Democratic Republic of Congo: Truth and Reconciliation

Context and Summary

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, is first predated by The Inter Congolese Dialogue (ICD), which took place in Sun City, South Africa (also referred to as the Sun City Accord) in early 2002. A plan emerged from these talks to establish a Truth and Reconciliation Commission. In this agreement, the signatories agreed that the TRC would consider political, economic, and social crimes committed from 1960 until 2003  in order to establish the truth and help bring individuals and communities to reconciliation [1]. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement, signed in December 2002, also helped create the framework for the Truth Commission [2]. Articles 154 – 160 of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement “tasked the commission to establish the truth among conflicting versions of history and to promote peace, reparation, and reconciliation” [3]. This was described as a transitional period in DRC’s history. The Truth and Reconciliation in DRC began in July 2003 and continued through to February 2007, lasting 3 years and 10 months [4]. The Truth Commission aimed to address the roots of the conflict; specifically inter-intra-community conflicts around political, economic, and military influence, the predatory state and government, and regional politics and influences from Uganda, Burundi, and Rwanda [5]. The UN mission in DRC has been the organization’s most expensive mission in UN history, and since 1999 over 8 billion USD have been spent to fund the peacekeeping efforts [6]. Despite this, peace remains elusive in DRC.

[1] Democratic Republic of the Congo ... - Human Rights Watch. 2004. https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/drc0104.pdf

[2] Truth Commission: Democratic Republic of Congo. 2003. https://www.usip.org/publications/2003/07/truth-commission-democratic-republic-congo

[3] Truth Commission: Democratic Republic of Congo. 2003.

[4] Democratic Republic of the Congo ... - Human Rights Watch. 2004.

[5] Democratic Republic of the Congo ... - Human Rights Watch. 2004.

[6] Accord: Policy & Practice Brief. The peace process in the DRC: A transformation quagmire.  2012. https://media.africaportal.org/documents/ACCORD-policy-practice-brief-20.pdf

Key Issues

It should firstly be noted that information on the specific contents of the DRC TRC was very difficult to find, we were unable to find the original, or copies, of the TRC. The principal objectives of the TRC were to facilitate the “reunification and reconstruction of the country, the re-establishment of peace and the restoration of territorial integrity and state authority in the whole of the national territory” [1]. The aims of the TRC also extended to reconciliation on a national level, the reconstruction of an integrated national army, the organization of “free and transparent elections at all levels” allowing for the establishment of a democratic government and other structures that will pave the way for a new political order [2]. It is widely argued that the provisions included in the TRC were not meaningfully backed-up by mandates that would have to ensure their implementation and success [3]. It is further argued that the agreement “barely defined the contours of the truth commission”, failing to properly outline how its objectives, functions, scope, and powers would be structured [4]. After the TRC received criticism for appearing to act as “merely an arena for power-sharing”, the government made some minor adjustments but ultimately, “changes in the composition of the TRC were not enough to persuade victims’ groups to cooperate with the process”[5].

[1] Global and Inclusive Agreement on Transition in the DR Congo: Inter-Congolese Dialogue - Political negotiations on the peace process and on transition in the DRC - Democratic Republic of the Congo. 2002. https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/global-and-inclusive-agreement-transition-dr-congo-inter-congolese

[2] Global and Inclusive Agreement on Transition in the DR Congo: Inter-Congolese Dialogue - Political negotiations on the peace process and on transition in the DRC - Democratic Republic of the Congo. 2002.

[3] Naughton, Elena. "Can Truth Commissions Strengthen Peace Processes." ICTJ. 2014. https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ_TruthCommPeace_English_2016.pdf

[4]  "Can Truth Commissions Strengthen Peace Processes." 2014.

[5] "Can truth commissions strengthen peace processes." 2014.

Key actors: Domestic

The Former Congolese Government:

The former Congolese government was involved in efforts towards transitional justice and played an important role in exposing the human rights violations done by both internal and external armed groups through sending reports and letters to international organizations. However, the DRC government did not provide a lot of political and financial support for the Congolese TRC [1].

Civil Society:

The Congolese civil society actors and organizations played a significant role in the creation of the Truth and reconciliation commission as they directly participated in peace and political negotiations leading up to the transition period. The commission was led by a member of the civil society and several other members were put in charge of the committee [2].

Church representatives:

As part of the civil society, church representatives were the strongest advocates of the TRC in the Inter-Congolese Dialogue. They appeared as moral defenders of the Congolese general population and advocated for reconciliation as the main pillar for justice and peace [3].

Non-Armed Opposition Parties:

These are parties such as Unified Lumumbist Party (PALU), the Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS), Innovative Forces for Union and Solidarity (FONUS) Popular Movement for the Revolution- Fait Privé (MPR- Fait Privé), and Democratic and Social Christian Party (PDSC) that were important actors throughout the Congolese conflicts and were also present in the peace negotiations [4].

Armed Groups:

Most of these groups were an important part of the peace negotiations that led to the creation of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission as they held significant political and military influence due to years of violent conflict in the DRC [5]. Some of the prominent armed groups are: RCD-ML, APC, MLC, RCD-N, UPC, the Hema, Ngiti, and Lendu. This is not an exhaustive list, as there are almost countless small armed groups that operated in the DRC during this time. Additionally, while most of the groups mentioned here were not involved in the peace processes / TRC, they continued to contribute to conflict and insecurity in the region, at times undermining the peace progress/TRC efforts.

The Mai-Mai:

These small, local, armed self defense groups  (who were originally founded as one in Katanga) formed to guard their local territories against outsider armed groups and the Congolese government forces. The Mai-Mai militias were especially active in the provinces of South and North Kivu [6].

Movement for liberation of the Congo (MLC):

This armed group was based in Gbadolite and controlled most of Equateur. Since 1998, the MLC has been backed by the Ugandan government [7].

The Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD):

Similar to the Mai-Mai and the MLC, RCD was a party to the Inter-Congolese Dialogue. It was funded by Uganda and Rwanda and gained control over many Congolese provinces[8].

The Congolese Rally for Democracy/Liberation Movement (RCD/ML):

In September of 1999, the RCD-ML separated from the RCD and moved its base to Bunia. It was backed by Uganda and was party to the Sun City negotiations and a party to the Sun City Agreement [9]. The APC is the armed wing of the RCD/ML

The Congolese Rally for Democracy/National (RCD-N):

This armed group was backed by Ugandans as well. It was also a party to the Inter-Congolese peace and political negotiations [10].

Union of Congolese Patriots (UPC)

The Union of Congolese Patriots is a militia operating in Ituri, DRC, mostly made up of ethnic Hema. The militia was formed near the end of the Second Congolese War, founded by Thomas Lubanga, and has been accused of widespread human rights abuses [11]

Allied Democratic Forces (AFD)

The Allied Democratic Forces is an armed rebel group operating in Uganda and DRC, which is considered by many to be a terrorist group. [12]

Congolese Revolutionary Movement (MRC)

The MRC is a militia made up of fighters belonging to the Lendu ethnic group. [13]

Ituri Patriotic Resistance Force (FPRI)

The Ituri Patriotic Resistance Force is an armed group closely linked to the FNI and composed mainly of ethnic Ngiti (a subgroup of the Lendu ethnic group). It receives backing from Uganda and is an enemy of Rwandan-backed UPC. [14]

 

The Congolese Parliament:

The Congolese Parliament played an important role in the creation of TRC as the laws governing the TRC passed by the parliament [15].

CIAT:

Le Comite International d’Assistance a la Transition is a committee of foreign Ambassadors and its role was to monitor and assess the transition process in the DRC. It provided funding and played a major role in supporting and overseeing the electoral process as well [13].

[1] Arnould, Valerie. "Transitional Justice in Peacebuilding: Dynamics of Contestation in the DRC." Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 10.3 (2016): 321-338. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17502977.2016.1199476?journalCode=risb20

[2] Koko, Sadiki. "The role of civil society in conflict resolution in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 1998–2006: An appraisal." African Journal on Conflict Resolution 16.1 (2016): 111-137

[3] Tunamsifu, Shirambere Philippe. "Transitional justice and peacebuilding in the Democratic Republic of the Congo." African Journal on Conflict Resolution 15.1 (2015): 59-83.

[4] Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada. “Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC): Civil Society of South Kivu (Société Civile Du Sud-Kivu), Including Its Political Views, Its Membership, Its Regional Offices and Treatment of Its Members by Government Authorities and Rebel Forces (1993 - May 2003).” Refworld. May 9th 2003. www.refworld.org/docid/3f7d4e07e.html.

[5] Verweijen, Judith. "Stable instability: political settlements and armed groups in the Congo." 2017. https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/57e92e4d4.pdf

[6] Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada. “Country Fact Sheet - Democratic Republic of the Congo.” Refworld, Apr. 2007. www.refworld.org/docid/46d2e2622.html.

[7] Human Rights Watch. "ITURI: ‘Covered in Blood’: Ethnically Targeted Violence in Northeastern DR Congo." Human Rights Watch. 15. 2003.

[8] Davis, Laura, and Priscilla Hayner. "Difficult peace, limited justice: Ten years of peacemaking in the DRC." International Center for Transitional Justice 36. 2009.

[9] "ITURI: ‘Covered in Blood’: Ethnically Targeted Violence in Northeastern DR Congo." 2003.

[10] “ITURI: ‘Covered in Blood’: Ethnically Targeted Violence in Northeastern DR Congo." 2003.

[11] Covered in Blood. Human Rights Watch. 2015.  https://www.hrw.org/report/2003/07/07/covered-blood/ethnically-targeted-violence-northern-drc

[12] Covered in Blood. Human Rights Watch. 2015.

[13]Covered in Blood. Human Rights Watch. 2015.

[14]Covered in Blood. Human Rights Watch. 2015.

[15] Democratic Republic of the Congo ... - Human Rights Watch. (2004, January). https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/drc0104.pdf

Key actors: International

MONUC:

It is one of the largest UN peacebuilding and peacekeeping operations that was set up in DRC on November 30, 1999. In addition to protecting civilians, monitoring ceasefires, and supporting the peace negotiations, MONUC provided advice and assistance for the Truth and Reconciliation Commission as well as the transitional government [1][2].

ICTJ:

During the political negotiations, the Peace talks, and the implementation of the truth and reconciliation commission, ICTJ supported the process by providing workshops with local groups in DRC regarding the truth and reconciliation process. Additionally, the center has also provided consultations for both the domestic and international stakeholders on issues relating to the TRC [3].

UNDP:

In DRC, the United Nation Development Program cooperated closely with other international and local NGOs and donors to lead joint peacebuilding missions, formulate and implement large-scale programs in support of the peace negotiations and the transition, and provide economic development programs [4].

OAU:

The The Organization of African Unity now the African Union, played a key role in facilitating the peace talks in Sun City by selecting the chief mediator for the negotiations. The organization also played an important role in the Lusaka Agreement [5].

EU:

The European Union was another important international actor in the peace negotiations and the creation of the TRC. In addition to the diplomatic presence of most of the EU state members, Belgium, the UK, France, Sweden, and the Netherlands were some of the important donors at the time. The EU was also actively involved in the Goma talks by creating clear guidelines and pushing the progress of the negotiations [6].

South Africa:

One of the most involved international actors throughout the planning and creating of the TRC was South Africa. In addition to supporting the peacekeeping operations, the country facilitated Sun City talks. In addition, it empowered local leaders and assisted DRC with the TRC process drawing on its own experience. After TRC, it carried out several Human Resources training projects in DRC [7].

[1] “National Consultations on DRC Truth and Reconciliation Commission.” MONUC, 18 Feb. 2016, monuc.unmissions.org/en/national-consultations-drc-truth-and-reconciliation-commission.

[2] “Attacks on Justice 2005 - Democratic Republic of Congo.” Refworld, International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), 11 July 2008, www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain?page=search&docid=48abdd680&skip=0&query=ATTACKS%20ON%20JUSTICE%20DEMOCRATIC%20REPUBLIC%20OF%20CONGO.

[3] “DRC (Congo) and Transitional Justice: ICTJ.” International Center for Transitional Justice, 13 June 2018, www.ictj.org/our-work/regions-and-countries/democratic-republic-congo-drc.

[4] Faubert, Carrol. "Evaluation of UNDP Assistance to Conflict-Affected Countries: Case Study–Democratic Republic of Congo." 2006. http://web.undp.org/evaluation/evaluations/documents/thematic/conflict/DRC.pdf

[5] Davis, Laura, and Priscilla Hayner. "Difficult peace, limited justice: Ten years of peacemaking in the DRC." International Center for Transitional Justice 36. 2009. https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-DRC-Difficult-Peace-2009-English.pdf

[6] “Difficult peace, limited justice: Ten years of peacemaking in the DRC." 2009.

[7] Nyuykonge, Charles, and Siphamandla Zondi. "South African Peacebuilding Approaches: Evolution and Lessons." Rising Powers and Peacebuilding. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, 2017. 107-125. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-60621-7_6

Barriers to Truth and Reconciliation

Despite the UN peacekeeping efforts, peace and stability continue to be out of reach for the DRC. The TRC process was hindered by numerous elements, one of them being the commission’s failure to address deeply rooted issues from DRC’s colonial period. Many contemporary issues and individuals are also yet to be properly represented by the commission which has further impeded its enforcement. One highly controversial aspect of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission is its fundamental integrity and credibility, specifically in regard to its eight members, many of whom elected themselves to the commission and have been implicated in human rights abuses [1]. This aspect of the TRC has received heavy criticism from the international community as it risks undermining the entire TRC and rendering it futile. Another barrier to the TRC process is the fact that DRC’s justice system is in a state of complete “disarray and it will likely take years to establish a functioning, independent, impartial, and fair judiciary”[2]. The DRC’s national judicial system is riddled with corruption, has seen little investment in recent years and many courts do not even function [3]. The lack of independence of the judiciary has presented numerous obstacles in holding guilty parties accountable; “the constantly growing power of the executive since the mid-1970s has resulted in de facto subordination of the judiciary to the executive branch” [4]. Another issue that has emerged numerous times in relation to the judiciary is the lack of properly trained personnel [5]. Furthermore, the “lack of adequate investigative capacity and the lack of fair trial standards and rights of the accused”[6]. Much of its personnel have also “not been paid for years and magistrates are badly trained and unsupported”[7]. The judicial system in DRC depends on judges and prosecutors appointed directly from law school, without prior experience [8]. DRC’s extensive natural resources and the subsequent presence of unregulated mining operations continues to be a serious barrier to peace. The conflict in DRC is reportedly “fueled and supported by various national and multinational corporations which sought to obtain mining concessions or contracts in the country on terms that were more favorable than they would have received in countries where there were peace and stability” [9]. As a result, MNCs continue to exploit the DRC through political, military, and business elites. Outside influences have also proven themselves as a force to be reckoned with. Rwanda continues to wage armed conflict against the FDLR in the Northern and Southern provinces of DRC [10]. In an attempt to rid Uganda of the Lord’s Resistance Army, the Ugandan military often forces the LRA to retreat into DRC[11]. Finally, the Burundi army frequently crosses into DRC to pursue members of armed opposition groups, mostly the National Forces of Liberation” [12]. Some key actors have also acted as spoilers in the endeavor towards peace, such as notorious warlord Thomas Lubanga (one of two Congolese men arrested on war crimes and convicted by the ICC), the governments of Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi, MNCs, armed rebel groups/ militias/ local insurgencies, proxies and so on. The death toll in DRC has surmounted 5.4 million, more than one million women and girls have been raped, 3 million civilians remain displaced and soldiers account for only 10% of deaths [13]. To address these spoilers, the specific type of spoiler should be identified (limited, total, inside, outside, greedy), followed by establishing a clear “understanding of tactics, motivations, and funding of the spoilers”, and the inclusion of civil society actors in peace talks to “address local violence dynamics, and design inducement, socialization, and coercive strategies” [14].

[1] Democratic Republic of the Congo ... - Human Rights Watch. 2004. https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/drc0104.pdf

[2] Democratic Republic of the Congo ... - Human Rights Watch. 2004.

[3] Democratic Republic of the Congo ... - Human Rights Watch. 2004.

[4] Democratic Republic of the Congo ... - Human Rights Watch. 2004.

[5] Democratic Republic of the Congo ... - Human Rights Watch. 2004.

[6] Democratic Republic of the Congo ... - Human Rights Watch. 2004.

[7] Democratic Republic of the Congo ... - Human Rights Watch. 2004.

[8] Democratic Republic of the Congo ... - Human Rights Watch. 2004.

[9] Accord: Policy & Practice Brief. The peace process in the DRC: A transformation quagmire.  2012.  https://media.africaportal.org/documents/ACCORD-policy-practice-brief-20.pdf

[10] Accord: Policy & Practice Brief The peace process in the DRC: A transformation quagmire. 2012.

[11] Accord: Policy & Practice Brief. The peace process in the DRC: A transformation quagmire. 2012.

[12] Accord: Policy & Practice Brief. The peace process in the DRC: A transformation quagmire. 2012.

[13] Managing Spoilers in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 2018. https://horninstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Managing-Spoilers-in-the-Democratic-Republic-of-the-Congo.pdf

[14] Managing Spoilers in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 2018.

Analysis of Successes

When one of the only concrete recommendations that a Truth and Reconciliation Commission gives in its final report is for another commission to be conducted at a later date, the efficacy of the first commission is called into question immediately. In the DRC, as discussed in the previous section, there were intense barriers to conducting a successful commission - the TRC lacked legitimacy, the commissioners were not adequately qualified, the country lacked a functioning judicial system, there were extensive political conflicts of interest, and the country was still in a state of conflict while the commission was being conducted.  Due to these primary difficulties, as well as other more minor barriers, the Truth and Reconciliation commission of the DRC can be considered as having failed its mandate. A 2014 report by the International Center for Transitional Justice and the Kofi Annan Foundation wrote:

“The TRC was ‘tasked with the responsibility to re-establish the truth’ and to promote ‘peace, justice, forgiveness and national reconciliation.’ But little truth was achieved. Accountability was sorely lacking in a process and an environment where combatants continued to commit human rights violations with impunity”[1].

Considering that the TRC did not conduct investigations on crimes, interview victims, or conduct hearings for perpetrators, a fundamental part of the commission can be considered missing - the truth that is required for reconciliation[2].

Another issue with the TRC’s success was the dual mandate. The TRC ‘s mandate “was not only to establish the truth, but also to prevent and manage conflict using mediation”.[3] This is rare because TRCs are generally considered separate from the peace process and take place when the nation is at a relatively stable point. The majority of the work that the TRC actually did fell under the second half of the mandate - tolerance and peace dialogues between communities, activities to reduce interethnic conflict, working with refugees to encourage their return home, and the promotion of election respect.  While these actions did fit within the TRC mandate, they were focused on “resolving current disputes and preventing future conflict” - especially around the coming election - and thus did not adequately address past grievances and the historical context of conflict[4].

The OHCHR report published in August of 2010 demonstrates how lofty the TRC mandate was, considering the barriers, and how extensive a proper TRC would have had to have been. The OHCHR report examines the “most serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law committed within the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo between March 1993 and June 2003”, [5] and was conducted over two years by an experienced UN team. The report produced is well over 500 pages and is sorted by region and theme. The OHCHR report considers the TRC to have failed due to the nature of its composition, its dual and unrealistic mandate, and lack of human and material resources. The Congo’s TRC’s mandate was far broader - the timeline stretched 46 years, from the end of the colonial period through the transitory government  up until the end of the transitionary government [6]. This is an incredibly ambitious period to cover, considering that there have been multiple wars, coups, and prolonged conflict during this timeframe that have affected every part of Congolese society. When examining the manpower, political will, and UN resources that the OHCHR report took to complete - a report that had a significantly less complicated mandate that covered a fifth of the timeframe - it becomes apparent that even the original scope of the mandate was flawed from the outset.[7]  The OHCHR notes that during their research, while victims expressed disappointment with the final result of the TRC, there is still a strong desire for another commission to accomplish what the first could not [8]. This, combined with legitimate political will, a future post conflict DRC,  and the wealth of scholarship on why the first TRC failed that has been published by organizations such as OHCHR and ICTJ, there is the potential for a future successful TRC.

[1] Naughton, Elena. "Can Truth Commissions Strengthen Peace Processes." ICTJ. 2014.  47. https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ_TruthCommPeace_English_2016.pdf

[2] United Nations OHCHR. “Democratic Republic of the Congo, 1993-2003”. 2010.  https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/CD/DRC_MAPPING_REPORT_FINAL_EN.pdf

[3] “Democratic Republic of the Congo, 1993-2003”. 2010. 478.

[4]  “Can Truth Commissions Strengthen Peace Processes”. 2014. 51.

[5]  “Democratic Republic of the Congo, 1993-2003” 2010.

[6] Savage, Tyrone. Kambala wa Kambala, Oliver. “Decayed, decimated, usurped and inadequate:  the challenge of finding justice through formal mechanisms in the DR Congo”. Restoring Justice after Large-Scale Violent Conflicts, edited by Aertsen et al. 2008. 336-358.

[7] “Democratic Republic of the Congo 1993-2003” 2010.

[8]  “Democratic Republic of the Congo 1993-2003” 2010.

Primary Texts and Documents

Annotated Bibliography

Aertsen, Ivo., Jana Arsovska, Holger-C Rohne, Marta Valinas, Kris Vanspauwen, editors. Restoring Justice after Large-Scale Violent Conflicts. Routledge Taylor and Francis, 2008.

“Restoring Justice after Large-Scale Violent Conflicts” is an edited collection of chapters concerning three different case studies - Kosovo, Israel/Palestine, and the DRC. It provides a comparative analysis of these three cases, alongside detailed information about each case. It contains four chapters on the DRC by different authors which provide contextual information about the Second Congo War and the peace process that came after it . It touches on the TRC as one of the transitional institutions that was part of the effort to restore a sense of justice to the Congo after the conflict, and offers a critical view of TRC’s mandate. It is written in easily accessible language, and can be used as a stepping stone into the broader more complex issues of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

Amnesty International. (2003, March) Democratic Republic of Congo: On the precipice: The deepening human rights and humanitarian crisis in Ituri. Retrieved from https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/100000/afr620062003en.pdf

The 2003 publication by Amnesty International offers an insight into the human rights and humanitarian crisis in Ituri, DRC. It begins with an introduction that touches on many of the issues that make the situation in Ituri a crisis. It then describes the main instigators of the violence, naming Uganda, armed political groups, and the governments of Rwanda and DRC. The publication then moves on to report some of the major human rights abuses, such as the mass unlawful killing of civilians perpetrated by armed political groups. The paper concluded by touching on the international community’s reaction to the crisis as well as providing recommendations to the primary parties.

Borello, F. "A First Few Steps: The Long Road to a Just Peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo " (Rep.). 2004. https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-DRC-Just-Peace-2004-English.pdf

Published in 2004 by the ICTJ, A First Few Steps: The Long Road to a Just Peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, provides a critical analysis of the transitional justice in DRC and evaluates the possibility and limitation of the prosecution of human rights abuses in DRC, discusses the Truth and reconciliation commission and examines the need for institutional reform. The author gives an overview of the TRC commission and argues that the amnesty provision of the TRC be reconsidered as it is ineffective. Since the paper was published while the TRC was still in its beginning stages, it does not give a full picture of the aftermath and output of the commission. However, it examines many different possibilities for the TRC and recommends the formation of a commission of experts to advise the TRC and the transitional justice process.

Covered in Blood. 2003. https://www.hrw.org/report/2003/07/07/covered-blood/ethnically-targeted-violence-northern-drc

This 2003 publication by Human Rights Watch describes in detail the atrocities that have become common-place within the Ituri province of DRC. It begins by giving readers a summary of the violence that plagues Ituri with an overview of the region, providing further context into the conflict. The publication continues to make recommendations to 1) the governments of Uganda, Rwanda, and DRC, 2) the Hema, Lendu, Ngiti and other armed political groups, 3) the United Nations, 4) donor governments, and 5) the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC. Moreover, it offers context on outside actors, domestic actors, and responses from the international community. It also details a number of massacres and human rights abuses.

Davis, Laura, and Priscilla Hayner. "Difficult peace, limited justice: Ten years of peacemaking in the DRC." International Center for Transitional Justice 36. 2009. https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-DRC-Difficult-Peace-2009-English.pdf

Published in 2009, this ICTJ report encompasses the 10 years of peacebuilding in the DRC since the late 1990s. It discusses the Congolese conflict’s history, root causes, and the role of international actors. In addition, it explains the limitations and effectiveness of the peace talks. It especially focuses on the issue of justice in the peace talks and provides an overview of different forms of justice included in the peace talks including the TRC. It also explores the role of international actors such as the ICC and the civil society on peacebuilding and transitional justice in the DRC.

Democratic Republic of the Congo ... - Human Rights Watch. January, 2004. https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/drc0104.pdf

The Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper, Democratic Republic of the Congo: Confronting Impunity, published January 2004, details the barriers in addressing the exemption for the atrocious acts that have been committed since 1996. The briefing touches on numerous obstacles facing the national justice system, whose deep inadequacies significantly hinder the process of holding guilty parties accountable for human rights crimes. The report additionally provides concrete recommendations and solutions to the national justice problems in DRC. The Briefing even touches on how DRC can meaningfully collaborate with international institutions that are designed to ensure justice is served, such as the ICC.

Naughton, Elena. "Can truth commissions strengthen peace processes." 2014. https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ_TruthCommPeace_English_2016.pdf

This publication offers a succinct evaluation of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of the DRC as one case study of five. The ICTJ was one of the primary organizations critically reviewing and reporting on the TRC process when it was happening, and while this document was authored a decade after the TRC, it provides an analysis that draws on secondary source literature as well as quotes from primary source documents. Considering that it is very difficult to find a copy of the TRC final report online, this document was imperative to understanding the TRC final report as well as the broader context surrounding its creation and aftermath.

Shirambere P. "Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding in the Democratic Republic of the Congo." African Journal on Conflict Resolution, vol. 15, no. 1, 2015, pp. 59-83 http://saccps.org/pdf/2-2/SAPSS%202(2)%20Tunamsifu.pdf

"Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding in the Democratic Republic of the Congo" is an article published by the African Journal on Conflict Resolution that discusses the conflict and peacebuilding measures in the DRC. The paper starts by giving an overview of the past and -at the time- ongoing armed conflicts in the country. It then discusses the challenges of the past political events and conflicts and analyzes the peacebuilding and transitional justice process including judicial and non-judicial mechanisms. The paper recommends that the country should prioritize indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms to resolve local level conflicts and consider the formation of a second TRC for broader level justice.

Bibliography/Works Cited

Accord: Policy & Practice Brief. (2012, December). The peace process in the DRC: A transformation quagmire. Retrieved from https://media.africaportal.org/documents/ACCORD-policy-practice-brief-20.pdf 

Aertsen, Ivo., Jana Arsovska, Holger-C Rohne, Marta Valinas, Kris Vanspauwen, editors. Restoring Justice after Large-Scale Violent Conflicts. Routledge Taylor and Francis, 2008. 

Afoaku, Osita. "Democratic Republic of the Congo." Africa Research Bulletin: Economic, Financial and Technical Series 44.2 (2007). Retrieved from https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4be3c8e90.pdf

Amnesty International. Democratic Republic of Congo: On the precipice: The deeping human rights and humanitarian crisis in Ituri. 2003. https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/100000/afr620062003en.pdf 

Amnesty International. The Time for Justice is Now: New Strategy Needed in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 2011 https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/28000/afr620062011en.pdf 

“Attacks on Justice 2005 - Democratic Republic of Congo.” Refworld, International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), 11 July 2008, www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain?page=search&docid=48abdd680&skip=0&query=ATTACKS%20ON%20JUSTICE%20DEMOCRATIC%20REPUBLIC%20OF%20CONGO

Apuuli, Kasaija Phillip. "The politics of conflict resolution in the Democratic Republic of Congo: the Inter-Congolese Dialogue process." African Journal on Conflict Resolution 4.1. 2004. 65-84.

Arnould, Valerie. "Transitional Justice in Peacebuilding: Dynamics of Contestation in the DRC." Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 10.3. 2016. 321-338.

Borello, F. (2004, October). A First Few Steps: The Long Road to a Just Peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Rep.). Retrieved https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-DRC-Just-Peace-2004-English.pdf

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