Key Issues and Final Outcomes:

1. Colombian Government and FARC-EP
   1. Rural Development
      1. Chapter 1 of the Final Agreement has an increased focus on integrating rural and urban populations through CRR
   2. Political Participation
      1. Chapter 2 of the Final Agreement recognizes FARC-EP recognized as a Colombian party eligible for congressional and presidential elections; a minority. This is seen as a way to enrich debate and consolidating pluralism.
   3. Drug Trafficking
      1. Chapter 4 of the Final Agreement has FARC-EP agree to the “Solution to the Illicit Drugs Problems” which includes the termination of drug crops used by the FARC-EP.
   4. Ceasefire and Rights of Victims
      1. Chapter 3 of the Final Agreement contains the rules of Ceasefire for both actors and emphasizes the protection of civilians as a key determinant of the agreement’s success in the long-term. Chapter 5 contains the “Victims” agreement whereby judicial mechanisms will be used to counteract impunity.
   5. Verification Mechanisms
      1. Chapter 6 of the Final Agreement outlines the creation of the “Commission for Monitoring, Promoting and Verifying the Implementation of the Final Agreement,” which is composed inter alia with National Government and FARC-EP representatives. They have agreed to ensure the promotion and monitoring of the implementation of the agreement’s laws.

2. Colombian Government and the ELN
   1. Civil Society Participation
      1. Although the ELN was not a part of the Final Agreement, the agreement’s success has set precedence for increased talks with the ELN. Outside of the Final Agreement, the ELN has begun to express interest in participation of the civil society through political participation.
   2. Rights of Victims
      1. The ELN has also began to acknowledge the importance of the Rights of Victims and appears to be willing to go through judicial processes.

List of actors that were invited to and that participated in peace talks:

1.     Colombian Government
   1.     Rural development: Pro; included in Comprehensive Rural Reform clause (CRR)
   2.     Political Participation: Pro-FARC-EP party creation subject to public electoral scrutiny
   3.     Drug Problem: FARC-EP must agree to cease all drug operations
   4.     Rights of Victims: Agrees to Truth & Reconciliation town halls (Named: “Comprehensive System for Truth, Justice, Reparations and Non-Recurrence”)
   5.     Judicial and Extrajudicial Mechanisms: Full-extent of the Colombian law
   6.     Implementation, Verification, and Support for Peace Agreement: Pro-UN Verification Mission in Colombia (established in UN Security Council Resolution 2366); and the creation of the bi-actor ““Commission for Monitoring, Promoting and Verifying the Implementation of the Final Agreement”
   7.     Disarmament: Pro-disarmament
   8.     Demobilization: Pro-demobilization
   9.     Reintegration: Pro-reintegration through social programs
   10.  Ending the Conflict: Seeks long-term ceasefire for peace
2.     FARC-EP
   1.     Rural development: Pro; included in Comprehensive Rural Reform clause (CRR)
   2.     Political Participation: Pro-FARC-EP party creation subject to public electoral scrutiny
   3.     Drug Problem: FARC-EP must agree to cease all drug operations
   4.     Rights of Victims: Agrees to Truth & Reconciliation town halls (Named: “Comprehensive System for Truth, Justice, Reparations and Non-Recurrence”)
   5.     Judicial and Extrajudicial Mechanisms: Want contextualized and case-by-case trials as well as members in the judicial commissions
   6.     Implementation, Verification, and Support for Peace Agreement: Pro-UN Verification Mission in Colombia (established in UN Security Council Resolution 2366); and the creation of the bi-actor ““Commission for Monitoring, Promoting and Verifying the Implementation of the Final Agreement”
   7.     Disarmament: Pro-disarmament
   8.     Demobilization: Pro-demobilization
   9.     Reintegration: Pro-reintegration through social programs
   10.  Ending the Conflict: Seeks long-term ceasefire for peace
3.     Government of Chile (Observer of CMPVI):
   1.     Disarmament: Pro-disarmament
   2.     Demobilization: Pro-demobilization
   3.     Reintegration: Pro-reintegration through social programs
4.     Government of Venezuela (Observer of CMPVI):
   1.     Disarmament: Pro-disarmament
   2.     Demobilization: Pro-demobilization
   3.     Reintegration: Pro-reintegration through social programs
5.     Government of Cuba:
   1. Host neutral country for current and future negotiations
6.     Government of Norway (Observer of UNMC and UNVMC):
   1. Observer and reporting country

Important Actors not involved in peace talks:

1. ELN:
   1.     Relevance: Second largest rebel group behind the FARC-EP; significantly smaller so not as large of a threat as the FARC-EP though has been a part of similar violence though at a smaller-scale
   2.     Rural development: ELN has active fighters even during the Cuba negotiations
   3.     Political Participation: ELN did not initially seek political participation
   4.     Drug Problem: ELN relies heavily on the sale of drugs for income
   5.     Rights of Victims: Agreed to Truth & Reconciliation if political demands met
   6.     Disarmament: Did not seek disarmament unless government reform occurs
   7.     Demobilization: Did not seek demobilization unless government reform occurs
   8.     Reintegration: Did not see reintegration as means to gain Marxist-end goal; sought governmental reform
   9.     Ending the Conflict: Did not express immediate interest
2. Civilians (Controversy):
   1. Relevance: There was controversy in terms of the kinds of civilian victims’ representatives that were chosen to attend the negotiations in Cuba. Some Colombians felt that the civilian representatives were too lenient of the FARC-EP and sought harsher representatives to attend the Cuban talks. Many victims’ groups were not satisfied with the candidates chosen by the Colombian National Government to testify.

Introduction

It is apparent that the history of the Colombian Peace Talks is a very complex one that is often at the mercy of the political environment and government of the day. With forms of peace agreements being sought after since the 1960s when the rebel groups formed, the most recent peace agreement signed in November 2016 has provided the most comprehensive and relatively successful establishment of peace to date. While occasional ceasefire breaks have occurred, the violence has generally died down [2]. Our research team has therefore deemed the Colombian Peace Talks of 2016 to be an overall successful endeavor, particularly in the areas of disarmament and political participation although some failures in the area of reintegration have been noted.

Disarmament – A Success

Although the disarmament process has been occurring since before the UN Mission in Colombia (UNMC) (established in July 2017), its formalization through Resolution 2261 allowed for a significant increase in “activities related to the laying down of weapons”; with weapons estimates being proportional to the number of weapons collected to date from FARC-EP and ELN combatants [2]. According to the UNMC press release The UN Mission Finalizes Activities of Neutralization of the FARC-EP Armament, there were a total of “8994 weapons” consolidated, including 1817 pistols and 6177 assault rifles, among other smaller weapons [2]. Yet, according to El Espectador and El Tiempo, both national Colombian newspapers, the FARC-EP was estimated to have a troop count of “13980” in 2016 whilst the ELN had up to “1380” combatants in 2013 [3,4]. Although these numbers may have changed significantly since 2016 and 2013, this is unlikely given that these numbers are estimated after the 2011 initial peace talks where very little disarmament occurred. It is also important to note that the UNMC only counted for weapons collected between March 1^st and September 22^nd, 2017, before the implementation of the current United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia (UNVMC); which suggests an impressive surge in disarmament as the peace process continues to be legitimized in the public sphere.

Political Participation – A Success

In terms of political participation, this aspect of the peace agreement was one of the most widely agreed upon clauses, yet one of the most controversial in the public sphere. Through the transitionary establishment of the FARC-EP as a political party from an active combatant, democracy has been strengthened in Colombia. Although the October 2016 plebiscite for the initial version of the peace agreement failed largely due to concerns of the FARC-EP being legitimized as a political party, the Colombian public now holds a more indifferent view considering how much of the party is a minority relative to those in opposition and in power such as President Santos’ Partido de la Unidad, which is the result its merge with the Partido Liberal Colombiano, creating a 76/102 seat hold of the Colombian Congress [5]. While not holding any seats since its inception, the FARC-EP party is up for congressional elections in 2018 as well as a Presidential election should they put forward a candidate.

Reintegration – An Ongoing Process

While the relative success in disarmament and political participation continues, there is qualitative and anecdotal evidence suggests that the agreement has failed to ensure “[combatant] protection” [6]. Failures in reconciliation have led to public distrust of combatants, and in particular, demobilized ex-combatants, as evidenced by the failed plebiscite, assassinations of the demobilized, and re-integrative services. It is the latter of these notions that is the most crucial aspect of DDR. Without reintegration, the level of peace in this conflict remains extremely fragile and long-term peace is out of the question. To date, the UNVMC has failed to fully reintegrate ex-combatants as evidenced by countless accounts and notable recent examples. The November 24^th, 2016 Final Agreement highlights notions such as the promotion of “civic values”, “the acknowledgement of different ethnic and cultural identities, equality of opportunity between men and women…social inclusion…and…the consolidation of democracy”; all of which are great notions in theory, but remain without practice [7]. As such, anecdotes such as “It makes me wonder if we made a mistake handing in our weapons” and “During wartime we lived hard but we had everything we needed. Here it’s very tough” have become widely publicized as the general sentiment of the demobilized population [8].

Conclusion

Overall, our research team has deemed the 2016 Colombian Peace Talks and its resultant Peace Agreement to be a success in terms of peace establishment. Although there are socioeconomic gaps that remain at civic levels, particularly for the demobilized, lives are saved as these peacebuilding processes move forward. The levels of disarmament, demobilization, and political participation have never been seen before in the history of Colombian-FARC-EP conflict, and as such it should be celebrated.

Key Documents

1. Final Version of the 2016 Colombian Peace Agreement (English Version):
   1. Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict and Build a Stable and Lasting Peace. PDF. http://especiales.presidencia.gov.co/Documents/20170620-dejacion-armas/acuerdos/acuerdo-final-ingles.pdf
2. Resolution 2261 (Establishment of the UNMC):
   1. United Nations Security Council Resolution 2261. PDF. United Nations Security Council, January 25, 2016. Accessed March 06, 2018. http://undocs.org/S/RES/2261(2016)
3. Resolution 2366 (Establishment of the UNVMC):
   1. United Nations Security Council Resolution 2366. PDF.
      United Nations Security Council, July 10, 2017. Accessed March 06, 2018.
      http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2366.pdf
4. Resolution 2377 (Addition of UNSG Recommendations):
   1. United Nations Security Council Resolution 2377. PDF. United Nations Security Council, September
      14, 2017. Accessed March 06, 2018.
      http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2377.pdf
5. Resolution 2381 (Ceasefire added to UNVMC Mandate):
   1. United Nations Security Council Resolution 2381. PDF. United Nations Security Council, October 6,
      2017. Accessed March 06, 2018.
      http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2381.pdf
6. Norwegian Government Report on Negotiation Progress:
   1. https://www.regjeringen.no/en/topics/foreign-affairs/peace-and-reconciliation-efforts/norways_engagement/peace_colombia/id2522231/
7. UNMC Agreement by both FARC-EP and the Colombian Government:
   1. Identical letters dated 19 January 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Colombia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council. PDF. United Nations Security
      Council, January 22, 2016. Accessed March 06, 2018. http://undocs.org/S/2016/53
8. Troop Contributing Countries to UN Missions Related to the Colombian Peace Agreement (UNVMC):
   1. Summary of Contributions to UN Peacekeeping by Country, Mission and Post.
      PDF. October 31, 2017. Accessed March
      06, 2018. https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/country_contributions.pdf
9. UN Report on Disarmament Progress:
   1. "The UN Mission finalizes activities of neutralization of the FARC-EP armament." UN Mission in Colombia. September 22, 2017. Accessed March 06, 2018. https://unmc.unmissions.org/en/un-mission-finalizes-activities-neutralization-farc-ep-armament.
10.  UNVMC Mandate Adds Ceasefire:
    1. “Security Council Extends Verification Mission in Colombia to Include Monitoring of Ceasefire Agreement, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2381 (2017) | Meetings Coverage and Press Releases." United Nations. Accessed March 06, 2018. https://www.un.org/press/en/2017/sc13017.doc.htm.

1.     Pico, Laura. Colombia, the Resilient Survivor: DDR, Elusive
Peace, and the Politics of Post-Conflict. Master's thesis, Pomona College, 2016. Claremont: Claremont
Colleges, 2016. 1-103.

2.     Segura, Renata, and Delphine Mechoulan. Made in
   Havana: How Colombia and the FARC Decided to End the War. PDF. New York: International Peace Institute,
   February 2017. Accessed March 06,
   2018. https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/IPI-Rpt-Made-in-Havana.pdf

3. Phelan, Alexandra Engaging Insurgency: The Impact of the 2016 Colombian Peace Agreement on FARC's Political Participation, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 2018. Accessed March 06, 2018: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1057610X.2018.1432027

4. Cairo et al. “Territorial Peace”: The Emergence of a Concept in Colombia’s Peace Negotiations, Geopolitics, 2018. Accessed March 06, 2018: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14650045.2018.1425110?journalCode=fgeo20

5.     Cardona, Angel. The Justice and the Colombia Peace Talks. Open Journal of Political Science, 2016. Accessed March 06, 2018:.http://file.scirp.org/Html/1-1670375_68023.htm

6.     Angelo, Paul. The Colombian Peace Process: Trial and Error: Survival ... Global Politics and Strategy, 2017. Accessed March 06, 2018: www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00396338.2017.1282680?src=recsys.

7.    Barkan, Elazar. Memories of Violence: Micro and Macro History and the ... Irish Political Studies, 2016. Accessed March 06, 2018:  www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/07907184.2015.1126922

8. On displacement/reintegration; Bilak, Alexandra. Global
   Report on Internal Displacement.
   PDF. Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, May 2017. Accessed March 06,
   2018. http://www.internal-displacement.org/assets/publications/2017/20170522-GRID.pdf

9.         Bank, World. Colombia - Peace Programmatic I : Demobilization and Reinsertion of Ex-Combatants in Colombia. , 2008. Accessed March 06, 2018 “https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/7836

1.     “Colombia Profile - Timeline.” BBC News, BBC, 10 Jan. 2018, www.bbc.com/1. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-19390164news/world-latin-america-19390164.

2. "The UN Mission finalizes activities of neutralization of the FARC-EP armament." UN Mission in Colombia. September 22, 2017. Accessed March 06, 2018. https://unmc.unmissions.org/en/un-mission-finalizes-activities-neutralization-farc-ep-armament.
3. "Desmovilización, principal arma contra las guerrillas." El Tiempo. September 22, 2013. Accessed March 6, 2018. http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/CMS-13077339.
4. "Las Farc tendrían 13.980 miembros." ElEspectador.com. August 12, 2016. Accessed March 6, 2018. https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/nacional/farc-tendrian-13980-miembros-articulo-648915.
5. Congreso Visible - Toda La Información Sobre El Congreso Colombiano En Un Solo Lugar, www.congresovisible.org/partidos/.
6. Segura, Renata, and Delphine Mechoulan. Made in Havana: How Colombia and the FARC Decided to End the War. PDF. New York: International Peace Institute, February 2017. Accessed March 06, 2018. https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/IPI-Rpt-Made-in-Havana.pdf
7. Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict and Build a Stable and Lasting Peace. PDF. http://especiales.presidencia.gov.co/Documents/20170620-dejacion-armas/acuerdos/acuerdo-final-ingles.pdf
8. Daniels, Joe Parkin. "'There's nothing for us': Farc rebels search for purpose a year after historic deal." The Guardian. December 05, 2017. Accessed March 6, 2018. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/05/farc-rebels-civilian-life-colombia-peace-deal-one-year-later.