Governmental Issues: The absence of good governance practices and lack of political space, as it has contributed to a largely military dominated state (Kurtenbach). Furthermore, there is a strong need for the break-up of the current integrated system of state governance and repression, which constitutes the military, the police and the judiciary system (Kurtenbach). This is a crucial reform, as the conflict mobilized and broke out, due to the changes demanded of the current mode of governance, which was then answered with amplified violence (Kurtenbach).

Issues of Organized Crime: There is an evident need to decrease and combat the ever rising organized crime in El Salvador. The existence of continued corruption involving narcotics trafficking, has increased the fear among citizens, as growth is not being visualized in the knowable production sectors of the country (such as coffee, sugar and cotton) (Moodie). Most crime continues to not be reported to authorities, or mentioned in media sources, creating a continued feeling of distrust by the people (Moodie). This issue is important, as it continues a lack of trust in the core institutions of the society.

Issues in Security and Armed Forces: The disbandment, demobilization and rehabilitation of security forces, such as the National Guard, Treasury Police, and the National Liberation Front, etc. (Negroponte & Piche). These bodies created and continued a sense of fear and distrust among the people, and contributed to the escalating violent tensions in the country (Negroponte). Furthermore, to ensure a successful reform, there is also a strong need for the creation of a new civilian police force, to address the very problems that led to the civil war (Piche).

Issues in Judiciary Systems: There is a strong need to re-evaluate and reform the current judiciary system, as it plays a crucial role in the reduction, control and sanctioning of accountability and illegal violence (Kurtenbach). As El Salvador remains one of the most violent countries in the world, without reforms in the judiciary, efforts to change the police and military are in danger of being undermined and unsuccessful (Kurtenback).

Barrio 18

One of El Salvador’s most dominant gangs contributing to the need for security sector reform to combat the countries high crime and murder rates. Barrio 18 is both a domestic and international threat to security, active members of Barrio 18 remain across North America and Central America. However, Barrio 18 is one of the main actors necessary for domestic security sector reform in El Salvador to reduce the threat of safety and corruption within the country. (“El Salvador Country Profile”)

Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13)

MS-13 is one of the most dominant gangs in El Salvador, they are the rival gang of Barrio 18 who also dominate in El Salvador. MS-13 is both a domestic and international threat since MS-13 has active members in the United States, Guatemala, and Honduras. In 2012, MS-13 and Barrio 18 were able to agree on a ceasefire thanks to the mediation of the Catholic Church. However, despite the truce, extortion remains the main source of income for both gangs and they cannot commit to reducing (Negroponte). Further, MS-13 and Barrio 18 will need to be included in the security sector reform for tensions to be reduced to satisfactory levels (“El Salvador Country Profile”).

The National Civilian Police (PNC)

Created in 1992 Peace Accord which ended the civil war, the PNC was negotiated to replace the previous military police system and endorse a democratic policing style (Woods Jr.). The PNC would introduce new strategies for combating crime. There have been accusations on the PNC for misconduct for negligence, involvement in criminal activity, involvement in human rights abuses and following improper procedures. The intent of the PNC is to civilianize the police force (“The National Civilian Police”).

The Catholic Church

The Archbishop of the Catholic Church, Monsignor Fabio Colindres, was a key leader in facilitating security in El Salvador through mediating a ceasefire between MS-13 and Barrio 18 (“El Salvador Country Profile”). The church had a following and credibility in El Salvador as the predominant religion in the country. The church acted as a mediator and helped manage the procedural organization for meetings between actors. The Jesuit Priest of the church was a key mediator between the FMLN and the Conservative party during civil war negotiations (Negroponte). The main goal of the Catholic Church was to act as a non-partisan mediator since most El Salvadorans share value and trust for the Catholic Church.

Frent Farabundo Marti de Liberacion Nacional (FMLN)

The FMLN is one of El Salvador’s major political parties, they formed towards the end of the civil war as a paramilitary rebel group fighting against the El Salvadoran government who was backed by the US (“Truth Commission: El Salvador”). During the UN Peace Accords, the FMLN agreed to disarm and were later recognized as an official political party (Tikkanen). The main goal of the FMLN is to revolutionize the government towards democracy and military truce (Grenier).

Human Rights Commission of El Salvador (CDHES)

The CDHES began with the intention of documenting human rights violations in El Salvador. CDHES records document killings, executions, disappearances, and torture committed in El Salvador. The nature of the CDHES has put members in danger, several of their members have been assassinated. This organization played a significant role in domestic reconciliation between the main actors to combat crime and violence (Negroponte). The intention of the CDHES is to reduce and reform the high rates of violence, crime and corruption within El Salvador.

Francisco Flores

A key actor whose policies contributed to heightened domestic gang conflict. Flores initiated an aggressive anti-gang and anti-crime policy called the “Iron Fist Plan”. This policy promoted the arrest of Salvadorans for suspected gang crimes based on their appearance. The number of gang members in prison doubled which unknowingly strengthened the MS-13 gang (“El Salvador Country Profile”). Francisco Flores was a dominant actor who attempted to support anti-gang and anti-crime through his policies however, these ideologies proved to be damaging to gang conflict and must be addressed to prevent harmful domestic police-gang tensions.

Judicial System

Skepticism remains over the El Salvadoran judicial system as inefficiency and corruption continue to strain the court system. Additionally, the prison system is overcrowded and underfunded which led to a lack of control causing MS-13 dominance (“El Salvador Country Profile”). The judicial system in El Salvador is one of the main sectors in need of reform. The Central America Regional Security Initiative is currently working to support reform in the judicial sector.

Transportistas

Responsible for transporting illegal contraband from El Salvador across borders. Two networks of Transportistas are the Parrones and Cartel De Texas. Both of these actors had a significant contribution to the northward flow of illicit drugs (“El Salvador Country Profile”). Both a domestic and international threat to security. With efficient judicial reform, the threat that transportitas and gang violence cause on security will be reduced.

The United States

The US government played a significant external role as they supported the El Salvadoran government and military in the civil war (Negroponte). The US strengthened its immigration policies, many Barrio 18 and MS-13 members were deported to El Salvador which heightened gang conflict in El Salvador (“El Salvador Country Profile”). The US government funded social and political reform throughout the civil war as they tried to reform El Salvadoran policy to favour neoliberal ideologies (Quan).

International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP)

The United States sponsored the ICITAP program in El Salvador to aid in youth crime and gang involvement, combat police corruption and PNC human rights violations (“The National Civilian Police”). The United States uses the ICITAP program to support foreign countries in enhancing their domestic law enforcement. This program is implemented in many foreign countries including El Salvador with the intention of supporting domestic anti-corruption and crime initiatives (ICITAP).

UN Commission on the Truth in El Salvador

The Commission took place from 1992-1993 with the intent of addressing the nature and effects of the violence throughout the country. The mandate of the UN mediators was to recommend methods to promote reconciliation within the country (“Truth Commission: El Salvador”). The commission was led by three international jurists who investigated complaints of victimization and violence throughout the country. The final report was highly controversial (Negroponte). The commission was intended to combat the prevalent violence within the country.

Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI)

An international aid program supported by the US with the intention of strengthening the law enforcement and judicial system in Central American countries. CARSI is dedicated to engaging at-risk youth in employment through alternative social and economic programs (“Central America Regional Security Initiative”). Focused on alleviating the effects that gangs and criminal activity have on society and the economy.

National Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (COPAZ)

COPAZ was developed as a result of the Chapultepec Peace Agreement to establish the full responsibilities of each party. Copaz held responsible for monitoring the implementation of negotiation agreements until its expiration in January 1996. COPAZ was viewed as a success by most (“Peace Accords Matrix”).

National Dialogue (ND)

National Dialogue was one of the most prominent civil societies in El Salvador during the Peace Agreement negotiations. The main goals of ND were to advocate for increased democracy and to educate the public on the peace agreements (Nilsson).

National Debate for Peace

A committee dedicated to engaging members of society in peaceful dialogue and constructive debate on the conflicting interests of actors regarding the Peace Agreements. The National Debate for Peace would ensure there was fair representation at the table and facilitated action in negotiations. The committees’ success deteriorated when several conservative actors pulled out and the debates were no longer representative of all members of societies interests (Nilsson).

The Forum for Economic and Social Accommodation (FOCES)

A forum intended to foster communication between social and political actors to discuss social and economic topics to encourage open dialogue. This forum would be open to all actors involved in the social and economic sectors (Nilsson).

Inadequate Judicial Reforms: Most SSR’s only includes the reform of core state institutions, such as military and police force, but yet, ignore the need to reform the judiciary, and promote the overall rule of law (Kurtenbach). Despite the increased need for a more holistic and wide-spread SSR, the continued disassociation between institutional and the activities within the security and justice sectors, continues to be barrier to a successful reform (Kurtenbach). Furthermore, changes implemented sometimes do not include the accountability of political actors and allies, which can also contribute to prohibit establishing a true reform. Although there has not been direct war related occurrence since 1992, the high levels of interpersonal violence and increased state repression of the alleged perpetrators, increases the need for more peace-building and reconciliation.

Continued Corruption and Elitism: As most of the high body officials were not fully prosecuted, there still remains an unequal power divide between the elite and the rest of the Salvadorian society (Kurtenbach). There continues to be a strong “lack of political space for addressing critical socio-economic problems as the principle cause” of the conflict, which needs to be addressed in order for there to be a holistic SSR (Negroponte). For example, the legalization of the FMLN as a political party, despite unwillingness to demobilize and disarm, has resulted in continued distrust in governing bodies (Negroponte).

Insufficient Police Force Reform: Despite the initial reform of armed forces, due to political bargains, resistance within old institutions and authoritarianism, it has undermined the SSR process (Piche). Undoubtedly, it has also undercut the ability of the new police force to respond to the needs of the Salvadoran population and ensure security and order throughout the country (Piche) Although the core security institutions were dismantled, it did not directly dismiss the men who had trained and fought with them (Negroponte). Furthermore, the lack of proper vetting in the National Civil Police (PNC), has resulted in perpetuating the culture permitting corruption in institutions such as the police force, and these issues remain due to the admission of ex-combatants into the police force (Piche & Negroponte).

Abstract

In order to analyze the success of the SSR, we conducted an analysis of the prior security institutions that were in effect prior to the transition to democracy.  There were a few institutions that enforced security such public security forces known as Cuerpos de Seguridad Publica (CUSEP), which maintained the public social order in urban areas.  The National Guard was often deployed in more rural to assist large landowners and repressed labor sectors that resisted the existing work conditions (Amaya).  With a security apparatus that reinforced the current political and social status quo of “to disciple, dominate, and control the population” the core of this civil war was rooted in class distinctions.  The different guerilla organizations were inherently leftist or socialist movements opposing the landowning elite, the military increased their attacks through death squads causing an increased polarization in violence and the coalition of Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) (Moran).  With the creation of the FMLN, the military continued to commit large scale massacres killing at least 50,000 unarmed civilians during the 1980s (Stanley).  The FMLN had its own guerilla fighters that carried out their attacks however many of them turned to be futile. This enforced the need for peace reform rather than more violence leading to the beginning of El Salvador’s Security Sector Reform.  Following this, we will analyse the impact the political parties made on SSR, the police reform and its successes, and how international organizations recognized the peace negotiations.

Political Parties

The strong party system in El Salvador helped contribute to the initial success of peace negotiations between ARENA and the FMLN in regards to the SSR.  With the prior guerrilla fighters now viewed as a legitimized and sizable political party, the FLMN no longer felt taken advantage of by the military. With the governing party brokering peace talks with the FLMN, they were further legitimized and continued to gather the public support.  Their continued political success allowed them to monitor the implementation of the peace accords, seemingly benefiting the SSR (Moran, 63).

By having the two most powerful political parties supporting the accords, it seemed in both of their best interest to implement and enforce the agreements because anything less could be interpreted as a spoil of the peace overall. El Salvador has something that other SSR countries did not - highly institutionalized party system that created an environment conducive to peace due to the risks involved with anything else.  While the strong political parties contributed to the initial success of the SSR, it soon began to fail when there was was the inability to break the link between the SSR and its organized criminal elements.

Police reform

The key transformation for the peace accords in El Salvador was the transition from military security into civilian control.  Having worked in other SSR cases, the UN along side of other major countries assisted in providing “police training programs and reform projects” as well as an observer mission to monitor the SSR (Moran, 37).  The reform to internal security occured in tangent with the changing of political parties. El Salvador lacked a functioning police force leading to the initial efforts of establishing a interim security force then filling the security gap in the long term (Berkow, 200) However, it quickly became clear that civilian policing is not the same as creating a military force, a fact tend to be ignored by the international community.  Civilian policing takes longer to establish and requires key political agreements in order to allow for proper development. In El Salvador, the number of members in the security force was cut from 60,000 to 6,000 in the course of a few weeks (Moran). This cut was linked to a surge in crime and violence with the number of homicides increasing by 300%. Contributing to the distrust was the quota put on the number of FLMN ex-combatants could be involved with the PNC in order to ensure recruitment of civilians to limit politicization.  However, international organizations were denied access to lists of personnel to ensure these quotas were met (Pinche,13). The security force reduction was not the only factor in the failure of the SSR. The widespread culture of violence, the ease of access to weapons, as well a pervasive poverty and inequality all contributed to the vacuum of violence. One corrupt former security personnel noted that when one is “trained in the use of arms, organized into tightly knit groups, and familiar with the ways of crime … could easily turn into significant organized crime networks” (Bailey).   

International Organizations

The measures of the SSR to combat gang violence through police reform ended up creating a violence vacuum that created more harm than imagined.  The escalation of violence caused many international organizations to reconsider their role in El Salvador’s SSR. During the Civil War, the Salvadoran military was funded and trained by the United States while the rebel FLMN was receiving support from the Soviet Union (Piche,10).   Following the peace accords the contributions of peace operations by the U.N. and other actors was overall modest. However, this did not mean the external stakeholders were not involved in the monitoring of the reform. The U.N. initially issued ONSUAL as a peace operation for human rights issues, political, police, and military sections yet their role was to not be involved in traditional peacekeeping, but “observing and monitoring” (Pinche,15).  Eventually, in 1994 ARENA was elected and phased out majority of the external actors causing some concern. With the violence vacuum underway, international organizations became increasingly aware of human rights violations and discriminatory factors. In November 2016, the U.N. urged the Salvadoran government to end their extraordinary security measures, which failed to comply to international human rights standards (Nilsson, 3). The measures that were in practices included prolonged and isolated detention under inhuman conditions and prolonged the suspension of family visits to detainees (Amnesty International).  

Summary

Initially, the notion of the guerrilla fighters and governmental parties agreeing to peace negotiations instead of prolonged conflict was the step in the right direction for El Salvador.  A strong political system meant that both parties were held accountable to the implementation and execution of the components of SSR including the reduction in armed forces, the dissolution of rapid deployment forces, and the demobilization and integration of armed FMLN units.  However, the policies implemented in support of the SSR quickly facilitated the power of gang violence and caused more civilian lives to be at risk. The inadequate new Police Force began to resemble its own various of organized crime and the rate at which they incarcerated any potential gang member cause the influx of death squads and the necessity for them as community support. Finally, external actors and international organizations viewed the SSR even when the majority of Salvadorans claimed they needed more assistance in bringing down the homicide rate.  All in all, our analysis showcases that many aspects of the SSR were not approached in a manner that served the needs of the community and the country of El Salvador as a whole.

1. Amnesty International. “Amnesty International Report 2017/18: The State of the World’s Human Rights”.  2018. London, UK: Peter Benenson House. https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/POL1067002018ENGLISH.PDF  Accessed: March 27 2019
2. Betancur, Belisario. UN Security Council, Annex. “From Madness to Hope: the 12-year war in El Salvador: Report of the Commission on the Truth for El Salvador”. 1993. United States Institute of Peace, Jan 26 2001. https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/ElSalvador-Report.pdf . Accessed: March 28 2019.
3. Donadío, Marcela ed. “Índice de Seguridad Pública (Public Security Index): Centroamérica: Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, y Panamá.” Buenos Aires, Argentina: Red de Seguridad y Defensa de América Latina (Security and Defense Network of Latin America), 2013. https://www.resdal.org/libro-seg-2013/resdal-indice_seg.pdf Accessed: March 24 2019
4. Office of the President of El Salvador. “Plan El Salvador Seguro: Resumen Ejecutivo.” El Salvador: Presidencia de la Republica, San Salvador, January 15 2015. Accessed: March 27 2019 http://www.presidencia.gob.sv/plan-el-salvador-seguro-es-un-documento-de-accion-realmente-consensuado-representante-residente-del-pnud . Accessed: March 28 2019
5. OECD/DAC . “Security Sector Reform and Governance: Policy and Good Practice”. Paris, France: OECD, April 6 2006. https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264007888-2-en Accessed: March 28 2019
6. Office of the President of El Salvador. . “Presidente Sanchéz Cerén presenta Plan Quinquenal de Desarrollo ‘El Salvador Productivo, Educado, y Seguro.’” El Salvador: Presidencia de La Republica. San Salvador, El Salvador: President of the Republic, 2015. http://www.presidencia.gob.sv/presidente-Sanchéz-Cerén-da-a-conocer-plan-quinquenal-2014-2019/. Accessed: March 28 2019
7. Policía Nacional Civil.  “Distribución del Presupuesto Asignado por Rubro de Agrupación; Ejercicio Fiscal” 2013. Print. Accessed: March 28 2019
8. United Nations Human Rights Commision. “Human Rights in El Salvador”.  Mission to El Salvador. March 10 1993. http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/E/CHR/resolutions/E-CN_4-RES-1995-63.doc Accessed: March 28 2019
9. United Nations Human Rights Commision. “Report of the Working Group on the use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination”. Mission to El Salvador. March 5 2008. http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=A/HRC/7/2/Add.2&Lang=E Accessed: March 27 2019
10. United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL).  “Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador” New York, New York: UNSCR. February 16 1994. http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=S/1994/179&Lang=E Accessed: March 28 2019
11. United Nations Security Council. “Resolution 991”.  New York, New York: UNSCR. April 28 1995. http://unscr.com/files/1995/00991.pdf   Accessed: March 26 2019
12. United States Department of Justice.  “Western Hemisphere Programs: ICITAP El Salvador”.  Washington, DC: United States Department of Justice, July 31 2018. https://www.justice.gov/criminal-icitap/western-hemisphere-programs Accessed: March 26 2019
13. United States Congress.  Congressional Research Service. “Gangs in Central America: Report RL34112”.  Washington, DC: United States Congress, 2016. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34112.pdf Accessed: March 26 2019
14. United States Congress.  CARSI. “U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America: Policy Issues for Congress: Report R44812”. Washington, DC: United States Congress, 2019. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R44812.pdf Accessed: March 28 2019

Hutchful, Eboe.  “Security Sector Reform Provisions in Peace Agreements”.  Department for International Development, ASSN, 2009. https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/SSRProvisionsinPeaceAgreements_ASSN2009.pdf

This report was commissioned by the African Security Sector Network, which promotes human security and development.  In this specific paper, the ASSN demonstrates how crucial it is to integrate issues of SSR into peace negotiations initially or face high risks.  While the report analysis 8 countries from Africa, it also highlights the successes and failures of El Salvador. One point it notes is the fact that even when robust SSR is present like in the case of El Salvador, there is not always equal implementation of change.  In El Salvador, even with the implementations of SSR the violence reported following the SSR exceeded the fatalities of the civil war; the report urges future policy makers to be aware of this development. This report argues that the SSR in El Salvador fell short of what was anticipated from the peace accords.      

Kurtenback, Sabine.  “Judicial Reform - A Neglected Dimension of SSR in El Salvador”.  Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 13.1, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1080/17502977.2018.1517112

This journal determines an integral part of SSR that is usually underestimated - the Judicial System.  Kurtenbach argues that, using El Salvador as a case study, reforms in the judicial system are key for the reformation of violence and security in post civil war countries.  Prior to SSR, El Salvador’s security and justice were linked by the elite landowners and the military. This gave way to the revolutionary rise of the FMLN. During the civil war, Amnesty International provided evidence that 90 percent of the human rights violations were committed by the government and their allies. As reaction to this, SSR can not only de-mobilize the military but facilitate in the disintegration of a system of state repression such as the judiciary.  Though the journal considers the SSR of El Salvador a success, it examines how risky judicial reform can be if not properly sanctioned and implemented.

Moodie, Ellen. El Salvador in the Aftermath of Peace: Crime, Uncertainty, and the Transition to Democracy. University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 2011. https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0308275X12456648

This chapter in the book El Salvador in the Aftermath of Peace captures the narratives of post war violence urges the reader to reconsider the label of El Salvador`s SSR program as a success.  Moodie continues this narrative throughout the book by asking `what happened next`in order to suggest new models for a transition to democracy and by making sense of the various elements of violence. She makes the assertion that post-war was worse than war in El Salvador through first person accounts on the aspect of crimes.  The stories we are told are often `re-coded`violence where the official fiscouse recasts the violence as non critical. Violence then is place on the other bodies, such as the raced, classed, or gendered bodies (young, male, gang member) in order to validate their discriminatory practices.

Nilsson, Manuela. Civil society actors in peace negotiations in Central America.  Journal of Civil Society, Vol 14:2. 2018. https://doi.org/10.1080/17448689.2018.1484004

Nilson examines the connection between civil society actors and how international actors push heavily for their coordination.  Yet she argues that the connection between peace negotiations and civil actors is not as certain as major international organizations ascribe it to be.  In El Salvador, the article questions how important the civil society actors were in peace negotiations and she argues that their presence did not strengthen the implementation of SSR.  She notes that in the end, all though El Salvador had a strong presence of civil society actors who conducted various forms of diplomacy, the final accords were reached behind close doors in a different country.  These meetings focused on singular actors rather than civil society organizations as a whole. Yet the creations of COPAZ and FOCES shows the contention that these negotiations had to civil society, a strong win for SSR.

Paris, Roland. “At War’s End Building Peace after Civil Conflict: Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala: Reproducing the Sources of the Conflict”. Cambridge University Press, 2004. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511790836.009

This article compares the sources of conflict in three Latin American countries and how different factors contributed to their SSR in different manners.  The start of El Salvador’s civil war was based on the failed attempt to introduce social reform to change the unequal system of land. It outlines how many attempts for peace were made during the war but acknowledges how the Chapultepec Accord eventually caused the end of the violence.  Paris examines the context of the SSR from the detailed plan and how it provided the blueprint for future peacebuilding missions. This is one of the few articles we used which focused on the economic consequences of El Salvador’s SSR and how the economic liberalization policies worked against long lasting peace.

Piche, Gaelle Rivard.  “Assessing the Impact of Orthodox Security Sector Reform in El Salvador” Centre for Security Governance, CSG Paper No 10, 2016. Retrieved from: https://secgovcentre.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Assessing_Orthodox_SSR_in_El_Salvador_Sept_2016.pdf

This peer-reviewed paper is part of an ongoing research project on SSR.  Piche argues how although the SSR in El Salvador was a modest success, it lacked a long term and holistic vision of how the reform could have affected the country.  By the poor implementaion of the PNC which failed to meet quotas on both sides of the aisle, the contributed to a violence vacuum that put civilian security into the hands of organized crime.  Finally, Pinche addresses how the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Assistance Committee was a key stakeholder in the success of the SSR and thus had a heavy hand in the creation of the core principles for El Salvador's SSR.

Piche, Gaelle Rivard. “The Gradual Emergence of Second Generation Security Sector Reform in El Salvador” Centre for Security Governance, CSG Paper 14, 2017. https://secgovcentre.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Second-Generation-SSR-in-El-Salvador-January-2017.pdf.

This peer-reviewed paper provides various reports on the SSR in El Salvador and was crucial to our determination of success for the reform and for the various actors.  Piche discusses how following the SSR implementation (including that of a civilan police force), the country is still plagued by violence and crime. He continues to outline how SSR in El Salvador should address the violence with a local level lens that can inform the national level.  By recognizing the work of the Gang Truce in 2012 and the US CARSI, the Salvadoran Security sector can rethink how to provide protection.

Stanley, William Deane. “El Salvador: State-building before and after democratisation, 1980-95”.  Third World Quarterly,Vol 27.1, 2006. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436590500369311

Stanley examines how the support of the United States during and after the civil war affected the implementation of SSR as the US attempted to shape the norm of a democratically elected civilian political arena.  In this article, we focused on the later half which talks about democratization following the 1992 peace accords. The US backed political/military party, ARENA, initially did not want to support a national civilian police; one of the crucial components of the SSR.  Stanley also acknowledges how because of this, the quotas for the FMLN were not met so the force was even more heavily civilian than planned. This contributed to the initial spiral into disorganization. While the paper agrees that El Salvador following the peace accords was far more democratic than before, it argues at what cost.  Was the Salvadoran experience an attempt by an outside power to promote state reform at their own interest?

Carballo, Carlos A.  El Salvador crime prevention policies: From Mano dura to El Salvador Seguro.  MA in Security Studies. Naval Postgraduate School, 2009.

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"El Salvador: The National Civilian Police (Policia Nacional Civil, PNC); Recent Attempts To Fight Police Corruption; Treatment Of Police Officers Suspected Of Being Criminals Or Involved In Criminal Gangs; Whether Complaints Against The Police Are Treated Seriously By Government Authorities (Updates And Replaces SLV37937.E Of 27 November 2001)." Refworld. N.p., 2019.Web. 13 Mar. 2019.

Grenier, Yvon. "Understanding The FMLN: A Glossary Of Five Words." Conflict Quarterly11.2 (1991): n. pag. Print.

"ICITAP." Justice.gov. N.p., 2018. Web. 13 Mar. 2019.

Kurtenbach, Sabine. "Judicial Reform - A Neglected Dimension of SSR in El Salvador."Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, vol. 13, no. 1, 2019, pp. 57-74.

McCartney, Clem, Martina Fisher & Oliver Wils. “Security Sector Reform: Potential Challenges for Conflict Transformation” Berghod Handbook Dialogue Series, no. 2, 2004.

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Moran, Patrick J.  El Salvador and Guatemala security sector reform and political party system effects on organized crime.  MS in National Security Affairs Thesis.  Naval Postgraduate School, 2009. pp 33-42.

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Nilsson, Manuela.  “Civil society actors in peace negotiations in Central America.” Journal of Civil Society, vol 14, no. 2, 2018, 135-152.

Piche, Gaelle Rivard.  “Assessing the Impact of Orthodox Security Sector Reform in El Salvador” Centre for Security Governance, CSG Paper No 10, 2016.

Piche, Gaelle Rivard. “The Gradual Emergence of Second Generation Security Sector Reform in El Salvador” Centre for Security Governance, CSG Paper 14, 2017.

Piche, Gaelle Rivard.  “The Salvadoran Gang Truce (2012-2014): Insights on Subnational Security Governance in El Salvador” Violence in Latin America and the Caribbean: Subnational Structures, Institutions, an Clientelistic Networks.  Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2017.

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Stanley, William Deane. “El Salvador: State-building before and after democratisation, 1980-1985”.  Third World Quarterly, vol 27, no 1. 101-114.

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Woods Jr., DeVere D. "THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE POLICÍA NATIONAL CIVIL OF EL SALVADOR." Policing in Central and Eastern Europe: Dilemmas of Contemporary Criminal Justice(2004): n. pag. Print.

1. Land ownership, inequality, and appalling living conditions of the peasantry in rural areas - One of the main historical causes of La Violencia is precisely such issues of imbalanced land ownership and underdevelopment of rural areas(1). A 2011 UNDP report recorded 1,1% of the total population owns 50% of Colombia´s land(2), making Colombia one of the most unequal countries in land distribution. This inequality fuelled leftist factions in Colombian society to rebel and have continued to do so today.

2. Political participation (including former FARC members and grassroots organizations and marginalized communities) - After the 2016 Peace Agreement between the Colombian Government and FARC-EP, the creation of new political parties comprised of previously marginalized groups has allowed them to express their political, social, and economic concerns through official institutions and mechanism. FARC in this process have also transformed from an insurgent group to a political party, as legitimized by the Peace Agreement. The government is committed to guaranteeing transparency in electoral processes and the creation of a discourse of peace and inclusion, although this is not without public backlash given the inclusion of former perpetrators of violence(3).

3. Ceasing of hostilities, guarantees of security, and the reincorporation of ex-fighters into civil life - The DDRR and SSR processes triggered by the Peace Agreement and starting with the ceasefire are controversial especially regarding the reincorporation of ex-combatants to society and the guarantee of security in a new stage of coexistence. With help from the United Nations and funding from foreign governments, the Colombian Government designed specific programs and policies to achieve sustainable reintegration and give legitimacy to its practices, with the UN Verification Mission acting as monitor. The below sections will provide detailed explanations of the barriers to successfully implementing some of these projects.

4. Drug trafficking and the ineffective prohibition of illicit crops - In tackling agrarian issues, the government proposed new rural economic development initiatives through the National Comprehensive Substitution Program for Illicit Crops. This is targeted to eliminate a key source of income for FARC, which previously depended heavily on the production and sales of illicit crops for profit. To further combat profits made from drug trafficking and production, the government created a new drug policy in which to some extent, the use of drugs is decriminalized, transforming drug use to an issue of health and not one of criminality(4).

5. Victims and justice - One of the hallmark achievements of the Agreement was the birth of the Comprehensive System of Truth, Justice, Repair, and Non-Repetition for the purpose of achieving some justice for the victims, guaranteeing legal security, and contributing to reconciliation and avoiding a repetition of crimes committed in this longterm conflict. The System creates a search unit for missing persons, effectively integrating reconciliation while strengthening a sense of security of communities(5).

Endnotes

1 Colombian government. General Agreement for the Termination of the Conflict and the Construction of a Stable and Lasting Peace, 2016, 12-34.
2 Eduardo Sánchez and Vicente Sánchez. "La Paz y La Solución Al Problema Del Campo En Colombia: Un Análisis Comparado Entre El Acuerdo De Paz y El Plan Nacional De Desarrollo." Araucaria, no. 39, 2018, 370.
3 Ibid. 57-97.
4 Ibid. 98-123.
5 Ibid. 124-143.

1. Government of Colombia - Once elected President from 2010 to 2018, Juan Manuel Santos broke with the previous President Álvaro Uribe Vélez´s discourse and started exploratory dialogues with the FARC. In October 2012, Santos announced the start of formal negotiations in Oslo(1), and that he was willing to negotiate historically ignored clauses in previous peace processes(2).

2. Revolutionary Forces of Colombia (FARC-EP) - FARC, the main actor in Colombia's civil war, has carried more political and military weight than other guerrilla groups, as well as it has governed vast swaths of territory. Moreover, FARC prompted the rise of other counterinsurgency and paramilitary forces, such as the United Self-Defense Forces(3).

3. The Democratic Center (right wing, Catholic opposition party) - The party with support from the former president, Alvaro Uribe were part of the “No” campaign, which won the plebiscite on Sunday 2 October by a margin of 0.4 per cent. They pushed the government to include some of their demands, which were reflected in the New Final Agreement signed on 12 November and approved by Congress on 1 December(4).

4. Bandas Criminales (BACRIMs) - coined by the former President Álvaro Uribe, the BACRIMs is an umbrella term describing organized crime organization and insurgent groups not linked to FARC. For example, the paramilitary group and main rival to FARC, ELN is a part of BACRIMs(5).

5. National Liberation Army (ELN) - The triumph of the Cuban Revolution caused the expansion of communist movements in Latin America and influenced the creation of the National Liberation Army” in Colombia in 1964. It was a group formed by student and young activists who were trained in guerrilla warfare in Cuba(6).

Endnotes

1 Francy Carranza-Franco. Demobilisation and Reintegration in Colombia: Building State and Citizenship. (New York: Routledge, 2019) 10.
2 Pedro Valenzuela. "The End of the Armed Conflict in Colombia: A Multiple Causal Factor Explanation". Peace & Change, vol. 43, no. 2, 2018, 213.
3 Carranza-Franco 87.
4 Ibid. p. 11.
5 David Maher and Andrew Thomson. “A Precarious Peace? the Threat of Paramilitary Violence to the Peace Process in Colombia”. Third World Quarterly, vol. 39, no. 11, 2018, 2248.
6 Carranza-Franco 42.

1. United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia - The Final Peace Agreement in 2016 specified that the UN should be responsible for monitoring and verifying the DDRR process in Colombia. This includes verification on a community, local, regional, as well as national level(1).

2. Government of the United States of America - Although not directly involved in negotiations, the US played a role in supporting it through the appointment of a special US delegate to the peace process and a $450 million dollar per year aid to Colombia for post-conflict development(2).

3. Government of Norway - Norway acted as a guarantor and played a key role in the peace process between the Colombian government and the FARC in the period 2010-2016. It was already involved in former peace processes in 1998-2000(3).

4. Government of Cuba - Acted as key guarantors with Norway and Havana was the first site of the secret exploratory meeting. Both Cuba and Norway continued to be involved in the peace process from secret preparatory talks (2010–2011), to secret exploratory talks (2012); and formal, public negotiations (2012–2016)(4).

5. Government of Venezuela - A companion to the negotiations, showed notable support in the earlier years of secret talks between the FARC and Colombian government. Former Hugo Chávez especially joined the Government of Cuba and advocated for a negotiated settlement(5).

6. Government of Chile - Also a facilitator with Venezuela, it is commitment to the process of monitoring and verifying the implementation of the agreements, hence its continued commitment in supporting exploratory peace talks between Colombia and another major rebel army, ELN, after the success of the FARC-EP agreement(6).

Endnotes

1 Francy Carranza-Franco. Demobilisation and Reintegration in Colombia: Building State and Citizenship. (New York: Routledge, 2019) 11.
2 Ibid.
3 Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation. A Trusted Facilitator: An Evaluation of Norwegian Engagement in the Peace Process between the Colombian Government and the FARC, 2010–2016. NORAD Evaluations Department, 2018, p. 5.
4 Ibid. p. 21.
5 Carranza-Franco 74.
6 "Chile to host Colombia peace talks". Euronews, 21 April. 2018.

1. Exclusion of other armed groups in peace deal
The Colombian Government's main obstacle is its inability to withhold its guarantee of security for the demobilized guerrillas and political actors. The peace accord does not concern other armed groups; therefore, the BACRIMs still spoils peace with kidnappings and assassinations of those partaking in DDRR. To jeopardize the process, they directly target FARC members or deter people from getting involved in politics in general. Many FARC rebels have expressed concerns for their safety after/during disarmament since forty assassinations of demobilizing FARC members occurred just after the signing of the deal(1). Also, the FARC as a political party remains a target as its former self was during the violent campaign against the Unión Patriótica in 1980(2).

2. Dissenting FARC members slipping back into violence
FARC dissidents who were either unsatisfied with the peace deal, not participating in demobilization, or unwilling to complete the DDRR process harms successful reintegration(3), increases the risk of these outliers being recruited by illegal armed groups still active in Colombia, and creating even more difficulties for the Government to include them effectively in reintegration.

3. Stigmatization of former FARC members
The fighters’ reintegration in society seem to be the most challenging step of the DDRR process since almost half of Colombia's population which voted NO in the 2016 referendum still view the FARC as criminal group rather than a political party. The goal of the above-mentioned referendum was to involve civil society in legitimizing the agreement, but it failed because a big part of the population sees voting YES to the deal as a vote for impunity and that this would recognize the violent FARC as a legitimate political entity(4). The population's attitude towards the fighters need to change for further successful reintegration.

4. Cleavages in the transitional justice framework
The process of DDRR within the transitional justice framework is still an issue that polarizes public opinion. For many people, the only acceptable condition to accept former combatants in their communities is for them to undergo criminal trials and receive deprivations of liberty. Many think that amnesty will not change the fact that FARC members committed heinous crimes. If those who committed severe crimes do not even qualify for amnesty, these criminals 'benefit' from receiving alternative penalties (which are viewed by the public as too light)(5). Thus, the decision to adopt a lenient approach has been cited as an attempt to foster impunity.

4. Gendered violence and the government's lack of response
The protection mechanisms for women are weak because they have not been able to avoid the increased risk of gender-based violence inside the Transitory Zones of Normalization (TZN) and in the former territories of the FARC. The fact that the gender approach has not been taken into account in the physical adaptation of TZN has situated many pregnant women and their children in precarious conditions(6). Aside from some cases of gender-based violence inflicted by former FARC members, the BACRIMs and other paramilitaries allegedly perpetrated most cases of sexual violence against women since the demobilization of the FARC. One main reason for this is that the social control of a territory is interpreted as the control of women(7).

Endnotes

1 David Maher and Andrew Thomson. “A Precarious Peace? the Threat of Paramilitary Violence to the Peace Process in Colombia.” New ed., 39 vols. (2018) 2151.
2 Germán Pataquiva. “FARC, Origins and Evolution.” (UNISCI Discussion Papers, no. 19, 2009) 166.
3 Francesca Capone. “An Overview of the DDR Process Established in the Aftermath of the Revised Peace Agreement between the Colombian Government and the FARC: Finally on the Right Track?” Global Jurist. 2017, p. 7.
4 María Teresa Aya. “El Proceso de Paz en Colombia: dos pasos adelante, un paso atrás.”, Estudios internacionales (Santiago), new ed., 49 vols. (2018) 177.
5 Ibid.
6 Kroc Institute. Informe sobre el estado efectivo de implementación del acuerdo de paz en Colombia, (Instituto Kroc de Estudios Internacionales de Paz Universidad de Notre Dame, 2017) 15.
7 Comisión Nacional de Reparación y Reconciliación. La reintegración: logros en medio de rearmes y dificultades no resueltas, (2010) 229.

The SSR and DDRR process triggered by the 2016 Peace Agreement between the Colombian government and FARC in comparison to those in the history of the conflict-ridden state is arguably productive, albeit existing problems with spoilers and assassinations, amongst others. The success following 2016 is achieved largely due to the inclusivity, localization, and development orientation of the DDRR and SSR policy (1).

The first tangible achievement of the Peace Agreement is the disarmament of FARC members, as in total, 11,049 ex-combatants have demobilized (2). Their reintegration to society has been largely successful, as supported by the creation of the Transitory Zones of Normalization and diverse training and economic programs. By 2018, 20 collective income-generating projects had been implemented, helping 1,340 former combatants achieve economic success (3). The agrarian issue, one of the main historical causes of the conflict, is being solved through the re-partition of land and various productive programs to support the development of rural communities, reducing the inequality gap between the rural and the urban. This is closely related to the positive progress of the Substitution Program for Illicit Crops, which supports sustainable and legal farming practices and discourages Colombia’s former development model based on cultivating illicit crops. By December 2018, approximately 32,929 out of 51,721 hectares of coca have been eradicated voluntarily and 9,096 families have benefited from the program (4).

The key issue of political participation has been put into practice with the creation of new political parties, which included not only FARC (as a political party) but other grassroots movements as well. Today, FARC hold eight seats in Congress, five in the Chamber of Representatives and four in the Senate (5). Furthermore, elections have been carried out in a more transparent and inclusive manner in comparison to past practices. Regarding transitional justice, the Commission for the Clarification of Truth, Coexistence, and Non-Repetition has been established since November 2018 to promote reconciliation between the Colombian society and former guerrilla fighters, and to address cases of missing family members (6). The Commission has yet to deliver its findings due to the recency of events, however it is notable to highlight the gendered approach to truth and reconciliation, with focus on the victims and their individualized narratives of victimization (7). In fact, the gender-based approach is written into the very Peace Agreement that the entire SSR and DDRR process is based on; putting women’s rights and gender equality at the center of every program birthed during and after the negotiations (8).

Colombia’s hardfought peace with FARC after five decades of conflict is expectedly being challenged by a number of factors. The multiplicity of actors generated a complex dynamic during the implementation process since the participants often have conflicting agendas and interests. Thus, it was difficult to operate an inclusive process that incorporated all civil organizations and communities claiming to be crucial actors in peacebuilding, and at the same time, deal with illegal actors who actively try to sabotage peace because it went against their interests, e.g. Bandas Criminales, paramilitaries, and drug dealers.

Moreover, the Colombian government has yet to overcome formerly overlooked external issues in the peace agreement. The two most worrisome concerns the continued violence of Bandas Criminales (BACRIMs) and the polarization of Colombian society. These issues represent obstacles to the SSR process since they had created other challenges for implementation; the BACRIMs pose the most significant threat to the peace since its bloody assassinations of ex-combatants and activists expose the lack of security guarantees to former FARC members, indigenous peoples, women’s rights and human rights activist in non-state controlled and rural territories (9). Also, the criminalization and stigmatization of former FARC members have impeded their complete integration. Consequently, this leads some former FARC members to defect from the DDRR process and rejoin organized crime groups such as ELN or BACRIMs in furthering the cycle of violence (10).

Historically since the 20th century, many peace processes, demobilization, and reintegration efforts in Colombia started but eventually ended when violence was rekindled by personal attacks and the killing of former combatants (11). Since the agreement’s implementation only started a few years ago, it is too early to inflict a similar forecast onto the current process. On the flip side, many measures bridging ex-FARC fighters back into society are seeing unprecedented progress. Similar to an individual’s reorientation after a conflict, peace requires high commitment from Colombia and its population over the long term. As for 2019, we shall witness whether the above achievements and shortcomings will survive politicization in Colombia’s regional elections come October.

Endnotes

1 Francy Carranza-Franco. Demobilisation and Reintegration in Colombia: Building State and Citizenship. (New York: Routledge, 2019) 81.
2 Ibid. 12.
3 United Nations. Report of the Secretary-General on the United Verification Mission in Colombia, 26 Dec. 2018 1.
4 Ibid. 4.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
7 Kroc Institute. Informe sobre el estado efectivo de implementación del acuerdo de paz en Colombia, Nov. 2017 15.
8 Ibid.
9 Francesca Capone. "An Overview of the DDR Process Established in the Aftermath of the Revised Peace Agreement between the Colombian Government and the FARC: Finally on the Right Track?", Global Jurist, vol. 17, no. 3, 6 Oct. 2017, 6.
10 David Maher and Andrew Thompson. "A Precarious Peace? the Threat of Paramilitary Violence to the Peace Process in Colombia." Third World Quarterly, vol. 39, no. 11, 7 Dec. 2018, 2143.
11 Carranza-Franco 18.

1. General Agreement for the Termination of the Conflict and the Construction of a Stable and Lasting Peace. Colombian government. Office of the High Commissioner for Peace. 26 August 2012, https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/133811/pdf/. Accessed 14 March 2019.

2. Decree by which the National Comprehensive Substitution Program for illicit crops is created. Presidency of Colombia. 29 May 2017. es.presidencia.gov.co/normativa/normativa/DECRETO%20896%20DEL%2029%20DE%20MAYO%20DE%202017.pdf. Accessed 14 March 2019.

3. La reintegración: logros en medio de rearmes y dificultades no resueltas. Comisión Nacional de Reparación y Reconciliación. 2010. www.ideaspaz.org/tools/download/52283. Accessed 14 March 2019.

4. “Misión de Verificación de las Naciones Unidas en Colombia.” Guterres, Antonio. Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas. September 2018, https://colombia.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/sg_report_on_colombia_spa.pdf. Accessed 14 March 2019.

5. Informe sobre el estado efectivo de implementación del acuerdo de paz en Colombia. Kroc Institute. November 2017, https://kroc.nd.edu/assets/257593/informe_kroc.pdf. Accessed 14 March 2019.

6. Decree by which the Law 434 of 1998 is modified and the National Council for Peace, Reconciliation and Coexistence is created. Colombian Ministry of the Interior. 26 May 2017. es.presidencia.gov.co/Documents/Dec885_20170526.pdf. Accessed 14 March 2019.

7. A Trusted Facilitator: An Evaluation of Norwegian Engagement in the Peace Process between the Colombian Government and the FARC, 2010–2016. Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation. October, 2018. https://norad.no/contentassets/33fb8fa056be4d2b9b6eadfda9f6b3e1/10.18-evaluation-of-norways-support-to-the-peace-process-in-colombia-20102016.pdf. Accessed 14 March 2019.

8. Final Agreement for Peace, the opportunity of building peace. Office of the High Commissioner for Peace. 24 November 2016. http://especiales.presidencia.gov.co/Documents/20170620-dejacion-armas/acuerdos/acuerdo-final-ingles.pdf. Accessed 14 March 2019.

9. Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Colombia. United Nations. 26 September, 2017. colombia.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/last_sg_report_on_the_un_mission_in_colombia_eng.pdf. Accessed 14 March 2019.

10. Report of the Secretary-General on the United Verification Mission in Colombia. United Nations. 26 December, 2018. colombia.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/n1845592.pdf. Accessed 14 March 2019.

11. Indigenous women and Colombia’s peace process: pathways to participation. Conciliation Resources. June 2018. https://www.c-r.org/downloads/Indigenous%20women%20and%20Colombia%E2%80%99s%20peace%20process.pdf. Accessed 14 March 2019.

Cantey, Seth, and Correa, Ricardo. "Making Peace: Next Steps in Colombia." Parameters, vol. 47, no. 4, 2017, pp. 85-96.
Cantey chronicles the recent transformation of FARC from a combat group to a political party immediately after the peace agreement. The article starts with a historical overview of Colombia’s civil conflict and gives examples of previously failed attempts at negotiating peace, before describing the success and struggles of the peace accord in Havana, Cuba, particularly from the perspective of the FARC negotiators. This is to point out the move towards positive change in Colombia, as the author puts forward policy recommendations for the US Department of Defence to support the country in its DDRR process.

Carranza-Franco, Francy. Demobilisation and Reintegration in Colombia: Building State and Citizenship. Routledge, New York, NY; Abingdon, Oxon, 2019.
Centered around empirical analysis and comparative studies of Colombia’s DDR process in the past decade and a half, even when the country is not in a peaceful environment, Carranza-Franco argues in his book, that both the former FARC fighters and the victimized and marginalized local population need to successfully negotiate their citizenship in a post-conflict society in order to achieve sustainable peace.

Capone, Francesca. "An Overview of the DDR Process Established in the Aftermath of the Revised Peace Agreement between the Colombian Government and the FARC: Finally on the Right Track?" Global Jurist, vol. 17, no. 3, 2017;2018.
Capone’s paper focuses on the implementation framework for transitional justice set up by the 2016 Peace Agreement, as she asserts the current DDR process satisfies many factors for success comparatively to past efforts. Capone gives an explanation of DDR, outlines Colombia’s history of attempted peace negotiations, provides a description of post-2016 DDR and the role of transitional justice in the process. She sporadically jumps from analyzing general DDR practices to the role of justice and concludes that the current DDR process looks successful on paper despite the challenges ahead with negative public opinions towards ex-FARC fighters during their reintegration.

Smitmans, Aya and Teresa, María. “El Proceso de Paz en Colombia: dos pasos adelante, un paso atrás.” Estudios internacionales (Santiago), vol. 49, no. 187, 2018, pp. 163-179.
The article discusses the challenges to the implementation of the peace agreement, specifically the polarization of the Colombian society after the result of the referendum. Aya points the stigmatization of the former FARC members as the primary cause of the "No" victory. In this, the agrarian issue (including the plantation of drugs in rural areas) played an important factor since it encouraged the formation of a perception of FARC as a criminal group. The author concludes saying that the victory of "NO" was not because the population voted against peace; instead, it was a vote against both impunity and the recognition of the FARC as a political group.

Maher, David, and Thomson, Andrew. "A Precarious Peace? the Threat of Paramilitary Violence to the Peace Process in Colombia." Third World Quarterly, vol. 39, no. 11, 2018, pp. 2142-2172.
The article presents an investigation that states that paramilitary groups in Colombia can pose a threat to the peace agreement. First, the authors highlight the government posture that denies the existence of paramilitarism and the liability of the criminal bands (BACRIMs) of the perpetration of the post-agreement violence. Second, through quantitative analysis, the investigation claims that the successor paramilitary groups are the key spoiler threat to the peace process by violently targeting demobilized FARC members.

Leech, Garry M. The FARC: The Longest Insurgency. Fernwood, London;New York;Halifax; 2011.
The book studies FARC insurgency since its origins until the present. It starts examining the principal characteristics of the guerrilla, their aims, ideology, and organizational and operational structures. Then, it makes a historical journey, studying how FARC has changed and adapted depending on its relationship with the government in turn and external factor. Finally, it analyzes the possible future of the guerrilla and the opportunity of a peace agreement.

Sánchez Iglesias, Eduardo and Sánchez Jiménez., Vicente "La Paz y La Solución Al Problema Del Campo En Colombia: Un Análisis Comparado Entre El Acuerdo De Paz y El Plan Nacional De Desarrollo." Araucaria, no. 39, 2018, pp. 365-387.
The article studies the agrarian issue of the Peace Agreement through a historical examination of its transcendence and analysis of the reforms created to implement the plans established. The article examines the possible impact of such reforms and the degree in which they could accomplish the historical agrarian issue in Colombia.

Valenzuela, Pedro. "The End of the Armed Conflict in Colombia: A Multiple Causal Factor Explanation." Peace & Change, vol. 43, no. 2, 2018, pp. 205-217.
The article analyzes the interplay and contextual factors in which peace negotiations between the government of Juan Manuel Santos and the FARC takes place, besides it does a comparison with the latest peace negotiations and the reasons of their failure. It studies the correlation of forces, intraparty factors, the public opinion, and the international context.

Amnesty International. “Colombia: Autoridades deben respetar los derechos de los Pueblos Indígenas del Chocó.” November 2018, www.amnesty.org/es/latest/news/2018/11/colombia-autoridades-deben-respetar-los-derechos-de-los-pueblos-indigenas-del-choco/. Accessed 14 March 2019.

Atuesta, Maria. “Colombia's Peace Experiment: 'Collective Reincorporation’.” The Olive Branch, 11 February. 2019, www.usip.org/blog/2019/02/colombias-peace-experiment-collective-reincorporation. Accessed 14 March 2019.

Smitmans, Aya and Teresa, María. “El Proceso de Paz en Colombia: dos pasos adelante, un paso atrás.” Estudios internacionales (Santiago), vol. 49, no. 187, 2018, pp. 163-179.

Cantey, Seth, and Correa, Ricardo. "Making Peace: Next Steps in Colombia." Parameters, vol. 47, no. 4, 2017, pp. 85-96.

Carranza-Franco, Francy. Demobilisation and Reintegration in Colombia: Building State and Citizenship. Routledge, New York, NY; Abingdon, Oxon, 2019.

Capone, Francesca. "An Overview of the DDR Process Established in the Aftermath of the Revised Peace Agreement between the Colombian Government and the FARC: Finally on the Right Track?" Global Jurist, vol. 17, no. 3, 2017;2018.

Chalaby, Odette. "Colombia’s peace agreement is the world’s first to have gender at its core." Apolitical, 12 January 2018, apolitical.co/solution_article/colombias-peace-agreement-worlds-first-gender-core/. Accessed 14 March 2019.

"Chile to host Colombia peace talks". Euronews, 21 April 2018, https://www.euronews.com/2018/04/21/chile-to-host-colombia-peace-talks. Accessed 14 March 2019.

Brown, Kimberly. "Why are former FARC rebels leaving reintegration camps?" Al Jazeera, 29 March 2018, www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/03/farc-rebels-leaving-reintegration-camps-180327141706796.html. Accessed 14 March 2019.

Daniels, Joe Parkin. "Colombian activists face 'extermination' by criminal gangs." The Guardian, 23 August 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/aug/23/colombian-activists-face-extermination-by-criminal-gangs. Accessed 14 March 2019.

Diaz, Fabio and Jiménez, Magda. "Colombia’s murder rate is at an all-time low but its activists keep getting killed." The Conversation, 6 April 2018, theconversation.com/colombias-murder-rate-is-at-an-all-time-low-but-its-activists-keep-getting-killed-91602. Accessed 14 March 2019.

González and Casey. “Colombian Prosecutor Investigating FARC Is Accused of Taking Bribe for Ex-Rebel.” New York Times, 1 March 2019, www.nytimes.com/2019/03/01/world/americas/colombia-prosecutor-farc.html. Accessed 14 March 2019.

Herreño, Juan and Muñoz, Juan. “Radiography of the Plebiscite”. CNN, October, 2016, cnnespanol.cnn.com/2016/10/03/colombia-los-departamentos-con-mas-victimas-votaron-mayoritariamente-si-en-el-plebiscito/. Accessed 14 March 2019.

Human Rights Watch. "Recycled Violence Abuses by FARC Dissident Groups in Tumaco on Colombia’s Pacific Coast". 13 December 2018, www.hrw.org/report/2018/12/13/recycled-violence/abuses-farc-dissident-groups-tumaco-colombias-pacific-coast#. Accessed 14 March 2019.

Leech, Garry M. The FARC: The Longest Insurgency. Fernwood, London;New York;Halifax, 2011.

Maher, David, and Andrew Thomson. "A Precarious Peace? the Threat of Paramilitary Violence to the Peace Process in Colombia." Third World Quarterly, vol. 39, no. 11, 2018, pp. 2142-2172.

Oficina del Alto Comisionado para la Paz. “Así es la cedulación para los miembros de las FARC.” March 2017. http://www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/Documents/informes-especiales/cedulas-farc-registraduria/index.html. Accessed 14 March 2019.

Pataquiva, Germán. "FARC, Origins and Evolution”. UNISCI Discussion Papers, no. 19, 2009, pp. 154.

Sánchez Iglesias, E., and V. Sánchez Jiménez. "La Paz y La Solución Al Problema Del Campo En Colombia: Un Análisis Comparado Entre El Acuerdo De Paz y El Plan Nacional De Desarrollo." Araucaria, no. 39, 2018, pp. 365-387.

Valenzuela, Pedro. "The End of the Armed Conflict in Colombia: A Multiple Causal Factor Explanation." Peace & Change, vol. 43, no. 2, 2018, pp. 205-217.

*Different Ethnic Groups

Since coming to independence in 1962, Burundi has struggled to find peace in the region. In the succeeding years, there were struggles for power that was fueled by ethnic tensions between the Hutu and Tutsi groups. The instability within the region brought ethnic repression and violence which has led to mass migrations and mass killings. [1]

Military

If not constructed correctly the military can be a catalyst for repression and the protection of specific groups. Historically, the military has been dominated by Tutsis which are the minority group in Burundi. This set-up has not allowed for the fair treatment of citizen’s and the military has been responsible for specifically targeting the Hutu majority.[2]

Corruption and the Police Force

Corruption is a major issue in Burundi, in the past 12 months, 14% of public service users have paid a bribe in the past 12 months and police and judiciary members are the most likely to be involved in it. These bribes can be used to arrest people or to free those who have been committed of crimes. [3]

Disarmament

Due to the ethnic conflicts in Burundi, civilian armament had been on the rise for both personal protection and/or to join armed groups. There is a general distrust among the public towards the government and there is fear about criminal and political violence. In addition to this, there is a lack of confidence in the police to provide protection and uphold the law leading to a feeling of insecurity. [4]

 

 

[1] The Security Sector Reform (SSR) mandated that the political arena needed to be neutral and united and not be a tool for the security of a regime. For more information, visit the International Security Sector Advisory Team’s page for Burundi under “Overview of SSR in the Republic of Burundi.” https://issat.dcaf.ch/Learn/Resource-Library/Country-Profiles/Burundi-SSR-Background-Note#overview%20of%20ssr

[2] The military needs to be an institution of stability and protection from both internal and external forces. Similar to the corruption of the police, if the military is configured in a way that does not perform its outlined roles, then society can not progress. Being able to create long-lasting peace and having civilian protection is a crucial step for sustainable SSR in Burundi. For more information, see Kristina Powell’s paper on Security Sector Reform and Protection of Civilians, pages 23-39.

[3] One of the major reforms that needed to happen was the creation of a new and improved police force. In order to have a working society, the law enforcement needs to be free of corruption and so in turn, the personnel needs to be re-trained and the institutions need to be revamped. For more information on the corruption, visit Transparency International’s site under “People and Corruption: Africa Survey 2015.” For the details outlining the agreement, see Wilen Nindorera’s paper “Security Sector Reform in Burundi: Issues and Challenges for Improving Civilian Protection” on page 7.

[4] Disarmament is necessary for two specific reasons. First, it is fundamental that disarmament occurs in order for a reformed police sector to perform their duties. Secondly, the overall sense of security should increase if civilians do not have firearms. For more information, see Kristina Powell’s paper on Security Reform on page 40.*

*Domestic State

The Union for National Progress (UPRONA)

UPRONA is a majority led Tutsi party that was founded in 1960 and won their first election in 1961. [1] In 1966 the National Revolutionary Council declared UPRONA the only legal political party and took control of the government,[2] with rumours that UPRONA was just an instrument of a military dictatorship. [3] This groups was responsible for ethnic purges led by the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Historically, "military leadership and political civilian elites" were intertwined with UPRONA making the military overwhelmingly one-sided. Part of the SSR was established to eliminate this inequality.[4]

The Front for Democracy in Burundi (FRODEBU)

FRODEBU is a Hutu based political party that was formed in 1986. Melchior Ndadaye was the first President in 1993 and in an attempt to settle the differences between them and UPRONA, he named a UPRONA as Prime Minister. His leadership was one that Burundi had not seen in a long time and it brought harmony and peace to the country and wanted to promote human rights. However, their power did not last long and President Ndadaye was assassinated through a military coup. [8]

National Council for the Defence of Democracy (CNDD)

In 2010, the CNDD was democratically elected in, however, they allegedly got their grip on power through intimidation political violence through torture, kidnapping and murder to suppress opposition. The government got even more control in 2013 when they passed a law to stop the freedom of the press, which included articles about national defence, public safety and local currency. The day this law was passed was a "black day for freedom of information in Burundi". Six months later they instituted a law that restricted public gatherings, this was most likely done to suppress protests.[9] In 2018 Nkurunziza called a referendum to extend presidential limits, changing Burundi's 13-year-old constitution which was a product of the peace process after the civil war. Opponents have allegedly been abducted and killed by the youth wing aligned to the CNDD, Imbonerakure.[10]

Domestic Non-State

Tutsi

The Sans Échec, Sans Défaite, Sans Pitié, Sans Capote are all Tutsi youth militias which operate across Burundi. Comprised largely of children, these gangs use weapons to coerce and kill members of the public on behalf of Tutsi interests [11].

The Imbogaraburundi (FRODEBU) and Puissance Auto-défense Amasekanya (PA-Amasekanya) are Tutsi rebel groups who, when under Hutu rule, undertook attacks on the Hutu people of Burundi [12].

Imbonerakure is President Pierre Nkurunziza’s party’s “youth league” in Burundi. Similar to the other Tutsi youth militias, Imbonerakure has been responsible for horrendous human rights violations since 2018. They have “...carried out widespread human rights abuses... including summary executions, rapes, abductions, beatings, and intimidation of suspected political opponents” [13].

Hutu

The National Council for the Defense of Democracy-Forces for the Defence of Democracy (CNDD-FDD/Intagoheka) is comprised of Hutu rebels who opposed the Forces Armées Burundaises (FAB) who were the Burundi government’s Tutsi-dominated army [14].

The Front de Libération Nationale or Parti pour la libération du Peuple Hutu (also referred to as FROLINA, FLN, PALIPEHUTU) is a Hutu rebel group which, similarly to the CNDD-FDD, opposed the Tutsi dominated armed forces and was involved in war crimes across Burundi. These armed Hutu groups are also known as “‘bandes armées’ (armed bands), ‘maquisards’ (‘guerillas’) or more recently, Intagoheka (‘those who do not blink’)” [15].

 

 

[1] Prince Louis Rwagasore created the party and was the King's eldest son. See the United States Institute of Peace page 19 for more information.  https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/resources/collections/commissions/Burundi-Report.pdf

[2] Rwanda played a part in this by diplomatically recognizing the legitimacy of the NRC. The NRC consisted of a 12 Tutsi and 5 non-Tutsi army officials. For more information, visit https://www.sciencespo.fr/mass-violence-war-massacre-resistance/fr/node/2749 or view the University of Central Arkansas website under "Burundi (1962-Present)".

[3] Captain Michel Micombero was the de facto dictator at the time and had roots in the military. He was a Tutsi and carried out aggressive repression among the Hutus. When he overthrew the monarchy in 1966 he filled the officer corps and ranks of the army with Tutsis. See the United States Institute of Peace, page 20 for more information. https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/resources/collections/commissions/Burundi-Report.pdf

[4] The UPRONA aligned military helped keep the party in power, taking part in "selective genocide," banning Hutu militaries and killing Hutu civilians. The military was not neutral and came to be known as the "mono-ethnic Tutsi army". The repression went on for 15 years and highlighted that the army had an agenda and was not an independent institution. For more information, see Wilén et. al. paper "The Burundian Army's Trajectory to Professionalization and Depoliticization, and Back Again," page 124.

[8] President Ndadaye did his best to create a bi-partisan government. In addition to giving and UPRONA position of Prime Minister, he also granted 33% of the cabinet positions to UPRONA party members, and gave another 33% of cabinet positions to Tutsi members from both UPRONA and FRODEBU. He also appointed two UPRONA provincial governors. For more information, visit the United States Institute of Peace, page 22. https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/resources/collections/commissions/Burundi-Report.pdf

[9] The government's main claim for doing the restriction of the press was to not allow journalists to undermine issues of national security, however, journalists responded stating that they would challenge the issue in court. People who break this law and publish stories regarding any of the forbidden topics can face fines that range from $2,000-6,000, which are much more than the annual salary of most journalists. For more information, read the Reuters article. https://www.reuters.com/article/burundi-rights-idUSL5N0EG3FZ20130604

[10] Many unidentified bodies have been found after arrests made by police or by the National Intelligence Service (SNR) that is headed by someone who reports directly to the President. Imbonerakure allegedly "covers the country" looking for threats and handles them through intimidation. For more information, read the UN News. https://news.un.org/en/story/2018/06/1013292

[11] The Tutsi youth militias are instrumental to the Burundi political landscape. They operate as a cheap and expendable tool for those looking to impose their beliefs on a group of people. Amnesty International, 1995 explains in further detail the role of groups like the Sans Échec, Sans Défaite, Sans Pitié, and Sans Capote within Burundi.

[12] Imbogaraburundi is further expanded upon and Human Rights Watch, 2003. This piece details the ethnic composition of the group and also expands upon their involvement with other rebel groups in Burundi. Prunier, 1995 also explores the role of FRODEBU in Burundi.

[13] Human Rights Watch, 2019 does an excellent job at showing the connection between state officials and non-state domestic actors in Burundi. Specifically this connection is that of Imbonerakure and President Pierre Nkurunziza. This paper situates the non-state actors within the political landscape of Burundi.

[14] Particularly as it relates to police sector reform, DCAF/ISSAT, 2017 examines the role of rebel groups in the composition of the Burundian National Police (PNB). The PNB, established in 2004, included fighters from ex-rebel groups and other branches of the national police force and was comprised of members from both the Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups.

[15] Amnesty International, 1995 goes into further detail about the types of atrocities committed by the FLN in Burundi. It is critical in shedding light on the cycle of violence which is perpetuated by different rebel groups across Burundi. This piece also explores the relationship of the FLN with other African governments such as Rwanda.*

*United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi

The United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi was focused on supporting the Government of Burundi in strengthening the legal frameworks of national institutions, emphasizing the role of justice to build national unity and promote reconciliation. BINUB also worked on creating economic and financial policies that focused on peacebuilding, reducing inequality and advocating for resource mobilization.[1]

African Union Mission in Burundi

The African Union Mission in Burundi was meant to supervise, observe, monitor and verify the implementation of the Arusha Agreement, the ceasefire protocols, and the DDR program in Burundi. The AUNI was largely successful in managing the violent conflict and secured conditions essential to the implementation of the peace and ceasefire agreements, the DDR program, the UN deployment and future political progress and economic development in Burundi.[2]

Arusha Accords (Burundi)

The Arusha Agreement outlined how the political and military powers would be allocated following the conflict. The agreement specifically mandated democratic elections, amendments to the makeup of the National Assembly, as well as judicial and military reforms to aid in reconciliation and long term domestic security.[3]

 

 

[1] The United Nations Office in Burundi (BNUB) was in place from 1 January 2011 until 31 December 2014. Following its closure, the remaining responsibilities have been transferred to the UN Country Team which is tasked with similar roles to the UN Development Assistance Framework. For more information see https://bnub.unmissions.org/mandate.

[2] The mission was organized by the African Union with the supervising troops coming from Ethiopia, Mozambique, and South Africa. It was only active for one year until their responsibilities were taken over by the UN. For more information, see Grant and Hamilton, pages 165-168.

[3]The Arusha Agreement was signed on 28 August 2000 in Arusha, Tanzania and ended the Burundian Civil War. The points of agreement were all subsequently added to the Constitution of Burundi where their influence is still in effect. For more information, see Grant and Hamilton, pages 170-172.*

*Social Cohesion

Tensions between Burundi’s two major ethnic group, Hutu and Tutsi Muslims, have historically been very problematic in the small African nation. The Hutus represent roughly 85% of the population of Burundi whereas the Tutsis represent a mere 14% but are disproportionately represented amongst political and social elites. This salient division has proven challenging to the SSR process. Equal opportunity and representation in various socioeconomic realms is an issue where Tutsis do not want to concede and where Hutus are demanding more. Both groups need to work together and be consulted in conjunction with SSR actors in order to reach a situation where both groups are satisfied. [1]

Arms Reduction

The issue of demilitarization is another key barrier to SSR in Burundi. Estimates of the number of small arms accessible to a large proportion of the population of Burundi suggest that there is roughly “...one AK47 rifle, or equivalent,” available to every family in the nation. This has posed an issue for SSR in Burundi as the ability for the public to act aggressively and lawlessly is still too great for reform to be totally effective. Clearly, further disarmament is required in Burundi in order to reduce the public’s capacity for violence. [2]

Economic Reintegration

The socio-economic viability of Burundi for the average citizen is bleak. In order for the reintegration of refugees and militants into society to be effective, it must be sustainable. The economic opportunity for many of the conflict-affected individuals is actually poorer following the relative calming of violence in Burundi. Upon their return, people who have fled violent persecution in Burundi influx into concentrated areas, increasing the competition for land: a necessary asset to the agrarian economy. Obviously, this increases opportunities for violence and also discourages people from returning, both issues affect the efficacy of the SSR process. [3]

Food Stability

High levels of corruption and all around poor governance have often left the people of Burundi without a reliable source of food relief in times of desperate need. Due to this “failure of political accountability”, many people in Burundi are forced to search elsewhere for more dependable sources of food. Not only does this mean that people are leaving Burundi altogether, but they are also withdrawing to more and more rural areas and becoming less dependent on what little the government provides. This represents a barrier to SSR in that the public is less receptive to authority as a result of their autonomy (in which they have relative security). [4]

 

 

[1] Equal representation between Hutus and Tutsis is critical among the ruling elite in Burundi. The retaliatory attacks by both groups on the ruling elite has helped to promote economic and political instability in the region. In order for SSR to be successful in Burundi, the involvement of both ethnic groups is instrumental. See Burundi by George Barnette for further reading on the issue.

[2] Rule of law is only effective insofar as the public is willing to accept it. Fears of ethnic cleansing in regions of Burundi have instilled within the public a deep seeded distrust of security forces to prevent such atrocities and thus, the public feels secure in remaining armed. Without disarmament, neither group will feel safe enough to lay down their weapons as a confidence-building measure. See Edmonds et al. page 32 for more information.

[3] Even second generation returnees (those born in exile) have fewer economic prospects and report more severe poverty than prior to the outbreak of violence in Burundi. See Sonja Fransen’s chapter “The Concept of Sustainable return” for further insights into the economic issues of reintegration for migrants of Burundi.

As one of the most densely populated countries in Africa, Burundi faces food insecurity issues acutely. The lack of reliance and lack of trust in authority has created a public who is content on remaining somewhat withdrawn from these sorts of figures. Those who attempt the SSR process are confronted with this problem directly. For further information, see Vervesich et al. page 273. *

*Much of the success with Security Sector Reform in Burundi has been a direct result of the campaign to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate the former combatants back into communities in Burundi. Many of the combatants joined their respective fighting groups because they wanted to fight for a cause that was deeply important to them. As a result of that, once the fighting was over, many combatants voluntarily demobilized because the result has essentially been decided. This was a commonly held viewpoint by both ex-CNDD-FDD and ex-FAB members which helped to ease the process of demobilization.[1] While it should not be accepted as a unanimous viewpoint, the majority of Burundian citizens want the elements of ‘peace’ and ‘liberty’ to be present in society. Answers generally referred to a negative peace of the absence of fear and violence. Women, in particular, noted that the remaining presence of small arms caused insecurity.[2] There were widespread concerns with former combatants being responsible for increased crime which depending on location were accurate or fictitious. There have been successes and difficulties with the DDR process but progress is certainly being made on the community level. The issues with the police’s reputation and training show the limitations of the reintegration because while on paper a current police officer might be reintegrated, in reality, there are further barriers to be accurate.

The largest aspect of SSR is the development of a competent police force to keep local communities safe. Lack of trust in the police is prevalent and warranted given the current challenges in maintaining the police force. Many of the police officers are former combatants which have been helpful in reintegrating them into communities but they have received little to no proper training so they are largely unfit to serve in the communities. Corruption is also very prevalent and due to cultural differences, the idea is not widely understood as problematic as it is by many international actors. One noticeable improvement in police forces has been ethnic integration between the Hutus and Tutsis which has helped with reducing ethnic tensions in policing.

A less important group in SSR has been the Burundi military because their job is not local but national defence. The military is largely more supported than the local police because the most accomplished and respected of the former CNDD-FDD and FAB members were put in the military as opposed to the police which has contributed to the perception of the military being more capable than the police force.[3]

As a result of police distrust both at a local level and as a result of the colonial past, people still harbour unfavourable views of police and will choose to deal with securing their communities in other ways. To solve the problem, community members have taken matters into their own hands by delivering justice to accused persons with punishments determined on the local level. This highlights serious shortcomings in the efficacy of the police and serves to undermine the institutions of both the police and the justice system. Some NGOs have stepped in and filled the role of conflict mediator but without an established or widespread justice system which only serves to further delegitimize the local police forces and justice system.[4]

The disarmament aspect is essential to people feeling safe as well as preventing further violence from returning. As we have seen before, there is mixed success with some people voluntarily giving up weapons to aid in the reform while others continue to keep some hidden. Disarmed ex-combatants were frequently included in community policing and security plans which successfully helps with reintegration and community building. The downside is the same as the NGO mediation in that it is still not carried out by police as they are meant to do.

While there has been success with SSR there is a lot to be done and has largely not been effective. There remains a disconnect between the authority and competency of police forces and the communities they are meant to protect. While ethnic tensions have been reduced in policing, many women continue to feel disproportionately unsafe. The lack of communication between the police and citizens can only be improved through continued dialogue, the need for which is evident given the continuation of community-based policing which has several problems. The progress that has been made shows that there needs to be continued work with reintegration and build on the success that has been made on the community level.

 

 

[1]A large number of former combatants had ambitions to give up arms and reintegrate into society but there were too few material or economic incentives to do so. There was a strange balance between combatants wanting a different lifestyle but it was not attainable. For more information, see Willems et al, page 14.

[2]Women faced a greater threat of danger given the large number of small arms still easily available to former combatants. Insecurity for women also came from the lack of development which was responsible for inequality. Women had fewer opportunities to make money and avoid poverty while men sometimes had the option to resume fighting to avoid poverty. For more information, see Willems et al, page 39.

[3]Trust in the police has been a serious concern as reports of former combatants being involved in local criminal activities have served to erode public trust. The military does not have the same public perception problem because of its more professional composition and has fewer day to day interactions with citizens, meaning there are far fewer chances for positive or negative interactions with the military. Citizens first-hand accounts continue to reinforce the notion that public perception takes a long time to change and is affected by social stigma. For more information, see Willems et al, page 38.

[4]As SSR continues to advance in Burundi, the role of NGOs needs to be continually diminishing. The NGOs currently are well respected by the citizens and that respect needs to be gradually transferred to the local institutions. As communities begin to see that former combatants have valuable skills to offer the communities, they will be viewed less as burdens and more so as valued members. For more information, see Willems et al, page 49.*

*Advisory Services and Technical Assistance for Burundi - United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (2005)

http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/E/CHR/resolutions/E-CN_4-RES-2005-75.doc

An Assessment of Armed Violence in Burundi - Geneva Declaration (2009) http://www.genevadeclaration.org/fileadmin/docs/Geneva-Declaration-Armed-Violence-Burundi-EN.pdf

Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi (August 2000) https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/sites/default/files/accords/Arusha_Peace_Accord____.pdf

Burundi Government Forces Closure of UN Human Rights Office - Time (2019)

http://time.com/5545568/burundi-closure-un-rights-office/

Closure of BNUB - United Nations Office in Burundi (March 14, 2017) https://bnub.unmissions.org/closure-bnub

Connecting Community Security and DDR: Experiences from Burundi - Peace Security and Development Network (November 2010) https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/4BBDB2E419277B7D852577D5005A8A9A-Full_Report.pdf

Mines Advisory Group’s Physical Security and Stockpile Management Program - Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (2012)

https://www.gichd.org/fileadmin/GICHD/topics/development/ma_development-2/AVR/AVR-Burundi-MAG-case-study-Sep2012.pdf

Security Sector Reform Monitor No. 1 - Centre of International Governance Innovation (2009) https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/121177/SSRM%20Burundi%20No%201.pdf

Security Sector Reform Monitor No. 2 - Centre of International Governance Innovation (2010) https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/121189/SSRM%20Burundi%20No%202.pdf

Situation of Human Rights in Burundi - United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (2000)

http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/E/CHR/resolutions/E-CN_4-RES-2000-20.doc

There Are Signs of Renewed Ethnic Violence in Burundi - Washington Post (2015)

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2015/12/15/there-are-signs-of-renewed-ethnic-violence-in-burundi/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.14fe6b29b186

*

*Human Rights Watch. Everyday Victims: Civilians in the Burundian War, 22 December 2003.

The central focus of this paper is the role of the FDD and FNL combatants in their conflicts and also in the signing of the Pretoria Protocols. It exposes the violent extortion of Burundi civilians at the hands of both groups and details some of the atrocities committed on both sides of the conflict. Within this is the statement of PA-Amasekanya and their refusal to relent their fight against a government which they perceive as taking part in "a diabolical plan for exterminating the Tutsi." of Burundi. This paper also takes a look at the pursuit of justice by the Burundi government and the lack of substantive action undertaken by it.

International Security Sector Advisory Team. “Burundi SSR Background Note.” International Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT), DCAF/ISSAT, 2017.

This paper examines a broad spectrum of issues as they relate to the SSR process in Burundi. Central to this piece are the “Oversight Bodies” which govern the specific sector reform. Included in this is police reform, defence reform, justice reform, and prison reform, all realms in critical need of some sort of international SSR intervention. This paper situates the ethnic issues of Burundi within the wider realm of African conflict as seen in countries such as Rwanda. In its conclusion, the author takes a look at the future of Burundi and the recent escalation of violence as a call to international intervention in the region.

J.Andrew Grant, Spencer Hamilton. (2016) Norm dynamics and international organizations: South Africa in the African Union and International Criminal Court. Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 54:2, pages 161-185.

This paper looks at the role that South Africa has played in the African Union, specifically in regards to peacekeeping operations in Africa. South Africa was tasked with overseeing the African Union Mission in Burundi and the paper looks at the mission’s interests as they relate to South Africa’s greater interests. The paper provided valuable insight into the work of the AUMB as well as the political ramifications for the signing of The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement. While the course was not about Burundi specifically, the information is still well written and pertains to this project. The paper concludes by assessing the dynamics of South Africa’s commitment to the African Union and International Criminal Court.

Moore, Jina. "Burundi's Leader Can Extend His Term. His African Peer Take Notes." The New York Times, May 17, 2018. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/17/world/africa/burundi   president-nkurunziza-referendum.html?rref=collection%2Ftimestopic%2FBurundi

Moore’s article highlights what the political arena in Burundi looks like today. This article focuses on President Pierre Nkurunziza, who has been Burundi’s longest-serving president. However, not all citizens have like the way he has kept power. He held a referendum that allowed the leader to have longer term lengths and granted him another term. The referendum faced protests in the streets, a failed coup and forced thousands of people to leave the country. Moore’s article highlights that although a lot has been done insofar as SSR and ending the conflict, more has to be done to create power checks and balances among the state’s leaders to fully modernize the country.

Nindorera, Wilen. “Security Sector Reform in Burundi: Issues and Challenges for Improving Civilian Protection.” The North-South Institute, 2007.

This paper was very similar to Powell’s paper insofar as Nindorera believed that security forces were the main issue and catalyst for conflict in Burundi. Nindorera claims that a major issue that the police force was facing was in regards to the views that the citizens of Burundi had towards their behaviour. Nindorera goes so far as claiming that at the peak of the conflict, the military was the “nerve centre of power”, however, the current state of the army is much more subdued and is even viewed positively in the eyes of the public. This paper helped in narrowing down the issues that Burundi had during the conflict, and outlined the steps that they have taken in resolving it.

Powell, Kristina. “Security Sector Reform and the Protection of Civilians in Burundi: Accomplishments, Dilemmas and Ideas for International Engagement .” The North-South Institute, 2007.

Powell’s article delves into the idea that the central way to solve the conflict in Burundi is through Security Sector Reform (SSR). In particular, Powell focusses on how the military and police need a provision in organization, structure and composition that will make the security forces act in a professional manner and adhere to human rights norms to provide security to all Burundians, regardless of their ethnic make-up. She also discusses how the governments of both Tanzania and South Africa, as well as the Organization of African Unity, have taken on proactive roles to mitigate the Burundian conflict. She ends the paper by stating that although a lot has been done in Burundi insofar as reform, there are still areas for improvement, such as better coordination of the police and the continuation of civilian disarmament.

Willems, R.C. & Kleingeld, J & Van Leeuwen, Mathijs. (2010). Connecting Community Security and DDR: Experiences from Burundi.

The report is the result of ten weeks of field work done by the Peace Security and Development Network (PSDN) working group on community security and community-based Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR). The majority of the information came from interviews of locals who had DDR taking place in their communities. The report specifically examines the successes and failures of the DDR in the specific areas of security, judicial reform, and political reform. The report serves an important role in increasing understanding of how effective the people of Burundi perceive the reforms to be. In conclusion, the report explains why for the most part the reforms have been unsuccessful and gives recommendations for all sectors on how to continue improving Burundi. *

* Amnesty International, Burundi: Struggle for survival: Immediate action vital to stop killings, 1 July 1995, AFR 16/07/1995.

"Amnesty International Report 1994 - Burundi." Amnesty International, 1994. https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a9fc3c.html

Barnette, George A. “Burundi.” SAGE Knowledge: Encyclopedia of Social Networks, 2011.

"Burundi (1962-Present)." University of Central Arkansas. https://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/sub-saharan-africa-region/burundi-1962-present/

“Burundi.” CARE. 2017. https://www.care.org/country.burundi

"Burundi Enacts Media Law that Reporters say Curbs Press Freedom."  Reuters, June 4, 2013. https://www.reuters.com/article/burundi-rights-idUSL5N0EG3FZ20130604

"Burundi's Government Boycotts Peace Talks." Africa News, October 30, 2018.  https://www.africanews.com/2018/10/30/burundi-government-boycotts-peace-talks/

“Burundi.” International Criminal Court/Cour Penale Internationale (ICC/CPI).2017.

“Burundi Profile - Timeline.” BBC News, BBC, 3 Dec. 2018. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13087604

“Burundi SSR Background Note.” International Security Sector Advisory Team, 2017,https://issat.dcaf.ch/Learn/Resource-Library/Country-Profiles/Burundi-SSR-Background-Note#general%20overview

“Burundi: UN Rights Office Forced to Close.” Time, Time, 6 Mar. 2019.

Edmonds, Martin, Greg Mills, and Terence McNamee. "Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and Local Ownership in the Great Lakes: The Experience of Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of Congo." African Security, vol. 2, no. 1, 2009, pp. 29-58. p.32

Fransen, Sonja. "The Socio‐Economic Sustainability of Refugee Return: Insights from Burundi." Population, Space and Place, vol. 23, no. 1, 2017.

Gladstone, Rick, and Simons, Marlise. “We're Not Done Yet, Hague Court Tells Burundi's Leaders.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 9 Nov. 2017.

Human Rights Watch, Everyday Victims: Civilians in the Burundian War, 22 December 2003.

"International Commission of Inquiry for Burundi: Final Report." United States Institute of Peace, 2004, pp. 1-67. https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/resources/collections/commissions/Burundi-Report.pdf 

“Integrating Gender into Security Sector Reform in Burundi.” International Alert, 2011. https://www.international-alert.org/news/integrating-gender-security-sector-reform-burundi

International Security Sector Advisory Team. “Burundi SSR Background Note.” International Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT), DCAF/ISSAT, 2017

J. Andrew Grant, Spencer Hamilton. (2016) Norm dynamics and international organizations: South Africa in the African Union and International Criminal Court. Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 54:2, pages 161-185.

Lemarchand, René. "The Burundi Killings of 1972." Online Encyclopedia of Mass Violence: Sciences Po, 1996. http://migs.concordia.ca/documents/The-Burundi-Killings-of-1972Lemarchand.pdf

Moore, Jina. "Burundi's Leader Can Extend His Term. His African Peer Take Notes." The New York Times, May 17, 2018. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/17/world/africa/burundi-president-nkurunziza-referendum.html?rref=collection%2Ftimestopic%2FBurundi

Nantulya, Paul. "Burundi: Why the Arusha Accords are Central." Africa Centre for Strategic Studies, 2015. https://africacenter.org/spotlight/burundi-why-the-arusha-accords-are-central/

Nindorera, Wilen. “Security Sector Reform in Burundi: Issues and Challenges for Improving Civilian Protection.” The North-South Institute, 2007.

"Opponents of Constitutional Change in Burundi Face Torture and Execution: UN Investigates." UN News, June 27, 2018.  https://news.un.org/en/story/2018/06/1013292

Peace Accords Matrix (Date of retrieval: (03/21/2019),https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/accord/arusha-peace-and-reconciliation-agreement-burundi,Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame.

“People and Corruption: African Survey 2015” Transparency International, 2015, https://www.corruptionwatch.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Africa-survey-2015-Global-Corruption-Barometer.pdf

Powell, Kristina. “Security Sector Reform and the Protection of Civilians in Burundi: Accomplishments, Dilemmas and Ideas for International Engagement .” The North-South Institute, 2007.

Prunier, Gerard. “Burundi: Descent Into Chaos or a Manageable Crisis?”, Writenet. 1 March 1995.

Sparks, Karen. “Melchior Ndadaye.” Encyclopædia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., 24 Mar. 2019.

“The World Factbook: Burundi.” Central Intelligence Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, 1 Feb. 2018.

“Thousands Fleeing Burundi.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 31 Mar. 1995.

“Two African Presidents Are Killed in Plane Crash.” The Washington Post, WP Company, 1994.

U.N. Security Council. Pretoria Protocols. United Nations Security Council, 2003.

Wilén, Nina et. al. "The Burundian Army's Trajectory to Professionalization and Depoliticization, and Back Again." Journal of Eastern African Studies, vol. 12, no.1, pp. 120-135.

Wilen, Nina. “Security Sector Reform, Gender and Local Narratives in Burundi.” Conflict, Security & Development, vol. 14, no. 3, 2014, pp. 331-354.*

• One main issue being address by SSR is in the defence sector where there were functionally three armies. The Republika Srpska had its own army, while the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina was divided into a Bosniak force and a Croat force (Marijan, “Orthodox” 11). The internationally-led SSR has created one unified - albeit still ethnically divided - state army to bring Bosnia more in-line with other sovereign states and to reduce the likelihood of re-emerging infighting.
• The police force was also divided along ethnic lines and was too large for a country at peace (Vandemoortele 202). Many police officers were not adequately trained or equipped, and the police force was heavily politicized (Vandemoortele 202). There is low citizen trust of the police force due to the atrocities committed during the war, given that an estimated 70% of which were perpetrated by the police, an issue that needs to be addressed in order to ensure cohesion between the police and citizens (Marijan, “Orthodox” 13).
• Sub-state level judicial structures had to be replaced with more centralized state judiciary institutions for successful judicial reform (Marijan, “Orthodox” 11). Even the process of lawmaking was significantly decentralized to the cantons, and needed to me unified along the state level (Marijan, “Orthodox” 16). Political interference in, and political appointees to the judiciary is still a significant problem that persists (Marijan, “Orthodox” 16).
• The creation of a state border service was also a priority, as none existed in Bosnia before SSR, with competency for border police split between the two main policing forces (Marijan, “Orthodox” 14). Bosnia's 1600km porous border was easily crossable by organized crime groups at any of the over 400 known illegal crossing points (Hills 191). Border security that targets illegal immigration and trafficking from Bosnia to other parts of Europe is now a top priority for international actors (Hills 192).
  

• Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina
  • Ministry of Defence of BiH
    • Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina (OSBiH)
  • Ministry of Human Rights and Refugees of BiH
  • Police
    • Border Police of Bosnia and Herzegovina
    • the State Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA)
• Bosnian Serbs (Muslim majority, Bosniaks)
• Catholic Croats
• Orthodox Serbs
  • Army of Republika Srpska (VRS): The Serb secessionist army that perpetrated the 1995 Srebrenica Massacre among other crimes. In 2006 it was integrated into the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Gaub 324).
• Civil Societies:
  • Žene Ženama: Women's rights, empowerment, and advocacy NGO that focuses on education, social rights, security, peace, and gender equality (Bećirević, Šulc, and Šoštarić, 3).
  • Atlantic Initiative (in Bosnia and Herzegovina): Established in 2009, AI conducts security and justice policy research and promotes open and informed debate (Bećirević, Šulc, and Šoštarić, 3).
  • Žene sa Une: The civil society organisation that seeks to ensure democracy, human rights protection, the elimination of prejudice, and equal opportunities for marginalized groups, with a specific focus on vulnerable women and children (Žene sa Une).
  • INFOTEKA: The voluntary and independent civil society organisation that focuses on improving the quality of life of women and children in Bosnia by guaranteeing the constitutional rights set in the Law on Gender Equality of Bosnia & Herzegovina (FundsforNGOs).

• Yugoslav Army: de facto controller of the Bosnian Serb Army (Burg 191).
• United Nations (UN)
  • United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR); United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR): Assisted in peacekeeping duties such as arranging ceasefires and assisting in the delivery of humanitarian aid. There were 23,000 troops by April 1994 (Burg 146).
  • International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY): Established by the UN in 1993, the ICTY holds those most accountable for the atrocious crimes that took place during the conflicts in the Balkans in the 1990’s (ICTY).
• European Union (EU)
  • European Commission; European Union Force Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR): Supports the collective and combined training of the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina and supports them in achieving NATO standards (About EUFOR).
  • European Union Special Representative (EUSR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Mandated by the Council of the European Union to reinforce EU’s policy objectives in Bosnia. Offers advice and facilitation support to institutions at all levels to ensure European political priorities are secured, particularly for the rule of law and Security Sector Reform. Responsible for EU communication in Bosnia (EUROPA).
• North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO): Gradually disarmed both sides and enforced the Dayton peace agreement, primarily through SFOR: the NATO-led Stability Force operation (Burg 145).
• Office of the High Representative (OHR): Created to oversee Bosnian institutions and nation-building efforts. Intervened to resolve deadlock between ethnic groups, to remove obstructive officials, and to enforce controversial legislation (Dobbins et al. 138).
• International Police Task Force (IPTF): Created by the Dayton Accords, the IPTF examined officers from 1996-2002 and banned 793 of 18 000 police officers (Burg 147).
• Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF): Assists states in developing laws, institutions, policies, and practices to improve security sector governance (Gender and Security Sector Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina).
• Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) mission in Bosnia: Undertakes arms control, SSR, war crimes processing, political and educational reform, gender equality initiatives, good governance policies, media reform, civil society support, and human rights initiatives. Its principle aim is to promote regional stability and reconciliation alongside political, economic, and social integration. (The OSCE is a global organisation for regional security consisting of over 57 states from North America, Europe, and Asia) (What We Do).

• There are too many international actors with differing goals and ideas involved in the SSR process who are often pursuing different policies (Marijan, “Orthodox SSR” 10, 12). International actors also present solutions and requirements to the local populations without much meaningful consultation, leading to local resentment and resistance (Marijan, “Second Generation” 9).
• Reformists, in an attempt to reform rather than remake security institutions, must also contend with the low citizen trust of the existing security institutions (Marijan, “Orthodox” 11). This is compounded by the perceived and real interference in the reform process by rampant organized crime, Bosnian elites, and local political parties fighting for their own interests (Marijan, “Orthodox” 12; ISSAT).
• The most severe challenge to the SSR process in Bosnia is the continued ethnic tension between Croats, Bosniaks and Serbs (Marijan, “Orthodox” 12). This essential issue permeates every aspect of the security sector, as the atrocities committed during the war contribute to their insecurity, resulting in the communities seeking to ensure their own security (via security services) over that of the others. It also prompts demographic and power-sharing fears in institutions like in the judiciary sector (Marijan, “Orthodox” 19). Reconciliation is absolutely necessary to overcome the distrust, anger, and hatred between Bosnia's three main ethnic communities.
• The lack of a strong centralized government is a problem that is compounded by Republika Srpska's resistance to reforms and its insistence on maintaining its independence and security, especially with its focus on maintaining its own justice system and army (ISSAT; Marijan, “Orthodox” 19). This is compounded by the international community’s self-inflicted obstacles, including the fact that the new constitution - written up as part of the Dayton Accords - does not mention state control of the security sector and even reinforces the rights of the various armies to provide security for their citizens (Marijan, “Orthodox” 12).

Following the conflict and genocide in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the UN and later the EU and NATO established various programs of Security Sector Reform (SSR) to strengthen justice and security institutions with the aim of protecting the rights of all citizens while building trust, promoting social cohesion, and ensuring economic welfare (“Security Sector Reform”). Yet to this day, the SSR process remains incomplete in Bosnia. This essay will analyse the effectiveness of SSR in the defence, policing, and judicial sectors. This analysis argues that despite some success, Security Sector Reform in Bosnia was somewhat ineffective because critical institutions were undermined by corruption and political manipulation, and due to a lack of local will, trust, consultation and participation.

Following international intervention in the Bosnian conflict, the EU spearheaded efforts for SSR to bring Bosnia more in line with other European states in terms of institutions and governance structures. Many top-down reforms were designed and implemented by the imposing international presence with minimal local input (Marijan, “Orthodox” 7). A continuous stream of international aid has slowly been diminishing as donors have become pessimistic about Bosnia’s future (Pasic). Bosnia is one of the poorest countries in the region, with high unemployment, low salaries, and a weak economy, exacerbated by rampant corruption (Marijan, “Orthodox” 31). Very few locals understand the SSR process, and it has produced uneven results across different sectors (Marijan, “Orthodox” 31).

The SSR process in Bosnia was effective in certain sectors, especially in the defence sector. There have been a number of successes within the defence sector, including successful military downsizing while maintaining a reasonable ratio of ethnic representation within it, despite the disproportionate male-to-female ratio (Marijan, “Orthodox” 28). Also, there has been much emphasis on overcoming military division resulting from the conflict (Vetschera and Damian 28), but more needs to be done since battalions are still based on ethnicity, which can easily result in the dissolution of their integration (Marijan, “Second Generation” 27). As for the security sector, the Ministry of Security has reported a reduction in crime, although hate crimes appear to persist and are underreported (Marijan, “Orthodox” 27-28). Post-war stability is also an overlooked achievement (Marijan, “Orthodox” 27). In terms of the judiciary sector, judges are now well paid, thus curbing albeit not halting corruption (Marijan, “Orthodox” 29). In the police sector, the border police appear to be quite efficient, despite the complaints of mistreatment and a lack of due process (Marijan, “Orthodox” 29). Thus, SSR has great potential to rebuild and centralize Bosnia’s critical infrastructure to reduce corruption and to ensure peace.

Despite these successes, the SSR process in Bosnia had many more shortcomings and failures. It is a short-term reform system that has lacked institutional coherence, adequate capabilities and expertise, and local ownership (Juncos 96). Its top-down approach neglects local agency (Juncos 96) and lacks transparency (Marijan, “Second Generation” 26). The EU has been criticized for enabling Bosnia’s overreliance on international funds as a political tactic to coerce the country into EU membership (Marijan, “Orthodox” 7). Thus, positive peace cannot be ensured with the current model of SSR if the public good in Bosnia is not prioritized, especially for the long-term. Reforms have also been slow as they have been resisted and reversed by self-interested local political elites (Juncos 95) as well as certain locals who despite the limitations that liberal peacebuilding imposes on their sovereignty (Juncos 98-102). In fact, since the institutions are still fragile, any liberal institutional reforms are more likely to fail due to a lack of general acceptance and solid foundations.

More specifically, the security sector suffers from weak oversight and accountability, with many members of the security force suspected of being corrupt (Juncos 101). The judiciary sector is fraught with corruption, and while indictments of corruption have increased, prosecutions have decreased, demonstrating the lasting institutional flaws and undermined public confidence resulting from poor SSR (Marijan, “Orthodox” 28). The police are still seen as  political instruments to be used by various ethnic groups rather than as impartial enforcers of the law (Juncos 101). In addition, political parties have great influence within the police hierarchy (Juncos 101). This inability to prevent political intervention has weakened police oversight capacity (Marijan, “Orthodox” 30). Furthermore, abuse of power among police is common, resulting in prisoners who suffer from overcrowding and a lack of resources and support staff (Marijan, “Orthodox” 29).

In summary, there has been progress within the security reform in Bosnia, yet challenges persist in building strong and coordinated institutions. While Bosnia is stable, high levels of corruption, unemployment, and ethnic distrust coupled with political interference undermine the goals of SSR.  After twenty years of over-reliance on international support with few incentives for the elites to allow for effective change, Bosnia's population has become disenchanted with reform, making the prospect of sustainable reform highly unlikely in the short-term.

“Bosnia: Army Lieutenant General Patrick Hughes Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Senate Armed Services Committee.” 1996 Congressional hearings Intelligence and Security, 1 Aug. 1996, www.fas.org/irp/congress/1996_hr/s960801h.htm.

“Dayton Peace Agreement.” Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, 14 Dec. 1995, www.osce.org/bih/126173.

“Decisions Taken at the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Permanent Session.” North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, 9 Feb. 1994, www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c940209a.htm.

“Dragan Obrenović: Guilty Plea Statement”, United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Uploaded by ICTY, 30 Oct. 2003, www.icty.org/en/content/dragan-obrenović.

“The Prosecutor of the Tribunal Against Radovan Karadzic Ratko Mladic.” The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, case no. : IT-95-18-I, 14 Nov. 1995, www.icty.org/x/cases/mladic/ind/en/kar-ii951116e.pdf.

“The Prosecutor of the Tribunal Against Radovan Karadzic Ratko Mladic.” The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, case no. :IT-95-5-I, Jul. 1995, www.icty.org/x/cases/mladic/ind/en/kar-ii950724e.pdf.

“Radislav Krstic becomes the First Person to be Convicted of Genocide at the ICTY and is Sentenced to 46 Years Imprisonment.” United Nations: International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 2 Aug. 2001, www.icty.org/sid/7964.

“Removal from Office of Nikola Poplasen.” Office of the High Representative, 3 May 1999, www.ohr.int/?p=55123.

“Resolution 827.” United Nations Security Council Resolutions, 25 May 1993, www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Statute/statute_827_1993_en.pdf.

“Selected Reports of the Secretary General.” United Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina: United Nations Documents, 1995-2002, www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unmibh/unmibhDrp.htm.

“Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, of the other part.” European Communities, No. 4, 16 June 2008, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/228868/7743.pdf.

“25th Report by the High Representative for Implementation of the Peace Agreement to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.” Office of the High Representative, 3 Mar. 2003, http://www.ohr.int/?p=46419.

 

Hills, A. “Crossing Boundaries: State Border Services and the Multidimensional Nature of Security.” Bosnian Security After Dayton, edited by Michael A. Innes, 1st ed., Routledge, 2006, pp. 191-208.

Alice Hills is a professor in conflict studies at Durham University, specialising in police development, post-conflict policing and sub-state security. This chapter is part of a collection of chapters by leading scholars on SSR in Bosnia after the Dayton Accords. This chapter deals with the complexities of arranging border security in Bosnia and Herzegovina given that it was once part of the former Yugoslavia, facing regional cynicism and international pressure riven by internal divisions. Hills concludes - with reference to Bosnia’s State Border Service - that Bosnian security is based on competing assumptions, social realities, and functional necessities operating within a security space. This conceptualisation raises questions over the boundaries of Bosnia as a political community and the interactions between national, regional, and international security actors.

 

Marijan, Branka. “Assessing the Impact of Orthodox Security Sector Reform in Bosnia-Herzegovina.” Centre for Security Governance, no. 9, Fall 2016, pp. 1-57. secgovcentre.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Assessing_Orthodox_SSR_in_Bosnia_Sept_2016.pdf. Accessed 15 Mar. 2019.

Dr. Branka Marijan specialises in security sector reform and peacebuilding research and is a Program Officer at Project Ploughshares in Waterloo, Ontario. Her paper acknowledges the necessity of international actors designing and enacting SSR due to a lack of local consensus, but challenges the sustainability of such policies due to the continuation of competing local views. Furthermore, it analyses the misappropriation of the SSR process by international actors who use it as a tool of Europeanisation and centralisation, jeopardising and politicising current and future reforms, particularly in the judicial and police sectors. This paper is not only useful in understanding the specifics of the shortcomings of the ongoing SSR in Bosnia but also in evaluating the problems associated with orthodox norms and principles.

 

Marijan, Branka. “The Gradual Emergence of Second Generation Security Sector Reform in Bosnia-Herzegovina.” Centre for Security Governance, no. 13, Winter 2017, pp. 1-33.  secgovcentre.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Second-Generation-SSR-in-Bosnia-Herzegovina-January-2017.pdf.

Dr. Branka Marijan specialises in security sector reform and peacebuilding research and is a Program Officer at Project Ploughshares in Waterloo, Ontario. This article explores the still nascent bottom-up, second-generation SSR in response to concerns over the sustainability of top-down, internationally driven SSR processes.  The article proposes some possible entry points to develop second-generation SSR which has been sidelined due to the politicisation of SSR in Bosnia and due to a lack of local political will. These proposals include community policing and wider civil society engagement as well a focus on working within existing political frameworks instead of using SSR as a political tool.

 

Juncos, Ana E. “EU Security Sector Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Reform or Resist?.” Contemporary Security Policy, vol. 39, no. 1, 2017, pp. 95-118, doi: 10.1080/13523260.2017.1391625

This article is by Ana Juncos from the School of Sociology, Politics and International Studies at Bristol, whose area of expertise is in European Union politics. In her analysis of security sector reform in Bosnia, Juncos moves away from the traditional dichotomy of international and local actors and seeks to analyse the power relations between the two. Taking a Foucauldian approach, SSR is viewed as an expression of neoliberal rationalities and the paradoxical power relations are broken into four categories of counter-conduct (struggle against governance); upholding European standards, using the local ownership trap, simulating reforms, and lowering the bar. This article adds to SSR literature by unveiling the impact of variable resistance by local actors on EU policies, enabling a more nuanced review of the shortcomings of SSR policies.

 

Padurariu, A. “The Implementation of Police Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Analysing UN and EU efforts.” Stability: International Journal of Security and Development, vol. 3, no. 1, doi: http://doi.org/10.5334/sta.db.

Amelia Padurariu is an Associate Research Fellow at the Free University of Brussels, specialising in the implementation of police reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina and is also a policy analyst at the European Commission. This article analyses the role of international actors - particularly the EU and UN - in implementing police reform. It explores the reasons for which the process remains unfinished by analysing the police force before and after the conflict, including the consequences of UN and EU policies. Padurariu concludes that for police reform to have long-term success, the EU must pay attention to local politics which present the majority of obstacles for institution-building via budgetary controls as well as the staffing and director appointment choices for newly created institutions.

 

 Slobodan, Perdan. “Security Sector Reform: The building of security in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Conflict, Security & Development, vol. 6, no. 2, 2006, pp. 179-209, doi: 10.1080/14678800600739226.

Perdan Slobodan is an independent researcher based in the United Kingdom who has published on development issues, security, and development in South Eastern Europe. This article assesses the success of SSR in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Slobodan argues that despite success in the main objectives of SSR, new security risks have been created inadvertently, raising the questions of whether Bosnia’s security has truly been enhanced due to the SSR processes. Slobodan identifies the lack of local ownership and the Dayton constitutional arrangements as the primary hindrances for further progress in SSR and concludes that Bosnia will remain a weak and marginalized country until these two issues are addressed. This will enable Bosnia to overcome insecurity, internal divisions and adversity.

 

Vandermoortele, Antoine. “Adaptation, Resistance and a (Re)turn to Functionalism: The Case of the Bosnian Police Restructuring Process (2003–2008).” European Security, vol. 21, no. 2. 2012, pp. 202-218, doi: 10.1080/09662839.2012.665884.

Antoine Vandremoortele, from the department of Social and Political Studies at the European University Institute critically analyses the police reform undertaken in Bosnia from 2003-2008. A major area of concern at the end of the war was the twofold problem with the police force; firstly, there was a practical lack of competencies and organisation, and secondly, the politicisation of the force existed along ethnic divisions. Vandremoortele suggests that while the design was the result of EU and UN preferences, the outcomes were influenced by local preferences coupled with the EU’s inability to adapt to local resistance. Vandermoortele describes this compromise that resulted in two new coordination laws as muddling through dynamics. This analysis aids in understanding the representations of actors and their different strategies of adaptation and resistance, providing a preliminary framework for review of current SSR policies.

 

Vetschera, Heinz, and Matthieu Damian. “Security Sector Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina: The Role of the International Community.” International Peacekeeping, vol. 13, no. 1, Summer 2006, pp. 28-42. Taylor & Francis, doi: 10.1080/13533310500424694

Dr. Heinz Vetschera was part of the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1996-1997 and 2002-2003, was a member of the Defence Reform Commission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and holds various other defence and security sector positions. Matthieu Damian is a PhD candidate currently working at Ecole de la Paix in Grenoble.  The article focuses on defence reforms undertaken since 2002. Firstly, the authors make an argument for the necessity of addressing defence reform early in the SSR process, citing the de facto military division resulting in two armies in Bosnia and Herzegovina as a result of a failure to adequately address defence issues.  The article concludes that defence reform was too focused on merging the two armies at the expense of understanding the local resistance who feared the loss of perceived sovereignty. This article is relevant to understanding how to better balance international objectives and expertise with local values, sensitivities, and perceptions through consultation.

“About EUFOR.” European Union Force in BiH: Operation Althea, www.euforbih.org/eufor/index.php/about-eufor/background. Accessed 27 Mar. 2019.

"About the ICTY." International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, www.icty.org/en/about. Accessed 19 Mar. 2019.

Bećirević, Majda, Željka Šulc, and Maja Šoštarić. “Gender and Security Sector Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina.” DCAF, 2011, www.dcaf.ch/sites/default/files/publications/documents/2011_12_07_Gender%20and%20Security%20Sector%20Reform.pdf.

“Bosnia and Herzegovina SSR Background Note.” International Security Advisory Team: Democratic Control of Armed Forces, www.issat.dcaf.ch. Accessed 20. Mar. 2019.

Burg, Steven L., and Paul S. Shoup. Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention: Crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1990-93. New York, Routledge, 1999.

“Delegation of the European Union to Bosnia and Herzegovina & European Special Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina.” European Union, www.europa.ba. Accessed 28 Mar. 2019.

Dobbins, J. Jones, S. G., Crane, K., Chivvis, C. S., Raddin, A., Larrabee, F. S., Bensahel, N., Stearns, B. K., and Goldsmith, B. W. “Bosnia.” Europe’s Role in Nation-building: From the Balkans to the Congo. Rand Corporation, 2008, pp. 139-172.

“Dobro Došli na Web Stranicu Udruženja, Žene sa Une.” Žene sa Une, www.zenesaune.org/. Accessed 19 Mar. 2019.

Gaub, Florence. Military Integration after Civil Wars: Multiethnic Armies, Identity and Post-Conflict Reconstruction. New York, Routledge, 2011.

“Gender and Security Sector Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina.” Democratic Control of Armed Forces, www.dcaf.ch/sites/default/files/publications/documents/2011_12_07_Gender%20and%20Security%20Sector%20Reform.pdf. Accessed 28 Mar. 2019.

"INFOTEKA – Women’s Information and Documentation Center." FundsforNGOs, www.fundsforngos.org/all-listings/infoteka-womens-information-and-documentation-center/. Accessed 19 Mar. 2019.

Juncos, Ana E. “EU Security Sector Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Reform or Resist?.” Contemporary Security Policy, vol. 39, no. 1, Winter 2017, pp. 95-118. Taylor & Francis, doi:10.1080/13523260.2017.1391625

Marijan, Branka. “Assessing the Impact of Orthodox Security Sector Reform in Bosnia-Herzegovina.” Centre for Security Governance, no. 9, Fall 2016, pp. 1-57. secgovcentre.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Assessing_Orthodox_SSR_in_Bosnia_Sept_2016.pdf. Accessed 15 Mar. 2019.

Marijan, Branka. “The Gradual Emergence of Second Generation Security Sector Reform in Bosnia-Herzegovina.” Centre for Security Governance, no. 13, Winter 2017, pp. 1-33. secgovcentre.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Second-Generation-SSR-in-Bosnia-Herzegovina-January-2017.pdf. Accessed 15 Mar. 2019.

Pasic, Lana. “Bosnia’s Vast Foreign Financial Assistance Re-examined: Statistics and Results.” Balkananalysis.com, www.balkanalysis.com/bosnia/2011/06/21/bosnia%E2%80%99s-vast-foreign-financial-assistance-re-examined-statistics-and-results/. Accessed 19 Mar. 2019.

“Security Sector Reform (SSR).” United Nations and the Rule of Law. www.un.org/ruleoflaw/thematic-areas/access-to-justice-and-rule-of-law-institutions/ssr/. Accessed 15 Mar. 2019.

Vetschera, Heinz, and Matthieu Damian. “Security Sector Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina: The Role of the International Community.” International Peacekeeping, vol. 13, no. 1, Summer 2006, pp. 28-42. Taylor & Francis, doi: 10.1080/13533310500424694

“What We Do.” Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, www.osce.org/mission-to-bosnia-and-herzegovina/what-we-do. Accessed 28 Mar, 2019.

Wiebes, Cees. Intelligence and the War in Bosnia, 1992-1995: Volume 1 of studies in intelligence history. New Jersey, LIT Verlag, 2003. ISBN 9783825863470

Opium

Opium is a high value cash crop, which has been used by various organizations – including the Taliban – to fund insurgencies. A depressed economy, ineffective rule of law, corruption, and overall failure to alter incentives led to an 87% increase in estimated total opium production from 2016 to 2017[i]. Cultivation poses unique threats to security sector reforms as it funds illegitimate actors who may erode peacebuilding efforts. The production and trafficking of illicit substances impacts rule of law, and therefore legitimacy of governing power if existing regulations cannot be enforced. Transnational criminal networks and insurgencies both contribute to instability and corruption within societal apparatuses[ii], including the security sector. Other economic opportunities must be presented to rural households lift them up out of the black-market shadow economy. Majority of counter-narcotics policy is derived from international donors[iii], but going forward there must be a transition towards Afghan independence for a sustainable reduction. Addressing economic opportunities through positive peace initiatives may help decrease the reliance on opium production and trade. Increasing equality and standards of living reduces incentives to participate in the narcotics business.

Illiteracy

Only 31% of the Afghan population is literate[iv], which poses significant challenges to training of security personnel and their effectiveness during duty. Literacy is a necessary tool for proper enforcement of security by the police and military. Individuals are hampered by their inability to read documents, write notes, or even navigate using street signs. Literate forces are easier to train and command[v]. Additionally, they may better understand the rule of law and safeguard against corruption as they are able to count and keep track of resources and their pay. Illiteracy may be compounding the problems with insecurity, crime, and the opium trade. A literate population could potentially find other economic opportunities and reduce the rates of opium trafficking and production. Literacy can help addressed structural problems. It may help create a viable economic, political, and judicial structure for Afghanistan[vi] that would uphold fair and effective rule of law once international actors exit the region. So far the United States has funded literacy programs in the Afghan police and army ($200M USD 2014) with the aim to bring individuals to a third grade reading, writing, and arithmetic; however, funding jurisdiction has seen shifted to NATO[vii]. Increasing literacy may help address structural violence such as equality of opportunity

Lack of belief in the state’s monopoly on power

To establish, consolidate, and transfer control there must be a belief in the state’s monopoly on power if there is to be increasing stability and security. Without negative peace, it is difficult to achieve positive peace as actors are unable to effectively run operations to address structural violence. Justice and rule of law needs to be expanded across all of Afghanistan. Authorized coercive power has been accused of not upholding the rule of law and nor does it solely belong to the state apparatus. It may contribute to the questioning of governing and/or security legitimacy.

“Strong Man” Militias

Local militias have been legitimized and incorporated into official Afghan forces. The Afghan Local Police (ALP) gave state authorization to irregular civilian military forces amid on-going insurgencies[viii]. The ALP is inexpensive, but dangerous and inadequately trained by the joint Afghan-American-British forces. Militias are a threat to rule of law and stability, potentially prolonging conflict. Those that emerge spontaneously tend to perform the least abuses towards communities; however, the more governing powers attempt to restrain and control militias – which is seen through their authorization in Afghanistan – their detrimental effects multiple in terms of long-term stability and governing political legitimacy[ix]. The ALP has been accused of serious human rights violations, abuses of civilians, and sexual assault of young boys[x]. Unit commanders in Rahimullah and Abdullah have been documented extorting communities, assaulting, and sometimes killing those who do not conform to their demands[xi]. Communities no longer trust or believe in the ALP. They are viewed as abusive forces authorized by the Afghan government seen through a simple patch stitched to their jackets.

Private Military Contractors (PMCs)

Additional agendas are factored into the shaping and understanding of national interest, threats, and security when legitimate force is outsourced. PMCs may erode “the political, cultural, and symbolic foundation of states’ authority regarding the use of force”[xii]. Privatizing state functions may be a threat to accountability, transparency, and democratic principles as there is a shift away from public to private governance. Private Military Contractors (PMCs) are difficult to be held accountable for crimes, alienates local populations[xiii], and are therefore undermining efforts towards SSR.

Lack of Cohesion

 There are a multitude of Afghan security forces, except there is little cooperation and oversight between the organizations. Quick ‘band-aid’ solutions have been the go-to as encouraged by international actors. This led to the creation of interim forces, like the ALP, who have been accused of abuses, yet have become semi-permeant institutions. The Afghan National Army (ANA), Afghan National Police (ANP), Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), and the Afghan Public Police Force (APPF) all have different directives to fill security gaps; however, they have difficulties effectively working together. It is compounded by discrepancies in training tactics as they have been under the oversight of different international actors. For example, US forces trained the ANA, joint US-UK oversaw the ALP, and the ANP was under the directive of Germany. Additionally, International actors struggled at times to cooperate. ANP reform shifted to under US control as they accused Germany of favouring literate police officers. Germany focused on extensive training for few police while the United States opted to train more individuals but less extensively[xiv]. Depending on the timeframe and region police officers received very different training. It has generated an unstable and at times confusing security force that is unable to effectively control internal territory or borders.

___________________________________________________________________________________________________

[i] Felbab-Brown, Vanda. "Afghanistan's Opium Production Is through the Roof-why Washington Shouldn't Overreact." Brookings. November 21, 2017. Accessed March 28, 2019. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2017/11/21/afghanistans-opium-production-is-through-the-roof-why-washington-shouldnt-overreact/.

[ii] Kamminga, Jorrit. "From Disengagement to Regional Opium War? Towards a Counter-Narcotics Surge in Afghanistan and Pakistan." UNISCI Discussion Papers 29 (2012): 101. http://revistas.ucm.es/index.php/UNIS/article/view/40662/38984.

[iii] Kamminga, “From Disengagement to Regional Opium War”, 91.

[iv] "Enhancement of Literacy in Afghanistan (ELA) Programme." United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. 2017. Accessed March 24, 2019. http://www.unesco.org/new/en/kabul/education/youth-and-adult-education/enhancement-of-literacy-in-afghanistan-iii/.

[v] Younossi, Obaid, Peter Dahl, Thruelsen Jonathan, Vaccaro Jerry M. Sollinger, and Brian Grady. “The Long March Building an Afghan National Army.” The National Defense Research Institute (2009): 18. https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG845.pdf

[vi] The World Literacy Foundation “The Economic & Social Cost of Illiteracy: A snapshot of illiteracy in a global context.” August 24, 2015. Available from https://worldliteracyfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/WLF-FINAL-ECONOMIC-REPORT.pdf

[vii] Graham-Harrison, Emma. "Illiteracy Persists among Afghan Troops despite US Education Drive." The Guardian. January 28, 2014. Accessed March 30, 2019. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/28/illiteracy-afghan-troops-us-education.

[viii] The Future of the Afghan Local Police. Asia Report no. 268. June 5, 2015. Accessed March 29, 2019: 1. https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/future-afghan-local-police.

[ix] Felbab-Brown, Vanda. "Hurray for Militias? Not so fast: Lessons from the Afghan Local Police experience." Small Wars & Insurgencies 2, no. 2 (2016): 260. https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2015.1129169.

[x] Mashal, Mujib. "U.S. Plan for New Afghan Force Revives Fears of Militia Abuses." The New York Times. September 15, 2017. Accessed March 30, 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/15/world/asia/afghan-local-police.html.

[xi] Felbab-Brown, “Hurray for Militias”, 264

[xii] Petersohn, Ulrich. “Outsourcing the Big Stick: The Consequences of Using Private Military Companies.” Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University. July 25, (2015): 2. Available from: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228396821_Outsourcing_the_Big_Stick_The_Consequences_of_Using_Private_Military_Companies

[xiii] State of Affairs: Three Years after Nisoor Square: Accountability and Oversight of U.S. Private Security and Other Contractors. September 2010: 3 Accessed March 28, 2019. http://www.ciaonet.org/record/21700?search=1.

[xiv] Murray, Tonita. “Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan, 2002–2011: An Overview of a Flawed Process.” International Studies 48, no. 1 (January 2011): 43–63. https://doi.org/10.1177/002088171204800103.

Afghan National Police (ANP)

The Afghan National Police (ANP) was created after 2001 by the international coalition as part of the peace building process in Afghanistan. While often overlooked in favour of the Afghan National Army, the ANP are essential to the maintenance of law and order in Afghanistan, and the protection of democracy. The ANP is under the authority and control of the Ministry of Interior Affairs[i].

Afghan National Army (ANA)

Beginning in 2002, the Afghan National Army (ANA) was created from scratch as the new army of Afghanistan with the goal to eventually operate independently in Afghanistan against the Taliban and other terrorist organizations. The ANA is under the authority and control of the Ministry of Defence[ii].

Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP)

 The civil order police (or civil order force) was recently transferred from the ministry of the interior to the ministry of defence to act as a police reserve to aid and augment the ANP. They perform counter-insurgency, highway patrol, and border security[iii].

Afghan Public Police Force (APPF)

 A pay-for-service protection force run by the ministry of the interior. Not members of the ANA or ANP, the APPF provide personal protection as well as convoy and infrastructure protection to allow the ANA and ANP to focus on counter insurgency and law enforcement. The APPF were created after the Afghan government ruled Private Security Companies (PSCs) and Private Military Contractors (PMCs) illegal and offered contractors the option to join the newly formed APPF; however, PSCs and PMCs may still operate in Afghanistan if registered as ‘risk-management’ companies[iv].

Afghan Local Police

 Local militias who have been trained and are paid by the U.S. government to protect rural areas and fill the security gap left by the ANP and ANA. The ANP is supposed to oversee the ALP however that has largely not occurred with the local police being frequently accused of violence and abuse of power. The ALP is accused of still acting as local militias with some accused of strongman-style extortion and abuse[v].

Current Government of Afghanistan

 The current Afghan government is led by President Ashraf Ghani who was elected in 2014 for a 5-year term. Ghani serves both as chief of state and head of government as per the Afghan constitution. The Minister of Defence is Tariq Shah Bahrami, and the Minister of Interior Affairs is Wais Barmak[vi].

The Ministry of Counter Narcotics

Established in 2005, the Ministry of Counter Narcotics coordinates all counter-narcotic activity in Afghanistan. The ministry is responsible further responsible for evaluation and implementation of the anti-narcotic strategy. The current Minister of Counter Narcotics is Salamat Azimi[vii].

Warlords

Much of Afghanistan remains outside of the control of the central Afghan Government, and instead is governed by various tribal powers who may be described as warlords. Not all individual Warlords are significant actors, but there are some notable ones such as the Northern Alliance[viii][ix].

Northern Alliance

 Officially known as the United Islamic Front for Salvation of Afghanistan, they were a coalition of militias who fought against the Taliban from 1996 to 2001. They controlled large amounts of Afghanistan by the time of the US-led invasion which allowed them to have significant say over the future of the country[x].

Taliban

An Islamic fundamentalist group that ruled Afghanistan from 1996 until 2001 which was ended by the US-led invasion. The Taliban survived and continued to operate an insurgency against the security forces and is currently (as of March 2019) in peace talks with the US government[xi].

Afghan Women for Peace

 A grassroots women’s movement who’s declared goal is to promote women’s voices from across the country. The movement has been very active in opposing the bilateral negotiations between the Taliban and the U.S. government[xii].

___________________________________________________________________________________________________

[i] A joint report by the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies and the Foreign Policy Research Institute. “Reforming the Afghan National Police.” February 3, 2013. Available from https://www.fpri.org/docs/ReformingAfghanNationalPolice.pdf

[ii] Younossi, Obaid, Peter Dahl, Thruelsen Jonathan, Vaccaro Jerry M. Sollinger, and Brian Grady. “The Long March Building an Afghan National Army.” The National Defense Research Institute (2009): 18. https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG845.pdf

[iii] "Ministry of Defense Takes Command of Police Unit." NATO Resolute Support | Ministry of Defense Takes Command of Police Unit. March 27, 2018. Accessed March 30, 2019. https://rs.nato.int/news-center/feature-stories/2018-feature-stories/ministry-of-defense-takes-command-of-police-unit.aspx.

[iv] Government of Afghanistan. "What Is the Afghan Public Protection Force?" Afghan Public Protection Force. Accessed March 28, 2019. http://appf.gov.af/?page_id=205&lang=en.

[v] The Future of the Afghan Local Police. Asia Report no. 268. June 5, 2015. Accessed March 29, 2019. https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/future-afghan-local-police.

[vi] Central Intelligence Agency. "Afghanistan." The World Factbook. Accessed March 28, 2019. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html.

[vii] "History MCN." History MCN - Ministry of Counter Narcotics. Accessed March 30, 2019. http://mcn.gov.af/en/page/1835/history-mcn.

[viii] "Afghan Warlords Maintain Grip on Power in Rural Provinces." BBC News. November 27, 2012. Accessed March 30, 2019. https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-20516013/afghan-warlords-maintain-grip-on-power-in-rural-provinces.

[ix] Mukhopadhyay, Dipali. “Warlords As Bureaucrats: The Afghan Experience.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 2009. https://carnegieendowment.org/files/warlords_as_bureaucrats.pdf

[x] "The Northern Alliance (or United Islamic Front for Salvation of Afghanistan - UIFSA) Narrative." The Northern Alliance (or United Islamic Front for Salvation of Afghanistan - UIFSA) Narrative | START.umd.edu. October 25, 2014. Accessed March 31, 2019. https://www.start.umd.edu/baad/narratives/northern-alliance-or-united-islamic-front-salvation-afghanistan-uifsa.

[xi] Laub, Zachary. "The Taliban in Afghanistan." Council on Foreign Relations. July 4, 2014. Accessed March 30, 2019. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/taliban-afghanistan.

[xii] Gharib, Malaka. "'This Is Not The Way': Afghan Women Push Back On U.S.-Taliban Peace Talks." NPR. March 05, 2019. Accessed March 30, 2019. https://www.npr.org/2019/03/05/700173721/this-is-not-the-way-afghan-women-push-back-on-u-s-taliban-peace-talks.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

An intergovernmental alliance between European and American states that led combat and non-combat missions to assist, advise, and train Afghan institutions and security forces[i].

International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)

A NATO conducted security mission in Afghanistan, which was established in December 2001 by the United Nations Security Council. Their objective was to assist in rebuilding institutions and train Afghan security forces in addition to combat operations. NATO member states contribute personnel[ii].

Japan

 Under ISAF Japan was the disarmament, demobilisation, repatriation, reintegration and resettlement (DDRR) lead. They provided two thirds of the Afghan New Beginnings Program (ANBP) budget and began implementing DDR even though they lack history and experience in such programs. Worked under the United Nations Development Program (UNDP)[iii].

 Germany

 Under ISAF Germany oversaw police reform where they focused on extensive training for police officers of select rank[iv].

 United States

 The US led the invasion of Afghanistan in fall 2001 with support of NATO allies. They remained to rebuild and reform under the directives of various United Nations, NATO, and ISAF missions in addition to their own organizations. They directed training of the Afghan National Army and eventually became the de facto leader of police reform by 2007[v].

Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR)

Created by the United States Congress they independently audit and oversee reconstruction projects in Afghanistan. Their aim is to ensure effective use of resources and prevent abuse through investigations and inspections. SIGAR has uncovered corruption within security sector reform[vi].

United Nations Development Program – Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (UNDP-DIAG)

Created in 2005 under the directive of the Afghan New Beginnings Program UNDP-DIAG focused on DDRR of illegitimate armed organizations who were neglected in the Japanese led DDRR, which solely focused on the Afghan National Army (ANA)[vii].

United Nations Assistance Mission Afghanistan

A UN mission at the request of the Afghanistan Government to support the creation of sustainable peace though respect of human rights, rule of law, and good governance[viii].

Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE)

 The OSCE provides assistance for counter-narcotics operations, border security, and police training at the request of the Government of Afghanistan. Additional work is done by sponsoring experts to oversee developed of democratic institutions to protect human rights[ix].

Afghanistan National Horticulture Development Organization (ANHDO)

 Operating in seven provinces they aim to build a strong agricultural industry to increase national living standards. Funded by the European Union their mission may be viewed as an attempt to provide alternatives to rural opium production[x].

___________________________________________________________________________________________________

[i] NATO. "Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan." NATO. July 18, 2018. Accessed March 31, 2019. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_113694.htm.

[ii] NATO. "ISAF's Mission in Afghanistan (2001-2014)." North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Last modified September 1, 2015. Accessed March 28, 2019. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_69366.htm.

[iii] Major Selber, William. “A Question of ‘Government’ Control: Afghanistan DDR Programs Since 2001.” Small Wars & Insurgencies, 29:2, 344-366. 2018. https://doi/10.1080/09592318.2018.1433514

[iv] Ayub Fatima, Sari Kouvo, Rachel Wareham. “Afghanistan Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan.” The International Center for Transitional Justice. April 2009

Available from https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Afghanistan-Security-Reform-2009-English.pdf

[v] Murray, Tonita. “Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan, 2002–2011: An Overview of a Flawed Process.” International Studies 48, no. 1 (January 2011): 43–63. https://doi/10.1177/002088171204800103.

[vi] "About SIGAR." Special Inspector General of Afghanistan Reconstruction. Accessed March 28, 2019. https://www.sigar.mil/about/index.aspx?SSR=1.

[vii] Major Selber, “A Question of ‘Government’”, 346

[viii] United Nations. "Mission Statement." United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan. Accessed March 28, 2019. https://unama.unmissions.org/mission-statement.

[ix] "Afghanistan and the OSCE." Organization for Security and Co-Operation Europe. Last modified December 1, 2010. Accessed March 28, 2019. https://www.osce.org/mc/87191.

[x] Weqar, Khaksar. "Vision, Mission, and Long-term Goals." Afghanistan National Horticulture Development Organization. Last modified August 21, 2017. Accessed March 28, 2019. http://anhdo.org.af/?p=728.

Corruption

Corruption impacts the legitimacy and effectiveness of political and legal institutions. Individuals will not defer to Afghan institutions if they do not believe their request will be honoured in a straight-forward manner. For example, the Taliban have developed an extensive judicial network in parallel with the state judicial system. Rural Afghans hold greater trust in the Taliban’s judicial system to “solve disputes in a fair way…without having to pay bribes”[i]. Bribes are a part of everyday life in Afghanistan and is compounded by the widespread acceptance of patronage and nepotism. Aid, resources and money routinely go missing. Nearly $1 billion USD has disappeared from Kabul Bank[ii].

The ANP and ANA specifically struggle with ‘ghost soldiers’, which is yet to be addressed in SSR. There are thousands of individuals in the ANP and ANA who do not exist. Commanders are inflating personnel numbers and collecting payments for the non-existent ‘ghost soldiers’. Security sectors still struggle with lack of verified and coordinated data to accurately determine personnel numbers. The discrepancy between payments to ‘ghost soldiers’ and actual personal is in the thousands[iii]. The resources of and trust in the Afghan government are being drained.

It is characterized by the absence of public institutions. Those that do exist lack strong tools to implement their directives and prevent corruption. Informal power-holders through the wars have maintained their positions of privilege; therefore, they have resisted attempts to formalize and consolidate legitimate power. Addressing corruption is necessary for national survival as it “undermines democracy and the rule of law, leads to violations of human rights, distorts markets, erodes the quality of life and allows organized crime, terrorism, and other threats to humanity to flourish”[iv]. In 2018, President Ghani’s administration implemented a new anti-corruption strategy, except the reforms are yet to have any tangible impact and have glossed over the political economic dimensions of corruption. The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) has questioned the government’s ability to adequately implement the strategy and have a long-term commitment. They accuse the government of not taking “Action against public officials who violate internal codes of ethics, while simultaneously failing to protect reformers and whistle-blowers from reprisal, a climate of corruption will endure”[v].

 

Centralization of power

Control of territory dictates who collaborates, instead of the ideology of the population. If individuals feel insecure and risk punishment they will not collaborate with the legitimate Afghan forces. The Afghan government holds almost no de factor power outside of Kabul. It limits their ability to effectively institute nationwide change and is a result of the rewarding militia commanders, who sided with ISAF coalition forces, key ministry positions in a power sharing agreement[vi]. The weak interim government and the international community’s decision to defer to ministry leaders (who were militia commanders and warlords) institutionalized the traditional responsibility of tribal alliances and militias for security.

Top-down reforms focused on a Kabul centralized government and its strengthening. It did not address legitimacy of regional governments and institutions. They lacked coherence and long-term vision, only focusing on the short-term while simultaneously attempting to be far-reaching and specific[vii].

Thus, security, governance e, and upholding rule of law is shared between the central government and traditional local power structures. They exist in parallel, but results in a fragmented state as local power structure contest the supreme power of the central governance. The tribal governance lacks a formal legal basis, yet it is the primary source of authority throughout much of Afghanistan[viii]. There was never one coherent nationwide peacebuilding mission, which left the fledging regime without the needed coercive power to persuade others of their supreme legitimacy outside of Kabul.

 

On-going insurgencies

Afghanistan is still yet to reach a negative peace. The Taliban and Al-Qaeda (AQ) insurgency is ongoing with them holding significant portions of the country. Additionally, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant – Khorasan Province (ISIL-KP) has developed branches in Eastern Afghanistan along the border with Pakistan. Former Taliban and AQ leaders have pledged allegiance to ISIL-KP, challenging current Taliban and AQ factions in their traditional rural Afghan strongholds like Helmand, Nangarhar, and Herat. ISIL-KP and the Taliban are in open conflict[ix]. The insurgencies are transnational as they somewhat freely move across the poorly secured Afghanistan-Pakistan border, which increases counter-insurgency (COIN) difficulties.

Afghanistan has been in an almost constant state of war since 1978 and the Soviet-Afghan War. The main actors and ideology has simply evolved over time, but an entire generation does not know negative peace. All-encompassing societal reforms are almost impossible as the on-going insurgencies prevent their spread across the country. The legitimate government does not have the power nor resources needed to dedicate to reforms, even with the aid of the international community, and instead more is consistently being diverted to COIN.

___________________________________________________________________________________________________

[i] Laub, Zachary. "The Taliban in Afghanistan." Council on Foreign Relations. July 4, 2014. Accessed March 30, 2019. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/taliban-afghanistan.

[ii] Afghanistan's Fight against Corruption: From Strategies to Implementation. May 2018. Accessed March 28, 2019. P.6. https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/afghanistans_fight_against_corruption_from_strategies_to_implementation-14_may_2018.pdf.

[iii] Assessing the Capabilities and Effectiveness of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the Comm. on Armed Services, 114th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-15 (2016) (statement of John F. Sopko, Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction). P.7 Accessed March 28, 2019. https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/testimony/SIGAR-16-17-TY.pdf.

[iv] Afghanistan’s Fight against Corruption, 2018, p.7

[v] Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction. Afghanistan's Anti-Corruption Efforts: The Afghan Government Has Begun to Implement an Anti-Corruption Strategy, but Significant Problems Must Be Addressed. Report no. 18-51-AR. Afghanistan's Anti-Corruption Efforts. Government Publishing Office, 2018. P.41 Accessed March 28, 2019. https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/audits/SIGAR-18-51-AR.pdf.

[vi] Major Selber, William. “A Question of ‘Government’ Control: Afghanistan DDR Programs Since 2001.” Small Wars & Insurgencies, 29:2, 350. 2018. https://doi/10.1080/09592318.2018.1433514

[vii] Ayub, Fatima, Sari Kouvo, and Rachel Wareham. “Afghanistan Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan.” The International Center for Transitional Justice. April 2009. P.7

Available from https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Afghanistan-Security-Reform-2009-English.pdf

[viii] Ayub, Kouvo, and Wareham, “Afghanistan Security Sector Reform”, p.11

[ix] Sheikh, Mona Kanwal. "Islamic State Enters Al-Qaeda's Old Hotbed." Connections 16, no. 1: 37-49. Accessed March 28, 2019. http://connections-qj.org/article/islamic-state-enters-al-qaedas-old-hotbed-afghanistan-and-pakistan.

Overall it is very difficult to claim that the Security Sector Reform (SSR) in Afghanistan was successful. Casualties from the conflict are going against global trends by rising every year, and large portions of the country are still highly contested war-zones between the Taliban and the Afghan Government[i]. However, it would be incorrect to label the SSR a complete failure as there have been some significant tangible successes from the program.

In terms of positive peace, there are some successes to highlight. Literacy, a major target of the positive peace reforms, has improved from 31% in 2011 to 38%[ii] in 2018 through direct education of the Afghan Police as well as programs to educate the civilian population. However, a contrast between male and female education still exist. According to Human Rights Watch, “only 37 percent of adolescent girls are literate, compared to 66 percent of adolescent boys. Among adult women, 19 percent are literate compared to 49 percent of adult men”[iii]. The Afghan Police, once a male-only police force, is now 2% women (a 38% increase since 2014)[iv]. While this is obviously a small fraction of the entire police force, it still represents a step in the direction of equal gender representation. Girls and women have been able to receive education, something that was illegal under the Taliban regime, where now there are 71 girls for every 100 boys in primary school[v]. The Afghan infrastructure also received a boost, access to electricity has increased by 30% and the UNDP has been funding the construction of micro-hydroelectric power plants[vi].

Unfortunately, in terms of positive peace, there are many reasons to be concerned for the region. Afghanistan still ranks among the worst countries for girls to get an education because many are unable to finish school due in part to the young age at which girls are married[vii]. Ethnic tension is still very high with violence between groups not uncommon. Many warlords still operate throughout the country but now with the U.S.-led coalition’s approval through their positions in the Afghan Local Police, and these same warlords have been accused by the Human Rights Watch of serious abuse against civilians[viii].

There have also been encouraging results from the negative peace building aspects of the SSR. Through the UNDP Afghan New Beginnings Programme, the militias handed over almost 9,000 heavy weapons and tens of thousands of small/medium weapons[ix]. Through the UNDP Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups Programme tens of thousands of soldiers/militias were disarmed and disbanded and received varying levels of reintegration and rehabilitation[x].

However, in terms of negative peace, the SSR was largely a failure. The Taliban have inflicted devastating casualties on the Afghan security forces, more than 28,000 from

2015-2018[xi]. The Afghan government only controls 53.8% of the districts which include 63.5% of the population[xii]. Of further concern, is that the casualty statistics and amount of territory controlled by the Taliban are on an upwards trend which indicates that the Afghan government’s fight is far from over.

In conclusion, while there are islands of hope it is largely in a sea of despair. SSR in Afghanistan is far from a success story, and as coalition forces contemplate a complete pullout of the country, many fear that the worst days still lie ahead. Afghanistan remains one of the most dangerous and least-developed countries in the world, and there are few signs of that changing any time soon.

___________________________________________________________________________________________________

[i] Karen, McVeigh. "Afghanistan Bucks Global Trend with Sharp Rise in Civilian Casualties." The Guardian. January 11, 2019. Accessed March 30, 2019. https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2019/jan/11/afghanistan-bucks-global-trend-with-sharp-rise-in-civilian-casualties.

[ii] World Bank Group. "Primary Education, Pupils." The World Bank Data. Accessed March 28, 2019. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.PRM.ENRL?locations=AF&view=chart.

[iii] Paula, Bronstein. "I Won't Be a Doctor, and One Day You'll Be Sick" | Girls' Access to Education in Afghanistan." Human Rights Watch. October 17, 2017. Accessed March 30, 2019. https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/10/17/i-wont-be-doctor-and-one-day-youll-be-sick/girls-access-education-afghanistan.

[iv] "Building Gender Equality in the Afghanistan Police Force." GAC. December 17, 2018. Accessed March 30, 2019. https://international.gc.ca/world-monde/stories-histoires/2018/afghanistan_police_equality-afghanistan_police_egalite.aspx?lang=eng.

[v] Ruby, Mellen. "Afghanistan Ranks Among the Worst Places for Girls to Get an Education." Foreign Policy. October 17, 2017. Accessed March 31, 2019. https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/10/17/afghanistan-ranks-worst-places-girls-to-get-an-education-africa/.

[vi] “About Afghanistan." UNDP in Afghanistan. Accessed March 30, 2019. http://www.af.undp.org/content/afghanistan/en/home/countryinfo/#Introduction.

[vii] “About Afghanistan”

[viii] Afghanistan: Rein in Abusive Militias and Afghan Local Police." Human Rights Watch. April 17, 2015. Accessed March 30, 2019. https://www.hrw.org/news/2011/09/12/afghanistan-rein-abusive-militias-and-afghan-local-police.

[ix] Amin, Tarzi."Disarmament in Afghanistan: which Militias and What Weapons?" ReliefWeb. April 20, 2005. Accessed March 30, 2019. https://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/disarmament-afghanistan-which-militias-and-what-weapons.

[x] United Nations Development Program, Afghanistan. Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG): Annual Project Report, 2010. Available from http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/445~v~United_Nations_Development_Programme_Afghanistan_Disbandment_of_Illegal_Armed_Groups__DIAG_.pdf

[xi] Rod, Nordland, and Fahim Abed. "Afghan Military Deaths Since 2015: More Than 28,000." The New York Times. November 15, 2018. Accessed March 30, 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/15/world/asia/afghanistan-military-death-toll.html.

[xii] Rod, Nordland."Afghan Government Control Over Country Falters, U.S. Report Says." The New York Times. January 31, 2019. Accessed March 30, 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/31/world/asia/afghanistan-taliban-territory-control.html.

 

A joint report by the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies and the Foreign Policy Research Institute. “Reforming the Afghan National Police.” February 3, 2013. Available from https://www.fpri.org/docs/ReformingAfghanNationalPolice.pdf

 Afghanistan Agreements: A Collection of Official Texts from 2001 to 2011. Civil-Military Fusion Centre, 2012. Accessed March 28, 2019. https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/CFC_Afghanistan_Agreements_June2012.pdf.

Afghanistan's Fight against Corruption: From Strategies to Implementation. May 2018. Accessed March 28, 2019. https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/afghanistans_fight_against_corruption_from_strategies_to_implementation-14_may_2018.pdf.

Assessing the Capabilities and Effectiveness of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the Comm. on Armed Services, 114th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-15 (2016) (statement of John F. Sopko, Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction). Accessed March 28, 2019. https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/testimony/SIGAR-16-17-TY.pdf.

"Building Gender Equality in the Afghanistan Police Force." GAC. December 17, 2018. Accessed March 30, 2019. https://international.gc.ca/world-monde/stories-histoires/2018/afghanistan_police_equality-afghanistan_police_egalite.aspx?lang=eng.

Federal Ministry of the Interior. "The German Police Project Team in Afghanistan." Federal Ministry of the Interior, Building and Community. September 25, 2017. Accessed March 28, 2019. https://www.bmi.bund.de/EN/topics/security/international-cooperation/afghanistan/afghanistan-node.html.

Furtos, Reka. “Sharp Drops in Opium Poppy Cultivation, Price of Dry Opium in Afghanistan, Latest UNODC Survey Reveals.” United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime. November 19, 2018. Accessed March 31, 2019.

Kubota Makiko, Nami Takashi, Mayesha Alam, Anna Applebaum, Briana Mawby. Strengthening the Afghan National Policies: Recruitment and Retention of Women Officers.  Japan International Cooperation Agency.  Available from https://www.jica.go.jp/jica-ri/publication/booksandreports/l75nbg00000697z9-att/Case_Study_on_Afghanistan.pdf

LTC Lewis D. Troy. “Training the Afghan National Army: A Monograph.”  United States Army School of Advanced Military Studies. United States Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2011. https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a545579.pdf

Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction. Afghanistan's Anti-Corruption Efforts: The Afghan Government Has Begun to Implement an Anti-Corruption Strategy, but Significant Problems Must Be Addressed. Report no. 18-51-AR. Afghanistan's Anti-Corruption Efforts. Government Publishing Office, 2018. Accessed March 28, 2019. https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/audits/SIGAR-18-51-AR.pdf.

United Nations Development Program, Afghanistan. Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG):Annual Project Report, 2010. Available from http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/445~v~United_Nations_Development_Programme_Afghanistan_Disbandment_of_Illegal_Armed_Groups__DIAG_.pdf

Felbab-Brown, Vanda. "Hurray for Militias? Not so fast: Lessons from the Afghan Local Police experience." Small Wars & Insurgencies 2, no. 2 (2016): 260. https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2015.1129169.

Vanda Felbab-Brown is an American expert on international and internal organized crime. She is a Brookings Institute senior fellow in the Foreign Policy Program. Felbab-Brown drew from over a decade of fieldwork in Afghanistan on militias. Afghanistan has legitimized and institutionalized local militias through the Afghan Local Police (ALP), which may prolong direct conflict especially as the government attempts greater regulation of irregular forces. The forces tend to be abusive and have contributed to greater insecurity and instability across the country. The accepted of militias has developed the international community looks for inexpensive yet effective methods of securitization. It demonstrates how Mark Sedra’s work on Afghanistan’s slide towards expediency in 2006 is still relevant.

Kamminga, Jorrit. "From Disengagement to Regional Opium War? Towards a Counter-Narcotics Surge in Afghanistan and Pakistan." UNISCI Discussion Papers 29 (2012): 91-112. http://revistas.ucm.es/index.php/UNIS/article/view/40662/38984.

Since 2005 Dr. Jorrit Kamminga has conducted extensive field research in Afghanistan, and is the previous director of the International Council on Security and Development (an international think tank focusing on conflict zones including Afghanistan. Dr. Nazia Hussain is a Postdoctoral fellow at the United Nations Center for Policy Research. The article outlines how the Afghan forces are unprepared as foreign troops are pulled out. The international community’s commitment to Afghanistan is waning and the state’s security infrastructure will suffer. A focus is placed on how conflict may increase as counter-narcotic efforts break down in the wake of transition to Afghan power. It highlights the much-needed work that must be done to achieve greater negative peace before structural violence may be addressed in addition to how the weak border security may exacerbate the problem. Efforts to confront structural violence rooted in economic inequalities would be beneficial towards counter-narcotics policies, which both the paper and ISAF failed to address.

Major Selber, William. “A Question of ‘Government’ Control: Afghanistan DDR Programs Since 2001.” Small Wars & Insurgencies, 29:2, 344-366. 2018. https://doi/10.1080/09592318.2018.1433514

Major William Selber of the United States Air Force (USAF) is currently a commander of Detachment 2, 18^th Intelligence Squadron at Osan Air Base, Korea, but previously deployed to Afghanistan multiple times as a US Central Command foreign area officer. These included working on provincial reconstruction and police transition teams. The article explores how and why the disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, and resettlement has failed even though reconciliation and reintegration is important to tribal cultures of Afghanistan. DDRR was poorly designed and implemented before the end of an insurgency; therefore, not enough territory was controlled to create incentive to give up arms. Parties still felt insecure, which is why DDRR is usually executed after a peace agreement, not before like in the case of Afghanistan.

Murray, Tonita. “Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan, 2002–2011: An Overview of a Flawed Process.” International Studies 48, no. 1 (January 2011): 43–63. https://doi/10.1177/002088171204800103.

Tonita Murray is the former gender advisor and senior adviser to the Minister of Interior of Afghanistan. She is currently a consultant at the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. From 2003 to 2008 Murray experienced the successes and failures of security sector reform first hand, which gives the article a unique perspective from an individual who was attempting to make change. She points to on-going insurgencies, lack of leadership capabilities, and non-existent vision of transition to Afghan control of Afghan forces as the major flaws in security sector reform. It cumulates in the international community postulating what they think Afghanistan needs, rather than Afghanistan articulating their wants. Written in 2011 the article looked forward to the 2014 Afghan security and political transition. The ANSF has seen assumed greater responsibilities and there has been a formation of a democratically elected government; however, Murray’s observations are still relevant in the post-transition era.

Petersohn, Ulrich. “Outsourcing the Big Stick: The Consequences of Using Private Military Companies.” Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University. July 25, 2015. Available from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228396821_Outsourcing_the_Big_Stick_The_Consequences_of_Using_Private_Military_Companies

Dr. Ulrich Petersohn is a Senior Lecturer/Associate Professor in International Politics at the University of Liverpool. The working paper submitted to the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs at Harvard University outlines the negative consequences on state governments when Private Military Companies (PMCs) are utilized and authorized in the security sector. It provides necessary background to why Afghanistan is experiencing a lack of belief in the state’s monopoly on power. An unprecedented number of PMCs are and have operated in Afghanistan They have undermined security sector reform efforts, which is explained in how PMCs erode accountability, democratic principles, and transparency

Sedra, Mark. “Security sector reform in Afghanistan: The slide towards expediency.” International Peacekeeping. 13:1, 94-110. 2006. https://doi.org/10.1080/13533310500424868

Mark Sedra is an Adjunct Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Waterloo, focusing on state building and peacebuilding. The article is rooted in the belief that security sector reform (SSR) is neglecting import building blocks of long-term sustainability and stability in exchange for maximizing momentary security force effectiveness. Thus, he concludes that SSR is aiming to become convenient, and possibly improper, while forgoing the original holistic visions and approaches to entrench accountability and democratic governance. Written in 2006 the information is relevant to understand why specific events have occurred. Sedra pointed to Afghan ownership of SSR as the key to its success, which has still failed to be implemented across the country.

Sheikh, Mona Kanwal. "Islamic State Enters Al-Qaeda's Old Hotbed." Connections 16, no. 1: 37-49. Accessed March 28, 2019. http://connections-qj.org/article/islamic-state-enters-al-qaedas-old-hotbed-afghanistan-and-pakistan.

Dr. Mona Kanwal Sheikh is a research coordinator and senior researcher at the Danish Institute for International Studies. Her expertise is in the Taliban, and transnational jihad (Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State movement). Connections is a quarterly peer reviewed open-access journal covering scholarly topics related to conflict, defense, and security. The article exams the emergence of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant – Khorasan Province (ISIL-KP) in opposition to the ‘old’ movements of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda (AQ), which are both still active. The majority of the article examines the ideological characteristics of ISIL-KP, AQ, and the Taliban; however, it is relevant to security sector reform as it demonstrates that Afghanistan is still experiencing an ongoing and evolving insurgency that SSR must address.

Simms M. Daniel, Toby W. Waine & John C. Taylor (2017) “Improved estimates of opium cultivation in Afghanistan using imagery-based stratification”, International Journal of Remote Sensing, 38:13, 3785-3799. https://doi.org/10.1080/01431161.2017.1303219

Dr. Daniel M. Simms is a research fellow in remote sensing and GIS at Cranfield University in the Department of Environmental Science and Technology; Dr. Toby Waine is a senior lecturer in applied remote sensing in the Centre for Environment and Agricultural Informatics at Cranfield University; and John C. Taylor completed the analysis of opium cultivation in Afghanistan based on the United Nation Office on Drug and Crime (UNDOC) and United States Government remote sensing data. There are discrepancies in data, which is attribute to the difficulty to accurately discern locations and rates of cultivation due to insecurity. The article identified where majority of opium cultivation occurs (Helmand province). The remote sensing data of where cultivation occurs is similar to regions of Afghanistan where the government holds no de facto power. It gave additional background to how the key issue of opium needs to be addressed in security sector reform, and which rural areas must be targeted.

"About SIGAR." Special Inspector General of Afghanistan Reconstruction. Accessed March 28, 2019. https://www.sigar.mil/about/index.aspx?SSR=1.

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Afghanistan Agreements: A Collection of Official Texts from 2001 to 2011. Civil-Military Fusion Centre, 2012. Accessed March 28, 2019. https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/CFC_Afghanistan_Agreements_June2012.pdf.

"Afghanistan and the OSCE." Organization for Security and Co-Operation Europe. Last modified December 1, 2010. Accessed March 28, 2019. https://www.osce.org/mc/87191.

Afghanistan's Fight against Corruption: From Strategies to Implementation. May 2018. Accessed March 28, 2019. https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/afghanistans_fight_against_corruption_from_strategies_to_implementation-14_may_2018.pdf.

Assessing the Capabilities and Effectiveness of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the Comm. on Armed Services, 114th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-15 (2016) (statement of John F. Sopko, Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction). Accessed March 28, 2019. https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/testimony/SIGAR-16-17-TY.pdf.

Ayub, Fatima, Sari Kouvo, and Rachel Wareham. “Afghanistan Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan.” The International Center for Transitional Justice. April 2009

Available from https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Afghanistan-Security-Reform-2009-English.pdf

A joint report by the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies and the Foreign Policy Research Institute. “Reforming the Afghan National Police.” February 3, 2013. Available from https://www.fpri.org/docs/ReformingAfghanNationalPolice.pdf

"Building Gender Equality in the Afghanistan Police Force." GAC. December 17, 2018. Accessed March 30, 2019. https://international.gc.ca/world-monde/stories-histoires/2018/afghanistan_police_equality-afghanistan_police_egalite.aspx?lang=eng.

Bronstein, Paula. ""I Won't Be a Doctor, and One Day You'll Be Sick" | Girls' Access to Education in Afghanistan." Human Rights Watch. October 17, 2017. Accessed March 30, 2019. https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/10/17/i-wont-be-doctor-and-one-day-youll-be-sick/girls-access-education-afghanistan.

Central Intelligence Agency. "Afghanistan." The World Factbook. Accessed March 28, 2019. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html.

Chughtai, Alia. "Afghanistan: Who Controls What." Afghanistan | Al Jazeera. October 19, 2018. Accessed March 30, 2019. https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/interactive/2016/08/afghanistan-controls-160823083528213.html.

Sheikh, Mona Kanwal. "Islamic State Enters Al-Qaeda's Old Hotbed." Connections 16, no. 1: 37-49. Accessed March 28, 2019. http://connections-qj.org/article/islamic-state-enters-al-qaedas-old-hotbed-afghanistan-and-pakistan.

"Enhancement of Literacy in Afghanistan (ELA) Programme." United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. 2017. Accessed March 24, 2019. http://www.unesco.org/new/en/kabul/education/youth-and-adult-education/enhancement-of-literacy-in-afghanistan-iii/.

Felbab-Brown, Vanda. "Hurray for Militias? Not so fast: Lessons from the Afghan Local Police experience." Small Wars & Insurgencies 2, no. 2 (2016): 260. https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2015.1129169.

Felbab-Brown, Vanda. "Afghanistan's Opium Production Is through the Roof-why Washington Shouldn't Overreact." Brookings. November 21, 2017. Accessed March 28, 2019. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2017/11/21/afghanistans-opium-production-is-through-the-roof-why-washington-shouldnt-overreact/.

Federal Ministry of the Interior. "The German Police Project Team in Afghanistan." Federal Ministry of the Interior, Building and Community. September 25, 2017. Accessed March 28, 2019. https://www.bmi.bund.de/EN/topics/security/international-cooperation/afghanistan/afghanistan-node.html.

Furtos, Reka. “Sharp Drops in Opium Poppy Cultivation, Price of Dry Opium in Afghanistan, Latest UNODC Survey Reveals.” United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime. November 19, 2018. Accessed March 31, 2019.

Graham-Harrison, Emma. "Illiteracy Persists among Afghan Troops despite US Education Drive." The Guardian. January 28, 2014. Accessed March 30, 2019. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/28/illiteracy-afghan-troops-us-education.

Gharib, Malaka. "'This Is Not The Way': Afghan Women Push Back On U.S.-Taliban Peace Talks." NPR. March 05, 2019. Accessed March 30, 2019. https://www.npr.org/2019/03/05/700173721/this-is-not-the-way-afghan-women-push-back-on-u-s-taliban-peace-talks.

Gross, Eva. “Security sector reform in Afghanistan: The EU's contribution.” The European Institute for Security Studies. April 2009. Available from  https://issat.dcaf.ch/sqi/content/download/8823/83148/file/european%20union%20institute%20for%20security%20studies.pdf

Greenfield, Victoria A., Craig A. Bond, and Keith Crane. "A Household Model of Opium-Poppy Cultivation in Afghanistan." Journal of Policy Modeling 39, no. 5 (2017): 741-761.

"History MCN." History MCN - Ministry of Counter Narcotics. Accessed March 30, 2019. http://mcn.gov.af/en/page/1835/history-mcn.

Hartzell, A. Caroline. “Missed Opportunities The Impact of DDR on SSR in Afghanistan.” The United States Institute of Peace. April 2011. Available from https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR270-Missed_Opportunities.pdf

Kamminga, Jorrit. "From Disengagement to Regional Opium War? Towards a Counter-Narcotics Surge in Afghanistan and Pakistan." UNISCI Discussion Papers 29 (2012): 91-112. http://revistas.ucm.es/index.php/UNIS/article/view/40662/38984.

Kubota Makiko, Nami Takashi, Mayesha Alam, Anna Applebaum, Briana Mawby. Strengthening the Afghan National Policies: Recruitment and Retention of Women Officers.  Japan International Cooperation Agency.  Available from https://www.jica.go.jp/jica-ri/publication/booksandreports/l75nbg00000697z9-att/Case_Study_on_Afghanistan.pdf

Laub, Zachary. "The Taliban in Afghanistan." Council on Foreign Relations. July 4, 2014. Accessed March 30, 2019. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/taliban-afghanistan.

Mansfield, David. “Turning deserts into flowers: settlement and poppy cultivation in southwest Afghanistan.” Third World Quarterly. 39:2, 331-349. 2018. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2017.1396535

Murray, Tonita. “Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan, 2002–2011: An Overview of a Flawed Process.” International Studies 48, no. 1 (January 2011): 43–63. https://doi/10.1177/002088171204800103.

Mukhopadhyay, Dipali. “Warlords As Bureaucrats: The Afghan Experience.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 2009. https://carnegieendowment.org/files/warlords_as_bureaucrats.pdf

Nato. "Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan." NATO. July 18, 2018. Accessed March 31, 2019. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_113694.htm.

NATO. "ISAF's Mission in Afghanistan (2001-2014)." North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Last modified September 1, 2015. Accessed March 28, 2019. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_69366.htm.

"Ministry of Defense Takes Command of Police Unit." NATO Resolute Support | Ministry of Defense Takes Command of Police Unit. March 27, 2018. Accessed March 30, 2019. https://rs.nato.int/news-center/feature-stories/2018-feature-stories/ministry-of-defense-takes-command-of-police-unit.aspx.

Mashal, Mujib. "U.S. Plan for New Afghan Force Revives Fears of Militia Abuses." The New York Times. September 15, 2017. Accessed March 30, 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/15/world/asia/afghan-local-police.html.

Major Selber, William. “A Question of ‘Government’ Control: Afghanistan DDR Programs Since 2001.” Small Wars & Insurgencies, 29:2, 344-366. 2018. https://doi/10.1080/09592318.2018.1433514

"National Military Academy of Afghanistan." Military School Directory. Accessed March 28, 2019. https://militaryschooldirectory.com/afghanistan-national-military-academy/.

Nordland, Rod, and Fahim Abed. "Afghan Military Deaths Since 2015: More Than 28,000." The New York Times. November 15, 2018. Accessed March 30, 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/15/world/asia/afghanistan-military-death-toll.html.

Nordland, Rod. "Afghan Government Control Over Country Falters, U.S. Report Says." The New York Times. January 31, 2019. Accessed March 30, 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/31/world/asia/afghanistan-taliban-territory-control.html.

Pike, John. "Military." DDR - Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration. Accessed March 28, 2019. https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/afghanistan/ddr.htm.

Petersohn, Ulrich. “Outsourcing the Big Stick: The Consequences of Using Private Military Companies.” Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University. July 25, 2015. Available from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228396821_Outsourcing_the_Big_Stick_The_Consequences_of_Using_Private_Military_Companies

Simms M. Daniel, Toby W. Waine & John C. Taylor (2017) Improved estimates of opium cultivation in Afghanistan using imagery-based stratification, International Journal of Remote Sensing, 38:13, 3785-3799. https://doi.org/10.1080/01431161.2017.1303219

Sedra, Mark. “Security sector reform in Afghanistan: The slide towards expediency.” International Peacekeeping. 13:1, 94-110. 2006. https://doi.org/10.1080/13533310500424868

Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction. Afghanistan's Anti-Corruption Efforts: The Afghan Government Has Begun to Implement an Anti-Corruption Strategy, but Significant Problems Must Be Addressed. Report no. 18-51-AR. Afghanistan's Anti-Corruption Efforts. Government Publishing Office, 2018. Accessed March 28, 2019. https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/audits/SIGAR-18-51-AR.pdf.

State of Affairs: Three Years after Nisoor Square: Accountability and Oversight of U.S. Private Security and Other Contractors. September 2010: 3 Accessed March 28, 2019. http://www.ciaonet.org/record/21700?search=1.

The World Literacy Foundation “The Economic & Social Cost of Illiteracy: A snapshot of illiteracy in a global context.” August 24, 2015. Available from https://worldliteracyfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/WLF-FINAL-ECONOMIC-REPORT.pdf

LTC Lewis D. Troy. “Training the Afghan National Army: A Monograph.”  United States Army School of Advanced Military Studies. United States Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas,  2011. https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a545579.pdf

Tarzi, Amin. "Disarmament in Afghanistan -- Which Militias and What Weapons? - Afghanistan." ReliefWeb. April 20, 2005. Accessed March 30, 2019. https://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/disarmament-afghanistan-which-militias-and-what-weapons.

The Future of the Afghan Local Police. Asia Report no. 268. June 5, 2015. Accessed March 29, 2019. https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/future-afghan-local-police.

"The Northern Alliance (or United Islamic Front for Salvation of Afghanistan - UIFSA) Narrative." The Northern Alliance (or United Islamic Front for Salvation of Afghanistan - UIFSA) Narrative | START.umd.edu. October 25, 2014. Accessed March 31, 2019. https://www.start.umd.edu/baad/narratives/northern-alliance-or-united-islamic-front-salvation-afghanistan-uifsa.

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United Nations Development Program, Afghanistan. Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG):Annual Project Report, 2010. Available from http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/445~v~United_Nations_Development_Programme_Afghanistan_Disbandment_of_Illegal_Armed_Groups__DIAG_.pdf

"USAID Improves Livelihoods for Afghan Women through Credit Shura [EN/Dari/PS] - Afghanistan." ReliefWeb. March 6, 2019. Accessed March 30, 2019. https://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/usaid-improves-livelihoods-afghan-women-through-credit-shura-endarips.

Weqar, Khaksar. "Vision, Mission, and Long-term Goals." Afghanistan National Horticulture Development Organization. Last modified August 21, 2017. Accessed March 28, 2019. http://anhdo.org.af/?p=728.

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Younossi, Obaid, Peter Dahl, Thruelsen Jonathan, Vaccaro Jerry M. Sollinger, and Brian Grady. “The Long March Building an Afghan National Army.” The National Defense Research Institute. 2009.  Available from https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG845.pdf

Zimmerman, and S. Rebecca. "Is It a Good Idea to Privatize the War in Afghanistan?" RAND Corporation. August 04, 2017. Accessed March 30, 2019. https://www.rand.org/blog/2017/08/is-it-a-good-idea-to-privatize-the-war-in-afghanistan.html.