The Truth Commission for El Salvador was a restorative justice truth commission aimed at investigating the perpetuated injustices throughout El Salvador’s twelve-year civil war.  Between 1979 and 1992, Salvadorans were caught in the middle of a violent conflict between the authoritarian military government and Marxist revolutionaries under the FMLN. Tens of thousands of citizens were killed, many more subject to deliberate terrorizing and targeting by US-trained government death squads and communist guerrillas. Recruitment of child soldiers along with other human rights violations were also prevalent. With increased international attention and pressure, the Truth Commission for El Salvador was established to investigate "serious acts of violence that had occurred between January 1980 and July 1991" that required "public knowledge of the truth". Findings from the investigations, including hearings from over 2 000 witness testimonies and gathered information from additional 20 000 witness statements, were compiled and published in the final report titled From Madness to Hope. Even though the peace process went smoothly, it soon became clear that the newly formed Salvadoran government deviated from the recommendations in the report. Herein lies the enigmatic nature of the truth and reconciliation in El Salvador: the public, who make up a majority of the victims, continues to vote for candidates who publicly oppose the Commission’s findings. As Salvadorans claim themselves, it is “peace without justice,” though some progress has been achieved nonetheless.

The mandate for the Commission on the Truth was “to investigate serious acts of violence that had occurred since 1980 and whose impact on society was deemed to require an urgent public knowledge of the truth”. [1] The Truth Commission was also responsible for promoting “national reconciliation” and presenting recommendations to prevent future acts of violence [2]. Five types of violent acts were identified, including acts of violence perpetrated by the FMLN, acts of violence carried out by the State, massacres of civilians conducted by the Armed Forces, death squad assassinations, and the assassinations of court judges [3]. In relation to these categories, the Commission also investigated four high profile cases committed during the Civil War. These included the FMLN summary executions of mayors, the killing of Jesuit priests by the State in 1989, the 1981 El Mozote massacre, and the assassination of Archbishop Romero in 1980 [4]. While the Truth Commission primarily focused on human rights violations rather than military reform, a separate Ad Hoc Commission investigated the Armed Forces and recommended officers who committed human rights violations be dismissed [5]. This was especially important as the majority of cases reviewed by the Truth Commission placed responsibility on the Armed Forces, state agents, and death squads [6].

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[1] “UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION IN EL SALVADOR (ONUSAL).” United Nations, United Nations, 2003, https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/onusalbackgr2.html#two

[2] “ACCOUNTABILITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON THE TRUTH FOR EL SALVADOR.” Human Rights Watch, vol. 5, no. 7, 1993, pp. 1-39., https://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/pdfs/e/elsalvdr/elsalv938.pdf. p. 9

[3] “UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION IN EL SALVADOR (ONUSAL).” United Nations, United Nations, 2003, https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/onusalbackgr2.html#two

[4] “ACCOUNTABILITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON THE TRUTH FOR EL SALVADOR.” Human Rights Watch, vol. 5, no. 7, 1993, pp. 1-39., https://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/pdfs/e/elsalvdr/elsalv938.pdf. p. 16

[5] Ibid. p. 9

[6] Ibid. p. 4

FMLN (Farabundo Marti National Liberation front)

The FMLN were a communist insurgent group formed in the 1970s to challenge the government at the time. It was comprised of five marxist guerilla groups, including the FPL, ERP, RN, PCS, PRTC. As tensions began to built between the farmers and elite class leading up to the Salvadoran War, the group started to organize military offensives against the military-led government [1]. The group is now a prominent political party in El Salvador and has enjoyed success in the past decade. 

Salvadoran government 

The authoritarian Salvadoran government at this time was led by the army. It severely restricted and limited political rights whilst committed many atrocities and human rights violations. Additionally, El Salvador's historic responses to communist uprisings date back to 1932, when the armed forces massacred of around 10,000 to 40,000 peasants [2].

Alfredo Cristiani 

The first president of El Salvador from 1989-1994. He represented the right-leaning ARENA party, and was backed by the US since he was a graduate of Georgetown. After his election, Cristiani was successful in negotiating a peace agreement with the opposition FMLN. [3] Some controversies persist around his alleged continuance of human rights abuses. 

Citizens of El Salvador 

There were many witnesses and victims of the abuse and human rights violations, including those whose families had been killed in military and guerilla massacres during the civil war. They would go on to deliver testimonies to the Truth Commission for El Salvador, and were taken into the consideration in the organization’s report on the conflict[4].

Tutela Legal

Founded in May 1982, Tutela Legal was a legal office under the direction of the Archdiocese of San Salvador which recorded instances of human rights violations and acts of violence. Tutela Legal collected and preserved records and documented testimonials from the public, eventually amassing over 50,000 documents in their archives. [5]

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[1] The Commission on the Truth for El Salvador. From Madness to Hope . United States Institute of Peace, 1993. pp.20

[2] Ibid. 

[3] Ibid. pp.9

[4] Ibid. pp.16

[5] “Tutela Legal Closed in El Salvador Amid Concern Over the Fate of Valuable Archives.” Council on Hemispheric Affairs, 3 Oct. 2013.

 

The United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) 

The agency was established in 1991. Duties included monitoring the accords and verifying the demobilization of combatants, reintegration, assisting in post-conflict structural reforms such as judicial reforms, training of new civilian forces, and transfer of land to previous combatants and/or landholders. [1] 

The Truth Commission for El Salvador 

A restorative justice truth commission approved by the UN to investigate the wrongdoings in the El Salvador civil war. The commission included three international and impartial commissioners appointed by the UN secretary-general, they are [2]

• • Belisario Betancur, former president of Colombia
  • Thomas Buergenthal, former president of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
  • Reinaldo Figueredo Planchart, former foreign minister of Venezuela 
  • Support staff of 20 members (not specified, did not include any Salvadorans)

The Argentine Forensic Anthropology Team 

Representatives from Argentina offered external assistance, investigated the controversial massacre in the town of El Mozote, exhume the remains of victims from this particular massacre in an attempt to figure out how many casualties were recorded. The exhumation process lasted from November 13-17 1992. The team included Dr. Clyde Snow, Dr. Robert H. Kirschner, Dr. Douglass Scott, and Dr. John Fitzpatrick of the Santa Tecla Institute of Forensic Medicine and of the Commission for the Investigation of Criminal Acts [3]. The forensic report supported victim testimonies that “victims were summarily executed” [4]

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[1] “UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION IN EL SALVADOR (ONUSAL).” United Nations, United Nations, 2003, peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/past/onusal.htm. 

[2]“Truth Commission: El Salvador.” United States Institute of Peace, 2 Oct. 2014, www.usip.org/publications/1992/07/truth-commission-el-salvador. 

[3] Betancur, Belisario, Reinaldo Figueredo Planchart, and Thomas Buergenthal. "From madness to hope: The 12-year war in El Salvador: Report of the Commission on the Truth for El Salvador." UN Security Council (1993) From Madness to Hope: The (1993).

[4] Navarro, Romina. “Argentine NGO Documenting Human Rights Violations Nominated for Nobel Peace Prize · Global Voices.” Translated by Stephanie Crane, Global Voices, 28 Feb. 2020, globalvoices.org/2020/02/25/argentine-forensic-anthropology-team-documenting-human-rights-violations-nominated-for-nobel-peace-prize/.

Most of the barriers throughout the peace process have to do with the implementation rather than the negotiation process. The report effectively acknowledged cases of human rights violations and killings, but it was also ambiguous and failed to settle on specific tactics and strategies to address problems at the roots of the conflict. Many of the report’s recommendations were not implemented by the Salvadoran government, including economic and social reforms, or reparations towards victims. Most military officers who were named in the report for human rights violations retired with full honour. 

Ambiguity of the Mission: 

While the ambiguity of the Commission's official mandate gave them the authority to decide which incidents to investigate, since they had to take the important social impact affiliated with each incident into account, the commission did not distinguish between large-scale incidents from smaller ones. Instead, it emphasized “serious acts of violence” which outraged the Salvadoran public. [1]

Social and Economic Inequality

The 1992 peace agreement in El Salvador challenged itself with the “twin goals” of building “participatory democracy” while also pursuing neo-liberal economic reforms. The conservative government of the ARENA (Nationalist Republican Alliance) embraced an exclusionary economic model that leaned towards concentrating income, whereas the report aimed to expand participation at the political level. In theory, democracy and economic reform supposedly complement each other, but El Salvador experienced a clash between the two objectives. During negotiations, both sides agreed to address political exclusion but did not agree on a strategy to address social and economic exclusive, one of the root causes of the conflict. [2] The economy as a result frequently experiences deflationary periods. [3] 

Social Disintegration

Social disintegration is another obstacle to peace building; it is reflected in the unprecedented crime rate and breakdown of families due to emigration. As the number of arrests has risen recently, crime has increased even more. Youth gangs known as Mara have seemingly transformed into well-organized crime organisations [4]. Some US immigration policies of deporting criminals back has aggravated the issue of public security in El Salvador. Family structures are also disintegrating because of migration and smuggling to the US, literally dividing many families. [5]

Political Disintegration

The political parties in El Salvador failed to adjust and reform in the post-conflict period. The continuation of old practices of both patronage and clientelism has resulted in the re-polarization of politics [6]. Consensus-building has also been hindered by the lack of discussion within society over the fundamental problems of the country. 

Political Collusion

The legislature has been dominated by the right-wing ARSA, and left-wing FMLN who have collectively won five presidencies out of the last six, pointing to a clear lack of impartiality in holding culpable actors accountable. Additionally, many of the ‘youth’ fighters have by now reached retirement age, and can qualify for military pensions and favourable social credits. [7] By superficially supporting the military and similar institutions, political parties can garner quick and easy support without facing harsh reprimand, all the while protecting their own interests. [8]

Criticism and tension among Salvadorans 

The report drew criticisms from the El Salvadorans. The Commission was criticized for failing to address important aspects of the war, such as the operation of death squads and the role of the United States [9]. The most senior commander of the Salvadoran military publicly responded on national television through a statement read by the country’s defense minister, that the report was “unfair, incomplete, illegal, unethical, biased, and insolent” [10]. The Salvadoran president, Alfredo Cristani, meanwhile claimed that the report failed to meet the Salvadoran people’s “yearning… to forgive and forget this painful past.” [11]

Amnesty Law

Just five days after the report's release, the El Salvador parliament passed a sweeping amnesty law. Although the naming of high-ranking perpetrators did lead to mass removal from the armed forces, there were minimal consequences for the others that were named. For instance, Salvadoran Minister of Defence René Emilio Ponce, who participated in human rights violations retired with full military honours. There was a retirement ceremony held in place, and President Cristiani praised his men for performing with “merit, efficiency, and loyalty to the highest duties that the nation can demand” [12].

Implementation 

Many of the Commission’s recommendations were not implemented by the government because they were seldom considered verbatim. In 2010, President Mauricio Funes established commissions to address reparations towards victims of the war, payment of reparations are still pending. [13]

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[1] “Truth Commission: El Salvador.” United States Institute of Peace, 2 Oct. 2014, www.usip.org/publications/1992/07/truth-commission-el-salvador.  

[2] Zamora. “Fifteen Years After the Peace Agreement: Problems of Peace-Building in El Salvador.” Wilson Center, 2006, www.wilsoncenter.org/event/fifteen-years-after-the-peace-agreement-problems-peace-building-el-salvador.  

[3] De Soto, Alvaro, and Graciana Del Castillo. “Obstacles to Peacebuilding Revisited.” Global Governance, vol. 22, no. 2, 2016, pp. 209–227. JSTOR,

[4] “El Salvador.” Overcoming Obstacles to Peace: Local Factors in Nation-Building, by James Dobbins et al., RAND Corporation, 2013, pp. 67–92. JSTOR, p. 76 

[5] “Fifteen Years After the Peace Agreement: Problems of Peace-Building in El Salvador.”

[6] Ibid.

[7] “El Salvador's Civil War Veterans Will Receive Pensions and Social Benefits.” Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador, 2015.

[8] Popkin, Margaret. Peace without justice: Obstacles to building the rule of law in El Salvador. Penn State Press, 2010.

[9] “El Salvador.” Securing Tyrants or Fostering Reform? U.S. Internal Security Assistance to Repressive and Transitioning Regimes, by Seth G. Jones et al., 1st ed., RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA; Arlington, VA; Pittsburgh, PA, 2006, pp. 23–48. JSTOR,

[10] Méndez, Juan E., and Javier Mariezcurrena. “Unspeakable Truths.” Human Rights Quarterly, vol. 25, no. 1, 2003, pp. 237–256., www.jstor.org/stable/20069659. Accessed 30 Nov. 2020. pp.51

[11] Ibid.

[12] Ibid. pp. 72.

[13] “Truth Commission: El Salvador.”

In accordance with the mandate explained in Key Issues, those tasked with carrying it out experienced mixed success given the unambitious yet challenging nature of the goals. Harsh realities on the ground forced investigators to exchange anonymity assurances for crucial information in retracing acts of violence [1]. The blatant sleight of hand posed a serious threat to the integrity and legitimacy of the investigation, which, after much pressure, ultimately cornered El Salvador into adhering to international law principles previously disregarded in its jurisprudence. The general ambiguity of the mandate also gave the commission freedom to dictate the direction of the investigations. As noted in Barriers, ‘serious’ acts of violence did not necessarily differentiate ‘big’ acts from ‘small’ ones. Nevertheless, the TRC outlined three areas of focus in their efforts of restoring justice to Salvadorans. Our analysis will directly pertain to the following:

1. Recommendations are legally binding and to be monitored by the oversight committee
2. Overhaul of the legal system, with the accountability of culpable actors via dismissal but not prosecution
3. Reparations for victims

On count one, El Salvador failed to go so far as even recognizing the recommendations. One week after the TRC was released, the government passed an amnesty law impeding investigation, persecution, and trial of those found responsible for war crimes [2]. In total, only two-hundred officers were dismissed from their duties, and top officials retired with full honors. Twenty-three years later, the Constitutional Court would dismiss the law as unconstitutional since it violated the rights to justice, to judicial protection of fundamental rights, and to full reparations, as well as being generally inconsistent with international treaties on human rights and the rights of armed conflict victims [3]. In their decision, the judges ordered the legislature to replace the law with one promoting reconciliation. Instead, the two dominating parties in government - the belligerents in the civil war no less - opted again to soften the punitive blow under the guise of the Law of Transitional and Restorative Justice for National Reconciliation. As for consequences, community service was deemed more acceptable with what former militants deserved for their actions, barring anyone from serving any jail-time [4]. Perhaps more explicitly, the replacement bill also deemed the TRC’s recommendations inadmissible in a court of law; a wholesale rejection of restorative justice in fear it would open old wounds. Civil unrest and political disenfranchisement would later see the proposal fall apart at the eleventh hour, however, Salvadorans continue to find themselves in ‘no man's land’. The uncertainty of ever finding justice is made worse by the fact no reparations have been paid to date; this despite rhetoric alluding to payments to survivors.       

The legal system, on the other hand, saw more change than the state’s political arm. Since the mandate pertained to investigating “serious” acts of violence, there needed to exist an applicable set of laws on which to act. International human rights law is only applicable to governments of the state, however, in this case, the FMLN assumed and exercised control of some territories, therefore binding them to the law as well [5]. In addition, international humanitarian law was also applicable to the Commission’s findings given the egregious deprivation of human life, cruel treatment, and torture by both the government and insurgents. The inclusion of agreements in the TRC, which were already ratified by El Salvador, conveys a successful effort in applying international concepts to a domestically fought war. Furthermore, El Salvador experienced a significant decrease in overall human rights abuses post-publication. Comparatively to neighbor Nicaragua, the Salvadoran government indirectly referenced the recommendations put forth on the separation between the police and military, extended officer training, response to the protest, and overall decentralization [6]. Nevertheless, El Salvador’s political rigor was limited by its beleaguered and ostensible power. Government institutions lacked credibility, a reality best demonstrated by a continual decrease in voter turnout until 2009, and a general electoral distrust for democratization [7]. Frequent acts of calamity, such as charging the set of a soap opera to purport their conspiracy theories, also did not help the state garner public trust [8].        

To surmise, El Salvador’s transitional justice process has been demanding on victims and on government officials for different reasons. While some good has been made in the legal and human rights spheres, a lot is left to be desired: mainly the recognition of reparations and prosecution of guilty individuals, but also the culpable international actors deliberately excluded by the Commission. Civil society remains engaged, though it will ultimately be the responsibility of all branches of government to enforce any future legislation supporting the Commission’s findings. This analysis considers El Salvador’s response as ‘satisfactory’ given that ‘failure’ would negate the gains and non-effects in the aforementioned fields.

Effect	Accountability	Future measures
Positive	Some officials left office	Legal system integrity Human rights violations (fewer)
No-effect	Prosecution (lack thereof) Reparations (lack thereof)	Systemic political change (lack thereof) Change in handling crime (lack thereof)
Negative

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[1] The Commission on the Truth for El Salvador. From Madness to Hope . United States Institute of Peace, 1993.

[2] "UN to Verify 1994 Elections in El Salvador - Truth Commission Report Issued." UN Chronicle (HeinOnline, 1993).

[3] "Three Years after the Annulment of the Amnesty Law: Victims of the Armed Conflict Defeat a Renewed Attempt at Codifying Impunity in El Salvador, but the Fight Is Far from Over” (Due Process of Law Foundation, 2019).

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Wiebelhaus-Brahm, Eric. “Truth and Peacebuilding in El Salvador.” Essay. In Truth Commissions and Transitional Societies: the Impact on Human Rights and Democracy, 80–103. Routledge. Taylor & Francis Group, 2010.

[7] “Republic of El Salvador Resultados Electorales Electoral Results.” Political Database of the Americas, Georgetown University, 2012.

[8] "Truth in El Salvador." New Statesman & Society Apr 02 1993: 10. ProQuest.

Betancur, Belisario, Reinaldo  F Planchart, and Thomas Buergenthal. “From Madness to Hope: Report of the Commission on the Truth for El Salvador.” New York City: UN Security Council, 1993.

Decreto No. 33.-CREACIÓN DE LA COMISIÓN NACIONAL DE BÚSQUEDA DE PERSONAS ADULTAS DESAPARECIDAS EN EL CONTEXTO DEL CONFLICTO ARMADO DE EL SALVADOR (DECREE No. 33.-CREATION OF THE NATIONAL SEARCH COMMISSION FOR DISAPPEARED ADULTS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE ARMED CONFLICT OF EL SALVADOR). PRESIDENCIA DE LA REPÚBLICA (PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC), https://www.refworld.org.es/pdfid/59d28c8e4.pdf.

El Salvador Human Rights Developments. Human Rights Watch, 1990, www.hrw.org/reports/1990/WR90/AMER.BOU-07.htm. 

“El Salvador: Truth Commission Report.” Youtube, PBS/Societe Radio Canada, 1993, www.youtube.com/watch?v=bI1DHIOYXdA.

Hajek, Danny. “'I Miss Them, Always': A Witness Recounts El Salvador's 1989 Jesuit Massacre.” NPR, 16 Nov. 2019, https://www.npr.org/2019/11/16/774176106/i-miss-them-always-a-witness-recounts-el-salvador-s-1989-jesuit-massacre. 

LEY DE AMNISTÍA GENERAL PARA LA CONSOLIDACIÓN DE LA PAZ: DECRETO Nº 486 de fecha 20 de marzo de 1993 y publicado el 22 de marzo de 1993 (GENERAL AMNESTY LAW FOR THE CONSOLIDATION OF PEACE: DECREE No. 486 dated March 20, 1993 and published on March 22, 1993). LA ASAMBLEA LEGISLATIVA DE LA REPUBLICA DE EL SALVADOR (THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY OF THE REPUBLIC OF EL SALVADOR), 22 Mar. 1993, https://www.acnur.org/fileadmin/Documentos/BDL/2002/1841.pdf. 

“Republic of El Salvador Resultados Electorales Electoral Results.” Political Database of the Americas, Georgetown University, 2012, pdba.georgetown.edu/Elecdata/ElSal/elsal.html. 

"Truth in El Salvador." New Statesman & Society Apr 02 1993: 10. ProQuest. https://www-proquest-com.ezproxy.library.ubc.ca/docview/224388664?OpenUrlRefId=info:xri/sid:summon&accountid=14656.

“UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION IN EL SALVADOR (ONUSAL).” United Nations, United Nations, 2003, peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/past/onusal.htm. 

United Nations. UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION IN EL SALVADOR. Information Technology Section/ Department of Public Information (DPI), United Nations , 2003.

"UN to Verify 1994 Elections in El Salvador - Truth Commission Report Issued." UN Chronicle, vol. 30, no. 2, June 1993, p. 26-28. HeinOnline, https://heinonline-org.ezproxy.library.ubc.ca/HOL/P?h=hein.unl/unchron0030&i=136.“Voluntary Pledges and Commitments.” United Nations General Assembly, 2014, https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/69/376.

Betancur, Belisario, Reinaldo Figueredo Planchart, and Thomas Buergenthal. "From madness to hope: The 12-year war in El Salvador: Report of the Commission on the Truth for El Salvador." UN Security Council (1993) From Madness to Hope: The (1993).

This is the report published by the Truth Commission for El Salvador, it is very detailed and this is the document that gave us our initial understanding of the issue. It provided the background of the conflict, introduced key actors, both domestic and international. It also outlined specific cases addressed by the Committee, the report named individuals responsible for human rights violations and gave recommendations for post-war reconstruction. 

De Soto, Alvaro, and Graciana Del Castillo. “Obstacles to Peacebuilding Revisited.” Global Governance, vol. 22, no. 2, 2016, pp. 209–227. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/44861074. 

This book talks about the new security challenges that lie in UN’s peacekeeping missions, such as the one in El Salvador. Alvaro De Soto is the senior political adviser to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Graciana Del Castillo is senior officer in the office of the secretary general and adjunct associate professor of economics at Columbia University.  Their work is an economic perspective of post-conflict implementation because implementing the ambitious goals set out in the Peace Accord, creation of a Civil Police and transfer of land to former combatants and farmers, require substantial financial costs. The authors argue that El Salvador is an example of the need for an “integrated approach to human security”, where under such an approach, military, political, economic, social, and environmental problems should be addressed coherently. This offers a potential solution to the issues of implementation in El Salvador, as the peace negotiations failed to agree on strategies of socio-economic inequalities. 

“El Salvador.” Overcoming Obstacles to Peace: Local Factors in Nation-Building, by James Dobbins et al., RAND Corporation, 2013, pp. 67–92. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/j.ctt3fgzrv.12. 

This book analyzes barriers posed by the local condition to peacebuilding, it examines how external actors and local leaders in a variety of societies modified around those conditions to promote peace. Chapter Four of this book focuses on post-conflict obstacles experienced by El Salvador, including a failed disintegration process that led to high violent crime rates, economic reforms post-conflict, political reforms (allowing the FMLN to become an official political party) The publisher of this book is RAND corporation, they are a US-based non-profit organization that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. The authors of this book are very well respected experts in their field, James Dobbins is an American diplomat who most recently served as United States Ambassador to the European Union. Laurel Miller is a senior expert at the US Institute of Peace where she focused on constitution-making, rule of law development, and transitional justice. The chapter on El Salvador was effective in demonstrating various barriers faced by the nation post-conflict and helped us understand how experts and officials deal with such barriers to promote peace. 

“El Salvador.” Securing Tyrants or Fostering Reform? U.S. Internal Security Assistance to Repressive and Transitioning Regimes, by Seth G. Jones et al., 1st ed., RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA; Arlington, VA; Pittsburgh, PA, 2006, pp. 23–48. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/mg550osi.11. 

This source is a chapter in the book Securing Tyrants or Fostering Reform? U.S. Internal Security Assistance to Repressive and Transitioning Regimes, the book is a study that examines US assistance to the internal security forces of four conflict and oppressive states: El Salvador, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. The chapter talks about the conflict in El Salvador as having evolved into a proxy war between the US and the Soviet Union. This source zooms out of El Salvador and offers a bigger perspective in the field of political science, in examining why civil conflicts such as El Salvador (and elsewhere in Central Amercas) can be manipulated and aggravated by foreign forces. 

Popkin, Margaret. Peace without justice: Obstacles to building the rule of law in El Salvador. Penn State Press, 2010. 

Margaret Popkin has extensive experience as a human rights advocate in El Salvador during the civil conflict, she also interviewed with a variety of Salvadorans and others involved in the judicial reforms and in negotiations and implementation of the peace accords. In her work, she focuses on the legal culture of El Salvador and documented El Salvador’s peace process as well as judicial reform. She shows convincingly the difficulties in attempting to reform El Salvador’s judiciary. This book is significant because the El Salvadorans themselves have claimed that they have peace without justice. Peace agreement was signed and peace was established, but the issues are reflected in the implementation process where El Salvadorans find themselves still struggling with social and judicial inequalities. 

“UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION IN EL SALVADOR (ONUSAL).” United Nations, United Nations, 2003, peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/past/onusal.htm. 

The ONUSAL was established by the UN in 1991 to verify the implementation of all agreements between the government of El Salvador and the FMLN. This resource is because the implementation of the recommendations (as suggested by the Truth Commission) faced many barriers despite this establishment of the observer mission. Combining this information with the other resources, we pinpoint why the recommendations did not reach its full expectations. It is important to note that the ONUSAL was even invited by the El Salvador government to witness the election in 1993 and the ONUSAL reported directly to the UN Secretary General. They acted as a third party monitoring agent in the post-conflict reconstruction period.

"UN to Verify 1994 Elections in El Salvador - Truth Commission Report Issued." UN Chronicle, vol. 30, no. 2, June 1993, p. 26-28. HeinOnline, https://heinonline-org.ezproxy.library.ubc.ca/HOL/P?h=hein.unl/unchron0030&i=136.

The UN Law Collection was a useful source of archived coverage on El Salvador’s adherence to the Commission’s findings. Since the report was supported by the UN, it committed itself to providing very detailed summaries and articles on various developments. In this case, the 1993 update summarized events from the year up to that point, and in addition, forecasted what was to be expected. This article was most applicable to news surrounding the amnesty bill passed a week after the report’s publishing.     

Wiebelhaus-Brahm, Eric. “Truth and Peacebuilding in El Salvador.” Essay. In Truth Commissions and Transitional Societies: the Impact on Human Rights and Democracy, 80–103. Routledge. Taylor & Francis Group, 2010. https://doi-org.ezproxy.library.ubc.ca/10.4324/9780203862025.

This chapter is part of a greater anthology on truth commissions and their broad implications written by Eric Wielbelhaus-Brahm. The author is a distinguished scholar and consultant focusing on subjects such as human rights, transitional justice, and peace studies. This source was used in conjunction with our own analysis on the consequences and successes of El Salvador’s truth commission. Wielbelhaus-Brahm’s comparative methodology was especially compelling in its ability to provide greater perspective on the desired issues. Overall, it was a conclusive and reliable source that helped bolster our personal claims.

“ACCOUNTABILITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON THE TRUTH FOR EL SALVADOR.” Human Rights Watch, vol. 5, no. 7, 1993, pp. 1-39., https://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/pdfs/e/elsalvdr/elsalv938.pdf.

Aleman, Marcos. “Salvadoran Experts Seeking 400 Bodies At Reputed Massacre Site.” Associated Press News, 19 May 1993, https://apnews.com/article/eea82d57523d07475c9f0c85abe26267. 

Amos, Deborah. “A Trial In Spain Raises Hope For Justice For 1989 Priest Killings In El Salvador.” NPR, 13 Aug. 2020, https://www.npr.org/2020/08/13/900855625/a-court-case-in-spain-raises-hope-for-justice-for-priests-killed-in-el-salvador. 

Brigida, Anna-Cat. “El Calabozo massacre: Remains of six returned 38 years later.” Al Jazeera News, 24 Jan. 2020, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/1/24/el-calabozo-massacre-remains-of-six-returned-38-years-later. 

Brigida, Anna-Cat. “Groups slam new El Salvador law to prosecute civil war crimes.” Al Jazeera News, 27 Feb. 2020, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/2/27/groups-slam-new-el-salvador-law-to-prosecute-civil-war-crimes. 

De Soto, Alvaro, and Graciana Del Castillo. “Obstacles to Peacebuilding Revisited.” Global Governance, vol. 22, no. 2, 2016, pp. 209–227. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/44861074. 

“El Salvador's Civil War Veterans Will Receive Pensions and Social Benefits.” Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador, 2015. https://cispes.org/article/el-salvador%E2%80%99s-civil-war-veterans-will-receive-pensions-and-social-benefits.

“El Salvador.” Overcoming Obstacles to Peace: Local Factors in Nation-Building, by James Dobbins et al., RAND Corporation, 2013, pp. 67–92. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/j.ctt3fgzrv.12. 

“El Salvador: Practice Relating to Rule 150. Reparation.” Customary IHL - 150. Reparation, International Committee of the Red Cross, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_cou_sv_rule150. Accessed 26 Nov. 2020. 

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