Key Issue	Outcome
Israel Security: Israel considers security to be a key issue as the country’s military is strong, however, Israel believes it is highly vulnerable due to geographical location. Another potential threat emerges from a future Palestinian state (such as an Islamist takeover)(4). As a result Israel may need to send troops into Palestinian territory when threats are emerging. Palestine argues for a full withdrawal of Israeli troops from the West Bank.	The issue did not get fully resolved during the Oslo Accords. However, Israeli troops were re-deployed from parts of the West Bank back to Israel.Palestinian police were deployed in those areas of the West Bank replacing the Israeli troops( mainly area A). There was a partial Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza strip. (4)
Border/ Palestinian Autonomy: In 1967 Israel captured the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem(1). Then drawing municipal boundaries that cut out some heavily palestinian populated areas. Palestine advocates for a separate state of Palestine in Gaza, Jerusalem and the West Bank. While Israel states its rights on the occupied lands. (5)	Palestinians who constitute the vast majority of the population in the occupied territories signed a deal with Israel giving them limited self-rule. This deal divided the West Bank into areas A, B and C. However, Israel did not accept Palestine as a separate state by the end of these negotiations. (5)
Water Access: In the 1967 war Israel gained exclusive control of the waters of the West Bank and the Sea of Galilee. The palestinian farmers would like access to the rivers which they argue is cut as a result of military power. The Israelis argue they do not use more water than before the occupation. (3)	The water issue was set aside to be dealt with in the "final status" Israel-Palestinian talks, which were never concluded. Hence the issue remains stagnant. (3)
Refugees: Since the creation of Israel and the occupation of the Gaza strip, there are thought to be millions of Palestinian refugees(2). Israel argues these refugees cannot return to what is now Israel and should instead be absorbed by Arab nations or the future state of Palestine.(2)	The Oslo agreement did not resolve the question of where the Palestinian refugees will be relocated to or if they may return to their original homes.(2)
Status of Jerusalem:  Both palestine and Israel claim Jerusalem as the capital of their state or future state and consider the city a holy and sacred location(1). Both Jews which comprise a large part of the Israeli population and Muslims which comprise a large portion of the Palestinian population regard the city as a key component in their respective religions (1)	The Oslo Accords did not find a solution to this problem. Both sides remain fixed in their position regarding the status of Jerusalem.(1)

sources :  

(1) Asser, Martin. “Obstacles to Arab-Israeli Peace: Jerusalem.” BBC News, BBC, 2 Sept. 2010,       www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-11096293. (1)

(2)Asser, Martin. “Obstacles to Arab-Israeli Peace: Palestinian Refugees.” BBC News, BBC, 2  Sept. 2010, www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-11104284.

(3)Asser, Martin. “Obstacles to Arab-Israeli Peace: Water.” BBC News, BBC, 2 Sept. 2010, www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-11101797.

(4)Herzog , Micheal. Cracking the Israeli-Palestinian Security Challenge Is Possible, But It Requires Thinking Outside the Box. 16 Sept. 2016, www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/cracking-the-israeli-palestinian-security-challenge-is-possible.

(5)“The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict:” The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Interactive Database, ecf.org.il/.

 

Palestine/PLO/Palestinian Authority

• On the issue of Palestinian refugees, the PLO and the Palestinian authority advocated for the right to return for Palestinian refugees and an end to Israeli settlements in the Gaza strip and Jericho area.
• They saw these areas as historically claimed by Palestine(1).
• Additionally, advocated for the withdrawal for Israeli forces in these same areas whilst a Palestinian security force be established to takeover security in these Palestinian territories.
• On the issue of water, Palestine believed that due to Israeli occupation and military power in West Bank and the Gaza strip in particular, Palestinian citizens have been subjected to limited water resources. Often being forced to buy water for inflated prices from their Israeli occupiers (2)

Israel

• On the issue of borders, the Israeli government led by Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, promoted territorial compromises with the Palestinians concerning West Bank and the Gaza strip, however continually objected to the withdrawal to the 1967 borders.
• Continually emphasised the importance of Jerusalem for the Israeli people and as Israel’s undivided capital (3)
• On the issue of Palestinian refugees, the Israeli government saw the return of refugees as an existential issue that threatens the existence of the only Jewish state.(4)
• The government justifies the issue by arguing that Israel is the only Jewish state in the world whilst there are 22 Arab countries that the refugees can take shelter in.(4)
• On the issue of water, Israel claims that the proportion of water that is available is fair for both Israeli citizens and Palestinian citizens.
• Advocated for a two-state agreement and for peaceful coexistence between Israel and Palestine in order to mobilize both international and internal support for the peace agreements

US and the Clinton Administration

• The role of the US in these negotiations was fairly impartial
• The Clinton administration did not push the two sides to address key contentious issues (5)
• Additionally, the administration was not granted full monitoring responsibilities during the Oslo Accords, so simply channelled its efforts in defusing the crisis and helping the Palestinian Authority to be established, helping with economic aid and security assistance.  (6)
• However, the administration emphasised and pushed for stable security measures as they believed it would advertently lead to a stable political environment.

United Nations

• The United Nations sees Israel’s forceful push of Palestinian refugees out of the state as refusing to follow Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and UN General Assembly Resolution 194. Which states that refugees have an unconditional right to return and live at peace in their old homes or to receive compensation for their losses.(4)

Norway

• https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/49432/16Jun_Arca%20Henon_Santiago.pdf?sequence=1
• Another third party mediator in the Oslo Accords
• Crucial in ensuring the secrecy of the talks and negotiations

Sources:

(1) Avraham Sela, “Difficult Dialogue: The Oslo Process in Israeli Perspective”, Transformations, 2009: 105-138

(2) Martin Asser, “Obstacles to Arab Israeli Peace: Water”, BBC News, 2010

(3)Nimrod Rosler, “Leadership and Peacemaking: Yitzakh Rabin and the Oslo Accords”, International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 2016: 55-67

(4)Martin Asser, “Obstacles to Arab Israeli Peace: Palestinian Refugees”, BBC News, 2010

(5)Yashar Taheri-Keramati, “Recipe for Failure: the Impotence of the Oslo Accords.”, Nebula, 2010: 77-87

(6) “The Oslo Accords and the Arab-Israeli Peace Process”, Office of the Historian, 2017

(7)Santiago Arca Henon, “Styles of International Mediation in Peace Processes between States and terrorist organizations”, Calhoun, 2016: 1-71

HAMAS

• Background: Founded in December 1987, Hamas is a Palestinian Islamist political organization, stemming from the Muslim Brotherhood Society (MB), an Egyptian Sunni Islamist movement (3). Hamas’ charter states that its ultimate goal was to apply the rule of Islam over the whole of Palestine and to replace the Israeli state with Palestine, notably through the principle of jihad (2). Following the emergence of the first Intifada, Hamas established itself as the political stem of the MB and an alternative to the PLO, joining the political-military struggle against Israel, engaging primarily in demonstrations and protest strikes, and other violent activities, such as suicide bombings and kidnappings (1). Apart from these actions, Hamas also offers a network of social services to Palestinians, alternative to the PLO and the Palestinian Authority (PA).
• Non-Attendance: Since its establishment, Hamas has constituted a serious threat to the peace process, viewing the Oslo Accords between Israel-PLO and its subsequent establishment of the PA as a threat to its authority, escalating it’s use of violence prior to the 1993 accords, and continuing past the 1995 reiteration of the accords. This use of violence and hardline policy against the recognition of Israel has notably separated them from peace processes such as Oslo. Additionally, its policy throughout the Oslo process followed ‘representation without participation’, actively not seeking to be involved in the peace process, significantly due to a rejection of Israeli legitimacy, and its tension with the PLO (1).

Sources:

(1)Avraham Sela, Non-State Peace Spoilers and the Middle East Peace Efforts (Israel: Jerusalem 2005) 1-78

(2)Muhammad Maqdsi, “The Charter of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) of Palestine,” Journal of Palestine Studies 1993: 122-134

(3)Zack Beauchamp, “Everything you need to know about Israel-Palestine” Vox 6 Dec. 2017: 1-21

HEZBOLLAH

• Background: Hezbollah was founded in 1982, and is a Shi’ite-Muslim organization, political party and militant group, based in Lebanon (1). In 1985, Hezbollah announced its official establishment, and published an ‘open letter’ which delineated the US and the Soviet Union as the key enemies of Islam, and denounced the state of Israel, calling for their ‘obliteration’ due to their occupation of Muslim lands, and further, to ‘adoption of the Islamic system’ based on the choice of the people (2). Hezbollah also lacks formal organization, with various subgroups maintaining a divided existence, depending on charismatic leaders and their religious authority, and roots of family and clan relationships (1). Similar to Hamas, it offers community and social services, and further, it operates predominantly along its own interests as a Lebanese political party (2).
• Non-Attendance: They’ve been noted to have used violence, such as bombings, against Jewish and Israeli targets, and has been noted as a terrorist organization, from Western states and the Arab league, among others (2). Despite acting as a political organization, Hezbollah was not involved in the Oslo process. Based in Lebanon, they are further removed from the direct Israel-Palestine conflict, and thus unlikely to be considered for involvement in the process. Furthermore, their hardline, anti-Israel ideology, and notably violent past against Israel denotes their capability to interrupt the diplomatic process, thus leading them to be evicted from the peace process (1).

Sources:

(1)Avraham Sela, Non-State Peace Spoilers and the Middle East Peace Efforts (Israel: Jerusalem 2005) 1-78

(2)“Profile: Lebanon’s Hezbollah Movement” BBC News 15 Mar. 2016

PALESTINIAN ISLAMIC JIHAD

• Background: A smaller organization than Hamas, The Islamic Jihad in Palestine (PJ) was founded in October 1987 at the initiation of the first Intifada. PJ is predominantly a nationalist organization who adhere to the principle of jihad to violently contest the existence of the Israeli authority. They aim for the complete destruction of the Israeli state and for the creation of a ‘historic Palestine’ in accordance with Islamic law. To achieve these goals, they notably engage in violent attacks on civilian and military personnel, leading to them being labelled a terrorist organization by many state authorities, such as the U.S. State Department.
• Non-Attendance:  A key reason why PJ was not involved in Oslo or other peace processes was due to the fact that, unlike Hamas, they do not participate in the political process or any form of political dialogue, and thus have no intention to be represented in the Palestinian Authority.Their view is that violence is the only way to combat and remove Israel completely, and thus deny any agreement that would allow the coexistence of both Israel and Palestine, thus removing them from any potential peace talks.

Sources:

(1) Avraham Sela, Non-State Peace Spoilers and the Middle East Peace Efforts (Israel: Jerusalem 2005) 1-78

The Oslo Accords between Israel and Palestine was intended to generate peace between both constituent, through negotiating prevalent issues which have incited and prolonged conflict between each state. However, the Accords ultimately cannot be labeled as successful - issues which occurred during, and following the process have hindered its success to this state, placing the Accords in a seemingly permanent stalemate. During the negotiation process, issues such as the inability to reach successful agreements on key issues, and the lack of public support acted as obstacles to creating a stable agreement. Furthermore, the inability to implement their stated goals following the conclusion of the Accords, due to an excessively utopian outlook which drew the attention away from root issues ultimately obstructed the prospective success of the negotiations. Thus, we argue that the Oslo Accords was ultimately unsuccessful due its deficiencies during both the process and implementation of their agreements.

Various obstacles during the process of the Oslo Accords itself introduced problems to the resolution of the conflict between Israel and Palestine. The negotiations themselves failed to reach adequate agreements regarding important topics for each side - for the Palestinians, this included issues such as Jerusalem, Palestinian refugees, and the Palestinian state and its borders; and for the Israeli’s, the unwillingness or inability of the Palestinian side to end terrorism (1). This effectively hindered the process of reconciling issues vital to building mutual trust between each state. Other concerns regarding the content of the Oslo process were its terms - for example, the Accords arguably failed to detail what the Palestinian’s would gain from implementing their own promises, consequently damaging their incentive to comply in the primary stages of the negotiation process (2). Moving away from the internal complexities of the process also reveals impediments to the negotiations - most notably, the lack of public support (2). Although political leaders are the dominant actors in negotiations, public support is crucial for the implementation and sustainability of any agreement. During the process of the Oslo Accords, the public of each party could not see any significant, immediate benefits to going through with the agreements, and was thus unwilling to legitimize it (2). This absence of widespread support triggered internal conflict and diminishing popular support for the peace process, influence its later collapse and inability to implement state goals.

Sources:

(1)Oren Barak, “The Failure of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process,” Journal of Peace Research Nov. 2005: 719-736

(2)Robert L. Rothstein, How to Not Make Peace: “Conflict Syndrome and the Demise of the Oslo Accords (Washington, D.C 2006) 1-49

(3)Jodi Rudoren, “What the Oslo Accords Accomplished,” The New York Times 30 Sept. 2015

The Oslo Accords and the conclusions reached by both sides ultimately failed as Israel and Palestine were both unable to follow through with the implementation of the various issues addressed. Both sides adopted a very utopian and naive outlook on the peace processes during and therefore neglected the practicality of peace building negotiations. This was a crucial contributing factor to the inability to implement the promises and conclusions reached in the agreements. For example, one prolific moment during the negotiations was when both sides mutually recognized each other’s right to existence. Whilst this was a breakthrough in the relations of these two countries it was insufficient to actually implement practical conflict resolution because it was insubstantial and a whimsical process(1). Another example is the failure of the Palestinian Authority and the Israeli government to push for the programs and incentives they created for greater integration and trust between the Palestinian people and the Israeli people. These annexes that dealt with civilian cooperation were not implemented and therefore created another failed outcome of the Accords (1).

1. Jonathan Rynhold, “The Failure of the Oslo Process: Inherently Flawed or Flawed Implementation?”, Mideast Security and Policy Studies, 2008: 1-26.

In conclusion, the Oslo Accords cannot be labeled as a success because of failure from both the Palestinian side and the Israeli side during and after the peace negotiations. Both sides’ inability to cooperate with each other on key issues, the lack of public support for the negotiations and the failure to implement their stated goals all contributed to the failure of the Oslo Accords.

 

 

ISRAEL DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE

May 14, 1948

https://israelipalestinian.procon.org/view.background-resource.php?resourceID=000908

PALESTINIAN LIBERATION ORGANIZATION CHARTER

July 17, 1968

https://israelipalestinian.procon.org/view.background-resource.php?resourceID=000902

YASSER ARAFAT’S SPEECH BEFORE THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY

November 13, 1974

https://israelipalestinian.procon.org/sourcefiles/ispaldoc1974.pdf

HAMAS CHARTER

August 18, 1988

http://www.palestine-studies.org/sites/default/files/jps-articles/2538093.pdf

HEZBOLLAH OPEN LETTER

February 16, 1985

https://www-degruyter-com.ezproxy.library.uq.edu.au/downloadpdf/books/harvard.9780674067523/harvard.9780674067523.c8/harvard.9780674067523.c8.pdf

EXCHANGE OF LETTERS BETWEEN YASSER ARAFAT AND YITZHAK RABIN BEFORE THE SIGNING OF THE OSLO DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES

September 9, 1993

https://israelipalestinian.procon.org/sourcefiles/ispaldoc1993.pdf

DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES ON INTERIM SELF-GOVERNMENT ARRANGEMENTS (THE OSLO ACCORD)

September 13, 1993

https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/resources/collections/peace_agreements/interim_agreement_09282005.pdf

ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN INTERIM AGREEMENT ON THE WEST BANK AND THE GAZA STRIP (OSLO II)

September 28, 1995

https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/resources/collections/peace_agreements/interim_agreement_09282005.pdf

Eve Spangler, Understanding Israel/Palestine (Netherlands: Rotterdam 2015) 1-246

This source provides a concise, thorough entry point to understanding the complexities of the Israel/Palestine conflict, offering both a historical and analytical framework to exploring the chronology of events and the intrinsic concepts and ideas present in the conflict. It pays special attention to the historical background of the conflict and the root causes of the hostility between Israel and Palestine, delving into the motivations of both sides in pursuing the persistent rivalry between both actors. It further analyses the different frameworks that have been used to analyse and interpret the conflict and arguments presented by both sides. It concludes by providing suggestions of different possible ways to respond and address the current situation, giving examples of measures that have already been taken. Throughout the text, Spangler argues towards the conclusion that human rights provide the foundation for a just, fair resolution. The strengths of this text lie in its comprehensive, unbiased analysis of the conflict’s history and processes to date, providing a detailed, yet concise entry point into understanding the conflict. A fault of the text, however, is that despite offering well-explored suggestions for dealing with the conflict, these suggestions are only applicable from and American standpoint, narrowing the scope of possibility.

Avraham Sela, Non-State Peace Spoilers and the Middle East Peace Efforts (Israel: Jerusalem 2005) 1-78

This source explores the role of local and regional Islamic actors in peace processes within the Israel-Palestine conflict, and whether or not their methods have had any significant impact on preventing or spoiling settlements between Israel and the PLO. It delves into the background, motives and actions of significant Palestinian non-state actors, and the position that they’ve had throughout the conflict, assessing how they’ve responded to peace processes in the past (particularly the Oslo Accords). The exploration concludes by providing various possible reasons, given their deconstruction of the Palestinian groups involved in the conflict, that the war has persisted, as well as suggesting possible pathways to creating more productive negotiations between Israel and Palestine, given the presence of these potential spoilers. Although the absence of any potential Israel-allied actors creates a one-sided text, Sela’s thorough analysis into the non-state, Islamic groups who oppose Israel’s authority provides vital background into the deconstruction of various peace processes and their aftermath, and who influenced the succeeding events. Despite the fact that it’s focus is not on the Oslo accords, Sela’s text does contribute sufficient information into the peace process and the involvement of Palestinian non-state actors, before, during and after the accords.

Hallward, Maia. "Pursuing "Peace" in Israel/Palestine." Journal of Third World Studies, vol. 28, no. 1, 2011, pp. 185.

This source outlines the failures of previous peace talks that have taken place between Israel and Palestine. It takes a constructive look at other “mainstream scholarly and media coverage.” The lack of the understanding of peace in Israeli and Palestinian terms is highlighted. Peace for the Israeli people means something different than what the Palestinian people consider peace to be. This particular source argues that the word peace is now regarded negatively by the Palestinian and Israeli people, this is because of the failed peace processes such as the Oslo Accord. The existence of peace making efforts by civil society is emphasized even when there is no “official peace efforts.” This is a valid source as it allows for a look at the conflict from a different lens, the views and efforts of the people are highlighted and this allows for an understanding of the conflict at a deeper level. Instead of only looking at official peacemaking efforts one is able to see how the average citizen contributes to the peace efforts.

Roy, Sara. "Re-conceptualizing the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Key Paradigm Shifts." Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. 41, no. 3, 2012, pp. 71-91

This source argues that the Oslo peace processes have caused severe losses to the Palestinian people. Roy argues that the Palestinian people have suffered economically, socially and politically since the occupation of the Gaza strip and the West Bank. This source vigorously argues for the Palestinian state. The question of refugees, the Arab minority in Israel and the Palestinian territories are discussed at length. Finally the changing view of Palestine in the international sphere is highlighted along with the key issues discussed before. For example the campaign around the refugees right of return is argued and is backed by other scholars and media outlets.This source is helpful in identifying key issues that the Palestinian people advocate for. However, some of the issues are argued in a narrow one view way, the Israeli side is seldom acknowledged.    

Mellisa Boyle Mahle, “A Political-Security Analysis of the Failed Oslo Process”, Middle East Policy, 2005: 79-96.

This source analyzes the failed venture of the Oslo Accords and the effect that US influence had on the negotiation’s failure. It outlines the assumption that the US government made before and after the Oslo Accords, that an emphasis and focus on a stable security situation will therefore produce a successful political environment. Mahle argues that these negotiations did not start to fail at the start of the September 28, 2000 Intifada, but rather started to fail during the negotiations, through broken political agreements, missed deadlines and the continuous breakdown of trust and good faith between the Israeli and Palestinian leaders. The author includes multiple examples and pieces of evidence that point towards the failure of the negotiations. This includes the election of Benjamin Netanyahu and the way his administration completely spoiled the future of the peace processes, the violence that occurred in occupied territories, the differing views and definitions of security by both the Israeli and Palestinian government and US influence on both governments post-Oslo Accords.

Landon E. Hancock and Joshua N. Weiss, “Prospect Theory and the Failure to Sell the Oslo Accords”, Peace and Change, 2011: 427-452.

This source examines the way in which both the Israeli and the Palestinian sides mobilized rhetoric to garner support or opposition during the peace processes. The source expands on this argument by adopting the prospect theory, which frames the preferred choice or outcome as far more appealing and less risky than the alternative. The article also argues that because the actors in the peace process framed the negotiations and agreements largely on aspirational and utopian terms, it failed to practically frame the negotiations as a far better alternative to continued conflict. This article compares this act of framing in the Oslo Accords to the act of framing the peace processes to garner support during the Good Friday Agreements in the Northern Ireland conflict. Hancock and Weiss argue that the aspirational rhetoric that both sides used during the peace processes created more harm than good in the long run as it set both the PLO and the Israeli government for failure. Arafat promised that the Palestinians would have an established state and that suffering would end for the people, whilst Rabin emphasized the end of terror and violence in the conflict.

Works Cited

Asser, Martin. “Obstacles to Arab-Israeli Peace: Jerusalem.” BBC News, BBC, 2 Sept. 2010,       www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-11096293.

Asser, Martin. “Obstacles to Arab-Israeli Peace: Palestinian Refugees.” BBC News, BBC, 2 Sept. 2010, www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-11104284.

Asser, Martin. “Obstacles to Arab-Israeli Peace: Water.” BBC News, BBC, 2 Sept. 2010, www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-11101797.

Herzog , Micheal. Cracking the Israeli-Palestinian Security Challenge Is Possible, But It Requires Thinking Outside the Box. 16 Sept. 2016, www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/cracking-the-israeli-palestinian-security-challenge-is-possible.

“The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict:” The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Interactive Database, ecf.org.il/.

Avraham Sela, “Difficult Dialogue: The Oslo Process in Israeli Perspective”, Transformations, 2009: 105-138

Nimrod Rosler, “Leadership and Peacemaking: Yitzakh Rabin and the Oslo Accords”, International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 2016: 55-67

Yashar Taheri-Keramati, “Recipe for Failure: the Impotence of the Oslo Accords.”, Nebula, 2010: 77-87

“The Oslo Accords and the Arab-Israeli Peace Process”, Office of the Historian, 2017

Santiago Arca Henon, “Styles of International Mediation in Peace Processes between States and terrorist organizations”, Calhoun, 2016: 1-71

 Avraham Sela, Non-State Peace Spoilers and the Middle East Peace Efforts (Israel: Jerusalem 2005) 1-78

Muhammad Maqdsi, “The Charter of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) of Palestine,” Journal of Palestine Studies 1993: 122-134

Zack Beauchamp, “Everything you need to know about Israel-Palestine” Vox 6 Dec. 2017: 1-21

“Profile: Lebanon’s Hezbollah Movement” BBC News 15 Mar. 2016

Oren Barak, “The Failure of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process,” Journal of Peace Research Nov. 2005: 719-736

Robert L. Rothstein, How to Not Make Peace: “Conflict Syndrome and the Demise of the Oslo Accords (Washington, D.C 2006) 1-49

Key Issue	Explanation	Outcome
Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC)	Nationalists felt that the RUC (which was overwhelmingly Protestant) was prejudiced against them. They wanted a new local police force that would be more representative of the Catholic population.	Per the recommendations of the Independent Commission on Policing in Northern Ireland, a new policing board was created and the RUC was renamed the Police Force of Northern Ireland in 2001. Many nationalists remained unsatisfied with the changes.
British troops in Northern Ireland	Along with a new police force, Nationalists wanted British troops removed and their army bases closed in Northern Ireland. 138 Catholics were killed by the force over its 40-year deployment.	The British army did not depart Northern Ireland until July 2007.
Constitutional changes	Unionists and the British government wanted a commitment from the Irish government that any constitutional change would require a majority vote by Northern Ireland.	Both the British and Irish government agreed to recognize the “legitimacy of whatever choice is freely exercised by a majority of the people of Northern Ireland”. The Irish government amended Articles 2 and 3 of their constitution, removing their territorial claim over Northern Ireland.
North-South institutions	Unionists and the British government feared that joint institutions between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland would erode the British nature of Northern Ireland and the protestant majority in the six counties of Northern Ireland. Nationalists wanted more interconnection with the Republic of Ireland and saw North-South institutions as progress toward a United Ireland.	Meaningful North-South institutions were established. The most prominent was a “North-South Ministerial Council to develop consultation, co-operation and action within the island of Ireland on matters of mutual interest and establishing as a start, at least six implementation bodies operating on a cross-border or all-island basis”
Prisoners	The early release of prisoners was a highly contentious issue. Both Nationalist and Loyalist paramilitary wings of mainstream parties had members in prison on charges directly related to the conflict.	Outlined in the agreement was the early release for prisoners affiliated with groups which maintained “complete and unequivocal ceasefires”. Different groups reached this threshold at different times in the two years following the agreement and by July 28th 2000 a total of 428 Nationalist and Unionist affiliated prisoners were granted early release. By 2012 this number had risen to 506.
Disarmament	The issue of disarming paramilitary organizations saw both Nationalist and Unionists skeptical of the intentions of the opposing actors. Separate talks were established throughout the Good Friday agreement negotiations on the topic of disarmament, led by Canadian General John de Chastelain.	In the agreement all participants affirmed commitment to the total disarmament of all paramilitary organization. However, the disarmament process began slowly. It was not until 2005 that nationalists and loyalist paramilitary groups were satisfied that full decommissioning of weapons had occurred.
Equality	The Troubles began with civil rights marches against inequality, and throughout the peace process equality continued to present a problem for negotiators. Catholics were consistently over-represented in the lower indices of deprivation and were the minority group in the workforce.	Equality in Northern Ireland remained a key issue beyond the agreement, with the employment rate and claims for government benefits higher than the UK national average. Catholics featured more highly on deprivation indicators than Protestants but achieved more highly in education attainment.

 

The Republic of Ireland’s Government

Key values:

• Focused on lasting peace on the island of Ireland.
• Some internal uncertainty on what outcomes the people of the Republic of Ireland would be willing to accept in a referendum, but a willingness to give up its constitutional claim towards Northern Ireland.
• Committed to working with all parties to achieve peace.
• Strong belief in the necessity of a referendum in the Republic of Ireland towards constitutional changes in relation to constitutional claim over Northern Ireland.

Primary objectives:

• A strong willingness to persuade the British government to change its position on self-determination for Northern Ireland.
• They believe the Unionist parties will only make compromises under significant pressure by the British government.
• Furthermore, they believe peace will only last with agreement between Unionist and Nationalist parties and paramilitary organizations.

• A commitment to Anglo-Irish intergovernmentalism with the Republic of Ireland, Northern Ireland and the rest of Great Britain involved in the political process

 

Social Democratic and Labour Party

Key values:

• The SDLP, led by David Hume, represent the values of moderate nationalism; they support power sharing and cooperation with the Republic of Ireland. Towards the latter years of the 1980’s, the party became anxious to maintain its support among Nationalists who found Sinn Fein’s more radical approach and philosophy to be more appealing.
• The SDLP advocate non-violence and equality of opportunity across sectors of society, having their primary support base in the Roman Catholic community of Northern Ireland, who felt aggrieved by their subjugation in Northern Irish society.
• The Party support Anglo-Irish cooperation, and campaign for Northern Ireland to remain part of the United Kingdom so long as the majority of the population agreed for it to be so.

Primary Objectives:

• To uphold the Principle of Consent: ensure any decision made in the talks were consented to by referendum by the Northern Irish people
• To establish North-South institutions with cross-border bodies to implement co-operation
• To ensure equality in Northern Ireland; strong reforms on employment, housing and representation

 

British Government

Key values:

• The British Government, lead first by Prime Minister John Major and then his successor Tony Blair, attempt to maintain peace in Northern Ireland and protect the unionists who believe Northern Ireland should be part of the United Kingdom
• As the first British Prime Minister to hold face-to-face meetings with the Nationalist party leaders, Tony Blair aims to halt the ‘troubles’ and reach an agreement in which a level of power sharing can be achieved between the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland

Primary Objectives:

• Ensure the inclusion of both Sinn Fein and the Democratic Unionist Party; peace will only be achieved if both sides are involved

 

Ulster Unionist Party

Key Values:

• Historically the largest Unionist party in Northern Ireland, the Ulster Unionist Party has strongly opposed a united Ireland and rejects Sinn Fein’s attendance in the peace talks
• The UUP had strong links to the British Conservative Party until the mid-1970s after which the ties were weakened
• The initial focus of the party was to unite all of Ireland with Great Britain
• Following the signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985, the UUP members of Parliament resigned their seats in protest of its establishing a consultative role for the Government of Ireland in the affairs of Northern Ireland
• Although reluctant, the UUP is willing to participate in talks with the British and Irish Governments along with the other Northern Ireland political parties

Primary Objectives:

• to insist upon the decommissioning of the IRA (on condition that this was carried out before it will accept Sinn Fein’s presence at peace talks)
• As internal division within the party increases, the UUP will both accept and reject the agreement

 

Sinn Fein

Key values:

• Political wing of the IRA focused strongly representing Republican interests.
• Committed to a future United Ireland. While understanding that a United Ireland was not an option on the table during Good Friday agreement negotiations
• Internal split between those who support a deal and those who view a deal as abandoning the cause for a United Ireland

Primary objectives:

• Maintaining unity in Sinn Fein and the IRA while bringing peace in the short term, while continuing toward the goal of a United Ireland.
• Acquiring the release of its fighters and political prisoners a confidence building measure to demonstrate the sincerity of the British government.
• No local parliament as it fears Unionist domination
• A new police force and withdrawal of British troops.
• A willingness to hold onto weapons. And the refusal of an admission of defeat.

 

Northern Ireland’s Women’s Coalition (NIWC)

Key Values:

• The NIWC was founded by Monica McWilliams, a Catholic scholar, and Pearl Sagar, a Protestant social worker. Since its founding, the NIWC has declined to declare a position on whether Northern Ireland should remain part of the United Kingdom. While supportive of the peace talks, the coalition’s main goal was to secure the representation of women in Irish politics.

Primary Objectives:

• As a cross-community political party, the NIWC had no set position during the peace talks. Some NIWC members supported a united Ireland while some supported Northern Ireland remaining part of the UK.
• Ensuring that women were represented in the peace negotiations was the coalition’s priority. The NIWC pushed for and achieved a recognition of the right of women to equal political participation in the agreement.
• The party also advocated for an inclusive negotiation process which considered all parties, including the DUP.

 

Northern Ireland Labour Party

Key Values:

• Composed of a coalition of labour and left-wing groups in Northern Ireland with a “working-class point of view” (Johnson).
• The Labour Party attributes the divide in Northern Ireland to class struggle, not religion.

Primary Objectives:

• The party wants a settlement which, they believe, will help to close the gap between rich and poor. Thus, they support a “yes” vote in the Northern Ireland referendum.

 

Alliance Party

Key values:

• As the first non-sectarian political party, the Alliance Party attempted to transcend the religious divide, pursuing mixed membership and representation from both religious groups.
• Based on non-sectarian unionism and liberalism, the Alliance Party considered the division between Protestants and Catholics to be the root cause of turmoil in Northern Ireland.

Primary Objectives:

• The AP’s main objective is to promote collaboration between Protestants and Catholics, Unionists and Nationalists.
• The party argued for a continued British presence in Northern Ireland, believing this would be a good compromise.

 

Progressive Unionist Party

Key Values:

• The Political wing of the Loyalist Paramilitary Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF)
• Focused on the maintenance of culturally, political and military unity with the rest of the United Kingdom.

Primary Objectives:

• With a leadership of former UVF prisoners they support the release of prisoners.
• Strongly interested in a political solution and understanding of the need for accommodation.
• Insistent the IRA should destroy or give up all weapons
• Desire for Ireland to give up constitutional claim toward Northern Ireland
• Pushing for a power sharing agreement giving maximum strength to an elected majority
• Avoid equality legislation that which too aggressively erodes the Britishness of Northern Ireland.

 

Ulster Democratic Party

Key Values:

• The UDP is a small loyalist, Protestant paramilitary group, the political branch of the Ulster Defence Association.
• They advocate for an independent Northern Ireland with an elected Assembly and Executive along with a Bill of Rights.
• The party values the principle of consent and wants it included in the Irish Constitution.

Primary Objectives:

• The party wants an agreement and with a ‘yes’ vote in the Northern Ireland Referendum. They are supportive of Northern Ireland remaining part of Britain but if they are allowed a devolved legislative parliament.
• The UDP cannot appear to be more accommodating to nationalist parties like Sinn Fein since many of its members already vote for the larger, more established Unionist parties.

 

US Government

Key Values:

• Publicly, the American government wants to appear even-handed and fair.
• The government wants to earn respect and maintain good relationships with all parties involved in the talks. Senator George Mitchell (who will serve as chairman at the talks) has already made strides here by participating in previous talks with several of the parties.
• Traditionally, the US has backed Britain however, the Clinton administration wants to empower the weaker parties including the Nationalists and the Irish government. This was evidenced by Clinton’s increasing the US annual contribution to the International Fund for Ireland.

Primary Objectives:

• The US government wants to push the parties to come to an agreement. This will advance their image as an objective and effective mediator. It will also reflect well on President Clinton’s office and on the American government in general.
• President Clinton expressed hope that the issue of decommissioning would be discussed at the talks.

 

UK Unionist Party

Key values:

• The UK Unionist Party, established by Robert McCartney in 1995, is a non-sectarian Unionist party formed as a breakaway group from the Ulster Unionist Party
• The UKUP withdrew from peace talks when Sinn Fein was admitted in 1997 and maintain an anti-agreement stance throughout negotiations
• In line with other Unionist parties, the UKUP supports British rule of Northern Ireland, however they do not support a Conservation ideology and propose more left-wing policies
• The UKUP believe that any agreement made at the peace talks would create a slippery slope towards a united Ireland, and lead to nothing but the appeasement of terrorists
• The UKUP would only participate if Sinn Fein abandons its objective of Irish Unity

Primary Objectives:

• Contest any agreement that proposed a move towards a united Ireland
• Reject the views of Sinn Fein and other nationalist groups who push for stronger North-South ties
• Strengthen Northern Ireland’s connection with the UK and eventually fully integrate

 

Democratic Unionist Party

Key values:

• As a hard-line faction of the Ulster Unionist Party, the Democratic Unionist Party strongly condemns any power sharing bodies and rejects the participation of Sinn Fein in peace talks, hence their boycotting of the talks when Sinn Fein was admitted in 1997
• Avoiding all contact with the Irish Government, the DUP strongly supports union with Britain and campaigns to prevent the dilution of British identity in Northern Ireland
• Despite rescinding violence like their opponents Sinn Fein, the DUP has a history of connections to Loyalist paramilitary groups such as the Ulster Resistance

Primary Objectives:

• Prevent the early release of nationalist paramilitary prisoners
• Reject any suggestion of compromise by the UUP leadership or British Government who are seen as being too willing to concede to the demands of Nationalist groups.

 

Canadian Chair of Decommissioning Talks

Key Values

• Presiding over talks focused on the monitoring of a ceasefire agreement with the IRA and the broader theme of decommissioning and disarmament.

Primary Objective

• Ensure that as the agreement is being finalized all terms and conditions of decommissioning and disarmament are met.
• Provide a third party actor for both parties to meet if further negotiations, clarifications or issues are raised.

“The disappointment comes not from the modesty of our achievements, which are considerable, but from the enormity of our expectations.” - Tony Blair, 2002[i]

Tony Blair’s words, four years after the Good Friday Agreement, capture the essence of the complex and problematic issues facing any post-conflict state. To this day, Northern Ireland still navigates a difficult path to peace.

In assessing the outcomes of the Good Friday Agreement, it is necessary to go beyond the absence of violence (negative peace) and consider the primary issues of governance and sectarianism which still permeate the collective conscience of Northern Irish communities. Might it be that Northern Ireland exists in the liminal space of “no war, no peace” characterized by social polarization?[ii]. The following evaluation will draw upon Kristine Höglund and Mimmi Kovac’s “Peace Triangle”, a development of the classical ‘Conflict Triangle’ of Johan Galtung, which takes actors as central to the analysis of incompatibilities, behaviour and attitudes in post conflict society[iii].

Höglund and Kovac demarcate post-conflict issues (incompatibilities) into the categories of “unresolved”, where the peace process has failed to manage core issues causing conflict, “restored”, where few political visions have been realized and little positive change has been achieved but peace is nevertheless secured, and finally, “contested”, where the terms of the peace accord facilitate future conflict[iv]. It is clear that the incompatibilities between the primary actors of the conflict continue to impact the political landscape of Northern Ireland; The Good Friday Agreement aimed to resolve the polarization on issues of governance and sectarianism, yet these issues, which formed the foundation of the agreement, remained unresolved after 1998.

The Agreement successfully founded the power-sharing systems, which have secured proportional representation to Unionists and Republicans, but this form of power sharing has encouraged and legitimized traditional “single identities” of Catholic-Irish and Protestant-British. It has also proved problematic given that hard-line parties benefited from their inclusion. Consequently, policy has been driven towards more extremist positions, at the expense of moderate parties such as the SDLP who have been progressively losing seats to Sinn Fein. This has caused the SDLP to lose all three of its Westminster seats in the June 2017 General Election. Moreover, the Protestant complaint that the treaty favoured Catholic interests rose from 50%, immediately following the agreement, to 70% in 2003, demonstrating an ideological return to the familiar polarization of the conflict shortly after the optimism of the Good Friday Agreement[v].

Höglund and Kovac measure behaviour in post-conflict environments under the classifications of “partial”, “regional” and “insecure’ peace”. A “partial” peace would be one in which one or more of the former warring parties continue to use violence as a political tool (but the peace still holds), “regional” peace refers to the geographical concentration of residual violence following conflicts, and “insecure” peace refers to the way in which violent and criminal activity fills the vacuums not filled by legitimate government[vi]. The Belfast Agreement was preconditioned by a ceasefire from the IRA and included clauses on militant disarmament, both of which have significantly diminished the threat of violence in the nation. Unfortunately, the actions of spoilers continued to be problematic, and behaviour did not change overnight. In July 1998, three young Catholic children were killed by the Ulster Volunteer Force and in August that same year, a bomb planted by dissident republicans killed 29 people[vii]. Though sporadic pockets of violence exist today, we may optimistically assert that Northern Ireland has moved beyond the aforementioned limited versions of peace.

In Höglund and Kovac’s peace triangle, “attitudes” refers to the presence or absence of conflict mindsets. They measure these attitudes according to three standards: “polarized peace”, where attitudes remain polarized following a peace settlement, “unjust peace”, where there remains a culture of impunity and lack of reconciliation, and “fearful peace”, where the absence of conflict is due to the force of a regime or political repression[viii]. Northern Ireland’s peace can be considered “polarized” due to the lasting and powerful sectarian divisions in recent years leading to the political landscape of Northern Ireland being referred to as a “political paralysis” since January 2017[ix]. This is believed to be due to the fact that the Democratic Unionist Party and Sinn Fein have consistently entrenched their divisions and resisted the proposals of the other, particularly on the issue of Brexit. The political sensitivities of Brexit were felt particularly strongly by Northern Ireland, given that Brexit caused a resurgence in Nationalist self-identification and attitudes. The majority of Ireland voted to remain in the EU but Nationalists, who consider themselves Irish Citizens and not part of the UK (which voted for “Leave”), felt that their autonomy would be jeopardized if Northern Ireland exited the EU.

 

[i] “The Full Text of Tony Blair’s Speech in Belfast.” The Guardian. Guardian News and Media, 17 Oct. 2002. Web. 15 Mar. 2018

[ii] Mac Ginty, Roger, Orla T. Muldoon, and Neil Ferguson. “No War, No Peace: Northern Ireland After the Agreement.” Political Psychology 28.1 (2007): JSTOR. Web. 13 Mar. 2018

[iii] Höglund, Kristine, and Mimmi Söderberg Kovacs. "Beyond the Absence of War: The Diversity of Peace in Post-Settlement Societies." Review of International Studies 36.2 (2010): 367-90. JSTOR. Web. 15 Mar. 2018.

[iv] ibid

[v] ibid

[vi] ibid

[vii] Walsh, Jason. "15 years after Good Friday Agreement, an imperfect peace in Northern Ireland". The Christian Science Monitor. Global News Blog. 10 April 2013. Web. 20 Mar. 2018

[viii] Ibid iii

[ix] Beesley, Arthur, and Mehreen Khan. "Power-sharing Is Least of Northern Ireland's Problems." Financial Times. N.p., 12 Feb. 2018. Web. 22 Mar. 2018.

 

The Belfast Agreement (Good Friday Agreement):

https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/136652/agreement.pdf

Addley, Esther. “British Troops Leave After 38 Years.” The Guardian. Guardian News and Media, 01 Aug. 2007. Web. 15 Mar. 2018.

This news article reports on the long-awaited end to the British military deployment in Northern Ireland in 2007. The last of the British troops left Bessbrook, Northern Ireland, marking the end of Operation Banner. The army’s presence in Northern Ireland between 1969 and 2007 contributed to the Northern Ireland conflict and is, therefore, featured in our chart of key issues. This source, written just a month after the withdrawal of the British forces, captures the excitement of the Irish folks, many of whom had long been opposed to a British presence in Northern Ireland. With quotes from former soldier turned Member of Parliament, Addley’s report explains how the withdrawal of the troops represented Britain’s acknowledgement (however late) of their expired claim to Northern Ireland, as decided by the Good Friday Agreement.

 

Ahern, Bertie. "The Good Friday Agreement: An Overview." Fordham International Law Journal 22.4 (1998): 1194-199. Web. 16 Mar. 2018.

The authors provide a surface overview of the Good Friday agreement outlining the historical background before delving into a selection of key areas in the agreement. One such highlighted section is establishment of North-South institutions in Northern Ireland which demonstrate a commitment for improved relations between the people of Northern Ireland, the government of the Republic of Ireland and the government of Great Britain. The text was useful to us in providing a succinct overview and historical framing of the peace agreement and also provided special insight into the critical role of the United States in the peace process. The work is useful as a historical document but as it was published in 1998 it does not have the benefit of the almost 20 years of history since the agreement. This text was helpful in unison with more recent and comprehensive texts.

 

Beesley, Arthur, and Mehreen Khan. "Power-sharing Is Least of Northern Ireland's Problems." Financial Times. N.p., 12 Feb. 2018. Web. 22 Mar. 2018.

This Financial Times article comments on the effect of Brexit on the DUP and Sinn Fein’s new power-sharing arrangement. Beesley and Khan argue that, since 20 years have passed since the Good Friday Agreement was signed, the time has finally come for the DUP and Sinn Fein to collaborate in government and face issues of language, gay marriage and Brexit. This source provides no background on either the DUP or Sinn Fein and assumes the reader is familiar with both the parties’ positions as well as the history (since before the Good Friday Agreement) of their relationship with one another.

 

Breadun, Deaglan De. “UDA Calls for Yes Vote in Support of Agreement.” The Irish Times. The Irish Times, 25 Apr. 1998. Web. 13 Mar. 2018.

This Irish Times news article explains the position of the loyalist paramilitary Ulster Defence Association. The political wing of the association, the Ulster Democratic Party, would attend the Good Friday talks on its behalf. The article succinctly explains the statements made by the UDA in anticipation of the talks, including its declaration of support of the Belfast Agreement as well as its call for a “yes” vote in the upcoming referendum on Northern Ireland’s status. This source lends much insight into the UDA’s perspective going into the talks. It also refers to several important interactions with other relevant parties including Sinn Fein and the Irish Republican Army days before the Good Friday conference. The article briefly notes the positions of a few other attendees including the Social Democratic and Labour Party, the Ulster Unionist Party and the Alliance Party but does not report on the positions of other parties expected at the talks.

 

“Constitutional Reform: Northern Ireland Good Friday Agreement. Peace Accords Matrix. University of Notre Dame, n.d. Web. 15 Mar. 2018.

This source is simply the written agreement (annex A and B) on constitutional reform in accordance with the Good Friday Agreement. It explains the British-Irish agreement to respect the choice of the Northern Ireland people, as decided by referendum, and related clauses including an affirmation of the Northern Irish people’s right to self-determination. It includes a useful timeline of the implementation of the constitutional reforms between 1998 and 2008.

 

Cox, Michael, Adrian Guelke, and Fiona Stephen. "A Farewell to Arms?" Google Books. Manchester University Press, 2006. Web. 15 Mar. 2018.

This text provides a comprehensive history of the conflict in Northern Ireland leading up to the 1998 Good Friday agreement leading up to the Good Friday agreement. Beginning largely in the 1960s the text delves into the dark statistics surrounding this blood conflict while also painting nuanced and comprehensive pictures of the actors and the rationales and ideologies that propelled these antagonistic groups. Further the book examines how concepts like victimhood, revenge, and and conflict became cyclical outcomes and the challenges posed in escaping the cycle of violence and distrust rampant in Northern Irish society. This text provided a large amount of useful information in broadening our understanding of the conflict in Northern Ireland.

 

Fearon, Kate, and Monica McWilliams. “The Good Friday Agreement: A Triumph of Substance Over Style.” The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. N.p., 1998. Web. 15 Mar. 2018.

The authors provide a meaningful overview of many of the significant elements of the Good Friday which distinguish the agreement from past peace attempts. Published in 1998 without the advantage of how the implementation of the agreement would occur. Even within these parameters the text provides a meaningful analysis of the negotiation process with special emphasis on the role of the Northern Irish Women’s Coalition and their role in the eventual peace agreement. This text was important for our group as it enriched our understanding of the  roles played by numerous actors in the negotiation process. Especially the role of the NIWC. All other actors were discussed only in passing and without the level of detail provided to the NIWC.

 

Höglund, Kristine, and Mimmi Söderberg Kovacs. "Beyond the Absence of War: The Diversity of Peace in Post-Settlement Societies." Review of International Studies 36.2 (2010): 367-90. JSTOR. Web. 15 Mar. 2018.

The authors discuss the concepts of negative and positive peace in the context of Northern Ireland and Cambodia. In their analysis of Northern Ireland, they move past the absence or presence of armed conflict. They focus on what is termed as the “Peace Triangle”, specifically the issues, behaviour, and attitudes in a post conflict state. Through their analysis they paint a thorough picture of the successes and challenges remaining for last and society-wide peace in Northern Ireland. One such area of difficulty is attitudes, as the authors lay out how both the Nationalist and Unionist sides of the Northern Irish conflict remain skeptical of each other, and the Unionists are especially skeptical of the Good Friday Agreement. A rise of extremist parties on both sides is also viewed as a sign of a fragile peace in Northern Ireland. The text provides little background on the conflict but, when combined with historical sources, it provides a sharp critical analysis and highlights the complexities of both peace and conflict in Northern Ireland.

 

Kumar, Radha. “Northern Ireland.” Negotiating Peace in Deeply Divided Societies: a Set of Simulations, SAGE, 2009, PP.1-64. Print.

Intended and written for use in a classroom simulation, this source provides readers with a basic background overview of the conflict in Northern Ireland. It gives a brief summary of the positions of each of the parties which were present at the Good Friday peace talks as well as a comprehensive and detailed conflict timeline. This timeline was extremely useful in the creation of our own timeline.

 

Larson, Per. “To Understand the Negotiations Leading to the Good Friday Agreement 1998.” Thesis. Lund University, n.d. Web. 15 Mar. 2018. <http://lup.lub.lu.se/luur/download?func=downloadFile&recordOId=2275657&fileOId=2275658>.

The author examines the psychological theories regarding the negotiations which led to the Good Friday Agreement. The approach is quite scientific and  analytical with a strong focus on the behavioral psychology of the negotiations. This paper serves as an excellent tool for those looking to understand the Good Friday Agreement from a perspective outside of the historical lens. To a reader trying to simply gain a background on the conflict and agreement this paper may not be the best resource. However, the paper benefited our group as it examined the agreement through a perspective we had not previously encountered therefore contributing to the depth and breadth of our understanding of the negotiation process and outcomes.

 

“Loyalist Party Split Over Peace Accord.” BBC News. BBC, 23 Jan. 2001. Web. 13 Mar. 2018.

This news article reports on the splitting of the Ulster Democratic Party (UDP) in January, three months before the Good Friday conference. The article lends useful insight into the UDP’s internal struggles leading up to the peace talks. While the UDP declared its support of the Good Friday Agreement, 14 branches of the UDP demonstrated their opposition to this support by quitting the party. The article includes valuable quotes from Party Chairman John White who characterized the split as worrying but not likely to affect the UDA ceasefire declared in 1994. Quotes by UDP leader Gary McMichael, who insisted only a third of the branches had left, suggest even more disagreement within the party. The article offers readers a look into the complicated workings of the UDP as it prepared to attend the talks in support of the Good Friday Agreement.

 

Mac Ginty, Roger, Orla T. Muldoon, and Neil Ferguson. "No War, No Peace: Northern Ireland After the Agreement." Political Psychology 28.1 (2007): 1-11. JSTOR. Web. 13 Mar. 2018.

The authors begin by outlining the multudinous areas where the Good Friday agreement has brought meaningful peace to Northern Ireland highlighting the ongoing ceasefire and improved governance and community relations. However, the authors make a clear point that Northern Ireland still has a long way to go before it can be understood as a harmonious democracy. Sectarianism among the two communities remains prevalent and at the time of this text, 10 years after the Good Friday Agreement. This source also provides a concise background of the conflict which added in our overall understanding of the Northern Ireland. The source was particularly useful in outlining some of the continued roadblocks to complete peace in Northern Ireland, especially when cross referenced with more recent sources, at which point we were able to paint a more nuanced picture of the current situation in Northern Ireland.

 

O’Rourke, Catherine. “Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition.” Encyclopedia Britannica. Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 20 May 2016. Web. 13 Mar. 2018.

This section of the online Encyclopedia Britannica provides a brief overview of the history of the Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition (NIWC) from creation in 1996 to disbandment in 2006. It also explains the coalition’s contributions to the Good Friday Agreement including its involvement in creating provisions for equality (for women) and human rights.

 

Taylor, Ros. “Who’s Who in Northern Ireland.” The Guardian. Guardian News and Media, 29 Jan. 1999. Web. 13 Mar. 2018.

Ros Taylor of the Guardian provides short summaries of all parties involved in the Good Friday Agreement. Taylor’s article begins with short definitions for frequently used descriptors for parties such as “loyalist” and “unionist”. He then writes short paragraphs for each party, including details about their histories, leaders, composition, values. While the source does not explain the parties’ positions or objectives going into the peace talks, it provides simple descriptions of each party, using the definitions listed at the beginning of the article.

 

"The Full Text of Tony Blair's Speech in Belfast." The Guardian. Guardian News and Media, 17 Oct. 2002. Web. 15 Mar. 2018.

Tony’s Blair’s speech captured the essence of the complex issues facing the parties post-conflict and post-agreement. His analysis of the outcome of the Good Friday Agreement, presented through this speech, mirrors our own analysis.

 

Tonge, Jonathan. “From Sunningdale to the Good Friday Agreement: Creating Devolved Government in Northern Ireland”. Taylor and Francis Online. Contemporary British History, 25 June 2008. Web. 15 Mar. 2018.

The authors in this text track some of the parallels between the 1973 Sunningdale agreement and the 1998 Good Friday agreement to how the peace process played out amongst almost 25 years of conflict between the two agreements. Special focus in the text is given to the issue of devolved government. With the views of the the prominent republican and loyalist groups demonstrated alongside that of the British government. The authors provide significant historical background into the failed Sunningdale peace agreement of 1973. Our group gained significant historical context from the text, while simultaneously enriching our understanding of the progression and at time regression of the peace process in Northern Ireland. The focus of the text on the issue of devolution is beneficial as the authors are able to clearly outline the complexities and nuances of what was both a significant issue in negotiations for the agreement and remains a significant issue in Northern Ireland today.

 

Wolff, Stefan. “The Road to Peace? The Good Friday Agreement and the Conflict in Northern Ireland.” World Affairs, vol. 163, no.4, 2001, pp.163-170. Web. 15 Mar. 2018.

The authors provide a background for the Good Friday agreement touching upon the history, key actors and previous attempts for peace. The text demonstrates the opposing understanding of the conflict within the Loyalist and Nationalist communities and in doing so aided our understanding of the key issues at work in the conflict. The text does not go into the key issues at length and is largely a surface historical account, but through the quality and concision the authors are able to provide a meaningful understanding of the conflict and peace process without going too deeply into the complexities of the conflict and peace agreement. The text outlines several key outcomes of the agreement and the saliency of these outcomes in the peace process of Northern Ireland. These outcomes proved useful in our analysis of the outcomes of the Good Friday agreement. Written in 2001 (three years after the agreement) the text provides three years of outcomes which we were able to build upon with later research to enrich our understanding of the eventual outcomes of the peace process and agreement, in the nearly two decades which have followed the Good Friday agreement.

 

A Belfast Man on Patrol for the Irish Republican Army, 1987. Digital image. ATI. ATI, 17 May 2016. Web. 22 Mar. 2018. <http://allthatsinteresting.com/the-troubles-northern-ireland>.

 

Addley, Esther. “British Troops Leave After 38 Years.” The Guardian. Guardian News and Media, 01 Aug. 2007. Web. 15 Mar. 2018.

 

Ahern, Bertie. "The Good Friday Agreement: An Overview." Fordham International Law Journal 22.4 (1998): 1194-199. Web. 16 Mar. 2018.

 

Beesley, Arthur, and Mehreen Khan. "Power-sharing Is Least of Northern Ireland's Problems." Financial Times. N.p., 12 Feb. 2018. Web. 22 Mar. 2018.

 

Breadun, Deaglan De. “UDA Calls for Yes Vote in Support of Agreement.” The Irish Times. The Irish Times, 25 Apr. 1998. Web. 13 Mar. 2018.

 

Burntollet March, 1969. Digital image. History Hub. History Hub, n.d. Web. 22 Mar. 2018. <http://historyhub.ie/why-was-there-a-civil-rights-movement-in-northern-ireland>.

 

“Constitutional Reform: Northern Ireland Good Friday Agreement. Peace Accords Matrix. University of Notre Dame, n.d. Web. 15 Mar. 2018.

 

Cox, Michael, Adrian Guelke, and Fiona Stephen. "A Farewell to Arms?" Google Books. Manchester University Press, 2006. Web. 15 Mar. 2018.

 

Fearon, Kate, and Monica McWilliams. “The Good Friday Agreement: A Triumph of Substance Over Style.” The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. N.p., 1998. Web. 15 Mar. 2018.

 

Good Friday Agreement. Digital image. BBC. BBC, 1998. Web. 22 Mar. 2018. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/events/good_friday_agreement>.

 

Guyoncourt, Sally. A British soldier drags a Catholic protester during the ‘Bloody Sunday’ massacre on 30 January, 1972. Digital image. The Independent. Independent Digital News and Media, 12 Nov. 2015. Web. 22 Mar. 2018. <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/bloody-sunday-ex-paratroopers-launch-legal-bid-to-halt-murder-inquiry-a6731031.html>.

 

Höglund, Kristine, and Mimmi Söderberg Kovacs. "Beyond the Absence of War: The Diversity of Peace in Post-Settlement Societies." Review of International Studies 36.2 (2010): 367-90. JSTOR. Web. 15 Mar. 2018.

 

Imbornoni, Ann Marie. Catholics and Protestants as a Percentage of the Population, 1991 (Map). Digital image. Crawford's World. N.p., n.d. Web. 22 Mar. 2018. <http://www.crawfordsworld.com/rob/apcg/UK/Father/Fatherchronology.htm>.

 

Kumar, Radha. “Northern Ireland.” Negotiating Peace in Deeply Divided Societies: a Set of Simulations, SAGE, 2009, PP.1-64. Print.

 

Larson, Per. “To Understand the Negotiations Leading to the Good Friday Agreement 1998.” Thesis. Lund University, n.d. Web. 15 Mar. 2018. <http://lup.lub.lu.se/luur/download?func=downloadFile&recordOId=2275657&fileOId=2275658>.

 

“Loyalist Party Split Over Peace Accord.” BBC News. BBC, 23 Jan. 2001. Web. 13 Mar. 2018.

 

Mac Ginty, Roger, Orla T. Muldoon, and Neil Ferguson. "No War, No Peace: Northern Ireland After the Agreement." Political Psychology 28.1 (2007): 1-11. JSTOR. Web. 13 Mar. 2018.

 

Mulberry Bush Pub Wrecked by Bomb in 1974. Digital image. Daily Mail. Daily Mail, n.d. Web. 22 Mar. 2018. <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3620905/Revealed-real-pub-bombers-coroner-orders-Birmingham-inquests-reopened-families-demand-killers-brought-justice-now.html>.

 

Murdered by the IRA. Digital image. Daily Mirror, 28 Aug. 1979. Web. 22 Mar. 2018. <https://i.pinimg.com/originals/43/10/bb/4310bb20bad8f19bbb8b035ce3885097.jpg>.

 

O’Rourke, Catherine. “Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition.” Encyclopedia Britannica. Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 20 May 2016. Web. 13 Mar. 2018.

 

Taylor, Ros. “Who’s Who in Northern Ireland.” The Guardian. Guardian News and Media, 29 Jan. 1999. Web. 13 Mar. 2018.

 

Tonge, Jonathan. “From Sunningdale to the Good Friday Agreement: Creating Devolved Government in Northern Ireland”. Taylor and Francis Online. Contemporary British History, 25 June 2008. Web. 15 Mar. 2018.

 

"The Full Text of Tony Blair's Speech in Belfast." The Guardian. Guardian News and Media, 17 Oct. 2002. Web. 15 Mar. 2018.

 

Walsh, Jason. "15 years after Good Friday Agreement, an imperfect peace in Northern Ireland". The Christian Science Monitor. Global News Blog. 10 April 2013. Web. 20 Mar. 2018

 

White, Connor. Sinn Fein Cartoon. Digital image. Unionist Voice. Unionist Voice, 3 Jan. 2018. Web. 22 Mar. 2018. <https://unionistvoice.com/2018/01/03/former-sinn-fein-ira-election-candidate-threatens-legal-action-against-unionist-voice/>.

 

Wolff, Stefan. “The Road to Peace? The Good Friday Agreement and the Conflict in Northern Ireland.” World Affairs, vol. 163, no.4, 2001, pp.163-170. Web. 15 Mar. 2018.

Global leaders are concerned about the withdrawal of North Korea from Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

Talks began after the fallout from the failed 1994 “Agreed Framework”, and North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT. Concerns over North Korea's increasing nuclear capabilities, combined with concerns over their leadership, spurred an international commitment to work on negotiating peace with North Korea. Currently, North Korea remains outside of the NPT but did disable nuclear reactor that produced plutonium for its weapons program.

North Korea wants normalized relationships with the United States and a non-aggression pact

As established in the first round of negotiations, a central issue for North Korea was that of creating normalized relationships with the United States, as well as a non-aggression pact. North Korea stated that without meeting these demands they would not consider dismantling their nuclear program. The United States previously rejected a non-aggression pact proposal and remained firm during talks, but later reached an agreement with North Korea. On October 11, 2008, during the sixth round of negotiations, the United States removed North Korea from its list of state-sponsored terrorism as well as removing North Korea from the Trading with the Enemy Act. This fulfilled one of North Korea’s demands of having a further normalized relationship with the USA.

The United States fails to provide aid to North Korea in a timely manner, sparking lost confidence in the negotiations

Another key demand of North Korea was that of receiving economic aid. After delays in the delivery of aid from the Americans, North Korea walked out of the negotiations. Failing to deliver aid in the agreed timeframe ultimately lead to lost confidence in the peace talks by the North. Rebuilding trust with the north has proven a difficult task since this round of deterioration.

Re-establishing Negotiations with North Korea

Currently, one of the key issues is simply trying to get North Korea to resume the peace negotiations. After failed negotiations in the sixth round, North Korea pulled out of the talks and began to resume their nuclear enrichment program. Despite this, South Korea recently reached a breakthrough when the North agreed to reopen dialogue with the South in 2018 during talks of North Korea’s participation in the Olympics held in PyeongChang.

1. The United States

• Disarmament nuclear arsenal

The United States has always been the leading promoter of a complete and irreversible dismantlement of the nuclear arsenal in North Korea. In consideration of North Korea's record of caprice and outright deceit, the U.S. insisted on a multilateral rather than a unilateral approach to negotiate, in order to impose international supervision on the DPRK. However, even though the U.S. was extremely resolute in disarming DPRK’s nuclear programs during the negotiation, from its national security tactics, the nuclear arsenal in DPRK is still used as an excuse for the U.S. to deploy its own antinuclear weapons in Korea and Japan to counter with the power of China and Russia. Thus, it is believed that the U.S.’s statement for nuclear dismantlement in North Korea was not sincere.

• Economic sanction on DPRK

Different than the diplomatic path with China in the 1970s, the U.S. preferred an isolation policy to North Korea without diplomatic recognition nor economic cooperation. However, the U.S. has promised to delist the DPRK as a supporter of terrorism and terminated the exercise of the Trading with the Enemy Act with DPRK in 2008. The U.S. also agreed to provide humanitarian aid with resources supplied if a complete and verifiable denuclearization is agreed to in North Korea.

2. North Korea

• Disarmament nuclear arsenal

The Kim family did not have the same economic strength and resources as China to have an open reform, therefore, they regarded military force as their only chip to defend the national ideology and a continued glorification of the family. They have learned lessons from the situations in Iraq and Libya, so they would not give up nuclear weapons unless a better relationship with America and other parties in security, diplomacy, and economy, can be guaranteed for the foreseeable future.

• The geopolitical relationship in Northeast Asia

Valuing regime survival above all else, North Korea has regarding their nuclear program as a weapon to deter a forcible unification with South Korea through the promotion of America. The DPRK remains extremely isolated, although maintains some relations with China and has kept a nuclear resources partnership with Iran and Pakistan.

• Economic sanctions

The illegal transaction of military weapons and technologies with the third world were believed to be DPRK’s major source of income. The economic sanction and isolation policy did little to terrorize the DPRK, which has a lower opportunity cost than Iraq and Iran because of a more autarkic economy – with fewer dependents on global trade and the international system. But, largely depending on the food and energy supply from China, North Korea might lower its head once this biggest trader has determined to stand with America in the case of denuclearization.

3. South Korea

• Disarmament nuclear arsenal

Bandwagoning with America, South Korea was the free-rider in the negotiation who has relied upon America to balance the powers in the East Asia and the threat from Kim’s regime.

• The geopolitical relationship in Northeast Asia

The historical issue between South and North Korea was the dynamic of the South to stand against the North in the negotiation, and also the biggest obstacle to establishing a peaceful system on the Korean peninsula. South Korea did want unification with the North, but prepared to wait after they realized the heavy cost. Concerning about the territory hegemons of East Asia, China and Russia, who also own their own nuclear programs, South Korea had no choice but accept its passive position in the relationship with America, and allow the U.S. to deploy its anti-nuclear programs (THAAD) in South Korea territory on the pretext of threatening the North.

• Economic sanctions

The South has little economic connection with North Korea and the economic sanctions were not a useful tool for the South to menace the North. Following the steps of America, South Korea showed its willingness to provide a certain amount of material and financial aids to the North with the processing of denuclearization.

4. China

• Disarmament nuclear arsenal

China was the host and mediator of the peace talks between the U.S. and DPRK. Despite sharing a border with North Korea, China did not believe the nuclear weapons in DPRK would ever hurt its national security. To China, the opposite sides in the negotiation were U.S. and DPRK, and North and South Korea. But, China still positively involved in the talk since recognizing that the possession of nuclear weapons might promote nuclear proliferation in the neighboring

• The geopolitical relationship in Northeast Asia

As both a historical friend and communist comrade, China has always kept a friendly relationship with the DPRK. The intense relationship with South Korea and Japan continues to threaten China’s position as regional hegemony within Asia, as a result, the key statement of China in SPT was a denuclearization in the whole Korean Peninsula. However, although China behaved positively in the SPT to reciprocate America for its favorable behaviors in the previous years, especially for its concession in the Taiwan issue, China opposed vehemently against America about THAAD for its threats to their national security.

• Economic sanction on DPRK

China is the DPRK’s largest trading partner. For instance, the exporting of coal contributed 30% of the trading income in North Korea. During the negotiations, China was worried that imposing economic sanctions on the North would cause economic damage that could lead to destabilization and potentially trigger conflict on Northeast Asian territory.

5. Japan

• Disarmament nuclear arsenal

Attended the negotiation as a great power in Asia, Japan was not actually involved in the conflict nor would they be affected by the result of the negotiations. Although they had been bandwagoning with the U.S. for its concern about national security, Japan did not really want a compromise from the DPRK, for which they might lose an excuse to deploy their own army and military instruments.

• The geopolitical relationship in Asia

Having stayed in an intense relationship with China for historical reasons, Japan has installed the US-developed Aegis ship-based anti-ballistic missile system in 2007 to defend the attack from North Korea while threatening China.

• Economic sanctions

Similar to South Korea, Japan had little commercial connection with the North but imposed harsh economic sanctions as the response to the call from America. Since 2006, Japan imposed a ban on North Korean ships from Japanese ports and import of products.

6. Russia

• Disarmament nuclear arsenal

Russia was not deeply involved in the conflict, Russia’s ambition was to play a constructive broker or moderate role in the strives of denuclearization. However, on the other hand, Russia provided technology to aid in the DPRK’s nuclear programs in the former Soviet period, it is believed that the dynamic of Russia in promoting denuclearization is similar with its partner China - aimed at the whole Korean Peninsula instead of to antagonize with the North.

• The geopolitical relationship in Asia

As another hegemony in Asia, Russia has always kept a close cooperdinationship with China. Owning the biggest nuclear warhead arsenal, Russia was invited to the peace talk mainly because of its powerful strength as a nuclear-armed territory hegemony, rather than any vested interests in the region. After the demise of the USSR, the Russian position in Asia has considerably declined especially since the rise of Far Eastern regions. In this circumstance, a multilateral structure in Northeast Asian security and cooperation was desirable for Russia to access the decision-making process for its own further interests. The problem of North Korea was a good entry path for Russia to improve its regional effects.

• Economic sanction on DPRK

Russia was the only member of the Six-Party Talks besides the United States that actually supplied heavy fuel oil to North Korea as was agreed in February 2007. Prioritizing the peace conditions in Northeast Asian territory in the first place of the whole negotiation, Russia was not active in imposing economic sanctions on the DPRK while impugning America’s “super-hardline policy” to force new concessions from Pyongyang without adequate reciprocity. Moscow was worried that a radical sanction might not only worsen the contradiction in the current nuclear problem, it might also cause the DPRK to become desperate, and trigger a security problem in the Northeastern Asian territory.

1. European Union

• Why they were not invited

As one of the biggest international powers, the EU was not invited to the peace talks simply because it had neither a direct interest in North Korea nor a considerable regional effect in Northeast Asia. However, with increasing commercial trades with Asian countries, such as China, the EU had actively engaged in the nuclear problem of the DPRK to improve its own influence in Asia.

• Disarmament of the nuclear arsenal and economic sanctions on the DPRK

The EU clearly stated its position with other participants in the SPT, insisting on the complete and irreversible denuclearization of North Korea, and has supported international sanctions against the DPRK. Lacking political ties with South Korea, the EU was a neutral civilian actor to the North. Supported EU’s request for enhanced observer status in UNGA and introduced more SEZs to promote trade, the economics of DPRK could be shocked heavily once EU strengthens the economic sanctions. Besides, EU had involved in KEDO construction with financial aid provided.

• Humanitarian aid to North Korea

Because the DPRK is not part of the WTO, they do not benefit from their programmes for developing nations under the EU's General System of Preferences (GSP). The EU had been providing humanitarian aid to North Korea’s agricultural sector since 1995 when severe famine afflicted the country, with a programme funded by the Food Security Thematic Programme of the Development Cooperation Instrument.

2. Iran and Pakistan

• Why they were not invited

Iran and Pakistan were not invited to the Six-Party talks because of its passive position in the Asian territory. Iran, like the DPRK, is also a violator of the NPT and was not invited to the peace talks about denuclearization.

• Disarmament nuclear arsenal in the DPRK

Allegedly in contact with North Korea and thought to have exchanged technology, Iran and Pakistan have been considered accomplices to the DPRK. Neither had made any clear statement about the nuclear programs in North Korea, nor promoted nuclear non-proliferation with other participants in the talk.

3. NATO

• Why they were not invited

There is no clear explanation about why NATO was not invited to the six-party talk, but the reason may be similar to that of the EU.

• The geopolitical relationship in Asia

NATO has been hoping to expand relations with South Korea since the early 2000s when South Korea was engaging with NATO to create a Security Partnership. However, this expansion has contained Russian and Chinese influence and it would not be worth it for South Korea to sacrifice relations with China and Russia by joining NATO as they are vital partners in de-escalating North Korean aggression.

• Disarmament nuclear arsenal and economic sanctions on the DPRK

NATO had always played a positive role in promoting denuclearization in North Korea while urging the interest-related countries, such as other participants in the SPT, to impose tougher sanctions on DPRK.

4. KEDO

• Why they were not invited
  

The Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) was established to implement the 1994 U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework, which entailed the construction of two light water reactor nuclear power plants in North Korea to replace North Korea's Magnox type reactors. The KEDO was a good step in freezing North Korea's nuclear programs by collective efforts of America, South Korea, and Japan. They were not invited to the SPT perhaps because all their members had already been involved in the talk to express their position previously, therefore it was not necessary for KEDO to attend as an actor. Furthermore, without a “sustained, high-level political leadership”, the light water reactor program had been closed in 2006. It is believed that the broken promise of the KEDO members had worsened the conflict between the oppositions in the SPT.

The goal of the Six-Party Talks was to peacefully negotiate the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Cooperating together, the six nations of North Korea, the United States, China, Russia, South Korea and Japan hoped to establish a dialogue that could create a greater level of peace and stability in the region. Ultimately, the peace negotiations fell apart during their Sixth Round, with North Korea leaving the negotiations indefinitely. Despite this, there has been some progress made since North Korea left the negotiation table that leads many to be hopeful that the talks may resume in the future.

North Korea’s missile program rapidly progressed in 2017, during which time it fired 23 missiles (Berlinger). These actions triggered concern throughout the international community, with the South Korean government stating, “We strongly condemn yet another provocation from the North,” (Manson et al.). The Americans also said that “all options are on the table” in response to a ballistic missile launch (Manson, Sevastopulo, and Harding). North Korea’s continued technological advancements and disregard of concern in the international community has only served as an added sense of urgency to resuming dialogue.

Despite an escalation in conflict in the Asian region recently, relations between North Korea and their southern neighbor have made some progress. In an unexpected move, North Korea asked to send delegated athletes to attend the 2018 Olympic Games held in PyeongChang.Their attendance was an unprecedented move, with South Korea diplomatically welcoming their athletes and establishing a formal dialogue for the first time in two years with North Korea (Stiles). Despite some international criticism, allowing the North to compete in the Olympics potentially offered a new sense of diplomacy between the two nations.

Under heightened tensions between the United States and North Korea the possibility of further talks have been renewed with North Korea sending an unexpected invitation of talks to the U.S. In a message delivered by South Korean diplomats to the United States stating that they wanted to reopen dialogue about the nuclear issue, President Donald Trump emphatically accepted their offer, stating that it was “very positive” (Cohen et al.). Additionally, after talking with the North, Seoul's national security chief, Chung Eui-yong, stated that the North offered to refrain from conducting nuclear and missile tests that while in talks with the U.S (Cohen et al.). These talks are expected to commence in mid-2018. The potential magnitude of these future discussions has yet to be seen and a resumption of the Six-Party Talks does not yet seem highly likely.

There has been a substantial lack of confidence in the North Korean regime and their ability to follow through on their statements of resolution. Although the idea of North Korea dismantling their nuclear program remains unlikely, the move towards more open communication, rather than their previous isolationism, offers some hope that peace talks could resume in the future. Until then, nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula are unlikely to go anywhere.

Statement by the Secretary-General on the Six-Party Talks
https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2008-06-26/statement-secretary-general-six-party-talks

US Department of State Archives on Six-Party Talks, 2001-2009
https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2008/may/104558.htm

American Policy regarding North Korea and the Six-Party Talks, from Bush to Obama
http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/obamas-north-korea-policy/

North Korea Taken off State Sponsored Terrorism List
https://www.cnn.com/2013/10/29/world/asia/north-korea-nuclear-timeline---fast-facts/index.html

Article on the background of Six-Party Talks
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/six-party-talks-north-koreas-nuclear-program

Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks, Beijing, 19 September 2005
https://www.state.gov/p/eap/regional/c15455.htm

Buszynski, Leszek. Negotiating with North Korea: the Six-Party Talks and the Nuclear Issue. Routledge, 2016.
Leszek Buszynski is a professor of International Relations. In his book, Buszynski examines the multilateral negotiations in the Six-Party Talks, with a focus on bargaining and negotiation. His focus on how negotiation shapes outcomes is an interesting addition to the literature surrounding the North Korean nuclear issue in that North Korea, being in strict isolation, is often seen as hostile and difficult to negotiate with. The importance of negotiating is a key component of peacebuilding, but as Buszynski there is difficulty is finding common ground between negotiators, with members of the Six-Party Talks having varying approaches to the issue. Another key idea that Buszynski addresses are the power dynamics that exist in negotiations, in particular that of the prevention of the U.S as being a “dominant player”, since they had to compete with China, who further had the support of Russia. This created difficulty in creating a resolution with North Korea. The ideas offered by Buszynski are of great importance when attempting to understand the difficulty of creating a denuclearized Korean Peninsula.

Millard, Andrew S., and Chae-Deug Yi. "The EU’s Potential Role in the Six-Party Talks and the North Korean Nuclear Crisis." Baltic Journal of European Studies, vol. 7, no. 2, 2017, pp. 247-283.
Millard and Chae examine the positions of the European Union in the SPT, and the relationship between EU and KEDO. This article listed EU and KEDO’s contribution to the denuclearization and reconstruction in North Korea provided a possible reason for them being not invited to the SPT.

Okano-Heijmans, Maaike. "Troubled Neighbours: Japan's Negative Economic Diplomacy Towards North Korea." European Journal of East Asian Studies, vol. 9, no. 2, 2010, pp. 363-394.
This research started from Japan’s tactics and policies in the DPRK issues, deeply analyzed Japan’s diplomatic relations with other five participants of the SPT, demonstrated Japan’s dynamic to bandwagon with America and cooperate with China for both the nuclear issue and the whole national blueprint.

Schneider, Mark. "The North Korean Nuclear Threat to the U.S." Comparative Strategy, vol. 33, no. 2, 2014, pp. 107-121.
Schneider introduced the characteristics of nuclear weapons in DPRK, Pakistan, and Iran indicated their illegal commercial connection for nuclear resources and technologies. This article is the base of the analyzation about Iran and Pakistan’s perspectives in the denuclearization of DPRK.

Shulong, Chu, and Lin Xinzhu. "the Six-Party Talks: A Chinese Perspective." Asian Perspective, vol. 32, no. 4, 2008, pp. 29-43.
Chu and Lin’s article expressed Chinese respective toward the nuclear non-proliferation in the DPRK and the relationship between these two communist countries. They indicated Chinese tactic and dynamics to promote denuclearization in the Korean Peninsula, deeply analyzed the state quo and power balances in Northeast Asia. All of their analyzation was derived from the diplomatic and economic connection between these six participants.

Snyder, Scott. "The Second North Korean Nuclear Crisis: Assessing U.S. and DPRK Negotiation Strategies." Pacific Focus, vol. 22, no. 1, 2007, pp. 47-72.
Synder’s article mainly discusses the relationship between America and DPRK, profoundly analyzed America’s tactic in promoting denuclearization in North Korea.

Suh, J. J. "three Failures of the Past, Three Structures of Peace." Asian Perspective, vol. 34, no. 2, 2010, pp. 201-208.
In this article, Such listed the obstacles the participants met in the SPT, concretely explained why they did not reach a workable agreement after the negotiation.

Tan, Ming H. "Multilateral Engagement of North Korea: An Assessment of the Six-Party Talks and the ASEAN Regional Forum." Asian Journal of Peacebuilding, vol. 5, no. 2, 2017, pp. 307-324.
This article also discussed the state quo and power balances in Northeast Asia. Besides, the author also provided a short but clear explanation about Kim family’s “military first” policy.

“The Six-Party Talks at a Glance.” The Six-Party Talks at a Glance | Arms Control Association”, Arms Control Association, July 2017, 
The Arms Control Association is a nonpartisan organization established in 1971 focused on providing public education and information on arms control policies. The information offered by this organization provides a clear analysis of the timeline of events in the Six-Party Talks. Beginning with the events leading up to the establishment of the peace negotiations, the article follows by summarizing each round of negotiations, one through six in brief detail. This organization offers valuable information about the issues being discussed in the Six-Party Talks, providing researchers a concise database of information.

Toloraya, Georgy. "the Six-Party Talks: A Russian Perspective." Asian Perspective, vol. 32, no. 4, 2008, pp. 45-69.
Toloraya made a similar analyzation about Russia as what Chu and Lin did about China. Russia’s relationships and interest conflictions with other five participants around nuclear problem were at the core of this article.

Berlinger, Joshua. “North Korea's Missile Tests: What You Need to Know.” CNN, Cable News
Network, 4 Dec. 2017.
Cohen, Zachary, et al. “Trump Touts 'Positive' Korea Talks but Wants Action.” CNN, Cable News
Network, 7 Mar. 2018,
Manson, Katrina, et al. “US Considering 'All Options' over North Korea Missile Launch.”
Financial Times, 29 Aug. 2017.
Millard, Andrew S., and Chae-Deug Yi. "The EU’s Potential Role in the Six-Party Talks and the
North Korean Nuclear Crisis." Baltic Journal of European Studies, vol. 7, no. 2, 2017, pp.
247-283.
Okano-Heijmans, Maaike. "Troubled Neighbours: Japan's Negative Economic Diplomacy
Towards North Korea." European Journal of East Asian Studies, vol. 9, no. 2, 2010, pp.
363-394.
Rozman, Gilbert. Strategic Thinking about the Korean Nuclear Crisis: Four Parties Caught
between North Korea and the United States. Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2007;2011;
Schneider, Mark. "The North Korean Nuclear Threat to the U.S." Comparative Strategy,
vol. 33, no. 2, 2014, pp. 107-121.
Shulong, Chu, and Lin Xinzhu. "the Six-Party Talks: A Chinese Perspective." Asian Perspective,
vol. 32, no. 4, 2008, pp. 29-43.
Snyder, Scott. "The Second North Korean Nuclear Crisis: Assessing U.S. and DPRK
Negotiation Strategies." Pacific Focus, vol. 22, no. 1, 2007, pp. 47-72.
Stiles, Matt. “North Korea Says It Wants to Go to the Winter Olympics in the South.” Los
Angeles Times, Los Angeles Times, 8 Jan. 2018,
Suh, J. J. "three Failures of the Past, Three Structures of Peace." Asian Perspective, vol. 34, no.
2, 2010, pp. 201-208.
Tan, Ming H. "Multilateral Engagement of North Korea: An Assessment of the Six-Party Talks
and the ASEAN Regional Forum." Asian Journal of Peacebuilding, vol. 5, no. 2, 2017,
pp. 307-324.
Toloraya, Georgy. "the Six-Party Talks: A Russian Perspective." Asian Perspective, vol. 32, no.
4, 2008, pp. 45-69.

Key Issues	Outcome
Lebanon’s sovereignty and identity	Following the agreement, Lebanon failed to reach the level of sovereignty it desired. The presence of Syria and Israel occupying Lebanon resulted in disrupted political affairs domestically and left the country without a president for 29 months at one time. Sovereignty and identity was not a successful principle brought forth by the agreement
End of Civil war in Lebanon	After 15 years the civil war ended in Lebanon. The war killed about 150,000 people and displaced about a million others. The civil war was finally seen as a hurting stalemate after 15 years and there was mutual agreement to put an end to that. The number of wasted militia resources and casualties along with a growing unpopularity of violence made this a key issue in Taif Accord.
Syria maintaining influence in Lebanon	Syria was considered a hurdle in these negotiations due to their strong presence in Lebanon. Syria showed their desire to continue occupying Lebanon during negotiations and their slow removal of military troops. The Agreement entailed for the redeployment of Syrian forces to the Bekka Valley however, no provision exists for the eventual withdrawal of Syrian forces from all of Lebanon until later on.
Abolition of Political Sectarianism	The Taif constitutes a roadmap to the abolition of political sectarianism constitutes which is a fundamental national objective. Political sectarianism and deadlock are still prevalent. The inability to create equalism between Christians and Muslims left a division of class in multiple aspects of society outside of parliament. The issue was considered too large to fix during these negotiations and plans for it were then abolished.

Lebanon

• Come in with the stance with the willingness to end the 15-year civil war while maintaining sovereignty in the nation
• Wanted the full removal of Syrian and Lebanese military troops from Lebanon
• Included the surviving members of Lebanon’s 1972 parliament, fathered by Parliament Speaker President Hussein El-Husseini
• Lebanon was focused on political reform, especially in the abolishment of political sectarianism. There are currently 17 different sects in Lebanon and equality between Maronite Christians and Muslims was a big reason for this agreement as Maronite’s had more representation in parliament.

Syria

• “Syria, which is eager for Lebanon's security, independence, and unity and for harmony among its citizens, should not permit any act that poses a threat to Lebanon's security, independence, and sovereignty.” (Taif)
• Conflict of interest when it comes to giving Lebanon its freedom and sovereignty. Syria believed their militia presence in Lebanon provided necessary and positive influence in the country, therefore they did not want to withdraw fully. As a member in the negotiations overlooking the Taif agreement, Syria acted as a spoiler and prevented a direct date for full withdrawal being negotiated and therefore took their time to remove their presence from the country.
• Supporter in ending the civil war as Syria’s military was heavily involved during the conflict in the country and was therefore tying up many resources in trying to provide Syria with security
• Thought of themselves as a peacekeeper rather than a spoiler

Arab League Mediation Committee

Morocco

• An important actor in pushing for the equality of all Lebanese people
• Expressed interest in abolishing Political sectarianism and making a more balanced legislative assembly

Algeria

• Stood with Lebanon and Syria that Hezbollah was a terrorist organization

Saudi Arabia

• The host country for the signing and final agreement of the accord in the city of Taif, Saudi Arabia
• King of Saudi Arabia signed country into the Arab League Mediation Committee

Non-Arab League Actors

United States of America (USA)

• Considered an important ally for Lebanon during the negotiations. Lebanon believed the US could help provide the security and defense it needed to achieve liberation and freedom as well as sovereignty.
• Wanted Israel to withdraw from south Lebanon through the use of inter
• March 19, 1978: The United Nations Security Council adopts Resolution 425, sponsored by the United States which asked for the withdrawal of Israel from South Lebanon and for the UN to establish a 4,000-strong UN peacekeeping force in South Lebanon.
  The force is termed the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon. Its original mandate was for six months. The force is still in Lebanon today.
• Played a neutral role but ultimately became a defender of Lebanese president at the time, Amine Gemayel

Hezbollah

• The Taif agreement led to a stronger Syrian presence in Lebanon, an important ally for Hezbollah empowering the organization even further
• Wanted Lebanon to achieve their sovereignty and freedom. They fought in Lebanon against Israeli based groups
• Taif agreement allowed Hezbollah to become more than just a movement, they grew to become an important non-state actor

United Nations

• Provided Peacekeeping troops to Lebanon
• Opposed to Syria’s influence in Lebanon as they pointed out that Syria was major power-broker for Lebanon and they are overstaying in the country whilst using the Taif accord as an excuse. However, Syrian presence in Lebanon, invited by the government in Beirut at the outbreak of the civil war, was legitimized by the Taif agreement and supported by the Arab League, and the agreement also committed Syria to ensure Lebanon's national security before it could pull out its troops.

Peace Processes Outlook

The Taif accord/agreement in 1989 between Lebanon and Syria can be viewed as a moment where a hurting stalemate was the driver in pushing the talks to a final agreement. However, the inability to incorporate multi-track diplomacy in the negotiations while dealing with the presence of spoilers made the impact of the agreement minimal and a failure. Among the many political reforms, ultimately the agreement set about to accomplish two major factors; end the Lebanese civil war and abolish political sectarianism while allowing Lebanon to maintain sovereignty and identity. Over the course of 15 years, the Lebanese civil-war had killed more than “150,000 people and left another 300,000 wounded”[1] and also displaced millions of other Lebanese citizens. After 15 years of combat, there was mutual interest in ending the fighting as there was an increase in intolerance for violence. In addition, the Lebanese government determined that minimizing internal conflict in their country by promoting anti-sectarian tactics like equaling Christian and Muslim representation in political office rather than the Christian dominated one they had previously would lead to a less oppressive and structurally sound political system that would benefit all citizens.

Spoilers

Lebanon also suffered from spoilers during the negotiations. The strong military presences of Syria and Israel in Lebanon even post-civil war made the idea of sovereignty tough to achieve and underdeveloped the process that the Taif agreement set out to accomplish. While they did not necessarily prevent anything from being agreed on in the accord, the removal of troops from Lebanon from both countries was a slow process and dragged on. For example, On January 14, 1985, the “Israeli Cabinet voted to completely withdraw its troops from Lebanon” but they left soldiers in southern Lebanon to “control 325 square feet” [2] and ensure a safety guard. In addition, the presence of Syria at the negotiations proved to be cumbersome, as they believed they had an agreement to continue their presence in Lebanon, rather than withdrawing themselves from the country.

Political Sectarianism

Furthermore, the inability to deal with political sectarianism right away led to a paralysis of the government. A country like Lebanon who already suffers from a fragile political structure, underwent a 29-month absence of a president, leaving the country in even more turmoil. In addition, the turmoil of surrounding countries such as Syria and Israel have directly affected the domestic affairs of the Lebanese government leaving it difficult for Lebanon to claim and assert their sovereignty as a free, independent state.

Multi-Track Diplomacy

The outcome of the Taif agreement showcases how important multi-track diplomacy is in peacebuilding negotiations. Without all three levels, negotiations are often not completed successfully. In this case, track 1 negotiations took precedent with high elite actors, specifically, 58 out of the 62 political activists voted in favour of this agreement. While the actors were equal in Christian and Muslim representation, the impact of eliminating religious sectarianism did not transfer into other sectors of the agreement, such as “public jobs, the judiciary, the military, security, public, and joint institutions” [3] which was stated in the Taif Accord. The idea of abolishing sectarianism is great on the surface and provides a cosmetic change to the visual structure of Lebanon’s government, nevertheless, traditional sectarian practices stayed at the core of their system.

 

Endnotes:

1. "Introduction To Principles Of Negotiation: Part III Taif Agreement." Delma.io. N. p., 2018.

Web. 24 Mar. 2018.

2. Saseen, Sandra M. “The Taif Accord and Lebanon’s Struggle to Regain its Sovereignty”

American University International Law Review, vol. 6. (1990)

3. “Taif Accord.” Peacemaker.un.org. N. p., 2018. Web. 23 Mar. 2018.

Introduction to Principles of Negotiation: Part III Taif Agreement (2016)

http://delma.io/en/draft/introduction-to-principles-of-negotiation-part-iii-taif-agreement

Taif Accord (1989)

https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/LB_891022_Taif%20Accords.pdf

Timeline of Events

http://www.mtholyoke.edu/~hhrobert/timline.html

Timeline of the Lebanese Civil War, 1975-1990

https://www.thoughtco.com/timeline-of-the-lebanese-civil-war-2353188

Rosiny, Stephan. "A Quarter Century of 'Transitory Power-Sharing'. Lebanon's Unfulfilled Ta'if Agreement of 1989 Revisited." Civil Wars, vol. 17, no. 4, 2015, pp. 485.

Stephan Rosiny’s article touches on the importance of power-sharing and how multi-sectarian countries like Lebanon. He suggests transitory-power sharing arrangement as a theory to manage conflicts that erupted in these countries. It presents several provisions of this agreement that adhere to three different approaches of how to deal with such conflicts: the consociational and the centripetal models of power-sharing as well as the integrationist paradigm. It thereby seeks to develop a theoretical argument about chances and risks of transitory power-sharing in deeply divided societies and derives some general lessons for managing conflicts in the Middle East.

Geukjian, Ohannes. "From Positive Neutrality to Partisanship: How and Why the Armenian Political Parties Took Sides in Lebanese Politics in the Post-Taif Period (1989-Present)." Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 45, no. 5, 2009, pp. 739-767.

Following the Taif agreement, the abolishment of political sectarianism was a goal of the document. Ohannes Geukjian examines Armenian religious sect in Lebanon and their post-Taif agreement. All parties had to abandon the positive neutrality. However, the Armenian parties were not united over the goal of maintaining the Armenian bloc inside parliament. As they chose different policies to pursue communal interests they took sides with the ruling majority and the anti-government opposition. The Armenians were criticized by some Christian politicians for their partisanship and were expected to maintain their traditional neutrality in Lebanese politics. It is very likely that the Armenians will return to their neutral policy and support the President and the government once their group rights are protected. Something like this would be important to analyze because the failure to abolish sectarianism would leave the Taif agreement without much value.

Krayem, Hassan. "The Lebanese civil war and the Taif Agreement." Conflict resolution in the Arab world: Selected essays (1997): 411-436.

This article by Hasan examines the deficiency of a democratic system that the Lebanese held. While democracy tries to account for equal opportunities for citizens as well as political accountability and political responsibility of officials and institutions were lacking. Lebanon had and still maintains a confessional system based on a formula allocating political and administrative functions to the major sects. This article is important because it shows how an unstable democracy like Lebanon’s post-Taif, leads to conflict.

Salem, Paul. “The Future of Lebanon.” Foreign Affairs, vol. 85, no. 6, 2006, pp. 13–22. JSTOR.

Paul Salem takes a systematic and structural look at the historic events of Lebanon and what could become from the country of them. This article amplifies important actors and events during the pre and post civil war to give a more dynamic look at the current situation in Lebanon. He does a good job in bringing in political party Hezbollah who holds significant influence in the region now especially since they have increased their presence as an actor.

Gaub, Florence. "Multi‐Ethnic Armies in the Aftermath of Civil War: Lessons Learned from Lebanon." Defence Studies 7.1 (2007): 5-20.

Florence Gaub, author of “Multi‐Ethnic Armies in the Aftermath of Civil War: Lessons Learned from Lebanon” examines how countries that have multi-ethnic armies usually suffer from negative downfalls following a civil war. However, through his research, it seems that a country like Lebanon who went through an army reform after the Taif agreement noticed a successful restructuring. An article like this is important for understanding said goals of the Taif Agreement, especially the aspect of abolishing sectarianism promoting equality.

Saseen, Sandra M. “The Taif Accord and Lebanon’s Struggle to Regain its Sovereignty” American University International Law Review, vol. 6. (1990)

Sandra Saseen examines the relationship between Lebanon and the effects that occupying countries Syria and Israel have on its sovereignty and power relations. Saseen talks about how Lebanon is being used as a launchpad by other countries to reach their goals and aims. She also explains how the external dimensions of the crisis are the most important and the most pressing; foreign militaries have occupied Lebanon and foreign nations have interfered in Lebanese internal political affairs. It is critical to Lebanon's future political stability that foreign nations refrain from intervention in Lebanon's domestic affairs. This article ties in well to how Syria and Lebanese influence played a role in the negotiations of the Taif. Often acting as a spoiler and delaying the details of the agreement to come to fruition.

Wantchekon, Leonard. "Credible Power-Sharing Agreements: Theory with Evidence from South Africa and Lebanon." Constitutional Political Economy, vol. 11, no. 4, 2000, pp. 339-352.

Leonard Wantchekon interprets a model which exemplifies the structure of credible post-conflict power-sharing agreements. He specifically examines a case study on Lebanon and South Africa and shows the ways in which power-sharing is crucial in order to maintain a status quo within a democracy. He argues that agreements need to first reconstruct the coercive institutions of the state through the stability of negotiations in settlements of civil wars. This article articulates that the Lebanese Civil war was not necessarily generated by the lack of power-sharing but rather an unfair arrangement among the religious groups.

Makdisi, Samir, and Marcus Marktanner. "Trapped by consociationalism: The case of Lebanon." Topics in Middle Eastern and North African Economies 11 (2009).

This article by Economists Samir Makdisi and Marcus Marktanner portray Lebanon’s current consociational democracy has failed to prevent the outbreak of a long-lasting civil conflict and periodic political crises. They outline that this consociational democracy has resulted in vertical and horizontal inequality. This is an important aspect to consider as drawing the connection between economic status and political structure can often tell a lot about the power relations and sustainability of a government. In this case, Makdisi and Marktanner determine that this inequality is a root cause of armed conflict in Lebanon, whilst claiming that a move to a full fledged democracy will lead to less conflict.

Hudson, Michael C. "lebanon After Ta'if: Another Reform Opportunity Lost?" Arab Studies Quarterly, vol. 21, no. 1, 1999, pp. 27-40.

In this article Michael Hudson examines the ways in which the Taif accord has proven to be a lost opportunity for reform within Lebanon. He articulates and provides insight into where the accord could have been successful and outlines where the accord lacks when trying to create a reform. He argues that even after the Taif, Lebanon has continued to suffer from the imbalance of political power which needs a stronger political reform to ensure cross-confessional support amongst all political parties. He also highlights the ways how the Taif took the wrong approach to the peacemaking process.

Abdallah, Ghassan. “Lebanon's Political System: An Analysis of the Taif Accord,” ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, 2003.

In this Article, Ghassan Abdallah summarizes the outcome of the Taif Accord and highlights the importance of the characteristics of the Lebanese political system. More specifically, it features the variables that affect democratic development and the stabilization of societies. Abdallah argues that although the Accord establishes and outlines reforms of the political system, they are yet to be fully implemented. He proposes the importance of freer elections in order to fully implement the agreements from the Accord. This critique of the political system is crucial to consider when identifying the reasons why the Accord failed and how more reforms are needed to further succeed politically within the Lebanese system.

"25 Years Of Taif." Middle East Eye. N. p., 2018. Web. 27 Mar. 2018. http://www.middleeasteye.net/essays/25-years-taif-1817997266

"A Look At The Taif Accord." Aljazeera.com. N. p., 2005. Web. 27 Mar. 2018 .www.aljazeera.com/archive/2005/03/2008410135815459954.html.

"AUB: The Lebanese Civil War And The Taif Agreement." Ddc.aub.edu.lb. N. p., 2018. Web. 27 Mar. 2018. http://ddc.aub.edu.lb/projects/pspa/conflict-resolution.html

Bahout, Joseph. "The Unraveling Of Lebanon’S Taif Agreement: Limits Of Sect-Based Power Sharing." Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. N. p., 2018. Web. 27 Mar. 2018. http://carnegieendowment.org/2016/05/16/unraveling-of-lebanon-s-taif-agreement-limits-of-sect-based-power-sharing-pub-63571

"Introduction To Principles Of Negotiation: Part III Taif Agreement." Delma.io. N. p., 2018. Web. 24 Mar. 2018. http://delma.io/en/draft/introduction-to-principles-of-negotiation-part-iii-taif-agreement

"It's Been 25 Years Since One Of The Middle East's Most Consequential Peace Agreements." Business Insider. N. p., 2018. Web. 27 Mar. 2018. http://www.businessinsider.com/its-been-25-years-since-the-taif-agreement-2014-11

"Lebanese Civil War Facts, Information, Pictures | Encyclopedia.Com Articles About Lebanese Civil War." Encyclopedia.com. N. p., 2018. Web. 27 Mar. 2018. https://www.encyclopedia.com/social-sciences-and-law/sociology-and-social-reform/sociology-general-terms-and-concepts/lebanese#A

“Taif Accord.” Peacemaker.un.org. N. p., 2018. Web. 27 Mar. 2018. https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/LB_891022_Taif%20Accords.pdf

"Timeline Of The Lebanese Civil War From 1975-1990." ThoughtCo. N. p., 2018. Web. 27 Mar. 2018.https://www.thoughtco.com/timeline-of-the-lebanese-civil-war-2353188

"Timeline." Mtholyoke.edu. N. p., 2018. Web. 27 Mar. 2018. http://www.mtholyoke.edu/~hhrobert/timline.html

"Why Lebanon Is Fractured By The Conflicts In The Middle East." YouTube. N. p., 2018. Web. 27 Mar. 2018. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i_w3v6t3rjY

Weapons Disposal Plan

The Bougainville Peace Agreement weapons disposal plan took into effect after the constitutional amendments implementing the agreement were passed under the PNG Parliament. In order to prevent further delay, any lack of compliance would delay UN authorization of new elections for the Autonomous Bougainville Government (ABG). This led to the withdrawal of the PNGDF as well as arrival of international monitors to oversee Bougainville’s weapons disposal. The United Nations Observer Mission on Bougainville (UNOMB) verified that all parties acted in accordance with the agreed weapons disposal plan. The plan was declared complete in 2005. 

Autonomy Government

One of the objectives of autonomy in the peace agreement was to provide a democratic system of government for Bougainville that meets the standards of good governance– this includes elections. As planned, Bougainville’s first elections were held from May 20 to June 2, 2005. The Autonomous Government of Bougainville was established on June 15 2005, after fair and transparent elections were held, making Joseph Kabui ABG’s first president. Elections are also an important step on the road to lasting peace in Bougainville. 

Independent State of Bougainville

PNG and Bougainville leaders agreed that a referendum on independence would be deferred for 10 to 15 years. It would also be non-binding and subject to approval of the PNG Parliament. To assure that Bougainville’s concerns that this part of the agreement would not be ignored over time, PNG government implemented the referendum in its constitution. Presently, Bougainville’s independence referendum has been scheduled for June 15, 2019. Depending on the extent of ABG’s political success, this will determine outcome of the referendum.

Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA)

Autonomy Government

The BRA supported the idea of high autonomy as they considered it an important process towards independence. Having an autonomous state of Bougainville will allow progress in the domestic capacity of the state while also allowing consensus on independence to develop. An autonomous state will also give Bougainville strict control over the nation’s crucial Panguna mine resulting in growth economically and socially. Therefore, the BRA took the view that autonomy will be the initial process towards independence.

Independent State

The idea of independence from PNG was highly pursued by the BRA. The party’s main position going into the negotiation was obtaining a referendum regarding the independence of Bougainville. The BRA had strong supporters as a majority of Bougainvilleans had wanted independence. The argument for independence from PNG was appropriate considering the drastic differences of ethnic, cultural, and customary values between Bougainville and Papua New Guinea. The BRA had aspirations of uniting all factions of Bougainville through the creation of an independent state.

Weapons Disposal Plan

Due to the failure of many peace accords and ceasefire agreements from both parties, weapons were essential for either party to protect themselves. BRA has acknowledged that a disposal of weapons were essential towards a successful outcome towards the issue of referendum. However, they only agreed to disposing of weapons after satisfactory outcomes regarding the political issues of autonomy and independence.

Bougainville Interim Government (BIG)

Autonomy Government

The BIG was created by the BRA as a as a form of legitimate authority in Bougainville. Therefore, this party possesses similar perspectives as the BRA towards achieving an autonomous government.

Independent State

The BIG was created by the BRA as a form of legitimate authority in Bougainville. Therefore, this party possesses similar perspectives as the BRA towards achieving an independent state.

Weapons Disposal Plan

The BIG was created by the BRA as a form of legitimate authority in Bougainville. Therefore, this party possesses similar perspectives as the BRA towards weapons disarmament.

Bougainville Transitional Government / Bougainville People’s Congress (BTG/BPC)

Autonomy Government

The BPC was created as a representative body and it mainly composed of elected members from the BTG, therefore, they would possess identical perspectives. The BTG/BPC possessed a less radical stance than the BRA as they persisted after building bridges between the factions in Bougainville. Therefore, they strongly supported the idea of an autonomous government as it would resolve the localised conflicts.

Independent State

As the BTG/BPC are a more moderate party, the idea of independence was less favoured among the members. However, they conformed with BRA’s radical viewpoint towards achieving independence in order to garner their aspirations of an autonomous government.

Weapons Disposal Plan

The disarmament of weapons is an essential step towards building bridges between the factions of Bougainville and creating a safe reconciliation environment for the factions of Bougainville.

Bougainville Resistance Force (BRF)

Autonomy Government

The BRF was represented by the BTG/BPC during the peace talks. Therefore, they had identical perspectives as the BTG/BPC

Independent State

The BRF was represented by the BTG/BPC during the peace talks. Therefore, they had identical perspectives as the BTG/BPC

Weapons Disposal Plan

The BRF was represented by the BTG/BPC during the peace talks. Therefore, they had identical perspectives as the BTG/BPC

Papua New Guinea (PNG)

Autonomy Government

The PNG government was against the idea of an autonomous government for Bougainville as the PNG government were more concerned regarding the sovereignty of Papua New Guinea. However, the government positioned peace as the main goal through restoring civil services and disposing weapons which will allow the fragile state of Bougainville to rejuvenate before the discussions of autonomy unfolds.

Independent State

The sovereignty for PNG was the main priority going into the peace talks. However, they were opposed to the idea of independence for Bougainville. The PNG officials were against Bougainville’s demands because they believed that creating and maintaining peace should be the focus while political settlements such as independence will be discussed after re-establishing a stable nation.

Weapons Disposal Plan

Disposal of weapons were a crucial aspect of PNG’s negotiation position as they strived towards achieving peace between the two nations. The disposal of weapons by rebel groups will subsequently restore civil authority (police, courts, and prisons) and civil services leading to restoration of the fragile state of PNG.

New Zealand

Autonomy Government

As New Zealand was a third-party mediator, they had a neutral position regarding this issue

Independent State

As New Zealand was a third-party mediator, they had a neutral position regarding this issue

Weapons Disposal Plan

As New Zealand was a third-party mediator, they had a neutral position regarding this issue

Non - Political Groups (Women’s Groups, Church Leaders, Chief Leaders)

Autonomy Government

They attempted to provide unity and maintained pressure on the Bougainville and PNG governments to continue to search for peace. They did believe that autonomy for Bougainville will result in a peaceful resolution.

Independent State

The role of the non-political groups were to enable a reconciliation process upon the dividing groups. Therefore, they believe that a unity of all groups in Bougainville will result in peace illustrating that an independent state would be beneficial for the long-term.

Weapons Disposal Plan

As the women’s groups, church leaders, and chief leaders of Bougainville primarily focused on reconciliation and restoring unity between the dividing factions of Bougainville, they supported strongly of a weapons disposal plan

Australia

Autonomy Government

The Australian government played a significant role towards hosting the Cairns I talks and providing aid towards Bougainville. However, they were not formally invited in the peace talks. Nevertheless, they did not support the idea of Bougainville possessing an autonomous government. The Bougainville Copper Mine (BCL) was a subsidiary of Cozinc Rio Tinto, a influential Australian company. Therefore, the creation of an autonomous government would diminish Australian’s control over the Panguna mine.

Independent State

As they were opposed of an autonomous state of Bougainville, they did support the sovereignty of Papua New Guinea (PNG). If PNG continued to remain an independent state with Bougainville incorporated then it will be beneficial for the Australian government

Weapons Disposal Plan

Peace was an important concept that the Australian government focused on. A strong reaction occurred when mercernaries by the PNG were introduced into the Bougainville conflict. Although, the Australian government supports the PNG government, it is evident that they approved of a weapons disposal for both parties as a method of establishing unity between them.

A civil strife that has haunted the state of Papua New Guinea (PNG) has reached its anticipated conclusion through the rebuilding of trust between PNG and Bougainville. The process towards obtaining the Bougainville Peace Agreement contained a prolonged history of conflicts that included a devastating civil war, multiple peace talks, and the intervention of a third party mediator to arrive at its final state. Therefore, the Bougainville peace talks are undisputedly successful because of the ethical outcomes that were produced from this extensive history of conflicts. Furthermore, with the incorporation of Track I, II, and III diplomacies, the potential for a sustainable peace has been created. This paper will examine the resolution of the extensive history of conflicts which led to the creation of sustainable peace illustrating the success of the Bougainville peace talks.

The prosperity of the Bougainville peace talks was created through repairing the fractured relationship between Bougainville and PNG. The Bougainville conflict originated from the Bougainvilleans’ dissatisfaction towards a joint identity between the two nations after the effects of World War I. This led to colonial exploitation by Australia towards Bougainville’s Paguna mine which was a fundamental aspect in the local economic sector. The creation of the Bougainville Copper Agreement resulted in significant social, environmental, and economic disruption in Bougainville. As a result, the Bougainville Civil War commenced due to the landowners dissatisfaction towards the treatment of their land. This civil war prolonged for decades due to the failed agreement of eight peace negotiations. Considering the conflicting perspectives that PNG and Bougainville possessed, the success of the peace talks are definite as a resolution seemed unreachable during the process. Ultimately, PNG seeked for peace among the two parties due to the exhaustive state that warfare has situated themselves in. On the contrary, Bougainville achieved their objective of obtaining an autonomous government with the ability to have a non-binding referendum to vote for an independent state of Bougainville. Therefore, the settlement that was arrived at has brought PNG and Bougainville onto agreeable terms recreating unity between the two parties.

The satisfactory outcomes reached by Bougainville and PNG has created sustainable peace between the two parties. This sustainable and positive peace has been created through the usage of a multi-track diplomacy which incorporates all Track I, II, and III diplomacies (Ramsbotham 25). The incorporation of all three tracks allows the corporation between government level officials, non-governmental organizations, and citizens creating a mutual understanding between them. Therefore, this method creates the possibility for achieving a positive peace where all levels of the society are in agreement. The importance of achieving the highest level of track diplomacy was the pivotal moment in the peace talks. The continuous failed peace processes between Bougainville and PNG illustrated the idea of a hurting stalemate where there was a mutual deadlock creating disadvantages for both parties (Zartman 1). However, with New Zealand’s usage of a third party intervention, it eventually led to the creation of a ripe moment where unreachable proposals are obtainable due to the usage of a mediator (Zartman 1). Therefore, after the occurence of the ripe moment, Track I negotiations began between Bougainville and PNG which illustrated the turning point in the peace processes. It is evident that after the incorporation of Track I diplomacy, the efficiency of the peace talks between the two parties increased. Government officials are situated into discussion during Track I diplomacy allowing for discussion of important national issues regarding autonomy, independence and weapons disposal in a political arena. Subsequently, this allowed for Track II and I diplomacies to occur peacefully between the two nations. Church leaders among the nations, representing track II are cooperating while local citizens representing track III are uniting. With the participation and agreement between all three levels of diplomacy, a sustainable peace is able to develop as all levels of society are in unity. The illustration of multi-track diplomacy has created a positive peace in Bougainville.

The success of the peace talks is illustrated through the unity of Bougainville and PNG after decades of conflict. Disputes over identity, autonomy and independence created the foundation of the Bougainville conflict. Ultimately, it is the resolution of these unconquerable controversies which demonstrates the success of the peace talks. Additionally, the usage of multi track diplomacy creates agreement through all levels of society which has the potential for sustainable peace in Bougainville. The ability to resolve the conflict ridden history between Bougainville and PNG ultimately illustrated the substantial success of the peace talks.

Bougainville Copper Agreement(June 1967):

http://www.paclii.org/pg/legis/PG-consol_act_1986/mcaa344.pdf

Endeavour Accord(August 5, 1990)

https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/PG_900805_EndeavourDialogueServicesBougainville.pdf

Tambea Accord (August 27, 1994): https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/PG_940827_TambeaRecord.pdf

Honiara Declaration (January 23, 1997) http://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/fullpeace/PNG%2019910123.pdf

Burnham Declaration(July 18, 1997) https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/resources/collections/peace_agreements/bougain_19970718.pdf

Lincoln Agreement(January 23, 1998)

https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/PG_980123_LincolnAgreement.pdf

Arawa Agreement (April 30, 1998):

http://theirwords.org/media/transfer/doc/1_pg_big_bra_brf_1998_03-4f272744f60ed481787d5fe189c67ae4.pdf

Matakana and Okataina Understanding(April 22, 1999): 

https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/PG_990422_Matakana%20and%20Okataina%20understanding.pdf

Bougainville Peace Agreement(August 30, 2001)

http://www.abg.gov.pg/uploads/documents/BOUGAINVILLE_PEACE_AGREEMENT_2001.pdf

Hammond, Timothy G. “Resolving Hybrid Conflicts: The Bougainville Story.” Foreign Policy Jounal. 22 December 2012.

Hammond provides a summary of the Bougainville conflict, and describes the “hybrid” form of warfare that has waged on for years, portraying the complexity of the conflict. Despite the social and natural resource disruption, peace building mechanisms for the re-building and resource management of Bougainville was achieved due to the Western model of political order. Furthermore, Hammond states that peace-building is most effective and long lasting when it is valued by communities and individuals at the grassroots level. Grassroots movements legitimized the success of Bougainville by incorporating their own traditional and cultural norms into the western methods of peace-and-state-building. In addition, Hammond emphasizes the role women played in peace process as they were key actors in peacemaking and negotiations, and put aside their differences in order to come together to create one Bougainvillean voice. The case of Bougainville provides hope and possibility for the peaceful resolution of intrastate hybrid conflicts, as long as people remain innovative and dedicated.

“Chronology of Bougainville Civil War” Pacific Island Report. Pireport.org. Accessed 26 March 2018.

This is a brief timeline that shows the key dates of the Bougainville civil war up until 1998. It also includes how Bougainville got its name, and the Japanese occupation in 1942.

Lees, Sean. “Bougainville Peace Agreement, The Burnham I and II Dialogues” UNDP Pacific Center. Accessed 26 March 2018.  

This journal article on the Bougainville Peace Agreement, focuses largely on Burnham I and II talks. The chronological layout of the article is effective, starting with context, problem, process, actors, challenges, breakthroughs, and results and values. It explains the the issues pertaining to the mine and the already-existing conflict over Bougainvillean identity and sovereignty that ignited a rebellion which turned into a destructive struggle for power; thereafter the decades long civil war. It also provides a comprehensive, in-depth description of the main grievances that were caused by the conflict and how the peace process attempted to address the issues. While the article mainly presents an overview of the Bougainville problem and peace process, illustrates the many levels of actors from Tracks 1, 2 and 3 that made trust, unity and eventual peace possible in the region.

Phillips, Keri. “Bougainville at a crossroads: independence and the mine.”  2 June 2015. http://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs. Accessed 26 March 2018.

Phillips provides historical background of the Panguna mine to explain the present repercussions that still occur in Bougainville, as it leads up to the referendum on independence from PNG. She states that the island’s mining is controlled by the ABG, whereas the others are controlled by the national government. However, the island is still divided regarding the issue of mining as landowners are concerned about the reopening as well as environmental effects. The issue is yet to be determined; the government faces pressure how to proceed with the matter, especially with the impending referendum. 

“Papua New Guinea– Bougainville.” Conciliation Resources. 2002. http://www.c-r.org/accord/papua-new-guinea%E2%80%93bougainville. Accessed 27 March 2018.

The PNG Accord is a negotiated settlement and outlines the efforts made to succeed at bringing greater unity to the Bougainvillean government and ending the organized violence. It describes the indigenous peace process that was incorporated with the western peace model, drawing on the strengths of Melanesian traditions. By merging the two values, strengths from both benefited from the roles of third parties. The Accord also includes the chronology of events, agreements and profiles of key people and institutions involved.

“Joint Creation, the Bougainville Peace Agreement– and beyond.” Accord 12. 2001. http://www.c-r.org/downloads/Accord%2012_10'Joint%20creation'_2002_ENG.pdf. Accessed 27 March 2018.

Wolfers reviews the process of Bougainville’s legitimate and successful peace process (the Burnham talks). The reviews the principles and activities covered in the Lincoln agreement and how this impacted the public and private sectors. Many of the other journal articles speak positively of the progress made, however Wolfers also acknowledges subsequent misunderstandings, frustrations and modest confrontations that arose during the peace process. This is important because some articles provide the false perception that Burnham peace process onwards were smooth sailing. Wolfers highlights the small bumps in the peace process that were eventually overcome. While the Bougainville agreement was large achievement considering the region’s extensive historical conflict, Wolfers states that peace-building is an ongoing process that does not stop at the peace agreement. Permanent peace in the region requires ongoing process of consultation and cooperation in establishing, developing and operating the ‘joint creation’ established in the agreement.

Antonino Adamo (2017) A Cursed and Fragmented Island: History and Conflict Analysis in Bougainville, Papua New Guinea, Small Wars & Insurgencies, 29:1, 164-186.

No single factor can best explain the civil war; Adamo uses history, economy and traditional social aspects of the island, the effects of colonization, to identify the various factors that led to the civil war. The main assumption is that the conflict cannot be explained by just one reason. Adamo considers the ecological factor, further investigates this through the resource curse theory;– the presents of natural resources leading to economic failure; the existence of ethnic cleavages, etc.

Nisira, Patrick. “Leadership Challenges for the Autonomous Bougainville Government.” Australian National University. 2017

Based on the speech by Hon. Patrick Nisira, this paper discusses the leadership challenges of the ABG. Even though the bloody civil war has ended, there still various forms of conflict, tension and divisions that continue in the region. The paper states the various leadership challenges (and are of special importance to Bougainville’s future) such as divisions/factions, the infant Bougainville police force, capacity of the public service and the transfer of powers from the National Government to the ABG, etc. While the ABG faces these issues, the discussion sheds light on finding realistic ways to address them.

Carl, A. & Garasu, L. Weaving consensus, the Papua New Guinea–Bougainville peace process. Conciliation Resources. 2002

This article discusses the matrix of the Bougainvillean negotiation options and maps the major language groups of Bougainville. This article is particularly distinct from others because it discusses the perspective of a local Bougainvillean, James Tanis, in the peace building process. Tanis focuses his experience of reconciliation in his own Nagovisi community (southwest of Bougainville): conflicts can be passed down from one generation to the next, which would often be communicated to the other side through a mutual party. It was common for a conflict to escalate due to the involvement of other parties. His article this provides us the understanding of the nature of traditional conflicts and conflict resolution.

Carl, A. & Garasu, L. Weaving consensus, the Papua New Guinea–Bougainville peace process. Conciliation Resources. 2002

This document lists all the key texts and agreements relating to the PNG-Bougainville peace process. It starts with the Bougainville Agreement in 1976 and ends with the 2001 peace agreement. It even includes minor statements and letters by written by the President of the Security Council and the UN Secretary General. Furthermore, the document lists the role and status regarding the peace agreement.

Zartman, W. “The Timing of Peace Initiatives: Hurting Stalemates and Ripe Moments.” The Global Review of Ethnopolitics. September 2018. P8-18

In this article, Zartman recognizes the importance of timing of efforts for reconciliation. A ripe moment is often accompanied by hurting stalemate; parties are able to resolve the conflict only when they are mutually ready to do so. Zartman states that as the notion of ripeness implies, MHS can be a very fleeting opportunity, a moment to be seized lest it pass, or it can be of a long duration, waiting to be noticed and acted upon by mediators. Finding the ripe moment is a skill to be provided in negotiations.

References

Antonino Adamo (2017) A Cursed and Fragmented Island: History and Conflict Analysis in Bougainville, Papua New Guinea, Small Wars & Insurgencies, 29:1, 164-186.

“Bougainville Peace Agreement.” (August 2001).

Carl, A. & Garasu, L. Weaving consensus, the Papua New Guinea–Bougainville peace process. Conciliation Resources. 2002

“Chronology of Bougainville Civil War” Pacific Island Report. Pireport.org. Accessed 26 Mar 2018.

Hammond, Timothy G. “Resolving Hybrid Conflicts: The Bougainville Story.” Foreign Policy Journal. 22 December 2012.

“Joint Creation, the Bougainville Peace Agreement– and beyond.” Accord 12. 2001. http://www.c-r.org/downloads/Accord%2012_10'Joint%20creation'_2002_ENG.pdf Accessed 27 March 2018.

Lees, Sean. “Bougainville Peace Agreement, The Burnham I and II Dialogues” UNDP Pacific Center. Accessed 26 Mac 2018.   

“Matakana & Okatania Understanding” (April 1999). Accessed 25 March 2018.

“Mining(Bougainville Copper Agreement).” (June 1967) Accessed 25 March 2018.

Nisira, Patrick. “Leadership Challenges for the Autonomous Bougainville Government.” Australian National University. 2017

Nisira, Patrick. “Leadership Challenges for the Autonomous Bougainville Government.” Australian National University. 2017

“Papua New Guinea– Bougainville.” Conciliation Resources. 2002 http://www.c-r.org/accord/papua-new-guinea%E2%80%93bougainville. Accessed 27 March 2018.

Phillips, Keri. “Bougainville at a crossroads: independence and the mine.”  2 June 2015. http://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs. Accessed 26 March 2018.  

Spriggs, Matthew. “Endeavour Accord on Dialogue And Return of Services to Bougainville.”

(August 1990). 25 March 2018 Accessed.

“Tambea Accord.” (August 1994). Accessed 25 March 2018.

“The Arawa Agreement.” (April 1998). Accessed 25 March 2018.

UCDP. “The Honiara Declaration.” UCDP. (January 1991). Accessed 25 March 2018.

United Nations. “Lincoln Agreement.” Security Council. (March 2018). Accessed 25 March 2018.

United States Institute Of Peace. “Peace Agreements Digital Collection.” United States Institute

of Peace. (April 2002). Accessed 25 March 2018.  

Zartman, W. “The Timing of Peace Initiatives: Hurting Stalemates and Ripe Moments.” The Global Review of Ethnopolitics. September 2018. P8-18

KEY ISSUES:		OUTCOMES:
Cessation of Hostilities(Article I)		In May 1999 the fate of the conflict took a massive turn and the two opposing leaders, Kabbah and Sankoh, agreed upon a ceasefire allowing for humanitarian aid to be delivered to the communities that needed the help. This started the beginning of a six day peace talk process that began the foundation of the peace agreement that would eventually materialize between the Rebel faction and the Government of Sierra Leone.
Ceasefire Monitoring (Article II)		A ceasefire monitoring committee was created. Headed by the United Nations observer mission, accompanied by government forces, RUF members, civil defense forces and ECOMOG soldiers. The monitoring process itself generally worked, due to the tensions in society there were localized fighting between mostly government and RUF forces. The monitoring committed was to seek assistance from international actors if they needed support in the case of a large-scale conflict breaking out. For the most part after Lomé there wasn’t large amounts of conflict breakouts, so this overviewing branch could be seen as semi successful.
GOVERNANCE ISSUES  (POWER SHARING)	Key feature established in the Lomé agreement. It was critical to establish a way to integrate the RUF into the existing political structure. This was one of the most difficult concessions taken on by the government negotiating team, but it was seen as essential to stopping any chance of the government segregating and another conflict breaking out. The public was largely against integrating the RUF into the new political structure by transforming the RUF in a political party and enabling members  the RUF to Hold Public Office. However their voices were largely ignored.
	Transforming the RUF into a political party (Article III)	The transforming of the RUF into a legitimate party was seen as essential by Sankoh, as well as was supported by the government of Sierra Leone. By enabling the RUF a political platform, reading a diplomatic result was much more guaranteed, the process allowed to fragmented rebel group to form unity under a political identification, as well as gave the government opportunity to integrate the rebel faction into the new government and peace processes going forward.
	Enabling RUF Members to Hold Office (Article IV)	Considered by many the most difficult part of the peace processes other than the amnesty agreement. There were large levels of public outcry against allowing it but in the end the government appointed four rebels to ministerial positions. Initially the RUF wanted to choose which members would take on these positions but the government instituted that it was their duty due to the basis of democratic governance. The RUF eventually conceded and accepted the terms of the government, helping to make an attempt at democratic ties between the two parties, but this took nearly a year to implement.
	Commission for Consolidation of Peace (Article VI)	The creation of the commission for consolidation of peace was  integral to the continuance of peacekeeping operations in Sierra Leone. The commission was responsible for supervising the implementation of all legislation, peace process and any other actions taken by any of the other commissions or committees created in the peace agreement of 1997. This commission was created to ensure that the necessary resources were being funded to the different subcommittees and commissions created to keep the peace in Sierra Leone.
	Commission for Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development (Article VII)	This commission was crucial to the peace process and one of the largest leaps the government took to establishing peace with the RUF. The government appointed Foday Sankoh as head of the CMRRD. The agreement set out new ways to manage the gold and diamonds proceeds generated by the nations rich natural resources. This commission turned into a failure and Foday Sankoh ignored his ministerial commitments and focused his time on continuing to exploit the resources in the land he controlled to fund his army.
Pardon and Amnesty (Article IX)	The pardon/amnesty of the RUF soldiers and Foday Sankoh was the most controversial part of the Sierra Leone peace process. It was highlighted by brutal crimes against humanity, large numbers of the public, civil society and international actors strongly disagreed with the government's move to pardon the RUF for all crimes committed during the conflict. On the other hand, the government saw no way to move forward in the peace talks without an absolute pardon of the crimes committed on both sides of the conflict, including full Amnesty for the RUF leader, Foday Sankoh. In the end the RUF saw a complete pardon of all crimes committed during the civil war, ignoring extensive social outcry from domestic and international actors. Many international actors saw this Amnesty as too quickly granted, especially when conflict broke out between Sankoh’s security guards and protesters in may 2000, resulting in the death of 19 protestors.
Constitutional Issues (Article X)	To ensure that moving forward the new government and agreements between each faction are met, a commission was created to review the constitution to ensure that all parameters of the deals created are constitutionally guaranteed. This commission was given the ability to make recommendations for revisions and amendments where it deemed changes to needed to be made. This was designed to help unify the nation and make sure that all different voices were being heard.
Electoral Issues (Article XI)	A new national electoral commission was established by the government after the signing of the peace agreement. When setting up the new commission, the president of Sierra Leone consulted all the different political parties and got their input on composition of the council and its terms. Some of the terms of the NEC were that no member shall be eligible for appointment into political office by any government formed as a result of an election. It also established a means to receive international aid in monitoring elections going forward, to ensure democratic rule.
Post-Conflict Military and Security Issues	The government of Sierra Leone and the RUF recognized that they needed to establish a series of different commissions designed to disarm, monitor and help facilitate peace between the different factions. The result were the creation of many different commissions and monitoring groups designed to work as watch dogs and ensure that the different groups tasked with established post conflict peace and security were following through with their mandates.
	Security Guarantees for Peace Monitors (Article XV)	The RUF and government of Sierra Leone agreed that the security and freedom of UNOMSIL workers would be guaranteed. This agreement was monitored by the Joint Monitoring Commission to guarantee its terms are met. This agreement allowed peacekeeper access to the Military observers in their duties throughout Sierra Leone. Specially throughout the process of disarmament when the chances of a conflict breaking out are at their highest. They were also allowed freedom of movement to monitor non military entities such as the human rights officers.
	Disarmament Issues (Article XVI)	Regarding disarmament issues, a Commission for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration was created. This commission was heavily criticized and seen generally as a failure. Comprised of UNOMSIL and ECOMOG members, the commission was designed to disarm and reintegrate the RUF and various factions within Sierra Leone back into society but 9 months after its implementation the commission was producing little results and they were experiencing budgetary limitations. Sankoh regularly told his commanders and soldiers to not give up their weapons and there was little incentive for them to do so as far as social infrastructure. The lack of implementation of social needs and inflexibility of this program resulted is large amounts of wasted finances and time.
	Defense Issues (Article XVII)	The reconstruction of the Sierra Leone armed forces was carried out by the government. It was willing to accept RUF soldiers into their ranks as long as the RUF soldiers and other factions passed a vetting test program, helping to create a recognizable intertwined new government comprised of the RUF and the current Government. The new army was to bare allegiance to the state of Sierra Leone, only partisan support for the government would be accepted. The recruitment process of the new army was designed to incorporate the geo politics of Sierra Leone.
	Withdrawal of Mercenaries (Article XVIII)	This established that all mercenaries in Sierra Leone be withdrawn immediately upon the signing of the Lomé peace agreement. This includes all mercenary groups, even those aligned with the government organizations. This process was overseen by the Joint Monitoring Commission. Mercenaries were prolifically used throughout the conflict. The withdraw of all mercenaries is a crucial step towards democracy and peace.
Humanitarian, Human Rights and Socio-Economic Issues	The government of Sierra Leone and the RUF agreed that establishing different commissions and networks to ensure humanitarian work, human rights and fixing socio-economic issues was essential to the peace process. The enforcement of humanitarian laws, agreement on formulas on how it would be handled were created in an attempt to fix these issues. Though, inequality of infrastructure development and some human rights abuses were still prevalent in Sierra Leone after the conflict. Many constituencies outside of the capital of Freetown complained about unequal distribution on infrastructure.
	Release of Prisoners and Abductees (Article XXI)	The release of all prisoners of war, including non-combatant prisoners were to be released immediately and unconditionally by both parties. This is coincided with the amnesty agreement that pardoned crimes committed by both sides of the war, hoping that fully resetting the playing field would bring peace to the nation quicker. The release of prisoners, akin to the amnesty, wasn’t greatly supported by society at the international and domestic levels. Despite the outcry the release of prisoners was carried through.
	Refugees and Displaced Persons (Article XXII)	Both the Sierra Leone government and the RUF and their allies agree that through the commission of resettlement and rehabilitation and reconstruction that they would receive help from the united nations to help all those displaced by the conflict return to Sierra Leone. This would be a voluntary program for reintegration of combatant and noncombatant refuges back into society, using international norms and practices.
	Guarantee of the Security of Displacement Persons and Refugees (Article XXIII)	As a move to further commitment of human security to those displaced, that the rights of those who choose asylum be respected. This is to ensure that camps and dwellings of refugees not to be infringed upon and their choices to be respected. This is a reaffirmation of their commitment to the principles of human rights and the status of refugees.
	Promotion of Human Rights (Article XXIV)	The basic civil rights of political liberties recognized by the Sierra Leone legal system and contained in the declarations and principles of human rights adopted by the UN and OAU, especially the declaration of human rights and the African charter on human and people’s rights, shall be fully protected and promoted within Sierra Leonean society.  This is to include the right to life, liberty, freedom from torture, the right to a fair trial, freedom of conscience, expression and association, the right to take part in the country’s government. This is critical to the integration of the once heavily segregated society and taking steps to creating a true democratic and equal society.
	Human Rights Commission (Article XXV)	The parties pledge to strengthen the existing machinery for addressing grievances of the people in respect to violations of their basic human rights. The parties pledge to promote human rights education through the various sectors of sierra Leonean society, including through schools, media, police, military and the religious communities. They shall receive technical assistance from the UN high commissioner for human rights, African commission on human rights and peoples right and other relevant organizations.  A consortium of local human rights and civil society groups will be created to help monitor the rights observance.
	Human Rights Violations (Article XXVI)	A truth and reconciling commission shall be established to address immunity, break the cycle of violence and provide a forum for both the victims and perpetrators of human rights violations. This will give the victims the ability to tell their story, get a clear picture of the past in order to generate a new future. This revenue allows those affected to come forward and help them come to terms with their past, in a safe avenue. This is crucial for moving on from the past and creating a new Sierra Leone.
	Humanitarian Relief (Article XXVII)	This guarantees the right of all humanitarian organizations access throughout the entire country to help facilitate the delivery of aid and humanitarian assistance. This also is an agreement between the political parties that the safety of the humanitarian organizations is guaranteed throughout the country as they do their work. This is also a commitment by the government to facilitate resources needed by humanitarian aid organizations to help get them access to communities and do the work they need to do.
Post-War Rehabilitation and Reconstruction (Article XXVIII)	This is the focus of rehabilitating society and rebuilding social infrastructure. Using international organizations and the resettlement commission, there will be appropriate financial and technical resources supplied to post war rehabilitation, reconstruction and development. This will focus on developing special infrastructure for those particularly victimized by the war, such as women and children. The design of this is to rebuild the moral, social and physical aspects of Sierra Leone.
Reconciliation Issues (Article XXIX)	The special victims fund is a fund specially designed to support those who are most affected by the conflict. This is specifically designed for but not limited to, the help amputees, women and children. Rape and dismemberment were used widely throughout the conflict as a weapon of war, these institutions are crucial for helping those affected to rehabilitated and integrate back into society.
Child Combatants (Article XXX)	Child soldiers were prominently used throughout the conflict. The government is going to establish a network of commissions and institutions to help the needs of the child soldiers used in the conflict. This includes the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of the child soldiers back into society. This program will receive support from the special offices of the UN dedicated for working with child soldiers as well as UNICEF.
Education and Health Issues (Article XXXI)	Education and health have been a heavy focus of the government throughout the discourse of the peace agreement. The government has set up. An institution to provide 9 years of free education and an additional three years of free education for those who choose to follow this path. The government will also provide free primary health care throughout the country.

 

• Sierra Leone Government:
  • Represented by key figures: Solomon Berewa - minister of Justice and attorney general; Sahr Matturi ( foreign minister); Sylvester Rowe ( permanent representative in the UN); Sheka Mansaray, ( National security advisor); Colonel Tom Carew ( senior army officer).
  • At that time under the regime of Kabbah. Characterized as weak, corrupted and badly held. Constantly threatened by military coups, previously ousted in 1997 by the AFRC.
  • Government initiative to propose full amnesty to the RUF members as an opening to the discussions and incentive to move things forward.
  • Truth and Reconciliation Commission: Pushed forward the UN led initiative which was meant to recommend prosecutions for the worst perpetrators and pointed out the RUF  as the only entity to face it.
  • The government was in favor of the Creation of a Special Unit for War Victims as part of the reparations plan.
  • Regarding power-sharing, the government was willing to give 2 of the ministries to the rebels which nearly collapsed the agreement. After talks with Nigerian representatives and the Lomé president, the government finally agreed on conceding 4 ministerial positions but maintained that the appointment of the ministries had to be done by the President and not through negotiations.

 

 

• Revolutionary United Front( AFRC - RUF alliance) 
  • Represented by: Solomon YB Rogers, loyal to Foday Sankoh; Allo Bangura ( foreign minister RUF); Omrie Golley ( legal adviser); Sahr Kalibanja ( education minister); Colonel Idrissa, Agnes Finoh ( higher ranking RUF combatant).
  • Wages war against government because of the political ideology, massive corruption, failure to represent the rural society.
  • Although AFRC was to be represented there were growing tensions between both parties especially after the Freetown attack in 1999 that increased the groups  unpopularity. The AFRC leader, Johhny Paul Koromah, was not invited for the preparatory meetings for the Lomé talks that produced most of their subsequent demands.
  • Lasting Peace in Sierra Leone: the Revolutionary United Front Perspective and Vision: demanded, a blanket amnesty for all RUF and AFRC fighters; the release of all prisoners; a power-sharing arrangement based on a four year transitional govt until the next elections; recognition of AFRC-RUF control over certain areas of the country; participation in a new Sierra Leonean army; the withdrawal of ECOMOG troops; and the creation of an independent peacekeeping force. It set a single pre-condition for the commencement of negotiations, the immediate and unconditional release of Sankoh
  • Truth and Reconciliation Commission: the RUF was against the idea as they felt targeted as the only party to be prosecuted, moreover it feared that it would serve as a Court. By the end of the negotiations they accepted the point due to the broadening of the language used in the agreement by the mediators.
  • Power-sharing: RUF demands transitional government, with the form of a national unity and requested half of the ministerial positions. They requested the expansion of the government cabinet to 20 members and for 11 ministerial and 4 deputy ministerial positions, including vice president, defence a finance, as well as 6 diplomatic posts such as ambassador to the US.  When the talks looked that were going to collapse, the role of the Nigerian Government representative to mediate both parts on the issue helped. The government agreed in conceding 4 ministry positions but the RUF could not appoint them.
  • Demanded ECOMOG withdrawal and a transitional government, at the end of the talks they retreated from this position in order to achieve peace. 
• Government of Togo:

1. • Official mediator of the Lomé peace talks. The Togolese foreign minister Joseph Koffigoh led the talks in a day-to-day basis.
   • Togo was the chair of ECOWAS and was perceived as a neutral country which was never directly involved in the conflict, therefore it was chosen to host the negotiations and assume the mediator role.
   • Gnassingbé Eyademá, President of Togo at the time, had a regular and active participation in the talks. Holding a neutral position was key in some critical moments. During the power-sharing part of the negotiations, Eyadéma contacted the Nigerian president Obasanjo, who was also interested in withdrawing the troops from SL, pulled the parties together to agree on Sankoh new position in the Commission for the Management Strategic resources. He also  took the idea to turn the conflict in regional diplomacy by contacting to more regional leaders Comparoé and Taylor to create balance and put pressures in the parties to compromise. The four parties agreed on Sankoh's new position, ECOMOG participation in peacekeeping, and afterwards met Kabbah and Sankoh to convince them to accept the deal.

• ECOWAS Countries:  ( Economic Community of West African states)

1. • Regional economic union formed by 16 West African countries.
   • Hold a neutral position also considered to have a mediator role. Even if it is supposed to be a strong supporter of the government not all the countries  hold the same position. The countries that were more relevant in the talks were Togo, Liberia, Burkina Faso, Libya and Nigeria.
   • ECOWAS was a key actor in the peace talks, having representatives in the mediation group, including ECOWAS General Secretary Lansana Kouyate and diplomats from the ECOWAS Committee of Six on Sierra Leone (Guinea, Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Liberia, Ghana and Mali) and Libya; and its diplomats also joined the ‘facilitating committee’ that formed during the talks. Subsequently, it became the chair of the Joint Implementation Committee, which was established by the Lomé talks.
   • Burkina Faso, Libya and  Liberia were secretly perceived  supporters of the RUF whist at the same time they were contributing to the ECOWAS troops, namely because of the diamond dealing and financing.
   • The leaders of Burkina Faso, Liberia and Nigeria had a key role in convincing to their allies in the conflict during the collapse of June 1999 to agree in the Power-sharing outcome of the agreement.

• Inter religious council of Sierra Leone ( IRCSL)
  • Formed by the unity of Muslims and Christians of Sierra Leone, who worked together to end the violence after the outbreak for the war.
  • This non governmental player between the warring factions and the population.
  • A first role on making the peace negotiations possible by convincing both parts to sit and open negotiations. They were invited to the talks as informal mediations to provide guidance.  
  • Throughout the process they remained neutral and supportive of the mediation prove, encouraging cooperation and return to the table.
  • During hard times where the main parties didn’t share the opinion such as power sharing, the Council were reported to preach to be resistant hard liners.
  • They important role during the process was recognized in the agreement by the creation of the Council of Elders and Religious Leaders. In the aftermath of the negotiations were also involved in reconciliation, human rights training, democratization and disarmament programs.
  • Didn’t share the amnesty  nor Sankoh’s pardon like the UN.

• UN
  • The UN had a neutral role in the Lomé talks and the Abidjan talks, taking the position as a moral guarantor and witness and representing human rights.
  • The UN senior representative was Francis Okelo who served as deputy chair of the Lomé talks and helped the draft of provisions relevant to different key issues. The UN peacekeeping mission UNAMSIL was a significant actor in the conflict, especially after 1999.
  •  Other representatives from the UN included officials from the UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.
  • The UN commission came with the Idea for a Truth, Reconciliation and Justice Commission. However due to the refusal of the RUF, the reference to justice was dropped to make the language broader.
  • A key and controversial issue for the UN was the provision of amnesty. The UN typed a document in 1999 which was mean to provide the representatives “the  Guidelines for the UN representatives on certain aspects of negotiations for conflict resolution”. This paper clearly stated that indicated that the UN “could not condone amnesty to war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide.” However, the UN representatives who hold a position against amnesty during the talks, agreed to sing in the end, against the guidelines provisions. Francis Okelo reported that he heard about the guidelines 2 days before the signing and if they refusal to sign would have collapsed the talks. At that point it considered more urgent.

• The US
  • Neutral position and mediating position,  the US ambassador to SL, Joseph Melrose, served as a chair in the final session of the talks.
  • US backed the controversial  amnesty proposal and the inclusion of 8 RUF leaders in the cabinet to the new government as to achieve peace. Clinton addressed the UN general assembly , "I know that some are troubled that the United States and others cannot respond to every humanitarian catastrophe in the world," he reiterated, "We cannot do everything everywhere." ( The Washington Post Company,1999).
  • Advocated for a dual track approach during the conflict: military and diplomatic to end the war.
  • Contributed to the 18th May ceasefire. Instigated by the Rev. Jesse Jackson, US Special Envoy for the Promotion of Democracy in Africa, whose intervention in Sierra Leone had been influenced by Donald Payne, the chairman of the US Congressional Black caucus.
  • Did not sign witness to avoid implying a commitment to resources of implementation.

• The UK
  • Really active role in the talks as Sierra Leone was an old protectorate of the region.
  • Often seen sympathetic to the Sierra Leonean government, the UK supported it before and after the 1997 coup; and important in  rallying the UN member states and international governments to support the elected Kabbah government.
  • Along with US, was one of the largest providers of humanitarian assistance to Sierra Leone; and also advocated for a dual track track approach in ending conflict.
  • Judicial reform effort, the Government committed to a major  judicial reform after the Lomé accord was signed.
  • Declined to sign as witness of the talks.
  • Major actor in putting international pressure to both parties to start negotiations by providing military aid on a commitment form from the SL government. Proposed a two track diplomacy, by suing dialogue but also military efforts.
  • Supported the Sierra Leonean Government even if they were meant to be neutral and represent democratization, rather than been partisan.
• Organization African Unity (OAU)
  • Represented by Adwoa Coleman.
  • Mediator role in order to ensure the continuation of Dialogue between the parties.
  • The OAU had been an important external actor during the Abidjan talks and Lomé talks during conflict, having sent delegations that tried to mediate between the government and the RUF on many occasions. This occurred frequently during 1995-1996, as it was  largely overseeing the Abidjan talks.
  • During the Abidjan talks the OAU they took relieve of the International Alert NGO.
  • The OAU was one of the key external actors, being one of the ‘moral guarantors’ of the talks and directly facilitated the Lomé peace agreement.
• Commonwealth
  •  Like the OAU, the Commonwealth was another important external actor that attempted to establish mediation between the two groups by sending delegations to Sierra Leone during the conflict. Also signed as a witness to the accord.
  • Even if was meant to be moral guarantor and mediator, it seems that  endorsed  Kabbah’s government during the duration of the talks.

• Women's Groups ( excluded from both talks)
  • The women’s organizations including the Sierra Leone Association of University Women, the Young Women’s Christian Association or the Women’s Association for National Development, within others, were not invited to the talks being marginalized from the Lomé agreement.  The RUF, the NPR and the Sierra Leonean government ignored their demands to be included in the Peace process.
  • This lack of representation is reflected by the negligence of women's issues in the talks, especially in terms of political and economic terms, although women were one of the primary victims during the war. There is only one reference to women, as being acknowledged as victims of the war ( Art XXVII). But there is no reference to their role in peace-building, political and economical reconstruction.
  • Outside the agreements they played a  crucial role to promote the agenda for the peace process. They were key for the National Consultative Conference held in august 1995 before the Abidjan talks.

• Regional groups: (other military groups)
  • Other groups excluded from the talks were the representatives of the provinces out of Freetown. One of the principle excluded groups were independent army combatants such as the SLA or the West Side Boyz. This resulted in the kidnapping  of around 40 people from the UNAMSIL civilian and military observers by former members of the SLA. They claimed that there were excluded from the Lomé Peace talks and presented some requests.
  • Within these, the incorporation of their soldiers to the new Sierra Leone army and the recognition of the promotions that the AFRC junta made during their position in power ( may 1997-February 1998). To satisfy these demands, the Lomé included the possibility of the ex combatants of the RUF and SLA to join the new army as stated in the Article XVII of Restructuring and Training of the Sierra Leone Armed Forces.

Peace, YES. But at what cost?

The 10 year-long Sierra Leonean civil war came to an end in the 2000s after a series of peace talks held between government of Sierra Leone and Revolutionary United Front (RUF). These talks resulted in the foundation of the newly designed democratic and constitutional state. While the conflict stopped, the agreement failed to develop the proper democratic institutions and political structure to help Sierra Leone transition in a functioning state. This essay argues that while the peace agreements stopped the fighting, there were many serious missteps that resulted in unequal representation, insufficiency in the rolls of the mediating parties, and too much concession given to those who committed crimes against humanity. By adopting a “peace at any costs” ideology, the peace agreements undermined the new government and constitution that was established, resulting in Sierra Leone falling back into cycles of political conflict and corruption.

        The exclusion of key actors throughout the course of the peace agreement caused many issues that played out in the aftermath of deal between the two opposing parties. Many of the groups left out of the peace negations were instrumental in the fostering of peace, with many of them representing side-lined communities that’s voices were lost in the wake of the negotiations. The lines of exclusion were regional, by putting too much focus on Freetown; gender biased, by excluding the Women’s representatives during the process and excluded the civil society initiatives.  The women’s organizations for instance, “played a crucial role in developing a non-partisan voice for peace and democratisation over the past ten years”[1] were largely left out of the peace talks resulting in women being marginalized in the Lomé agreement. The new legislation being put forward at the Lomé agreement “acknowledged women as victims of the war and the agreement provides that 'special attention shall be accorded to their needs and potentials” but they were left out of the “political and economic reconstruction of the country”[2].

       Civil society organizations and groups representing the traditional structures of the Sierra Leonean communities were also largely left out of the Lomé agreement. These isolated community structures were designed to help increase the involvement of the public into the creation of government policy and help the voices of the most marginalized be heard. These traditional structures involved using representative selected by communities that came together and help meetings to discuss potential policy. A large meeting was held prior to the Lomé agreement involving, “representatives from all the provinces who had emerged out of consultations chiefdom by chiefdom, district by district. Yet the recommendations from this meeting were ignored” [3] during the peace agreement.  

        Another critical misstep was the faulty role of the third-party mediator, the Government of Togo. As explained by Ramsbotham, “the entry of a third party may change the conflict structure and allow a different pattern of communication, enabling the third party to filter or reflect back the messages, attitudes and behaviour of the conflictants”[4]. Moreover, a mediator party should also ensure that the interests of the civil society are represented. In this case, it seems that the only goal of the Government of Togo and from other mediator parties such as the UN, was to achieve peace regardless of the terms of the agreement. The main issue at stake is the overlook at the civil societies request of justice to the war atrocities, which was ignored by both the parties, including the mediator, who quickly agreed on full amnesty instead of seeking for alternative solutions.

By observing the current situation of Sierra Leone, one can observe that the main drivers of the conflict back in 1991 are still present: there is frustration for government corruption, limited public services, high unemployment and unprecedented poverty. Solving these issues would be critical to developing a social and political culture that is invested in the legitimacy of the government. Having a functioning system of social infrastructure that could provide a legitimate means for people to live could have helped Sierra Leone get off of its feet and take strides towards being completely independent. Life expectancy is still only near the 50-year-old mark, and the GDP per capita is only at 496 USD. With a national GDP of only just over 3.5 Billion-dollar (4), Sierra Leone is one of poorest countries in the world. The serious lapses of judgement in the peace accords caused by the peace at any cost mentality has left sierra Leone in a position today where there is still inter-conflict between different groups of society, and high levels of political corruption and poverty.

The peace agreements that stopped the civil war in sierra Leone initially achieved their goal in stopping the bloodshed, but ultimately failed to foster a functioning state. While by stopping the conflict the peace agreements could be viewed as somewhat of a success, they failed to establish a function democratic state that has led to Sierra Leone being in a very weak position today. The “peace at any cost” attitude towards the peace agreements resulted in serious lapses of judgement and foresight, that has left Sierra Leone politically corrupt and socially distraught today.

• Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, signed at Abidjan on 30 November 1996

https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/SL_961130_PeaceAgreementSierraLeone-RUFSL.pdf

• Communiqué issued at Conakry on 23 October 1997 at the conclusion of the meeting between the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Committee of Five on Sierra Leone of the Economic Community of West African States and the delegation representing Major Johnny Paul Koromah

https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/resources/collections/peace_agreements/sl_10231997.pdf

• Peace Agreement Between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone Lomé, Togo, July 7, 1999

https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/resources/collections/peace_agreements/sierra_leone_07071999.pdf

• “Lasting peace in Sierra Leone: The Revolutionary United Front Sierra Leone ( RUF/SL) Perspective and vision”  11th may 1999

http://theirwords.org/media/transfer/doc/sl_ruf_08-8b0383b426906a2602263d3afda2c66d.pdf

• Abuja ceasefire agreement

http://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/fullpeace/SiL%2020001110.pdf

1)Barnes, C., Ph.D., & Polzer, T. (2000, September 27). Sierra Leone peace process: Learning from the past to address current challenges. Retrieved from https://reliefweb.int/report/sierra-leone/sierra-leone-peace-process-learning-past-address-current-challenges

This document was focused on the Lomé peace agreement through the eyes of international actors as well as individuals that were present. The document comes direct from Reliefweb.INT, the world leading website on humanitarian information regarding human crisis and natural disasters. The website is owned and operated by the UN office for the Coordination of Humanitarian affairs. The document itself is an expert summary report created following the signing of the Lomé peace agreement in 1999. It breaks down the strengths and weaknesses of the agreement, concentrating on using multiple viewpoints to paint a clearer picture of the successes and pitfalls of the controversial peace agreement. A strength of this document is the use of different viewpoints, giving contrasting points on view on different results of the peace agreement, painting a non-partisan point of view for the reader. Written by Catherine Barnes and Tara Polzer, both have extensive backgrounds in humanitarian and social service work within the African continent. Tara Polzer is a Ph.D. candidate, who studied at the London School of Economics and Political Sciences and Cambridge University. Catherine Barnes is a Ph.D. recipient, she holds a doctoral degree from the Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution and is an independent consultant on peacebuilding. The information in this document was key to highlighting the representation issue that plagued the Lomé peace agreement, showing the points of view of those included and those not included in the peace building processes.

2) Hayner, P. (2011, May 26). Negotiating peace in Sierra Leone: Confronting the justice challenge. Retrieved from https://www.ictj.org/publication/negotiating-peace-sierra-leone-confronting-justice-challenge

This document is a report focusing on the Lomé peace agreement and the impacts of the peace agreement on the 10-year civil war that tore through Sierra Leone. The document comes from the International Center for Transitional Justice, a website dedicated to bringing to the light the most brutal abuses of human rights violations and conflicts. The focus of the sight is to work with the victims, civil society groups and national and international organizations so ensure that the victims voices are heard and to prevent any further atrocities from happening. The documents highlights the implementation of the peace agreement and the results of the deals and commissions created throughout the accords. One of the biggest strengths of this document is its analytical work on the post peace agreement processes and how the agreement was implemented. Written by Priscilla Hayner, the Transitional Justice in Peace Negotiations at the United Nations; a highly awarded social scientist that was schooled at Earlham College, who went on receive a master’s degree in international Affairs and Human Rights from Columbia University. The focus on the post peace agreement applications of the commissions was critical to understanding where the failures and strengths of the Lomé agreement lay. This document provided detailed and essential inside information for our project.

 

3) Obita, J., Lord, D., Gberie, L., Rashid, I., Bright, D., Jusu-Sheriff, Y., . . . Fortune, F. (2015, July 27). Paying the price: The Sierra Leone peace process. Retrieved from http://www.c-r.org/resources/paying-price-sierra-leone-peace-process.

This 100 page document uses multiple authors to dive into great detail about the brutal Sierra Leone civil war that lasted 10 years. The document uses 8 different authors, each writing a chapter highlight each one of their areas of expertise. The document gives great background information of the conflict, which many other documents do not. As well as this, this document also focuses on the stories of those who were not involved in the conflict, giving light to minority groups such as the women’s civil society groups that were largely left out of the peace agreement negotiations. Financed by the independent Conciliation Resources organization, focused on working with victims of conflict, to help prevent future conflict and promote peaceful societies. Using multiple authors and insight from experts, this document highlights a complete look at the Lomé agreement, as well as the pre and post agreement landscapes of Sierra Leone.  This document was critical to finding the keys of the negotiation period. It specifically highlights how each of the keys were implemented and their results. It was an absolutely instrumental source of information, that covered areas that most of the other sources missed.

4) Kaldor, Mary. Vincent, James. (2006). “Evaluation of UNDP Assistance to Conflict-Affected Countries - Case Study: Sierra Leone”. Retrieved from http://web.undp.org/evaluation/documents/thematic/conflict/SierraLeone.pdf

This document provides an evaluation of the Sierra Leone conflict by the UNDP. After detailing the background of the conflict, the report considers how human security has improved since the peace negotiations, and contribution of international actors, the UN, and the UNDP in upholding human security in Sierra Leone. Mary Kaldor led the UNDP Evaluation team for conflict-affected countries, and James Vincent was the National Consultant for Sierra Leone in the team. A Professor of Global Governance  and the Director of the Conflict and Civil Society Research Unit in the London School of Economics Department of International Development, Mary Kaldor is well qualified in her field. On top of founding organizations such as the EUropean Nuclear Disarmament and Helsinki Citizens Assembly, and authoring books such as Global Civil Society: An Answer to War and Human Security: Reflections on Globalization and Intervention; she directs the Conflict Research Programme in her department that focuses on several countries in the Middle East and Africa, including Sierra Leone. She has also written several reports for the UNDP, including this one, which she co-authored with James Vincent. Accordingly, this report seems to have an academic viewpoint as well as a local one in evaluating the conflict.

6) Human Rights Watch - Sierra Leone - Human Rights Post. “Sierra Leone, Human Rights Development.” Africa 10 www.hrw.org/legacy/wr2k/Africa-09.htm 

This source provides a country profile in terms of human rights, for the Human Rights Watch tenth World Report, 2000. The Human Rights Watch is an INGO that conducts research and advocacy on Human Rights.  The reports’ focus is on the year 1999, and discusses several conflicts occuring in the continents of Africa, South America, Asia, Europe and Central Asia, the Middle East and North Africa, and the United States.It also details special issues such as Academic Freedom, Child Soldiers, Lesbian and Gay Rights, and Refugees, Displaced Persons, and Asylum Seekers.  The Overview on Sierra Leone focuses human rights developments and the involvement of international players, in light of the developments of 1999. It provides brief summaries of what they perceived to be key international players. This includes, ECOMOG and ECOWAS; the United Nations; the European Union, United Kingdom, and United States. Naturally focusing on the human rights aspect, its information on international actors did not seem substantial enough, but provided some useful statistics in terms of the aid they provided.

7)“The Road to Peace: Report of National Consultative Conference on the Peace Process in Sierra Leone” Organized by The National Commission for Democracy and Human Rights and Civil Society Organizations (1999, April) http://www.democracy.gov.sl/images/reports/THE%20ROAD%20TO%20PEACE.pdf

A report of the different consensus views expressed on the peace process of Sierra Leone during the Consultative Conference that took place from April 7-9, organized by The National Commission for Democracy and Human Rights and Civil Society Organization. The Conference occurred under the auspices of the Kabbah’s government and included 250 participants from different civic groups. Among them some groups were: Sierra Leone students, Religious Organizations, Sierra Leone Labour Congress and other Trade Unions, Chamber of Commerce and Indigenous Business Organizations, Local NGOs, Women’s Organizations, IDP Camps and other war victims, and Political Parties in Parliament. It details all the statements, remarks, presentations and discussions that occurred during the conference. Accordingly, it provides good insight to viewpoints of the civic groups who didn’t actively participate in the peace talks. While the resulting conference report wasn’t endorsed by the government, it was sent to the Togolese government who was mediating the Lome talks. Thus, the document presents relevant and contemporary information to the conflict. It has been relevant for our project to see what is the voice of different civil society groups that didn’t participate in the talks, and what was their position on the different issues.

8) Demirag, Elif Gizem. (2014) “Comparative Analysis of Peace Processes: Democratic Republic of Congo and Sierra Leone”.https://ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/dce2ffc1-1e3a-446e-8755-6673b1bd2c7d.pdf

Elif Gizem Demirag was a graduate student at Sabanci University, Istanbul, when this paper was written. Although, it’s credibility may be questionable it is strengthened by the fact that the paper was presented at the  Graduate Student Conference of European Consortium for Political Research in 2014. Moreover, Demirag has held many academic positions including, Graduate and Research Assistant and Training Assistant, and is now a PhD student at Koc University. His paper provides a unique perspective by presenting the Sierra Leone peace negotiations as relatively successful. Through the a comparative analysis of the peace processes in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sierra Leone, it argues that Sierra Leone was relatively successful; and this was largely due to the nature of third party roles and mediation in the process. Using Bercovitch’s mediation approach: the nature of the parties, nature of the issues and the nature of the mediator are interconnected and strongly affect the mediation outcome, the author analyses the nature of conflict and its mediation process. He concludes that peace outcomes are more likely to successful in cases such as Sierra Leone, where the mediator, the Togolese government, was not involved in the conflict. The article provides a positive outlook to the Sierra Leone peace negotiations, as an example of a good theoretical framework for mediation. The use of the paper was relevant for our project when it came to the analysis and assessment of the overall outcome of the conflict. It provided us with a different approach on the conflict that we could contest with our own opinions.

9) Mateos, O. (2009). " Construcció de Pau a Sierra Leone". Fundació Kontrast. Retrieved from http://www.fkontrast.org/documents/Ajut%20a%20la%20recerca%202008.pdf

Oscar Mateos holds a bachelor degree in Political Sciences and a masters degree in Peace Culture and International Relations. This document is part of his PhD thesis on the African conflicts. He worked as a teacher and researcher in the Department of Peace and Conflicts of the University of Sierra Leone in Freetown between 2006 and 2008. Today, he is a teacher at eh University of Ramon Llull in Barcelona.  This paper is part of a study he conducted in 2009 thank to the support of Kontrast Foundation. It gives the reader an analysis and insight of the construction of peace in Sierra Leone through the perspectives and opinions of the students of Peace and Conflict in the University of Sierra Leone. Three main issues are discussed: 1) which measures consolidated the peace process in Sierra Leone? 2) To what extent the idea of local appropriation is respected in the talks? 3) To what extent the reforms of peace construction are adapted to the local context. This source was relevant for our database project especially when we had to evaluate the success/ failure of the talks. It provided us with diverse opinions and perspectives on what might have been the shortages of the conflict to the mind of Sierra Leonean students, who have a first hand experience on the conflict and peace building.

10) BBC:“Sierra Leone Profile - Timeline.” BBC News, BBC, 7 Mar. 2018, www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14094419.

The British Broadcasting Corporation, is one of the best known and trusted world wide public service broadcaster as well as the world’s oldest national broadcasting organization. Since its foundation in 1922 it became a referent on the News and Media sphere. This specific publication provides an overall view on the Sierra Leonean conflict by listing the main events of the conflict and peace process from 1787 until 2016. It was essential for our project as it provided us with an general view on the conflict through which we could research more information as well as compare it to other documents and articles that provided us with similar but not exact timelines of the same issue.

AFRC-RUF. “Lasting Peace in Sierra Leone: The Revolutionary United Front Perspective and Vision”. Sierra Leone Web -  www.sierra-leone.org/AFRC-RUF/RUF-051199c.html

Barnes, Catherine; Polzer, Tara. “The Sierra Leone peace process: learning from the past to address current challenges”, Conciliation Resources (September, 2000)http://www.c-r.org/downloads/TheSierraLeonePeaceProcess_200011_ENG.pdf

BBC:“Sierra Leone Profile - Timeline.” BBC News, BBC, 7 Mar. 2018, www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14094419.

Dago, Jan. "Civil War in Sierra Leone." Alexia Foundation : Jan Dago. N.p., 2001. Web. 24 Mar. 2018.http://www.alexiafoundation.org/stories/civil-war-in-sierra-leone

Demirag, Elif Gizem. "Comparative Analysis of Peace Processes: Sierra Leone and Democratic Republic of Congo." Sabanci University, Istanbul, 2014. Web. 27 Mar. 2018.https://ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/dce2ffc1-1e3a-446e-8755-6673b1bd2c7d.pdf

Horn, Adrian, Funmi Olonisakin, and Gordon Peake. "United Kingdom-led Security Sector Reform in Sierra Leone." Civil Wars 8.2 (2006): 109-23. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13698240600877247?src=recsys

Hayner, P. (2011, May 26). Negotiating peace in Sierra Leone: Confronting the justice challenge. Retrieved from https://www.ictj.org/publication/negotiating-peace-sierra-leone-confronting-justice-challenge

Human Rights Post. “Sierra Leone, Human Rights Developement.” Africa 10, www.hrw.org/legacy/wr2k/Africa-09.htm.

Mateos, O. (2009). " Construcció de Pau a Sierra Leone". Fundació Kontrast. Retrieved from http://www.fkontrast.org/documents/Ajut%20a%20la%20recerca%202008.pdf

Obita, J., Lord, D., Gberie, L., Rashid, I., Bright, D., Jusu-Sheriff, Y., . . . Fortune, F. (2015, July 27). Paying the price: The Sierra Leone peace process. Retrieved from http://www.c-r.org/resources/paying-price-sierra-leone-peace-process.

Pickering, Jonathan, Policy Coherence in International Responses to State Failure: The role of the United Kingdom in Sierra Leone, July 2009, Development Studies Institute London School of Economics and Political Sciences http://www.lse.ac.uk/internationalDevelopment/pdf/WP/WP76.pdf

Ramsbotham, Oliver, Tom Woodhouse, and Hugh Miall. Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The Prevention, Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflicts. 3rd ed. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2016.

SIERRA LEONE: IRIN Focus on the Peace Process.”, University of Pennsylvania - African Studies Centre, www.africa.upenn.edu/Newsletters/irinw_111699.html

“Sierra Leone GDP 1960-2018 | Data | Chart | Calendar | Forecast | News.” Sierra Leone GDP | 1960-2018 | Data | Chart | Calendar | Forecast | News, tradingeconomics.com/sierra-leone/gdp

“The Road to Peace: Report of National Consultative Conference on the Peace Process in Sierra Leone” Organized by The National Commission for Democracy and Human Rights and Civil Society Organizations (1999, April) http://www.democracy.gov.sl/images/reports/THE%20ROAD%20TO%20PEACE.pdf

Mufson, Steven. “The US Backs Amnesty in Sierra Leone.” The Washington Post, WP Company, 18 Oct. 1999, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/daily/oct99/leone18.htm.

Voeten, Teun. "Newton, near Freetown, May 2000." Photography on War and Conflict in Sierra Leone and Liberia. N.p., 2013. Web. 24 Mar. 2018.http://www.teunvoeten.com/photography_conflict_sierraleone_liberia.php?selectedCountry=SierraLeone_Liberia&selectedPage=0

On August 18, 2003, the Liberian government, rebels, and political parties signed the Accra Comprehensive Peace Agreement to officially conclude the Second Liberian Civil War. The agreement was signed in Accra, Ghana. It was created after vigorous back-door negotiations, which commenced earlier on June 4 in Akosombo, Ghana, and the signing of a ceasefire agreement on June 17. The negotiations and subsequent agreement committed the signatories to an immediate ceasefire, cantonment, disarmament, demobilization. In addition, the negotiations also addressed long-term issues of rehabilitation and reintegration; security sector reform; release of prisoners and abductees; human rights; security guarantees for humanitarian activities; women and children rights; post-conflict rehabilitation and reconstruction programme etc. Charles Taylor was forced to leave Liberia as part of the peace settlement and was later brought to the Special Court for Sierra Leone. The warring parties, opposition parties, and civil society groups agreed to share ministerial portfolios and employment opportunities in the cabinet and parliament and elections were to be held no later than 2005. [1]

Issue	Key Issues of Negotiation and Subsequent Implementation
Ceasefire (as discussed Article II)	Negotiation: The Parties called on the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to establish a Multinational Force to be deployed as an Interposition Force in Liberia, to secure the ceasefire, and create a zone of separation between the belligerent forces and thus provide a safe corridor for the delivery of humanitarian assistance and free movement of persons. The Joint Monitoring Committee (JMC), established under the terms of the Ceasefire Agreement and composed of representatives of ECOWAS, the UN, AU, ICGL, and Parties to the Ceasefire Agreement, supervised and monitored the implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement. In addition, they also assumed the responsibilities to resolve potential disputes concerning implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement, which included the investigation of any alleged violation and also recommend remedial action for confirmed ceasefire violations. Implementation: the ceasefire was partly implemented in 2004, with sporadic violations by actors against local civilians. By 2005, the ceasefire was fully implemented and respected.
Disarmament (as discussed in Article VI)	Negotiations: The Political Parties agreed on the need for the deployment of an International Stabilization Force (ISF) to ensure the prompt and efficient implementation of a national process of cantonment, disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation, and reintegration. The ISF conducted the disarmament of all combatants of the Parties including paramilitary groups. The process was as follows: following disengagement, all forces had to withdraw from combat positions to cantonment locations in accordance with the withdrawal and cantonment plan, and such plan was published by the ISF and the National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration (NCDDRR) within the first 30 days. Subsequently, all arms and ammunition were placed under constant surveillance by the ISF. Implementation: the processes of cantonment, disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation achieved only minimum and intermediate implementation from 2003-2008. It was considered fully implemented in 2009 when 103,019 of the 101,495 combatants were accounted and disarmed.
Truth, reconciliation, rehabilitation, and reintegration mechanism (as discussed in Article XIII	Negotiations: A Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was established to provide a forum to issues of impunity, as well as an opportunity for both the victims and perpetrators of human rights violations to share their experiences, in order to get a clear picture of the past to facilitate genuine healing and reconciliation. In the spirit of national reconciliation, the Commission dealt not with the root causes of the crises in Liberia, including human rights violations, but rather recommend measures to be taken for the rehabilitation of victims of human rights violations. Membership of the Commission was drawn from a cross-section of Liberian society. Implementation: the processes of truth, reconciliation, rehabilitation, and reintegration were partially implemented in 2004, as the TRC was being set up and the Act was being drafted. In 2005, the TRC Draft Act was passed and in 2006, the president formally inaugurated the TRC. The TRC was mandated to investigate rights abuses and killings from 1979 until 2003.
Release of prisoners and abductees	The Parties involved agreed to unconditionally release all political prisoners and prisoners of war, including non-combatants and abductees. Relevant information regarding their prisoners of war, abductees or detained persons were provided to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and other relevant national and international agencies for verification purposes. These agencies were then expected to give the necessary assistance to the released persons, including relocation to any part of Liberia. Implementation: all prisoners and abductees were released in 2003.
Human rights (as discussed in Article XII)	The Parties agreed that the basic civil and political rights enunciated in the Declaration and Principles on Human Rights adopted by the United Nations, African Union, and ECOWAS, in particular, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, and as contained in the Laws of Liberia, shall be fully guaranteed and respected within Liberia. The Parties also agreed on the need for the establishment of an Independent National Commission on Human Rights (INCHR), which would monitor compliance with the basic rights guaranteed in the present Peace Agreement as well as promote human rights education throughout the various sectors of Liberian society, including schools, the media, the police and the military. Implementation: There was no significant evidence of implementation until September 2010, when the parliament finally established the Independent National Human Rights Commission after a substantial delay through Information Freedom Act of 2010. The Commissioners were confirmed by the Senate in September 2010.
Women’s rights (as discussed in Article XXVIII and XXXI)	Negotiation: The Parties agreed to reflect national and gender balance in all elective and non-elective appointments within the National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL). The NTGL accorded particular attention to the issue of the rehabilitation of vulnerable groups or war victims (children, women, the elderly and the disabled) within Liberia, who have been severely affected by the conflict in Liberia. The NTGL also agreed to try and maintain gender balance in the implementation of programs for national rehabilitation, reconstruction and development, for the moral, social and physical reconstruction of Liberia in the post-conflict period. Implementation: Women’s rights as discussed was barely implemented in the subsequent years. In 2009, President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf unveiled the new Liberia National Gender Policy focused on opening opportunities in employment, compensation, land ownership, credit, literacy, and access to justice for women, but the implementation of this policy has not been evaluated.
Children’s rights	Negotiation: In addition to the aforementioned focus on rehabilitation of vulnerable groups, Parties agreed to mobilize resources with the assistance of the International Community, especially in cooperation with the Office of the U.N. Special Representative for Children in Armed Conflict, UNICEF, the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child and other relevant agencies, to address children’s demobilization and reintegration needs.

Source: Peace Accord Matrix. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame. [2]

The mediator for the talks was General Abdulsalami Abubakar, a former head of state of Nigeria. The talks were held under the auspices of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

Primary Negotiators

Government of Liberia

Ceasefire: [3]

• Charles Taylor would only consider stepping down once Taylor, other government leaders, and military commanders had been given international guarantees about their security.
• In response to the demand of resignation within 10 days of a ceasefire agreement, the government initially refused and said Taylor should stay in power until January.

Power sharing transitional government: [4]

• Taylor’s government demanded a constitutional transition.
• A constitutional transition would mean that Taylor’s Vice-President Moses Blah would take over the transitional government.

Amnesty: [5]

• Demanded amnesty for any actions committed during the civil war.
• Taylor attempted to pass an act that would grant immunity for all persons who committed crimes or acts during the civil war, although it was not legitimately passed.

Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and Model for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL)

The single issue the rebel groups would not compromise on was the removal and departure of Charles Taylor.

Ceasefire: [6]

• LURD and MODEL demanded that any ceasefire agreement would have to require Charles Taylor’s resignation and the establishment of a new broad-based government of national unity within 10 days.
• The rebels demanded that a U.S. or Western-led intervention force should monitor the ceasefire, rather than a West African or ECOWAS force.

Power sharing transitional government: [7]

• The rebel groups wanted President Taylor excluded from the transitional government and refused the proposal that Vice-President Moses Blah would take over the transitional government.  
• LURD and MODEL wanted to be included in the transitional government. The rebel forces had refused to sign one version of the peace agreement because it excluded LURD from top government positions.
• LURD and MODEL demanded that an interim president should be selected from political parties and civil society groups that did not partake in the conflict. LURD and MODEL should also hold two vice-presidential positions.

Amnesty: [8]

• Rebel factions initially demanded a tribunal for war crimes for justice.
• This demand was not strong because the rebel groups could also be accused of war crimes.

Constitutional reform: [9]

• LURD proposed the establishment of a commission to review the constitution, particularly in relation to presidential powers.

Signatories

Political Parties

• All-Liberian Coalition Party
• Free Democratic Party
• Liberian Action Party
• Unity Party
• All-Liberian Coalition Party
• True Whig Party
• Liberian People's Party
• National Patriotic Party
• National Reformation Party
• Labor Party
• Liberia Unification Party
• People's Democratic Party
• National Democratic Party
• Reformation Alliance Party
• United People's Party
• Liberia National Union
• Equal Rights Party
• Progressive Peoples Party
• The New Deal Movement

*18 political parties attended the peace negotiations. However, there is a gap in literature regarding their official positions. Some sources have suggested that about half of the parties were created by the Taylor government leading up to the peace talks.

International Actors

International Contact Group of Liberia (composed of members of the UN, ECOWAS, AU, World Bank, US, Ghana, Nigeria, UK, Spain, and Sweden)

Ceasefire: [10]

• Urged the government of Liberia and LURD to enter into a ceasefire immediately and without any preconditions.
• Called on the Security Council to authorize a monitoring mechanism for the ceasefire.

Elections: [11]

• Urged the government to create the conditions required for a free and fair election.
• In particular, they called for a ceasefire, security, a process of reconciliation, electoral reform, and respect for human rights before free and fair elections are possible.

U.S. Representatives specifically

Transitional government: [12]

• Held the firm belief that no faction representatives should hold positions in the transitional government.
• The initial draft of the peace agreement reflected this position.

Official Observers: Civil Society Leaders

Mano River Women’s Peace Network

All Components of new Liberian government: [13]

• Called for the inclusion of women within the executive, legislative, and judiciary structures.
• Called for 50% representation of women in transitional leadership.

Peace and Post-Conflict Processes: [14]

• Called for the group’s participation in the DDR process and for the inclusion of women in rehabilitation, reconstruction, and redevelopment process.
• Demanded more participation in ongoing peace processes, including being made official delegates (rather than observers) and have voting rights.

*The Inter-Religious Committee in Liberia, the Liberian Bar Association, and Members of the Liberian diaspora also attended the peace negotiations. The civil society actors involved in the talks likely had a significant role following the negotiation of the ceasefire. However, there is a gap in literature regarding their positions in the talks. For more information, see: Franzisca Zanker [15].

Due to the extensive nature of the peace agreement and vast involvement of the main warring parties and important representatives, it seems that there were no important actors that were excluded from the peace talks.

Our research team considers the peace talks and negotiations of the Accra Comprehensive Peace Agreement between parties involved in the Second Liberian Civil War to be relatively successful. The ‘success’ of this peace talk is based on the evaluation of the negotiated topics/issues and the process of implementation. To highlight the overall success, we will look at both the benefits and concerns with the Accra Peace agreement in general, such as its inclusion of a wide range of actors involved in the conflict, the problems with the power-sharing article, and the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commision.

The peace talks included a range of actors from civil society in both the negotiations and peacebuilding process. In particular, the Mano River Women’s Peace Network was influential in the negotiations while other women placed pressure from outside of the formal talks. For example, the Liberian Peace-building Network mobilized Liberian women living in refugee camps to protest outside of the conference room in Ghana [16]. Furthermore, civil society actors received formal roles in the transitional government. For example, seven seats were reserved for civil society groups in the legislative assembly [17]. The ministries of national security, education, gender and development, information, rural development, and youth and sports were also entrusted to civil society representatives  [18].

Furthermore, the peace talks led to the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) as a form of restorative justice following the mass abuses of human rights. Notably, Liberia’s TRC was the first TRC to include its diaspora community extensively, to investigate economic crimes as a principal source of conflict, and to provide a comprehensive mapping of human rights violations [19]. However, the TRC is also criticized for its lack of funding, inadequate staff and technical support, and the government’s lack of follow through on the recommendations [20].

A section of the peace agreement that has been critiqued is that pertaining to the power-sharing of different sectors between the respective actors. Within the agreement that the parties signed, it included dividing major public sectors between the major warring groups: LURD got justice, transport, labor, and finance etc. MODEL was given commerce, foreign affairs, mines, and energy etc, while the remnants of the Taylor government were tasked with health and social welfare, internal affairs etc. The problem with this section in the agreement is that instead of incentivizing cooperation between the previous warring factions, it divided key institutions and left avenues for the potential to “ siphon off state resources and thereby fund whatever they pleased” [21]. Another way to address this disparity is to share the authoritative power between other levels of government besides the three major warring parties. This would mitigate the potential for abusing power and also empower the local citizens to be active participants in the process, making for a more stable model for long-term peace. It could also relieve some “local-based ethnic disputes” that fueled the civil war on a grassroots level [22].

The peace talks also led to an agreement on disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) to help with post-conflict reconstruction. However, the overall effectiveness of Liberia’s DDR program is debated. There are mixed feelings among ex-combatants regarding the effectiveness of the reintegration and rehabilitation elements of the DDR program [23]. Meanwhile, the disarmament and demobilization were generally viewed favourably, particularly the cash for arms program and the UN’s presence [24]. The UN’s presence also highlights the significant role that international actors played in both the short-term conflict resolution and long-term peacebuilding process. In particular, international actors helped to promote an environment conducive to deeper structural reforms and to conditions that would allow for  free and fair elections [25].

“The Accra Comprehensive Peace Agreement,” Accra, Ghana, August 18, 2003. Retrieved from:
https://www.peacemaker.un.org/liberia-peaceagreementlurdmodel2003

“Agreement on Ceasefire and Cessation of Hostilities,” Accra, Ghana, June 17, 2003. Retrieved from:
https://www.peacemaker.un.org/liberia-ceasefire2003

“The Golden Tulip Declaration of Liberian Women Attending the Peace Talks in Accra,” Accra Ghana, March 15, 2003. Retrieved from:
http://www.peacewomen.org/sites/default/files/rep_goldentulipdeclarationliberianwomenpeacetalks_representvariouslibwomensorg_2003_0.pdf

“‘No to War!’ Statement by H.E. President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf at Commemoration of the 10th Anniversary of the Signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement,” Monrovia, Liberia, August 19, 2013. Retrieved from:
http://www.emansion.gov.lr/doc/20130819_President_Sirleafs_Statement_Decade_Peace_Ceremony_1.pdf

Republic of Liberia Truth and Reconciliation Commission. “Volume II: Consolidated Final Report,” Monrovia, Liberia, June 30, 2009. Retrieved from:
https://web.archive.org/web/20170515044651/http://trcofliberia.org:80/reports/final-report

United Nations Security Council. “Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on Liberia,” September 11, 2003. Retrieved from:
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2003/875

The Guardian. “ Liberian rebels sign peace deal,” August 19, 2003. Retrieved from:
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/aug/19/westafrica

Peace Accords Matrix. “Accra Peace Agreement,” August 18, 2003. Retrieved from:
https://www.peaceaccords.nd.edu/accord/accra-peace-agreement

Atkinson, Philippa. "Liberal Interventionism in Liberia: Towards a Tentatively just Approach?: Analysis." Conflict, Security & Development, vol. 8, no. 1, 2008, pp. 15-45.

This paper critically evaluates the role of the international community in Liberia’s conflict resolution phase and post-conflict phase. Philippa Atkinson begins by evaluating the liberal peace agenda and whether the international community’s intervention was justified. Next, Atkinson analyzes of the strengths and weaknesses of the international community’s intervention. This section is particularly useful because it provides a balanced overview of the international community’s impact. The paper concludes that the international community did indeed play a substantial role in longer-term peace processes, despite the international community’s shortcomings. Overall, this paper is useful in understanding the supportive role that international actors play in the peacebuilding process.

Debusscher, Petra, and Maria Martin de Almagro. "Post-Conflict Women's Movements in Turmoil: The Challenges of Success in Liberia in the 2005-Aftermath." The Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 54, no. 2, 2016, pp. 293-316.

This paper reviews the role of Liberian women’s advocacy in peacebuilding. First, the authors review the overall literature on women’s advocacy in conflict settings. The review helps to put the Liberian women’s advocacy in the context of the challenges facing women in peacebuilding. The authors then provide a short history of the Liberian women’s movement during the conflict and peace negotiations. This section is particularly useful in understanding how women were influential as actors both inside and outside of the formal Accra talks. Following this discussion, the authors seek to understand why the current women’s movement is weakening in post-conflict Liberia. In particular, the authors addressed this question by conducting interviews with gender activists involved in NGOs and government institutions. Overall, the authors provide a useful overview of the role and challenges of women’s advocacy. The authors suggest that there are important lessons to learn from the case of Liberia because civil society advocacy is essential for post-conflict reconstruction.

De Ycaza, Carla. "A Search for Truth: A Critical Analysis of the Liberian Truth and Reconciliation Commission." Human Rights Review, vol. 14, no. 3, 2013, pp. 189-212.

This paper provides a balanced overview of the Liberian Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Carla De Ycaza begins by discussing the history of the conflict. Next, De Ycaza reviews the establishment of the TRC, the proceedings, and the TRC’s findings and recommendations. The paper is thorough in its analysis because it refers to primary and secondary sources about perspectives on the TRC. It also includes qualitative and quantitative data about the effectiveness of the TRC. Furthermore, De Ycaza discusses the unique contributions that the Liberian TRC made to the field of transitional justice, the debates regarding the TRC, and its criticisms. Overall, the paper provides a succinct overview of the impact of the TRC and its limitations in restorative justice. This paper is significant in understanding the healing and reconciliation process in Liberia.

Jennings, Kathleen M. "The Struggle to Satisfy: DDR through the Eyes of Ex-Combatants in Liberia." International Peacekeeping, vol. 14, no. 2, 2007, pp. 204-218.

This paper evaluates the justification, formulation, and implementation of Liberia’s DDR program. First, Kathleen M. Jennings outlines the situation in Liberia and analyses its DDR program. Jennings provides a particularly useful analysis because she conducted qualitative fieldwork with ex-combatants in Monrovia, Liberia to evaluate the successfulness of the DDR program. Jennings identifies that the primary rationale for reintegration was to satisfy the ex-combatants but concludes through the interviews that this goal has not been met. This paper also successfully identifies issues with Liberia’s DDR process that relate to gaps in the overall literature in DDR programs. DDR is an important component of post-conflict reconstruction and this paper provides a solid understanding of the strengths and limitations of Liberia’s DDR program.

Mehler, Andreas. “ Peace and Power Sharing in Africa: A Not so Obvious Relationship.” African Affairs, Vol 108, no. 432, 2009, pp. 453-473.

This paper discusses the implications of peace agreements being signed in different African contexts. Mehler provides an objective critique of the Accra Peace agreement and why agreements that are made by simply dividing up power between the warring parties may not be the best solution on the pursuit for a more sustainable long term peace. Instead the author advocates for more broader based participation in the agreements so that the main beneficiaries, the citizens, can be empowered participants. This paper is relevant to our entry due to the fact that it highlights the problems that could be embedded within these larger peace agreements, and the implications of what ignoring these problems could lead to.

Pham, J. P. "Liberia and Sierra Leone: A Study of Comparative Human Rights Approaches by Civil Society Actors." Interdisciplinary Journal of Human Rights Law, vol. 1, no. 1, 2006, pp. 69-105.

This paper provides a useful comparison between Liberia and Sierra Leone to help understand the role of civil society actors, NGOs, and other members of the human rights community in peacebuilding. J. Peter Pham begins by comparing the histories and civil wars of Liberia and Sierra Leone. Next, Pham identifies the different roles that civil society played during the conflict in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Pham then identifies the different approaches that civil society took in the post-conflict phase. This section is particularly useful in understanding the role that civil society played during the talks and how this approach led to a formalized role for civil society representatives in the post-conflict phase. Overall, this paper helps to understand the role of Liberian civil society in both the conflict phase and the post-conflict rebuilding phase.

Zanker, Franziska. "Legitimate Representation: Civil Society Actors in Peace Negotiations Revisited." International Negotiation 19, no. 1, 2014, pp. 62-88.

This paper evaluates the representation of civil society actors in the Liberian and Kenyan peace negotiations. This paper is particularly useful because it creates an empirical model to understand “legitimate representation” based on subjective, substantive, and accountable representation. This model is used to compare civil society activism in Liberia and Kenya. Franzisca Zanker seeks to fill a gap in the literature regarding why and how involving civil society groups improves the legitimacy of negotiations. Zanker identifies how the involvement of civil society groups can make the negotiations and their outcomes more legitimate for the aggrieved. Zanker also identifies the limitations of this argument. As a result, this paper is highly useful in understanding why and how the inclusion of civil society was significant in the Accra talks.

1. "Secretary General's Report to the UN Security Council," United Nations Security Council (S/2003/1175), December 15, 2003.
2. Peace Accords Matrix. “Accra Peace Agreement,” Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, Date of retrieval: (3/15/2018),
   https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/accord/accra-peace-agreement
3. IRIN. “Liberia: Peace talks deadlocked over rebel demand for Taylor to quit.” Reliefweb, June 15, 2003. Retrieved from:
   https://reliefweb.int/report/liberia/liberia-peace-talks-deadlocked-over-rebel-demand-taylor-quit
4. IRIN. “Liberia: Draft comprehensive peace accord presented.” Reliefweb, July 18, 2003. Retrieved from:
   https://reliefweb.int/report/liberia/liberia-draft-comprehensive-peace-accord-presented
5. Hayner, Priscilla. “Negotiating peace in Liberia: Preserving the possibility for Justice.” International Center for Transitional Justice, November, 2007. Retrieved from: https://www.ictj.org/publication/negotiating-peace-liberia-preserving-possibility-justice
6. IRIN. “Liberia: Peace talks deadlocked over rebel demand for Taylor to quit.” Reliefweb, June 15, 2003. Retrieved from:
   https://reliefweb.int/report/liberia/liberia-peace-talks-deadlocked-over-rebel-demand-taylor-quit
7. IRIN. “Liberia - Taylor at Accra peace talks: “Honourable exit or extended mandate?” Reliefweb, July 22, 2003. Retrieved from:
   https://reliefweb.int/report/liberia/liberia-taylor-accra-peace-talks-honourable-exit-or-extended-mandate
8. Hayner, Priscilla. “Negotiating peace in Liberia: Preserving the possibility for Justice.” International Center for Transitional Justice, November, 2007. Retrieved from: https://www.ictj.org/publication/negotiating-peace-liberia-preserving-possibility-justice
9. Ibid.
10. UN News. “Liberia: International contact group urges Government and rebels to hold ceasefire talks,” March 1, 2003. Retrieved from: https://news.un.org/en/story/2003/03/60622-liberia-international-contact-group-urges-government-and-rebels-hold-ceasefire
11. Ibid.
12. Hayner, Priscilla. “Negotiating peace in Liberia: Preserving the possibility for Justice.” International Center for Transitional Justice, November, 2007. Retrieved from: https://www.ictj.org/publication/negotiating-peace-liberia-preserving-possibility-justice
13. “The Golden Tulip Declaration of Liberian Women Attending the Peace Talks in Accra,” Accra Ghana, March 15, 2003. Retrieved from:  http://www.peacewomen.org/sites/default/files/rep_goldentulipdeclarationliberianwomenpeacetalks_representvariouslibwomensorg_2003_0.pdf
14. Ibid.
15. Zanker, Franziska. "Legitimate Representation: Civil Society Actors in Peace Negotiations Revisited." International Negotiation 19, no. 1, 2014, pp. 62-88.
16. Debusscher, Petra, and Maria Martin de Almagro. "Post-Conflict Women's Movements in Turmoil: The Challenges of Success in Liberia in the 2005-Aftermath." The Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 54, no. 2, 2016, pp. 293-316.
17. Pham, J. P. "Liberia and Sierra Leone: A Study of Comparative Human Rights Approaches by Civil Society Actors." Interdisciplinary Journal of Human Rights Law, vol. 1, no. 1, 2006, pp. 69-105.
18. Ibid.
19. De Ycaza, Carla. "A Search for Truth: A Critical Analysis of the Liberian Truth and Reconciliation Commission." Human Rights Review, vol. 14, no. 3, 2013, pp. 189-212.
20. Ibid.
21. Mehler, Andreas. “ Peace and Power Sharing in Africa: A Not so Obvious Relationship.” African Affairs, Vol 108, no. 432, 2009, pp. 453-473.

22. Ibid.
23. Jennings, Kathleen M. "The Struggle to Satisfy: DDR through the Eyes of Ex-Combatants in Liberia." International Peacekeeping, vol. 14, no. 2, 2007, pp. 204-218.
24. Ibid.
25. Atkinson, Philippa. "Liberal Interventionism in Liberia: Towards a Tentatively just Approach?: Analysis." Conflict, Security & Development, vol. 8, no. 1, 2008, pp. 15-45.
    
26. Debusscher, Petra, and Maria Martin de Almagro. "Post-Conflict Women's Movements in Turmoil: The Challenges of Success in Liberia in the 2005-Aftermath." The Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 54, no. 2, 2016, pp. 293-316.
27. De Ycaza, Carla. "A Search for Truth: A Critical Analysis of the Liberian Truth and Reconciliation Commission." Human Rights Review, vol. 14, no. 3, 2013, pp. 189-212.
28. Hayner, Priscilla. “Negotiating peace in Liberia: Preserving the possibility for Justice.” International Center for Transitional Justice, November, 2007. Retrieved from: https://www.ictj.org/publication/negotiating-peace-liberia-preserving-possibility-justice
29. “The Golden Tulip Declaration of Liberian Women Attending the Peace Talks in Accra,” Accra Ghana, March 15, 2003. Retrieved from:  http://www.peacewomen.org/sites/default/files/rep_goldentulipdeclarationliberianwomenpeacetalks_representvariouslibwomensorg_2003_0.pdf
30. IRIN. “Liberia: Draft comprehensive peace accord presented.” Reliefweb, July 18, 2003. Retrieved from:
    https://reliefweb.int/report/liberia/liberia-draft-comprehensive-peace-accord-presented
31. IRIN. “Liberia - Taylor at Accra peace talks: “Honourable exit or extended mandate?” Reliefweb, July 22, 2003. Retrieved from:
    https://reliefweb.int/report/liberia/liberia-taylor-accra-peace-talks-honourable-exit-or-extended-mandate
32. IRIN. “Liberia: Peace talks deadlocked over rebel demand for Taylor to quit.” Reliefweb, June 15, 2003. Retrieved from:
    https://reliefweb.int/report/liberia/liberia-peace-talks-deadlocked-over-rebel-demand-taylor-quit
33. Jennings, Kathleen M. "The Struggle to Satisfy: DDR through the Eyes of Ex-Combatants in Liberia." International Peacekeeping, vol. 14, no. 2, 2007, pp. 204-218.
34. “Liberians Fail to Sign Comprehensive Peace Agreement.” GhanaWeb, 17 July 2003. Retrieved from:
    http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=39449. 
35. “Peace Accords Matrix.” Accra Peace Agreement | Peace Accords Matrix, Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame., 2015, Retrieved from:
    http://www.peaceaccords.nd.edu/accord/accra-peace-agreement.
36. Pham, J. P. "Liberia and Sierra Leone: A Study of Comparative Human Rights Approaches by Civil Society Actors." Interdisciplinary Journal of Human Rights Law, vol. 1, no. 1, 2006, pp. 69-105.
37. UN News. “Liberia: International contact group urges Government and rebels to hold ceasefire talks,” March 1, 2003. Retrieved from:
    https://news.un.org/en/story/2003/03/60622-liberia-international-contact-group-urges-government-and-rebels-hold-ceasefire
38. Zanker, Franzisca. "Legitimate Representation: Civil Society Actors in Peace Negotiations Revisited." International Negotiation 19, no. 1 (2014): 62-88.

Issue	Outcome
The transfer of power from an autocratic regime to a democratic government, Resulting in the Twelve point agreement (2005) in order to achieve this transition in a peaceful manner. This issue was debated heavily and initiated the spark that grew to be the Maoist armed conflict with high mortality rate, economic downturn and devastation of property.	The bringing about of democracy, peace, prosperity, social advancement and a sovereign Nepal for Nepali people. This issue involved the agreement to establish a full democracy by bringing autocratic monarchy to an end. To achieve this (peace, progress, prosperity) the creation of a nation wide democratic movement. This agreement involved the restoration of parliament in order to establish a full democracy, holding the election of constituent assembly, holding a national political conference as well as other measures to ensure the stability and peaceful transfer of power back to the Nepali people.
The armed conflict initiated by the Maoists that resulted in mass death, destruction, damage of property and economic loss. This was carried out in the name of escalating the Maoist agenda and overall influence on the country. To attempt to put an end to this armed conflict The banding together of the seven major political parties involved in the issue occurred and at the same time stood together in opposition of the king. These events resulted  in the Comprehensive peace agreement (CPA) between government of Nepal and Maoists.	This agreement set out to end the conflicts between the Maoists and the Government of Nepal. Actions taken involved a ceasefire, management of both national and Maoist armies & arms, as well as a call for increased human rights and humanitarian law principles and policies. The ultimate goal of this agreement was to turn temporary ceasefire with the Maoists into long lasting peace. The agreement also included the calling forth of the UN to oversee an election held to select a constituent assembly in order to end the transition period as well as the duty of this new assembly to raise the question of the necessity of Monarchy as an influential institution to the country. This agreement also existed to reaffirm commitments made in the previous twelve point agreement. The CPA is an eight-point consensus and twenty five point code of conduct.
Armed conflict, Violence and unrest caused by the possession of arms and mismanagement of  primarily the Maoists forces Resulting in The Agreement on Monitoring of the Management of Arms and Armies (AMMAA), 2006. This agreement branched off of the former negotiations revolving around the CPA.	This agreement stated that an equal number of weapons from both groups would be stored and monitored by the UN. At the same time, under this agreement, ex-combatants of the Maoist party would receive support and rehabilitation post conflict. another similar agreement was reached between the Nepali Congress (NC), Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist Leninist) [(CPNUML)] and the CPN (Maoist) on 25 April 2008  in which ex-combatants would receive aid through assisted integration into security agencies and/ or economic assistance. This agreement set out to create an environment of safety and freedom for Nepali citizens.
The issue of the post-conflict trauma Maoist combatants withstood that had to  be dealt with in order to move forward with the creation of the new constitution based on complete national consensus, resulting in the 7 Point agreement.	This agreement focussed on the assistance of rehabilitation and integration of Maoist combatants back into national security forces including receiving proper training and the passing over of arms to the possession of the new government. This also involved the regrouping of those willing to integrate into the new security force and those being rehabilitated. Commission to investigate forced disappearances was agreed upon ( regarding the CPA and the TRC’s wishes). The seven point agreement also involved the formation of packages of relief for those who fell victim to conflict. Maoists agreed to return properties in which they dominated in the countryside and the peasants retrieved their rights on this land. Maoist vehicles were to be regulated and unregulated vehicles were taken away. Lastly, this agreement made leeway for the drafting of a new constitution under the consensus of the nation.

Seven Party Alliance

   The seven party alliance members included; Nepali Congress, Nepali Congress (Democratic), Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist) who withdrew on May 3 2009), Nepal Workers and Peasants Party, Nepal Goodwill Party(Anandi Devi), United Left Front and the People’s front. Their main goal was to put an end autocratic rule. They made up the majority of the seats in The Nepalese legislature. The seven party alliance went into the talks with the notion of implementing full democracy in order to address long standing yet pressing issues that the Nepalese people have been struggling under for years due to both the past multi-party democratic governments and the instability of power/inter-party conflicts all of which delayed action on these issues. The seven party alliance therefore demanded solutions to issues revolving around class, caste, gender and region. Primarily this group sought to bring the autocratic government to an end and in turn restore democracy, peace and prosperity. To achieve this, they wished for the restoration of parliament.  

Maoists

The CPN (Maoists) when entering the twelve point agreement, held the position that the goal of peace and democracy can be attained by forming an interim government and called for a national conference of the seven party democratic forces. They also held the view that the only alternative to the previously discussed method of achieving democratic peace is through the force of the people’s movement. Maoists displayed responsibility for making their commitment to democracy and democratic values public and clear as well as allowing displaced peoples during the armed conflict to return to their places of origin safely and with dignity. Lastly, the Maoists approached the talks with the willingness to accept and respect humans rights norms and values as well as the acceptance of their past mistakes and commitment to avoid said weaknesses in the future. In terms of the CPA negotiations,  Because it was a solidification and slight revamp of the previous twelve-point agreement, the positions held by the Maoists and the GoN were relatively clear and similar as they had been previously hammered out. The Maoists approached this negotiation with the intent to refrain from further violence (in the form of aggression, kidnappings, or any other acts of harassment) towards neither the GoN forces or Nepalese common people. The Maoists came into the negotiations with the understanding (derived from the previous twelve point agreement) that their troops would remain in Cantonments monitored by the UN. Maoists also came into the talks supporting the notion that private property of any individual would not be taken over unless permitted by the law. This is something the Maoists would previously be in disagreement to (for they formerly had position to large amounts of countryside) but since the twelve point agreement, the standards are clear on both sides.Coming into the talks that resulted in the Seven Point agreement, Maoists wished for the rehabilitation of their combatants, including an economic package for those opting not to integrate into the national security system. For those integrating would receive proper training for the job.

Government of Nepal

The GoN’s main goal coming into the CPA  negotiations was to transform the temporary ceasefire that was currently being held into lasting, sustainable peace. They came into these negotiations with the understanding that their army shall remain confined within the barracks. The Nepali government was also pushing for the rationing of the Maoist combatants. The Government of Nepal was in agreement and support in adopting the necessary policies to ensure economic, political and social transformation in order to resolve remaining conflict in Nepal. The government of Nepal also backed initiatives to create policy for the rights for the average Nepali citizen to education, health, housing, employment and food security. The Government of Nepal stood for the rights of the individual in terms of speech, expression and peaceful gathering. With the cultivation of a new peace, the GoN came into the talks with visions of freedom of opinion and expression, freedom of movement and the right to take part in political activities peacefully. Regarding the AMMAA, Following the CPA, the Government of Nepal came into these negotiations with the awareness and support for the fact that their army would continue to be monitored and remain in the barracks with its weapons out of reach. Entering into the talks regarding the 7 point agreement, the GoN wished for a drafting of a new constitution that was fair, equal and backed by the nation.

United Nations

In reference to the (AMMAA) negotiations, The United Nations main role and position was to provide surveillance of all arms and combatant locations and activity. They aimed to create a Joint Monitoring Coordination Committee with representative members from the UN, NA, and Maoist army. The functions of this new committee would be to resolve military or operational disputes, to gain the trust of the parties/build confidence and lastly, to assist both parties in instilling this agreement (through arms surveillance).  The main chairman would be a delegate from the United Nation and the two vice chairmen would be from the Maoist and NA armies. The JMCC’s activities would be regularly reported to the Security-General through the Chairman. The United Nations entered into the negotiations which resulted in the twelve point agreement with intentions to be a mediator and overseer of any and all decisions made regarding a shift in power. Naturally, they were called upon to monitor the election of a constituent assembly to end the transition period between governments.

During Nepal’s vital peace negotiations in 2003, civil society organizations tried their best to lobby and pressurize the conflicting parties to make the peace process meaningful [but]... they were not given enough roles and press coverage. The process became a closed door business of key players from the government and the Maoist leaders” (Kattel 2004).

China’s relations during the Nepalese peace process were more distant, partly because of their lesser visibility in its dealings with Nepal and their long-held views on non-intervention in the affairs of others

• “With a critical perspective on the Maoists as an unruly force that besmirched the good name of Chairman Mao, this stance had translated into unfailing support of the government of the day.”
• China’s involvement grew, however, in 2005 as a consequence of Gyanendra Bir Bikram Shah Dev’s (the last king of Nepal from 2001-2008) efforts to mobilize support for his coup

“The United Nations was present first through an Office of the UN HIgh Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and later in a specialised political mission (UNMIN). However, neither the UN nor the other external actors supporting the peace process ever fulfilled a formal role of mediation”

There was a significant lack of female representation during peace talks and negotiations. There were no women assigned or trusted to facilitate discussions; “in the first round of peace talks two respected male facilitators were assigned but no additional female members included in the facilitators team. In the second peace talks more were added than in the previous two but all were men”. A lack of female members from both sides except in the first term of the 2003 discussions are discouraging, and conducive of a misrepresentation of a huge sector in the population.

The peace talks pertaining to the Nepali conflict proved to be successful, however, there were multiple drawbacks that hindered the process along the way including external actors, constrained participation of civil society, and having limited checks and balances.

The Seven-Point Agreement of 2011 contains aspects that Nepal adopted which embraces unique principles and ultimately, precedence for integration and rehabilitation.  Despite having support from the international community, the peace processes were dominated by a domestic, actors-led process. External actors advising the peace processes through critical perspectives provided international views and opinions on justice. However, they should have brought a broad range of experience to the peace talks. Confusion as to which actions to take can be attributed to the parties lacking basic knowledge about international experiences, appropriate aims and proper mechanisms and policies. This included truth commissions, disappearance commissions, the vetting of security forces, and possible amnesty and reparations.  Essentially, the government and main political parties involved began and concluded the peace processes within Nepal through internal technical reforms such as demobilizing, registering, and monitoring the cantonments and arms. It was the “political parties themselves envisaged the contents of the peace process and concluded processes according to the agreement”(Nepal Institute for Policy Studies, 2013).

Furthermore, Nepal’s violent conflict concluded through prolonged negotiation. The then armed rebellion party gave up the decade-long armed struggle by renouncing violence and embracing the fundamental tenets of peaceful democratic process through the CPA (Nepal Institute for Policy Studies, 2013).  The CPN dissolved its army to transform itself into a civilian party, which acted as a statement claiming that perhaps violence can be addressed through negotiation--through peace talks. However, rather than finding success after the predicted six months, it took Nepal six years. Evidently, peace processes can be weakened if the role of civil society is limited or too constrained.  Civil society representatives attended negotiations as observers but were unable to contribute directly to peace talks, instead providing input during informal side meetings. Unfortunately, there was a lack of official records stating how much of an input these representatives brought to the table and whether these ideas were implemented.

Under the Interim Constitution, there was the creation of the SC by the GoN, which was comprised of representatives from the major political parties including the UCPN (Maoist), the NC, the CPN-UML and the Madhesi Parties).  They were given the responsibility of completing the peace process, where the representatives of the political parties, security agencies and ex-combatants made the policy decisions. Further, the SC were essentially responsible for the checks and balances of the peace process by undertaking the role of supervising, integrating, and rehabilitating the combatants while monitoring the arms and cantonments.  This was a major breakthrough especially given that Nepal was deemed a “highly politically polarized society,” thus having this agreement across political parties ensured that all decisions had to be made through a consensus (Nepal Institute for Policy Studies, 2013). Consequently, the peace talk can be considered a success because they clearly addressed the issue of sustainability and showcased their desire for prolonged peace.  However, there was also limited to no follow up procedure on the ex-combatants in voluntary retirement. Essentially, there was a lack of knowledge for their integration into society, which means that there is no account for monetary assistance given to ensure it will be used properly. and their possibility of joining criminal groups

In addition, although there were extremely contrasting perspectives, goals, issues, and perceived ideal processes, the major political parties involved ensured that communication persisted.  In turn, this perpetual dialogue process ultimately contributed to settling to an agreement that addressed all key actors. For example, even when political parties had contradictory opinions and adamant stands in the given political context that resulted in widening and deepening their differences, the NA gave momentum to the process by proposing integration of the ex-combatants into a new National Security and Development Directorate under it(Nepal Institute for Policy Studies, 2013). Evidently, this peace talk would not be classified as successful should this constant communication not have been established.

The peace talks associated with the Nepali crisis was a process that took six years, rather than the originally anticipated six months due to the complications addressed above.  Significant progress has been made that sufficiently addressed the conflict in a manner that has proven to be sustainable thus far. Therefore, this peace talk process may be considered successful.

http://carnegieendowment.org/newsletters/SAP/pdf/nepal_modalities_agreement_nov_28_final.pdf

https://reliefweb.int/report/nepal/full-text-comprehensive-peace-agreement-held-between-government-nepal-and-communist

http://carnegieendowment.org/newsletters/SAP/pdf/nepal_modalities_agreement_nov_28_final.pdf7

https://issat.dcaf.ch/download/111494/2023947/Nepal's%20Peace%20Process_A%20Brief%20Overview_Eng%20(2).pdf

Krampe, Florian. “Empowering peace: service provision and state legitimacy in Nepal’s peace-building process”, Conflict, Security and Development, 2016. Vol. 16., issue 1, 53-73 doi.org/10.1080/14678802.2016.1136138

Krampe offers their critique on Nepal’s peace-building process through a perspective of state legitimacy and provisions of rural communities during the resolution process. By addressing the gap in service provisions as a part of the emerging post-war order and its role in peace, this paper questions how civil societies are affected regarding socio-economic inequalities and the dynamics of state provisional abilities. By focusing on a specific topic of how reintegration during and after the peace process impacted micro-hydropower development, it recognizes how it may not be a specific peace-building strategy but is representative of how peace resolutions should address “social, economic, and environmental concerns of rural communities” (Krampe, 54). Krampe conclusively recognizes how the challenges of development policies and state legitimacy run parallel, yet any short-term failure can be outweighed by long-term socio-economic gains in the future.

Navlakha, Gautam. “Nepal: Peace Process Heading South”, Economic and Political Weekly, vol. 44, No. 49. 2009, pp. 8-13. www.jstor.org/stable/25663851

Navlakha’s commentary on the Nepal Peace Process questions the aftermath of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2006 and India’s involvement with the Maoist agenda during the events of the conflict negotiations. This article reflects  on the possibilities of power takeovers following the Maoist mass protest movement, a “Bangladeshi-type coup”, or some form of national government led by the Maoists. Summarizing the events of the emerging Communist Party of Nepal as the single largest party in the CA in 2008, Navlakha questions the benefits and potential problems of coalition alongside the “truly staggering” (Navlakha, 8) extent of Indian influence over Nepal. There is a slight sense hesitation against the possibility of a true non-violent transformation lending credibility in India, but admits that those who want to “qualitatively transform the state and society along the socialist path must be prepared to negotiate their way forward from a position of strength or not at all” (Navlakha, 13).

Björnehed, Emma. “Ideas in Conflict: The effect of frames in the Nepal conflict and peace process”, Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis, 2012. , p. 257

This academic thesis provided a critical viewpoint on the 1996 Nepalese events in analysis of social representations involving the motivations behind actors and their choices. Björnehed presents two analytical lenses in which to view the beginnings of the Maoist insurgency: a terrorism frame during the conflict period and a peace frame, involving the period of conflict resolution. Unlike a traditional frame analysis regarding specific audiences and the manoeuvrability of political or non-state actors, this theses presents the effects of frames on those involved in the framing process and all enabling or restrictive ways. Altogether, Björnehed recognizes the effects of self-entrapment and the “coercive character of ideas in making actors perceive themselves as forced to take a certain action or position” (Björnehed, 4). This model is reflective of the actors on the side of the Maoists and the Nepalese government during the insurgency of the civil war, where several parties were required to adhere and manifest significant political changes. Björnehed acknowledges limitations of their “Four logic of actor effects” model in terms of generality. Björnehed suggests that the Maoist leaders were in fact knowledgeable of the implications of their demands in relation to the extent of peace and democracy, in their attempt to make the SPA comply with their terms.

Thapa, Ganga B., Sharma, Jan. “From Insurgency to Democracy: The Challenges of Peace and Democracy-Building in Nepal”, International Political Science Review, 2009. Vol. 30, No.2, 205-219, Sage Publications, Ltd. www.jstor.org.ezproxy.library.ubc.ca/stable/25652899

Thapa and Sharma’s analysis of the prospects for peace-building in Nepal reviews the challenges faced during the transformation from insurgency into a democratic society. They employ an outsider perspective on the optimistic and pessimistic viewpoints on Nepal’s potential for becoming a stable democracy through analysis of their evolution of indigenous government, their period of political and diplomatic isolation, and the aspects of monarchical rule. Using a thorough examination on motivations of actors and decision-making processes, such as the founding of the NC and CPN establishing their roots in the early 1900’s, Thapa and Sharma offer an open-ended answer to the possibility of a democratic future. Although public opinion is less than optimistic, several suggestions are included, such as the possibility of a new plurality in Nepal with political leaders cut from a different cloth, and far-reaching measures such as new statues for economic institutions.

The Economist; London, “Asia: In limbo; Nepal’s Peace Process”. Vol. 385, Iss. 8554, 2007: 87. search-proquest-com.ezproxy.library.ubc.ca/docview/224000546?OpenUrlRefId=info:xri/sid: summon&accountid=14656

This brief article from the Economist constructs a viewpoint of the year of 2007’s peace agreement ending the Maoist insurrection. Although illustrations of non-violence have been hoped for, the article recognizes that abductions and threats have not been eradicated, due to a string of militant and criminal groups in the Terai territory of Nepal. This article is representative of the setbacks and efforts during the extremely long peace-process stemming from political stalemates and the constant postponement of elections. The presence of a political limbo set in the backdrop of politicians’ short term gains and the failure of the Maoists to accept competitive politics is demonstrative of civilian involvement. This short outlook into UN potential involvement, specifically through UNMIN, recognizes the necessity for long-term solutions and the emphasis for military force and police efforts in restricting the potentiality for civilian casualty during peace processes.

Robins, Simon. “Towards Victim-Centred Transitional Justice: Understanding the Needs of Families of the Disappeared in Postconflict Nepal”, International Journal of Transitional Justice, Vol. 5, Issue 1, 2011. Pg. 75-98. doi.org/10/1093/ijtj/ijq027

Robins offers a view on a topic regarding the after-effects of Nepal’s peace process and the 160 families of people that disappeared during the decade-long Maoist insurgency. The reparations from the transitional justice process is analyzed in an attempt to study the psychological and mental well-being of the victim’s families. Specifically, economic support and the need for truth about the disappearances that occured. This topic is essential for the study on conflict and peace, as the main highlights typically involve the conflictual wars and resulting resolutions or constitutions emerging as a result in its conclusion. Little is offered in the way of civilians and the effects on their homelife, especially those who are unaccounted for through a human rights lens. The avoidance of the marginalized class of citizens and the expectations held by the victims is recognized by Robins, who suggests improvements on the process of reconciliation that allows “policies to be driven by the needs of those most affected”.

Potter, Antonia. “Gender sensitivity: nicety or necessity in peace-process management?” Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, OSLO forum, 2008.

Potter’s approach to peace processes and sensitizing gender presents an awareness of the role of gender in conflict mediation, a vital and necessary aspect for tract negotiations. Pertaining to the conflict in Nepal, despite Maoist commitments to equality, and the existence of a handful of politically powerful women, there was a recorded lack of women representation in negotiations and discussions. The marginalization of a prominent space for women in mediator teams discussing issues not only affecting women, but all political actors and networks of individuals further desensitizes the effects of peace processes. Sexual violence, rehabilitation, security, justice, and demobilization are just a few of the issues where the voices of women benefit the formation of constitutions and amendments during periods of conflict. Potter includes an example of the women’s health network in Nepal as providing a valuable means of communication “with rural communities on issues ranging far beyond health concerns” (Potter, 59), countering fears of confusion or resistance pertaining to women involvement in state developmental processes. This paper offers a broad analysis on gender and its roles in peace processes, bringing to light the potential for female political participation and how limiting minority roles in constitution only harms the future of peace-making processes.

Subedi, DB. “Dealing with Ex-Combatants in a Negotiated Peace Process: Impacts of Transitional Politics on the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programme in Nepal”, Journal of Asian and African Studies, 2013. Sage Journals, journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0021909613507537

The historic Seven-Point AGreement signed on November 1st 2012 was a national consensus document addressing the integration and rehabilitation of the ex-combatants during the Nepal peace process. During this period in time, discussion and compromise was demonstrated on the part of several major political parties representing the SC in line with the Interim Constitution of 2007, the CPA, and other subsequent agreements for international practices. Working towards a logical conclusion, the rehabilitation of ex-combatants demonstrated the significant features of the Nepal peace processes. Subedi’s paper investigates the nature of this transitional process and outcomes of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) program. He labels this program as unconventional due to its unique context-specific model led by national actors despite a lack of external intervention that offered no space for non-state actors to participate in the Maoist army management. Subedi’s valuable contribution recognizes the flaws and potential drawbacks in this period of negotiation processes, calling out the failure of political actors and their conflicting needs and interests severely politicizing this resolution. Although the outcome was in fact conclusive and implemented, this account is helpful in a way that critiques the processes in which these agreements are formed, and suggests ways of future improvement.

Bhatta, Chandra D. “Reflections on Nepal’s Peace Process”, International Policy Analysis, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2012. library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/08936-20120228.pdf

Gachcchadar, Bijay Kumar.  “The Seven Point Agreement”, 1 November 2011. http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/nepal/document/papers/12_Point_Understanding.pdf. Accessed March 15, 2018.

Government of Nepal Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction. “12-point understanding reached between the Seven Political Parties and Nepal Communist Party (Maoists)”, 2005. www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/nepal/document/papers/12_Point_Understanding.pdfAccessed March 2, 2018.

Kathmandu, “Timeline of Constitution Statis”, IRIN, 2012. www.irinnews.org/report/95754/nepal-timeline-constitution-statis. Accessed March 2, 2018.

Lunn, Jon. “Nepal’s Endless Peace Process, 2006-12” House of Commons Library, International Affairs and Defence Section Commons Briefing Papers. 2013. researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/SN04229

Nepal Institute for Policy Studies. “Nepal’s Peace Process: A Brief Overview” Policy Paper. Vol. 8, Issue 1., 2013. issat.dcaf.ch/download/111494/2023947/Nepal's%20Peace%20Process_A%20Brief%20Over view_Eng%20(2).pdf. Accessed March 9, 2018.

Upreti, Bishnu Raj., Sapkota, Bisnu. “Case Study on Nepal: Observations and Reflections on the Peace and Constitution-Making Process” Swiss Peace, 2017. swisspeace.ch/fileadmin/user_upload/pdf/Mediation/Nepal_Case_Study__National_Dialogue_Handbook.pdf. Accessed March 3, 2018.

Wanis-St. John, Anthony., Kew, Darren. “Civil Society and Peace Negotiations: Confronting Exclusion” International Negotiation, 13, 2008., 11-36, doi: 10.1163/138234008X297896

Whitfield, Teresa. “Masala Peacemaking: Nepal’s Peace Process and the Contribution of Outsiders”, Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum, 2008. www.wiltonpark.org.uk/wpcontent/uploads/nepal-peace-process.pdf

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