. “Gender and Security Sector Reform in Serbia .” Belgrade Center for Security

Policy , 2010, pp. 36–39., doi:https://issat.dcaf.ch/download/4954/43684/2010 Gender and SSR in Serbia_EN.pdf.

[5] Petrović, N., et al. “Gender and Security Sector Reform in Serbia .” Belgrade Center for Security

Policy , 2010, pp. 36–39., doi:https://issat.dcaf.ch/download/4954/43684/2010 Gender and SSR in Serbia_EN.pdf.

[6] Petrović, N., et al. “Gender and Security Sector Reform in Serbia .” Belgrade Center for Security

Policy , 2010, pp. 36–39., doi:https://issat.dcaf.ch/download/4954/43684/2010 Gender and SSR in Serbia_EN.pdf.

[7] Petrović, N., et al. “Gender and Security Sector Reform in Serbia .” Belgrade Center for Security

Policy , 2010, pp. 36–39., doi:https://issat.dcaf.ch/download/4954/43684/2010 Gender and SSR in Serbia_EN.pdf.

1. UN Mission to Kosovo (UNMIK)
   1. UNMIK was established by the United Nations Security Council in 1999 to ensure peaceful and normalized living conditions for all individuals living in Kosovo prior to Kosovo’s independence from Serbia in 2008. Also promotes regional stability in the Western Balkans and works in parallel with the OSCE under the Security Council Resolution 1244. [1]
2. The Contact Group (US Russia UK France Germany Italy)
   1. An informal international council consisting of great power foreign ministers created in response to the 1990 conflict in Bosnia. This group consists of representatives from the U.S., Russia, France, Germany and Italy as well as several permanent members of the UN Security Council. This group has key interest in the UN led process determining the independence of Kosovo. The Contact Group mainly acts by releasing public statements on the conflict situation. [2]
3. Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
   1. The OSCE Mission to Serbia focuses on assisting Serbia in building effective democratic institutions particularly government institutions, the media and civil society. They also strive to foster rule of law and reform the police force into a police service in Serbia. [3]
4. NATO
   1. Since the conclusion of the Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) in 2015, NATO’s main work with Serbia has centered on supporting Serbian authorities in achieving their reform goals. Previously they deployed the NATO led Kosovo Force (KFOR) to provide security during the height of conflict and cooperated with Serbian armed forces in fostering stability in the region. They currently focus on providing advice and assistance to the reform and modernization of Serbia’s armed forces. [4]
5. European Union
   1. The EU Mission to Serbia has contributed significant financial contributions to the country in support of establishing rule of law, democratic reform and social development. [5]
6. UNCIVPOL
   1. The UN Civilian Police Force was established to foster law and order during the Kosovo conflict and played a key role in enforcing human rights. In their work, they focused mainly on establishing a domestic law enforcement. [6]

[1] “Mandate.” UNMIK, 17 Feb. 2016, unmik.unmissions.org/mandate.

[2] “The Contact Group .” U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of State, 2001-

2009.state.gov/p/eur/ci/kv/c13102.htm.

[3] “OSCE Mission to Serbia.” OSCE, www.osce.org/mission-to-serbia.

[4] Nato. “NATO's Relations with Serbia.” NATO Military Liaison Office Belgrade - NATO's Relations

with Serbia, NAPLES - Allied Joint Force Command, jfcnaples.nato.int/mlo_belgrade/about-mlo-belgrade/natos-relationship-with-serbia.

[5] “EU Delegation to Serbia.” EUD, EU Delegation to Serbia , europa.rs/?lang=en.

[6] Decker, D. Christopher. “Enforcing Human Rights: The Role of the UN Civilian Police in

Kosovo.” International Peacekeeping, vol. 13, no. 4, 2006, pp. 502–516., doi:10.1080/13533310600988747.

“All setbacks, as well as progress, in the security sector reform are the inevitable result of conflicting internal political processes and tensions in Serbia” [1]

Post-Authoritarian Heritage

Pavlovic and Antonic point to the issue of Serbia’s “post-authoritarian heritage”: the lack of “necessary pre-requisites for the general democratic consolidation” and for security sector reform[2]. Overall low economic stability, years of a socio-politically oppressive communist dictatorship and a history of violent conflict concerning Kosovo and state sovereignty, all challenge the effectiveness of democratic reforms in term of actual institutional changes and targeting uneven economic development.

Parallelism of Processes

In post-conflict zones such as Serbia, “parallelism of processes” are a major challenge for SSR[3].  While these are all “directed towards the same goal (institutional reform and development of a consolidated democratic system),” they can also undermine their actual success through being, to some extent, mutually exclusive[4]. In times of widespread systematic, political and institutional change, processes may overlap or exclude each other - this may weaken the drive for assuring the completion of reforms of new political elites in the long-run[5].

Public Opinion

Considering Serbia's past zones of conflict and previous authoritarian leadership, public opinion generally perceives the state as both the provider of security but also the major source of insecurity. Security services, whether police, army or state security, are seen as “politicized instruments of those in power” - operating in secrecy as “a fist of the regime”[6]. Changing this opinion and ensuring depolitization of the security sector is thus a major barrier to successful reform.

[1]Hadžić, Miroslav. "Bilans reforme sektora bezbednosti Srbije ." Godišnjak reforme sektora

bezbednosti u Srbiji. Beograd: Centar za civil- no-vojne odnose, 2009. 19-27.

[2]Pavlovic, Antonic and Antonic Slobodan. Konsolidacija demokratskih ustanova u Srbiji posle

2000. Belgrad: godine, 2007

[3]Lišanin, Mladen. "Security Sector Reform in the Post-Authoritarian Environment." Western

Balkan Security Observer(2010): 115.

[4]Lišanin, Mladen. "Security Sector Reform in the Post-Authoritarian Environment." Western

Balkan Security Observer(2010): 115.

[5]Lišanin, Mladen. "Security Sector Reform in the Post-Authoritarian Environment." Western

Balkan Security Observer(2010): 115.

[6]Ćoragić, Denis. "Are Security and Intelligence Services in Serbia Politicized?" Western Balkans

Security Observer(2010): 115.

Despite promising initial efforts of Security Sector Reform (SSR) in Serbia, too many factors diminished the success of the SSR implementation over the long run. Powerful actors who had economic and political power to gain, were not in favour of strong regulations on the private security sector. This in turn, along with a history of abusive power by the security services and police of the nation, weakened the trust the people had toward the security sector. Attempts of politicising the security services was also largely overlooked, heightening the suspicion of the Serbian people.

A major setback of the security sector reform in Serbia has been the lack of legal regulation of the private sector. The presence of private sector companies (PSC’s) in Serbia have been in an upward trend, and it is estimated that there are 47,000 weapons in the possession of legal entities which have been regulated [1]. However, the nation remains the only post-socialist state (excluding Czech Republic) to have not properly regulated the sector, even years after the democratization transformation of the state [2]. Steps were taken in order to pass a draft law in 2003, however it was withdrawn from the parliament, without an explanation being publicly made [3]. It is in the mutual interest of the various actors including, political parties, private companies, and security services, to generate their profits and political strength from the private security sector of the nation [4]. Therefore, there is a presence of inefficacy of the judiciary, leading to crime and corruption. Furthermore, the adoption of laws regulating the private sector will not overcome all the existing interests of the powerful actors, and hence, economic reforms for the security services and police are needed to create truly impactful progression of the private security sector.

The lack of transparency between the state and the people of Serbia prevents the level of trust that is needed for successful SSR. Since 2003, the legislative regulations of the Serbian government have shifted toward more depoliticization [5]. A few laws were enacted to limit and regulate the power of the security services, as is custom with other modern democracies and security sectors. However, given the history of the Serbian security services like the police and state security as inflictors of insecurity by abusing their power, the public has not bought into the reform [6]. Hence, the negative public opinion toward the security sector has been a major drawback for SSR in the country, the belief being “Serbian public still largely believes that security services are politicised instruments of those in power, used, under the veil of secrecy, to support narrow political interests” [7]. Suspicion was raised over the Parliamentary Committee for Defense and Security, when no inquiry committee was put into place in order to investigate allegations of inter-party scandals targeting reform process politicisation [8]. The depoliticization of security services is vital in shifting the public opinion of the Serbian people into trusting the services, and hence, the focus should be to instill a General Inspector who would raise the effectiveness of the Parliamentary Committee for Defense and Security [9]. The presence of a General inspector can help persuade the people that abuse of power is not occurring behind the scenes for the benefit of powerful actors.

The barriers to fulfilling key fundamentals of the SSR model have held back the implementation of security sector reform in Serbia. There has been a lack of transparency regarding security planning information [10], between powerful actors invested in the security sector and the people of Serbia. Furthermore, democratic accountability and oversight being effective governance of the security sector [11], not met because of the insufficient regulations governing the private security sector. An inability to meet these norms and principles of the model has largely held back the progression of the SSR process. Despite efforts made after the democratic transformation of Serbia in 2000 to enact laws and regulations, depoliticising the private security sector and security services, the nation has largely struggled to create effective and long-lasting reform. The SSR implementation in Serbia similar to many other global examples, experienced an initial rapid growth in the SSR normative framework, followed by poor enforcement and practise of the policies [12]. The nation must overcome these barriers through enacting proper reform, and effective enforcement of the regulations.

[1] Petrović, N., et al. “Reserved Domains as Obstacles to Adopting the Law on Private Security

Sector.” Belgrade Center for Security Policy, (2010), pp. 36–39.

[2] Petrović, N., et al. “Reserved Domains as Obstacles to Adopting the Law on Private Security

Sector.” Belgrade Center for Security Policy, (2010), pp. 36–39.

[3] Petrović, N., et al. “Reserved Domains as Obstacles to Adopting the Law on Private Security

Sector.” Belgrade Center for Security Policy, (2010), pp. 36–39.

[4] Petrović, N., et al. “Reserved Domains as Obstacles to Adopting the Law on Private Security

Sector.” Belgrade Center for Security Policy, (2010), pp. 36–39.

[5] Ćoragić, Denis. "Are Security and Intelligence Services in Serbia Politicized?" Western

Balkans Security Observer, (2010), pp. 29-39.

[6] Ćoragić, Denis. "Are Security and Intelligence Services in Serbia Politicized?" Western

Balkans Security Observer, (2010), pp. 29-39.

[7] Ćoragić, Denis. "Are Security and Intelligence Services in Serbia Politicized?" Western

Balkans Security Observer, (2010), pp. 29-39.

[8] Ćoragić, Denis. "Are Security and Intelligence Services in Serbia Politicized?" Western

Balkans Security Observer, (2010), pp. 29-39.

[9] Ćoragić, Denis. "Are Security and Intelligence Services in Serbia Politicized?" Western

Balkans Security Observer, (2010), pp. 29-39.

[10] Sedra, Mark., et al. “Security Sector Reform 101: Understanding the Concept, Charting

Trends and Identifying Challenges.” Security Sector Reform Resource Centre, (2010), pp. 1-23.

[11] Sedra, Mark., et al. “Security Sector Reform 101: Understanding the Concept, Charting

Trends and Identifying Challenges.” Security Sector Reform Resource Centre, (2010), pp. 1-23.

[12] Sedra, Mark., et al. “Security Sector Reform 101: Understanding the Concept, Charting

Trends and Identifying Challenges.” Security Sector Reform Resource Centre, (2010), pp. 1-23.

The Citizens’ Opinion of the Police in Serbia in 2018 - Public Opinion Survey conducted by Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (2018)  http://www.bezbednost.org/All-publications/6887/The-Citizens-Opinion-of-the-Police-in-Serbia.shtml

Belgrade Centre for Security Policy Resources - Library of resources and publications on SSR in Serbia http://www.bezbednost.org/BCSP/2429/Publications.shtml/nav_start=

NATO's Relationship with Serbia - Military Liaison Office Belgrade / NATO MLO (2015) https://jfcnaples.nato.int/mlo_belgrade/about-mlo-belgrade/natos-relationship-with-serbia

Policing the Economic Transition in Serbia: An assessment of the Serbian Police Service's capacities to fight economic crime - OSCE Report by Reto Brunhart and Novak Gajić (2005) https://web.archive.org/web/20081207005707/http://www.osce.org/publications/fry/2005/02/18263_551_en.pdf

Corruption in Serbia: Bribery as Experienced by the Population - United Nations Office On Drugs and Crime (2011) https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/statistics/corruption/Serbia_corruption_report_web.pdf

Constitutional Reform of Serbian Judiciary - Marina Matic (2018) http://www.bezbednost.org/All-publications/6761/Constitutional-reform-of-Serbian-judiciary.shtml

Human Rights in Serbia 2018 - Belgrade Center for Human Rights (2018) http://www.bgcentar.org.rs/bgcentar/eng-lat/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Human-Rights-in-Serbia-2018.pdf

Draft of the Law on Military Intelligence Agency and Military Security Agency - Brief review by Predrag Petrovic (2009) http://www.bezbednost.org/All-publications/4179/A-brief-review-of-the-Draft-of-the-Law-on-the.shtml

Police Reform in Serbia: Towards the Creation of a Modern and Accountable Police Force - Law Enforcement Department OSCE Mission to Serbia and Montenegro (2004) https://www.osce.org/serbia/18310?download=true

Western Balkan Pulse for Police Integrity and Trust (POINTPULSE) - Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (Bojan Elek , Gorana Radovanovic, Sasa Djordjevic) (2015) http://bezbednost.org/All-projects/5711/Western-Balkans-Pulse-for-Police-Integrity-and.shtml

Lišanin, M. (2010). Security Sector Reform in the Post-Authoritarian Environment. Western       

Balkan Security Observer, 115.

Lišanin focuses on the effect of the post-authoritarian context on the efficiency and success of the security sector process. She criticizes, that while there are obvious barriers and conflict that arise in reforming a post-authoritarian security sector, the context itself was not fully used enough to its advantage, nor where the disadvantages connected to this authoritarian and conflict environment removed to the extent necessary to make SSR sustainable. The author's work is primarily theoretical, highlighting the Serbia's unique parallelism of processes that need to be overcome by Security Sector Reform - this notion is featured in the barriers to successful reform. 

Center for Euro-Atlantic Studies. (2012, November). For a More Dynamic Reform of the Security

Sector in Serbia. Retrieved from The Central and Eastern European Online Library: https://www-ceeol-com.ezproxy.library.ubc.ca/search/viewpdf?id=545370

The Center for Euro-Atlantic Studies uses quantitative data gathered from a poll about the perception of the security sector in Serbia on the governmental and civil society level, to evaluate the success of SSR and recommend further reforms. Most importantly, the study finds that most respondents continue to perceive the private security sector as a threat to citizens and the state. Moreover, Serbia's National Security Strategy and Defense Strategy are found to be considered inadequate documents by Serbians. On the basis of these findings, the CEAS recommends further reform of the security sector: urgent regulation of the private security sector, further EU integration, continuous work but not accession with the NATO and new strategic documentation for all policy areas. By evaluating citizen's opinions, the study and analysis of findings provide a very comprehensive picture of major obstacles of SSR in 2012 - it dampens the perception of the reform’s successes. 

Ćoragić, D. (2010). Are Security and Intelligence Services in Serbia Politicized? Western Balkans

Security Observer, 115.

In this article, Ćoragić evaluates whether the Serbian security services should still be considered as a highly politicized entity that serves the narrow interest of a small political elite. Most of the Serbian general public continues to perceive the state's security services this way. While the author comes to the conclusion that, Serbia’s security service has undergone vast depoliticization, Ćoragić points to how this process, just like the rest of Serbia's security sector reform and democratization, is far from implemented. This paper helps clarify the importance of public opinion in barriers to reform as civil society is highly aware of this lack of implementation. However it lacks specific quantitive research, which would have been valuable to analyze the effects of public opinion more closely.

Gardner, A.-M. (2008, July). Beyond Standards before Status: Democratic Governance and Non-State

Actors. Retrieved from Cambridge University Press: https://www-jstor org.ezproxy.library.ubc.ca/stable/pdf/40212488.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A02feb0fb82ee22c37debbd67a2c3096e

Gardner examines the relationship between self-determination claims of sub-state actors that have internalized internationally respected norms of democratization and the willingness of the international community to support such self-governance. Her concluding argument assumes that the international community is more likely to support self-determination of groups that have internalized human rights and liberal democratic norms - the essential notions of democratic governance. However, as local standards of legitimacy may not coincide with these international standards, this can pose a serious issue when applied to the success of security sector reform in post-authoritarian states. Gardner’s work is not specific to Serbia and thus has its limitations, but she looks closely at Kosovo and thus provides a general sense of issues that SSR has to overcome and foreign actors need to consider.

Radovanovic, G., Radoman, J., Petrovic, P., & Popovic, D. (2011). Context analysis of the security

sector reform in Serbia 1989-2009. Belgrade: Belgrade Centre for Security Policy .

This in-depth context analysis was compiled for the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy and provides a comprehensive understanding of Serbia's socio-political environment and historical context. By splitting the analysis into two parts - the Milosevic era (1989-2000) and the beginning of reforms (2000-2009) - the reader is able to grapple the major issues faced in the creation of security sector reform and that these issues stem from the Milosevic era and authoritarian rule. The context analysis focuses specifically on the corruption, elitism and personal link to Milosevic in the military, police and private security complex and less on human rights, civilian perception or experience of judicial issues. This document is key for developing an understanding of the multi-faceted security challenges that persist to this day.

SeCons Development Initiative Group. (n.d.). Country Assessment Report – Human Security SERBIA.

The Country Assessment Report clearly and concisely outlines some of the key issues of Serbia's security sector reforms. As the focus of this report on human security, it mainly summarizes the way in which security sector reform has helped transform civilian life in Serbia over the last two decades, while not going into much closer detail of security reforms involving the military, police or judiciary. However, the Report’s focus on the overlying security narratives, clarifies why the main policies, institutions and instruments of SSR were deemed necessary in the first place. This report is rather short and therefore serves as an essential overview of security sector reform.

Petrović, N. (2010). Gender and Security Sector Reform in Serbia. Retrieved from Belgrade Center

for Security Policy: doi:https://issat.dcaf.ch/download/4954/43684/2010 Gender and SSR in Serbia_EN.pdf.

The Belgrade Centre for Security Policy published this study on gender and the security sector in Serbia in order to closely examine women’s status as actors and receivers of SSR since 2000. The findings of this major study was presented in front of the National Assembly in 2010 and is a key work that attempts to help include the gender perspective in Serbia's security reforms. The findings celebrate the existence of the necessary framework for inclusion and positive steps of inclusion in the police force. However, major criticism of underrepresentation of women in the security sector is linked back to overall socio-cultural prejudice of the traditional role for women. Overall, only a small number of women can be found in position that rewire major decision-making. This work provides a dimension of security sector reform that is often overlooked in the wake of powerful security discourse and democratization – the way in which gender plays a role for key domestic actors and may undermine SSR. This is an essential foundation for creating an inclusive database.

OSCE Mission to Serbia. (2015, October 26). War crimes proceedings in Serbia (2003-2014) - An

analysis of the OSCE Mission to Serbia’s monitoring results. Retrieved from Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe: https://www.osce.org/serbia/194461?download=true

This analysis, authored by the OSCE Mission to Serbia in 2015, monitors the results of war crimes proceedings in Serbia from 2003-2014 and finds some major criticisms that connect to limitations of effective security sector reform. Overall, this study criticizes the relatively small amount of actual war crime cases, the little amount of state support for victims, the lack of witness protection, general trend of lenient sentencing and the failure to prosecute political elites. The OSCE does acknowledge the complicated process of holding the state and its actors accountable for past war crimes, in midst of democratic overhaul and security sector reform. This source is essential for evaluating the successes of SSR in terms of democratization of the judiciary and general public opinion. In the future, an updated report on the last five years of war crimes proceedings would be beneficial for the database.

Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe. (2018, December 31). Mission to Serbia .

Retrieved from Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe: https://www.osce.org/mission-to-serbia/285186?download=true

The Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE)’s Mission to Serbia is a field operation set up in 2001, officially invited by the Serbian state. This document outlines the mission’s mandate: the democratization of Serbia’s institutions, judiciary and reforming the police force. By providing detailed explanations on the organization's work in the areas of rule of law and human rights, security co-operation, democratization and media - this source points to OSCE's focus on accountability mechanisms within its mandate. This source does not provide any analysis or any critical approach to the OSCE's own work, however the information is essential to understand the different actor's involvement in key issue areas of SSR and also points to a relatively overlooked aspect of reforms that the organization has been focusing on - democratization of the media.

Ćoragić, Denis. "Are Security and Intelligence Services in Serbia Politicized?" Western Balkans

Security Observer(2010): 115.

Belgrade Centre for Security Policy. Belgrade Centre for Security Policy. 2018. 1 February 2019.

<http://www.bezbednost.org/National-Security/2495/Police.shtml>.

Center for Euro-Atlantic Studies. "For a More Dynamic Reform of the Security Sector in Serbia."

November 2012. The Central and Eastern European Online Library .<https://www-ceeol-com.ezproxy.library.ubc.ca/search/viewpdf?id=545370>.

Decker, D. Christopher. "Enforcing Human Rights: The Role of the UN Civilian Police in Kosovo."

International Peacekeeping13 no. 4, 2006.4 (2006): 502-516. <doi:10.1080/13533310600988747>.

EUD. "EU Delegation to Serbia." n.d. EU Delegation to Serbia .<europa.rs/?lang=en.>.

Gardner, Anne-Marie. "Beyond Standards before Status: Democratic Governance and Non-State

Actors." July 2008. Cambridge University Press.<https://www-jstor-org.ezproxy.library.ubc.ca/stable/pdf/40212488.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A02feb0fb82ee22c37debbd67a2c3096e>.

Hadžić, Miroslav. "Achievements of Security Sector Reform in Serbia." Year: 2008 Security Sector

Reform: Achievements and Prospects. Belgrade: Centre for Civil-Military Relations, 2008. 174.

Hadžić, Miroslav. "Bilans reforme sektora bezbednosti Srbije ." Godišnjak reforme sektora

bezbednosti u Srbiji. Beograd: Centar za civil- no-vojne odnose, 2009. 19-27.

Lišanin, Mladen. "Security Sector Reform in the Post-Authoritarian Environment." Western

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Demobilization in the Great Lakes Region
Rwanda needs to address the issue of Non-State Armed Groups (NSAGs) to ensure security across the country. Currently, Hutu-led NSAGs are operating in the Democratic Republic of Congo, along with various other groups from different countries. There are approximately 25 armed groups within the Great Lakes Region, which consists of 8 countries, including Rwanda (1). Unfortunately, Rwanda’s attempt at demobilization within the country has no effect on these NSAGs, making them unpredictable and dangerous. Furthermore, insecurity within the region greatly affects insecurity in Rwanda. Conducting regional peacebuilding must be the next step for the Rwandan Government if they want to create peace and security within the country.

Integration
Rwanda must also focus on the social and economic reintegration of demobilized NSAGs of Rwandan nationality. Although Rwanda has already shown they are willing to and capable of carrying out these integration processes, it will be an ongoing task that the country must face to prevent future conflict within the country.

Degree of Democracy
Although Rwanda routinely conducts democratic elections, the government seems to be a one-party system. The following issues raise concern in regard to the degree of democracy in the country: ban on political grassroots initiatives, unequal media coverage of other candidates due to the nature of state-run media, lack of competitive elections - Paul Kagame has been President since 2000 (2). To prevent future uprising or conflict, this issue must be addressed.

Inclusion
It could be argued there is a lack of inclusion when it comes to Security Sector Reform in Rwanda. For instance, Rwanda’s military, the Rwandan Defense Force (RDF), is fundamentally the same group as the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), which is mainly comprised of Tutsis. There has been a “de-tutsification” of the military at the lower levels, leaving the Tutsi ethnic minorities to lead the military (3). Similarly, in the government, there is a majority of Tutsi in office and even the President, Paul Kagame, was the leader of the RPF. To ensure there is no ethnic divide, positions throughout the military and the government must be open for all citizens in the country.

1. Podder, Sukanya. “Non-State Armed Groups and Stability: Reconsidering Legitimacy and Inclusion.” Contemporary Security Policy, vol. 34, no. 1, 2013, pp. 33., doi:10.1080/13523260.2013.771029.
2. Kiwuwa, David Emmanuel. “Democratization and Ethnic Politics: Rwandas Electoral Legacy.” Ethnopolitics, vol. 4, no. 4, 2005, pp. 445., doi:10.1080/17449050500348568.
3. Jowell, Marco. “Cohesion through Socialization: Liberation, Tradition and Modernity in the Forging of the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF).” Journal of Eastern African Studies, vol. 8, no. 2, 2014, pp. 279., doi:10.1080/17531055.2014.891715.

Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR)
The Rwandan Armed Forces (Forces Armée Rwandaises), or FAR, is the military of the former Hutu-dominated government, in power prior to the 1994 genocide (1). FAR was one of the main groups involved in the genocide, and there have since been efforts to demobilize and reintegrate FAR combatants into Rwandan society (2). However, this is difficult to achieve because many now reside in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Rwanda has accused them of continuing to destabilize the country from the DRC (3). It has also been difficult to convince many members of FAR to return home to begin the DDR process (4).

Interahamwe
The Interahamwe is a Hutu civilian militia unit which, under the previous Hutu government, was trained to attack Tutsi civilians (5). Like the FAR, they were involved in committing the 1994 genocide, and have since been difficult to demobilize and reintegrate due to their escape into the DRC (6). They have also been accused by the Rwandan government of attempting to destabilize Rwanda from the DRC (7).

Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda (FDLR)
The Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda (FDLR) is a Hutu rebel force primarily located in the North and South Kivu provinces of eastern DRC (8). Members of the FDLR were involved in the 1994 genocide (9), and although they are no longer considered a military threat to Rwanda, the group continues to operate in DRC (10). Currently, the Rwandan Demobilization and Reintegration Commission aims to demobilize and reintegrate members of the FDLR by creating programs which encourage members to defect and return to Rwanda so they can be reintegrated into the country (11).

Rwanda Patriotic Army/Rwandan Defense Forces (RPA/RDF)
The Rwanda Patriotic Army (RPA) was a rebel group, predominantly composed of Rwandan Tutsis (12). The RPA’s invasion of Rwanda in 1994 ended the genocide, and the group took control of the country, with the associated political party remaining in power today (13). However, the group has been accused of committing human rights abuses during their invasion (14). The first stage of the Rwandan Demobilization and Reintegration Commission primarily focused on demobilizing the RPA, although, due to a lack of funding, little support was provided for reintegration (15). Today, with civilian control of the military institutionalized in Rwanda, the RPA has been renamed as the Rwandan Defense Forces (RDF) (16).

Government of Rwanda
The Government of Rwanda is the major domestic actor in security sector reform and has created the Rwandan Demobilization and Reintegration Commission to oversee DDR processes in the country (17). It has also undertaken efforts to reform the police service (18), and control small arms in Rwanda (19). However, the government has been accused of authoritarian practices (20) and only placing Tutsis in higher leadership positions, which could reignite tensions in the state (21).

Ministry of Internal Security
The Ministry of Internal Security is responsible for protecting security and rule of law in Rwanda, and so has been involved in security sector reform efforts (22). In particular, it oversees both the Rwanda National Police and the national prison system, and so has participated in work to reform both these areas (23).

Rwandan Demobilization and Reintegration Commission (RDRC)
The Rwandan Demobilization and Reintegration Commission (RDRC), established in 1997, oversees the planning and implementation of the Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Programme for ex-combatants (24). It assists with the demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration of members of all armed groups into their communities (25). The RDRC is involved in many areas of the DDR process, including creating programming which encourages current combatants to defect (26), offering courses on how Rwanda has changed since former combatants left the country (27), and helping ex-combatants to reintegrate by providing health services (28), employment training (29), help obtaining a job (30), and monetary assistance to ex-combatants (31).

Rwanda National Police
The Rwanda National Police was created in 2000 when the government merged the three previously existing police forces (the Gendarmerie Nationale, the Communal Police, and the Judicial Police) into one (32). As part of the demilitarization process of the country, it has been the target of reforms to professionalize its officers and ensure greater gender equality (33). However, it has also been accused of threatening journalists who criticize the government (34), and, due to the small number of police officers, is still reliant on community policing in more remote and rural areas (35).

Pro-Femmes/Twese Hamwe (PF/TH)
Pro-Femmes/Twese Hamwe (PF/TH) is an umbrella organization which works for the advancement of women, peace, and development in Rwanda (36). It has assisted with the work of the RDRC, successfully leading reintegration programs for over 3000 ex-combatants as well as providing counseling services to former combatants (37).

Rwanda Peace Academy
The Rwanda Peace Academy offers training and research programs related to challenges which may emerge post-conflict in Africa (38). It works towards conflict prevention and management and so has offered courses on security sector reform, including in 2012 when it hosted a security sector reform course that drew participants from regional military, police and civilian institutions from nine countries (39).

1. Nelson Alusala, Disarmament and Reconciliation: Rwanda’s concerns, Institute for Security Studies, 2005, Web, reliefweb.int/report/rwanda/disarmament-and-reconciliation-rwandas-concerns.
2. Alusala.
3. Alusala.
4. Alusala.
5. Phil Clark, “Bringing Them All Back Home: The Challenges of DDR and Transitional Justice in Contexts of Displacement in Rwanda and Uganda,” Journal of Refugee Studies, vol. 27, no. 2, 2014, pp. 234-259, Oxford University Press, doi: 10.1093/jrs/fet051 240-241.
6. Alusala.
7. Alusala.
8. Clark 241.
9. Clark 241.
10. Ingrid Samset, “Building a Repressive Peace: The Case of Post-Genocide Rwanda,” Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, vol. 5, no. 3, 2011, pp.265-283, Taylor and Francis Online, doi:10.1080/17502977.2011.566485 268.
11. Clark 241.
12. Lars Waldorf, Transitional Justice and DDR: The Case of Rwanda, International Center for Transitional Justice, 2009, Web, www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-DDR-Rwanda-CaseStudy-2009-English.pdf 8.
13. Alusala.
14. Alusala.
15. Waldorf 9-10.
16. Martin Edmonds, Greg Mills and Terence McNamee, “Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and Local Ownership in the Great Lakes: The Experience of Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of Congo,” African Security, vol. 2, no. 1, 2009, pp. 29-58, Taylor and Francis Online, doi:10.1080/19362200902766383 41.
17. Edmonds, Mills and McNamee 41.
18. ISSAT, Rwanda SSR Snapshot, 2015, https://issat.dcaf.ch/Learn/Resource-Library/Country-Profiles/Rwanda-SSR-Snapshot.
19. Alusala.
20. ISSAT.
21. Nina Wilén, “A Hybrid Peace through Locally Owned and Externally Financed SSR-DDR in Rwanda?” Third World Quarterly, vol. 33, no. 7, 2012, pp. 1323-1336, Taylor and Francis Online, doi: 10.1080/01436597.2012.691833 1329.
22. ISSAT.
23. ISSAT.
24. Edmonds, Mills and McNamee 41.
25. Waldorf, 9; Edmonds, Mills and McNamee 41.
26. Molly Karna Lynderup Cohen, Conflict Resolution through Defection Programming: The Case of Rwanda and the Forces Démocratiques Pour la Libération du Rwanda / Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, 2017, Tulane University, PhD Dissertation, ProQuest, search-proquest-com.ezproxy.library.ubc.ca/docview/2001284066?pq-origsite=summon 13.
27. Alusala
28. Clark 242.
29. Waldorf 10.
30. Alusala
31. ISSAT.
32. ISSAT.
33. ISSAT.
34. ISSAT.
35. Bruce Baker, “Post-War Policing by Communities in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Rwanda,” Democracy and Security, vol. 3, no. 2, 2007, pp. 215-236, Taylor and Francis Online, doi:  10.1080/17419160701483753 215.
36. Peace Insight, Pro-Femmes/Twese Hamwe (PFTH), 2017, https://www.peaceinsight.org/conflicts/rwanda/peacebuilding-organisations/pro-femmes/.
37. Peace Insight.
38. ISSAT.
39. ISSAT.

Although various intergovernmental organizations assisted Rwanda with SSR, the presence of international actors was limited. Various states and organizations have donated funds, however, Rwanda is known for taking local ownership over the process of SSR (1).

World Bank
The World Bank created and completed two projects within Rwanda to help with SSR. The first project, the Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Project, focused on the demobilization of ex-combatants, supporting social and economic transitions for ex-combatants and promoting reallocation of Government funding to social and economic sectors (2). The other project, The Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project, aimed to demobilize members of armed groups from Rwanda and the Rwandan Defence Force. In particular, it focused on reintegration of the individuals, especially female, child and disabled ex-combatants (3).

United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR)
The United Nations also played a significant role in Rwanda. UNAMIR was intended to monitor the ceasefire agreement, establish a demilitarized zone (DMZ), begin the process of demobilization and provide security for refugees or displaced persons (4). However, once the genocide began, UNAMIR troops quickly began to leave Rwanda, allowing the genocide to continue without international help.

The United Nations Development Programme
The UNDP for the Justice Sector Support Programme contributed US$ 1.3 million to mend Rwanda’s justice system in the following areas: protection of human rights, increasing the justice system’s accessibility for vulnerable groups, and developing better connections between law enforcement and the justice system (5).

Financial Donations
There were many financial donations made by international actors to the domestic program: the Rwandan Demobilization and Reintegration Program. Most notably, the World Bank (US$ 27 million), Multi-Donors Trust Fund (US$ 14.4 million), Department for International Development (US$ 8.8 million), and Germany – Kreditanstalt fuer Wiederaufbau (US$ 2.7 million) (6).

1. Nina Wilén, “A Hybrid Peace through Locally Owned and Externally Financed SSR-DDR in Rwanda?” Third World Quarterly, 33(2012): 13294, 6 February 2019. DOI: 10.1080/01436597.2012.691833.
2. “Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Project,” The World Bank, online, 10 February 2019. Available: http://projects.worldbank.org/P075129/rwanda-demobilization-reintegration-project?lang=en.
3. “Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project,” The World Bank, 10 February 2019. Available: http://projects.worldbank.org/p112712/second-emergency-demobilization-reintegration-project?lang=en.
4. “UNAMIR.” United Nations, Sept. 1996, online, 15 February 2019. Available: www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unamir_b.htm.
5. ISSAT, “Rwanda SSR Snapshot,” ISSAT, 2015, online, 6 February 2019. Available: https://issat.dcaf.ch/Learn/Resource-Library/Country-Profiles/Rwanda-SSR-Snapshot.
6. ISSAT, online.

The Role of International Actors

The role of international actors has greatly harmed Rwanda’s SSR process, especially in the beginning phases. For instance, in the Arusha peace talks of 1993, France wanted to be seen as a third-party mediator, however, they continued to provide weapons to the Hutu-led government (1). As a result, the Arusha Agreements failed to provide security due to France’s involvement in supporting the Hutu led government. Additionally, the lack of involvement by the UN and UNAMIR led to the failure of the Arusha Agreements and the continuation of the genocide. The UN clearly refused to be involved in the conflict, particularly when the UNAMIR leader, Roméo Dallaire, request for more support was denied, and in return troops were taken out of Rwanda (2).

Political tensions in Rwanda

By the end of the Rwandan Civil War, Rwanda was a weak state. Wanting more power, President Habyarimana’s dictatorship did not respect the Arusha Agreements and eventually broke the ceasefire. If the government was more inclusive for both Hutu and Tutsi citizens, further conflict may have been prevented and the country could have begun a successful peace process and SSR. Even today, Rwanda’s politics and government have been accused of being anti-democratic and being Tutsi-dominated, which could create future conflicts or uprisings.

Ethnic Division of Rwanda

The ethnic divide between Hutus and Tutsis made it hard for reforms and peace to be implemented within Rwanda. Various media outlets, such as Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines, demonized the Tutsi population and ultimately assisted in the spreading of the genocide. Overall, this barrier to successful reform was caused by the ethnic division of Rwanda and demonstrates how media sources further promoted the divide among citizens.

A Wrong Interpretation of Democracy

Prior to the genocide, the Hutu-led government shared a harmful interpretation of democracy - where majority rules in the idea that the ethnic majority rules. Since ethnic Hutus citizens made up a majority (80%) of the population, they felt that they had the legal right to control and persecute the Tutsi population. Although this is not so much a current issue, this understanding was one of the major barriers to successful reform before the genocide.

1. Schirer, Antoine, “Génocide au Rwanda : quel rôle a exactement joué la France?” Le Monde, 26 October 2018. https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/video/2018/10/26/genocide-au-rwanda-quel-role-a-exactement-joue-la-france_5374967_3212.html
2. Dallaire, Roméo, and Brent Beardsley. Shake Hands with the Devil: the Failure of Humanity in Rwanda. Arrow, 2004.

Since the 1994 genocide, Rwanda has become a relatively peaceful country (1), however, ongoing structural issues still need to be addressed for one to say security sector reform (SSR) has been entirely successful. Rwanda largely accomplished its goals related to SSR in certain areas, such as domestic control over the process (2), and internal disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) (3). Yet, SSR has been less successful regarding DDR outside the country, ongoing inequality, and a semi-democratic government (4).

Rwanda’s experience of SSR is notable, and was in part successful, because the process was primarily locally controlled (5). Few international actors were involved in SSR other than providing funding (6), allowing it to be designed to best suit the country’s needs. Often, international actors have preconceived understandings of best practices and will attempt to implement them everywhere (7). However, these strategies may not be the most successful due to differences between countries which external actors may not understand (8). In Rwanda, the government fought to have control over SSR, and this enabled it to tailor the process to best suit its needs, ensuring it did not conflict with local values (9). Consequently, the process was more successful, and through the government’s methods, such as the gacaca courts (10), or locally operated centers of DDR (11), peace was able to be created internally (12).

One aspect of SSR which worked well in Rwanda was the gacaca courts which addressed the lower level perpetrators of the genocide (13). By taking a process which previously existed in communities to deal with local grievances, and applying it to the genocide, the state was both able to work towards greater reconciliation in the country (14), as the community run process is much more about dialogue than a traditional court (15), and reduce the number of people imprisoned (16). Since there were so many people involved in the genocide, attempting to try and imprison all of them would have put an enormous strain on the justice system (17). As well, it would have promoted a more retributive form of justice, and consequently undermined reconciliation (18). Instead, the gacaca courts were able to deal with those involved in the genocide, and help communities reconcile, making them extremely important because they were able to help resolve widespread violence (19).

Additionally, DDR within Rwanda has been effective because the process has been completed for those who remained in Rwanda after the genocide (20). Initially, there were concerns about ex-combatants being fully accepted by the community, and able to support themselves (21). These issues are no longer as widespread since most ex-combatants have, through the education process and state assistance, been able to support themselves, and have become accepted by the communities in which they live (22).

However, DDR has not been entirely successful because many armed groups outside Rwanda still threaten the state’s security (23). This includes Rwandans who fled the country after the RPA gained control and could destabilize the state through cross-border attacks (24). Although Rwanda has attempted to entice these combatants to voluntarily demobilize (25), and continues to run its DDR process for new defectors (26), a significant number of combatants in the DRC have not been demobilized (27), and so threaten to undermine the region’s security (28).

As well, underlying issues could lead to future violence. Due to the fact the Tutsi-controlled RPA ended the genocide by taking control of the country (29), many high-level positions in the government and military, including the justice and police sectors, are occupied by Tutsis (30). Consequently, the historical ethnic distinction is reinforced, and although officially prohibited today (31), it could lead to violence if Hutus begin to feel oppressed. This is particularly likely since Rwanda is only semi-democratic (32). The country’s current leader, Kagame, has been in power since the end of the genocide, and elections are not entirely free or fair (33). As a result, the government’s composition may not accurately reflect society. If Hutus demand greater representation, there could be ethnic violence which would undo all that has been achieved since the end of the genocide.

Overall, while SSR in Rwanda has been successful at creating a relatively peaceful country (34), this has primarily been achieved by reinforcing the historical distinction responsible for the genocide (35). The DDR and gacaca processes have helped reduce violence in the country, and promote reconciliation (36). However, combatants outside the country (37), and the predominantly Tutsi-controlled government and military could mean that if something reignites ethnic tensions, the situation could quickly become out of control (38). Ultimately, to ensure Rwanda remains peaceful, the structural issues that contributed to the genocide need to be addressed, including more equal representation in the security sector.

1. Ingrid Samset, “Building a Repressive Peace: The Case of Post-Genocide Rwanda,” Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, vol. 5, no. 3, 2011, pp.265-283, Taylor and Francis Online, doi:10.1080/17502977.2011.566485 265.
2. Nina Wilén, “A Hybrid Peace through Locally Owned and Externally Financed SSR-DDR in Rwanda?” Third World Quarterly, vol. 33, no. 7, 2012, pp. 1323-1336, Taylor and Francis Online, doi: 10.1080/01436597.2012.691833 1324.
3. Phil Clark, “Bringing Them All Back Home: The Challenges of DDR and Transitional Justice in Contexts of Displacement in Rwanda and Uganda,” Journal of Refugee Studies, vol. 27, no. 2, 2014, pp. 234-259, Oxford University Press, doi: 10.1093/jrs/fet051 241.
4. Nelson Alusala, Disarmament and Reconciliation: Rwanda’s concerns, Institute for Security Studies, 2005, Web, reliefweb.int/report/rwanda/disarmament-and-reconciliation-rwandas-concerns.
5. Marco Jowell, “Cohesion through socialization: liberation, tradition and modernity in the forging of the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF).” Journal of Eastern African Studies, vol. 8, no. 2, 2014, pp. 278-293. Taylor and Francis Online, doi: 10.1080/17531055.2014.891715 280.
6. ISSAT, Rwanda SSR Snapshot, 2015, https://issat.dcaf.ch/Learn/Resource-Library/Country-Profiles/Rwanda-SSR-Snapshot.
7. Wilén 1324.
8. Wilén 1324.
9. Antonia Does, Inclusivity and Local Perspectives in Peacebuilding: Issues, Lessons, Challenges, Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation and Geneva Peacebuilding Platform, 2013, Web, www.gpplatform.ch/sites/default/files/PP%2008%20-%20Inclusivity%20of%20Local%20Perspectives%20in%20PB%20July%202013.pdf 2.
10. Does 2.
11. Wilén 1330-1331.
12. ISSAT.
13. Lars Waldorf, Transitional Justice and DDR: The Case of Rwanda, International Center for Transitional Justice, 2009, Web, www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-DDR-Rwanda-CaseStudy-2009-English.pdf 11.
14. Samset 265.
15. Waldorf 4.
16. Alusala.
17. The contribution of the Gacaca jurisdictions to resolving cases arising from the genocide: Contributions, limitations and expectations of the post-Gacaca phase, PRI, 2010, Web, cdn.penalreform.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/Gacaca_final_2010_en.pdf 15-16.
18. The contribution of the Gacaca jurisdictions to resolving cases arising from the genocide 29-30.
19. The contribution of the Gacaca jurisdictions to resolving cases arising from the genocide 29.
20. The contribution of the Gacaca jurisdictions to resolving cases arising from the genocide 19.
21. Waldorf 4.
22. Martin Edmonds, Greg Mills and Terence McNamee, “Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and Local Ownership in the Great Lakes: The Experience of Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of Congo,” African Security, vol. 2, no. 1, 2009, pp. 29-58, Taylor and Francis Online, doi:10.1080/19362200902766383 41.
23. Edmonds, Mills and McNamee 41.
24. Martin Bishop, “Reintegration of demobilized soldiers,” The New Times, 17 June 2011, www.newtimes.co.rw/section/read/97709
25. Alusala.
26. Alusala.
27. Molly Karna Lynderup Cohen, Conflict Resolution through Defection Programming: The Case of Rwanda and the Forces Démocratiques Pour la Libération du Rwanda / Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, 2017, Tulane University, PhD Dissertation, ProQuest, search-proquest-com.ezproxy.library.ubc.ca/docview/2001284066?pq-origsite=summon 13.
28. Edmonds, Mills and McNamee 41.
29. Edmonds, Mills and McNamee 41.
30. Alusala.
31. Alusala.
32. Wilén 1329; ISSAT.
33. ISSAT.
34. ISSAT.
35. Jason Burke, “Paul Kagame re-elected president with 99% of vote in Rwanda election,” The Guardian, 5 August 2017, www.theguardian.com/world/2017/aug/05/paul-kagame-secures-third-term-in-rwanda-presidential-election; Samset 275-276; ISSAT.
36. Samset 265.
37. Wilén 1329; ISSAT.
38. Edmonds, Mills and McNamee 41; Waldorf 4.

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World Bank. Rwanda demobilization and reintegration project. World Bank, 2002, reliefweb.int/report/rwanda/rwanda-demobilization-and-reintegration-project.

Baker, Bruce. “Post-War Policing by Communities in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Rwanda.”  Democracy and Security, vol. 3, no. 2, 2007, pp. 215-236. Taylor and Francis Online, https://doi-org.ezproxy.library.ubc.ca/10.1080/17419160701483753. Accessed 13 March 2019.

        This article compares post-war policing in Sierra Leone, Liberia and Rwanda, focusing on community-based policing. The author argues the conflict helps shape the form and function of community-based policing, as factors such as the outcome of the conflict, the ideology of the new regime, the stability of the peace, and public attitudes toward policing following conflict experiences, all impact the structure of the police. Baker makes it clear community-based policing is rarely as separated from the state as may be believed, although he largely ignores the fact the interaction between the two police systems may not always be cooperative.

Burgess, Stephen F. “Fashioning Integrated Security Forces after Conflict.” African Security, vol. 1, no. 2, 2008, pp. 69-91. Taylor and Francis Online, https://doi-org.ezproxy.library.ubc.ca/10.1080/19362200802479772. Accessed 6 February 2019.

Burgess examines the post-conflict creation of integrated security forces in African countries. He argues state strength, external involvement and assistance, the professionalism of contending militias and management of the integration process affect a state’s success in integrating their security forces. Successful countries include Zimbabwe, Namibia, South Africa, Mozambique, and Burundi, whereas Angola, Rwanda and Sierra Leone have failed to integrate their security forces. The use of many case studies makes Burgess’ argument compelling, however, it could be strengthened by including additional countries which have recently attempted to integrate their security forces to determine whether his argument remains true.

Clark, Phil. “Bringing Them All Back Home: The Challenges of DDR and Transitional Justice in Contexts of Displacement in Rwanda and Uganda.” Journal of Refugee Studies, vol. 27, no. 2, 2014, pp. 234-259. Oxford Academic, https://doi-org.ezproxy.library.ubc.ca/10.1093/jrs/fet051. Accessed 6 February 2019.

        Clark critically examines the coordination of the processes of DDR and transitional justice, arguing the methods used in Rwanda and Uganda were not effective in creating lasting peace and security. In particular, he highlights how those displaced during conflict are both victims and perpetrators, and argues systems of DDR and transitional justice must address both groups. His in-depth field research strongly supports the main claims of the article. However, Clark fails to propose solutions to the current problems in Rwanda, instead describing what should be done in other post-conflict countries, limiting the usefulness of the analysis for Rwanda.

Edmonds, Martin, Greg Mills and Terence McNamee. “Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and Local Ownership in the Great Lakes: The Experience of Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of Congo.” African Security, vol. 2, no. 1, 2009, pp. 29-58. Taylor and Francis Online, https://doi-org.ezproxy.library.ubc.ca/10.1080/19362200902766383. Accessed 6 February 2019.

        This article discusses the DDR processes in the Great Lakes Region of Africa, highlighting Rwanda’s distinctiveness because the process has been locally owned. The authors argue DDR in Rwanda has been most successful largely because of the local ownership of DDR. While the argument is compelling, the emphasis on Rwanda’s success masks the country’s ongoing issues related to DDR. The article makes it appear as if the process has been entirely successful and effective, when this is not completely accurate, and so the argument would have been strengthened by a more critical examination of the current situation in Rwanda.

Jowell, Marco. “Cohesion through socialization: liberation, tradition and modernity in the forging of the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF).” Journal of Eastern African Studies, vol. 8, no. 2, 2014, pp. 278-293. Taylor and Francis Online, https://doi-org.ezproxy.library.ubc.ca/10.1080/17531055.2014.891715. Accessed 6 February 2019.

This article seeks to understand the development of Rwanda’s national army (RPF) after the genocide by examining the interaction between socialization experiences and processes of military integration. The author describes several factors which have affected the military’s current structure and argues for the important influence of the ongoing balancing act between tradition, liberation and modernization. Additionally, he discusses the role of education, welfare and control, as well as actual experiences of combat in integrating and socializing the armed forces. Overall, the author provides a comprehensive and in-depth account of the different institutions involved in restructuring and reforming the national army.

Samset, Ingrid. “Building a Repressive Peace: The Case of Post-Genocide Rwanda.” Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, vol. 5, no. 3, 2011, pp. 265-283. Taylor and Francis Online, https://doi-org.ezproxy.library.ubc.ca/10.1080/17502977.2011.566485. Accessed 13 March 2019.

Samset challenges the common understanding that peacebuilding and democracy must always be linked, by examining Rwanda’s post-genocide peace. She argues Rwanda demonstrates that peacebuilding does not require democracy, although this leads to a repressive peace, and may not be stable in the long-term. Instead of democracy, Samset claims the country focused on security, economic recovery and statebuilding, and the elections actually reinforced authoritarian tendencies. Although the arguments are compelling, providing a comprehensive overview of Rwanda post-genocide, as Samset acknowledges, further research is needed to determine the stability of Rwanda’s peace long-term, as well as the possibility for future democratization.

Verwimp, Philip and Marijke Verpoorten. “‘What are all the soldiers going to do?’ demobilization, reintegration and employment in Rwanda.” Conflict, Security and Development, vol. 4, no. 1, 2004, pp. 39-57. Taylor and Francis Online, https://doi-org.ezproxy.library.ubc.ca/10.1080/1467880042000206859. Accessed 6 February 2019.

        In this article, the authors take a critical approach to the DDR process in Rwanda, arguing it has been too focused on the security aspect of demobilization. The authors claim the Rwandan government must also focus on development issues, such as employment and education, in order to create a sustainable peace in the country. Drawing on interviews from those working in the demobilization programme, donors and ex-combatants, the authors make a compelling case for an increased focus on development, and greater support for ex-combatants. However, as the article acknowledges, the findings are limited by the small sample size.

Wilén, Nina. “A Hybrid Peace through Locally Owned and Externally Financed SSR-DDR in Rwanda?” Third World Quarterly, vol. 33, no. 7, 2012, pp. 1323-1336. Taylor and Francis Online, DOI: 10.1080/01436597.2012.691833. Accessed 6 February 2019.

        This article examines the peacebuilding process in Rwanda through the lens of SSR and DDR. Wilén argues the situation in Rwanda is a hybrid peace between state building and state formation due to Rwanda’s actions domestically to build negative peace, as well as the external funding it has received and its international peacebuilding efforts. The author also highlights flaws in the local process typically celebrated by the international community, thus critiquing the trend toward greater inclusion of local actors. Ultimately, the article successfully demonstrates how Rwanda has resisted international norms, meaning locally-driven SSR may not have created a sustainable peace.

Alusala, Nelson. Disarmament and Reconciliation: Rwanda’s concerns. Institute for Security Studies. 2005. reliefweb.int/report/rwanda/disarmament-and-reconciliation-rwandas-concerns.

Baker, Bruce. “Post-War Policing by Communities in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Rwanda.” Democracy and Security, vol. 3, no. 2, 2007, pp. 215-236, Taylor and Francis Online, doi:  10.1080/17419160701483753 215.

Bishop, Martin. “Reintegration of demobilized soldiers.” The New Times. 17 June 2011. www.newtimes.co.rw/section/read/97709

Burke, Jason. “Paul Kagame re-elected president with 99% of vote in Rwanda election.” The Guardian. 5 August 2017. www.theguardian.com/world/2017/aug/05/paul-kagame-secures-third-term-in-rwanda-presidential-election

Clark, Phil. “Bringing Them All Back Home: The Challenges of DDR and Transitional Justice in Contexts of Displacement in Rwanda and Uganda.” Journal of Refugee Studies, vol. 27, no. 2, 2014, pp. 234-259, Oxford University Press, doi: 10.1093/jrs/fet051 240-241.

Contribution of the Gacaca jurisdictions to resolving cases arising from the genocide: Contributions, limitations and expectations of the post-Gacaca phase. PRI. 2010. cdn.penalreform.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/Gacaca_final_2010_en.pdf 15-16.

Dallaire, Roméo, and Brent Beardsley. Shake Hands with the Devil: the Failure of Humanity in Rwanda. Arrow, 2004.

Does, Antonia. Inclusivity and Local Perspectives in Peacebuilding: Issues, Lessons, Challenges, Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation and Geneva Peacebuilding Platform. 2013. www.gpplatform.ch/sites/default/files/PP%2008%20%20Inclusivity%20of%20Local%20Perspectives%20in%20PB%20July%202013.pdf 2.

Edmonds, Martin, Greg Mills and Terence McNamee. “Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and Local Ownership in the Great Lakes: The Experience of Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of Congo.” African Security, vol. 2, no. 1, 2009, pp. 29-58, Taylor and Francis Online, doi:10.1080/19362200902766383 41.

ISSAT, Rwanda SSR Snapshot, 2015, https://issat.dcaf.ch/Learn/Resource-Library/Country-Profiles/Rwanda-SSR-Snapshot.

Jowell, Marco. “Cohesion through Socialization: Liberation, Tradition and Modernity in the Forging of the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF).” Journal of Eastern African Studies, vol. 8, no. 2, 2014, pp. 278–293., doi:10.1080/17531055.2014.891715.

Karna Lynderup Cohen, Molly. Conflict Resolution through Defection Programming: The Case of Rwanda and the Forces Démocratiques Pour la Libération du Rwanda / Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. 2017. Tulane University, PhD Dissertation, ProQuest,

Kiwuwa, David Emmanuel. “Democratization and Ethnic Politics: Rwandas Electoral Legacy.” Ethnopolitics, vol. 4, no. 4, 2005, pp. 447–464., doi:10.1080/17449050500348568.

Peace Insight. Pro-Femmes/Twese Hamwe (PFTH). 2017. https://www.peaceinsight.org/conflicts/rwanda/peacebuilding-organisations/pro-femmes/.

Podder, Sukanya. “Non-State Armed Groups and Stability: Reconsidering Legitimacy and Inclusion.” Contemporary Security Policy, vol. 34, no. 1, 2013, pp. 16–39., doi:10.1080/13523260.2013.771029.

Samset, Ingrid. “Building a Repressive Peace: The Case of Post-Genocide Rwanda.” Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, vol. 5, no. 3, 2011, pp.265-283, Taylor and Francis Online, doi:10.1080/17502977.2011.566485 268.

Schirer, Antoine. “Génocide au Rwanda : quel rôle a exactement joué la France?” Le Monde. 26 October 2018. https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/video/2018/10/26/genocide-au-rwanda-quel-role-a-exactement-joue-la-france_5374967_3212.html 

United Nations. UNAMIR. United Nations. September 1996. www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unamir_b.htm 

Waldorf, Lars. Transitional Justice and DDR: The Case of Rwanda, International Center for Transitional Justice. 2009. www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-DDR-Rwanda-CaseStudy-2009-English.pdf 8

Wilén, Nina (2012) “A Hybrid Peace through Locally Owned and Externally Financed ssr–ddr in Rwanda?” Third World Quarterly, 33:7, 1323-1336, DOI: 10.1080/01436597.2012.691833

World Bank. Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Project. http://projects.worldbank.org/P075129/rwanda-demobilization-reintegration-project?lang=en.

World Bank. Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project. http://projects.worldbank.org/p112712/second-emergency-demobilization-reintegration-project?lang=en.

Question of Autonomy for Bougainville
Bougainville’s citizens have always experienced themselves as distinct from the peoples of Papua New Guinea. One of the main pillars of the 2001 Peace Agreement between Bougainville and the PNG national government is autonomy for Bougainville, with a referendum for complete independence occurring within 15 years of the election of the first Autonomous Bougainville Government.[1]

Establishing an Autonomous Bougainville Police Unit
For the stability of Bougainville as a region, it was necessary to create a police force that was partly built on local customs and culture. The Bougainville police was divided into two parts, one being the Bougainville Police Service (BPS) and the other being the Community Auxiliary Police (CAP), where the CAP works in the rural areas of the islands and incorporates many traditional Bougainvillean community governance principles.[2]

Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration
To ensure stability and lasting peace after the 2001 Peace Agreement, rebel groups including the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA) and the Bougainville Resistance Force (BRF) had to be reintegrated into society, and their arms given to the UN Observatory Mission to Bougainville (UNOMB). Anyone involved in the conflict received amnesties from the PNG national Government. As there was significant divisiveness in society, Councils of Elders liaised with community members and communicated to the UNOMB when the population was ready for ex-combatants to be reintegrated into society.[3][4]

Natural Resource Management
One of the root causes of the conflict was the imposition of foreign/international actors on Bougainville’s resources, most notably the Panguna mine. To fully resolve the conflict, it is important to address the aspects that lead to conflict, as well as reconcile the existing differences in Bougainville.[5] Therefore, it is important that Bougainville acquires autonomy over resources on their land, to create lasting peace.[6]

Notes

[1] Autonomous Bougainville Government. “Referendum.” ABG, Autonomous Bougainville Government, www.abg.gov.pg/peace-agreement/referendum.

[2] Dinnen, Sinclair, and Gordon Peake. “More Than Just Policing: Police Reform in Post-Conflict Bougainville.” International Peacekeeping, vol. 20, no. 5, 2013, pp. 570–584., doi:10.1080/13533312.2013.853961.

[3] Autonomous Bougainville Government. “Bougainville Peace Agreement: Signed at Arawa, 30th August, 2001.” Bougainville Peace Agreement: Signed at Arawa, 30th August, 2001, ABG, 2001. 62-69.

[4] Spark, Natascha & Jackie Bailey. “Disarmament in Bougainville: ‘guns in boxes’”, International Peacekeeping, vol. 12, no. 4, 2005, pp. 599-608, DOI: 10.1080/13533310500202025

[5] Reddy, Peter. “Reconciliation in Bougainville: Civil war, peacekeeping and restorative justice.” Contemporary Justice Review, vol. 11, no. 2, 2008. pp. 117-130, DOI: 10.1080/10282580802057744

[6] Autonomous Bougainville Government. "Bougainville Peace Agreement" 22-23.

State:

Government of Papua New Guinea (PNG)
PNG gained control of the island of Bougainville after their independence from Australia in 1975. Ethnic tensions between islanders and mainlanders in addition to disputes over resource distribution from the Panguna mine sparked conflict in 1988. PNG responded by sending the army to invade Bougainville which resulted in violent conflict until the March 1990 ceasefire [1]. PNG’s contributions to the BPA include the payment of annual Restoration and Economic Development grants to Bougainville [2], and making constitutional amendments to recognize the autonomy of Bougainville until the referendum on independence [3].

Autonomous Bougainville Government (ABG)
Created on June 15, 2005, the ABG has been instrumental in implementing provisions of the peace accords including disarmament, security sector reform and education about the referendum [4].

Previous to this government there was the Provincial Government of Bougainville set-up by the PNG government in 1976, followed by the Bougainville Interim Government (BIG) set up by the BRA as well as the Bougainville Transition Government (BTG) set up by PNG and BRF during the conflict.

Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary (RPNGC)
The national police force of Papua New Guinea that was deployed to police Bougainville when conflict broke out in 1989. They are currently leading the security sector reform and police training for Bougainville Police Services (BPS), but have their own internal issues relating to corruption [5].

Bougainville Copper Limited (BCL)
A mining company mainly owned by Conzinc Riotinto of Australia who operated the Panguna Copper Mine along with the PNG government. Conflicts surrounding the Panguna mine including resource exploitation, environmental degradation and indigenous land ownership served as a catalyst to the outbreak of war. The mine has been closed since 1989 and issues around ownership and distribution of resources, as well as ethnic reconciliation between locals and mine workers from the mainland, are security sector problems that still require reform [6].

Non-State:

Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA)
An organized paramilitary group of traditional landowners who forcibly closed the Panguna Mine in 1989. Ex-combatants have participated in the disarmament process which has collected 1,025 firearms. Many ex-BRA members have also reintegrated into society as police officers [7].

Me’ekamui Defence Force (MDF)
A rebel group lead by Francis Ona. The MDF was originally part of the BRA but split off during the peace process, arguing that Bougainville was already independent via the 1990 Universal Declaration of Independence. The MDF did not participate in peace process or in the disarmament process, which has limited the overall collection of firearms [8].

Bougainville Resistance Forces (BRF)
Bougainville rebel group that emerged to assist the side of the Papua New Guinea national defence forces. Their participation in the weapons disposal program has led to the collection of 596 firearms [9].

Bougainville Community Integrated Development Agency (BOCIDA)
The main humanitarian organization that provided food, clothing and medicine to those in government and BRA controlled areas during the conflict. The group is currently engaged in peace education, critical literacy, and reproductive health [10].

Bougainville Inter-Church Women’s Forum (BICWF)
A women’s group established in 1995 to become a united voice for peace. The group currently focuses its work on small business training and capacity building for women, as well as critical literacy [11].

Council of Elders
Groups of traditional local leaders who guide disarmament in rural areas of Bougainville. They also have a large part in the reconciliation process based around local traditions and customs and have become the new system of local government [12].

Notes

[1] UNPO. “History of Bougainville.” UNPO. https://unpo.org/article/34

[2] Collin, Katherine.“Peacemaking Referendums in Oceania: Making or Delaying Peace in New Caledonia and Bougainville.” Ethnopolitics, vol. 18, no. 2, 2019, p.151, . https://doi.org/10.1080/17449057.2018.1513726

[3] “Peace Accords Matrix.” Bougainville Peace Agreement | Peace Accords Matrix, University of Notre Dame, 2015, peaceaccords.nd.edu/accord/bougainville-peace-agreement.

[4] Ibid, 2015

[5] Papua New Guinea Post Courier. “Young Bougainvilleans Making a Difference in Policing.” Papua New Guinea Post-Courier. 28 November 2018. https://postcourier.com.pg/young-bougainvilleans-making-difference-policing/

[6] Braithwaite, John; Hilary Charlesworth, Peter Reddy & Leah Dunn. Reconciliation and Architectures of Commitment: Sequencing Peace in Bougainville. ANU E Press: Canberra. Web. 2010, p. 12-13. http://epress.anu.edu.au/??_citation.html

[7] “Peace Accords Matrix.” Bougainville Peace Agreement, 2015

[8] Ibid, 2015

[9] Ibid, 2015

[10] Garasu, Lorraine. “The Role of Women in Promoting Peace and Reconciliation.” Conciliation Resources, 2002, p. 29 https://www.c-r.org/downloads/Accord%2012_7The%20role%20of%20women%20in%20promoting%20peace%20and%20reconciliation_2002_ENG.pdf

[11] Ibid, 2002, p. 30

[12] Dinnen, Sinclair, and Gordon Peake. “More Than Just Policing: Police Reform in Post-Conflict Bougainville.” International Peacekeeping, vol. 20, no. 5, 2013, p. 575. doi:10.1080/13533312.2013.853961.

United Nations
The United Nations has set up the United Nations Peacebuilding Fund for Papua New Guinea to support the upcoming referendum determining the status of the autonomous region of Bougainville, through a roadshow, educating citizens on their rights and the referendum process.  The fund also supports disarmament and peacebuilding measures in the region that had been engulfed in civil war for over a decade [1].

Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)
PNG is part of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), were it receives security assistance in terms of funding and support. In 2018 Australia provided US$94.2 million toward security for APEC states, a significant proportion which will have been distributed to ongoing peace efforts in PNG [2].

Australia
Australia is PNG principle security partner, with the neighbouring nation committing US$411.3 million worth of security funding in 2018/19.  Furthermore, PM Scott Morrison and PNG Prime Minister have fortified relations between the two nations by signing a joint defence agreement, collaborating on security cooperation [3]. Despite the level of aid Australia has contributed to the hardships in PNG through the involvement in the Panguna Mine and the refugees crisis on Manus Island.

China
While Australia is PNGs most significant security partner, China is set to become the nation's largest assistance donor, committing US$4 billion to build a road network in PNG. PNGs geographic positioning in the Pacific makes is significant ally to have for both Australia and China, increasing the willingness of each nation to provide assistance [4].

Notes
[1] Human Rights Watch, “PNG Events of 2018,” World Report. 2018.https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/papua-new-guinea 

[2] Human Rights Watch, “PNG Events of 2018.”

[3] Amy Remeikis, “Scott Morrison and PNG’s PM Agree to Joint Naval Base on Manus Island” The Guardian. 2018.https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2018/nov/01/scott-morrison-and-papua-new-guineas-pm-agree-to-joint-naval-base-on-manus-island

[4] Human Rights Watch, “PNG Events of 2018.”

Persisting Police Corruption and Brutality
With over 40% of PNG population living in poverty, police corruption and brutality is significant. The brutal assaults of criminal suspects by police are rarely investigated or held accountable for their actions. Abusing their power, police and officials in positions of power are hinder progress in reform processes, particularly in related to violence around political matters including the last PNG election and the upcoming 2019 referendum determining Bougainville's independence [1].

“Non-binding,” Postponed Referendum
A significant barrier to effective security sector reform is the ‘non-binding’, postponed referendum, determining Bougainvilles independence from PNG. The referendum, originally scheduled for June of 2019 has been postponed four months until October 17th.  Leaders of both sides, PNG Prime Minister Peter O’Neill and Bouganville President John Momis agreed upon the new date due to the inability of adequate voter registration, primarily from a lack of funding.

Once the referendum takes place, the resulting outcome is ‘non-binding’ according to the PNG Prime Minister, with the PNG government required to debate the matter and make a concluding decision. This non-binding outcome of this referendum leaves little motivation for voters to participate or value the referendum and places the the future of Bougainville ultimately under PNG authority. Furthermore, if the referendum is not managed carefully it could disrupt Bougainvilles current state of peace [2].

Women’s Rights
Bougainville and PNG have severely infringed the rights of women, denying equal representation of women in parliament and protection from violence under the law. In the Bougainville government, only 3 out of 33 seats are reserved for women, they are only granted one representative from each region, whilst PNG parliament had no participating females following the 2017 election. There are efforts being made toward change, including PNGs ‘Vision 2050’ plan, dedicating a quota system to equal gender representation, however the current gender inequality is hindering a fair system to achieving security sector reform. Furthermore, following the 2013 Family Protection Act creation, criminalizing women from domestic violence, many police and prosecutors still regularly ignore investigations and cases in court, resorting to alternate methods including mediation and compensation, denying court access to the law [3].

Lack of Education and a Lack of Knowledge of Rights.
Access to education for the children of PNG is restricted heavily by geography and financial means, with many children forced to work. Furthermore, violence against children both within the home and by figures of authority including police is significantly hinders their access to knowledge.  The wider population of all ages is also limited to education and knowledge surrounding their rights and the political climate in which they leave, impeding the progress and potential success of security sector reform [4].

Notes
[1]  Human Rights Watch, “PNG Events of 2018,” World Report. 2018. https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/papua-new-guinea

[2] Tom Westbrook, “Bougainville Independence Vote Postponed to October,” Reuters, 2019 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-papua-bougainville/bougainville-independence-vote-delayed-to-october-idUSKCN1QI3XI

[3]Human Rights Watch, “PNG Events of 2018.”

[4]Human Rights Watch, “PNG Events of 2018.”

According to the University of Notre Dame’s “Peace Accords Matrix,” the 2001 Bougainville Peace Agreement has been 89 percent implemented, thus it can largely be considered a success [1]. Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programs such as the weapons disposal program, in addition to Security Sector Reform (SSR) to establish an autonomous Bougainville police service have been successful [2]. ‘Bottom-up’ reconciliation processes based on local traditions of forgiveness have also begun, and contributed to sustainable peace between the local groups [3], however structural issues still remain acting as a barrier to achieving positive peace [4].

The autonomous province of Bougainville is also set to have a referendum for full independence by the fall of 2020, based on the fulfillment of two conditions; weapons disposal and good government [5]. However, a significant drawback of the referendum is the fact that it will be ‘non-binding’, meaning that the National Government of Papua New Guinea has the authority to decide whether or not Bougainville can be granted full independence [6]. In either case, the referendum may restart the violence again should one side be unsatisfied with the outcome.

In terms of DDR, the weapons disposal program to collect and destroy firearms from the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA) and the Bougainville Resistance Force (BRF) has resulted in the collection of 81 percent of the firearms [7]. However, the Me’ekamui Defence Force (MDF) has up until now refused to participate in weapons disposal. This has further limited the political reform progress, since the referendum cannot be held until the weapons collection is completed [8]. Additionally, the presence of armed MDF groups controlling ‘no go zones’ could be considered spoilers for the referendum [9].

In terms of SSR, police training initiatives for the Bougainville Police Service (BPS) in the urban centers, and the Civilian Auxiliary Police (CAP) in rural communities have been widely successful [10]. Police training programs have decreased structural inequalities by allowing people from rural areas access to education and job training [11]. CAP specifically has been successful integrating police work into rural realities to increase local engagement with the police and ensure that local perspectives are considered in liberal peacebuilding processes [12]. These security sector reforms have also seen more women enter policing through CAP, thus helping reduce structural inequalities [13].

In addition to security sector reform, the BPA has also seen success with political reform. Collin argues that the model of interim autonomy before an independence referendum has created stability before a potentially polarizing vote [14]. Regan further argues that the BPA’s structure of incentives for the PNG government to recognize Bougainville’s autonomy in exchange for Bougainville’s participation in weapons disposal has served as confidence building measures for both parties [15]. The creation of the interim autonomy under the Autonomous Bougainville Government (ABG) has provided an environment for a successful ‘hybrid’ peace process that combines traditional bottom-up reconciliation with top-down political reform to take place [16]. However, Collin notes the ABG has not significantly improved relationships with the PNG government, and argues that a referendum is unlikely to be the final step in the peace process [17].

Despite these successes, there are several issues that still persist in Bougainville. One of the big barriers to positive peace, meaning a society free of structural violence, that allows everyone in society to reach their full potential, [18] is that women, and women’s rights have been largely ignored in the peace process. Only 3 out of 33 seats in the Bougainville Parliament are reserved for women, “to represent the interests of women” [19].

Further, the 2001 Peace Agreement does not mention the Panguna mine at all, which indicates that this part of the conflict has not been entirely solved. Dinnen and Peake refer to the area around the Panguna mine as a ‘no go zone’, [20] where the Bougainville Police Service (BPS) are not allowed to operate. To this extent, the 2001 Bougainville Peace Agreement fails in addressing the very root causes of the conflict, and while activity at the Panguna Mine has been suspended since 1989,[21] it also signals how peacebuilding in Bougainville is stuck at a conflict resolution stage, with not enough focus on solving the root causes of conflict.

While reconciliation efforts in Bougainville have largely taken into account local traditions and customs, and are thus more likely to achieve lasting peace, [22] further reforms in Bougainville as well as in Papua New Guinea more generally are needed. New reforms should focus on access to, and quality of education, as well as strengthening women’s rights, as these are issues that are preventing the emergence of positive peace in the area, and are described as problematic by organizations like Human Rights Watch [23]. Education is especially important because it gives young people something to do, thus increasing the threshold for returning to violence.

Notes

[1] “Peace Accords Matrix.” Bougainville Peace Agreement | Peace Accords Matrix, University of Notre Dame, 2015, peaceaccords.nd.edu/accord/bougainville-peace-agreement.

[2] Ibid., 2015.

[3] Regan, Anthony. “Bougainville, Papua New Guinea: Lessons from a Successful Peace Process,” The RUSI Journal, vol. 163, no. 6, 2018, p. 50-51 https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2018.1562020

[4] Galtung, Johan. "Violence, Peace, and Peace Research." Journal of Peace Research, vol. 6, no. 3, 1969, p.183. http://www.jstor.org/stable/422690.

[5] Autonomous Bougainville Government. “Bougainville Peace Agreement: Signed at

Arawa, 30th August, 2001.” Bougainville Peace Agreement: Signed at Arawa, 30th August, 2001, ABG, 2001, p. 58.

[6] Autonomous Bougainville Government. “Bougainville Peace Agreement,” p. 58.

[7] UN News. “Post-conflict Bougainville’s disarmament is progressing well, UN says.” UN News. 6 May 2004. https://news.un.org/en/story/2004/05/102662-post-conflict-bougainvilles-disarmament-process-progressing-well-un-says

[8] “Peace Accords Matrix.” Bougainville Peace Agreement, 2015.

[9] Collin, Katherine. “Peacemaking Referendums in Oceania: Making or Delaying Peace in New Caledonia and Bougainville.” Ethnopolitics, vol. 18, no. 2, 2019, p. 150. https://doi.org/10.1080/17449057.2018.1513726

[10] Dinnen, Sinclair, and Gordon Peake. “More Than Just Policing: Police Reform in Post-Conflict Bougainville.” International Peacekeeping, vol. 20, no. 5, 2013, p. 575-576. doi:10.1080/13533312.2013.853961.

[11] Papua New Guinea Post Courier. “Young Bougainvilleans Making a Difference in Policing.” Papua New Guinea Post Courier. 28 November 2018. https://postcourier.com.pg/young-bougainvilleans-making-difference-policing/

[12] Dinnen & Peake, “More Than Just Policing: Police Reform in Post-Conflict Bougainville,” 2013, p. 575-577.

[13] George, Nicole.“Liberal–Local Peacebuilding in Solomon Islands and Bougainville: Advancing a Gender-Just Peace?” International Affairs, vol. 94, no. 6, 2018, p.1345, https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiy193

[14] Collin, “Peacemaking Referendums in Oceania.” 2019, p. 139

[15] Regan.“Bougainville, Papua New Guinea: Lessons from a Successful Peace Process.” 2018, p. 51.

[16] Braithwaite, John; Hilary Charlesworth, Peter Reddy & Leah Dunn. Reconciliation and Architectures of Commitment:Sequencing Peace in Bougainville. ANU E Press: Canberra. Web. 2010, p. 68, http://epress.anu.edu.au/??_citation.html

[17] Collin, “Peacemaking Referendums in Oceania.” 2019, p. 140

[18] Galtung, Johan. "Violence, Peace, and Peace Research." Journal of Peace Research, vol. 6, no. 3, 1969, p.183. http://www.jstor.org/stable/422690.

[19] Autonomous Bougainville Government. “Parliament.” ABG, Autonomous Bougainville Government, www.abg.gov.pg/government/parliament.

[20] Dinnen, Sinclair, and Gordon Peake. “More Than Just Policing: Police Reform in Post-Conflict Bougainville.” International Peacekeeping, vol. 20, no. 5, 2013,10. 578, doi:10.1080/13533312.2013.853961.

[21] “The Origins of the Conflict.” Conciliation Resources, 23 July 2015, www.c-r.org/accord-article/origins-conflict.

[22] Reddy, Peter. “Reconciliation in Bougainville: Civil war, peacekeeping and restorative justice.” Contemporary Justice Review, vol. 11, no. 2, 2008. pp. 117-130, DOI:10.1080/10282580802057744

[23] Human Rights Watch, “PNG Events of 2018,” World Report.2018. https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/papua-new-guinea

Constitution of the National Government of Papua New Guinea 

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Papua_New_Guinea_2014.pdf 

Bougainville Peace Agreement (2001)

http://www.abg.gov.pg/uploads/documents/BOUGAINVILLE_PEACE_AGREEMENT_2001.pdf

Autonomous Bougainville Government Constitution 

http://www.abg.gov.pg/uploads/documents/BOUGAINVILLE_CONSTITUTION_2004.pdf

Papua New Guinea Family Protection Act (2013)

http://cfcpng.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/FAMILY-PROTECTION-ACT-2013.pdf

Autonomous Bougainville Government: Fact Sheet for Referendum

http://www.abg.gov.pg/uploads/documents/Fact_sheet_-_BPA_JOINT_KEY_MESSAGES_-_English.compressed_%281%29.pdf

Bougainville Community Policing Program: Independent Evaluation 

https://www.mfat.govt.nz/assets/Aid-Prog-docs/Evaluations/2013/Feb-2013/Bougainville-Commuity-Policing-Project-BCPP-Independent-Evaluation-February-2013-Public-Version.pdf

Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Bougainville (Papua New Guinea)

https://search.archives.un.org/uploads/r/united-nations-archives/6/5/f/65f7e4dd7df2f50d13ae0342ba15f154a7e2c6a7e5114557bd5cf62ba3052ba3/S-1096-0051-10-00009.pdf

The Honiara Declaration (1991)

https://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/fullpeace/PNG%2019910123.pdf

Bougainville Mining Amendment Act (2016)

http://www.abg.gov.pg/uploads/acts/16-02_Bougainville_Mining_%28Amendment%29_Act_2016.pdf

Letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Papua New Guinea addressed to the President of the UN Security Council. 

https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/PG_971010_The%20Burnham%20Truce.pdf

Braithwaite, John; Hilary Charlesworth, Peter Reddy & Leah Dunn. Reconciliation and Architectures of Commitment: Sequencing Peace in Bougainville. ANU E Press: Canberra. Web. 2010. http://epress.anu.edu.au/??_citation.html

This e-book provides a historical overview of the Bougainville conflict and outlines the success of the Bougainville Peace Process (BPA) in areas such as disarmament, reconciliation and political reform. The book argues that Bougainville has successfully implemented a ‘hybrid’ peace process which integrates bottom-up traditional and Christian reconciliation practices with top-down political reforms in the government and security sector. The authors not only provide an in-depth overview of the challenges and successes of the peace process, but also provide smaller case analyses of local initiatives relating to reconciliation or security sector reform which does an excellent job of bringing local perspectives to the forefront.

Collin, Katherine.“Peacemaking Referendums in Oceania: Making or Delaying Peace in New Caledonia and Bougainville.” Ethnopolitics, vol. 18, no. 2, 2019, pp.139-157, . https://doi.org/10.1080/17449057.2018.1513726

This article outlines the benefits of the peacebuilding model that promotes interim autonomy prior to an independence referendum to create political stability with secessionists, using the cases of Bougainville and New Caledonia. In the case of Bougainville, Collin argues that interim ABG autonomy has allowed for reconciliation between islanders to occur and bring stability to the island, but has not greatly improved relations with the government in Papua New Guinea. This article does a good job at focusing on the importance of integrating the “local” in liberal peacebuilding but does not go into much detail on how this process would succeed without it.

Dinnen, Sinclair, and Gordon Peake. “More Than Just Policing: Police Reform in Post-Conflict Bougainville.” International Peacekeeping, vol. 20, no. 5, 2013, pp. 570–584., doi:10.1080/13533312.2013.853961.

The article does a good job of explaining how the Community Auxiliary Police (CAP) in Bougainville is a result of the ‘local turn’ in peacebuilding efforts. It explains how the CAP are built on community oriented principles of community governance and dispute resolution, and operates in accordance with the Bougainville Police Service (BPS). However, the article puts significant importance on the fact that New Zealand is the implementing donor and how the success of the CAP is New Zealand’s achievement. This speaks to the critiques of the ‘local turn’, that it may still promote neoliberal ideas and the locals are only brought in during implementation stage of a policy, instead of being involved in the whole process.

George, Nicole.“Liberal–Local Peacebuilding in Solomon Islands and Bougainville: Advancing a Gender-Just Peace?” International Affairs, vol. 94, no. 6, 2018, pp.1329–1348, . https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiy193

This article assesses local-liberal peacebuilding in the Solomon Islands and Bougainville through a ‘vernacular security lens’ to understand the roles of women can inform liberal peacebuilding. George explains how hybridized peace processes that integrate liberal institution building with local traditions can give women a greater role in grassroots peace processes for instance, but limit their roles in other contexts, such as government peacebuilding policies. Additionally, the author’s focus on traditional perceptions of women’s roles as ‘mothers of the land’ in Bougainville culture provides additional insight into the structural challenges women still face gaining legitimacy of their authority as peacebuilders.

Reddy, Peter. "Reconciliation in Bougainville: Civil war, peacekeeping and restorative justice," Contemporary Justice Review, vol. 11 no. 2, 2008, pp.117-130, DOI: 10.1080/10282580802057744

Reddy explores how reconciliation took place in Bougainville, and pays special attention to the different outcomes around when women were included and excluded. He further talks about ‘restorative justice conferences,’ or reconciliation ceremonies and the different ways that reconciliation occurs in traditional Bougainvillean cultures. He concludes by stating that without these homegrown reconciliation practices, Bougainville would still be in crisis, and that this way of practicing reconciliation can inform other societies as well, and help divided societies achieve peace. 

Regan, Anthony. “Bougainville, Papua New Guinea: Lessons from a Successful Peace Process,” The RUSI Journal, vol. 163, no. 6, 2018, pp. 44-54, . https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2018.1562020

This article outlines the successes of the Bougainville Peace Accord (BPA) 22 years after the deal was signed, to understand what lessons it holds for future peace processes. Regan argues that reconciliation practices built on local traditions have largely contributed to the BPA’s success and would be difficult to replicate elsewhere. However, he also argues that the BPA’s  incentive structures for PNG and the resistance groups to comply to the terms of the peace deal are positive lessons that can be utilized in other contexts. Regan’s focus on the local reconciliation process also highlights the important scholarly debate of how liberal peacebuilding models can integrate local perspectives to create a hybrid ‘local-liberal peacebuilding.’ However, I think Regan’s insistence on the intrinsic locality of Bougainville reconciliations falls short of thoroughly analyzing the benefits of reconciliation, and how it can be altered for new contexts to create sustainable peace.

Spark, Natascha & Jackie Bailey. “Disarmament in Bougainville: ‘guns in boxes’”, International Peacekeeping, vol. 12, no. 4, 2005, pp. 599-608, DOI: 10.1080/13533310500202025

Spark and Bailey explore the Peace Monitoring Group’s (PMG) ‘guns in boxes’ approach to disarmament that was used in post-conflict Bougainville. They argue that it is a narrow DDR approach, but that it was a fitting approach in this particular context. The authors critique the lack of grassroots involvement in this process, despite Councils of Chiefs/Elders guiding the process in rural areas. Further, the DDR process in Bougainville focused heavily on traditional reconciliation practices within Bougainville. The authors conclude that the PMG’s ‘guns in boxes’ strategy was too narrow as it did not involve grassroots leaders, but that the PMG did well in not infringing on Bougainville’s autonomy by avoiding participation in reintegration activities. Finally, they argue that there should have been more room for grassroots leaders in the peace agreement. The article does well in exposing the nuances of successful DDR, and explaining what the PMG did right, as well as how they can improve.

Sturzaker, Damian, Craig Cawood. “The Sandline Affair Illegality and International Law”. Australian International Law Journal. 1999. Pp. 214 - 224. https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?collection=journals&handle=hein.journals/austintlj16&id=230&men_tab=srchresults

Sturzaker and Cawood examine the controversial agreement between the PNG government and the international, private military company, Sandline. They recount the brief relationship established between to parties and the potential harm it would have caused the Bougainville community. They then adopt a critical lens to explore the legality of both domestic and international law in protecting the rights of Bougainville citizens in the case of external participation. This article was particularly useful for exposing a potential threat to security and the complications of international involvement in conflict.

Autonomous Bougainville Government. “Bougainville Peace Agreement: Signed at Arawa, 30^th August, 2001.” Bougainville Peace Agreement: Signed at Arawa, 30th August, 2001, ABG, 2001. http://www.abg.gov.pg/uploads/documents/BOUGAINVILLE_PEACE_AGREEMENT_2001.pdf

Autonomous Government Bougainville. “Bougainville Mining (Amendment) Act.” 2016.http://www.abg.gov.pg/uploads/acts/16-02_Bougainville_Mining_%28Amendment%29_Act_2016.pdf

Autonomous Bougainville Government. “Joint Key Messages: No. 2 Fact Sheet.” 2016. http://www.abg.gov.pg/uploads/documents/Fact_sheet_-_BPA_JOINT_KEY_MESSAGES_-_English.compressed_%281%29.pdf

Braithwaite, John; Hilary Charlesworth, Peter Reddy & Leah Dunn. Reconciliation and Architectures of Commitment: Sequencing Peace in Bougainville. ANU E Press: Canberra. Web. 2010. http://epress.anu.edu.au/??_citation.html

Collin, Katherine.“Peacemaking Referendums in Oceania: Making or Delaying Peace in New Caledonia and Bougainville.” Ethnopolitics,vol. 18, no. 2, 2019, pp.139-157, . https://doi.org/10.1080/17449057.2018.1513726

Conciliation Resources. “The Origins of the Conflict.” Conciliation Resources, 23 July 2015, www.c-r.org/accord-article/origins-conflict.

Dinnen, Sinclair, & Gordon Peake. “Bougainville Community Policing Project Independent Evaluation." https://www.mfat.govt.nz/assets/Aid-Prog-docs/Evaluations/2013/Feb-2013/Bougainville-Commuity-Policing-Project-BCPP-Independent-Evaluation-February-2013-Public-Version.pdf

Dinnen, Sinclair, & Gordon Peake. “More Than Just Policing: Police Reform in Post-conflict Bougainville,” International Peacekeeping, vol. 20, no. 5, 2013.pp. 570-584, DOI: 10.1080/13533312.2013.853961

Galtung, Johan. "Violence, Peace, and Peace Research." Journal of Peace Research. vol.6, no. 3, 1969. pp 167-191. http://www.jstor.org/stable/422690.

Garasu, Lorraine. “The Role of Women in Promoting Peace and Reconciliation.” Conciliation Resources, 2002,p. 29 https://www.c-r.org/downloads/Accord%2012_7The%20role%20of%20women%20in%20promoting%20peace%20and%20reconciliation_2002_ENG.pdf

George, Nicole.“Liberal–Local Peacebuilding in Solomon Islands and Bougainville: Advancing a Gender-Just Peace?” International Affairs, vol. 94, no. 6, 2018, pp.1329–1348, . https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiy193

Government of Papua New Guinea. “Papua New Guinea’s Constitution of 1975 with Amendments through to 2014.” constituteproject.org. 2015. https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Papua_New_Guinea_2014.pdf

Human Rights Watch, “PNG Events of 2018,” World Report.2018. https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/papua-new-guinea

Momis, John. “The Constitution of The Autonomous Region of Bougainville.”Autonomous Government of Bougainville. 2004. http://www.abg.gov.pg/uploads/documents/BOUGAINVILLE_CONSTITUTION_2004.pdf

Papua New Guinea. “Family Protection Act.” No.19. 2013. http://cfcpng.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/FAMILY-PROTECTION-ACT-2013.pdf

Papua New Guinea Post Courier. “Young Bougainvilleans Making a Difference in Policing.” Papua New Guinea Post-Courier. 28 November 2018. https://postcourier.com.pg/young-bougainvilleans-making-difference-policing/

Reddy, Peter. “Reconciliation in Bougainville: Civil war, peacekeeping and restorative justice,” Contemporary Justice Review,vol. 11, no.2, 2008. Pp. 117-130, DOI: 10.1080/10282580802057744

Remeikis, Amy, “Scott Morrison and PNG’s PM Agree to Joint Naval Base on Manus Island” The Guardian. 2018. https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2018/nov/01/scott-morrison-and-papua-new-guineas-pm-agree-to-joint-naval-base-on-manus-island

Spark, Natascha & Jackie Bailey. “Disarmament in Bougainville: ‘guns in boxes’”, International Peacekeeping, vol. 12, no. 4, 2005, pp. 599-608, DOI: 10.1080/13533310500202025

Regan, Anthony J. “Causes and Course of the Bougainville Conflict.” The Journal of Pacific History, vol. 33, no. 3, 1998, pp. 269–285. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/25169410.

Sturzaker, Damian, & Craig Cawood. “The Sandline Affair Illegality and International Law”. Australian International Law Journal.1999.pp. 214 - 224. https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?collection=journals&handle=hein.journals/austintlj16&id=230&men_tab=srchresults

UN News. “Post-conflict Bougainville’s disarmament is progressing well, UN says.”UN News. 6 May 2004.https://news.un.org/en/story/2004/05/102662-post-conflict-bougainvilles-disarmament-process-progressing-well-un-says

UN Security Council. 28 March 2005. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Bougainville (Papua New Guinea).” UN Archives. https://search.archives.un.org/uploads/r/united-nations-archives/6/5/f/65f7e4dd7df2f50d13ae0342ba15f154a7e2c6a7e5114557bd5cf62ba3052ba3/S-1096-0051-10-00009.pdf

UN Security Council. “Letter dated 30 March 1998 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Papua New Guinea addressed to the President of the Security Council.”  31 March 1998. https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/PG_971010_The%20Burnham%20Truce.pdf

University of Notre Dame. “Peace Accords Matrix.” Bougainville Peace Agreement | Peace Accords Matrix, University of Notre Dame, 2015, peaceaccords.nd.edu/accord/bougainville-peace-agreement.

UNPO. “History of Bougainville.” UNPO. 2 February 2004. https://unpo.org/article/34

Uppsala Conflict Data Program. “The Honiara Declaration,” UCDP, 23 Jan. 1991. https://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/fullpeace/PNG%2019910123.pdf

Westbrook, Tom, “Bougainville Independence Vote Postponed to October,” Reuters, 2019. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-papua-bougainville/bougainville-independence-vote-delayed-to-october-idUSKCN1QI3XI

Police Reform

After years of community fragmentation through the Troubles, the RUC became to be seen as biased and unwilling to provide protection equally to all communities[i]. Formed by a majority of protestant staff, Catholics were not proportionally represented. In the pursuit of decreasing sectarianism in post-troubles Northern Ireland, the RUC had to be reformed in order to welcome social integration and to serve and protect its population regardless of their background.

Military Reform

A large number of paramilitary organizations were operating on both sides of the conflict in Northern Ireland, including the IRA and UVF, in addition to how militarized the RUC was. In order to deal with escalating violence, these organizations needed to be disbanded and restructured respectively[ii].

Reintegration of Ex-Prisoners

While there are statistics claiming the number of people imprisoned during the Troubles was just a few hundred, there is evidence to suggest many more were taken prisoners, with numbers in the mid 30,000 range[iii]. With numbers this high, the reintegration of ex-prisoners into Northern Irish and British society demanded a high amount of coordination and was an imperative undertaking in transforming post-conflict Northern Irish society.

Creation of a Power-Sharing Organizational Structure of Government

Northern Ireland existed in a state of institutional limbo with both Ireland and the UK wanting to govern it. New institutional reforms and the creation of an independent power-sharing legislation have given Northern Ireland its own parliament, but its powers are limited and dependent on the UK Parliament[iv]. Meanwhile its unique status makes international agreements like Brexit tenuous.

Notes

[i]Aiken

[ii]Roberts

[iii]Mervyn

[iv]Bayley

State Actors

• British Government
• Government of Northern Ireland
• Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC)
• Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI)
• Security Service, Military Intelligence Section 5 (MI5)
• British Army
• Royal Irish Regiment
• Ulster Defence Regiment

Non-State Actors

Republican Parties:

• Sinn Fein: Founded in 1905 it is the most prominent Irish republican political party in Northern Ireland. During the Troubles, the party maintained close links with the Provisional IRA and the Continuity IRA[i].
• Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP): Founded in 1970 it is a social democratic and Irish nationalist party that played an important role in IRA’s cease fire. In 1980 the SDLP, Sinn Fein and the Irish government established secret talk in order to build the foundation for a political settlement that concluded active fighting[ii].

Republican Paramilitary Organizations:

• Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA): Largest republican paramilitary group in the Troubles. It aimed to end British rule in Northern Ireland. It was active between 1969 and 1998[iii].
• Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA): Dissident paramilitary organization. It emerged from a split in the PIRA in 1986. It remains active[iv].
• Irish National Liberation Army (INLA): Militant wing of the Irish Republican Socialist Party. They advocated for physical force in order to pursue Irish republicanism while promoting a socialist political programme. Operated between 1974 – 1998[v].
• The Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA): Dissident Irish republican paramilitary group that opposed the peace process. Its members came from the PIRA[vi].
• The New Irish Republican Army (New IRA): It is a dissident Irish republican paramilitary group formed in 2012 by the RIRA and the Republican Action Against Drugs (RAAD)[vii].

Loyalist Parties:

• Democratic Unionist Party (DUP): The largest unionist party in Northern Ireland. It was founded in 1971. It was the only major party that abstained the Good Friday Agreement in 1998[viii].
• Ulster Democratic Party (UDP): One of the largest loyalist parties in Northern Ireland. It disbanded in 2001[ix].
• Ulster Unionist Party (UUP): Founded in 1905, it is the largest unionist parties in Northern Ireland. It was one of the main parties representing unionism at the GFA[x].
• Progressive Unionist Party (PUP): Founded in 1979, it is a unionist party that had links to the Ulster Volunteer Force[xi].

Loyalist Paramilitary Organizations:

• Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF): One of the largest loyalist paramilitary organizations formed in 1965. Its mission was to protect and enhance Unionism[xii].
• Ulster Defence Association (UDA): One of the largest loyalist paramilitary groups formed in 1971. Its mission was to maintain the union with Great Britain and defend Protestants in Northern Ireland. Its foundation followed the ceasefire in 1997[xiii].
• Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF): Dissident loyalist paramilitary group in Northern Ireland formed in 2007 by members of UDA. It was disbanded in 2007[xiv].
• Combined Loyalist Military Command (CLMC): An umbrella body of loyalists paramilitary groups set up in the 1990’s. This association dissolved in 2001[xv].
• Red Hand Commando (RHC): Small loyalist paramilitary group that was closely linked to the UVF. Active from 1972 to 1994[xvi].
• Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF): It was a loyalist paramilitary organization largely formed from UVF members in 1997 who opposed to the peace process[xvii].
• Real Ulster Freedom Fighters Real (UFF): It was a dissident loyalist paramilitary group that was formed by members of the UDA. The organization was disbanded in 2007[xviii].

Civil Society

• Youth Link: It is an inter-church youth service founded in 1991 for Northern Ireland that aims to promote equity, diversity and interdependence. It facilitates a space where the Presbyterian, Methodist, Roman Catholic and Church of Ireland can work together and launch social programs that invite the diverse youth of Northern Ireland. It provides training programs to enhance leadership, community relations, citizenship and peace and reconciliation[xix].
• Belfast Conflict Resolution Consortium (BCRC): It is a citywide cross-community partnership working to assist conflict transformation at Belfast’s interfaces. It focuses on intercommunity engagements, practitioner work and initiatives, shared history and dealing with the past, research project training and capacity building and international study visits/activities. It has been primarily funded by the European Union (EU) through the Programme for Peace and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland and the Border Region of Ireland (PEACE)[xx].
• Causeway Institute for Peace-building and Conflict Resolution International (CIPCR): It is an Non-governmental organization (NGO) established in 2010 that aims to build peace through active and collaborative engagement in divided communities across Northern Ireland. It has worked as a platform to bring together groups across divided societies to promote trust and understanding through dialogue[xxi].
• Irish Network for Nonviolent Action Training and Education (INNATE): It is an NGO founded in 1990 that provides information and training on nonviolence and nonviolent approaches to conflict issues. It holds workshops and information through its website[xxii].
• Healing Through Remembering (HTR): It is a cross-community organization, which has conducted extensive work on how to deal with the legacy of the Troubles. HTR has developed a network of diverse forms of commemoration and remembrance work accessible to Northern Irish society that have welcome peace[xxiii].
• Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission (NIHRC): It is a national human right institution with a status accreditation from the United Nations (UN). It is funded by the United Kingdom government, but it is an independent public body[xxiv]. It works with citizens whose rights have been violated in government and other public bodies in Northern Ireland.

Notes

[i]Whiting

[ii]Mulcahy

[iii]Mulcahy

[iv]trackingterrorism.org

[v]Whiting

[vi]Mulcahy

[vii]McDaid

[viii]Tonge

[ix]Mulcahy

[x]Southern

[xi]Southern

[xii]Aiken

[xiii]peaceaccords.nd.edu

[xiv]BBC news.co.uk

[xv]cfr.org

[xvi]trackingterrorism.org

[xvii]Mulcahy

[xviii]Sullivan

[xix]youthlink.org.uk

[xx]bcrc.eu

[xxi]http://www.cipcr.org/

[xxii]innatenonviolence.org

[xxiii]healingthroughremembering.org

[xxiv]org

• Canada: General (Ret.) John de Chastelain, Finland: Brigadier Tauno Nieminen, and US: Ambassador Andrew D. Sens: Each state sent one representative to form the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning (IICD) with the objective to facilitate the decommissioning of firearms, ammunition and explosives[i]
• European Union (EU): Since 1995 the European Union has funded peace programmes in Northern Ireland through the programme for Peace and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland and the Border Counties of Ireland also known as PEACE[ii].
• Republic of Ireland: It played a prominent role in the Good Friday Agreement. The following was a peace deal agreed upon in April 1998 that created a power-sharing government that involved political forces aligned with paramilitary organization[iii].
• An Garda Siochana: Commonly referred as the Gardai, is the police service of the Republic of Ireland[iv].
• Óglaigh na hÉireann (ÓÉ): They are the defence forces of the Republic of Ireland. They played a prominent role in civil affairs during the Troubles supporting the Garda[v].

Notes

[i]cain.ulster.ac.uk

[ii]Gallagher

[iii]cfr.org

[iv]garda.ie

[v]Harvey

Police Reform

Northern Ireland’s policing has had many advantages compared to other post conflict societies, but still faces unique challenges in its reform process. The police force has made dramatic steps forward from the heavily militarized, protestant RUC but has not become fully accepted in the eyes of the public[i]. In order to fully legitimize itself it needs to successfully distance itself from its previous image and role in maintaining order. The RUC has been incredibly open to accountability measures, but public distrust is still a factor.

Brexit

In recent years, the BREXIT referendum and process has raised significant concerns about the future of the Northern Ireland Border[ii]. If BREXIT succeeds, then it will officially become a customs border. Provisions are in effect to keep it from being a hard border, but it is presently impossible to reconcile the demands of Northern Ireland, the Good Friday agreement and BREXIT. Not reaching a deal could mean a return to a hard border with Ireland, which would potentially harm many of the SSR’s successes.

Reintegration of Ex-Prisoners

Estimates of the number of ex-political prisoners in Northern Ireland number between 30-40,000[iii]. Programs have existed to reintegrate these former prisoners since the Good Friday Agreement, but still face problems. Ex-prisoners on both sides of the conflict are now banding together for initiatives against violence by young individuals in Northern Ireland, but this only begins to address the issues of the hundreds of thousands of people affected by political imprisonment across Northern Ireland.

Peace Walls

Peace walls are structures meant as physical barriers between Irish Catholic and Protestant neighbourhoods. They are primarily located in Belfast but can be found in other major northern Irish cities. These walls were erected during the Troubles but have yet to be taken down as a sign of reconciliation. The current target is to remove them by 2023, but this looks unlikely at present[iv]. Proponents of the peace lines still feel they are necessary as they have been erected around flashpoints of violence, especially in poorer and more religiously divided areas of Belfast.

Notes

[i]Powell

[ii]Sloat

[iii]Campbell

[iv]Ulster Research

“The Good Friday Agreement is a work of genius that’s applicable if you care at all about preserving democracy” Former US President Bill Clinton praised the legacy of the Good Friday Agreement (GFA) last April, when he, former British Prime Minister Tony Blair, and many other diplomats involved in the Agreement met in Belfast for the 20th anniversary of the Good Friday Agreement[i]. Among peace literature and public perception alike, the GFA has, overall, been regarded as a success. Particular to the area of security sector reform (SSR), the police reform conducted during this time is thought of by many as a blueprint for police reform globally[ii]. While the public’s perception of the efficacy of the GFA and the efficacy of SSR implemented following the GFA are two separate evaluations to be made, the result is that both can be heralded as a success. And while no peace process evolves without hindrance in some form or another, in conducting this project, we contend that the SSR implemented in Northern Ireland has been effective.

In assessing the efficacy of SSR, it is first important to understand it’s tenets; the United Nations defines SSR as aiming to improve “safety through enhancing the effectiveness and accountability of security institutions controlled by civilians and operating according to human rights and the rule of law”[iii]. In this sense, SSR focuses more on achieving a negative form of peace, primarily being concerned with civilian safety, security, and ensuring a lack of large-scale violence. Accordingly, in evaluating the efficacy of SSR, it can be easy to conflate public opinion with an analysis of SSR; fortunately, in this case, the trajectory of public discourse maps well onto the trajectory of SSR in Northern Ireland. In particular, police reform has been a focal point of SSR in Northern Ireland. Written into the GFA was the establishment of the Patten Commission, an independent commission intended to produce a policy document with recommendations on the “future direction of the police”[iv]. As a result of the Patten commission, the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) was disbanded in Northern Ireland and transformed into the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI). The PSNI enforced new uniforms, badges, symbols, and equipment, a program that would grant early retirement to officers who don’t agree with the changes between the RUC and PSNI, and notably started enforcing 50:50 recruitment of men and women[v]. More prominently, the PSNI introduced 50:50 recruitment for Catholics and Protestants. And while that programme ended in 2011, the number of Catholic officers has increased from 8% in 2001 to at least 32% as of 2018[vi].

In reflecting upon the efficacy of SSR in Northern Ireland, out analysis would be incomplete without discussing the establishment of the Northern Ireland Assembly, the power-sharing legislative assembly formed at Stormont Estate (where parliament is located in Belfast). Ever since direct rule was imposed on Northern Ireland in 1972, successive attempts at creating a power-sharing legislation were fraught with tensions and failures[vii]. The creation of the Northern Ireland Assembly was influential in the implementation of many smaller governmental bodies that were influential in the SSR process, such as the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning, placed in charge of the oversight of the decommissioning of all paramilitary weapons in Northern Ireland, and the Independent Monitoring Commission, responsible for monitoring the activity of paramilitary groups, and monitoring the commitment made by the British government to maintain security normalisation measures[viii]. The GFA also lead to the creation of numerous inter-governmental councils that are designed to increase cooperation, coordination, and consultation between governments within the region, such as The North/South Ministerial Council and the British-Irish Council.

When it comes to the progress of the SSR undertaking, the Northern Irish have been vocal in expressing their often-felt dissatisfaction with the Good Friday Agreement and the progress of SSR in general. A classic critique of the GFA highlights the numerous times the Assembly has been suspended in the years since its establishment in 1999[ix], and while this is true at face value, the good that the Assembly has done for Northern Ireland in creating stability in society is invaluable in comparison to the challenges it may have faced since its conception. There are similar disparaging remarks regarding the long and arduous process in establishing the PSNI; we argue that the long process of implementing police reform has been beneficial in maintaining a society with the absence of large-scale violence, and is a testament to the attention, care, effort that has gone into the SSR process in the years since the GFA. While there are still secular rifts and tensions present in Northern Irish society today, the SSR project as a whole has been a success story overall. SSR is a reform of institutions; this is not to be seen as an end itself, but part of the process that is the means to an end. It is evident that the deep seeded identity issues that paved the way for the Troubles to blossom are still underlying; even so, the peace that the SSR assignment has brought to Northern Ireland has been monumentally efficacious and is a worthwhile project.

Notes

[i]BBC

[ii]O’Rawe

[iii]United Nations

[iv]Powell

[v]Powell

[vi]Irish Times

[vii]Wilford

[viii]McEvoy and Shirlow

[ix]Powell

Twenty-Sixth and Final Report of the Independent Monitoring Commission. Independent Monitoring Commission, 4 July 2011. HC 1149. https://cain.ulster.ac.uk/issues/politics/docs/imc/imc040711.pdf.

Northern Ireland Act 1998. The Northern Ireland Assembly, 19 November 1998. http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/47/pdfs/ukpga_19980047_en.pdf.

St. Andrews Agreement. The British and Irish Governments, 13 October 2006. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/136651/st_andrews_agreement-2.pdf.

IRA Ceasefire Statement. Irish Republican Army, 31 August 1994. https://cain.ulster.ac.uk/events/peace/docs/ira31894.htm.

Combined Loyalist Military Command Ceasefire Statement. Combined Loyalist Military Command, 13 October 1994. https://cain.ulster.ac.uk/events/peace/docs/clmc131094.htm.

A New Framework For Agreement. The British and Irish Governments, 22 February 1995. https://cain.ulster.ac.uk/events/peace/docs/fd22295.htm.

Final Report of the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning. Independent International Commission on Decommissioning, 28 March 2011. https://cain.ulster.ac.uk/events/peace/decommission/iicd040711.pdf.

The Community and the Police Service. The Patten Commission, August 2001. https://cain.ulster.ac.uk/issues/police/patten/patten2001.pdf.

The Northern Ireland Peace Agreement. The Northern Ireland Assembly, 10 April 1998. https://www.dfa.ie/media/dfa/alldfawebsitemedia/ourrolesandpolicies/northernireland/good-friday-agreement.pdf.

The Stormont Agreement. The British and Irish Governments, 23 December 2014. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/706293/Stormont_House_Agreement.pdf

Aiken, Nevin T. Identity, Reconciliation and Transitional Justice. 1st ed., Routledge, 2013. Taylor & Francis Group, https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/9781135086688.

In this book, professor Nevin T. Aiken at the University of Wyoming explores the long term social and psychological impact of the memory of violence from the Troubles in Northern Ireland. Aiken affirms that violence damaged intercommunity relationships and social connections, and advocates for mechanisms that could restore the social fabric and rebuilding intergroup relations. For his analysis, he explores transitional justice as a tool to address reconciliation and sustainable peace. In his book, Aiken offers an extensive collection of fieldwork and research concluding in a critical need for instrumental, socioemotional, and distributive mechanisms in order to enhance reconciliation. Finally, Aiken concludes that justice and truth are needed to build reconciliation in divided societies.

Joyce, Carmel, and Orla Lynch. "Doing Peace: The Role of Ex-Political Prisoners in Violence Prevention Initiatives in Northern Ireland." Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, vol. 40, no. 12, 30 March 2017, pp. 1072-1090. Taylor & Francis Online, doi:10.1080.1056710X.2016.1253990.

In this article, the authors are focused on the role of the ex-prisoners in the community working in preventing violence, and in particular, the way they manage their identities as they transition from the role of political prisoner into a more violence-prevention role. They aim to understand the resources that ex-prisoners use in their path to reintegration and to understand how this community of ex-prisoners understands their role in desistance programmes. They contend that it is crucial to consider the perspective of ex-prisoners themselves, who are both forging their own path of desistance from political violence, as well as leaders of desistance programmes; arguing that participants in the desistance programs use their own identities to actually do the preventative work. In reading this article, it is clear that there are many opportunities for ex-prisoner-guided violence prevention in Northern Ireland to anti-terrorism prevention internationally.

Goldie, Roz, and Joanne Murphy. "Embedding the peace process: The role of leadership, changes and government in implementing key reforms in policing and local government in Northern Ireland." International Journal of Peace Studies, vol. 15, no. 2, Autumn/Winter 2010, pp. 33-58. JSTOR, https://www.jstor.org/stable/41853006?pq-origsite=summon&seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents.

Goldie and Murphy discuss the role of reforms in Northern Ireland across all aspects of the peacebuilding spectrum. It examines the quality of leadership, resources available, and pacing of reforms to determine the nature of successes following the Good Friday Agreement. It focuses in particular on the RUC and district councils, acknowledging the rate and types of change as measures of institutional success. This lens acknowledges how much of the peacebuilding process rests in developing strong institutions. Structural and cultural changes can influence outcomes significantly, a change from the standard emphasis on political, military and economic factors as the sole measure of success.

Knox, Colin. "Sharing power and fragmenting public services: complex government in Northern Ireland." Public Money & Management, vol. 35, no. 1, 24 November 2014, pp. 23-30, doi:10.1080/09540962.2015.986861.

Colin Knox’s paper explores the current government dynamics of Northern Ireland. Currently there are many government offices with redundant and overlapping mandates which make civil system difficult to navigate. Knox’s paper addresses the root causes of this complexity, tying them to the various peace agreements that have been signed and how each agreement has managed to change the direction of Northern Ireland’s modern governance. It includes an overview of the real role of the Northern Ireland Executive and its powers, along with the success of the main social programs being administered.

Lawther, Cheryl, and Taylor & Francis eBooks A-Z. Truth, Denial and Transition: Northern Ireland and the Contested Past. New York, NY, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, 2014.

In her book, professor Cheryl Lawther at the Queen’s University of Belfast explores the debate of transitional justice in Northern Ireland. In particular, she focuses on the complexity of having a truth recovery processes, while belligerents developed positions where they see themselves as victims and appear least enthusiastic about organised truth-telling. In Lawther’s analysis, Unionism and Unionist’s perceive themselves as the victims, while republicans have, in several occasions, advocated for an international truth commission. Lawther argues that the complexity of Unionist victimhood, blamelessness, denial, and deep mistrust are factors related to political self-confidence. She argues that they should be treated individually and cumulatively in order to understand the fear of Unionism.  Additionally, Lawther’s book offers numerous interviews with politicians from the main unionist and loyalist parties, policing representatives, academics and members of society.

Marijan, Branka, and Dejan Guzina. "Police Reform, Civil Society and Everyday Legitimacy: A Lesson From Northern Ireland." Journal of Regional Security, vol. 9, no. 1, 21 May 2014, pp. 51-66, doi:10.11643/issn.2217-995X141SPM38.

Marijan and Guzina’s paper addresses the modern state of Northern Ireland’s police system. Northern Ireland currently exists as a relatively successful case of post-conflict reform and has been incredibly open to new civilian oversight. While these reforms have greatly changed the nature of the service, they have yet to completely change its public image. This paper explores current public relations and institutional issues the PSNI encounters. The main question, however, is how much the police service has been legitimized in the public eye, and Marijan and Guzina conclude that the community level relationship needs to change to integrate policing as part of regular life and not a source of repression.

Mulcahy, Aogan. Policing in Northern Ireland. 1st ed., Willan, 2005. Taylor & Francis Group, https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/e/9781134019953.

In this book, professor Aogan Mulcahy from the University College of Dublin analyses the historical formation of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) in Northern Ireland in order to pursue the themes of conflict, legitimacy and reform. Mulcahy identifies that the RUC, from its foundation, was largely formed by a protestant police staff with a quasi-military/security role intended to be responsible to defend the state. For Mulcahy, this was particularly challenging as it left vulnerable the Catholic minority that was misrepresented in parliament. Furthermore, Mulcahy’s work looks at how the RUC sought to reform itself during the years of conflict (1968-1994), the ceasefire period (1994-1998), and transition into the PSNI (1998-2005). This book offers a wide set of formal and informal interviews from the police body and civil society.

Powell, Brenna Marea. "Policing post-war transitions: Insecurity, legitimacy and reform in Northern Ireland." Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict, vol. 7, no. 2-3, 13 November 2014, pp. 165-182. Taylor & Francis Online, doi:10.1080/17467586.2014.977928.

In her article, Brenna Powell examines the role that the police play in dealing with the fundamental challenges that peace processes typically present: things such as the DDR, and the “security vacuums” that exist as a result. Her article examines a case study from Northern Ireland, typically regarded as a successful case of post-conflict police reform, and highlights that even in the so-called success stories of institutional reform, there are political challenges that emerge. In her case study, she identifies that the way people view the police (either as legitimate or not) is linked to their perceptions about the legitimacy of the state. She demonstrates that police-reform efforts and the efforts to establish legitimate security institutions is generally perceived as legitimate, seen as a critical aspect for a stable and sustainable resolution.

“About Us.” About Us | The Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission (NIHRC), www.nihrc.org/about-us.

Bayley, D. H. “Post-Conflict Police Reform: Is Northern Ireland a Model?” Policing, vol. 2, no. 2, 2008, pp. 233–240., doi:10.1093/police/pan026.

Campbell, Cormac. “Former Troubles Prisoners Need Help to ‘Civilianise.’” The Irish Times, 29 Apr. 2016, www.irishtimes.com/news/ireland/irish-news/former-troubles-prisoners-need-help-to-civilianise-1.2628411

“Causeway Institute for Peacebuilding and Conflict Resolution (CIPCR).” Peace Insight, www.peaceinsight.org/conflicts/northern-ireland/peacebuilding-organisations/cipcr/.

“Commemoration.” Healing Through Remembering, healingthroughremembering.org/what-we-do/themes-of-work/network-of-commemoration/.

“Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA).” TRAC, www.trackingterrorism.org/group/continuity-irish-republican-army-cira.

Gallaher, Carolyn, and Project Muse University Press eBooks. After the Peace: Loyalist Paramilitaries in Post-Accord Northern Ireland. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 2007.

Garda Info. “History of An Garda Síochána.” Garda, www.garda.ie/en/About-Us/Our-History/.

Gormley-Heenan, Cathy, and Jonny Byrne. “The Problem with Northern Ireland's Peace Walls.” Political Insight, vol. 3, no. 3, 2012, pp. 4–7., doi: https://doi-org.ezproxy.library.ubc.ca/10.1111/j.2041-9066.2012.00115.x.

Harvey, Dan. Soldiering Against Subversion: The Irish Defence Forces and Internal Security During the Troubles, 1969-1998. Merrion Press, 2018. Irish Academic Press, https://irishacademicpress.ie/product/soldiering-against-subversion-aid-to-the-civil-power-1969-1998/

“Home Page of the Irish Network for Nonviolence Action Training and Education.” Home Page of the Irish Network for Nonviolence Action Training and Education, www.innatenonviolence.org/.

Lawther, Cheryl, and Taylor & Francis eBooks A-Z. Truth, Denial and Transition: Northern Ireland and the Contested Past. New York, NY, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, 2014.

McDaid, Shaun. The Origins and Rise of Dissident Irish Republicanism: The Role and Impact of Organizational Splits - by John F. Morrison. vol. 13, Wiley Subscription Services, Inc, Newcastle-upon-Tyne, 2015.

McEvoy, Kieran, and Peter Shirlow. "Re-imagining DDR: Ex-combatants, leadership and moral agency in conflict transformation." Theoretical Criminology, vol. 13, no. 1, 01 February 2009, pp. 31-59. SAGE Publications, doi:10.1177/1362480608100172.

Melaugh, Martin. “Events: Peace: IICD Reports - Reports and Statements by the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning (IICD).” CAIN, cain.ulster.ac.uk/events/peace/decommission/iicdreports.html.

Moriarty, Gerry. "Why are there still so few Catholics in the PSNI?" The Irish Times, 4 October 2018, https://www.irishtimes.com/news/ireland/irish-news/why-are-there-still-so-few-catholics-in-the-psni-1.3650559.

Mervyn, Jess. “The issues facing former paramilitary prisoners in NI.” The Irish Times, 7 June 2011, https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland-13689453.

Mulcahy, Aogán, and Taylor & Francis eBooks A-Z. Policing Northern Ireland: Conflict, Legitimacy and Reform. Willan, Cullompton, Devon; Portland, Or, 2006.

“Northern Ireland Loyalist Paramilitaries (U.K., Extremists).” Council on Foreign Relations, Council on Foreign Relations, www.cfr.org/backgrounder/northern-ireland-loyalist-paramilitaries-uk-extremists.

O'Rawe, Mary. "Security System Reform and Identity in Divided Societies: Lessons from Northern Ireland." International Center for Transitional Justice, October 2009, pp. 1-4.

“Peace Accords Matrix.” Paramilitary Groups: Northern Ireland Good Friday Agreement | Peace Accords Matrix, peaceaccords.nd.edu/provision/paramilitary-groups-northern-ireland-good-friday-agreement.

“Peace Walls 'As Contentious As Ever' €" Ulster Research.” Ulster University, 2012, www.ulster.ac.uk/news/2012/september/peace-walls-as-contentious-as-ever-ulster-research.

Powell, Brenna Marea. "Policing post-war transitions: Insecurity, legitimacy and reform in Northern Ireland." Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict, vol. 7, no. 2-3, 13 November 2014, pp. 165-182. Taylor & Francis Online, doi:10.1080/17467586.2014.977928.

“Project Activities.” BCRC, www.bcrc.eu/project-activities.

“Red Hand Commandos (RHC) - Ireland.” TRAC, www.trackingterrorism.org/group/red-hand-commandos-rhc-ireland.

Roberts, David. “Constabulary and Military Reform in Northern Ireland.” Defence Studies, vol. 1, no.1, March 2001, pp. 162.166. Taylor & Francis Online, doi:10.1080/714000013.

Sloat, Amanda. “Explaining Brexit and the Northern Ireland Question.” Brookings, Brookings, 16 Oct. 2018, www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/10/15/explaining-brexit-and-the-northern-ireland-question/.

Southern, Neil. "Post Agreement Electoral Decline: The Ulster Unionist Party and the Problem of Decommissioning." Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, vol. 24, no. 4, 2018, pp. 456-477

Sullivan, Colleen. "Ulster Freedom Fighters." The SAGE Encyclopedia of Terrorism.Ed. Gus Martin.2nd ed Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, Inc., 2011. 600. SAGE Knowledge. Web. 31 Mar. 2019, doi: 10.4135/9781412980173.n403.

“The Northern Ireland Peace Process.” Council on Foreign Relations, Council on Foreign Relations, www.cfr.org/backgrounder/northern-ireland-peace-process.

Tonge, Jonathan, and University Press Scholarship Online. The Democratic Unionist Party: From Protest to Power. Oxford University Press, Oxford, United Kingdom, 2014, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198705772.001.0001.

“Training.” Youth Link NI, www.youthlink.org.uk/training/.

“UK | Northern Ireland | UFF given the Order to Stand Down.” BBC News, BBC, 12 Nov. 2007, news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/northern_ireland/7089310.stm.

United Nations. https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/thematic-areas/access-to-justice-and-rule-of-law-institutions/ssr/. Accessed 21 Mar. 2018."Good Friday Agreement was 'work of genius'." BBC, 10 April 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland-43660970.

Whiting, Sophie A., and UPSO eCollections (University Press Scholarship Online). Spoiling the Peace? The Threat of Dissident Republicans to Peace in Northern Ireland. Manchester University Press, Manchester [U.K.], 2016.

Wilford, Rick. "Designing the Northern Ireland Assembly." Parliamentary Affairs, vol. 53, no. 3, 01 July 2000, pp. 577-590. Oxford Academic, doi:10.1093/pa/53.3.577.

Human Rights

There is still almost total impunity for past and present human rights abuses, particularly sexual and gender-based violence. In the 1,511 rape cases registered in 2014 and 2015, less than 4 percent of the alleged perpetrators were convicted. Many alleged perpetrators, even if arrested, are not held accountable under the law.

Increased budgetary Support for National Police

In the budget for 2015/16 for the Liberia National Police, $14.2 million covered salaries and $1.7 million covered operations. As a consequence, the national police lack sufficient mobility, communications, uniforms, computers and generators, which undermines operational performance. The late or partial payment of salaries also has had a destabilizing effect.

Military Discipline/Budgetary Support

In both the army and the coastguard, discipline is a major issue and development is hindered by a lack of resources. The army faces operational challenges due to insufficient funding, which hampers its ability to deploy quickly or sustain operations outside of Monrovia. The coastguard has a limited operational role because it lacks personnel.

Development of Strong Democratic Institutions

Throughout its past Liberia has had a weak democratic structure due to its violent suppression the general populace by the ruling parties. As a result, the region has been a victim of intense conflicts due to the lack of accountability towards the government

State Security Forces:

Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) - The official military force of Liberia fighting on behalf of the Government.

Special Security Service (SSS) - Special forces troops selected to guard Charles Taylor.

Liberian National Police (LNP) - Main force responsible for the security of the people of Liberia. At the time of the civil war much of the National Police force had dwindled down due to budget cuts.

National Port Authority - National entity that controls the main port in Monrovia the cities capital. This authority is extremely important as the port is vital to Liberia's economy.

Anti-Terrorist Unit - Miltiary force formed by former NPFL troops under Charles Taylor with little to no government oversight.

National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) - Charles Taylor's old military front which he used to win the first Liberian Civil War. During the Second Civil War this outfit remained loyal to Taylor.

Non-State Security forces:

Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) - Liberian rebel group that formed in 1999 at the beginning of civil war. The group received support from various countries around the world.

Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) - Liberian rebel group formed in 2003 based out of the Ivory Coast.

Local NGOs/civil society/governmental agencies working on SSR:

Liberia Media Project - organized a number of peace festivals around the country to help reconcile divided groups and communities

Mandingo and Lorma ethnic groups - initiated reconciliation efforts involving traditional cleansing ceremonies

Liberia Community Infrastructure Programme - helped finance reconciliation efforts

Kissi community of Liberia, Guinea, and Sierra Leone - organized a reconciliation event with high-level political participation from each country to resolve the Yenga border dispute between the Kissi people of Sierra Leone and Guinea.

Mano ethnic group of Guinea and Liberia - organized meetings to recommit to a nonaggression pact signed during the Taylor period

Kpelle and Mandingo ethnic groups - organized a meeting where US$5,000 and LR$30,000 was received in pledges and cash to clean up the city of Gbarnga

DynCorp - a US private company that assisted in the reform of the AFL

International Committee of the Red Cross - corrections system support

Japan - Reform of the Liberian National police

Netherlands - Reform of the Liberian National police

Norway - Reform of the Liberian National police, corrections system reform

United Kingdom - Reform of the Liberian National police

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) - Sponsored reintegration programmes for ex-combatants, rehabilitate critical roads

United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) - ensured the issue of child combatants was a part of the DDR program and organized a program for war-affected youth, which included vocational and literacy training and trauma counseling

United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) - rehabilitate critical roads, rehabilitate secondary and feeder roads

United Nations police - assisted with reform of the Liberian National Police, human rights promotion, judicial system support, corrections system reform

United States - Reform of the Liberian National Police, reform of the Armed Forces of Liberia, consolidation of state authority, corrections system reform

World Bank - rehabilitate critical roads

World Food Programme (WFP) - corrections system support, rehabilitating secondary and feeder roads

World Health Organization (WHO) - promoted women’s issues during the planning and implementation of the DDR program

Lack of Financial Ability

The global decline in commodity prices and the Ebola virus outbreak of 2014 and its continued effects have constrained Liberia’s limited financial space, hampering the government’s ability to implement reforms in a number of security areas, including the Liberian National Police and the Armed National Forces. As a result, there is a lack of personnel, logistics, and transport required in order to operate at a full capacity. Nearly ninety percent of funds allocated towards security agencies are for salaries and recurrent costs, with little remaining for development-related expenditures.

Lack of Political Will

There is a lack of political will on the government’s part to address the issues of accountability, human rights, and human law. For example, there remains legislation that goes against its promises to protect human rights that have been used to limit fundamental rights. Additionally, the government has suspended two opposition media outlets, apparently in an attempt to silence opposing voices. This has negatively affected the reform process of a number of security areas, including the judicial and corrections systems. It has also had an effect on the ability of the security forces, including the Liberian National Police, to operate and protect citizens.

Lack of Civil Society Engagement

The Government has made inadequate efforts to involve and engage civil society in reforms and empowering them as citizens. This has led to a lack of mistrust of civilians in the security sector, specifically the Liberia National Police and Armed Forces of Liberia, with poor state-society relations posing a risk to sustaining peace and security.

Security/Justice Structure reform

As it currently stands the trust within the armed forces of Liberia is at a very low point due to the systematic abuses of power during both civil wars. While efforts are being made to retrain troops by the private US company DynCorp the civilian trust in the institution will take significant amounts of time to rebuild.

The DDRR programme in Liberia was generally considered a success. In July, President Johnson-Sirleaf officially closed the national disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation and reintegration programme, which had successfully disarmed and demobilized more than 101,000 ex-combatants, and provided reintegration assistance to more than 90,000 former combatants since 2003. During this process, all rebel groups involved in the conflict were disbanded and disarmed as well. According to a survey of ex-combatants undertaken by UNDP in March 2006, ex-combatants who “formally disarmed, registered, and completed a reintegration training experienced an overall 8 percent increase in their socio-economic situation.” About 94 percent of the ex-fighters in this survey indicated that they have not had problems being accepted into their communities.

The two key forces of security, the Liberian National Police and the Armed Forces of Liberia, were completely reformed. In 2016, the Armed Forces of Liberia completed its training and is considered a professional and credible army that is well trained and equipped. The Liberian National Police consists of new, fully trained officers, with improved leadership and management officers. However, mistrust of the population against both forces persists and hinders the operational capabilities of the police force. In addition, a lack of resources hampers the operational capabilities of both forces.

Some reforms of the judicial system have been made. Courts are operational in all counties, with trained prosecutors and public defenders deployed across the country. The legal framework has been improved, and the code of conduct for lawyers and judges has been reformed. Despite these reforms, however, the judicial system still needs to be met with significant reforms, including access to courts, the need to update many laws, the lack of transparency and accountability, bribery, and a lack of resources and personnel. Many still rely on the traditional justice system for dispute resolution, where efforts to bring it in line with international human rights standards have still been unmet. In addition, prisons are operational in all counties except Grand Kru. However, many are still unguarded and unarmed and many are overcrowded.

The security situation in Liberia has remained relatively stable since the conflict, even after UNMIL handed back security responsibilities to the Liberian government in 2016. While there has been a significant success in increasing the budgetary support and stability across all departments in Liberia. This success has been built off the strong DDRR programs implemented. This success has been in spite of the slow institutional change that occurs in the region. 

Overall the DDR process itself has been a great success as much of the society has been able to reintegrate itself. While this has been a success the country still suffers greatly from other issues like corruption that are rampant across the region.

Defense Agreement Between the US and Liberia, 2005

https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/185774.pdf

RAND Report on Liberia National Security Sector, 2007

https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2007/RAND_MG529.pdf

Accra Peace Agreement, August 2003

https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/accord/accra-peace-agreement

Human Rights Watch Report on Child Soldiers in Liberia, February 2004

https://www.hrw.org/report/2004/02/02/how-fight-how-kill/child-soldiers-liberia

UN Security Council Report on UNMIL, December 2006

https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Liberia%20S2006958.pdf

National Defense Strategy of Liberia, 2008

https://issat.dcaf.ch/Learn/Resource-Library/Other-Documents/National-Security-Strategy-of-Liberia-2008

Refugee Review Tribunal Research Response, 2006

https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4b6fe2882.pdf

Global Network of Women Peacebuilders Report, 2011

http://www.peacewomen.org/sites/default/files/GNWP_Monitoring_Liberia.pdf

UNDP Human Development Report, 2018

http://hdr.undp.org/sites/all/themes/hdr_theme/country-notes/LBR.pdf

UNMIL Report on Human Rights Situation, 2007

https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/47454d132.pdf

Ursula C. Schroeder, Fairlie Chappuis & Deniz Kocak (2014) Security Sector Reform and the Emergence of Hybrid Security Governance, International Peacekeeping, 21:2, 214-230

This work analyzes SSR interventions in various situations including Liberia in order to trace patterns and draw insights into the 'hybrid security models' that are implemented as a result of the merging of SSR models with domestic models. The work uses specific focus on Norms and Rules, Organizational structures and Technical Capacities in order to form a hybrid measure which provides a stronger assessment. This assessment has resulted in the evaluation that there needs to be a stronger focus on correct implementations of SSR which are unique to each case rather than applying blanket approaches across different countries.

Sean McFate (2008) Lessons Learned from Liberia, The RUSI Journal,153:1, 62-66

This article talks of the impending failure of the SSR process expected by the author due to the ineffectiveness of the process following the conflict in Liberia which saw intense abuses by National armed forces. It further draws upon the lack of trust within the country against a force that has done to its people.  The article uses this to paint a picture of what must be done in order to derive a formula for a successful SSR process. The article comes to the conclusion that the comprehensive nature of SSR takes decades to complete in most cases especially when it occurs in failed states such as Liberia.

Sabrina Karim & Ryan Gorman (2016) Building a more competent security sector: The case of UNMIL and the Liberian National Police,International Peacekeeping, 23:1, 158-191

This article analyzes the effectiveness of reforming the Liberian National Police in an attempt to create a formula for the implementation of a similar process in future SSR processes. Specifically, this article looks at determiners for success within the reform process and is able to see that there is no single aspect that determines the ability for a force to reform but rather that a stronger emphasis on learning needs to be made in order for there to be a success.

Alexander Loden, Civil Society and Security Sector Reform in Post-conflict Liberia: Painting a Moving Train without Brushes, International Journal of Transitional Justice, Volume 1, Issue 2, July 2007, Pages 297–307

This paper seeks to analyze the SSR process and deem whether it was an effective tool since the Accra Peace Accord. The article strongly focusses on the civil rights and development in the region and its evolving context. Additionally, there is context on the importance of civic engagement within the process and how it plays a significant role in the SSR process.

Kathleen M. Jennings (2009) The political economy of DDR in Liberia: a gendered critique, Conflict, Security & Development, 9:4, 475-494

This article looks at the reintegration aspect of DDR with a specific focus around gender and the focus on male combatants. The article makes the argument that the programmes in Liberia defaulted to this assumption and therefore failed to address a large percentage of the population who are female. Further focus on this aspect will result in a process that appeals to a wider variety of conflicts and will enable further programmes to be more effective.

Jairo Munive & Stine Finne Jakobsen (2012) Revisiting DDR in Liberia: exploring the power, agency and interests of local and international actors in the ‘making’ and ‘unmaking’ of combatants, Conflict, Security & Development, 12:4, 359-385

This article further focusses on the DDR programmes and looks at the actual effects in order to understand how DDR works with relation to governance. It also takes a further look at local and international actors with regards to what makes a combatant. This plays a specific importance as this definition is significant when designing various DDR programmes.

Jennings, Kathleen M. “Unclear Ends, Unclear Means: Reintegration in Postwar Societies—The Case of Liberia.” Global Governance, vol. 14, no. 3, 2008, pp. 327–345. JSTOR 

This article uses Liberia as a case study to show the vagueness and contradictory nature of reintegration and how this can significantly change the strategy of many DDR programs. This change often leaves many programs unable to meet the initial needs and ultimately lead to a massive failure. Additionally, Jennings provides strong recommendations for the improvement of this process by promoting the use of local actors within this process rather than outsiders in order to create a stronger chance for reintegration to succeed.

Helen S. A. Basini (2013) Gender Mainstreaming Unraveled: The Case of DDRR in Liberia, International Interactions, 39:4, 535-557

This article examines the role of women within the DDR process and explores how they have been ignored from the DDR process. Specifically, it looks at female ex-combatants and points to the need for frameworks that address this problem. This will increase the effectiveness of the DDR process and allow for future programs to implement a more gendered approach to the process.

Jaye, Thomas. Transitional Justice and DDR: The Case of Liberia. International Center for Transitional Justice, June 2009, www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-DDR-Liberia-CaseStudy-2009-English.pdf.

Liberia: Rehabilitation and Reintegration Projects Approved for Ex-Combatants. United Nations Mission in Liberia, 2004, https://reliefweb.int/report/liberia/liberia-rehabilitation-and-reintegration-projects-approved-ex-combatants

“Liberia SSR Snapshot.” International Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT), The International Security Sector Advisory Team, Aug. 2018, issat.dcaf.ch/Learn/Resource-Library/Country-Profiles/Liberia-SSR-Snapshot.

“Liberia: The Promises of Peace for 21,000 Child Soldiers.” Liberia: The Promises of Peace for 21,000 Child Soldiers, Amnesty International, 16 May 2004. www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr34/006/2004/en/.

“UNICEF Backs the Re-Commencement of DDRR in Liberia.” UNICEF, 16 Apr. 2004, www.unicef.org/media/media_20447.html.

United Nations. “Liberia's Disarmament Process off to a Good Start.” UNHCR, www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2003/12/3fd495764/liberias-disarmament-process-good-start.html.

United Nations Security Council, Thirteenth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia, S/2006/958 (11 December 2006), https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Liberia%20S2006958.pdf

United Nations Security Council, Thirty-second progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia, S/2016/706 (12 August 2016), https://unmil.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/n1624814.pdf

United Nations Security Council, Special report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia, S/2006/969 (15 November 2016), https://unmil.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/special_unmil_sg_report_15_november_

Disbanding and Disarming All (Lebanese and non-Lebanese) Militia Groups:

A large threat to stable security and SSR in Lebanon was due to the many militia groups, both Lebanese and non-Lebanese, involved in the conflicts. Since the outbreak of the civil war Lebanese authorities have continuously tried to condemn the existence of militia groups. The efforts to disband, disarm, and rehabilitate militia fighters have been unsuccessful, were the lack of reintegration has left fighters to rely on their own means for reintegration, making them vulnerable to society. (Karamé)

Protection of Civilians and Vulnerable Groups:

One of the main concerns within the implementation of SSR and the ending the unrest and violence in Lebanon is ensuring the protection of civilians. Throughout the Lebanon conflict(s), UN missions had to balance a fine line between peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Protection of civilians involved actions from the delivery of humanitarian aid to ensuring the withdrawal of Israeli troops to assisting in the safe return of displaced persons and groups. (Murphey)

Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons:

In the years that had led up to the Lebanese Civil War, the state of Lebanon received an influx of approximately 100,000 Palestinian Refugees after the creation of the state of Israel. The establishment of Israel dramatically changed the religious dynamic of the region as many of the refugees fleeing to Lebanon were of Muslim faith. Because of this religious divide, Israel continuously posed themselves as a threat to Lebanon, invading Lebanon in 1982 and 2005. (CNN)

Security Groups Divided Along Sectarian Cleavages:

The implementation of SSR within Lebanon was greatly affected because of Lebanon’s geographical location, as Lebanon is a small nation surrounded by three middle-eastern powers. Along with the several international actors present, this created a problem of trust among Lebanese forces and civilians. All these actors and elements at play creates a high risk of conflict escalation and violence, where SSR is focused on short-term goals to defuse the violence instead of addressing long-term goals for systemic change. (Kraft)

Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)

Internal Security Forces (ISF)

 Office of the Minister of State for Administrative Reform (OMSAR)

Lebanese National Movement (LNM):

A leftist nationalist movement, founded in 1969, advocating for a secular political system in Lebanon. The movement was made up of Arab Nationalists, which included Palestinians.

Kata’ib Party/Lebanese Forces (LF):

An overwhelmingly Christian party, the Kata’ib party was absorbed by the Lebanese Forces in the later years of the Lebanon conflict. The party advocated for liberal economic values and maintaining Lebanon’s political ‘status-quo’.

Progressive Socialist Party (PSP):

This socialist party gained most of their support from Lebanon’s Druze community, as the party was a major supportive element to the LNM during the Lebanese Civil War.

Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO):

This umbrella organization claims to represent all Palestinians of whom lived in Palestine and then were displaced in the creation of the State of Israel. The organization came together in 1964 in order to centralize various Palestinian advocate groups into one body.

Amal Movement:

The Amal political party, also known as the Hope Movement, is a primarily Shia Muslim community party with alliances with PSP and Hezbollah parties.

Hezbollah:

A radical Shia Muslim combatant group, provoked by Islamic revolution in Iran and Israel’s invasion of Lebanon, in which they worked towards liberating all occupied Lebanese territories and POW’s from Israel’s control. In Lebanon today, Hezbollah is both a strong-armed movement and political party.

South Lebanon Army (SLA):

The creation of the SLA was an after-effect of Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in the southern region. After Israel’s partial withdrawal, Israel maintained a security zone to create a security buffer between Israel and Lebanon with the allied militia of the SLA in order to maintain the zone.

Lebanese Transparency Association (LTA):

Lebanese NGO focused on reducing corruption and promoting the principles of good governance while encouraging society civil society towards more transparency and accountability in Lebanon.

Former Fighters for Peace (FFP):

Lebanese NGO working with ex-fighters, youth, and civil society activists in working towards building civil peace and reconciliation. This organization unites ex-fighters in Lebanon from different political, religious, and social backgrounds, where former fighters can find peace within their lives and communities.

Lebanese Association for Civil Rights (LACR):

Lebanese NGO focused on promoting a culture of non-violence in Lebanon working for civil peace, socioeconomic and political rights, humanistic education, and justice.

Joint Command Council:

The command council was the early institutions of the LF and was established to prevent crime and examine security concerns. The council became an official police force in 1978.

Palestinian Armed Struggle Command:

The command force was the police force used by the PLO that established a court system in 1972 in order to prosecute violations by armed forces and to mediate disputes between the PLO and other parties.

Syrian Military:

An ally of Lebanon, called upon by the Lebanese government to help put an end to the civil war. However, as the violence and conflict persisted, Syria did not withdraw their troops until 2005.

 United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL):

This UN Peacekeeping mission was first deployed as an interim force in 1978, focusing on providing a security buffer in Southern Lebanon and striving to maintain peaceful condition in the nation.

Arab League Peacekeeping Force:

Also known as the Arab Deterrent Force, the force created by the Arab League, deployed with the goal of deterring the outbreak of violence between conflicting sides and maintaining the cease-fire by supporting the Lebanese government authority.

The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF):

Driving and shaping SSR policy and programming worldwide, DCAF in Lebanon works closely with the Lebanese government and civil society organizations to strengthen public institutions and enhancing governance in the security and justice sectors.

 United States Government:

The United States has traditional close ties with Lebanon. Supporting the UN Security Council Resolution 1559, the US has been assisting with relief, recovery, rebuilding, and security in Lebanon.

 Organization for Economic and Co-operation and Development (OECD):

Aim to promote policies that will improve economic and social well-being in the countries which they support. The organization has been working with Lebanon to continue to improve the well-being of vulnerable communities and institutions in the nation.

 Euro-Arab-Muslim Dialogue (ASSAM):

A grassroots organization aiming to create a peaceful dialogue among Muslims and Christians in Lebanon, as the coexistence between these two religious communities is necessary for addressing structural challenges effecting SSR in the region.

International Independent Investigation Commission (UNIIC):

The UN commission that was established in Lebanon in 2005 to investigate the assassination of Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. The commission concluded that Lebanese and Syrian security/intelligence agencies committed the assassinated through Hezbollah.

Financial and Administrative Corruption:

A lot of government institutions were substantially damaged during the war and the post war phase, including the internal security institutions which were not adequately rebuilt especially in regard to their ethical standards and mechanisms of inspection and accountability. Economic difficulties further encouraged corruption where officers within the ISF, the GS, and the ST devised methods to collect money from citizens and private companies. High ranking security officers often favour staff for religious, political and sectarian.

Inadequate Staff Development:

ISF officers lack adequate training and are not specialized in their line of work. The lack of professionalism is particularly evident when reading investigative reports which are hand written in stylistically untailored. Investigative methods are primitive and inefficient leading officers the threat of violence to extract confessions during interrogations. Officers tend to also have informal and inappropriate interactions with civilians often acting as womanizers or bullies, insulting citizens who break the law.

Insufficient and Unsuitable Equipment:

Both the ISF and the GS are missing basic necessary equipment for law enforcement. Most stations are not equipped with computers, photocopying machines, and the filing system is unorganized and confusing. Forensic labs are also often missing necessary chemicals. The ISF uses old and inadequate trucks to transport prisoners that sometimes cause them to faint from heat and lack of oxygen upon arrival to their destination.

Rivalry and Lack of Coordination:

The current local security apparatus arrangements are characterised by encouraging multiple organizations which weakened accountability. Sources of failure were hard to pin down when so many institutions were considered in charge of security without clear specializations. This lack of clear mandates leads to tensions between various security institutions as they would find themselves investigating the same crimes which creates difficulties when it comes to crime scene management, and the collection and transportation of physical evidence.   In 2005, the ISF development an intelligence service however its biased political label made it relatively limited and inefficient and rivalry with Army intelligence further accentuated these limitations (Nashbe, 2009, The Arab Reform Initiative). The confessional ecology of the security apparatus which guarantees that all major sects be represented in the leadership of a security institution, while informal cannot be ignored by leaders since this historic convention balances out the interests of different sectarian constituencies within the security forces. This sectarianism has created a low level of trust in the agencies amongst citizens which is reported to low reporting rates (Walsh, 2019, The Middle Eastern Institute).

Analysis of Success:

Lebanon gaining independence from Syria in 2005 has been a major catalyst for the inadequacy of effective security sector reform (SSR) due to the protest/riots, the war with Israel, and the destruction of Nahr-el Bared that followed soon after that gain of Lebanese independence. The destruction of the Palestinian refugee camp, Nahr-el Bared, in 2007 led to the loss of homes and properties of the Palestinian community. The Nahr-el Bared mini-war was a war launched in opposition to the LAF and the Fatah-Islam an armed organization group led by Palestinian commanders and composed of Jihadi fighters (Hokayem & McGovern, 2008, p.9). This operation for the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) did not prove itself successful due to a lack of coordination skills, organization, and proper training. This mini-war was not only a defeat for the LAF but it also was a loss in the sense that this proved the LAFs need for foreign assistance on winning victories through the help of Western backed powers like the US. But what Nahr-El Bared produced as an indirect consequence of the war was the effects of the mass displacement of Palestinian refugees which compounded the already severe socioeconomic conditions facing these refugees and constitute a chronic humanitarian crisis (United Nations Relief and Works Agency). This lack of the Lebanese government to deal with the effects of the Israeli-Palestinian issue within its own borders has ultimately resulted in the dispersion of many Palestinian camps outside of the control and jurisdiction of the Lebanese state, which has allowed terrorist organization and armed militia groups to occupy and form groups within these unstable Palestinian refugee camps. This has led to a major security breach that the Lebanese government has not addressed through effective SSR strategies.

To implement successful Security Sector Reform (SSR) what needs to be addressed is an implementation of a new mandate or constitution forged between the countries of Lebanon and Syria. Since, 1969 the Lebanese state has chosen to refrain from entering these camps, allowing for the free movement of Palestinians and other organizations (Hokayem & McGovern, 2008, p.10). But the securing of Lebanese borders works in direct conjunction with the Syrian state and their border security. This fusion between Syrian and Lebanese border protection was mandated through a “UN resolution, in particular UN resolution 1701, demand that Lebanon secure its border with Syria in order to prevent the entry of weaponry. But the borders between Lebanon and Syria have historically been porous and the Syrian reluctance to delineate borders and facilitate the monitoring of the movement of goods and people only exacerbate the problem. The Syrian and Hezbollah opposition to the deployment of international forces to deploy along the border has placed the burden on the Lebanese security sector, which is ill designed and equipped to perform this mission satisfactorily, and is politically constrained as is illustrated by instances in which weaponry seized by security forces is returned to Hezbollah for fear of escalation (Hokayem & Mcgovern, 2016, p. 10). This has caused SSR to be delineated itself towards the implementation of a community policing procedure in Lebanon in order to rectify the lack of support from Syria to reinforce proper border security measures on their part. Therefore, “the Lebanese government at an international donor conference in Vienna in June 2008, reiterated the need to re-establish security and order in the camp through community policing. The government’s proposal met the common criteria for community policing as it emphasized the need to deploy a police force to the camp that would be culturally and politically sensitive to the plight of Palestinians, and hence be able to build close ties with camp residence and offer proactive policing services” (Mazzola, 2018, Middle East Institute).

In order to secure effective SSR measures to be implemented in the case of Lebanon, there must not only be amendments made or the forging of an entirely new constitutional mandate that would uphold Syria's role of the responsibility of protecting the border between Lebanon and Syria. But there should be stipulations that reduces US or Western backed funding on community policing programs. For instance, Nahr-el Bared residents were rather suspicious of the new community police in their camp. US involvement in funding the program led to the impression among residents that community policing was an international plot under the guise of a program designed to serve them that would ultimately bolster the Lebanese state’s control over the camp populations (Mazzola, 2018, Middle East Institute). That is why it is important to build relationships and bridge divides between the citizens of the community itself and the police force. For example, The Policing Pilot Project (PPP), jointly funded by the American and British embassies in London, was set to showcase how proactive community policing can be to enhance citizen’s experiences with the police force beyond the Nahr el-Bared experience. The West Beirut neighborhood of Ras Beirut was chosen as a project to test this new policing project because the area represented a microcosm of Lebanon filled with residents, visitors, members of the LGBTQ community, migrant workers, expats, and refugees. This sounded nice in theory but did not produce adequate results in practice. “In sum, the effects of community policing in Ras Beirut clearly mirrors those in the Nahr al-Bared Palestinian refugee camps: community policing, regardless of its intention, increases policing directly against refugees and hence reproduces their insecurity (Mazzola, 2018, Middle East Institute). Therefore, to enhance SSR in the region and to produce effective results it requires a police force that does not receive western backing/funding, and it must not operate in such a way that promotes the over targeting of minority communities and clientelism amongst the police force in order to reduce further insecurities amongst citizens/civilians.

Ta’if Agreement: https://www.un.int/lebanon/sites/www.un.int/files/Lebanon/the_taif_agreement_english_version_.pdf

UN Resolutions 425 & 426:

http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/IP%20SRES%20425.pdf

UN Resolution 1701:

http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/PKO%20SRES1701.pdf

UN Resolutions 520 & 521:

http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/UNIFIL%20SRES520.pdf

National Reconciliation Pact (Includes Court Reforms):

http://confinder.richmond.edu/admin/docs/leb.pdf

Letter of Agreement on Law Enforcement Between the Government of the United States and the Government of Lebanon:

https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/130486.pdf

ISF Code of Conduct:

http://www.isf.gov.lb/files/1582100364CoCEnglish.pdf

Hezbollah's Program/Manifesto:

https://israelipalestinian.procon.org/files/hezbollah_program.pdf

Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation and Coordination Between the Syrian Arab Republic and the Lebanese Republic:

https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/LB-SY_910522_TreatyBrotherhoodCooperationCoordination.pdf

Cairo Agreement:  

Brynen2_09.htm

Towards a More Secure and Stable Lebanon: Prospects for Security Sector

Hokayem, Emile El-, & McGovern, Elena. (2008). Towards a More Secure and Stable Lebanon:

Prospects for Security Sector Reform. Washington: The Henry L Stimson Center. P.

1-48.

This is an article that details the security vacuum in Lebanon primarily caused by the withdrawal of Syrian forces in 2005, protests that advocated political upheaval, the assassination of political leaders, and the war between Lebanon and Israel. The war between Lebanon and Israel has highlighted the need for Lebanon to tighten its security measures, especially after the attack on Nahr el-Bared, in which Lebanon was dealing with a Palestinian refugee crisis within their borders. It also details the fact that in order for Lebanon to gain a level of adequate security they must develop their own independent security force without relying upon the US to coordinate and fund it, especially since the withdrawal of Syrian forces. This would be best achieved through a national security strategy. The strength of this article is that it displays the effects of both the changes in the political regime and the event of the Nahr el-Bared attack that exposed faults in Lebanon's national procedures for securing the border with Syria, and the need for Lebanon to produce reforms that reduce the leverage of Western powers in organizing their own national security regimens. A weakness of this article is that although it eludes to the need to for Lebanon to bring about a reform in security and to produce a national security strategy, and offers these suggestions after detailing the events in Lebanon that produced these vast security vacuums along their border. But it does not specify the specific policies or amendments implemented in the new national security reform. This is partially due to the fact that this article was written in the year 2008 and it was only until around after 2008 that the Lebanese state enforced some new initiatives, especially new programs surrounding community peacebuilding. We will use the events of Nahr el-Bared in this article and how it led to a security vacuum along the Lebanon-Syria border.

Reintegration and the Relevance of Social Relations: The Case of Lebanon

Karamé, Kari. “Reintegration and the Relevance of Social Relations: The Case of Lebanon.” Conflict, Security & Development, vol. 9, no. 4, 2009, pp. 495–514.

This is an article that outline and highlights the processes of Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) in Lebanon. The article is able to give an overview of the different militias and Lebanese forces, giving summaries of the main actors involved in the civil war. The DDR process did not involve any cooperation between international actors and the Lebanese government which resulted in the DDR programmes being ineffective. The article presents the many weakness and pitfalls of DDR that left many ex-combatants to rely on untraditional and unregulated methods of social and economic reintegration. When reintegrating militia fighters, many were not found to be suited for reintegrating into the Lebanese forces, making these fighters potential threats to the peace process, as they can become ‘spoilers’. The strength of this article is its ability to show the problems within DDR in Lebanon while giving an overview of the different militia actors involved in the process. The article also is able to give a critical view of actions that limited the success of DDR and the ways civil society compensated for the lack of official state support. Overall, this article demonstrated the importance of taking into consideration social factors in DDR in order bring about positive social processes within DDR.

Walking the Line

Kraft, Martin, et al. Walking the Line: Strategic Approaches to Peacebuilding in Lebanon. Working Group on Development and Peace (FriEnt), 2008.

This is an article addressing the deeper, structural challenges of the Lebanese conflict that need to be addressed in order for the country to move forward in their effort of maintaining peace. The Lebanese civil war highlighted how the regional and international conflicts surround Lebanon affected the state, focusing specifically on the Arab-Israeli conflict. Along with Lebanon’s geographical location in the Middle-East, the country was seen as of high strategic value for stakeholders in surrounding conflicts. The article highlights the core problems that led to the initial conflict in Lebanon with the begging of the civil war, focusing on the sectarian-based patronage system, the lack of a viable central government, the large influx of Palestinian refugees, and private sectarian-based political identities. The causes are outlined in the article, among others, and goes on to suggest approaches for conflict transformation and address these structural issues. The article strongly enhances the research as it gives insight into the structural causes of the conflict and give recommendations for conflict transformation and peacebuilding between suited to Lebanon and the core structural issues at the heart of the conflict. Overall, the article recommends enhancing strategic peacebuilding approaches in Lebanon, reassessing the role of external actors, and the investment in conflict sensitivity and transnational justice.

Community Policing in Lebanon

Mazzola, Francisco. (2018). Community Policing in Lebanon. Washington: Middle East Institute.

Community Policing in Lebanon is an article that details the politics and policing currently occurring in Lebanon, specifically the introduction of the Policing Pilot Project (PPP). The Policing Pilot Project was jointly funded by American and British embassies and was a way to address the lack of Lebanese state jurisdiction in policing certain communities and refugee camps. The problem with the Policing Pilot Project was that it tried to strengthen citizen and police participation with one another, but it often resulted in the Police force heighten insecurities amongst marginalized groups, such as refugees, members of LGBT community, sex workers, and drug users etc. This heightened insecurity was mainly caused by the over targeting of members of these communities by the Policing Pilot Project (PPP). The strength of this article is that it explains how effective police reform can act as a strategy of the promotion of state building. A strength of this article also argues how policy intervention that claims to be apolitical in ‘fixing’ police-citizen relations might be more divisive and produces a lack of cohesion than other types of policy. However, this article needs to build upon how maybe it is the way the governmental system in Lebanon is built that leads to clientelistic practices amongst the police forces, it essentially needs to elaborate more upon the clientelism aspect in the police force. We will implement the facts of the Policing Pilot Project and the plight of marginalized communities at the hands of this new British and US backed program, and how it resembles the failures of the security initiatives in the aftermath of the Nahr el-Bared attack.

Security Sector Reform in Lebanon: Internal Security Forces and General Security

Nashbe, Omar. “Security Sector Reform in Lebanon: Internal Security Forces and General Security.” The Arab Reform Initiative, 2009, 1-9.

This article provides a general overview of the origins of security sector reform in Lebanon, the factors that limited its success, recommendation on how to engage in more effective security sector reform, figures on personnel, budgets, and hierarchies of security institutions, as well as basic legal references to decrees that created, reformed and adjusted security institutions.  The article was published in 2009, meaning that it is does not take into account the more recent and slightly more successful security sector reform initiatives undertaken in the 2010s. It also does not reference academic theories in its analysis. However, the author’s arguments and perspectives are all in line with other research conducted and his analysis is sound relative to the events that took place. The article enhances our research because firstly it gives us the perspective of a local Lebanese scholar based out of Lebanon, as opposed to a Western outlook. Secondly, the author has conducted interviews with high ranking security officers in Lebanon meaning that his analysis of the impediments to success of SSR takes into account an insider perspective from the sector itself, which is not something we have come across in our research.

Peacekeeping in Lebanon and Civilian Protection

 Ray Murphy, Peacekeeping in Lebanon and Civilian Protection, Journal of Conflict and Security Law, Volume 17, Issue 3, Winter 2012, Pages 373–402.

This is an article that highlights the role of the United Nations peacekeeping force in Lebanon, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), and their successes and failures in the protection of civilians. As the name suggests, the peacekeeping force in Lebanon was only an interim force, meaning they were only supposed to be implemented in Lebanon for a temporary period of time. The article speaks to the complexity of the Lebanese conflicts, and the difficulty of various armed groups posed on the peacekeeping force. The continuous escalation and de-escalation of violence in Lebanon has made this ‘’interim’ force a now seemingly permanent force, still present in Lebanon today. The strength this article brings to the research is its ability to outline the history of the Lebanese conflict whilst explaining and analyzing the role of the UNIFIL, bringing a critical view of the peacekeeping force by showing the strengths and weakness of the UNIFIL mission. However, the article focuses specifically on civilian protection and does not go into much detail about other aspects of the SSR carried out by the UNIFIL. Overall, the article is able to show the difficulties faced by UN peacekeeping missions and their ability or inability to be able to protect civilians in situations of escalating violence.

Nahr el-Bared Camp

The United Nations. Nahr el-Bared Camp. United Nations Relief and Works Agency for PalestinianRefugees in the Near East

This is an article and a summary produced by the United Nations relief and works agency for Palestinian refugees detailing the events that occurred at the Nahr el-Bared Palestinian Refugee camp during the year of 2007. This article provides a detailed account of the aftermath effects of the destruction of the camp and the effects of Palestinians being displaced from their homes. It provides estimates and figures of how many people were displaced in the process and how much money/funding went into reconstructing the camp by the United States. The strength of this article is that it focuses directly upon the effects of the displacement and how this displacement has led to the reliance on assistance from the UNRWA. Another strength of this article is that it provides the actual cost estimates of both US and UNRWA funding for the reconstruction of the camp. However, this article is rather short and is just to provide a brief summary of what happened to the Palestinian refugees after their displacement from the camp and the amount of funding they receive from Western powers after being dislocated from their homes. It does not provide a deep theoretical analysis of the effects of why the funding off the camp reconstruction failed or made no difference, rather the article merely just states the estimates of why it made no difference without much explanation. But we will use the detailed summary in this article of what happened to the Palestinian refugees after being dispossessed from their camp in 2007.

Security Sector Reform and in the Internal Security Forces in Lebanon:

Walsh, Alex. “Security Sector Reform and in the Internal Security Forces in Lebanon.” The Middle Eastern Institute. 2019.

This article begins by detailing the progress of donor funded SSR, the challenges it faces and a few public polls to measure the effects on the citizenry. The article was published in January of 2019 taking into account the most recent initiatives and some future ambitions. The public polls also give us direct insight to what Lebanese citizens view as the challenges meeting their security agencies and whether they feel like security sector reform are impacting their interactions with security officer and the quality of the services they provide.

Barak, Oren. “Representation and Stability in Postwar Lebanon.” Representation, vol. 48, no. 3, 2012, pp. 321–333.

Baylouny, Anne Marie. “Born Violent: Armed Political Parties and Non-State Governance in Lebanon’s Civil War.” Small Wars & Insurgencies, vol. 25, no. 2, 2014, pp. 329–353.

Gaub, Florence. “Multi‐Ethnic Armies in the Aftermath of Civil War: Lessons Learned from Lebanon.” Defence Studies, vol. 7, no. 1, 2007, pp. 5–20.

Hokayem, Emile El-, & McGovern, Elena. (2008). Towards a More Secure and Stable Lebanon: Prospects for Security Sector Reform. Washington: The Henry L Stimson Center. 1-48.

Karamé, Kari. “Reintegration and the Relevance of Social Relations: The Case of Lebanon.” Conflict, Security & Development, vol. 9, no. 4, 2009, pp. 495–514.

Kingston, Paul. “The Pitfalls of Peacebuilding from Below.” International Journal: Canadas Journal of Global Policy Analysis, vol. 67, no. 2, 2012, pp. 333–350.

Kraft, Martin, et al. Walking the Line: Strategic Approaches to Peacebuilding in Lebanon. Working Group on Development and Peace (FriEnt), 2008.

“Lebanon Fast Facts.” CNN, Cable News Network, 31 Aug. 2018, www.cnn.com/2013/09/03/world/meast/lebanon-fast-facts/index.html.

Mazzola, Francisco. (2018). Community Policing in Lebanon. Washington: Middle East Institute.

Nashbe, Omar. “Security Sector Reform in Lebanon: Internal Security Forces and General Security.” The Arab Reform Initiative, 2009, 1-9.

Newby, Vanessa F. “Positive Hybridity? Unpacking UN Security Sector Reform in South Lebanon.” Contemporary Politics, vol. 23, no. 2, 2016, pp. 156–174.

Ray Murphy, Peacekeeping in Lebanon and Civilian Protection, Journal of Conflict and Security Law, Volume 17, Issue 3, Winter 2012, Pages 373–402.

Rowayheb, Marwan George. “Political Change and the Outbreak of Civil War: The Case of Lebanon.” Civil Wars, vol. 13, no. 4, 2011, pp. 414–436.

The United Nations. Nahr el-Bared Camp. United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East.

Walsh, Alex. “Security Sector Reform and in the Internal Security Forces in Lebanon.” The Middle Eastern Institute. 2019.

• Military Reform: Specifically in Iraq, SSR reform the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) is a militia group turned government entity in 2016. This is an example of successful military reform while partaking in SSR as the government now has control of this group as opposed to the group having no recognition. It’s good that the government is taking control of the militia; without government support, the militia would be rogue and under related to SSR. Because the government is taking control, the PMFs are a form of SSR.
  • (Saliba, Issam. Iraq: Legislating the Status of the Popular Mobilization Forces. Global Legal Monitor, Last Updated 7 December 2016, http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/iraq-legislating-the-status-of-the-popular-mobilization-forces/.)

• Political Reform: Since the American invasion of 2003, there has been multiple political reforms beginning with America capturing Saddam Hussein. Prior to his capture, Hussein was the President of Iraq for 24 years. The Americans captured Hussein in Operation Red Dawn  in 2003, transferring power to an American interim government. In June 2004, America handed over sovereignty to a new Iraqi government headed by Prime Minister Iyad Allawi.
  • (The Guardian Staff and Agencies. “US Hands over Power in Iraq.” The Guardian, Guardian News and Media, 28 June 2004, www.theguardian.com/world/2004/jun/28/iraq.iraq1.)

• Ethical / Social Reform: In Iraq, ethical and social reform has come in the form of international aid. For example, the International Centre of Transitional Justice (ICTJ) and the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies are foreign entities which assist people impoverished by violence. Specifically in Iraq, the ICTJ advises Iraqi peoples on accountability and justice; the Red Cross provides aid to refugees and other people affected by the violent conflict.
  • (Sissons, Miranda and Abdulrazzaq Al-Saiedi. A Bitter Legacy: Lessons of De-Baathification in Iraq. International Centre for Transitional Justice, 2013, https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Report-Iraq-De-Baathification-2013-ENG.pdf.)

• Judicial Reform: Through SSR, the state of Iraq has implemented entities which investigative and focus on terrorism, organized crime, and governmental corruption. Two of these entities include the Special Judicial Body for Crimes Against Yezidis and the CPA Central Criminal Court. It’s essential for these bodies and courts to be present in Iraq in order to prevent further violence and punish those who have inflicted violence.
  • (Coalition Provisional Authority. CPA Order Number 13 (Revised) (Amended) The Central Criminal Court of Iraq. Coalition Provisional Authority, 2004, https://govinfo.library.unt.edu/cpa-iraq/regulations/20040422_CPAORD_13_Revised_Amended.pdf. )

• • Ba’ath Party: The main tool Saddam Hussein used to retain control over Iraq. One of the main aspects of SSR reform in Iraq has been the dismantling of the Ba’ath Party, however, it has remained an active political group post-2003, and is linked to many civil organisations in Iraq.
  • Kurdish Peshmerga: responsible for the security of the region of Iraqi Kurdistan
  • Naqshbandi Army: A Ba’athist and Sufi military insurgency group, created with the intention of restoring the Ba’ath party to power in Iraq. Has strong nationalist tendencies and ideologies.
  • Popular Mobilisation Forces, Kurdish Regional Government Forces, Iraqi Army and Police Force: Heavily involved in the fight against ISIS, retaking the cities of Mosul,  and Telafar, among others
  • Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant: formed as terrorist organization in the early 2010s. ISIL has been recruiting Iraqis and foreigners to fight for their jihadist cause. The extremists have battle against the Iraqi forces since 2013 and, at one point held Mosul and Fallujah
  • Counter-Terrorism Service (CTS): Iraqi Special Forces unit created by the coalition forces after the 2003 invasion, separate from the Iraqi Ministry of Defence. Heavy involvement in the fight against ISIS.

Sources:

Alaaldin, Ranj. Legalising PMF in Iraq: Why it’s not all bad news. Al Jazeera, 1 December 2016, available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2016/11/legalising-pmf-iraq-bad-news-161129140729509.html.

Knights, Michael and Alex Mello. THE BEST THING AMERICA BUILT IN IRAQ: IRAQ’S COUNTER-TERRORISM SERVICE AND THE LONG WAR AGAINST MILITANCY. War on the Rocks, July 19, 2017, available at: https://warontherocks.com/2017/07/the-best-thing-america-built-in-iraq-iraqs-counter-terrorism-service-and-the-long-war-against-militancy/.

BBC News. Iraq key players, then and now. BBC News, 2008, available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7297592.stm.

Reid, Robert H. Major Players in the Iraq Conflict. Stars and Stripes, June 26 2014, available at: https://www.stripes.com/news/middle-east/major-players-in-the-iraq-conflict-1.288687.

Dobbins James et al.Occupying Iraq: A History of the Coalition Provisional Authority. RAND Corporation, 2009, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG847.sum.pdf.

Kafala, Tarik. The Iraqi Baath party. BBC News, 25 March 2003, available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2886733.stm.

• • Coalition of actors who supported the 2003 Invasion: George Bush: President of the US, Tony Blair: British PM, Jose Maria Aznar: PM of Spain,
  • US-led Global Coalition Against ISIS: in operation since 2014 to reduce the threat of ISIS, involves a military campaign, civilian effort, counter-messaging program and counter-finance program. It is the largest international coalition in history.
  • International Centre of Transitional Justice (ICTJ): the ICTJ has worked in Iraq since 2003 in advising Iraqis on accountability and justice options and monitoring measures taken to address the past
  • International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies: provides support and aid to refugees, Dips and other people affected by violent conflict in Iraq
  • United Nations Development Program (UNDP): has been present in Iraq since 1976, promotes emergency livelihoods, community dialogue, stabilising newly liberated areas, providing technical assistance to support governance reforms and decentralization.
  • United Nations of High Commission of Refugees: works closely with refugees and displaced groups in Iraq, focusing on the crisis that resulted from the 2014 conflict
  • PAX: a Netherlands-based organisation, working to address the root causes and patterns of conflict in Iraq. Implements programs designed to build trust between communities, facilitate dialogue between policy-makers and citizens, enhance gender sensitivity, etc.
  • Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA): CPA was the provisional government in Iraq following the 2003 invasion, headed by an American diplomat, Paul Bremer.
  • United States Institute of Peace (USIP): the United States Institute for Peace provides financial and technical assistance to civic groups and government institutions involved in peacebuilding efforts, since 2003.
  • Multinational Force Iraq: the military command during the 2003 invasion and the following Iraq War, led by the US, UK, Australia, Spain and Poland.
  • United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI): formed by UNSC Resolution 1500 in 2003 to support national development efforts throughout the country.

Sources:

The Iraq War. Encyclopedia Britannica, accessed 20 March 2019. Available at: https://www.britannica.com/place/Iraq/The-Iraq-War#ref793786.

Peace Insight. Iraq: International Organisations. Peace Direct, accessed 20 March 2019. Available at: https://www.peaceinsight.org/conflicts/iraq/internationals/.

BBC News. Iraq key players, then and now. BBC News, 2008, available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7297592.stm.

Reid, Robert H. Major Players in the Iraq Conflict. Stars and Stripes, June 26 2014, available at: https://www.stripes.com/news/middle-east/major-players-in-the-iraq-conflict-1.288687.

U.S. Mission to Canada. Fact Sheets: The Global Coalition – Working to Defeat ISIS. U.S. Embassy & Consulates in Canada, 2019, available at: https://ca.usembassy.gov/fact-sheets-the-global-coalition-working-to-defeat-isis/.

Dobbins James et al.Occupying Iraq: A History of the Coalition Provisional Authority. RAND Corporation, 2009, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG847.sum.pdf.

• Recruitment and staffing in the new security sector: the US decided to disband the former Iraqi army, which created a large pool of angry, unemployed young men. These people are ideal targets for recruitment into terrorist/extremist organisations. Choosing who to recruit into a country’s new security forces is a difficult task which can be a barrier to successful reform if the policies carried out are contrary to the development of peace and reconciliation. The strict policy of de-Baathification has made recruitment into the security sector difficult, and there are concerns that such a strict policy of exclusion will result in an inability to find a consensus for the future of Iraq.
• Different Cultures in Reform: One issue highlighted in the literature was the potential clash between intervening countries’ cultures and Iraq’s culture. When creating methods for reform, the intervening state must take into consideration local culture and the local political environment. One issue post-2003, was that US reform attempts were seen as the forcible intrusion of Western power and Western values into Iraq, a country with its own long-standing cultures and traditions, and a distinct religious history. This poses a risk of mutual estrangement which can inhibit post-conflict recovery if not dealt with properly.
• Barriers to Reconciliation: a series of courts have been founded/are being founded across Iraq that seek to bring perpetrators of human rights violations in relation to ISIS to justice. However, little attempt is made to allow for victim and witness participation in these trials. In the case of the Yezidi people, a Board for compensation has been created, and a special judicial investigative body has been created, however there is little public knowledge about this, and many Yezii leaders claim to have never interacted with these bodies. Thus, these initiatives, without due focus on community reconciliation, may not affect the tensions that remain in Iraq, which increases the likelihood of inter-ethnic violence and the resumption of conflict.
• Armed Groups Post-ISIS: While regional and local power structure remain unstable after conflict, there are many armed groups left behind, seeking to consolidate their position post-ISIS. One example is the recently legalised PMF, which is a coagulation of armed groups who came together to fight ISIS in Iraq. These groups represent widely varied ideological perspectives, and there is a risk that now that the conflict has officially ended, the fracture of this group could result in a resumption of ethnic and religious conflict. Similarly, following the recent referendum on Kurdistan’s independence, the movements of Iraqi Security Forces have brought political issues back to the forefront of conflict again which have gone unresolved during the previous conflict.

Sources:

Cheema, Sujata Ashwarya. Investing in Iraq: Prospects and Challenges. Middle East Institute, 20 February 2013, available at: https://www.mei.edu/publications/investing-iraq-prospects-and-challenges.

Taylor, Andrea. Three Pressing Barriers to Forming an Iraqi Government. Atlantic Council, 21 August 2018, available at: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/three-pressing-barriers-to-forming-an-iraqi-government.

U.S. Mission to Canada. Fact Sheets: The Global Coalition – Working to Defeat ISIS. U.S. Embassy & Consulates in Canada, 2019, available at: https://ca.usembassy.gov/fact-sheets-the-global-coalition-working-to-defeat-isis/.

Alaaldin, Ranj. Legalising PMF in Iraq: Why it’s not all bad news. Al Jazeera, 1 December 2016, available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2016/11/legalising-pmf-iraq-bad-news-161129140729509.html.

O’Driscoll Dylan, Dave van Zoonen. The Future of Iraq: Is Reintegration Possible? Middle East Policy Council, 2017, available at: https://www.mepc.org/journal/future-iraq-reintegration-possible.

Rudaw. Yezidis cautiously welcome Iraq court tasked with prosecuting ISIS. Rudaw, 12 June 2017, available at: http://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/iraq/12062017.

Domisiewicz, Rafal. Consolidating the Security Sector in Post-Conflict States: Polish Lessons from Iraq. The International Security Sector Advisory Team, The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2005, https://issat.dcaf.ch/Learn/Resource-Library2/Policy-and-Research-Papers/Consolidating-the-Security-Sector-in-Post-Conflict-States-Polish-Lessons-from-Iraq.

Security Sector Reform (SSR) in Iraq has been mostly successful at establishing a democratically free country and suppressing the influence of terrorist organizations within Iraq. Following the successful invasion of Iraq in 2003, the USA government wanted to implement changes within the Iraqi government and security sectors following the defeat of the Saddam Hussein regime. The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) ordered the Iraqi army and security sectors to disband, causing 400,000 men to demilitarize. This action was a simple demobilization, which was not enough to solve the conflict. Unemployed and angry young men became perfect targets for recruitment into other non-state armed forces. This decision to disband the Iraqi army was a decision made as opposed to choosing an alternate option to re-integrate the soldiers in society and start programs designed to promote DDR effectively. It is possible that this action would have been more effective in ensuring lasting security than the simple demobilization of the entire Iraqi armed forces.

Despite the ramifications of the CPA order, in 2005, the coalition forces helped implement a new Constitution in Iraq and, soon after, parliamentary elections took place within the country. Despite the elections, some Iraqis continued to revolt against the American-led forces and insurgent attacks became a regular occurrence during the late 2000s. The aggression against the Coalition forces did not stop the democratic proceedings however, and the Iraqi government is considered today to be the most-free political system in the Arab world with more than 11 million people voting in the 2014 elections. Furthermore, despite the effects of the CPA order to disband the army, the soldiers who fought for Saddam Hussein could no longer be used to oppress Kurdish and Shia Arabs in the country systematically.

In light of the American invasion of Iraq, there was an influx of NGOs and international governmental organizations that came to the aid of the Iraqi people. For example, the United Nations formed a political mission to coordinate humanitarian efforts within Iraq. The mission has had broad implementations since its formation in 2003, as the UN has aided the Iraqi government in judicial, DDR, and humanitarian efforts to counter the terrorist organizations in the country. The assistance of the UN has helped the Iraqi government implement essential services for citizens within the country while also presenting opportunities for economic reform through the inclusion of international financial institutions, such as the International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq.

Following the US decision to remove American troops from Iraq, the Coalition forces began training and equipping Sunni Muslim men to combat al-Qaeda and take over the security duties. The training became a major military goal for the Coalition forces. Initially, the security forces were organized, despite the Commander of the Multinational Division commenting on how reformers were unprepared for the ongoing conflictual situation, and a breakdown of law and order would accompany the post-conflict reforms. The commander proved to be correct as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) increased its territorial hold in 2014 and the institutions that had been created to stop insurgents in Iraq swiftly fell apart. The thousands of trained police officers, border control guards and defence corps who made up the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) could not handle the increasing strength of ISIL, and the security sector was suffering as a result. In light of the near collapse of the Iraqi Security Forces, Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, a prominent Sunni Muslim leader called for effective action against the Islamic State. The Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) formed pockets of ethnically and ideologically-opposing groups whom all agreed to fight against ISIS forces. The PMF has been successful against the Islamic state; however, some of these militias pose severe risks to national unity through the militarization of ethnosectarian nationalisms, which can potentially lead to further conflict after ISIL has been dealt with.

The US-led invasion of Iraq was beneficial for the Iraqi people as it established democracy in Iraq and freed the citizens from the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein. However, the invasion was also responsible for Iraqi insurgent groups, who oppose the Coalition authority in the country. These insurgent groups aided the rise of al-Qaeda and, later on, ISIS in the nation. Because of the prominence and influence these two terrorist organizations have had since the mid-2000s, the results of SSR have varied. Despite implementing democracy in Iraq, the consequences of the 2003 invasion has split Iraq into multiple, secluded ethnic groups. Without further security sector reform, Iraq may continue to have issues with the nationalist and ethnically different militias within a post-ISIS country.

Sources:
Hasan, Mehdi. “Blowback: How ISIS Was Created by the U.S. Invasion of Iraq.” The Intercept, 29 Jan. 2018, theintercept.com/2018/01/29/isis-iraq-war-islamic-state-blowback/.

Hermesauto. “The Rise and Fall of ISIS in Iraq and Syria.” The Straits Times, 17 Feb. 2019, www.straitstimes.com/world/europe/the-rise-and-fall-of-isis-in-iraq-and-syria.

“The Iraq War.” Council on Foreign Relations, Council on Foreign Relations, www.cfr.org/timeline/iraq-war.

Roy, Avik. “Important Objective Measures Show That The Iraq War Was A Success.” Forbes, Forbes Magazine, 3 June 2017

1. Domisiewicz, Rafal. Consolidating the Security Sector in Post-Conflict States: Polish Lessons from Iraq. The International Security Sector Advisory Team, The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2005, https://issat.dcaf.ch/Learn/Resource-Library2/Policy-and-Research-Papers/Consolidating-the-Security-Sector-in-Post-Conflict-States-Polish-Lessons-from-Iraq.
2. Saliba, Issam. Iraq: Legislating the Status of the Popular Mobilization Forces. Global Legal Monitor, Last Updated 7 December 2016, http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/iraq-legislating-the-status-of-the-popular-mobilization-forces/.
3. PAX Alliance. Engendering the Transition to Peace and Security in Iraq. PAX Alliance, 2018.
4. United States Institute of Peace (USIP). The Current Situation in Iraq: A USIP Fact Sheet. USIP, 2017, https://www.usip.org/publications/2017/09/current-situation-iraq.
5. Human Rights Watch. Flawed Justice: Accountability for ISIS Crimes in Iraq. Human Rights Watch, December 5, 2017, https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/12/05/flawed-justice/accountability-isis-crimes-iraq.
6. Dobbins James et al.Occupying Iraq: A History of the Coalition Provisional Authority. RAND Corporation, 2009, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG847.sum.pdf.
7. Coalition Provisional Authority. CPA Order Number 13 (Revised) (Amended) The Central Criminal Court of Iraq. Coalition Provisional Authority, 2004, https://govinfo.library.unt.edu/cpa-iraq/regulations/20040422_CPAORD_13_Revised_Amended.pdf.
8. Witty, David. The Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Service. The Washington Institute, 2016, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/David-Witty-Paper_Final_Web.pdf.
9. Witty, David M. Iraq’s Post-2014 Counter-Terrorism Service. The Washington Institute, 2018, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus157-Witty-2.pdf.
10. Sissons, Miranda and Abdulrazzaq Al-Saiedi. A Bitter Legacy: Lessons of De-Baathification in Iraq. International Centre for Transitional Justice, 2013, https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Report-Iraq-De-Baathification-2013-ENG.pdf.

• Ahn, Julie, et al. The Politics of Security in Ninewa: Preventing an ISIS Resurgence in Northern Iraq. 2018, www.hks.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/degree programs/MPP/files/Finalized PAE_Ahn_Campbell_Knoetgen.pdf.
  • This source was a book on the SSR and ISIS prevention techniques occurring in Northern Iraq. It looks at how to prevent ISIS from regaining influence in the Northern region of Iraq through the implementation of policy in the country. The book calls for more work on the liberation of Northern Iraq, as many militias remain in the region. Furthermore, the book emphasizes the importance of the US and Iraqi governments in securing the region, which undermines the militias influence in the region and how they can help with peace. The book gives too much credit to the American forces in Iraq and states that security would be difficult to attain without US assistance.
• Dobbins James et al.Occupying Iraq: A History of the Coalition Provisional Authority. RAND Corporation, 2009, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG847.sum.pdf.
  • This source looks at the role of the Coalition Provisional Authority in SSR in Iraq post the 2003 invasion. It provides an assessment of the CPA’s role in reforming the security sector, however demonstrates the U.S. and Coalition point of view. It is useful in looking at what the CPA did post-invasion, despite its pro-U.S. stance. It concludes that the CPA succeeded in restoring Iraq’s public services due to prior U.S. planning, however that the CPA was unable to stop Iraq’s civil war, which it claims was the result of the return of sovereignty to the Iraqi people. Thus, the report demonstrates a biased view which represents the U.S. opinion, and must be treated with some caution. Nevertheless, it shows the policies and actions implemented by the CPA during its tenure.
• Domisiewicz, Rafal. Consolidating the Security Sector in Post-Conflict States: Polish Lessons from Iraq. The International Security Sector Advisory Team, The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2005, https://issat.dcaf.ch/Learn/Resource-Library2/Policy-and-Research-Papers/Consolidating-the-Security-Sector-in-Post-Conflict-States-Polish-Lessons-from-Iraq.
  • In this report, the lessons of the Polish experience in administering Iraq under the Multinational Division are examined. It provides a critical view at how reform attempts in the security sector succeeded and failed, and what can be learned for future SSR missions. It also provides suggestions for how to overcome these difficulties and barriers to successful reform, and thus is useful for anyone involved in SSR, as it provides lessons from a learned experience in Iraq. It provides a relatively balanced overview of the failures of the administration of the Multinational Division, so that the mistakes made and problems encountered can be learned from.
• The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica. “Al-Qaeda in Iraq.” Encyclopædia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., 27 Oct. 2015, www.britannica.com/topic/al-Qaeda-in-Iraq.
  • This source explains the founding of Al-Qaeda in Iraq and its involvement in the Iraqi conflict. More specifically, an important point made in the article examines the weakening of Al-Qaeda in 2007, which is a form of Security Sector Reform. The weakening of Al-Qaeda was assisted by militias paid by the United States to counter Al-Qaeda insurgency attacks. This plan is important as the US Army began teaching local groups who and how to fight properly, a form of military reformation. These new found US funded malities were then known as the “Awakening Councils”.
• Gompert, David C; Binnendijk, Hans, Lin, Bonny. “Chapter Fourteen - The U.S. Invasion of Iraq, 2003.” Blinders, Blunders, and Wars: What America and China Can Learn, RAND Corporation, 2014, pp. 161–174.
  • This book chapter provides the reasoning behind American President George W. Bush’s decision to invade the Middle Eastern country of Iraq. President Bush was convinced Iraq’s controversial President Saddam Hussein had access to weapons of mass destruction (WMD). After the terrorist attack in New York on September 11th 2001, President Bush was convinced of imminent national danger from the Middle East. The threat of WMDs and terrorist groups, like Al-Qaeda, grew fear amongst the American population of a larger, more detrimental attack on US soil. In the name of national security, President Bush gave the orders to wage war on Iraq, in order to protect American sovereignty. This information is useful for analysis on why the United States interfered in a domestic conflict of Iraq. Arguably, the reason for invasion could have been peacekeeping or in American national interest and security.
• O’Driscoll Dylan, Dave van Zoonen. The Future of Iraq: Is Reintegration Possible? Middle East Policy Council, 2017, available at: https://www.mepc.org/journal/future-iraq-reintegration-possible.
  • This source looks at the role of the Popular Mobilization Forces in combatting ISIL in Iraq. It provides an assessment of the PMF’s role in the battle and how the PMF has been able to work together, despite ethnic differences. It is important to observe how the ISF failed against ISIL and how the PMF formed in response to the ISF’s failures. The report states that PMF forces must be treated carefully, in order to avoid any further disruptions between the ideologically different militias. Nevertheless, the report underestimates the importance of the PMF in combatting ISIL and does not give enough credit to the different ethnic groups working together.

• USAICoE Command History Office. “Operation RED DAWN Nets Saddam Hussein.” Www.army.mil, Dec. 2003, www.army.mil/article/116559/operation_red_dawn_nets_saddam_hussein.
  • This article is a review of the mission to capture Iraq’s disgraced leader, Saddam Hussein. Almost immediately after the 2003 American Invasion of Iraq, Hussein fled to a secretive location in hopes of escaping American custody. The American led invasion of Iraq was intended to oust Hussein of power and to set the Iraqi people free from his dictatorship. The article praises the United States army and intelligence teams for the capture of one of the world’s most wanted men. Teams such as the 4th Infantry Division and Tactical HUMINT Teams were specifically used to track and capture Hussein alive. After being convicted of crimes against humanity, Hussein was executed three years after his capture in 2006. The capture of Hussein was the first step towards Security Sector Reform in Iraq.
• Witty, David M. Iraq’s Post-2014 Counter-Terrorism Service. The Washington Institute, 2018, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus157-Witty-2.pdf.
  • This source examines the recently-formed Counter-Terrorism Service in Iraq, looking at its successes and failures. It provides a critical analysis of this aspect of security sector reform by the United States, to conclude that it is one of the most successful aspects of U.S. reform in Iraq, and the author provides the opinion that it can be used as a paradigm for nonsectarian forces in a country trying to rebuild its security sector. Witty provides reasons for its success and a balanced assessment of both the U.S. and Iraqi role in its achievements. The source is useful for those looking for a positive and successful aspect of SSR in Iraq, and is useful for anyone involved in SSR, regardless of region.

Ahn, Julie, Campbell, Maeve, Knoetgen, Pete. “The Politics of Security in Ninewa: Preventing an ISIS Resurgence in Northern Iraq.” 2018,www.hks.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/degree programs/MPP/files/FinalizedPAE_Ahn_Campbell_Knoetgen.pdf.

Al Makhzoomi, Khairuldeen. “Trump, here’s a solution for Iraq after the defeat of ISIS.” Middle East Eye, 17 March 2017, available at: https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/trump-heressolution-iraq-after-defeat.

Alaaldin, Ranj. “Legalising PMF in Iraq: Why it’s not all bad news.” Al Jazeera, 1 December 2016, available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2016/11/legalising-pmf-iraq-bad-news-161129140729509.html.

Baker, Deane-Peter. “Special Operations Remote Advise and Assist: an Ethics Assessment.” Ethics and Information Technology, vol. 21, no. 1, 2018, pp. 1–10., doi:10.1007/s10676-018-9483-3.BBC News. Iraq key players, then and now. BBC News, 2008, available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7297592.stm.

Cheema, Sujata Ashwarya. Investing in Iraq: Prospects and Challenges. Middle East Institute, 20 February 2013, available at: https://www.mei.edu/publications/investing-iraq-prospects and-challenges.

Chulov, Martin. “The Rise and Fall of the Isis 'Caliphate'.” The Guardian, Guardian News and Media, 24 Mar. 2019, www.theguardian.com/world/2019/mar/23/the-rise-and-fall-of-theisis-caliphate.

Coalition Provisional Authority: Government of Iraq. Encyclopaedia Britannica, accessed on 20 March 2019. Available at: https://www.britannica.com/topic/Coalition-ProvisionalAuthority. Coalition Provisional Authority. CPA Order Number 13 (Revised) (Amended) The Central

Criminal Court of Iraq. Coalition Provisional Authority, 2004,https://govinfo.library.unt.edu/cpairaq/regulations/20040422_CPAORD_13_Revised_    mended.pdf.

Crook, John R. “Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to Contemporary Law.” The American Journal of International Law, vol. 102, no. 1, 2008, pp. 155–158., www.jstor.org/stable/40007777?pq-origsite=summon&seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents.

Dobbins James et al.Occupying Iraq: A History of the Coalition Provisional Authority. RAND Corporation,2009https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG847.sum.pdf.

Domisiewicz, Rafal. Consolidating the Security Sector in Post-Conflict States: Polish Lessons from Iraq. The International Security Sector Advisory Team, The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2005, https://issat.dcaf.ch/Learn/Resource-Library2/Policy-and-Research-Papers/Consolidating-the-Security-Sector-in-Post-Conflict-States-Polish-Lessons-from-Iraq.

Gompert, David C; Binnendijk, Hans, Lin, Bonny. “Chapter Fourteen - The U.S. Invasion of Iraq, 2003.” Blinders, Blunders, and Wars: What America and China Can Learn, RAND Corporation, 2014, pp. 161–174.

Hasan, Mehdi. “Blowback: How ISIS Was Created by the U.S. Invasion of Iraq.” The Intercept, 29 Jan. 2018, theintercept.com/2018/01/29/isis-iraq-war-islamic-state-blowback/.

Hermesauto. “The Rise and Fall of ISIS in Iraq and Syria.” The Straits Times, 17 Feb. 2019, www.straitstimes.com/world/europe/the-rise-and-fall-of-isis-in-iraq-and-syria.

Human Rights Watch. Flawed Justice: Accountability for ISIS Crimes in Iraq. Human Rights Watch, December 5, 2017, https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/12/05/flawedjustice/accountability-isis-crimes-iraq.

Iraq Operations. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), accessed 20 March 2019. http://reporting.unhcr.org/node/2547#_ga=2.22123645.779465724.1553545210-1869412164.1553545210.

Kafala, Tarik. The Iraqi Baath party. BBC News, 25 March 2003, available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2886733.stm.

Knights, Michael and Mello, Alex. THE BEST THING AMERICA BUILT IN IRAQ: IRAQ’S COUNTER-TERRORISM SERVICE AND THE LONG WAR AGAINST MILITANCY. War on the Rocks, July 19, 2017, available at: https://warontherocks.com/2017/07/the-best-thing-america-built-in-iraq-iraqs-counter-terrorism-service-and-the-long-war-against-militancy/.

Long, Austin. “The Anbar Awakening.” Survival, 25 March 2008, 50:2, 67-94, DOI:10.1080/00396330802034283 O’Driscoll Dylan, van Zoonen, Dave. “The Future of Iraq: Is Reintegration Possible?” Middle East Policy Council, 2017, available at: https://www.mepc.org/journal/future-iraqreintegration-possible.

McCoy, Terrence. “How the Islamic State Evolved in an American Prison.” The Washington Post, WP Company, 4 Nov. 2014, www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2014/11/04/how-an-american-prison-helped-ignite-the-islamic-state/?utm_term=.4ac7cd5ff7cd.

PAX Alliance. Engendering the Transition to Peace and Security in Iraq. PAX Alliance, 2018.

Peace Insight. Iraq: International Organisations. Peace Direct, accessed 20 March 2019. Available at: https://www.peaceinsight.org/conflicts/iraq/internationals/.

Reid, Robert H. Major Players in the Iraq Conflict. Stars and Stripes, June 26 2014, available at: https://www.stripes.com/news/middle-east/major-players-in-the-iraq-conflict-1.288687.

Reuters. Iraq;s Shi’ite militias formally inducted into security forces. Reuters, 8 March 2018, available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-militias/iraqs-shiitemilitias-formally-inducted-into-security-forces-idUSKCN1GK354.

Roberts, Kristin. “U.S. Sends Troops Back to Iraq to Maintain ‘Surge.’” Reuters, Thomson Reuters, 2 Apr. 2007, www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-usa-troops/u-s-sends-troops-backto-iraq-to-maintain-surge-idUSCOL13882420070402.

Roy, Avik. “Important Objective Measures Show That The Iraq War Was A Success.” Forbes, Forbes Magazine, 3 June 2017, www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2017/06/02/importantobjective-measures-show-that-the-iraq-war-was-a-success/#1bd6abf781de.

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Military reform

During the conflict, the military wielded immense influence and had a major role in the human rights abuses and genocide of Indigenous communities (1). The subsequent Peace Accords emphasized curbing the military’s power in favour of the civilian government (2). Despite the implementation of some changes, military reform has been slow (3).

Police reform 

Similar to the military, the police force was responsible for significant human rights abuses and genocide of Indigenous communities during the civil war (4). With the Peace Accords, old police forces were removed to create the National Civil Police (5). But this effort has not addressed the long-term issues of corruption, abuse and incompetence (6).

Judicial reform

Guatemala has long struggled with corruption — an important issue since establishing the rule of law is a significant component of peacebuilding (7). In 2006, the International Commission against Impunity (CICIG) in Guatemala was created to help prosecute serious crimes (8). While this did lead to some improvements, the Guatemalan government withdrew its support in 2019, prompting renewed concerns about corruption (9).

Indigenous rights

83 per cent of the victims of genocide and human rights abuses during the civil war were Mayan (10). Indigenous women also faced significant gender-based violence, with many being survivors of mass rape (11). For security reforms to be effective, they must also take into account this racial tension.

1. J. Mark Ruhl, 55
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Marie-Louise Glebbeek, 431.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Jessica Gramajo
8. “International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala.”
9. Sandra Cuffe
10. Christian Tomuschat et al, 13
11. Ibid.

Civil Society Organizations (CSOs)

CSOs have played a key role in leading reforms in the security sector working outside of, but in tandem with, the Guatemalan government — they remain a key dissenting voice in the country. There are thousands of NGOs and community-based organizations in Guatemala that fall under this umbrella, with mandates addressing security sector reform and general social change ranging from organizations that promote land rights and unions to those that defend Indigenous  rights  over  their  culture and access  to  justice (1). According to the report, “a good number of CSOs in Guatemala have matured and have become more professional, and are capable of high level discourse, dialogue and proposition” (2).

Rebel Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unit (Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca, URNG)

A main rebel group (though there were many throughout The final peace agreement between the Guatemalan government and the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG) signed in 1996 comprised 11 accords that were signed on a range of substantive issues related to SSR (3).

Commission of Historical Clarification

The truth commission borne out of a 1994 agreement, whose job it was to look into the abuses suffered by the Guatemalan population during the armed conflict (especially Indigenous peoples). The commission later created a report called “Guatemala: Memory of Silence” that was explicit and did not shy away from the violent truth (4) (5). 

The Guatemalan Military

The Guatemalan military formed one side of the long-winded civil war; its military and paramilitary units engaged in “kidnapping, torture and executions” during it (6).

National Defence Ministry (Ministerio de la Defensa de la Nación, NDM)

The NDM is the government agency responsible for the military of Guatemala — its training, budget, and policies.

National Civil Police (PNC)

Created following the 1996 Peace Accords, “which prescribed the restructuring of police forces with the goal of strengthening civil power, as well as the role of the Army in a democratic society. As of 2017, the PNC numbered 35,000 personnel with which to guarantee the security of over 16 million Guatemalans” — but this body, too, has been accused of corruption — most notably by the US government (7).

1. Manolo Sánchez et al, 26
2. Ibid
3. The OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and Justice, section 3
4. Commission for Historical Clarification: Charter
5. Christian Tomuschat et al, 13
6. Mireya Navarro
7. “Guatemala SSR Background Note”

International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG)

This commission was established by the UN, at the Guatemalan government’s request, to act as an independent international body aiming to investigate “illegal security groups and clandestine security organizations” in the country (1). The establishment of CICIG in 2007 and its subsequent renewal every two years received a great deal of praise. In September 2018 however, President Jimmy Morales announced he would not renew CICIG’s mandate — which ends in September 2019 — to huge international outcry (2).

The UN

The United Nations has played a significant role in the peacekeeping and peacebuilding processes in Guatemala. The contribution started with the organization’s two-year role in brokering Guatemala’s Peace Accords, which brought not only negative peace but also vision for positive peace in the country (3). This work was carried out under the UN Mission for the Verification of Human Rights and of Compliance with the Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights in Guatemala, which includes both a short-term peacekeeping mission and long-term peacebuilding activities (4). Another significant peacebuilding contribution from the UN includes the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala, which supports Guatemalan government bodies in prosecuting serious crimes. The commission was created in 2006 by the UN at the request of the then-Guatemalan administration (5). Currently, it’s unclear if this is continuing because the current Guatemalan government just recently withdrew its support for the commission (6).

The European Union

The European Union provides support for Guatemala’s justice reform effort through the Programme for Security and Justice in Guatemala initiative (7). In particular, the six-year program focuses on helping to restructure security and justice institutions, as well as decreasing the level of impunity. The EU contributes €20,000,000 to the program’s operations (8).

The United States

The United States’s main involvement in Guatemala’s security sector reform effort is through the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs programming (9). Besides combating narcotics and gang violence, the contribution focuses on training and assisting the National Civil Police; the US also supports the justice reform effort, which ranges from “procedural and institutional changes” to providing “training to prosecutors and judges.” It’s unclear how the US’s recent plan to cut aid to Guatemala would affect this support (10).

1. “International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala.”
2. Cuffe
3. “Agreement on a Firm and Lasting Peace.”
4. “Guatemala - MINUGUA: Background”
5. Markus Schultze-Kraft, 137
6. Cuffe
7. Soraya Long, 3
8. Ibid
9. “Guatemala.” US Department of State
10. Ibid

Inadequate training of the PNC

The peace accords signed in 1996 between the URNG and President Álvaro Arzú included the abolition of existing peace forces (PN) and the ensuing creation of a new National Civil Police, or Policía Nacional Civil (PNC) (1). Since its creation, the PNC has been understaffed, inadequately trained and has lacked career development for its staff (2). During the peace accords, the Guatemalan government announced that the Spanish Civil Guard would offer training and assistance to the PNC. This decision allowed for the influence of a militarized form of policing to enter the police academy. Consequently, training for new police recruits has included military-style procedures and a great deal of formality and hierarchy (3).

Lack of funding & resources

Police and judicial reforms in Guatemala have suffered severe budgetary cutbacks and a lack of resources, which has led to poor personnel training, insufficient presence in rural areas and widespread, institutionalized corruption across the judicial system (4). Further, recruiting capable instructors to train the PNC has been difficult due to the low wages offered, and has in turn resulted in a reduced quality of training in the police forces (5).

Lack of public confidence in the PNC

Corruption and a lack of professionalism within the Policía Nacional Civil combined with various policing strategies based on dissuasion, containment and violence have created a widespread sense of distrust and a lack of confidence towards the Guatemalan police. This lack of confidence has led many citizens to take justice into their own hands, often using public lynching as a mechanism of justice (6). The Guatemalan government has consequently responded to the PNC’s lack of professionalism by militarizing public security – an action condemned by many at the international level but supported by citizens at the domestic level due to their lack of trust towards police forces (7).

Limitations of the Peace Accords:

While the peace accords signed in 1996 were undoubtedly a step in the right direction, the framework provided did not include sufficient details and steps to indicate the way in which the reform would be implemented (8). Indeed, many scholars have contended that the framework in itself was “overly-ambitious” and suggest that it has been viewed by government officials as a short-term political challenge rather than as a long-term process vital to the future of the country’s fragile democracy (9).

1. Glebbeek, 431
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. “The OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and Justice,” section 3
5. Émilie Noël, 29
6. José Miguel Cruz, 53
7. Noël, 93
8. Glebbeek, 451
9. Susanne Jonas

A 36-year civil war characterized by violence, human rights abuses, authoritarian rule and a national security doctrine militarizing the state was finally put to an end in 1996, when Peace Accords were signed between the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG) guerrilla forces and the Guatemalan government under President Álvaro Arzú (1). The Peace Accords were signed on several issues concerning human rights and laid out a solid foundation for extensive security sector reforms. The final draft, titled “Agreement on the Strengthening of Civilian Power and on the Role of the Armed Forces in a Democratic Society,” included the reconstruction and consolidation of the Guatemalan peace force into a new National Civil Police (PNC), military reform and the strengthening and modernization of the justice system (2). A UN Mission (MINUGUA) established by the Security Council in 1994 played a significant role in these peace accords by verifying the implementation of the ensuing security sector reforms between 1996 and 2004 (3). While Guatemala has indeed taken significant steps in the right direction towards security and institutional reform, current high levels of violence, impunity and corruption within the security sector reveal that there is still a long road ahead towards effective SSR in the country.

POLICE REFORM

While the creation of the new Policía Nacional Civil (PNC) was indeed a noteworthy step in the SSR process, poor training, budgetary cutbacks and a lack of staffing and resources have contributed to high rates of corruption within the police academy. A 2017 US Department of State Human Rights Report revealed widespread institutional corruption and detailed various recent instances of human rights abuses, mistreatment and extortion by PNC members (4). Inadequate training of police recruits can partly be traced back to the government’s decision to receive training, counselling and assistance from the Spanish Civil Guard during the establishment of the PNC. As aforementioned, this resulted in a militarized form of policing characterized by violence and dissuasion. Technical skills were often learned during training but rarely used in or incorporated in work routines and operations (5). In December 2010, a National Commission on Police Reform (CNRP) was created as an internal investigation body under the Office of Professional Responsibility (ORP) in order to investigate and monitor these government efforts to modernize and strengthen the police forces — however, this too has seen little progress since its establishment (6). Further, concerns of partiality have been raised regarding the CNRP, seeing as the head of the commission is appointed by the president himself (7). Conclusively, on an index measuring the public’s perception of corruption, Guatemala was placed 144^th out of 180 countries (with 1 being the least corrupt), slotting the PNC as among the most corrupt institutions (8).

MILITARY REFORM

Military reform in Guatemala encompasses a twofold transformation: from internal conflict to peace, and from authoritarian to democratic ruling (9). Demilitarization and reform have moved very slowly due to significant resistance from military authorities to comply with the conditions of the Peace Accords (10). Initially under President Arzú’s presidency, the armed forces did reduce both their troop numbers and budget however, they have since expanded and have been heavily involved in public security as part of a government effort to resolve the rampant rates of crime across the country (11). This particular issue of militarizing public security was the subject of a 1999 constitutional referendum asking citizens if they supported the reformation and separation of the military from police forces. Ultimately, the referendum was defeated – a result considered by many to be a significant setback in SSR for the country (12). Currently, the military resumes the constitutional responsibility to maintain internal security and despite MINUGUA protests and explicit violation of the 1996 peace accords, several former military officers (many of whom have been linked to the atrocities committed during the civil war) have been incorporated into the PNC (13). Impunity and corruption run rampant in Guatemala’s armed forces as reflected in countless reports of arbitrary or unlawful killings by military officers combined with an estimated impunity rate of 97% (14).

JUDICIAL REFORM

The establishment of CICIG – the UN-sponsored International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala – in 2007 was a significant step in Guatemala’s judicial reform process. The commission was charged with assisting the justice system in prosecuting, investigating and dismantling organized crime groups within the country’s security sector (15). While the CICIG has indeed seen great successes since its inception, a recent announcement from current President Jimmy Morales in September 2018 revealed that he would not renew CICIG’s mandate – a decision that has been met with huge international outcry (16). In addition, arbitrary arrests, prolonged detentions, unfair and often incomplete trials are commonly found in Guatemala. These factors combined with the government’s failure to fully protect witnesses, judicial officials and civil society members from threats or intimidation exacerbate the need for further security sector reform (17). Overall, Guatemala’s justice system requires major improvement in order to successfully prevent Guatemalan citizens from taking justice into their own hands and attributing to the country’s rising levels of crime

1. “Agreement on a Firm and Lasting Peace.”
2. “Agreement on the Strengthening of Civilian Power and on the Role of the Armed Forces in a Democratic Society.”
3. “Guatemala SSR Background Note”
4. “Guatemala 2016 Human Rights Report,” 1
5. “The OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and Justice”
6. “Guatemala SSR Background Note,” 1
7. Ibid
8. “Guatemala.” Transparency International
9. “The OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and Justice,” section 3
10. Schultze-Kraft, 153
11. Noël, 90
12. Ruhl, 55
13. Noël, 90
14. Gramajo
15. Schultze-Kraft, 153
16. Cuffe
17. “Guatemala 2016 Human Rights Report”

Commission for Historical Clarification Agreement: https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/resources/collections/commissions/Guatemala-Charter.pdf

Guatemala: Memory of Silence (the report for the Commission for Historical Clarification): https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/357870-guatemala-memory-of-silence-the-commission-for.html

Agreement on a Firm and Lasting Peace (UN document): https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/GT_961229_AgreementOnFirmAndLastingPeace.pdf

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1094 (Central America: efforts towards peace): http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/1094

Agreement on the Strengthening of Civilian Power and on the Role of the Armed Forces in a Democratic Society (UN document): https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/GT_960919_AgreementStrengtheningCivilianPower.pdf

Agreement on the Basis for the Legal Integration of Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (UN document): https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/GT_961212_AgreementOnBasisOfTheLegalIntegrationOfURNG.pdf

Agreement on the Establishment of the Commission to Clarify Past Human Rights Violations and Acts of Violence that have Caused Guatemalan Population to Suffer (UN document): https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/GT_940623_EstablishmentCommissionClarifyPastHumanRightsViolations.pdf

Agreement on the Creation of an International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala: https://www.cicig.org/uploads/documents/mandato/cicig_acuerdo.pdf

Guatemala 2016 Human Rights Report (a report by the US’s department of state): https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/265802.pdf

Guatemala’s White Paper for Security (El Libro Blanco de Seguridad): https://stcns.gob.gt/docs/2015/Libro_Blanco/Libro-Blanco-de-Seguridad-de-Guatemala.pdf

Brett, Roddy. “Peace without social reconciliation? Understanding the trial of Generals Ríos Montt and Rodriguez Sánchez in the wake of Guatemala’s genocide.” Journal of Genocide Research, Volume 16, Issue 2, June 2016, Pages 285-303. https://doi.org/10.1080/14623528.2016.1186955

Roddy Brett’s paper examines the effect of annulling the trial of general Efraín Ríos Montt, who were found guilty for crimes against humanity. The paper finds that the initial verdict against Montt validated the harrowing experience of the Indigenous communities and victims during the civil conflict, just as much as the annulment’s indication of how Guatemalans still disagreed on historical narrative of the conflict. The paper also notes that Constitutional Court’s decision to annul the verdict due to “pressure from elite economic, political and military actors” is evidence of the lack of rule of law in Guatemala. In general, this discussion shows that while there’s negative peace in Guatemala with the Peace Accords, positive peace has yet to be realized.

Cruz, José Miguel. “Criminal Violence and Democratization in Central America: The Survival of the Violent State.” Latin American Politics and Society, Volume 53, Issue 4, Winter 2011, Pages 1-33. https://www.jstor.org/stable/41342343

José Miguel Cruz’s paper examines the lower level of violent crimes in Nicaragua versus the higher rates in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras. In particular, the paper argues that beyond the effects of “war, socioeconomic underdevelopment, and neoliberal structural reforms,” the discussion also has to look at the impacts created by a corrupt state security sector. For instance, many of the new Guatemalan police officers were part of the old militarized police force, which was heavily involved in repressive violence prior to the Peace Accords. This paper shows that structural police reform in Guatemala is needed not only to move on from the repressive state-sponsored violence, but also to guard against contemporary insecurities like gang and drug-related violence.

Glebbeek, Marie-Louise. “Police Reform and the Peace Process in Guatemala: The Fifth Promotion of the National Civilian Police.” Bulletin of Latin American Research, Volume 20, Issue 4, October 2001, Pages 431-453. https://www.jstor.org/stable/3339023

Marie-Louise Glebbeek’s paper examines the police reform effort under president Alvaro Arzú’s regime between 1996-2000. Like the military, the police was an instrumental part of repressive state violence prior to the Peace Accords. While there was an intention to reform the police force, the paper finds that the Guatemalan government mainly used short-term approaches rather than those would systemically change the structure. In particular, while the government created a new National Civil Police, the hierarchy was still dominated by officers from the old police force and connected with the military. There was also little improvement in the recruitment and training process for the officers. As a result, there were some tangible police reforms in the short term, but they didn’t facilitate long-term changes.

Isaacs, Anita. “At War with the Past? The Politics of Truth Seeking in Guatemala.” International Journal of Transitional Justice, Volume 4, Issue 2, July 2010, Pages 251–274. https://doi.org/10.1093/ijtj/ijq005

Alongside security sector reform, a large part of the peacebuilding process has to do with reconciliation. Anita Isaacs’s paper examines the process of truth seeking and reconciliation in post-war Guatemala, in which it finds that both the survivors and perpetrators were unsatisfied with the Commission for Historical Clarification. At the same time, the antagonistic dynamic between those two sides were still being played out during the post-war truth commission, potentially triggering more “polarization and violence.” However, the paper does find the truth commission does energize the Indigenous communities and civil society to push for more reforms. Overall, the case shows that truth commissions might not always deliver restorative justice in the short run but could have long term positive impact on peacebuilding.

Nakaya, Sumie. “Women and Gender Equality in Peace Processes: From Women at the Negotiating Table to Postwar Structural Reforms in Guatemala and Somalia.” Global Governance, Volume 9, Issue 4, October 2003, Pages 459-476. https://www.jstor.org/stable/27800497

One half of Sumie Nakaya’s paper examines the roles of women’s groups in fostering gender equality in post-war Guatemala. The paper concludes that while women were able to get a seat at the negotiating table, this initial success didn’t automatically mean there would be systemic change. Instead, a deeper success would require the local community to have long-term and active ownership over the integration of gender equality and peacebuilding process. This finding highlights the need to have track-three diplomacy — especially for the promotion of women’s rights — for the peacebuilding process, instead of just track-one diplomacy.

Noël, Émilie. Weaknesses of Security Sector Reforms in Central America: Excludable Policing Strategies and Violence. 2015. McGill University, Master’s thesis. http://digitool.library.mcgill.ca/webclient/StreamGate?folder_id=0&dvs=1553569062403~600

With examples from Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica, Émelie Noël’s paper looks at how weak security sector reform efforts have led to high level of violence. In particular, while Guatemala’s Peace Accords mandate a reduction in the power of the military — which was a major part of state violence — the police force’s low capacity and professional training has maintained the military’s presence. At the same time, there has been little progress in terms of advancing accountability mechanisms for the security forces. Ultimately, weak reforms keep the security sector as an “excludable” good — where it benefits a few and not all groups within society — thus creating distrust in citizens and leading to more violence. Overall, the paper reinforces the importance of strong security sector reforms in facilitating peace in Guatemala.

Ruhl, J. Mark. “The Guatemalan Military since the Peace Accords: The Fate of Reform under Arzú and Portillo.” Latin American Politics and Society, Volume 47, Issue 1, Spring 2005, Pages 55-85. https://www.jstor.org/stable/4490389

J. Mark Ruhl’s paper touches on an important discussion around military reform in Guatemala. The paper finds that president Alvaro Arzú (1996-2000) was able to secure the military’s acceptance of the Peace Accords, but many important changes weren’t implemented. There was even less reform under President Alfonso Portillo (2000-2004), especially as he allied with Efraín Ríos Montt — a former military leader who was later convicted of genocide. The reform picked up steam under President Oscar Berger, but the paper was published soon after he took office so it’s unclear how much progress has been made since. Overall, the paper attributes the lack of reform mainly to “insufficient commitment” from the civilian administration, rather than resistance from the military.

Schultze-Kraft, M. “Security and the Rule of Law in Colombia and Guatemala: Priorities, Trade-offs and Interdependencies.” Hague Journal on the Rule of Law, Volume 4, Issue 1, January 2012, Pages 135-177. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1876404512000085

Partly using the Guatemalan case study, Markus Schultze-Kraft’s paper challenges the notion within liberal peacebuilding that pushing for security sector reform and straightening rule of law are “interdependent and complementary.” The paper finds that the effort to reduce impunity via a UN-sponsored commission was mainly used only when the elites were threatened by illegal competitors — instead of being genuinely for improving the rule of law. Meanwhile, Guatemala’s security sector reform was partly failing due to the large presence of the old and corrupt force in the new police force, meaning rule of law was also elusive within the security sector itself. As a result, the paper stresses the need to improve the rule of law for civilians and shape security sector reform in that direction for a more effective approach.

“Agreement on a Firm and Lasting Peace.” United Nations General Assembly, 29 Dec. 1996, https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/GT_961229_AgreementOnFirmAndLastingPeace.pdf. Accessed March 31, 2019

“Agreement on the Basis for the Legal Integration of Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca.” United Nations General Assembly, 12 Dec. 1996, https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/GT_961212_AgreementOnBasisOfTheLegalIntegrationOfURNG.pdf. Accessed March 31, 2019.

“Agreement on the Creation of an International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala.” International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala, 12 Dec. 2006, https://www.cicig.org/uploads/documents/mandato/cicig_acuerdo.pdf. Accessed March 31, 2019.

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