Lebanon

• Come in with the stance with the willingness to end the 15-year civil war while maintaining sovereignty in the nation
• Wanted the full removal of Syrian and Lebanese military troops from Lebanon
• Included the surviving members of Lebanon’s 1972 parliament, fathered by Parliament Speaker President Hussein El-Husseini
• Lebanon was focused on political reform, especially in the abolishment of political sectarianism. There are currently 17 different sects in Lebanon and equality between Maronite Christians and Muslims was a big reason for this agreement as Maronite’s had more representation in parliament.

Syria

• “Syria, which is eager for Lebanon's security, independence, and unity and for harmony among its citizens, should not permit any act that poses a threat to Lebanon's security, independence, and sovereignty.” (Taif)
• Conflict of interest when it comes to giving Lebanon its freedom and sovereignty. Syria believed their militia presence in Lebanon provided necessary and positive influence in the country, therefore they did not want to withdraw fully. As a member in the negotiations overlooking the Taif agreement, Syria acted as a spoiler and prevented a direct date for full withdrawal being negotiated and therefore took their time to remove their presence from the country.
• Supporter in ending the civil war as Syria’s military was heavily involved during the conflict in the country and was therefore tying up many resources in trying to provide Syria with security
• Thought of themselves as a peacekeeper rather than a spoiler

Arab League Mediation Committee

Morocco

• An important actor in pushing for the equality of all Lebanese people
• Expressed interest in abolishing Political sectarianism and making a more balanced legislative assembly

Algeria

• Stood with Lebanon and Syria that Hezbollah was a terrorist organization

Saudi Arabia

• The host country for the signing and final agreement of the accord in the city of Taif, Saudi Arabia
• King of Saudi Arabia signed country into the Arab League Mediation Committee

Non-Arab League Actors

United States of America (USA)

• Considered an important ally for Lebanon during the negotiations. Lebanon believed the US could help provide the security and defense it needed to achieve liberation and freedom as well as sovereignty.
• Wanted Israel to withdraw from south Lebanon through the use of inter
• March 19, 1978: The United Nations Security Council adopts Resolution 425, sponsored by the United States which asked for the withdrawal of Israel from South Lebanon and for the UN to establish a 4,000-strong UN peacekeeping force in South Lebanon.
  The force is termed the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon. Its original mandate was for six months. The force is still in Lebanon today.
• Played a neutral role but ultimately became a defender of Lebanese president at the time, Amine Gemayel

Hezbollah

• The Taif agreement led to a stronger Syrian presence in Lebanon, an important ally for Hezbollah empowering the organization even further
• Wanted Lebanon to achieve their sovereignty and freedom. They fought in Lebanon against Israeli based groups
• Taif agreement allowed Hezbollah to become more than just a movement, they grew to become an important non-state actor

United Nations

• Provided Peacekeeping troops to Lebanon
• Opposed to Syria’s influence in Lebanon as they pointed out that Syria was major power-broker for Lebanon and they are overstaying in the country whilst using the Taif accord as an excuse. However, Syrian presence in Lebanon, invited by the government in Beirut at the outbreak of the civil war, was legitimized by the Taif agreement and supported by the Arab League, and the agreement also committed Syria to ensure Lebanon's national security before it could pull out its troops.

Peace Processes Outlook

The Taif accord/agreement in 1989 between Lebanon and Syria can be viewed as a moment where a hurting stalemate was the driver in pushing the talks to a final agreement. However, the inability to incorporate multi-track diplomacy in the negotiations while dealing with the presence of spoilers made the impact of the agreement minimal and a failure. Among the many political reforms, ultimately the agreement set about to accomplish two major factors; end the Lebanese civil war and abolish political sectarianism while allowing Lebanon to maintain sovereignty and identity. Over the course of 15 years, the Lebanese civil-war had killed more than “150,000 people and left another 300,000 wounded”[1] and also displaced millions of other Lebanese citizens. After 15 years of combat, there was mutual interest in ending the fighting as there was an increase in intolerance for violence. In addition, the Lebanese government determined that minimizing internal conflict in their country by promoting anti-sectarian tactics like equaling Christian and Muslim representation in political office rather than the Christian dominated one they had previously would lead to a less oppressive and structurally sound political system that would benefit all citizens.

Spoilers

Lebanon also suffered from spoilers during the negotiations. The strong military presences of Syria and Israel in Lebanon even post-civil war made the idea of sovereignty tough to achieve and underdeveloped the process that the Taif agreement set out to accomplish. While they did not necessarily prevent anything from being agreed on in the accord, the removal of troops from Lebanon from both countries was a slow process and dragged on. For example, On January 14, 1985, the “Israeli Cabinet voted to completely withdraw its troops from Lebanon” but they left soldiers in southern Lebanon to “control 325 square feet” [2] and ensure a safety guard. In addition, the presence of Syria at the negotiations proved to be cumbersome, as they believed they had an agreement to continue their presence in Lebanon, rather than withdrawing themselves from the country.

Political Sectarianism

Furthermore, the inability to deal with political sectarianism right away led to a paralysis of the government. A country like Lebanon who already suffers from a fragile political structure, underwent a 29-month absence of a president, leaving the country in even more turmoil. In addition, the turmoil of surrounding countries such as Syria and Israel have directly affected the domestic affairs of the Lebanese government leaving it difficult for Lebanon to claim and assert their sovereignty as a free, independent state.

Multi-Track Diplomacy

The outcome of the Taif agreement showcases how important multi-track diplomacy is in peacebuilding negotiations. Without all three levels, negotiations are often not completed successfully. In this case, track 1 negotiations took precedent with high elite actors, specifically, 58 out of the 62 political activists voted in favour of this agreement. While the actors were equal in Christian and Muslim representation, the impact of eliminating religious sectarianism did not transfer into other sectors of the agreement, such as “public jobs, the judiciary, the military, security, public, and joint institutions” [3] which was stated in the Taif Accord. The idea of abolishing sectarianism is great on the surface and provides a cosmetic change to the visual structure of Lebanon’s government, nevertheless, traditional sectarian practices stayed at the core of their system.

Endnotes:

1. "Introduction To Principles Of Negotiation: Part III Taif Agreement." Delma.io. N. p., 2018.

Web. 24 Mar. 2018.

2. Saseen, Sandra M. “The Taif Accord and Lebanon’s Struggle to Regain its Sovereignty”

American University International Law Review, vol. 6. (1990)

3. “Taif Accord.” Peacemaker.un.org. N. p., 2018. Web. 23 Mar. 2018.

Introduction to Principles of Negotiation: Part III Taif Agreement (2016)

http://delma.io/en/draft/introduction-to-principles-of-negotiation-part-iii-taif-agreement

Taif Accord (1989)

https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/LB_891022_Taif%20Accords.pdf

Timeline of Events

http://www.mtholyoke.edu/~hhrobert/timline.html

Timeline of the Lebanese Civil War, 1975-1990

https://www.thoughtco.com/timeline-of-the-lebanese-civil-war-2353188

Rosiny, Stephan. "A Quarter Century of 'Transitory Power-Sharing'. Lebanon's Unfulfilled Ta'if Agreement of 1989 Revisited." Civil Wars, vol. 17, no. 4, 2015, pp. 485.

Stephan Rosiny’s article touches on the importance of power-sharing and how multi-sectarian countries like Lebanon. He suggests transitory-power sharing arrangement as a theory to manage conflicts that erupted in these countries. It presents several provisions of this agreement that adhere to three different approaches of how to deal with such conflicts: the consociational and the centripetal models of power-sharing as well as the integrationist paradigm. It thereby seeks to develop a theoretical argument about chances and risks of transitory power-sharing in deeply divided societies and derives some general lessons for managing conflicts in the Middle East.

Geukjian, Ohannes. "From Positive Neutrality to Partisanship: How and Why the Armenian Political Parties Took Sides in Lebanese Politics in the Post-Taif Period (1989-Present)." Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 45, no. 5, 2009, pp. 739-767.

Following the Taif agreement, the abolishment of political sectarianism was a goal of the document. Ohannes Geukjian examines Armenian religious sect in Lebanon and their post-Taif agreement. All parties had to abandon the positive neutrality. However, the Armenian parties were not united over the goal of maintaining the Armenian bloc inside parliament. As they chose different policies to pursue communal interests they took sides with the ruling majority and the anti-government opposition. The Armenians were criticized by some Christian politicians for their partisanship and were expected to maintain their traditional neutrality in Lebanese politics. It is very likely that the Armenians will return to their neutral policy and support the President and the government once their group rights are protected. Something like this would be important to analyze because the failure to abolish sectarianism would leave the Taif agreement without much value.

Krayem, Hassan. "The Lebanese civil war and the Taif Agreement." Conflict resolution in the Arab world: Selected essays (1997): 411-436.

This article by Hasan examines the deficiency of a democratic system that the Lebanese held. While democracy tries to account for equal opportunities for citizens as well as political accountability and political responsibility of officials and institutions were lacking. Lebanon had and still maintains a confessional system based on a formula allocating political and administrative functions to the major sects. This article is important because it shows how an unstable democracy like Lebanon’s post-Taif, leads to conflict.

Salem, Paul. “The Future of Lebanon.” Foreign Affairs, vol. 85, no. 6, 2006, pp. 13–22. JSTOR.

Paul Salem takes a systematic and structural look at the historic events of Lebanon and what could become from the country of them. This article amplifies important actors and events during the pre and post civil war to give a more dynamic look at the current situation in Lebanon. He does a good job in bringing in political party Hezbollah who holds significant influence in the region now especially since they have increased their presence as an actor.

Gaub, Florence. "Multi‐Ethnic Armies in the Aftermath of Civil War: Lessons Learned from Lebanon." Defence Studies 7.1 (2007): 5-20.

Florence Gaub, author of “Multi‐Ethnic Armies in the Aftermath of Civil War: Lessons Learned from Lebanon” examines how countries that have multi-ethnic armies usually suffer from negative downfalls following a civil war. However, through his research, it seems that a country like Lebanon who went through an army reform after the Taif agreement noticed a successful restructuring. An article like this is important for understanding said goals of the Taif Agreement, especially the aspect of abolishing sectarianism promoting equality.

Saseen, Sandra M. “The Taif Accord and Lebanon’s Struggle to Regain its Sovereignty” American University International Law Review, vol. 6. (1990)

Sandra Saseen examines the relationship between Lebanon and the effects that occupying countries Syria and Israel have on its sovereignty and power relations. Saseen talks about how Lebanon is being used as a launchpad by other countries to reach their goals and aims. She also explains how the external dimensions of the crisis are the most important and the most pressing; foreign militaries have occupied Lebanon and foreign nations have interfered in Lebanese internal political affairs. It is critical to Lebanon's future political stability that foreign nations refrain from intervention in Lebanon's domestic affairs. This article ties in well to how Syria and Lebanese influence played a role in the negotiations of the Taif. Often acting as a spoiler and delaying the details of the agreement to come to fruition.

Wantchekon, Leonard. "Credible Power-Sharing Agreements: Theory with Evidence from South Africa and Lebanon." Constitutional Political Economy, vol. 11, no. 4, 2000, pp. 339-352.

Leonard Wantchekon interprets a model which exemplifies the structure of credible post-conflict power-sharing agreements. He specifically examines a case study on Lebanon and South Africa and shows the ways in which power-sharing is crucial in order to maintain a status quo within a democracy. He argues that agreements need to first reconstruct the coercive institutions of the state through the stability of negotiations in settlements of civil wars. This article articulates that the Lebanese Civil war was not necessarily generated by the lack of power-sharing but rather an unfair arrangement among the religious groups.

Makdisi, Samir, and Marcus Marktanner. "Trapped by consociationalism: The case of Lebanon." Topics in Middle Eastern and North African Economies 11 (2009).

This article by Economists Samir Makdisi and Marcus Marktanner portray Lebanon’s current consociational democracy has failed to prevent the outbreak of a long-lasting civil conflict and periodic political crises. They outline that this consociational democracy has resulted in vertical and horizontal inequality. This is an important aspect to consider as drawing the connection between economic status and political structure can often tell a lot about the power relations and sustainability of a government. In this case, Makdisi and Marktanner determine that this inequality is a root cause of armed conflict in Lebanon, whilst claiming that a move to a full fledged democracy will lead to less conflict.

Hudson, Michael C. "lebanon After Ta'if: Another Reform Opportunity Lost?" Arab Studies Quarterly, vol. 21, no. 1, 1999, pp. 27-40.

In this article Michael Hudson examines the ways in which the Taif accord has proven to be a lost opportunity for reform within Lebanon. He articulates and provides insight into where the accord could have been successful and outlines where the accord lacks when trying to create a reform. He argues that even after the Taif, Lebanon has continued to suffer from the imbalance of political power which needs a stronger political reform to ensure cross-confessional support amongst all political parties. He also highlights the ways how the Taif took the wrong approach to the peacemaking process.

Abdallah, Ghassan. “Lebanon's Political System: An Analysis of the Taif Accord,” ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, 2003.

In this Article, Ghassan Abdallah summarizes the outcome of the Taif Accord and highlights the importance of the characteristics of the Lebanese political system. More specifically, it features the variables that affect democratic development and the stabilization of societies. Abdallah argues that although the Accord establishes and outlines reforms of the political system, they are yet to be fully implemented. He proposes the importance of freer elections in order to fully implement the agreements from the Accord. This critique of the political system is crucial to consider when identifying the reasons why the Accord failed and how more reforms are needed to further succeed politically within the Lebanese system.

"25 Years Of Taif." Middle East Eye. N. p., 2018. Web. 27 Mar. 2018. http://www.middleeasteye.net/essays/25-years-taif-1817997266

"A Look At The Taif Accord." Aljazeera.com. N. p., 2005. Web. 27 Mar. 2018 .www.aljazeera.com/archive/2005/03/2008410135815459954.html.

"AUB: The Lebanese Civil War And The Taif Agreement." Ddc.aub.edu.lb. N. p., 2018. Web. 27 Mar. 2018. http://ddc.aub.edu.lb/projects/pspa/conflict-resolution.html

Bahout, Joseph. "The Unraveling Of Lebanon’S Taif Agreement: Limits Of Sect-Based Power Sharing." Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. N. p., 2018. Web. 27 Mar. 2018. http://carnegieendowment.org/2016/05/16/unraveling-of-lebanon-s-taif-agreement-limits-of-sect-based-power-sharing-pub-63571

"Introduction To Principles Of Negotiation: Part III Taif Agreement." Delma.io. N. p., 2018. Web. 24 Mar. 2018. http://delma.io/en/draft/introduction-to-principles-of-negotiation-part-iii-taif-agreement

"It's Been 25 Years Since One Of The Middle East's Most Consequential Peace Agreements." Business Insider. N. p., 2018. Web. 27 Mar. 2018. http://www.businessinsider.com/its-been-25-years-since-the-taif-agreement-2014-11

"Lebanese Civil War Facts, Information, Pictures | Encyclopedia.Com Articles About Lebanese Civil War." Encyclopedia.com. N. p., 2018. Web. 27 Mar. 2018. https://www.encyclopedia.com/social-sciences-and-law/sociology-and-social-reform/sociology-general-terms-and-concepts/lebanese#A

“Taif Accord.” Peacemaker.un.org. N. p., 2018. Web. 27 Mar. 2018. https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/LB_891022_Taif%20Accords.pdf

"Timeline Of The Lebanese Civil War From 1975-1990." ThoughtCo. N. p., 2018. Web. 27 Mar. 2018.https://www.thoughtco.com/timeline-of-the-lebanese-civil-war-2353188

"Timeline." Mtholyoke.edu. N. p., 2018. Web. 27 Mar. 2018. http://www.mtholyoke.edu/~hhrobert/timline.html

"Why Lebanon Is Fractured By The Conflicts In The Middle East." YouTube. N. p., 2018. Web. 27 Mar. 2018. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i_w3v6t3rjY