The need for Colombia’s Truth and Reconciliation (TRC) comes from the low-intensity asymmetric war that has ravaged through the nation since 1964 and killed over 200,000 people [1]. Fought by right and left-wing armed forces, the paramilitary, guerilla fighters, as well as a corrupt government, the goal of the conflict is to increase influence in Colombian territory and revolves around land, natural resources, political power, and the drug market (Justice for Colombia). On June 23 of 2016, after four separate attempts at negotiations, the Colombian government signed a peace deal with the nation’s most violent rebel group, The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), ultimately initiating the first phase of the TRC [2]. In this first phase, FARC members were disarmed and began their process of being reintegrated into society. At the same time, the Colombian Truth Commission brought special attention to the women, children, members of the LGBTQ+ community, and farmers that were disproportionately affected by the armed conflict by launching a variety of workshops and conferences [3]. At this point in time (2020), the Colombian TRC is still unfolding and negotiations with the nation’s second largest rebel group, The National Liberation Army (ELN) have been paused since early 2019. 

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1. “Colombian Armed Conflict”. Justice for Colombia, https://justiceforcolombia.org/about-colombia/colombian-armed-conflict/. Accessed 24 November 2020.
2. Valenzuela, Pedro. "The End of the Armed Conflict in Colombia: A Multiple Causal Factor Explanation." Peace and Change, vol. 43, no. 2, 2018, pp. 206.
3. A Review of How Colombia’s Truth Commission is Advancing. Colombia Peace, 6 Apr. 2020, https://colombiapeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/TCGS-2.pdf. Accessed 24 November 2020.

Victims and Their Right to Truth
Following the peace agreement signed between the FARC and the Colombian government in 2016, the “Commission for the Clarification of Truth, Coexistence and Non-repetition” was constructed with the main tenet of victims and their right to truth. In order to accomplish this, the International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) was brought into Colombia to help reinforce the government's ability to facilitate and implement policies such as the judicial hearings of the victims, protection of victims and their right to truth and reparations for the victims [1]. One of the key ways in which the ICTJ hopes to do this is through creating a public discourse regarding the victims in order to bring more understanding to the problems that these victims face [2]. As was highlighted in the beginning of our course many victims of crises not only suffer from physical violence but from structural violence and dwell in a negative peace. Therefore, by illuminating these structural forms of violence and mending them the hope will be that the victims of the conflict are not only recognized but that their right to the truth is respected. 

Role of Gender in the Conflicts and in the TRC Process
Commendably, the Colombian government’s approach to the TRC was heavily focused on how gender played a part in the conflict and how gender affected the way in which individuals were seen and treated in society. This focus on women’s rights received overwhelming support from the international community with a plethora of NGOs and international organizations such as the UN Women, who lent a hand to solidify policies. These actors would end up directly assisting those affected by the conflict [3]. The policies which have been set up to facilitate this can be seen through the creation of truth houses which aim to create a safe space for dialogue, developing aid, and learning [4]. Furthermore, women’s groups are working in unison with the Colombian government and peace-building operations to ensure that the effects have an impact on public policy as well [5]. What has come indirectly out of the TRC, however, is the support of these policies from women in the Colombian diaspora. This means that Colombian women living all over the world have created communities to help in the healing of the trauma and acts as a platform in which women can voice their opinions and contribute to the peace process. 

Reconciliation of Ex-Combatants
There are an array of relevant issues that are included in the TRC but are extremely difficult to implement. Although the Colombian government, in conjunction with many foreign actors, set up policies such as “truth houses” to succour the reintegration process; due to the historic conflict, many in Colombia did not agree with the TRC as they viewed it as a pardon for FARC members. The reconciliation and reintegration of ex FARC soldiers into society has been seen as one of the biggest issues that the Colombian public has with the TRC [6]. Not only do many blame them for the death of their loved ones and the destruction of their homes but many simply cannot accept them as part of their society. When this fact is coupled with the attacks and assassinations from BACRIM forces - who target those trying to help former FARC members - the problem becomes elevated [7]. This is because the public, who already do not like the idea of reintegration, point to these assassinations as another reason to stop the reconciliation and reintegration process for former FARC members. 

Search for Missing Persons
As is mentioned in the international review of the Red Cross, many times the search for missing persons is not only the first step in the TRC process but is an essential part in being able to deal with the past [8]. It is interconnected with the reintegration of armed actors and the ability for individuals to be at peace with themselves knowing the outcome of their missing loved one. Unfortunately, however, in the case of Colombia although it was highlighted as a key part to the TRC process there has been little progress on the front of the search for missing problems due to a myriad of reasons. One of the key factors to the delay can be seen as there was a shift in power in 2018 due to the presidential election which not only made this aspect of the TRC delayed but the TRC in general. Nevertheless, when you combine a shift in power to external spoilers such as BACRIM it is becoming increasingly difficult for the TRC to conduct a search for missing persons. 

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1. “Colombia”. ITCJ, 2020, https://www.ictj.org/our-work/regions-and-countries/colombia 
2. Oettler, Anika. “Colombia’s ongoing violence has shifted truth and reconciliation from the past into the present.” Latin America and Caribbean Center. https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/latamcaribbean/2020/01/13/colombias-ongoing-violence-has-shifted-truth-and-reconciliation-from-the-past-into-the-present/. Accessed November 30 2020. 
3. “Truth, memory and reconciliation commission of Colombian women in the diaspora.” Conciliation Resources, https://www.c-r.org/where-we-work/truth-memory-and-reconciliation-commission-colombian-women-diaspora. Accessed November 30 2020. 
4. Ibid. 
5. Violence Against Women in Colombia: A Report to the Committee Against Torture. World Organization Against Torture (OMCT), https://www.omct.org/files/2004/07/2409/eng_2003_04_colombia.pdf. Accessed 30 November, 2020. 
6. Casey, Nicholas, and Escobar, Federico Rios. “Colombia Struck a Peace Deal with Guerillas, but Many Return to Arms.” New York Times, 18 Sept. 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/18/world/americas/colombia-farc-peace.html?action=click&module=In%20Other%20News&pgtype=Homepage&action=click&module=News&pgtype=Homepage. Accessed 27 November 2020. 
7. Bargent, James and Charles, Mat. “InSide Colombia’s BACRIM: Murder”, InSight Crime, 13 Jul. 2017, https://www.insightcrime.org/investigations/inside-colombia-s-bacrim-murder/. Accessed 27 November 2020.
8. Baumgartner, Elisabeth and Ott, Lisa. “Determining the fate of missing persons: The importance of archives for “dealing with the past” mechanisms.” International Review of the Red Cross (ICRC), 2017, https://international-review.icrc.org/sites/default/files/irrc_99_905_11.pdf. Accessed 30 November 2020. 

Government of Colombia 
With the inauguration of President Juan Manuel Santos in 2010 came a new wave of peace talks at the state level with rebel groups like The FARC and The ELN. In Santos’ eight years in office, he was able to effectively sign a successful peace deal in 2016 and initiate the beginnings of a working peace in Colombia, after talks first beginning in Oslo in 2012. [1]

Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)
The FARC, which was the largest rebel group in Colombia, was created in 1964 by Colombian peasants as an anti-imperialist force. They disbanded in June of 2017 after the successful signing of the peace deal, but are nonetheless responsible for military tactics that killed many people throughout the conflict. [2]

The National Liberation Army (ELN)
Also formed in 2016, the ELN is Colombia’s second largest rebel group born out of the Cuban revolution and Marxist ideology. Following the initiation of talks between the Colombian Government and The FARC back in 2012, the ELN showed similar interest. [3] However, talks have been relatively unsuccessful and have been effectively paused since early 2019 when ELN rebels bombed a police station in Bogota. [4]

Criminal Bands (BACRIMs)
BACRIMs, a term coined by former President AUC following the demobilization of the United Self Defence Forces of Colombia (AUC), typically describes criminal gangs involved in extortion and illicit drug activities. While they do not have an inherent political ideology, their extremely violent tactics pose a threat to Colombia’s lasting peace. [5]

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1. Valenzuela, Pedro. "The End of the Armed Conflict in Colombia: A Multiple Causal Factor Explanation." Peace and Change, vol. 43, no. 2, 2018, pp. 206. 
2. “Profiles: Colombia’s Armed Groups”. BBC, 29 Aug. 2013, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-11400950. 
3. Ibid.
4. González, Jenny Carolina, and Kurmanaev Anatoly. “Colombia Captures Guerrillas Accused in Deadly Car Bombing”. New York Times, 2 Jul. 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/02/world/americas/colombia-eln-bombing-arrests.html
5. Maher, David, and Andrew Thomson. "A Precarious Peace? the Threat of Paramilitary Violence to the Peace Process in Colombia." Third World Quarterly, vol. 39, no. 11, 2018, pp. 2142.

Government of Norway
Was instrumental in the peace process as they acted as a designated guarantor due to their reputation and well known impartiality regarding the conflict. Furthermore, Norway had the capital to fund a majority of the peace process. [1]

Government of Cuba
Not only held the position as a designated guarantor alongside Norway but also was the location where many significant track 2 and track 1 negotiations regarding the peace process were held (track 2 preparatory talks, track 2 exploratory talks, and track 1 negotiations). The location was essential to the success of the peace talk as Cuba provided a location that was not only controlled but also removed from the mainland of Colombia. [2]

Government of Venezuela
Was designated as an accompanying country to the guarantors of the PP. They played a critical role as they provided Colombia with regional support in conjunction with their vocal call for Colombia to reach a negotiated settlement. [3]

Government of Chile
Was, alongside Venezuela, another accompanying country to the guarantors. Chile was essential to the peace talks as they acted as a counterweight to Venezuela as the government of Colombia felt that president Chavez’ connections with the FARC would not bide well with the public. [4]

Government of the U.S.
While playing a distanced role, the U.S. played a critical role in that it provided the Colombian government with a substantial aid package which sought to facilitate peace, build the economy, and deepen democracy.  [5]

International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
Was responsible for coordinating the secret transfer of the FARC to Cuba through their helicopters. Furthermore, they acted as a neutral intermediary and produced many policy papers that were primarily focused on demobilization, forced disappearances, and humanitarian agreements. [6]

United Nations Women
Were critical in advocating for the inclusion of a gendered perspective within the peace talks and, in turn, illuminating the significance of having women representation at the negotiating table. Prior to this many of the gender issues were ignored along with LGBT rights. [7]

United Nations Security Council
Provided security to the peace talks as all forces were assigned to a plethora of the peace talks, sub-commissions, and support talks, by holding the role of a delegate. [8]

International Center for Transitional Justice
Acted as a trusted advisor for both the Colombian Government and The FARC during the negotiations by advocating for victims rights while lending technical and professional expertise. The ICTJ is responsible for building dialogue and capacity, the bettering of women’s rights, reparations for victims of armed conflict, reintegration of children, and more. [9]

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1. A Trusted Facilitator: An Evaluation of Norwegian Engagement in the Peace Process between the Colombian Government and the FARC, 2010–2016. Government of Norway, Oct. 2018, https://www.norad.no/contentassets/33fb8fa056be4d2b9b6eadfda9f6b3e1/10.18-evaluation-of-norways-support-to-the-peace-process-in-colombia-20102016.pdf. 
2. Segura, Renata, and Mechoulin, Delphine. “Made in Havana: How Colombia and the FARC Decided to End the War.” International Peace Institution (IPI), 2017, https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/IPI-Rpt-Made-in-Havana.pdf
3. Ibid. p. 3.
4. Ibid. p. 33.
5. Ibid. p. 3.
6. Ibid. p. 12.
7. Ibid. p. 16.
8. Badour, Dylan. “UNSC in Colombia to check on Implementation of FARC Peace Deal”. Aljazeera, 11 Jul. 2019, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/7/11/unsc-in-colombia-to-check-on-implementation-of-farc-peace-deal. 
9. “Colombia”. ITCJ, 2020, https://www.ictj.org/our-work/regions-and-countries/colombia 

Dissenting FARC Members Acting as Spoilers:
In light of the peace accords between the government of Colombia and the FARC, which resulted in the cessation of a civil war, there lies a minority of FARC members who have become dissidents. Most notable amongst these dissidents is Iván Márquez, the former second in command of FARC. In 2019 he released a video in which he bellowed a clarion like call to the rest of the FARC dissidents proclaiming that a new phase of the arm struggle was beginning to take place [1]. This is extremely problematic as it not only has resulted in an increased criticism for the transitional justice system but makes it much harder for the general population to accept the reintegration of non-dissenting FARC members into society [2].

Integrating FARC Back Into Society & Stigmatization of Former FARC Members and the Difficulty in Rehabilitation of FARC Members:
Hitherto the statement made by Marquez regarding a new phase in the civil war was beginning, the reintegration of former FARC members into society was already a prominent problem in Colombia [3]. Not only is there a prevalent stigmatization regarding former FARC members, shown through 50.2% of voters rejecting the 2016 FARC peace deal, but many who cannot accept the thought of living with “the enemy” [4]. Therefore, when coupled with spoilers such as Marquez alongside the violent history of the FARC, it makes it extremely difficult for Colombians to accept former FARC members into society. 

Exclusion of Other Armed Groups in the Peace Deal (I.e. BACRIM and Paramilitary groups):
Although FARC was the main opponent of the Colombian government during the civil war there were a myriad of other rebel groups who fought against the government. However, not all of these rebel groups were invited to the negotiating table which has resulted in the Colombian government withholding the promise of security to a number of these rebel groups in addition to launching pre-emptive strikes against some of them [5].  Some of these groups have been grouped and branded by the Colombian government as BACRIM, a paramilitary criminal group who has come to play the role of a spoiler by attacking, kidnapping, and assassinating members of the FARC and Colombian government [6]. Doing so to hinder anything to do with the TRC and DDRR between Colombia and FARC.

Political Polarization of Public Opinion:
Although the 2016 Colombian peace deal is often regarded as a “success story”, there have been an emergent number of polarized beliefs since its signing. For example, in areas that were not directly impacted by the conflict, researchers have seen a higher resistance to change. On the other hand, in areas heavily impacted by the conflict, the public was more likely to be open to social reconciliation with ex-combatants [7]. This difference in public opinion indicates the societal discrepancies between how different geographical areas and social/economic classes see the peace deal. In order to facilitate a successful and lasting peace, negotiators and actors must find a way to manage and reconcile these differences.

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1. “Colombia ex-Farc rebel Iván Márquez issues call to arms.” BBC, 29 Aug. 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-49508411. Accessed 27 November 2020. 
2. Casey, Nicholas, and Escobar, Federico Rios. “Colombia Struck a Peace Deal with Guerillas, but Many Return to Arms.” New York Times, 18 Sept. 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/18/world/americas/colombia-farc-peace.html?action=click&module=In%20Other%20News&pgtype=Homepage&action=click&module=News&pgtype=Homepage. Accessed 27 November 2020. 
3. “Colombia Reaping Gains of Peace Process Yet Reintegration of Ex-combatants Still Work in Progress, Special Representative Tells Security Council.” United Nations, 14 Oct. 2020, https://www.un.org/press/en/2020/sc14325.doc.htm. Accessed 27 November 2020. 
4. “Colombia referendum: Voters reject Farc peace deal.” BBC, 3 Oct. 2016, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-37537252. Accessed 27 November, 2020. 
5. Response to Information Requests (RIR). Immigrant and Refugee Board of Canada, 2020, https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/country-information/rir/Pages/index.aspx?doc=453950. Accessed 27 November 2020.
6. Bargent, James and Charles, Mat. “InSide Colombia’s BACRIM: Murder”, InSight Crime, 13 Jul. 2017, https://www.insightcrime.org/investigations/inside-colombia-s-bacrim-murder/. Accessed 27 November 2020.
7. Revelo, Diana R., and Cecilia E. Sottilotta. "Barriers to Peace? Colombian Citizens’ Beliefs and Attitudes Vis-à-Vis the Government-FARC-EP Agreement." Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 2020, pp. 1-22.

The TRC is an essential section in the 2016 Peace Agreement regarding Colombia’s ability to fairly and respectfully conduct an effective transitional justice. In November of 2016, the Commission for the Clarification of Truth, Coexistence, and Non-Repetition was implemented to fill in the lacuna surrounding victims of the conflict, their right to truth, search for missing victims, and reconciliation of the public with former guerilla fighters [1]. 

In light of this, as it stands, the TRC is arguably ineffective. This is due to the fact that there is currently a certain nebulousness pertaining to the government and public’s willingness to fully enact all of the policies that are stated within the TRC. This ambiguity arises from a plethora of factors, most notably the difficulties surrounding the reintegration of former FARC members, the exclusion of certain parties in the 2016 peace talks acting as spoilers, and the lack of implementation [2]. Nevertheless, it is important to note that as the TRC is such a new endeavour, it can be seen as the starting point in the process of Colombia’s amelioration. In practice, if all of the policies set out in the TRC were correctly executed, it would be an effective tool to mend the wounds of many Colombians affected by the conflict.

First and foremost, the 2016 peace talks and TRC have had a direct impact in the improvement of gender rights and women’s representation in Colombia [3]. The dialogue of women, children, and other groups of particularly vulnerable peoples (such as rural farmers) are finally being incorporated into political discourse. Previously, much of the peace talks were from a male perspective, solely revolving around the combatants and the economic implications of the conflict.  However, due to the commendable work of thousands of women in Colombia, and around the world, the effects that the conflict had on gender were included in the peace talks. Furthermore, the viewpoints of women were brought into the negotiation tables. The effects can be seen through the initiation of the Truth Houses and Non-Repetition Dialogues, and the 2018 launch of the Colombian Truth Commission [4]. In light of these monumental steps towards reconciling the cleavages in gender rights and the reconciliation for victims of the conflict, there are certain oversights and critical factors which are preventing the TRC from working effectively.

Regardless of the positive foundation that the peace deal and TRC have set in place in allowing Colombia to begin its amelioration process, its implications reveal that the implementation of the policies have not yielded much fruit. A primary reason for this is the public’s reaction to the attempt to reintegrate former FARC members into society [5]. Although there a myriad of reasons regarding the public’s polarized views, according to Jamie Rowen, the instrumentalization of the transitional justice system wrestles with extremely harrowing matters such as sexual violence and mass violence in a naïve and short-sighted manner [6]. Not only are acts of violence still occurring - through attacks from rebels such as BACRIM - but the land restitution cases which the government of Colombia promised are severely backlogged with a minute number of cases being successful. Furthermore, Rowen highlights how truth commissions have been inflated by the international community in what they are able to tangibly achieve [7]. These often unfulfillable expectations of TRCs are often the reason why people become distrusting of TRC processes: when results from the peace talks do not immediately come to fruition, it becomes increasingly difficult for the public to trust the peace process. Unfortunately, Colombia is no different. 

When the fact is 80% of the Colombian population wants former FARC members to face jail time [8] and 50.2% reject the peace deal [9] it becomes clear why many in Colombia equate the TRC with impunity and do not care for it. Moreover, even though the search for missing persons is a key tenet in the TRC - with many relying on the TRC to have a sense of closure - since the 2018 presidential elections there has been little to no effort to carry out the search for missing persons [10]. Therefore, it is increasingly apparent where the frustration of the Colombian people comes from. The Colombian people are then left asking the government how former FARC members can so easily be forgiven for the harm they have caused throughout decades of conflict, when the masses are left without the fulfillment of reparations that they were once promised by the government.

While the 2016 Peace Agreement has proven itself to be more successful than attempts in the past, this does not imply that the TRC is, in itself, successful. In light of this, the TRC represents a step in the right direction and should not be completely elided. Rather, the implementation of additional policies focused on getting rid of the stigma surrounding FARC members and the inclusion of other rebel groups into the peace talks could drastically shift the public's opinion surrounding the TRC. The success of the TRC will depend on the political will of involved parties and their abilities to stay committed to a lasting Colombian peace. However, with a world impacted so heavily by the detriments of COVID-19, it is unknown how the Colombian TRC will progress. 

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1. “Colombia”. ITCJ, 2020, https://www.ictj.org/our-work/regions-and-countries/colombia 
2. United Nations Report of the Secretary General on the United Verification Mission in Colombia. United Nations, 2 Apr. 2018, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/1481504?ln=en.. Accessed 30 November, 2020.
3. Bouvier, Virginia M. “Gender and the Role of Women in Colombia’s Peace Process.” UN Women, 4 Mar. 2016, https://www.unwomen.org/-/media/headquarters/attachments/sections/library/publications/2017/women-colombia-peace-process-en.pdf?la=en&vs=17. Accessed 30 November, 2020.
4. Ibid.
5. Bargent, James and Charles, Mat. “InSide Colombia’s BACRIM: Murder”, InSight Crime, 13 Jul. 2017, https://www.insightcrime.org/investigations/inside-colombia-s-bacrim-murder/. Accessed 27 November 2020.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Rowen, Jamie R. ““We Don’t Believe in Transitional Justice:”Peace and the Politics of Legal Ideasin Colombia.” Law and Society Inquiry, vol 42, no. 3, 2017, pp. 622-647.  
9. “Colombia referendum: Voters reject Farc peace deal.” BBC, 3 Oct. 2016, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-37537252. Accessed 27 November, 2020. 
10. Response to Information Requests (RIR). Immigrant and Refugee Board of Canada, 2020, https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/country-information/rir/Pages/index.aspx?doc=453950. Accessed 27 November 2020.

1. General Agreement to End the Conflict and Building a Stable and Lasting Peace. Government of  the Republic of Colombia, 26 Aug. 2012, https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/133811/pdf/. Accessed 24 November 2020. 

2. A Review of How Colombia’s Truth Commission is Advancing. Colombia Peace, 6 Apr. 2020, https://colombiapeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/TCGS-2.pdf. Accessed 24 November 2020.

3. Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict and Build a Stable and Lasting Peace. Government of the Republic of Colombia, 24 Nov. 2016, http://especiales.presidencia.gov.co/Documents/20170620-dejacion-armas/acuerdos/acuerdo-final-ingles.pdf . Accessed 24 November 2020.

4. Sistema Integral de Verdad Justica Reparacion y No Repeticion (SIVJRNR). Jurisdiccion Especial para la Paz, 2019, https://www.jep.gov.co/Infografas/SIVJRNR_ES.pdf. Accessed 24 November 2020.

5. Comunicado Conjunto 5: Entre El Gobierno Nacional Y El de Liberacion Nacional. Government of the Republic of Colombia, 4 Sept. 2018, https://www.peaceagreements.org/viewmasterdocument/2045. Accessed 24 November, 2020.

6. A Trusted Facilitator: An Evaluation of Norwegian Engagement in the Peace Process between the Colombian Government and the FARC, 2010–2016. Government of Norway, Oct. 2018, https://www.norad.no/contentassets/33fb8fa056be4d2b9b6eadfda9f6b3e1/10.18-evaluation-of-norways-support-to-the-peace-process-in-colombia-20102016.pdf. Accessed 24 November, 2020.

7. Inclusion of gender and sexual minorities in peacebuilding. Conciliation Resources, Jul. 2018, https://rc-services-assets.s3.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/Inclusion%20of%20gender%20and%20sexual%20minorities%20in%20peacebuilding.pdf. Accessed 24 November, 2020.

8. Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the United Nations Mission in Colombia. United Nations Security Council (UNSC), 18 Aug. 2016, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2016_729.pdf. Accessed 24 November, 2020

9. Innovations in the Colombian Peace Process. Conciliation Resources, Jun. 2016, https://www.c-r.org/resource/innovations-colombian-peace-process. Accessed 24 November, 2020.

10. United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia. United Nations Security Council (UNSC), 25 Sept. 2020, https://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2020/943. Accessed 24 November, 2020. 

Capone, Francesca. "An Overview of the DDR Process Established in the Aftermath of the Revised Peace Agreement between the Colombian Government and the FARC: Finally on the Right Track?" Global Jurist, vol. 17, no. 3, 2017, pp. 1-11.

• Capone first discusses the importance of the DDR Process in post-conflict societies before contextualizing it within Colombia. Ultimately, this article suggests that the DDR process following the 2016 peace deal is different from ones previously implemented in past years due to the fact that it is built on a stable ceasefire and both negotiating parties agree that the fighting is over. Capone explains that on paper, this current process satisfies all of the components of a successful DDR, and has an overall positive outlook despite challenges to reintegration. This article offers the counterargument to many other scholars who observe a more grim prediction regarding the DDR of former FARC combatants. 

Carranza-Franco, Francy. Demobilisation and Reintegration in Colombia: Building State and Citizenship. Routledge, 2019

• Carranza-Franco’s book compares the demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR) processes in Colombia between Alvaro Uribe’s presidency, and President Juan Manuel Santos’ administration. Using data collected through fieldwork done with local authorities, ex-combatants, and officers, Carranza-Franco first details the process of the Colombian DDR before explicating the difficulties former combatants may face in attempting to reintegrate into a post-conflict society. The author ultimately argues that the successful integration of former combatants requires the necessary renegotiation of citizenship rights and democracy by both the ex-combatants and the larger society at hand.

Céspedes-Báez, Lina M., and Felipe Jaramillo Ruiz. "‘Peace without Women does Not Go!’ Women’s Struggle for Inclusion in Colombia’s Peace Process with the FARC." Colombia Internacional, vol. 94, no. 94, 2018, pp. 83-109.

• In this article, Cespedes-Baez and Ruiz explore the gendered elements of the Colombian TRC argue that women were able to challenge gender bias by using three tactics. First, the women took a normative and legal stance with the government and other negotiators. Second, women argued that in order to fully protect women’s rights and create effective processes for transitional justice, women must be included in the talks. Third, they followed a slogan created by Mujeres por la Paz, which states that “there cannot be peace while there is still oppression and half of humanity is still excluded from full development, women”. Overall, the article shows how womens’ experience of warfare is often undermined, and despite making some headway, there are still ways to go until equity is achieved. 

LeGrand, Catherine C., Luis van Isschot, and Pilar Riaño-Alcalá. "Land, Justice, and Memory: Challenges for Peace in Colombia." Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies, vol. 42, no. 3, 2017, pp. 259-276.

• This article offers a thorough explanation of the Colombian conflict and further analyzes the 2016 peace deal signed by The FARC-EP and the Colombian Government. The authors suggest that moving forward, issues regarding rural inequality, displacement, impunity, drug trafficking, the military, private armed groups, and overall changing roles within the state could be potential challenges in creating a lasting peace in Colombia. Furthermore, it ties together seven articles written on the conflict and offers a resource-rich bibliography that readers can use to learn more about the ongoing peace process in Colombia. 

López-López, Wilson, et al. "Forgiving Perpetrators of Violence: Colombian People’s Positions." Social Indicators Research, vol. 114, no. 2, 2013, pp. 287-301.

• The researchers in this study examined Colombian people’s positions on granting forgiveness to individuals who were directly and actively involved in the conflict over the last 60 years. They found that the majority of people, and especially those of the wealthier classes, opted for “no forgiveness under any condition”, whereas 18 percent (mostly of the lower classes) considered that forgiveness should be granted to the former perpetrators who showed true remorse. This research shows how fragmented the Colombian people are on how to move toward with transitional justice and the challenges that may arise from it. While this study can be useful to analyze people’s opinions, it only has a sample size of 400 in one city; in order get a better understanding of the nation’s stance on forgiving former perpetrators, a geographically broader study should be conducted.

Maher, David, and Andrew Thomson. "A Precarious Peace? the Threat of Paramilitary Violence to the Peace Process in Colombia." Third World Quarterly, vol. 39, no. 11, 2018, pp. 2142-2172

• Maher and Thomson argue that paramilitary groups in Colombia have the potential to be spoilers of peace between the Colombian Government and The FARC. Using fieldwork and questionnaires, the authors conclude that paramilitary groups are more likely to act as spoilers than criminal bandits (called BACRIMS), and suggest that it is a mistake of the Colombian Government to ignore the existence of paramilitary groups within the country. This research, then, expands on the discourse of the challenges to a lasting peace in Colombia and offers tangible ways to proactively prevent it, rather than attempt to protect it. 

Pabon, Fabio A. Truth, Justice and Reconciliation in Colombia: Transitioning from Violence. Edited by Fabio A. Díaz Pabón. Routledge, Milton, 2018, doi:10.4324/9781315148373.

• This book brings together works by Colombian practitioners and academics, as well as reflections written by other researchers where peace initiatives have taken place in order to create a volume that is “written by the South, for the South”. Pabon further discusses the challenges that lay ahead in peacemaking in Colombia and how those working to create peace must look far beyond just theories and traditional legislative frameworks in order to address the full extent of human rights violations and needs for transitional justice. The author argues that the success of the TRC depends greatly on Colombia’s ability to mend the gap between what is institutionalized and what is really happening.

Rhyn, Larissa. “Overcoming Stigma and Fostering Participation Mechanisms for Community Reintegration in Colombia”. Conflict, Security and Development, vol. 19, no. 2, 2019, pp. 195-222.

• Rhyn’s article argues that integration of ex-combatants is made especially difficult due to stigma which further deters the wider society from participating in community reintegration projects. She creates the following four-fold process by which integration can be encouraged and stigma can be overcome: information provision, inclusion of target groups in design and implementation, provision of incentives for participation and a change in the narrative surrounding ex-combatants. Finally, Rhyn suggests that integration processes can be more successful if focussed on by areas of interest, rather than by geography, and that community reintegration in cities is not difficult to achieve. 

Alsema, Adriaan. “FARC demobilization ends: 8,100 arms and 22000kg of explosives removed.” Colombia Reports, 15 Aug. 2017, https://colombiareports.com/farc-demobilization-ends-8100-arms-22000kg-explosives-removed/. Accessed 24 November 2020. 

Armario, Christine. “Colombia Takes Big Steps to Peace as Rebels Lay Down Guns.” Associated Press (AP) News, 27 Jun. 2017, https://apnews.com/article/6c77aa2530ab4bc2a4863da519b308ca. Accessed 24 November 2020. 

Badour, Dylan. “UNSC in Colombia to check on Implementation of FARC Peace Deal”. Aljazeera, 11 Jul. 2019, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/7/11/unsc-in-colombia-to-check-on-implementation-of-farc-peace-deal. 

Bargent, James and Charles, Mat. “InSide Colombia’s BACRIM: Murder”, InSight Crime, 13 Jul. 2017, https://www.insightcrime.org/investigations/inside-colombia-s-bacrim-murder/. Accessed 27 November 2020.

Bouvier, Virginia M. “Gender and the Role of Women in Colombia’s Peace Process.” UN Women, 4 Mar. 2016, https://www.unwomen.org/-/media/headquarters/attachments/sections/library/publications/2017/women-colombia-peace-process-en.pdf?la=en&vs=17.

Baumgartner, Elisabeth and Ott, Lisa. “Determining the fate of missing persons: The importance of archives for “dealing with the past” mechanisms.” International Review of the Red Cross (ICRC), 2017, https://international-review.icrc.org/sites/default/files/irrc_99_905_11.pdf. Accessed 30 November 2020.

Brodzinsky, Sibylla. “Farc rebels announce unilateral truce in attempt to rescue Colombia peace talks.” The Guardian, 8 Jul. 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/08/farc-rebels-unilateral-ceasefire-colombia-peace-talks. Accessed 27 November 2020. 

Casey, Nicholas, and Escobar, Federico Rios. “Colombia Struck a Peace Deal with Guerillas, but Many Return to Arms.” New York Times, 18 Sept. 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/18/world/americas/colombia-farc-peace.html?action=click&module=In%20Other%20News&pgtype=Homepage&action=click&module=News&pgtype=Homepage. Accessed 27 November 2020. 

Céspedes-Báez, Lina M., and Felipe Jaramillo Ruiz. "‘Peace without Women does Not Go!’ Women’s Struggle for Inclusion in Colombia’s Peace Process with the FARC." Colombia Internacional, vol. 94, no. 94, 2018, pp. 83-109.

“Colombia”. ITCJ, 2020, https://www.ictj.org/our-work/regions-and-countries/colombia 

“Colombian Armed Conflict”. Justice for Colombia, https://justiceforcolombia.org/about-colombia/colombian-armed-conflict/. Accessed 24 November 2020.

“Colombia’s ELN to blame for bomb attack that killed 21: Officials.” Aljazeera, 18 Jan. 2019, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/1/18/colombias-eln-to-blame-for-bomb-attack-that-killed-21-officials. Accessed 24 November 2020.

“Colombia ex-Farc rebel Iván Márquez issues call to arms.” BBC, 29 Aug. 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-49508411. Accessed 27 November 2020. 

“Colombia Reaping Gains of Peace Process Yet Reintegration of Ex-combatants Still Work in Progress, Special Representative Tells Security Council.” United Nations, 14 Oct. 2020, https://www.un.org/press/en/2020/sc14325.doc.htm. Accessed 27 November 2020. 

“Colombia Signs New peace deal with FARC.” BBC, 24 Nov. 2016, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-38096179. Accessed 27 November 2020. 

“Colombia referendum: Voters reject Farc peace deal.” BBC, 3 Oct. 2016, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-37537252. Accessed 27 November, 2020. 

“Colombia: 9 FARC dissidents killed in bombing raid.” Aljazeera, 31 Aug. 2019, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/08/31/colombia-9-farc-dissidents-killed-in-bombing-raid/. Accessed 24 November 2020.

Forero, Juan. “Rebel Control of Large Zone In Colombia Is Extended.” The New York Times, 7 Dec. 2000, https://www.nytimes.com/2000/12/07/world/rebel-control-of-large-zone-in-colombia-is-extended.html. Accessed 27 November 2020. 

González, Jenny Carolina, and Kurmanaev Anatoly. “Colombia Captures Guerrillas Accused in Deadly Car Bombing”. New York Times, 2 Jul. 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/02/world/americas/colombia-eln-bombing-arrests.html

Madrid, Marcela. “The Peasants Cry Out for the Truth of the Conflict.” Land and Environmental, 12 Dec. 2019, https://cerosetenta.uniandes.edu.co/campesinos-verdad-colombia/. Accessed 24 November 2020. 

Maher, David, and Andrew Thomson. "A Precarious Peace? the Threat of Paramilitary Violence to the Peace Process in Colombia." Third World Quarterly, vol. 39, no. 11, 2018, pp. 2142-2172

“Mi Cuerpo Dice la Verdad.” Comisión de la Verdad, (n.d.), https://comisiondelaverdad.co/encuentro-por-la-verdad-mi-cuerpo-dice-la-verdad. Accessed 24 November 2020. 

Neuman, William. “Colombia and Rebels Agree on Drug Fight.” The New York Times, 16 May 2014,https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/17/world/americas/colombia-and-rebels-agree-on-drug-fight.html?ref=americas. Accessed 27 November 2020. 

Oettler, Anika. “Colombia’s ongoing violence has shifted truth and reconciliation from the past into the present.” Latin America and Carribean Center. https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/latamcaribbean/2020/01/13/colombias-ongoing-violence-has-shifted-truth-and-reconciliation-from-the-past-into-the-present/. Accessed November 30 2020.

The Peace Process in Colombia. Government of Norway, 29 Nov. 2019, https://www.regjeringen.no/en/topics/foreign-affairs/peace-and-reconciliation-efforts/norways_engagement/peace_colombia/id2522231/. Accessed 24 November 2020.  

“Primer 'Espacio de escucha': sobre los hechos de violencia contra exmiembros de las FARC-EP.” Comision de la Verdad, 3 Mar. 2020, https://comisiondelaverdad.co/actualidad/noticias/primer-espacio-de-escucha-sobre-los-hechos-de-violencia-contra-exintegrantes-de-las-farc-ep. Accessed 24 November 2020. 

“Profiles: Colombia’s Armed Groups”. BBC, 29 Aug. 2013, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-11400950. 

Reuters Staff. “Colombia, ELN Rebels to Begin Peace Talks in Ecuador”, 30 Mar. 2016, https://fr.reuters.com/article/us-colombia-rebels-eln-idUSKCN0WW1FY. Accessed 24 November 2020. 

Reuters Staff. “Colombia, ELN Rebels say Peace Talks Will Be Moved to Cuba.” 5 May 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-colombia-rebels-idUSKBN1I60N6. Accessed 24 November 2020. 

Response to Information Requests (RIR). Immigrant and Refugee Board of Canada, 2020, https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/country-information/rir/Pages/index.aspx?doc=453950. Accessed 27 November 2020. 

Revelo, Diana R., and Cecilia E. Sottilotta. "Barriers to Peace? Colombian Citizens’ Beliefs and Attitudes Vis-à-Vis the Government-FARC-EP Agreement." Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 2020, pp. 1-22.

A Review of How Colombia’s Truth Commission is Advancing. Colombia Peace, 6 Apr. 2020, https://colombiapeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/TCGS-2.pdf. Accessed 24 November 2020. 

Rowen, Jamie R. ““We Don’t Believe in Transitional Justice:”Peace and the Politics of Legal Ideasin Colombia.” Law and Society Inquiry, vol 42, no. 3, 2017, pp. 622-647. 

Segura, Renata, and Mechoulin, Delphine. “Made in Havana: How Colombia and the FARC Decided to End the War.” International Peace Institution (IPI), 2017, https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/IPI-Rpt-Made-in-Havana.pdf 

Suarez, Juliana. “Colombia: Dialogues for Non-Repetition Begin.” Latin American Post, 18 Jun. 2019, https://latinamericanpost.com/28554-colombia-dialogues-for-non-repetition-begin. Accessed 24 November 2020. 

A Trusted Facilitator: An Evaluation of Norwegian Engagement in the Peace Process between the Colombian Government and the FARC, 2010–2016. Government of Norway, Oct. 2018, https://www.norad.no/contentassets/33fb8fa056be4d2b9b6eadfda9f6b3e1/10.18-evaluation-of-norways-support-to-the-peace-process-in-colombia-20102016.pdf. 

“Truth, memory and reconciliation commission of Colombian women in the diaspora.” Conciliation Resources, https://www.c-r.org/where-we-work/truth-memory-and-reconciliation-commission-colombian-women-diaspora. Accessed November 30 2020.

Valenzuela, Pedro. "The End of the Armed Conflict in Colombia: A Multiple Causal Factor Explanation." Peace and Change, vol. 43, no. 2, 2018, pp. 205-217. 

Violence Against Women in Colombia: A Report to the Committee Against Torture. World Organization Against Torture (OMCT), https://www.omct.org/files/2004/07/2409/eng_2003_04_colombia.pdf. Accessed 30 November, 2020. 

United Nations Report of the Secretary General on the United Verification Mission in Colombia. United Nations, 2 Apr. 2018, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/1481504?ln=en.. Accessed 30 November, 2020.

Wilson, Scott. “Colombia Extend DMZ for 2 Months.” Washington Post, 8 Dec. 2000, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2000/12/08/colombia-extends-dmz-for-2-months/b1b8e155-e06a-4a16-97c1-f650218cb130/. Accessed 24 November 2020.