On August 18, 2003, the Liberian government, rebels, and political parties signed the Accra Comprehensive Peace Agreement to officially conclude the Second Liberian Civil War. The agreement was signed in Accra, Ghana. It was created after vigorous back-door negotiations, which commenced earlier on June 4 in Akosombo, Ghana, and the signing of a ceasefire agreement on June 17. The negotiations and subsequent agreement committed the signatories to an immediate ceasefire, cantonment, disarmament, demobilization. In addition, the negotiations also addressed long-term issues of rehabilitation and reintegration; security sector reform; release of prisoners and abductees; human rights; security guarantees for humanitarian activities; women and children rights; post-conflict rehabilitation and reconstruction programme etc. Charles Taylor was forced to leave Liberia as part of the peace settlement and was later brought to the Special Court for Sierra Leone. The warring parties, opposition parties, and civil society groups agreed to share ministerial portfolios and employment opportunities in the cabinet and parliament and elections were to be held no later than 2005. [1]

Issue	Key Issues of Negotiation and Subsequent Implementation
Ceasefire (as discussed Article II)	Negotiation: The Parties called on the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to establish a Multinational Force to be deployed as an Interposition Force in Liberia, to secure the ceasefire, and create a zone of separation between the belligerent forces and thus provide a safe corridor for the delivery of humanitarian assistance and free movement of persons. The Joint Monitoring Committee (JMC), established under the terms of the Ceasefire Agreement and composed of representatives of ECOWAS, the UN, AU, ICGL, and Parties to the Ceasefire Agreement, supervised and monitored the implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement. In addition, they also assumed the responsibilities to resolve potential disputes concerning implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement, which included the investigation of any alleged violation and also recommend remedial action for confirmed ceasefire violations. Implementation: the ceasefire was partly implemented in 2004, with sporadic violations by actors against local civilians. By 2005, the ceasefire was fully implemented and respected.
Disarmament (as discussed in Article VI)	Negotiations: The Political Parties agreed on the need for the deployment of an International Stabilization Force (ISF) to ensure the prompt and efficient implementation of a national process of cantonment, disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation, and reintegration. The ISF conducted the disarmament of all combatants of the Parties including paramilitary groups. The process was as follows: following disengagement, all forces had to withdraw from combat positions to cantonment locations in accordance with the withdrawal and cantonment plan, and such plan was published by the ISF and the National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration (NCDDRR) within the first 30 days. Subsequently, all arms and ammunition were placed under constant surveillance by the ISF. Implementation: the processes of cantonment, disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation achieved only minimum and intermediate implementation from 2003-2008. It was considered fully implemented in 2009 when 103,019 of the 101,495 combatants were accounted and disarmed.
Truth, reconciliation, rehabilitation, and reintegration mechanism (as discussed in Article XIII	Negotiations: A Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was established to provide a forum to issues of impunity, as well as an opportunity for both the victims and perpetrators of human rights violations to share their experiences, in order to get a clear picture of the past to facilitate genuine healing and reconciliation. In the spirit of national reconciliation, the Commission dealt not with the root causes of the crises in Liberia, including human rights violations, but rather recommend measures to be taken for the rehabilitation of victims of human rights violations. Membership of the Commission was drawn from a cross-section of Liberian society. Implementation: the processes of truth, reconciliation, rehabilitation, and reintegration were partially implemented in 2004, as the TRC was being set up and the Act was being drafted. In 2005, the TRC Draft Act was passed and in 2006, the president formally inaugurated the TRC. The TRC was mandated to investigate rights abuses and killings from 1979 until 2003.
Release of prisoners and abductees	The Parties involved agreed to unconditionally release all political prisoners and prisoners of war, including non-combatants and abductees. Relevant information regarding their prisoners of war, abductees or detained persons were provided to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and other relevant national and international agencies for verification purposes. These agencies were then expected to give the necessary assistance to the released persons, including relocation to any part of Liberia. Implementation: all prisoners and abductees were released in 2003.
Human rights (as discussed in Article XII)	The Parties agreed that the basic civil and political rights enunciated in the Declaration and Principles on Human Rights adopted by the United Nations, African Union, and ECOWAS, in particular, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, and as contained in the Laws of Liberia, shall be fully guaranteed and respected within Liberia. The Parties also agreed on the need for the establishment of an Independent National Commission on Human Rights (INCHR), which would monitor compliance with the basic rights guaranteed in the present Peace Agreement as well as promote human rights education throughout the various sectors of Liberian society, including schools, the media, the police and the military. Implementation: There was no significant evidence of implementation until September 2010, when the parliament finally established the Independent National Human Rights Commission after a substantial delay through Information Freedom Act of 2010. The Commissioners were confirmed by the Senate in September 2010.
Women’s rights (as discussed in Article XXVIII and XXXI)	Negotiation: The Parties agreed to reflect national and gender balance in all elective and non-elective appointments within the National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL). The NTGL accorded particular attention to the issue of the rehabilitation of vulnerable groups or war victims (children, women, the elderly and the disabled) within Liberia, who have been severely affected by the conflict in Liberia. The NTGL also agreed to try and maintain gender balance in the implementation of programs for national rehabilitation, reconstruction and development, for the moral, social and physical reconstruction of Liberia in the post-conflict period. Implementation: Women’s rights as discussed was barely implemented in the subsequent years. In 2009, President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf unveiled the new Liberia National Gender Policy focused on opening opportunities in employment, compensation, land ownership, credit, literacy, and access to justice for women, but the implementation of this policy has not been evaluated.
Children’s rights	Negotiation: In addition to the aforementioned focus on rehabilitation of vulnerable groups, Parties agreed to mobilize resources with the assistance of the International Community, especially in cooperation with the Office of the U.N. Special Representative for Children in Armed Conflict, UNICEF, the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child and other relevant agencies, to address children’s demobilization and reintegration needs.

Source: Peace Accord Matrix. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame. [2]

The mediator for the talks was General Abdulsalami Abubakar, a former head of state of Nigeria. The talks were held under the auspices of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

Primary Negotiators

Government of Liberia

Ceasefire: [3]

• Charles Taylor would only consider stepping down once Taylor, other government leaders, and military commanders had been given international guarantees about their security.
• In response to the demand of resignation within 10 days of a ceasefire agreement, the government initially refused and said Taylor should stay in power until January.

Power sharing transitional government: [4]

• Taylor’s government demanded a constitutional transition.
• A constitutional transition would mean that Taylor’s Vice-President Moses Blah would take over the transitional government.

Amnesty: [5]

• Demanded amnesty for any actions committed during the civil war.
• Taylor attempted to pass an act that would grant immunity for all persons who committed crimes or acts during the civil war, although it was not legitimately passed.

Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and Model for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL)

The single issue the rebel groups would not compromise on was the removal and departure of Charles Taylor.

Ceasefire: [6]

• LURD and MODEL demanded that any ceasefire agreement would have to require Charles Taylor’s resignation and the establishment of a new broad-based government of national unity within 10 days.
• The rebels demanded that a U.S. or Western-led intervention force should monitor the ceasefire, rather than a West African or ECOWAS force.

Power sharing transitional government: [7]

• The rebel groups wanted President Taylor excluded from the transitional government and refused the proposal that Vice-President Moses Blah would take over the transitional government.  
• LURD and MODEL wanted to be included in the transitional government. The rebel forces had refused to sign one version of the peace agreement because it excluded LURD from top government positions.
• LURD and MODEL demanded that an interim president should be selected from political parties and civil society groups that did not partake in the conflict. LURD and MODEL should also hold two vice-presidential positions.

Amnesty: [8]

• Rebel factions initially demanded a tribunal for war crimes for justice.
• This demand was not strong because the rebel groups could also be accused of war crimes.

Constitutional reform: [9]

• LURD proposed the establishment of a commission to review the constitution, particularly in relation to presidential powers.

Signatories

Political Parties

• All-Liberian Coalition Party
• Free Democratic Party
• Liberian Action Party
• Unity Party
• All-Liberian Coalition Party
• True Whig Party
• Liberian People's Party
• National Patriotic Party
• National Reformation Party
• Labor Party
• Liberia Unification Party
• People's Democratic Party
• National Democratic Party
• Reformation Alliance Party
• United People's Party
• Liberia National Union
• Equal Rights Party
• Progressive Peoples Party
• The New Deal Movement

*18 political parties attended the peace negotiations. However, there is a gap in literature regarding their official positions. Some sources have suggested that about half of the parties were created by the Taylor government leading up to the peace talks.

International Actors

International Contact Group of Liberia (composed of members of the UN, ECOWAS, AU, World Bank, US, Ghana, Nigeria, UK, Spain, and Sweden)

Ceasefire: [10]

• Urged the government of Liberia and LURD to enter into a ceasefire immediately and without any preconditions.
• Called on the Security Council to authorize a monitoring mechanism for the ceasefire.

Elections: [11]

• Urged the government to create the conditions required for a free and fair election.
• In particular, they called for a ceasefire, security, a process of reconciliation, electoral reform, and respect for human rights before free and fair elections are possible.

U.S. Representatives specifically

Transitional government: [12]

• Held the firm belief that no faction representatives should hold positions in the transitional government.
• The initial draft of the peace agreement reflected this position.

Official Observers: Civil Society Leaders

Mano River Women’s Peace Network

All Components of new Liberian government: [13]

• Called for the inclusion of women within the executive, legislative, and judiciary structures.
• Called for 50% representation of women in transitional leadership.

Peace and Post-Conflict Processes: [14]

• Called for the group’s participation in the DDR process and for the inclusion of women in rehabilitation, reconstruction, and redevelopment process.
• Demanded more participation in ongoing peace processes, including being made official delegates (rather than observers) and have voting rights.

*The Inter-Religious Committee in Liberia, the Liberian Bar Association, and Members of the Liberian diaspora also attended the peace negotiations. The civil society actors involved in the talks likely had a significant role following the negotiation of the ceasefire. However, there is a gap in literature regarding their positions in the talks. For more information, see: Franzisca Zanker [15].

Due to the extensive nature of the peace agreement and vast involvement of the main warring parties and important representatives, it seems that there were no important actors that were excluded from the peace talks.

Our research team considers the peace talks and negotiations of the Accra Comprehensive Peace Agreement between parties involved in the Second Liberian Civil War to be relatively successful. The ‘success’ of this peace talk is based on the evaluation of the negotiated topics/issues and the process of implementation. To highlight the overall success, we will look at both the benefits and concerns with the Accra Peace agreement in general, such as its inclusion of a wide range of actors involved in the conflict, the problems with the power-sharing article, and the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commision.

The peace talks included a range of actors from civil society in both the negotiations and peacebuilding process. In particular, the Mano River Women’s Peace Network was influential in the negotiations while other women placed pressure from outside of the formal talks. For example, the Liberian Peace-building Network mobilized Liberian women living in refugee camps to protest outside of the conference room in Ghana [16]. Furthermore, civil society actors received formal roles in the transitional government. For example, seven seats were reserved for civil society groups in the legislative assembly [17]. The ministries of national security, education, gender and development, information, rural development, and youth and sports were also entrusted to civil society representatives  [18].

Furthermore, the peace talks led to the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) as a form of restorative justice following the mass abuses of human rights. Notably, Liberia’s TRC was the first TRC to include its diaspora community extensively, to investigate economic crimes as a principal source of conflict, and to provide a comprehensive mapping of human rights violations [19]. However, the TRC is also criticized for its lack of funding, inadequate staff and technical support, and the government’s lack of follow through on the recommendations [20].

A section of the peace agreement that has been critiqued is that pertaining to the power-sharing of different sectors between the respective actors. Within the agreement that the parties signed, it included dividing major public sectors between the major warring groups: LURD got justice, transport, labor, and finance etc. MODEL was given commerce, foreign affairs, mines, and energy etc, while the remnants of the Taylor government were tasked with health and social welfare, internal affairs etc. The problem with this section in the agreement is that instead of incentivizing cooperation between the previous warring factions, it divided key institutions and left avenues for the potential to “ siphon off state resources and thereby fund whatever they pleased” [21]. Another way to address this disparity is to share the authoritative power between other levels of government besides the three major warring parties. This would mitigate the potential for abusing power and also empower the local citizens to be active participants in the process, making for a more stable model for long-term peace. It could also relieve some “local-based ethnic disputes” that fueled the civil war on a grassroots level [22].

The peace talks also led to an agreement on disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) to help with post-conflict reconstruction. However, the overall effectiveness of Liberia’s DDR program is debated. There are mixed feelings among ex-combatants regarding the effectiveness of the reintegration and rehabilitation elements of the DDR program [23]. Meanwhile, the disarmament and demobilization were generally viewed favourably, particularly the cash for arms program and the UN’s presence [24]. The UN’s presence also highlights the significant role that international actors played in both the short-term conflict resolution and long-term peacebuilding process. In particular, international actors helped to promote an environment conducive to deeper structural reforms and to conditions that would allow for  free and fair elections [25].

“The Accra Comprehensive Peace Agreement,” Accra, Ghana, August 18, 2003. Retrieved from:
https://www.peacemaker.un.org/liberia-peaceagreementlurdmodel2003

“Agreement on Ceasefire and Cessation of Hostilities,” Accra, Ghana, June 17, 2003. Retrieved from:
https://www.peacemaker.un.org/liberia-ceasefire2003

“The Golden Tulip Declaration of Liberian Women Attending the Peace Talks in Accra,” Accra Ghana, March 15, 2003. Retrieved from:
http://www.peacewomen.org/sites/default/files/rep_goldentulipdeclarationliberianwomenpeacetalks_representvariouslibwomensorg_2003_0.pdf

“‘No to War!’ Statement by H.E. President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf at Commemoration of the 10th Anniversary of the Signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement,” Monrovia, Liberia, August 19, 2013. Retrieved from:
http://www.emansion.gov.lr/doc/20130819_President_Sirleafs_Statement_Decade_Peace_Ceremony_1.pdf

Republic of Liberia Truth and Reconciliation Commission. “Volume II: Consolidated Final Report,” Monrovia, Liberia, June 30, 2009. Retrieved from:
https://web.archive.org/web/20170515044651/http://trcofliberia.org:80/reports/final-report

United Nations Security Council. “Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on Liberia,” September 11, 2003. Retrieved from:
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2003/875

The Guardian. “ Liberian rebels sign peace deal,” August 19, 2003. Retrieved from:
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/aug/19/westafrica

Peace Accords Matrix. “Accra Peace Agreement,” August 18, 2003. Retrieved from:
https://www.peaceaccords.nd.edu/accord/accra-peace-agreement

Atkinson, Philippa. "Liberal Interventionism in Liberia: Towards a Tentatively just Approach?: Analysis." Conflict, Security & Development, vol. 8, no. 1, 2008, pp. 15-45.

This paper critically evaluates the role of the international community in Liberia’s conflict resolution phase and post-conflict phase. Philippa Atkinson begins by evaluating the liberal peace agenda and whether the international community’s intervention was justified. Next, Atkinson analyzes of the strengths and weaknesses of the international community’s intervention. This section is particularly useful because it provides a balanced overview of the international community’s impact. The paper concludes that the international community did indeed play a substantial role in longer-term peace processes, despite the international community’s shortcomings. Overall, this paper is useful in understanding the supportive role that international actors play in the peacebuilding process.

Debusscher, Petra, and Maria Martin de Almagro. "Post-Conflict Women's Movements in Turmoil: The Challenges of Success in Liberia in the 2005-Aftermath." The Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 54, no. 2, 2016, pp. 293-316.

This paper reviews the role of Liberian women’s advocacy in peacebuilding. First, the authors review the overall literature on women’s advocacy in conflict settings. The review helps to put the Liberian women’s advocacy in the context of the challenges facing women in peacebuilding. The authors then provide a short history of the Liberian women’s movement during the conflict and peace negotiations. This section is particularly useful in understanding how women were influential as actors both inside and outside of the formal Accra talks. Following this discussion, the authors seek to understand why the current women’s movement is weakening in post-conflict Liberia. In particular, the authors addressed this question by conducting interviews with gender activists involved in NGOs and government institutions. Overall, the authors provide a useful overview of the role and challenges of women’s advocacy. The authors suggest that there are important lessons to learn from the case of Liberia because civil society advocacy is essential for post-conflict reconstruction.

De Ycaza, Carla. "A Search for Truth: A Critical Analysis of the Liberian Truth and Reconciliation Commission." Human Rights Review, vol. 14, no. 3, 2013, pp. 189-212.

This paper provides a balanced overview of the Liberian Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Carla De Ycaza begins by discussing the history of the conflict. Next, De Ycaza reviews the establishment of the TRC, the proceedings, and the TRC’s findings and recommendations. The paper is thorough in its analysis because it refers to primary and secondary sources about perspectives on the TRC. It also includes qualitative and quantitative data about the effectiveness of the TRC. Furthermore, De Ycaza discusses the unique contributions that the Liberian TRC made to the field of transitional justice, the debates regarding the TRC, and its criticisms. Overall, the paper provides a succinct overview of the impact of the TRC and its limitations in restorative justice. This paper is significant in understanding the healing and reconciliation process in Liberia.

Jennings, Kathleen M. "The Struggle to Satisfy: DDR through the Eyes of Ex-Combatants in Liberia." International Peacekeeping, vol. 14, no. 2, 2007, pp. 204-218.

This paper evaluates the justification, formulation, and implementation of Liberia’s DDR program. First, Kathleen M. Jennings outlines the situation in Liberia and analyses its DDR program. Jennings provides a particularly useful analysis because she conducted qualitative fieldwork with ex-combatants in Monrovia, Liberia to evaluate the successfulness of the DDR program. Jennings identifies that the primary rationale for reintegration was to satisfy the ex-combatants but concludes through the interviews that this goal has not been met. This paper also successfully identifies issues with Liberia’s DDR process that relate to gaps in the overall literature in DDR programs. DDR is an important component of post-conflict reconstruction and this paper provides a solid understanding of the strengths and limitations of Liberia’s DDR program.

Mehler, Andreas. “ Peace and Power Sharing in Africa: A Not so Obvious Relationship.” African Affairs, Vol 108, no. 432, 2009, pp. 453-473.

This paper discusses the implications of peace agreements being signed in different African contexts. Mehler provides an objective critique of the Accra Peace agreement and why agreements that are made by simply dividing up power between the warring parties may not be the best solution on the pursuit for a more sustainable long term peace. Instead the author advocates for more broader based participation in the agreements so that the main beneficiaries, the citizens, can be empowered participants. This paper is relevant to our entry due to the fact that it highlights the problems that could be embedded within these larger peace agreements, and the implications of what ignoring these problems could lead to.

Pham, J. P. "Liberia and Sierra Leone: A Study of Comparative Human Rights Approaches by Civil Society Actors." Interdisciplinary Journal of Human Rights Law, vol. 1, no. 1, 2006, pp. 69-105.

This paper provides a useful comparison between Liberia and Sierra Leone to help understand the role of civil society actors, NGOs, and other members of the human rights community in peacebuilding. J. Peter Pham begins by comparing the histories and civil wars of Liberia and Sierra Leone. Next, Pham identifies the different roles that civil society played during the conflict in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Pham then identifies the different approaches that civil society took in the post-conflict phase. This section is particularly useful in understanding the role that civil society played during the talks and how this approach led to a formalized role for civil society representatives in the post-conflict phase. Overall, this paper helps to understand the role of Liberian civil society in both the conflict phase and the post-conflict rebuilding phase.

Zanker, Franziska. "Legitimate Representation: Civil Society Actors in Peace Negotiations Revisited." International Negotiation 19, no. 1, 2014, pp. 62-88.

This paper evaluates the representation of civil society actors in the Liberian and Kenyan peace negotiations. This paper is particularly useful because it creates an empirical model to understand “legitimate representation” based on subjective, substantive, and accountable representation. This model is used to compare civil society activism in Liberia and Kenya. Franzisca Zanker seeks to fill a gap in the literature regarding why and how involving civil society groups improves the legitimacy of negotiations. Zanker identifies how the involvement of civil society groups can make the negotiations and their outcomes more legitimate for the aggrieved. Zanker also identifies the limitations of this argument. As a result, this paper is highly useful in understanding why and how the inclusion of civil society was significant in the Accra talks.

1. "Secretary General's Report to the UN Security Council," United Nations Security Council (S/2003/1175), December 15, 2003.
2. Peace Accords Matrix. “Accra Peace Agreement,” Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, Date of retrieval: (3/15/2018),
   https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/accord/accra-peace-agreement
3. IRIN. “Liberia: Peace talks deadlocked over rebel demand for Taylor to quit.” Reliefweb, June 15, 2003. Retrieved from:
   https://reliefweb.int/report/liberia/liberia-peace-talks-deadlocked-over-rebel-demand-taylor-quit
4. IRIN. “Liberia: Draft comprehensive peace accord presented.” Reliefweb, July 18, 2003. Retrieved from:
   https://reliefweb.int/report/liberia/liberia-draft-comprehensive-peace-accord-presented
5. Hayner, Priscilla. “Negotiating peace in Liberia: Preserving the possibility for Justice.” International Center for Transitional Justice, November, 2007. Retrieved from: https://www.ictj.org/publication/negotiating-peace-liberia-preserving-possibility-justice
6. IRIN. “Liberia: Peace talks deadlocked over rebel demand for Taylor to quit.” Reliefweb, June 15, 2003. Retrieved from:
   https://reliefweb.int/report/liberia/liberia-peace-talks-deadlocked-over-rebel-demand-taylor-quit
7. IRIN. “Liberia - Taylor at Accra peace talks: “Honourable exit or extended mandate?” Reliefweb, July 22, 2003. Retrieved from:
   https://reliefweb.int/report/liberia/liberia-taylor-accra-peace-talks-honourable-exit-or-extended-mandate
8. Hayner, Priscilla. “Negotiating peace in Liberia: Preserving the possibility for Justice.” International Center for Transitional Justice, November, 2007. Retrieved from: https://www.ictj.org/publication/negotiating-peace-liberia-preserving-possibility-justice
9. Ibid.
10. UN News. “Liberia: International contact group urges Government and rebels to hold ceasefire talks,” March 1, 2003. Retrieved from: https://news.un.org/en/story/2003/03/60622-liberia-international-contact-group-urges-government-and-rebels-hold-ceasefire
11. Ibid.
12. Hayner, Priscilla. “Negotiating peace in Liberia: Preserving the possibility for Justice.” International Center for Transitional Justice, November, 2007. Retrieved from: https://www.ictj.org/publication/negotiating-peace-liberia-preserving-possibility-justice
13. “The Golden Tulip Declaration of Liberian Women Attending the Peace Talks in Accra,” Accra Ghana, March 15, 2003. Retrieved from:  http://www.peacewomen.org/sites/default/files/rep_goldentulipdeclarationliberianwomenpeacetalks_representvariouslibwomensorg_2003_0.pdf
14. Ibid.
15. Zanker, Franziska. "Legitimate Representation: Civil Society Actors in Peace Negotiations Revisited." International Negotiation 19, no. 1, 2014, pp. 62-88.
16. Debusscher, Petra, and Maria Martin de Almagro. "Post-Conflict Women's Movements in Turmoil: The Challenges of Success in Liberia in the 2005-Aftermath." The Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 54, no. 2, 2016, pp. 293-316.
17. Pham, J. P. "Liberia and Sierra Leone: A Study of Comparative Human Rights Approaches by Civil Society Actors." Interdisciplinary Journal of Human Rights Law, vol. 1, no. 1, 2006, pp. 69-105.
18. Ibid.
19. De Ycaza, Carla. "A Search for Truth: A Critical Analysis of the Liberian Truth and Reconciliation Commission." Human Rights Review, vol. 14, no. 3, 2013, pp. 189-212.
20. Ibid.
21. Mehler, Andreas. “ Peace and Power Sharing in Africa: A Not so Obvious Relationship.” African Affairs, Vol 108, no. 432, 2009, pp. 453-473.

22. Ibid.
23. Jennings, Kathleen M. "The Struggle to Satisfy: DDR through the Eyes of Ex-Combatants in Liberia." International Peacekeeping, vol. 14, no. 2, 2007, pp. 204-218.
24. Ibid.
25. Atkinson, Philippa. "Liberal Interventionism in Liberia: Towards a Tentatively just Approach?: Analysis." Conflict, Security & Development, vol. 8, no. 1, 2008, pp. 15-45.
    
26. Debusscher, Petra, and Maria Martin de Almagro. "Post-Conflict Women's Movements in Turmoil: The Challenges of Success in Liberia in the 2005-Aftermath." The Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 54, no. 2, 2016, pp. 293-316.
27. De Ycaza, Carla. "A Search for Truth: A Critical Analysis of the Liberian Truth and Reconciliation Commission." Human Rights Review, vol. 14, no. 3, 2013, pp. 189-212.
28. Hayner, Priscilla. “Negotiating peace in Liberia: Preserving the possibility for Justice.” International Center for Transitional Justice, November, 2007. Retrieved from: https://www.ictj.org/publication/negotiating-peace-liberia-preserving-possibility-justice
29. “The Golden Tulip Declaration of Liberian Women Attending the Peace Talks in Accra,” Accra Ghana, March 15, 2003. Retrieved from:  http://www.peacewomen.org/sites/default/files/rep_goldentulipdeclarationliberianwomenpeacetalks_representvariouslibwomensorg_2003_0.pdf
30. IRIN. “Liberia: Draft comprehensive peace accord presented.” Reliefweb, July 18, 2003. Retrieved from:
    https://reliefweb.int/report/liberia/liberia-draft-comprehensive-peace-accord-presented
31. IRIN. “Liberia - Taylor at Accra peace talks: “Honourable exit or extended mandate?” Reliefweb, July 22, 2003. Retrieved from:
    https://reliefweb.int/report/liberia/liberia-taylor-accra-peace-talks-honourable-exit-or-extended-mandate
32. IRIN. “Liberia: Peace talks deadlocked over rebel demand for Taylor to quit.” Reliefweb, June 15, 2003. Retrieved from:
    https://reliefweb.int/report/liberia/liberia-peace-talks-deadlocked-over-rebel-demand-taylor-quit
33. Jennings, Kathleen M. "The Struggle to Satisfy: DDR through the Eyes of Ex-Combatants in Liberia." International Peacekeeping, vol. 14, no. 2, 2007, pp. 204-218.
34. “Liberians Fail to Sign Comprehensive Peace Agreement.” GhanaWeb, 17 July 2003. Retrieved from:
    http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=39449. 
35. “Peace Accords Matrix.” Accra Peace Agreement | Peace Accords Matrix, Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame., 2015, Retrieved from:
    http://www.peaceaccords.nd.edu/accord/accra-peace-agreement.
36. Pham, J. P. "Liberia and Sierra Leone: A Study of Comparative Human Rights Approaches by Civil Society Actors." Interdisciplinary Journal of Human Rights Law, vol. 1, no. 1, 2006, pp. 69-105.
37. UN News. “Liberia: International contact group urges Government and rebels to hold ceasefire talks,” March 1, 2003. Retrieved from:
    https://news.un.org/en/story/2003/03/60622-liberia-international-contact-group-urges-government-and-rebels-hold-ceasefire
38. Zanker, Franzisca. "Legitimate Representation: Civil Society Actors in Peace Negotiations Revisited." International Negotiation 19, no. 1 (2014): 62-88.