Northern Ireland (Good Friday Agreement) | Peace Processes and Policies Database

List of key issues being debated in formal peace negotiations and final outcome on each of these elements

Key Issue	Explanation	Outcome
Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC)	Nationalists felt that the RUC (which was overwhelmingly Protestant) was prejudiced against them. They wanted a new local police force that would be more representative of the Catholic population.	Per the recommendations of the Independent Commission on Policing in Northern Ireland, a new policing board was created and the RUC was renamed the Police Force of Northern Ireland in 2001. Many nationalists remained unsatisfied with the changes.
British troops in Northern Ireland	Along with a new police force, Nationalists wanted British troops removed and their army bases closed in Northern Ireland. 138 Catholics were killed by the force over its 40-year deployment.	The British army did not depart Northern Ireland until July 2007.
Constitutional changes	Unionists and the British government wanted a commitment from the Irish government that any constitutional change would require a majority vote by Northern Ireland.	Both the British and Irish government agreed to recognize the “legitimacy of whatever choice is freely exercised by a majority of the people of Northern Ireland”. The Irish government amended Articles 2 and 3 of their constitution, removing their territorial claim over Northern Ireland.
North-South institutions	Unionists and the British government feared that joint institutions between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland would erode the British nature of Northern Ireland and the protestant majority in the six counties of Northern Ireland. Nationalists wanted more interconnection with the Republic of Ireland and saw North-South institutions as progress toward a United Ireland.	Meaningful North-South institutions were established. The most prominent was a “North-South Ministerial Council to develop consultation, co-operation and action within the island of Ireland on matters of mutual interest and establishing as a start, at least six implementation bodies operating on a cross-border or all-island basis”
Prisoners	The early release of prisoners was a highly contentious issue. Both Nationalist and Loyalist paramilitary wings of mainstream parties had members in prison on charges directly related to the conflict.	Outlined in the agreement was the early release for prisoners affiliated with groups which maintained “complete and unequivocal ceasefires”. Different groups reached this threshold at different times in the two years following the agreement and by July 28th 2000 a total of 428 Nationalist and Unionist affiliated prisoners were granted early release. By 2012 this number had risen to 506.
Disarmament	The issue of disarming paramilitary organizations saw both Nationalist and Unionists skeptical of the intentions of the opposing actors. Separate talks were established throughout the Good Friday agreement negotiations on the topic of disarmament, led by Canadian General John de Chastelain.	In the agreement all participants affirmed commitment to the total disarmament of all paramilitary organization. However, the disarmament process began slowly. It was not until 2005 that nationalists and loyalist paramilitary groups were satisfied that full decommissioning of weapons had occurred.
Equality	The Troubles began with civil rights marches against inequality, and throughout the peace process equality continued to present a problem for negotiators. Catholics were consistently over-represented in the lower indices of deprivation and were the minority group in the workforce.	Equality in Northern Ireland remained a key issue beyond the agreement, with the employment rate and claims for government benefits higher than the UK national average. Catholics featured more highly on deprivation indicators than Protestants but achieved more highly in education attainment.

List of actors that were invited to and that participated in peace talks

The Republic of Ireland’s Government

Key values:

Focused on lasting peace on the island of Ireland.
Some internal uncertainty on what outcomes the people of the Republic of Ireland would be willing to accept in a referendum, but a willingness to give up its constitutional claim towards Northern Ireland.
Committed to working with all parties to achieve peace.
Strong belief in the necessity of a referendum in the Republic of Ireland towards constitutional changes in relation to constitutional claim over Northern Ireland.

Primary objectives:

A strong willingness to persuade the British government to change its position on self-determination for Northern Ireland.
They believe the Unionist parties will only make compromises under significant pressure by the British government.
Furthermore, they believe peace will only last with agreement between Unionist and Nationalist parties and paramilitary organizations.

A commitment to Anglo-Irish intergovernmentalism with the Republic of Ireland, Northern Ireland and the rest of Great Britain involved in the political process

Social Democratic and Labour Party

Key values:

The SDLP, led by David Hume, represent the values of moderate nationalism; they support power sharing and cooperation with the Republic of Ireland. Towards the latter years of the 1980’s, the party became anxious to maintain its support among Nationalists who found Sinn Fein’s more radical approach and philosophy to be more appealing.
The SDLP advocate non-violence and equality of opportunity across sectors of society, having their primary support base in the Roman Catholic community of Northern Ireland, who felt aggrieved by their subjugation in Northern Irish society.
The Party support Anglo-Irish cooperation, and campaign for Northern Ireland to remain part of the United Kingdom so long as the majority of the population agreed for it to be so.

Primary Objectives:

To uphold the Principle of Consent: ensure any decision made in the talks were consented to by referendum by the Northern Irish people
To establish North-South institutions with cross-border bodies to implement co-operation
To ensure equality in Northern Ireland; strong reforms on employment, housing and representation

British Government

Key values:

The British Government, lead first by Prime Minister John Major and then his successor Tony Blair, attempt to maintain peace in Northern Ireland and protect the unionists who believe Northern Ireland should be part of the United Kingdom
As the first British Prime Minister to hold face-to-face meetings with the Nationalist party leaders, Tony Blair aims to halt the ‘troubles’ and reach an agreement in which a level of power sharing can be achieved between the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland

Primary Objectives:

Ensure the inclusion of both Sinn Fein and the Democratic Unionist Party; peace will only be achieved if both sides are involved

Ulster Unionist Party

Key Values:

Historically the largest Unionist party in Northern Ireland, the Ulster Unionist Party has strongly opposed a united Ireland and rejects Sinn Fein’s attendance in the peace talks
The UUP had strong links to the British Conservative Party until the mid-1970s after which the ties were weakened
The initial focus of the party was to unite all of Ireland with Great Britain
Following the signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985, the UUP members of Parliament resigned their seats in protest of its establishing a consultative role for the Government of Ireland in the affairs of Northern Ireland
Although reluctant, the UUP is willing to participate in talks with the British and Irish Governments along with the other Northern Ireland political parties

Primary Objectives:

to insist upon the decommissioning of the IRA (on condition that this was carried out before it will accept Sinn Fein’s presence at peace talks)
As internal division within the party increases, the UUP will both accept and reject the agreement

Sinn Fein

Key values:

Political wing of the IRA focused strongly representing Republican interests.
Committed to a future United Ireland. While understanding that a United Ireland was not an option on the table during Good Friday agreement negotiations
Internal split between those who support a deal and those who view a deal as abandoning the cause for a United Ireland

Primary objectives:

Maintaining unity in Sinn Fein and the IRA while bringing peace in the short term, while continuing toward the goal of a United Ireland.
Acquiring the release of its fighters and political prisoners a confidence building measure to demonstrate the sincerity of the British government.
No local parliament as it fears Unionist domination
A new police force and withdrawal of British troops.
A willingness to hold onto weapons. And the refusal of an admission of defeat.

Northern Ireland’s Women’s Coalition (NIWC)

Key Values:

The NIWC was founded by Monica McWilliams, a Catholic scholar, and Pearl Sagar, a Protestant social worker. Since its founding, the NIWC has declined to declare a position on whether Northern Ireland should remain part of the United Kingdom. While supportive of the peace talks, the coalition’s main goal was to secure the representation of women in Irish politics.

Primary Objectives:

As a cross-community political party, the NIWC had no set position during the peace talks. Some NIWC members supported a united Ireland while some supported Northern Ireland remaining part of the UK.
Ensuring that women were represented in the peace negotiations was the coalition’s priority. The NIWC pushed for and achieved a recognition of the right of women to equal political participation in the agreement.
The party also advocated for an inclusive negotiation process which considered all parties, including the DUP.

Northern Ireland Labour Party

Key Values:

Composed of a coalition of labour and left-wing groups in Northern Ireland with a “working-class point of view” (Johnson).
The Labour Party attributes the divide in Northern Ireland to class struggle, not religion.

Primary Objectives:

The party wants a settlement which, they believe, will help to close the gap between rich and poor. Thus, they support a “yes” vote in the Northern Ireland referendum.

Alliance Party

Key values:

As the first non-sectarian political party, the Alliance Party attempted to transcend the religious divide, pursuing mixed membership and representation from both religious groups.
Based on non-sectarian unionism and liberalism, the Alliance Party considered the division between Protestants and Catholics to be the root cause of turmoil in Northern Ireland.

Primary Objectives:

The AP’s main objective is to promote collaboration between Protestants and Catholics, Unionists and Nationalists.
The party argued for a continued British presence in Northern Ireland, believing this would be a good compromise.

Progressive Unionist Party

Key Values:

The Political wing of the Loyalist Paramilitary Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF)
Focused on the maintenance of culturally, political and military unity with the rest of the United Kingdom.

Primary Objectives:

With a leadership of former UVF prisoners they support the release of prisoners.
Strongly interested in a political solution and understanding of the need for accommodation.
Insistent the IRA should destroy or give up all weapons
Desire for Ireland to give up constitutional claim toward Northern Ireland
Pushing for a power sharing agreement giving maximum strength to an elected majority
Avoid equality legislation that which too aggressively erodes the Britishness of Northern Ireland.

Ulster Democratic Party

Key Values:

The UDP is a small loyalist, Protestant paramilitary group, the political branch of the Ulster Defence Association.
They advocate for an independent Northern Ireland with an elected Assembly and Executive along with a Bill of Rights.
The party values the principle of consent and wants it included in the Irish Constitution.

Primary Objectives:

The party wants an agreement and with a ‘yes’ vote in the Northern Ireland Referendum. They are supportive of Northern Ireland remaining part of Britain but if they are allowed a devolved legislative parliament.
The UDP cannot appear to be more accommodating to nationalist parties like Sinn Fein since many of its members already vote for the larger, more established Unionist parties.

Important Actors not involved in peace talks

US Government

Key Values:

Publicly, the American government wants to appear even-handed and fair.
The government wants to earn respect and maintain good relationships with all parties involved in the talks. Senator George Mitchell (who will serve as chairman at the talks) has already made strides here by participating in previous talks with several of the parties.
Traditionally, the US has backed Britain however, the Clinton administration wants to empower the weaker parties including the Nationalists and the Irish government. This was evidenced by Clinton’s increasing the US annual contribution to the International Fund for Ireland.

Primary Objectives:

The US government wants to push the parties to come to an agreement. This will advance their image as an objective and effective mediator. It will also reflect well on President Clinton’s office and on the American government in general.
President Clinton expressed hope that the issue of decommissioning would be discussed at the talks.

UK Unionist Party

Key values:

The UK Unionist Party, established by Robert McCartney in 1995, is a non-sectarian Unionist party formed as a breakaway group from the Ulster Unionist Party
The UKUP withdrew from peace talks when Sinn Fein was admitted in 1997 and maintain an anti-agreement stance throughout negotiations
In line with other Unionist parties, the UKUP supports British rule of Northern Ireland, however they do not support a Conservation ideology and propose more left-wing policies
The UKUP believe that any agreement made at the peace talks would create a slippery slope towards a united Ireland, and lead to nothing but the appeasement of terrorists
The UKUP would only participate if Sinn Fein abandons its objective of Irish Unity

Primary Objectives:

Contest any agreement that proposed a move towards a united Ireland
Reject the views of Sinn Fein and other nationalist groups who push for stronger North-South ties
Strengthen Northern Ireland’s connection with the UK and eventually fully integrate

Democratic Unionist Party

Key values:

As a hard-line faction of the Ulster Unionist Party, the Democratic Unionist Party strongly condemns any power sharing bodies and rejects the participation of Sinn Fein in peace talks, hence their boycotting of the talks when Sinn Fein was admitted in 1997
Avoiding all contact with the Irish Government, the DUP strongly supports union with Britain and campaigns to prevent the dilution of British identity in Northern Ireland
Despite rescinding violence like their opponents Sinn Fein, the DUP has a history of connections to Loyalist paramilitary groups such as the Ulster Resistance

Primary Objectives:

Prevent the early release of nationalist paramilitary prisoners
Reject any suggestion of compromise by the UUP leadership or British Government who are seen as being too willing to concede to the demands of Nationalist groups.

Canadian Chair of Decommissioning Talks

Key Values

Presiding over talks focused on the monitoring of a ceasefire agreement with the IRA and the broader theme of decommissioning and disarmament.

Primary Objective

Ensure that as the agreement is being finalized all terms and conditions of decommissioning and disarmament are met.
Provide a third party actor for both parties to meet if further negotiations, clarifications or issues are raised.

Brief Analysis of Outcomes

“The disappointment comes not from the modesty of our achievements, which are considerable, but from the enormity of our expectations.” - Tony Blair, 2002[i]

Tony Blair’s words, four years after the Good Friday Agreement, capture the essence of the complex and problematic issues facing any post-conflict state. To this day, Northern Ireland still navigates a difficult path to peace.

In assessing the outcomes of the Good Friday Agreement, it is necessary to go beyond the absence of violence (negative peace) and consider the primary issues of governance and sectarianism which still permeate the collective conscience of Northern Irish communities. Might it be that Northern Ireland exists in the liminal space of “no war, no peace” characterized by social polarization?[ii]. The following evaluation will draw upon Kristine Höglund and Mimmi Kovac’s “Peace Triangle”, a development of the classical ‘Conflict Triangle’ of Johan Galtung, which takes actors as central to the analysis of incompatibilities, behaviour and attitudes in post conflict society[iii].

Höglund and Kovac demarcate post-conflict issues (incompatibilities) into the categories of “unresolved”, where the peace process has failed to manage core issues causing conflict, “restored”, where few political visions have been realized and little positive change has been achieved but peace is nevertheless secured, and finally, “contested”, where the terms of the peace accord facilitate future conflict[iv]. It is clear that the incompatibilities between the primary actors of the conflict continue to impact the political landscape of Northern Ireland; The Good Friday Agreement aimed to resolve the polarization on issues of governance and sectarianism, yet these issues, which formed the foundation of the agreement, remained unresolved after 1998.

The Agreement successfully founded the power-sharing systems, which have secured proportional representation to Unionists and Republicans, but this form of power sharing has encouraged and legitimized traditional “single identities” of Catholic-Irish and Protestant-British. It has also proved problematic given that hard-line parties benefited from their inclusion. Consequently, policy has been driven towards more extremist positions, at the expense of moderate parties such as the SDLP who have been progressively losing seats to Sinn Fein. This has caused the SDLP to lose all three of its Westminster seats in the June 2017 General Election. Moreover, the Protestant complaint that the treaty favoured Catholic interests rose from 50%, immediately following the agreement, to 70% in 2003, demonstrating an ideological return to the familiar polarization of the conflict shortly after the optimism of the Good Friday Agreement[v].

Höglund and Kovac measure behaviour in post-conflict environments under the classifications of “partial”, “regional” and “insecure’ peace”. A “partial” peace would be one in which one or more of the former warring parties continue to use violence as a political tool (but the peace still holds), “regional” peace refers to the geographical concentration of residual violence following conflicts, and “insecure” peace refers to the way in which violent and criminal activity fills the vacuums not filled by legitimate government[vi]. The Belfast Agreement was preconditioned by a ceasefire from the IRA and included clauses on militant disarmament, both of which have significantly diminished the threat of violence in the nation. Unfortunately, the actions of spoilers continued to be problematic, and behaviour did not change overnight. In July 1998, three young Catholic children were killed by the Ulster Volunteer Force and in August that same year, a bomb planted by dissident republicans killed 29 people[vii]. Though sporadic pockets of violence exist today, we may optimistically assert that Northern Ireland has moved beyond the aforementioned limited versions of peace.

In Höglund and Kovac’s peace triangle, “attitudes” refers to the presence or absence of conflict mindsets. They measure these attitudes according to three standards: “polarized peace”, where attitudes remain polarized following a peace settlement, “unjust peace”, where there remains a culture of impunity and lack of reconciliation, and “fearful peace”, where the absence of conflict is due to the force of a regime or political repression[viii]. Northern Ireland’s peace can be considered “polarized” due to the lasting and powerful sectarian divisions in recent years leading to the political landscape of Northern Ireland being referred to as a “political paralysis” since January 2017[ix]. This is believed to be due to the fact that the Democratic Unionist Party and Sinn Fein have consistently entrenched their divisions and resisted the proposals of the other, particularly on the issue of Brexit. The political sensitivities of Brexit were felt particularly strongly by Northern Ireland, given that Brexit caused a resurgence in Nationalist self-identification and attitudes. The majority of Ireland voted to remain in the EU but Nationalists, who consider themselves Irish Citizens and not part of the UK (which voted for “Leave”), felt that their autonomy would be jeopardized if Northern Ireland exited the EU.

[i] “The Full Text of Tony Blair’s Speech in Belfast.” The Guardian. Guardian News and Media, 17 Oct. 2002. Web. 15 Mar. 2018

[ii] Mac Ginty, Roger, Orla T. Muldoon, and Neil Ferguson. “No War, No Peace: Northern Ireland After the Agreement.” Political Psychology 28.1 (2007): JSTOR. Web. 13 Mar. 2018

[iii] Höglund, Kristine, and Mimmi Söderberg Kovacs. "Beyond the Absence of War: The Diversity of Peace in Post-Settlement Societies." Review of International Studies 36.2 (2010): 367-90. JSTOR. Web. 15 Mar. 2018.

[iv] ibid

[v] ibid

[vi] ibid

[vii] Walsh, Jason. "15 years after Good Friday Agreement, an imperfect peace in Northern Ireland". The Christian Science Monitor. Global News Blog. 10 April 2013. Web. 20 Mar. 2018

[viii] Ibid iii

[ix] Beesley, Arthur, and Mehreen Khan. "Power-sharing Is Least of Northern Ireland's Problems." Financial Times. N.p., 12 Feb. 2018. Web. 22 Mar. 2018.

List of important web links to key documents

The Belfast Agreement (Good Friday Agreement):

https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/136652/agreement.pdf

Annotated Bibliography

Addley, Esther. “British Troops Leave After 38 Years.” The Guardian. Guardian News and Media, 01 Aug. 2007. Web. 15 Mar. 2018.

This news article reports on the long-awaited end to the British military deployment in Northern Ireland in 2007. The last of the British troops left Bessbrook, Northern Ireland, marking the end of Operation Banner. The army’s presence in Northern Ireland between 1969 and 2007 contributed to the Northern Ireland conflict and is, therefore, featured in our chart of key issues. This source, written just a month after the withdrawal of the British forces, captures the excitement of the Irish folks, many of whom had long been opposed to a British presence in Northern Ireland. With quotes from former soldier turned Member of Parliament, Addley’s report explains how the withdrawal of the troops represented Britain’s acknowledgement (however late) of their expired claim to Northern Ireland, as decided by the Good Friday Agreement.

Ahern, Bertie. "The Good Friday Agreement: An Overview." Fordham International Law Journal 22.4 (1998): 1194-199. Web. 16 Mar. 2018.

The authors provide a surface overview of the Good Friday agreement outlining the historical background before delving into a selection of key areas in the agreement. One such highlighted section is establishment of North-South institutions in Northern Ireland which demonstrate a commitment for improved relations between the people of Northern Ireland, the government of the Republic of Ireland and the government of Great Britain. The text was useful to us in providing a succinct overview and historical framing of the peace agreement and also provided special insight into the critical role of the United States in the peace process. The work is useful as a historical document but as it was published in 1998 it does not have the benefit of the almost 20 years of history since the agreement. This text was helpful in unison with more recent and comprehensive texts.

Beesley, Arthur, and Mehreen Khan. "Power-sharing Is Least of Northern Ireland's Problems." Financial Times. N.p., 12 Feb. 2018. Web. 22 Mar. 2018.

This Financial Times article comments on the effect of Brexit on the DUP and Sinn Fein’s new power-sharing arrangement. Beesley and Khan argue that, since 20 years have passed since the Good Friday Agreement was signed, the time has finally come for the DUP and Sinn Fein to collaborate in government and face issues of language, gay marriage and Brexit. This source provides no background on either the DUP or Sinn Fein and assumes the reader is familiar with both the parties’ positions as well as the history (since before the Good Friday Agreement) of their relationship with one another.

Breadun, Deaglan De. “UDA Calls for Yes Vote in Support of Agreement.” The Irish Times. The Irish Times, 25 Apr. 1998. Web. 13 Mar. 2018.

This Irish Times news article explains the position of the loyalist paramilitary Ulster Defence Association. The political wing of the association, the Ulster Democratic Party, would attend the Good Friday talks on its behalf. The article succinctly explains the statements made by the UDA in anticipation of the talks, including its declaration of support of the Belfast Agreement as well as its call for a “yes” vote in the upcoming referendum on Northern Ireland’s status. This source lends much insight into the UDA’s perspective going into the talks. It also refers to several important interactions with other relevant parties including Sinn Fein and the Irish Republican Army days before the Good Friday conference. The article briefly notes the positions of a few other attendees including the Social Democratic and Labour Party, the Ulster Unionist Party and the Alliance Party but does not report on the positions of other parties expected at the talks.

“Constitutional Reform: Northern Ireland Good Friday Agreement. Peace Accords Matrix. University of Notre Dame, n.d. Web. 15 Mar. 2018.

This source is simply the written agreement (annex A and B) on constitutional reform in accordance with the Good Friday Agreement. It explains the British-Irish agreement to respect the choice of the Northern Ireland people, as decided by referendum, and related clauses including an affirmation of the Northern Irish people’s right to self-determination. It includes a useful timeline of the implementation of the constitutional reforms between 1998 and 2008.

Cox, Michael, Adrian Guelke, and Fiona Stephen. "A Farewell to Arms?" Google Books. Manchester University Press, 2006. Web. 15 Mar. 2018.

This text provides a comprehensive history of the conflict in Northern Ireland leading up to the 1998 Good Friday agreement leading up to the Good Friday agreement. Beginning largely in the 1960s the text delves into the dark statistics surrounding this blood conflict while also painting nuanced and comprehensive pictures of the actors and the rationales and ideologies that propelled these antagonistic groups. Further the book examines how concepts like victimhood, revenge, and and conflict became cyclical outcomes and the challenges posed in escaping the cycle of violence and distrust rampant in Northern Irish society. This text provided a large amount of useful information in broadening our understanding of the conflict in Northern Ireland.

Fearon, Kate, and Monica McWilliams. “The Good Friday Agreement: A Triumph of Substance Over Style.” The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. N.p., 1998. Web. 15 Mar. 2018.

The authors provide a meaningful overview of many of the significant elements of the Good Friday which distinguish the agreement from past peace attempts. Published in 1998 without the advantage of how the implementation of the agreement would occur. Even within these parameters the text provides a meaningful analysis of the negotiation process with special emphasis on the role of the Northern Irish Women’s Coalition and their role in the eventual peace agreement. This text was important for our group as it enriched our understanding of the roles played by numerous actors in the negotiation process. Especially the role of the NIWC. All other actors were discussed only in passing and without the level of detail provided to the NIWC.

Höglund, Kristine, and Mimmi Söderberg Kovacs. "Beyond the Absence of War: The Diversity of Peace in Post-Settlement Societies." Review of International Studies 36.2 (2010): 367-90. JSTOR. Web. 15 Mar. 2018.

The authors discuss the concepts of negative and positive peace in the context of Northern Ireland and Cambodia. In their analysis of Northern Ireland, they move past the absence or presence of armed conflict. They focus on what is termed as the “Peace Triangle”, specifically the issues, behaviour, and attitudes in a post conflict state. Through their analysis they paint a thorough picture of the successes and challenges remaining for last and society-wide peace in Northern Ireland. One such area of difficulty is attitudes, as the authors lay out how both the Nationalist and Unionist sides of the Northern Irish conflict remain skeptical of each other, and the Unionists are especially skeptical of the Good Friday Agreement. A rise of extremist parties on both sides is also viewed as a sign of a fragile peace in Northern Ireland. The text provides little background on the conflict but, when combined with historical sources, it provides a sharp critical analysis and highlights the complexities of both peace and conflict in Northern Ireland.

Kumar, Radha. “Northern Ireland.” Negotiating Peace in Deeply Divided Societies: a Set of Simulations, SAGE, 2009, PP.1-64. Print.

Intended and written for use in a classroom simulation, this source provides readers with a basic background overview of the conflict in Northern Ireland. It gives a brief summary of the positions of each of the parties which were present at the Good Friday peace talks as well as a comprehensive and detailed conflict timeline. This timeline was extremely useful in the creation of our own timeline.

Larson, Per. “To Understand the Negotiations Leading to the Good Friday Agreement 1998.” Thesis. Lund University, n.d. Web. 15 Mar. 2018. <http://lup.lub.lu.se/luur/download?func=downloadFile&recordOId=2275657&fileOId=2275658>.

The author examines the psychological theories regarding the negotiations which led to the Good Friday Agreement. The approach is quite scientific and analytical with a strong focus on the behavioral psychology of the negotiations. This paper serves as an excellent tool for those looking to understand the Good Friday Agreement from a perspective outside of the historical lens. To a reader trying to simply gain a background on the conflict and agreement this paper may not be the best resource. However, the paper benefited our group as it examined the agreement through a perspective we had not previously encountered therefore contributing to the depth and breadth of our understanding of the negotiation process and outcomes.

“Loyalist Party Split Over Peace Accord.” BBC News. BBC, 23 Jan. 2001. Web. 13 Mar. 2018.

This news article reports on the splitting of the Ulster Democratic Party (UDP) in January, three months before the Good Friday conference. The article lends useful insight into the UDP’s internal struggles leading up to the peace talks. While the UDP declared its support of the Good Friday Agreement, 14 branches of the UDP demonstrated their opposition to this support by quitting the party. The article includes valuable quotes from Party Chairman John White who characterized the split as worrying but not likely to affect the UDA ceasefire declared in 1994. Quotes by UDP leader Gary McMichael, who insisted only a third of the branches had left, suggest even more disagreement within the party. The article offers readers a look into the complicated workings of the UDP as it prepared to attend the talks in support of the Good Friday Agreement.

Mac Ginty, Roger, Orla T. Muldoon, and Neil Ferguson. "No War, No Peace: Northern Ireland After the Agreement." Political Psychology 28.1 (2007): 1-11. JSTOR. Web. 13 Mar. 2018.

The authors begin by outlining the multudinous areas where the Good Friday agreement has brought meaningful peace to Northern Ireland highlighting the ongoing ceasefire and improved governance and community relations. However, the authors make a clear point that Northern Ireland still has a long way to go before it can be understood as a harmonious democracy. Sectarianism among the two communities remains prevalent and at the time of this text, 10 years after the Good Friday Agreement. This source also provides a concise background of the conflict which added in our overall understanding of the Northern Ireland. The source was particularly useful in outlining some of the continued roadblocks to complete peace in Northern Ireland, especially when cross referenced with more recent sources, at which point we were able to paint a more nuanced picture of the current situation in Northern Ireland.

O’Rourke, Catherine. “Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition.” Encyclopedia Britannica. Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 20 May 2016. Web. 13 Mar. 2018.

This section of the online Encyclopedia Britannica provides a brief overview of the history of the Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition (NIWC) from creation in 1996 to disbandment in 2006. It also explains the coalition’s contributions to the Good Friday Agreement including its involvement in creating provisions for equality (for women) and human rights.

Taylor, Ros. “Who’s Who in Northern Ireland.” The Guardian. Guardian News and Media, 29 Jan. 1999. Web. 13 Mar. 2018.

Ros Taylor of the Guardian provides short summaries of all parties involved in the Good Friday Agreement. Taylor’s article begins with short definitions for frequently used descriptors for parties such as “loyalist” and “unionist”. He then writes short paragraphs for each party, including details about their histories, leaders, composition, values. While the source does not explain the parties’ positions or objectives going into the peace talks, it provides simple descriptions of each party, using the definitions listed at the beginning of the article.

"The Full Text of Tony Blair's Speech in Belfast." The Guardian. Guardian News and Media, 17 Oct. 2002. Web. 15 Mar. 2018.

Tony’s Blair’s speech captured the essence of the complex issues facing the parties post-conflict and post-agreement. His analysis of the outcome of the Good Friday Agreement, presented through this speech, mirrors our own analysis.

Tonge, Jonathan. “From Sunningdale to the Good Friday Agreement: Creating Devolved Government in Northern Ireland”. Taylor and Francis Online. Contemporary British History, 25 June 2008. Web. 15 Mar. 2018.

The authors in this text track some of the parallels between the 1973 Sunningdale agreement and the 1998 Good Friday agreement to how the peace process played out amongst almost 25 years of conflict between the two agreements. Special focus in the text is given to the issue of devolved government. With the views of the the prominent republican and loyalist groups demonstrated alongside that of the British government. The authors provide significant historical background into the failed Sunningdale peace agreement of 1973. Our group gained significant historical context from the text, while simultaneously enriching our understanding of the progression and at time regression of the peace process in Northern Ireland. The focus of the text on the issue of devolution is beneficial as the authors are able to clearly outline the complexities and nuances of what was both a significant issue in negotiations for the agreement and remains a significant issue in Northern Ireland today.

Wolff, Stefan. “The Road to Peace? The Good Friday Agreement and the Conflict in Northern Ireland.” World Affairs, vol. 163, no.4, 2001, pp.163-170. Web. 15 Mar. 2018.

The authors provide a background for the Good Friday agreement touching upon the history, key actors and previous attempts for peace. The text demonstrates the opposing understanding of the conflict within the Loyalist and Nationalist communities and in doing so aided our understanding of the key issues at work in the conflict. The text does not go into the key issues at length and is largely a surface historical account, but through the quality and concision the authors are able to provide a meaningful understanding of the conflict and peace process without going too deeply into the complexities of the conflict and peace agreement. The text outlines several key outcomes of the agreement and the saliency of these outcomes in the peace process of Northern Ireland. These outcomes proved useful in our analysis of the outcomes of the Good Friday agreement. Written in 2001 (three years after the agreement) the text provides three years of outcomes which we were able to build upon with later research to enrich our understanding of the eventual outcomes of the peace process and agreement, in the nearly two decades which have followed the Good Friday agreement.

Full bibliography

A Belfast Man on Patrol for the Irish Republican Army, 1987. Digital image. ATI. ATI, 17 May 2016. Web. 22 Mar. 2018. <http://allthatsinteresting.com/the-troubles-northern-ireland>.

Addley, Esther. “British Troops Leave After 38 Years.” The Guardian. Guardian News and Media, 01 Aug. 2007. Web. 15 Mar. 2018.

Ahern, Bertie. "The Good Friday Agreement: An Overview." Fordham International Law Journal 22.4 (1998): 1194-199. Web. 16 Mar. 2018.

Beesley, Arthur, and Mehreen Khan. "Power-sharing Is Least of Northern Ireland's Problems." Financial Times. N.p., 12 Feb. 2018. Web. 22 Mar. 2018.

Breadun, Deaglan De. “UDA Calls for Yes Vote in Support of Agreement.” The Irish Times. The Irish Times, 25 Apr. 1998. Web. 13 Mar. 2018.

Burntollet March, 1969. Digital image. History Hub. History Hub, n.d. Web. 22 Mar. 2018. <http://historyhub.ie/why-was-there-a-civil-rights-movement-in-northern-ireland>.

“Constitutional Reform: Northern Ireland Good Friday Agreement. Peace Accords Matrix. University of Notre Dame, n.d. Web. 15 Mar. 2018.

Cox, Michael, Adrian Guelke, and Fiona Stephen. "A Farewell to Arms?" Google Books. Manchester University Press, 2006. Web. 15 Mar. 2018.

Fearon, Kate, and Monica McWilliams. “The Good Friday Agreement: A Triumph of Substance Over Style.” The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. N.p., 1998. Web. 15 Mar. 2018.

Good Friday Agreement. Digital image. BBC. BBC, 1998. Web. 22 Mar. 2018. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/events/good_friday_agreement>.

Guyoncourt, Sally. A British soldier drags a Catholic protester during the ‘Bloody Sunday’ massacre on 30 January, 1972. Digital image. The Independent. Independent Digital News and Media, 12 Nov. 2015. Web. 22 Mar. 2018. <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/bloody-sunday-ex-paratroopers-launch-legal-bid-to-halt-murder-inquiry-a6731031.html>.

Imbornoni, Ann Marie. Catholics and Protestants as a Percentage of the Population, 1991 (Map). Digital image. Crawford's World. N.p., n.d. Web. 22 Mar. 2018. <http://www.crawfordsworld.com/rob/apcg/UK/Father/Fatherchronology.htm>.

Kumar, Radha. “Northern Ireland.” Negotiating Peace in Deeply Divided Societies: a Set of Simulations, SAGE, 2009, PP.1-64. Print.

“Loyalist Party Split Over Peace Accord.” BBC News. BBC, 23 Jan. 2001. Web. 13 Mar. 2018.

Mac Ginty, Roger, Orla T. Muldoon, and Neil Ferguson. "No War, No Peace: Northern Ireland After the Agreement." Political Psychology 28.1 (2007): 1-11. JSTOR. Web. 13 Mar. 2018.

Mulberry Bush Pub Wrecked by Bomb in 1974. Digital image. Daily Mail. Daily Mail, n.d. Web. 22 Mar. 2018. <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3620905/Revealed-real-pub-bombers-coroner-orders-Birmingham-inquests-reopened-families-demand-killers-brought-justice-now.html>.

Murdered by the IRA. Digital image. Daily Mirror, 28 Aug. 1979. Web. 22 Mar. 2018. <https://i.pinimg.com/originals/43/10/bb/4310bb20bad8f19bbb8b035ce3885097.jpg>.

O’Rourke, Catherine. “Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition.” Encyclopedia Britannica. Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 20 May 2016. Web. 13 Mar. 2018.

Taylor, Ros. “Who’s Who in Northern Ireland.” The Guardian. Guardian News and Media, 29 Jan. 1999. Web. 13 Mar. 2018.

"The Full Text of Tony Blair's Speech in Belfast." The Guardian. Guardian News and Media, 17 Oct. 2002. Web. 15 Mar. 2018.

Walsh, Jason. "15 years after Good Friday Agreement, an imperfect peace in Northern Ireland". The Christian Science Monitor. Global News Blog. 10 April 2013. Web. 20 Mar. 2018

White, Connor. Sinn Fein Cartoon. Digital image. Unionist Voice. Unionist Voice, 3 Jan. 2018. Web. 22 Mar. 2018. <https://unionistvoice.com/2018/01/03/former-sinn-fein-ira-election-candidate-threatens-legal-action-against-unionist-voice/>.

Wolff, Stefan. “The Road to Peace? The Good Friday Agreement and the Conflict in Northern Ireland.” World Affairs, vol. 163, no.4, 2001, pp.163-170. Web. 15 Mar. 2018.