The Guatemalan civil war, which began in the 1960’s and ended in 1996, was an internal conflict between leftist guerrilla forces, the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG) and the Guatemalan government. (1) During the conflict, both parties committed human rights violations which resulted in the death of over 200,000 Guatemalans. After the government and the guerrilla forces signed the Agreement on a Firm and Lasting Peace in 1996, Guatemala hosted its first truth commission to begin the process of restorative justice and investigate the human rights violations that had been committed during the war. (2) The Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico (CEH) was established in 1994, and the official time frame of its investigation and ultimate report lasted from February 1997 to February 1999.(3)The CEH conducted hundreds of interviews and provided platforms for victims to provide testimony on their experience within the conflict. Through this, the commission strived to consider the impact of the civil war specifically on the indigenous Mayan population, who suffered extreme amounts of violence at the hands of state and paramilitary forces. 

After the official investigation concluded, the CEH produced a final report which contained an in depth documentation of the conflict and the impact it had on the victims. The final report was an essential facet of the Guatemalan Truth and Reconciliation commission, as it concluded that the state and government institutions had unequivocally committed human rights violations against its citizens, most notably those within Mayan indigenous communities.(4)

(1) Rothenberg, Daniel and Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico (Guatemala). Memory of Silence: The Guatemalan Truth Commission Report. 1st ed. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012.
(2) “Agreement on a Firm and Lasting Peace | UN Peacemaker.” United Nations, United Nations, peacemaker.un.org/guatemala-firmlastingpeace96.https://peacemaker.un.org/guatemala-firmlastingpeace96
(3) Toumschat, Christian. “Clarification Commission in Guatemala.” Human Rights Quarterly, vol. 23, no. 2, 2001, pp. 233–258. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/4489334. Accessed 29 Nov. 2020.
(4) Rothenberg, Daniel and Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico (Guatemala). Memory of Silence: The Guatemalan Truth Commission Report. 1st ed. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. 

The official mandate of the CEH was to “clarify human rights violations related to the thirty-six year internal conflict from 1960 to the United Nation's brokered peace agreement of 1996, and to foster tolerance and preserve memory of the victims”. (1) Harnessing the integral ideals of impartiality and equity, the commission primarily covered issues of violence mandated by the state armed forces (military), specifically against the Mayan population, to ultimately conclude whether acts of genocide had been committed. The commission also considered the role of the URNG guerilla forces, which did not commit violence against Guatemalan civilians at the same level as the military, but still maintained a significant role in the conflict. Finally, the commission considered the issue of government complicity in the conflict, primarily by analyzing the role of state judiciary institutions in the promotion of repression and discrimination. 

The mandate outlined the responsibility of the commission to create an objective report of findings advised by the international human rights framework of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). (2) This report was to fulfill the objective of historical clarification, and also to inform subsequent policy recommendations given by the commission. 

One restrictive measure of the CEH mandate that critics have denounced was the inability of the commission to name specific perpetrators or recommend persecutory action (e.g. authorize subpoenas). This critique posits that the CEH was essentially a comprehensive “ethnography of violence”, with little to no legal or moral implications. (3) Several civil society activists also found the CEH mandate to be unrepresentative as it  “did not require any additional debate or governmental approval … and therefore lacked both an executive decree and a law to ground its mandate.” (4)

(1)“Truth Commission: Guatemala.” United States Institute of Peace, 17 Oct. 2018, www.usip.org/publications/1997/02/truth-commission-guatemala.
(2) FitzGerald, Garret. The Truth Commissions of Guatemala, 2010, projects.iq.harvard.edu/hdsjournal/book/truth-commissions-guatemala.
(3) ibid.
(4) Ictj. Challenging the Conventional: Case Studies - Guatemala, www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/subsites/challenging-conventional-truth-commissions-peace/guatemala.html. 

 

URNG: In 1982 URNG (Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemala) or Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity was formed. As anti-government guerilla forces they operated throughout the 1970’s and 80’s and they occupied territory throughout Guatemala and in the municipalities of Nebaj, Cotzal, and Chajul.(1)
Government: From 1944 to 1954 (known as the “Guatemalan Spring”), President Arevelo and his successor, President Arbenz, passed laws that gave Mayans the right to vote, allowing political parties and labor unions to exist—including the Communist party—and decentralized the government so that mayors of towns would be elected locally, instead of being picked by the national government. These changes largely contributed to the conflict in the region. (2)
Military: The military of Guatemala has been long plagued with turmoil. Instability and fragmentation were frequent themes throughout its history. Supported by the United States to quell the threat of Communism, the military governments of Guatemala were often violent and unjust.(3)
Rebel Groups: Formed in the 1960’s of army dissidents various rebel groups sought to destabilize the region for decades until eventually consolidating into the URNG. These included the Guerilla Army of the Poor, the Revolutionary Organization of Armed People, and and the Rebel Armed Forces.(4)
Mayan Indigenous Peoples and Ladino Peoples: Guatemala has a large indigenous population comprising approximately 50-60% of the population; these include the Garifuna, Xinca, and the descendants of the Maya. An additional 40% of the population of Guatemala are Ladinos. These distinctions are more cultural than racial, as most of the population is mestizo (mixed Spanish/European and Indigenous). (5)
Roman Catholic Church: The Roman Catholic Church is at times heavily influential in Guatemala. It was also frequently targeted in assassinations and kidnappings throughout the ongoing conflict in Guatemala. (6)

1. Michael E. Allison (2016) The Guatemalan National Revolutionary unit: the long collapse, Democratization, 23:6, 1042-1058, DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2016.1159557
2. Armbruster-Sandoval, Ralph. “Guatemala: Eternal War, Eternal Struggle.” Latin American Perspectives, vol. 45, no. 6, Nov. 2018, pp. 165–170, doi:10.1177/0094582X17750155.
3. Steinberg, Michael K., and Matthew J. Taylor. “Public Memory and Political Power in Guatemala's Postconflict Landscape.” Geographical Review, vol. 93, no. 4, 2003, pp. 449–468. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/30033937. Accessed 29 Nov. 2020.
4. Kubota, Yuichi. "Explaining State Violence in the Guatemalan Civil War: Rebel Threat and Counterinsurgency." Latin American Politics and Society 59.3 (2017): 48-71. ProQuest. Web. 29 Nov. 2020.
5. Söchtig, J., Álvarez-Iglesias, V., Mosquera-Miguel, A. et al. Genomic insights on the ethno-history of the Maya and the ‘Ladinos’ from Guatemala. BMC Genomics 16, 131 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1186/s12864-015-1339-1
6. “Religion in Latin America.” Pew Research Center's Religion & Public Life Project, 27 July 2020, www.pewforum.org/2014/11/13/religion-in-latin-america/.

United Nations Secretary General: The UN Secretary General acted as the primary international advisor to the creation, structural organization, and operation of the CEH. With the agreement of all participating parties, the Secretary General appointed the chair of the commission, and provided recommendations on the CEH mandate. (1)

Christian Toumschat: Christian Toumschat is a German law professor from Berlin Humboldt University. Toumschat was the single international actor out of the three appointed commissioners, and filled the role of official chair of the CEH. This position was designed to provide a neutral yet informed stance in regard to the task of writing the final report and subsequent recommendations. (2)

Jean Arnault: Jean Arnault is a French diplomat with years of experience relating to the Guatemalan conflict and subsequent peace processes. Arnault was the head of the United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA), which facilitated a 3 month peacekeeping mission in 1997 aimed at observing the demobilization process which was a key prerequisite to the successful implementation of the later initiatives of the CEH. (3)

International Centre For Human Rights Research  (CIIDH): The CIIDH organization contributed to the data collection efforts of the CEH through the utilization of “Peace Technology”. Throughout the 1990’s, the organization consolidated data on the Guatemalan human rights situation, including research conducted by the press, NGOs, and victims. The CIIDH then organized and entered this information into an accessible database, to be easily referred to by CEH researchers. (4) 

 UNOPS: The United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) provided key administrative services to the CEH. UNOPS handled budgetary matters for the commission, and also facilitated the dissemination of important commission related information. UNOPS also contributed to the accessibility of this information, by providing translations of the summary and recommendation portions of the CEH final report in multiple Mayan languages. (5) 

Inter-American Court of Human Rights: The Inter-American Court of Human Rights is a transnational legal system based in San Jose, Costa Rica. The court contributed to the CEH by filling judicial and financial gaps that Guatemalan justice and reparations systems were not able to comprehensively address. The court formally ruled on 200 cases against the Guatemalan state, in addition to 11 contentious cases. It also facilitated the awarding of close to $8 million dollars in financial reparations to victims and their families. (6)

(1) Truth Commission: Guatemala.” United States Institute of Peace, 17 Oct. 2018, www.usip.org/publications/1997/02/truth-commission-guatemala.
(2) Toumschat, Christian. “Clarification Commission in Guatemala.” Human Rights Quarterly, vol. 23, no. 2, 2001.
(3) Ibid.
(4) “Human Rights Data Analysis Group.” HRDAG, hrdag.org/guatemala/.
(5) Toumschat, Christian. “Clarification Commission in Guatemala.” Human Rights Quarterly, vol. 23, no. 2, 2001.
(6) IHRLC Working Paper Series. “COMPARATIVE COUNTRY STUDIES REGARDING TRUTH, JUSTICE, AND REPARATIONS FOR GROSS HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS BRAZIL, CHILE, AND GUATEMALA.” International Human Rights Law Clinic University California Berkeley , no. 2, 2014. 

Clarity barriers: The official reparations program of the CEH process was the Programa Nacional de Resarcimiento (PNR). In its infancy, the program had several issues regarding a lack of specificity regarding who qualified for reparations, which reparations were appropriate for varying cases, and which specific violations warranted compensation. Since reparations (of financial, material, and symbolic form) were one of the most key aspects of the CEH, the lack of clarity and equitable implementation of the reparations program was a significant barrier to the peace process. In 2005, the Guatemalan government officially revised the program to have a greater degree of specificity regarding the distribution and organization of reparations. (1)

Financial barriers: As outlined by the ICTJ case study on the CEH, a lack of financial security compromised the overall efficacy of the commission, through a variety of organizational and judicial issues. There was a significant gap in domestic funding for the CEH, with international contributions accounting for “more than 90% of commission funds''. Reparations programs illustrated a particularly large discrepancy in international versus domestic funding, as the Inter-American Court awarded up to $25,000 in reparations, while the national PNR scheme typically provided around $5,000 awards. The lack of internal funding is not particularly unusual, given that the Guatemalan government was organizing this scheme in a post-conflict context -- however, the heavy reliance on international aid has led to questions of policy consistency and the long term sustainability of reparations initiatives. (2)

Guatemalan Army's reluctance to cooperate with the provision of documents to CEH: One of the most significant barriers to the CEH came in the form of the Guatemalan Army, who could be categorized as a “spoiler” to the process, as an actor within the formal process that “sought to hinder or undermine conflict settlement”. Several army officials ostensibly strived to hinder the truth seeking aspect of the CEH process, by refusing to provide military records or other related documents to the commission. These documents would not only have been crucial evidence for the prosecution of genocide offenders, but also would have represented a willingness of the army to harness institutional responsibility for the systematic violence perpatrated throughout the conflict. (3) 

Ideological and Political Barriers: Another important barrier to the CEH was the strong criticism the commission received from Guatemala’s elite population. The minority and conservative elite society of Guatemala deeply criticized the report for mainly focusing on the abuses suffered by the indigenous Mayan population. They, who also had suffered from abuses and losses, considered the CEH as part of a left-wing project that undermined the violence that was endured by the Ladino community. However according to the actual historical records, the violence of this internal conflict was mainly perpetrated against the Mayans. More specifically, according to the Center for Justice and Accountability, 83 percent of the victims of the civil war were indigenous Mayans. Scholar Jonathan D. Tepperman states this “reflected the genuinely genocidal nature of the war, which affected Mayans far more than Ladinos”. (4) 

(1) Ictj. Challenging the Conventional: Case Studies - Guatemala, www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/subsites/challenging-conventional-truth-commissions-peace/guatemala.html.
(2) IHRLC Working Paper Series. “COMPARATIVE COUNTRY STUDIES REGARDING TRUTH, JUSTICE, AND REPARATIONS FOR GROSS HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS BRAZIL, CHILE, AND GUATEMALA.” International Human Rights Law Clinic University California Berkeley , no. 2, 2014.
(3) Newman, Edward, and Oliver Richmond. “Peace Building and Spoilers.” Conflict, Security & Development, vol. 6, no. 1, 2006, pp. 101–110., doi:10.1080/14678800600590728.
(4) Crandall, Joanna. “Truth Commissions in Guatemala and Peru: Perpetual Impunity and Transitional Justice Compared.” Journal of Peace, Conflict and Development, no. 4, 2003, doi:10.7246/pcd.0405. 

The CEH was successful in fulfilling its three official objectives: to objectively clarify the human rights violations that had been committed, submit a report containing the findings of what had occurred during the conflict, and create specific recommendations to facilitate long-term peace in the country.(1) However the sustainability of the commission in facilitating lasting peace was limited by several factors such as the CEH’s constraining mandate.(2) One of the most significant constraints was the inability to name specific perpetrators of the violence, or recommend any legal action against them. This has had reverberating consequences for a lasting Guatemalan peace, given that only a small number of military officers have been legally held responsible for their role in committing extensive violence against Mayan communities.The following analysis will further explore the success of CEH in conducting comprehensive research and providing thorough documentation of the conflict. It will also explore the many constraints that problematized the commission’s ability to legally implement many of its recommendations, and explore how additional commissions complemented the work of the CEH towards the ultimate objective of building peace. 

Time is always an integral, delicate, and complex factor to peace processes. The brevity of TRC’s in general are essential to maintaining international and local attention regarding the relevance of the serious issues considered by commissions.(3) In the case of the CEH however, it was also essential to provide enough time for the testimony and claims of Mayan individuals to be comprehensively investigated and highlighted by the commission. CEH chair Christian Toumschat asserts that “the whole undertaking would have been a complete failure if the CEH had told these people, that for a lack of time, it was unable to grant them a hearing”.(4) Under the Oslo Agreement, the CEH was originally allotted a 6 month time frame for the completion of the investigation and final report starting from the conclusion of the Agreement on a Firm and Lasting Peace.(5)  It was almost immediately clear to the commissioners that this time frame, even given the possibility of an additional 6 month extension, was logistically infeasible given the scope of the work to be done. Therefore, the CEH ultimately spent two years completing the necessary work. (6) If success is to be defined by a timeframe that facilitates a concise yet thorough investigation and reporting process, the two year period of the CEH was indeed successful in ensuring the opportunity for affected individuals to meaningfully participate, without extending so long as to become a retroactive initiative. 

This being said, the mere provision of time and certain official platforms for Mayan individuals to voice their experiences, did not necessarily mean that these communities felt fully supported and franchised by the CEH process. In regard to the writing of the CEH mandate and the diplomatic negotiations involved in the 1996 Agreement on the Definitive Ceasefire, several human rights and civic society groups claimed there was a lack of consultation with local communities and advocates in drafting relevant policies. (7) Additionally, many of the indictments facilitated by the CEH (indirectly, as the commission did not explicitly have persecutory powers), presented issues of representation and equity. The narrow legal scope by which the commission defined “gross human rights violations” (e.g. mostly applied to extra-judicial killings) left many affected individuals within Mayan communities feeling neglected by the justice process. 

Peacebuilding literature on the Guatemalan TRC process has highlighted the subsequent Recovery of Historical Memory Project (REMHI), headed by the Catholic Church, as an initiative that filled moral and judicial gaps left by the CEH; thus this commission warrants consideration as an important supplement to the CEH. One of the most significant differences in the operation of REMHI in comparison to the CEH, was its ability to explicitly name perpetrators of state sponsored and guerrilla violence, an action the CEH was restricted by its mandate from doing. (8) The REMHI “pastoral” approach proceeded to do this not under the guise of retribution in the form of public shaming, but instead in recognition that forgiveness, accountability, and justice could be concurrent objectives of the Guatemalan reconciliation process. REMHI, through the cooperation of religiously affiliated organizations, was also able to garner a more significant amount of local participation for its formal processes. 

Given the legal and logistical constraints of the CEH, the REHMI commission was an integral supplement to the Guatemalan truth and reconciliation process. This is not to undermine the various significant contributions made by the CEH, but instead highlights how internationally facilitated commissions can be meaningfully supplemented by more locally integrated organizations, to achieve the ultimate goal of building a sustainable peace. 

(1) Crandall, Joanna. (2003). Truth Commissions in Guatemala and Peru: Perpetual Impunity and Transitional Justice Compared. Journal of Peace, Conflict and Development. 10.7246/pcd.0405. https://www.bradford.ac.uk/library/find-materials/journal-of-peace-conflict-and-development/truth-commission.pdf
(2) FitzGerald, Garret. The Truth Commissions of Guatemala, 2010, projects.iq.harvard.edu/hdsjournal/book/truth-commissions-guatemala. https://projects.iq.harvard.edu/hdsjournal/book/truth-commissions-guatemala
(3) Toumschat, Christian. “Clarification Commission in Guatemala.” Human Rights Quarterly, vol. 23, no. 2, 2001, p. 240.
(4) Ibid. pp. 242.
(5) Ibid. pp. 240.
(6) Ibid. pp. 241.
(7) Ictj. Challenging the Conventional: Case Studies - Guatemala, www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/subsites/challenging-conventional-truth-commissions-peace/guatemala.html.
(8) FitzGerald, Garret. The Truth Commissions of Guatemala, 2010, projects.iq.harvard.edu/hdsjournal/book/truth-commissions-guatemala. 

 

• Rothenberg, Daniel and Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico (Guatemala). Memory of Silence: The Guatemalan Truth Commission Report. 1st ed. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. https://hrdag.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/CEHreport-english.pdf    
• MINUGUA - Background; REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE GROUP OF MILITARY OBSERVERS ATTACHED TO MINUGUA (1994, September 19). Retrieved from https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/minuguabackgr.html
• El Equipo de Redacción. Guatemala, Never Again! Orbis Books, 1999.
• U.S. Embassy Guatemala | 7 February, 2020 | Topics: News. “Joint Statement by the Government of Guatemala and the Government of the U.S.” U.S. Embassy in Guatemala, 8 Feb. 2020, gt.usembassy.gov/joint-statement-by-the-government-of-guatemala-and-the-government-of-the-u-s/. 
• “OGP Civil Society Leaders Statement of Significant Concern on Guatemala.” Open Government Partnership, 12 Mar. 2020, www.opengovpartnership.org/news/ogp-civil-society-leaders-statement-of-significant-concern-on-guatemala/. 
•  “Statement on the Situation in Guatemala.” Regeringskansliet, www.government.se/statements/2017/08/statement-on-the-situation-in-guatemala/. 
• Supreme Court Criminal Division. February 25, 2003. Decision of the Spanish Supreme Court Concerning the Guatemala Genocide Case.
• Doyle, Kate. “The Guatemalan Genocide Case Chronicles: Day 1.” NACLA, nacla.org/node/4474. 

 

1. Crandall, Joanna. (2003). Truth Commissions in Guatemala and Peru: Perpetual Impunity and Transitional Justice Compared. Journal of Peace, Conflict and Development. 10.7246/pcd.0405. https://www.bradford.ac.uk/library/find-materials/journal-of-peace-conflict-and-development/truth-commission.pdf 

In this essay, Joanna Crandall compares the truth commissions of both Guatemala and Peru to examine the success of this peacebuilding process in reconciling conflict in war-torn states and obtaining justice. Specifically, he compares Guatemala’s Historical Clarification Commission to the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commision. Both Guatemala and Peru have been ravaged by violent civil conflict. Guatemala’s civil war resulted in over 200,000 deaths and Peru’s civil war resulted in over 700,000 deaths. Crandall concludes that even though the truth and reconciliation commissions do have value in clarifying what happened; in order to obtain long term reconciliation, perpetrators must be prosecuted and held accountable for their actions.

 2. FitzGerald, Garret. The Truth Commissions of Guatemala, 2010, projects.iq.harvard.edu/hdsjournal/book/truth-commissions-guatemala. 

This article, written by Harvard graduate student Garrett Fitzgerald also juxtaposes two different commissions, but in this case comparing the CEH with another Guatemalan commission: the Recuperación de la Memoria Histórica (REMHI). The article strives to show how differing theoretical interpretations of human rights informed the distinct policies of the two commissions. This source provides a unique perspective, as it considers how the “ecumenical” background of the REMHI led to an interpretation of human rights (and thus the violations of these rights) as defined by Roman Catholic notions of “natural rights”. This was directly compared to the CEH interpretations, which based their policies on the more international human rights framework of the UDHR. The ultimate purpose of the article was to emphasize that despite differences in policy and ideology, the two commissions complemented each other's efforts in the overall objective of the Guatemalan truth and reconciliation process. 

3. García, María Luz. “Translated Justice? The Ixil Maya and the 2013 Trial of José Efraín Ríos Montt for Genocide in Guatemala.” American Anthropologist, vol. 121, no. 2, Mar. 2019, pp. 311–324., doi:10.1111/aman.13230.

In the 2013 trial of José Efraín Ríos Montt for genocide of the Ixil people and crimes against humanity, twelve Ixil-Maya women and one Ixil man testified against Montt about the sexual violence that had occurred during the height of Guatemala’s conflict. The article particularly highlights the central role of language in the processes of justice, politics, and in the courtroom as María Luz details the trial marked by difficulties in communications between the Ixil witnesses and non-Ixil lawyers, judges, and observers. 


4. Guematcha, Emmanuel. “Genocide Against Indigenous Peoples: The Experiences of the Truth Commissions of Canada and Guatemala.” International Indigenous Policy Journal, vol. 10, no. 2, Apr. 2019, pp. 1–23., doi:10.18584/iipj.2019.10.2.6.

Emmanuel Guematcha’s article discusses, questions, and compares the truth commissions of Guatemala and Canada and demonstrates that the specificities of a country, including the context and the perceptions of genocide, influence findings on genocide, and consequently the findings of truth commissions on genocide against Indigenous people may vary. Based on this demonstration, Guematcha ultimately suggests an evolution of international law regarding the crime of genocide to include new elements. In short the article explores how genocide is analyzed and experienced across different societies and suggests an evolution of international law to encompass this variance

5. Oglesby, Elizabeth. “Educating Citizens in Postwar Guatemala: Historical Memory, Genocide, and the Culture of Peace.” Radical History Review, vol. 2007, no. 97, 2007, pp. 77–98., doi:10.1215/01636545-2006-013.


Elizabeth Oglesby’s article examines the public discourse on the remnants of Guatemala’s war and the extent that Guatemalan society has yet to fully assimilate to the experience. The article focuses on the notion of historical memory and how the efforts to disseminate the Guatemalan truth commission’s findings have or haven’t been effective particularly how the civic sector has responded; how teachers, human rights groups, and international institutions have taken up the report in educational projects.

6. Quinn, Joanna R., and Mark Freeman. “Lessons Learned: Practical Lessons Gleaned from inside the Truth Commissions of Guatemala and South Africa.” Human Rights Quarterly, vol. 25, no. 4, 2003, pp. 1117–1149. 

This 2003 article, written by two experts in international law and human rights, juxtaposes the truth commissions of Guatemala and South Africa to elucidate aspects of the two commissions that were both successful, or less so. The analysis of these two commissions contribute meaningfully to the field of truth and reconciliation, as they were both implemented in the 1990s, when TRC’s were a fairly new process, and thus set a precedent for future commissions. Reflections on the structure, mandate, and research methodology of the CEH was especially pertinent to our project, as it illustrated how the objectives and outcomes of the commission not only had reverberating consequences for Guatemalan society, but could also be expanded to inform future commissions in other countries. 

7. Stewart, Stephen Robin Peter. 2019. “More than the Silence of Rifles : Guatemalan Rebel Combatants’ Perspectives on the Eve of Peace.” Electronic Theses and Dissertations (ETDs) 2008+. T, University of British Columbia. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.14288/1.0388202.

In this thesis, Stephen Stewart gathers interviews of thirteen guerrillas from 1997, when he was a journalist reporting on the Guatemalan civil war, the negotiated Peace Accords, and the final demobilization process. The thesis compiles testimonies of guerrilla fighters and documents their experiences fighting as well as their ideologies and motivations for joining the guerrillas. The thesis concludes that the reintegration of guerilla fighters, after years of violent conflict, into the Guatemalan society was quite successful. The thesis recommends that this form of reintegration should have also been made available to more former fighters.

8. Toumschat, Christian. “Clarification Commission in Guatemala.” Human Rights Quarterly, vol. 23, no. 2, 2001, pp. 233–258. 

This 2001 article, written by Christain Toumschat, the chair of the Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico (CEH) provided a retrospective report on the structure, objectives, successes and downfalls of the commission. The source contributes to the broader field of Truth and Reconciliation by providing a historical and political context for the use of truth commissions in general, and then conceptualizing how the Guatemalan CEH specifically fits into this framework. Ultimately, the article drew the conclusion that despite the monumental importance of the commission and its report, the Guatemalan government was not overly receptive to policy recommendations for further action. Toumschat thus suggests that there remained a significant need for government and judicial reform in the country. The article provides a concise overview of the role that the CEH played in the process of peace and reconciliation in Guatemala. However, it is worth noting that this article was published before the conclusion of several related cases that would ultimate place responsibility on military and governmental members for acts of genocide.

Armbruster-Sandoval, Ralph. “Guatemala: Eternal War, Eternal Struggle.” Latin American Perspectives, vol. 45, no. 6, Nov. 2018, pp. 165–170, doi:10.1177/0094582X17750155.

Crandall, Joanna. “Truth Commissions in Guatemala and Peru: Perpetual Impunity and Transitional Justice Compared.” Journal of Peace, Conflict and Development, no. 4, 2003, doi:10.7246/pcd.0405.

“Efrain Rios Montt: Guatemala Ex-Leader Tried for Genocide Dies.” BBC World Latin America News, BBC, 1 Apr. 2018, www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-43611867.

FitzGerald, Garret. The Truth Commissions of Guatemala, 2010, projects.iq.harvard.edu/hdsjournal/book/truth-commissions-guatemala. https://projects.iq.harvard.edu/hdsjournal/book/truth-commissions-guatemala

García, María Luz. “Translated Justice? The Ixil Maya and the 2013 Trial of José Efraín Ríos Montt for Genocide in Guatemala.” American Anthropologist, vol. 121, no. 2, Mar. 2019, pp. 311–324., doi:10.1111/aman.13230.

Gómez, Iván Velásquez. “CICIG | Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs.” United Nations, Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, dppa.un.org/en/mission/cicig.

“Guatemala Commemorates Victims and 15 Year Anniversary of Truth Commission.” NISGUA, 27 Dec. 2019, nisgua.org/guatemala-commemorates-victims-and-15-yr-anniversary-of-truth-commission/.

Guematcha, Emmanuel. “Genocide Against Indigenous Peoples: The Experiences of the Truth Commissions of Canada and Guatemala.” International Indigenous Policy Journal, vol. 10, no. 2, Apr. 2019, pp. 1–23., doi:10.18584/iipj.2019.10.2.6.

Grainger, Sarah. “First Soldier Convicted in Guatemala Disappearances.” Reuters, Thomson Reuters, 4 Dec. 2009, ca.reuters.com/article/idAFTRE5B30MT20091204.

“Human Rights Data Analysis Group.” HRDAG, hrdag.org/guatemala/.

“Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons” The Organization of American States, Twenty-Fourth Regular Session of the General Assembly to the Organization of American States., Sept. 1994, www.oas.org/juridico/english/treaties/a-60.html.

IHRLC Working Paper Series. “COMPARATIVE COUNTRY STUDIES REGARDING TRUTH, JUSTICE, AND REPARATIONS FOR GROSS HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS BRAZIL, CHILE, AND GUATEMALA.” International Human Rights Law Clinic University California Berkeley , no. 2, 2014.

Ictj. Challenging the Conventional: Case Studies - Guatemala, www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/subsites/challenging-conventional-truth-commissions-peace/guatemala.html.

Kemp, Susan. “Guatemala Prosecutes Former President Rios Montt: New Perspectives on Genocide and Domestic Criminal Justice.” Journal of International Criminal Justice, vol. 12, Mar. 2014, doi:10.1093/jicj/mqu002.

Newman, Edward, and Oliver Richmond. “Peace Building and Spoilers.” Conflict, Security & Development, vol. 6, no. 1, 2006, pp. 101–110., doi:10.1080/14678800600590728.

Kubota, Yuichi. "Explaining State Violence in the Guatemalan Civil War: Rebel Threat and Counterinsurgency." Latin American Politics and Society 59.3 (2017): 48-71. ProQuest. Web. 29 Nov. 2020.

Michael E. Allison (2016) The Guatemalan National Revolutionary unit: the long collapse, Democratization, 23:6, 1042-1058, DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2016.1159557

Oglesby, Elizabeth. “Educating Citizens in Postwar Guatemala: Historical Memory, Genocide, and the Culture of Peace.” Radical History Review, vol. 2007, no. 97, 2007, pp. 77–98., doi:10.1215/01636545-2006-013.

Quinn, Joanna R., and Mark Freeman. “Lessons Learned: Practical Lessons Gleaned from inside the Truth Commissions of Guatemala and South Africa.” Human Rights Quarterly, vol. 25, no. 4, 2003, pp. 1117–1149.

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