Seven Party Alliance

   The seven party alliance members included; Nepali Congress, Nepali Congress (Democratic), Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist) who withdrew on May 3 2009), Nepal Workers and Peasants Party, Nepal Goodwill Party(Anandi Devi), United Left Front and the People’s front. Their main goal was to put an end autocratic rule. They made up the majority of the seats in The Nepalese legislature. The seven party alliance went into the talks with the notion of implementing full democracy in order to address long standing yet pressing issues that the Nepalese people have been struggling under for years due to both the past multi-party democratic governments and the instability of power/inter-party conflicts all of which delayed action on these issues. The seven party alliance therefore demanded solutions to issues revolving around class, caste, gender and region. Primarily this group sought to bring the autocratic government to an end and in turn restore democracy, peace and prosperity. To achieve this, they wished for the restoration of parliament.  

Maoists

The CPN (Maoists) when entering the twelve point agreement, held the position that the goal of peace and democracy can be attained by forming an interim government and called for a national conference of the seven party democratic forces. They also held the view that the only alternative to the previously discussed method of achieving democratic peace is through the force of the people’s movement. Maoists displayed responsibility for making their commitment to democracy and democratic values public and clear as well as allowing displaced peoples during the armed conflict to return to their places of origin safely and with dignity. Lastly, the Maoists approached the talks with the willingness to accept and respect humans rights norms and values as well as the acceptance of their past mistakes and commitment to avoid said weaknesses in the future. In terms of the CPA negotiations,  Because it was a solidification and slight revamp of the previous twelve-point agreement, the positions held by the Maoists and the GoN were relatively clear and similar as they had been previously hammered out. The Maoists approached this negotiation with the intent to refrain from further violence (in the form of aggression, kidnappings, or any other acts of harassment) towards neither the GoN forces or Nepalese common people. The Maoists came into the negotiations with the understanding (derived from the previous twelve point agreement) that their troops would remain in Cantonments monitored by the UN. Maoists also came into the talks supporting the notion that private property of any individual would not be taken over unless permitted by the law. This is something the Maoists would previously be in disagreement to (for they formerly had position to large amounts of countryside) but since the twelve point agreement, the standards are clear on both sides.Coming into the talks that resulted in the Seven Point agreement, Maoists wished for the rehabilitation of their combatants, including an economic package for those opting not to integrate into the national security system. For those integrating would receive proper training for the job.

Government of Nepal

The GoN’s main goal coming into the CPA  negotiations was to transform the temporary ceasefire that was currently being held into lasting, sustainable peace. They came into these negotiations with the understanding that their army shall remain confined within the barracks. The Nepali government was also pushing for the rationing of the Maoist combatants. The Government of Nepal was in agreement and support in adopting the necessary policies to ensure economic, political and social transformation in order to resolve remaining conflict in Nepal. The government of Nepal also backed initiatives to create policy for the rights for the average Nepali citizen to education, health, housing, employment and food security. The Government of Nepal stood for the rights of the individual in terms of speech, expression and peaceful gathering. With the cultivation of a new peace, the GoN came into the talks with visions of freedom of opinion and expression, freedom of movement and the right to take part in political activities peacefully. Regarding the AMMAA, Following the CPA, the Government of Nepal came into these negotiations with the awareness and support for the fact that their army would continue to be monitored and remain in the barracks with its weapons out of reach. Entering into the talks regarding the 7 point agreement, the GoN wished for a drafting of a new constitution that was fair, equal and backed by the nation.

United Nations

In reference to the (AMMAA) negotiations, The United Nations main role and position was to provide surveillance of all arms and combatant locations and activity. They aimed to create a Joint Monitoring Coordination Committee with representative members from the UN, NA, and Maoist army. The functions of this new committee would be to resolve military or operational disputes, to gain the trust of the parties/build confidence and lastly, to assist both parties in instilling this agreement (through arms surveillance).  The main chairman would be a delegate from the United Nation and the two vice chairmen would be from the Maoist and NA armies. The JMCC’s activities would be regularly reported to the Security-General through the Chairman. The United Nations entered into the negotiations which resulted in the twelve point agreement with intentions to be a mediator and overseer of any and all decisions made regarding a shift in power. Naturally, they were called upon to monitor the election of a constituent assembly to end the transition period between governments.

During Nepal’s vital peace negotiations in 2003, civil society organizations tried their best to lobby and pressurize the conflicting parties to make the peace process meaningful [but]... they were not given enough roles and press coverage. The process became a closed door business of key players from the government and the Maoist leaders” (Kattel 2004).

China’s relations during the Nepalese peace process were more distant, partly because of their lesser visibility in its dealings with Nepal and their long-held views on non-intervention in the affairs of others

• “With a critical perspective on the Maoists as an unruly force that besmirched the good name of Chairman Mao, this stance had translated into unfailing support of the government of the day.”
• China’s involvement grew, however, in 2005 as a consequence of Gyanendra Bir Bikram Shah Dev’s (the last king of Nepal from 2001-2008) efforts to mobilize support for his coup

“The United Nations was present first through an Office of the UN HIgh Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and later in a specialised political mission (UNMIN). However, neither the UN nor the other external actors supporting the peace process ever fulfilled a formal role of mediation”

There was a significant lack of female representation during peace talks and negotiations. There were no women assigned or trusted to facilitate discussions; “in the first round of peace talks two respected male facilitators were assigned but no additional female members included in the facilitators team. In the second peace talks more were added than in the previous two but all were men”. A lack of female members from both sides except in the first term of the 2003 discussions are discouraging, and conducive of a misrepresentation of a huge sector in the population.

The peace talks pertaining to the Nepali conflict proved to be successful, however, there were multiple drawbacks that hindered the process along the way including external actors, constrained participation of civil society, and having limited checks and balances.

The Seven-Point Agreement of 2011 contains aspects that Nepal adopted which embraces unique principles and ultimately, precedence for integration and rehabilitation.  Despite having support from the international community, the peace processes were dominated by a domestic, actors-led process. External actors advising the peace processes through critical perspectives provided international views and opinions on justice. However, they should have brought a broad range of experience to the peace talks. Confusion as to which actions to take can be attributed to the parties lacking basic knowledge about international experiences, appropriate aims and proper mechanisms and policies. This included truth commissions, disappearance commissions, the vetting of security forces, and possible amnesty and reparations.  Essentially, the government and main political parties involved began and concluded the peace processes within Nepal through internal technical reforms such as demobilizing, registering, and monitoring the cantonments and arms. It was the “political parties themselves envisaged the contents of the peace process and concluded processes according to the agreement”(Nepal Institute for Policy Studies, 2013).

Furthermore, Nepal’s violent conflict concluded through prolonged negotiation. The then armed rebellion party gave up the decade-long armed struggle by renouncing violence and embracing the fundamental tenets of peaceful democratic process through the CPA (Nepal Institute for Policy Studies, 2013).  The CPN dissolved its army to transform itself into a civilian party, which acted as a statement claiming that perhaps violence can be addressed through negotiation--through peace talks. However, rather than finding success after the predicted six months, it took Nepal six years. Evidently, peace processes can be weakened if the role of civil society is limited or too constrained.  Civil society representatives attended negotiations as observers but were unable to contribute directly to peace talks, instead providing input during informal side meetings. Unfortunately, there was a lack of official records stating how much of an input these representatives brought to the table and whether these ideas were implemented.

Under the Interim Constitution, there was the creation of the SC by the GoN, which was comprised of representatives from the major political parties including the UCPN (Maoist), the NC, the CPN-UML and the Madhesi Parties).  They were given the responsibility of completing the peace process, where the representatives of the political parties, security agencies and ex-combatants made the policy decisions. Further, the SC were essentially responsible for the checks and balances of the peace process by undertaking the role of supervising, integrating, and rehabilitating the combatants while monitoring the arms and cantonments.  This was a major breakthrough especially given that Nepal was deemed a “highly politically polarized society,” thus having this agreement across political parties ensured that all decisions had to be made through a consensus (Nepal Institute for Policy Studies, 2013). Consequently, the peace talk can be considered a success because they clearly addressed the issue of sustainability and showcased their desire for prolonged peace.  However, there was also limited to no follow up procedure on the ex-combatants in voluntary retirement. Essentially, there was a lack of knowledge for their integration into society, which means that there is no account for monetary assistance given to ensure it will be used properly. and their possibility of joining criminal groups

In addition, although there were extremely contrasting perspectives, goals, issues, and perceived ideal processes, the major political parties involved ensured that communication persisted.  In turn, this perpetual dialogue process ultimately contributed to settling to an agreement that addressed all key actors. For example, even when political parties had contradictory opinions and adamant stands in the given political context that resulted in widening and deepening their differences, the NA gave momentum to the process by proposing integration of the ex-combatants into a new National Security and Development Directorate under it(Nepal Institute for Policy Studies, 2013). Evidently, this peace talk would not be classified as successful should this constant communication not have been established.

The peace talks associated with the Nepali crisis was a process that took six years, rather than the originally anticipated six months due to the complications addressed above.  Significant progress has been made that sufficiently addressed the conflict in a manner that has proven to be sustainable thus far. Therefore, this peace talk process may be considered successful.

http://carnegieendowment.org/newsletters/SAP/pdf/nepal_modalities_agreement_nov_28_final.pdf

https://reliefweb.int/report/nepal/full-text-comprehensive-peace-agreement-held-between-government-nepal-and-communist

http://carnegieendowment.org/newsletters/SAP/pdf/nepal_modalities_agreement_nov_28_final.pdf7

https://issat.dcaf.ch/download/111494/2023947/Nepal's%20Peace%20Process_A%20Brief%20Overview_Eng%20(2).pdf

Krampe, Florian. “Empowering peace: service provision and state legitimacy in Nepal’s peace-building process”, Conflict, Security and Development, 2016. Vol. 16., issue 1, 53-73 doi.org/10.1080/14678802.2016.1136138

Krampe offers their critique on Nepal’s peace-building process through a perspective of state legitimacy and provisions of rural communities during the resolution process. By addressing the gap in service provisions as a part of the emerging post-war order and its role in peace, this paper questions how civil societies are affected regarding socio-economic inequalities and the dynamics of state provisional abilities. By focusing on a specific topic of how reintegration during and after the peace process impacted micro-hydropower development, it recognizes how it may not be a specific peace-building strategy but is representative of how peace resolutions should address “social, economic, and environmental concerns of rural communities” (Krampe, 54). Krampe conclusively recognizes how the challenges of development policies and state legitimacy run parallel, yet any short-term failure can be outweighed by long-term socio-economic gains in the future.

Navlakha, Gautam. “Nepal: Peace Process Heading South”, Economic and Political Weekly, vol. 44, No. 49. 2009, pp. 8-13. www.jstor.org/stable/25663851

Navlakha’s commentary on the Nepal Peace Process questions the aftermath of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2006 and India’s involvement with the Maoist agenda during the events of the conflict negotiations. This article reflects  on the possibilities of power takeovers following the Maoist mass protest movement, a “Bangladeshi-type coup”, or some form of national government led by the Maoists. Summarizing the events of the emerging Communist Party of Nepal as the single largest party in the CA in 2008, Navlakha questions the benefits and potential problems of coalition alongside the “truly staggering” (Navlakha, 8) extent of Indian influence over Nepal. There is a slight sense hesitation against the possibility of a true non-violent transformation lending credibility in India, but admits that those who want to “qualitatively transform the state and society along the socialist path must be prepared to negotiate their way forward from a position of strength or not at all” (Navlakha, 13).

Björnehed, Emma. “Ideas in Conflict: The effect of frames in the Nepal conflict and peace process”, Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis, 2012. , p. 257

This academic thesis provided a critical viewpoint on the 1996 Nepalese events in analysis of social representations involving the motivations behind actors and their choices. Björnehed presents two analytical lenses in which to view the beginnings of the Maoist insurgency: a terrorism frame during the conflict period and a peace frame, involving the period of conflict resolution. Unlike a traditional frame analysis regarding specific audiences and the manoeuvrability of political or non-state actors, this theses presents the effects of frames on those involved in the framing process and all enabling or restrictive ways. Altogether, Björnehed recognizes the effects of self-entrapment and the “coercive character of ideas in making actors perceive themselves as forced to take a certain action or position” (Björnehed, 4). This model is reflective of the actors on the side of the Maoists and the Nepalese government during the insurgency of the civil war, where several parties were required to adhere and manifest significant political changes. Björnehed acknowledges limitations of their “Four logic of actor effects” model in terms of generality. Björnehed suggests that the Maoist leaders were in fact knowledgeable of the implications of their demands in relation to the extent of peace and democracy, in their attempt to make the SPA comply with their terms.

Thapa, Ganga B., Sharma, Jan. “From Insurgency to Democracy: The Challenges of Peace and Democracy-Building in Nepal”, International Political Science Review, 2009. Vol. 30, No.2, 205-219, Sage Publications, Ltd. www.jstor.org.ezproxy.library.ubc.ca/stable/25652899

Thapa and Sharma’s analysis of the prospects for peace-building in Nepal reviews the challenges faced during the transformation from insurgency into a democratic society. They employ an outsider perspective on the optimistic and pessimistic viewpoints on Nepal’s potential for becoming a stable democracy through analysis of their evolution of indigenous government, their period of political and diplomatic isolation, and the aspects of monarchical rule. Using a thorough examination on motivations of actors and decision-making processes, such as the founding of the NC and CPN establishing their roots in the early 1900’s, Thapa and Sharma offer an open-ended answer to the possibility of a democratic future. Although public opinion is less than optimistic, several suggestions are included, such as the possibility of a new plurality in Nepal with political leaders cut from a different cloth, and far-reaching measures such as new statues for economic institutions.

The Economist; London, “Asia: In limbo; Nepal’s Peace Process”. Vol. 385, Iss. 8554, 2007: 87. search-proquest-com.ezproxy.library.ubc.ca/docview/224000546?OpenUrlRefId=info:xri/sid: summon&accountid=14656

This brief article from the Economist constructs a viewpoint of the year of 2007’s peace agreement ending the Maoist insurrection. Although illustrations of non-violence have been hoped for, the article recognizes that abductions and threats have not been eradicated, due to a string of militant and criminal groups in the Terai territory of Nepal. This article is representative of the setbacks and efforts during the extremely long peace-process stemming from political stalemates and the constant postponement of elections. The presence of a political limbo set in the backdrop of politicians’ short term gains and the failure of the Maoists to accept competitive politics is demonstrative of civilian involvement. This short outlook into UN potential involvement, specifically through UNMIN, recognizes the necessity for long-term solutions and the emphasis for military force and police efforts in restricting the potentiality for civilian casualty during peace processes.

Robins, Simon. “Towards Victim-Centred Transitional Justice: Understanding the Needs of Families of the Disappeared in Postconflict Nepal”, International Journal of Transitional Justice, Vol. 5, Issue 1, 2011. Pg. 75-98. doi.org/10/1093/ijtj/ijq027

Robins offers a view on a topic regarding the after-effects of Nepal’s peace process and the 160 families of people that disappeared during the decade-long Maoist insurgency. The reparations from the transitional justice process is analyzed in an attempt to study the psychological and mental well-being of the victim’s families. Specifically, economic support and the need for truth about the disappearances that occured. This topic is essential for the study on conflict and peace, as the main highlights typically involve the conflictual wars and resulting resolutions or constitutions emerging as a result in its conclusion. Little is offered in the way of civilians and the effects on their homelife, especially those who are unaccounted for through a human rights lens. The avoidance of the marginalized class of citizens and the expectations held by the victims is recognized by Robins, who suggests improvements on the process of reconciliation that allows “policies to be driven by the needs of those most affected”.

Potter, Antonia. “Gender sensitivity: nicety or necessity in peace-process management?” Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, OSLO forum, 2008.

Potter’s approach to peace processes and sensitizing gender presents an awareness of the role of gender in conflict mediation, a vital and necessary aspect for tract negotiations. Pertaining to the conflict in Nepal, despite Maoist commitments to equality, and the existence of a handful of politically powerful women, there was a recorded lack of women representation in negotiations and discussions. The marginalization of a prominent space for women in mediator teams discussing issues not only affecting women, but all political actors and networks of individuals further desensitizes the effects of peace processes. Sexual violence, rehabilitation, security, justice, and demobilization are just a few of the issues where the voices of women benefit the formation of constitutions and amendments during periods of conflict. Potter includes an example of the women’s health network in Nepal as providing a valuable means of communication “with rural communities on issues ranging far beyond health concerns” (Potter, 59), countering fears of confusion or resistance pertaining to women involvement in state developmental processes. This paper offers a broad analysis on gender and its roles in peace processes, bringing to light the potential for female political participation and how limiting minority roles in constitution only harms the future of peace-making processes.

Subedi, DB. “Dealing with Ex-Combatants in a Negotiated Peace Process: Impacts of Transitional Politics on the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programme in Nepal”, Journal of Asian and African Studies, 2013. Sage Journals, journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0021909613507537

The historic Seven-Point AGreement signed on November 1st 2012 was a national consensus document addressing the integration and rehabilitation of the ex-combatants during the Nepal peace process. During this period in time, discussion and compromise was demonstrated on the part of several major political parties representing the SC in line with the Interim Constitution of 2007, the CPA, and other subsequent agreements for international practices. Working towards a logical conclusion, the rehabilitation of ex-combatants demonstrated the significant features of the Nepal peace processes. Subedi’s paper investigates the nature of this transitional process and outcomes of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) program. He labels this program as unconventional due to its unique context-specific model led by national actors despite a lack of external intervention that offered no space for non-state actors to participate in the Maoist army management. Subedi’s valuable contribution recognizes the flaws and potential drawbacks in this period of negotiation processes, calling out the failure of political actors and their conflicting needs and interests severely politicizing this resolution. Although the outcome was in fact conclusive and implemented, this account is helpful in a way that critiques the processes in which these agreements are formed, and suggests ways of future improvement.

Bhatta, Chandra D. “Reflections on Nepal’s Peace Process”, International Policy Analysis, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2012. library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/08936-20120228.pdf

Gachcchadar, Bijay Kumar.  “The Seven Point Agreement”, 1 November 2011. http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/nepal/document/papers/12_Point_Understanding.pdf. Accessed March 15, 2018.

Government of Nepal Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction. “12-point understanding reached between the Seven Political Parties and Nepal Communist Party (Maoists)”, 2005. www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/nepal/document/papers/12_Point_Understanding.pdfAccessed March 2, 2018.

Kathmandu, “Timeline of Constitution Statis”, IRIN, 2012. www.irinnews.org/report/95754/nepal-timeline-constitution-statis. Accessed March 2, 2018.

Lunn, Jon. “Nepal’s Endless Peace Process, 2006-12” House of Commons Library, International Affairs and Defence Section Commons Briefing Papers. 2013. researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/SN04229

Nepal Institute for Policy Studies. “Nepal’s Peace Process: A Brief Overview” Policy Paper. Vol. 8, Issue 1., 2013. issat.dcaf.ch/download/111494/2023947/Nepal's%20Peace%20Process_A%20Brief%20Over view_Eng%20(2).pdf. Accessed March 9, 2018.

Upreti, Bishnu Raj., Sapkota, Bisnu. “Case Study on Nepal: Observations and Reflections on the Peace and Constitution-Making Process” Swiss Peace, 2017. swisspeace.ch/fileadmin/user_upload/pdf/Mediation/Nepal_Case_Study__National_Dialogue_Handbook.pdf. Accessed March 3, 2018.

Wanis-St. John, Anthony., Kew, Darren. “Civil Society and Peace Negotiations: Confronting Exclusion” International Negotiation, 13, 2008., 11-36, doi: 10.1163/138234008X297896

Whitfield, Teresa. “Masala Peacemaking: Nepal’s Peace Process and the Contribution of Outsiders”, Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum, 2008. www.wiltonpark.org.uk/wpcontent/uploads/nepal-peace-process.pdf