Weapons Disposal Plan

The Bougainville Peace Agreement weapons disposal plan took into effect after the constitutional amendments implementing the agreement were passed under the PNG Parliament. In order to prevent further delay, any lack of compliance would delay UN authorization of new elections for the Autonomous Bougainville Government (ABG). This led to the withdrawal of the PNGDF as well as arrival of international monitors to oversee Bougainville’s weapons disposal. The United Nations Observer Mission on Bougainville (UNOMB) verified that all parties acted in accordance with the agreed weapons disposal plan. The plan was declared complete in 2005. 

Autonomy Government

One of the objectives of autonomy in the peace agreement was to provide a democratic system of government for Bougainville that meets the standards of good governance– this includes elections. As planned, Bougainville’s first elections were held from May 20 to June 2, 2005. The Autonomous Government of Bougainville was established on June 15 2005, after fair and transparent elections were held, making Joseph Kabui ABG’s first president. Elections are also an important step on the road to lasting peace in Bougainville. 

Independent State of Bougainville

PNG and Bougainville leaders agreed that a referendum on independence would be deferred for 10 to 15 years. It would also be non-binding and subject to approval of the PNG Parliament. To assure that Bougainville’s concerns that this part of the agreement would not be ignored over time, PNG government implemented the referendum in its constitution. Presently, Bougainville’s independence referendum has been scheduled for June 15, 2019. Depending on the extent of ABG’s political success, this will determine outcome of the referendum.

Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA)

Autonomy Government

The BRA supported the idea of high autonomy as they considered it an important process towards independence. Having an autonomous state of Bougainville will allow progress in the domestic capacity of the state while also allowing consensus on independence to develop. An autonomous state will also give Bougainville strict control over the nation’s crucial Panguna mine resulting in growth economically and socially. Therefore, the BRA took the view that autonomy will be the initial process towards independence.

Independent State

The idea of independence from PNG was highly pursued by the BRA. The party’s main position going into the negotiation was obtaining a referendum regarding the independence of Bougainville. The BRA had strong supporters as a majority of Bougainvilleans had wanted independence. The argument for independence from PNG was appropriate considering the drastic differences of ethnic, cultural, and customary values between Bougainville and Papua New Guinea. The BRA had aspirations of uniting all factions of Bougainville through the creation of an independent state.

Weapons Disposal Plan

Due to the failure of many peace accords and ceasefire agreements from both parties, weapons were essential for either party to protect themselves. BRA has acknowledged that a disposal of weapons were essential towards a successful outcome towards the issue of referendum. However, they only agreed to disposing of weapons after satisfactory outcomes regarding the political issues of autonomy and independence.

Bougainville Interim Government (BIG)

Autonomy Government

The BIG was created by the BRA as a as a form of legitimate authority in Bougainville. Therefore, this party possesses similar perspectives as the BRA towards achieving an autonomous government.

Independent State

The BIG was created by the BRA as a form of legitimate authority in Bougainville. Therefore, this party possesses similar perspectives as the BRA towards achieving an independent state.

Weapons Disposal Plan

The BIG was created by the BRA as a form of legitimate authority in Bougainville. Therefore, this party possesses similar perspectives as the BRA towards weapons disarmament.

Bougainville Transitional Government / Bougainville People’s Congress (BTG/BPC)

Autonomy Government

The BPC was created as a representative body and it mainly composed of elected members from the BTG, therefore, they would possess identical perspectives. The BTG/BPC possessed a less radical stance than the BRA as they persisted after building bridges between the factions in Bougainville. Therefore, they strongly supported the idea of an autonomous government as it would resolve the localised conflicts.

Independent State

As the BTG/BPC are a more moderate party, the idea of independence was less favoured among the members. However, they conformed with BRA’s radical viewpoint towards achieving independence in order to garner their aspirations of an autonomous government.

Weapons Disposal Plan

The disarmament of weapons is an essential step towards building bridges between the factions of Bougainville and creating a safe reconciliation environment for the factions of Bougainville.

Bougainville Resistance Force (BRF)

Autonomy Government

The BRF was represented by the BTG/BPC during the peace talks. Therefore, they had identical perspectives as the BTG/BPC

Independent State

The BRF was represented by the BTG/BPC during the peace talks. Therefore, they had identical perspectives as the BTG/BPC

Weapons Disposal Plan

The BRF was represented by the BTG/BPC during the peace talks. Therefore, they had identical perspectives as the BTG/BPC

Papua New Guinea (PNG)

Autonomy Government

The PNG government was against the idea of an autonomous government for Bougainville as the PNG government were more concerned regarding the sovereignty of Papua New Guinea. However, the government positioned peace as the main goal through restoring civil services and disposing weapons which will allow the fragile state of Bougainville to rejuvenate before the discussions of autonomy unfolds.

Independent State

The sovereignty for PNG was the main priority going into the peace talks. However, they were opposed to the idea of independence for Bougainville. The PNG officials were against Bougainville’s demands because they believed that creating and maintaining peace should be the focus while political settlements such as independence will be discussed after re-establishing a stable nation.

Weapons Disposal Plan

Disposal of weapons were a crucial aspect of PNG’s negotiation position as they strived towards achieving peace between the two nations. The disposal of weapons by rebel groups will subsequently restore civil authority (police, courts, and prisons) and civil services leading to restoration of the fragile state of PNG.

New Zealand

Autonomy Government

As New Zealand was a third-party mediator, they had a neutral position regarding this issue

Independent State

As New Zealand was a third-party mediator, they had a neutral position regarding this issue

Weapons Disposal Plan

As New Zealand was a third-party mediator, they had a neutral position regarding this issue

Non - Political Groups (Women’s Groups, Church Leaders, Chief Leaders)

Autonomy Government

They attempted to provide unity and maintained pressure on the Bougainville and PNG governments to continue to search for peace. They did believe that autonomy for Bougainville will result in a peaceful resolution.

Independent State

The role of the non-political groups were to enable a reconciliation process upon the dividing groups. Therefore, they believe that a unity of all groups in Bougainville will result in peace illustrating that an independent state would be beneficial for the long-term.

Weapons Disposal Plan

As the women’s groups, church leaders, and chief leaders of Bougainville primarily focused on reconciliation and restoring unity between the dividing factions of Bougainville, they supported strongly of a weapons disposal plan

Australia

Autonomy Government

The Australian government played a significant role towards hosting the Cairns I talks and providing aid towards Bougainville. However, they were not formally invited in the peace talks. Nevertheless, they did not support the idea of Bougainville possessing an autonomous government. The Bougainville Copper Mine (BCL) was a subsidiary of Cozinc Rio Tinto, a influential Australian company. Therefore, the creation of an autonomous government would diminish Australian’s control over the Panguna mine.

Independent State

As they were opposed of an autonomous state of Bougainville, they did support the sovereignty of Papua New Guinea (PNG). If PNG continued to remain an independent state with Bougainville incorporated then it will be beneficial for the Australian government

Weapons Disposal Plan

Peace was an important concept that the Australian government focused on. A strong reaction occurred when mercernaries by the PNG were introduced into the Bougainville conflict. Although, the Australian government supports the PNG government, it is evident that they approved of a weapons disposal for both parties as a method of establishing unity between them.

A civil strife that has haunted the state of Papua New Guinea (PNG) has reached its anticipated conclusion through the rebuilding of trust between PNG and Bougainville. The process towards obtaining the Bougainville Peace Agreement contained a prolonged history of conflicts that included a devastating civil war, multiple peace talks, and the intervention of a third party mediator to arrive at its final state. Therefore, the Bougainville peace talks are undisputedly successful because of the ethical outcomes that were produced from this extensive history of conflicts. Furthermore, with the incorporation of Track I, II, and III diplomacies, the potential for a sustainable peace has been created. This paper will examine the resolution of the extensive history of conflicts which led to the creation of sustainable peace illustrating the success of the Bougainville peace talks.

The prosperity of the Bougainville peace talks was created through repairing the fractured relationship between Bougainville and PNG. The Bougainville conflict originated from the Bougainvilleans’ dissatisfaction towards a joint identity between the two nations after the effects of World War I. This led to colonial exploitation by Australia towards Bougainville’s Paguna mine which was a fundamental aspect in the local economic sector. The creation of the Bougainville Copper Agreement resulted in significant social, environmental, and economic disruption in Bougainville. As a result, the Bougainville Civil War commenced due to the landowners dissatisfaction towards the treatment of their land. This civil war prolonged for decades due to the failed agreement of eight peace negotiations. Considering the conflicting perspectives that PNG and Bougainville possessed, the success of the peace talks are definite as a resolution seemed unreachable during the process. Ultimately, PNG seeked for peace among the two parties due to the exhaustive state that warfare has situated themselves in. On the contrary, Bougainville achieved their objective of obtaining an autonomous government with the ability to have a non-binding referendum to vote for an independent state of Bougainville. Therefore, the settlement that was arrived at has brought PNG and Bougainville onto agreeable terms recreating unity between the two parties.

The satisfactory outcomes reached by Bougainville and PNG has created sustainable peace between the two parties. This sustainable and positive peace has been created through the usage of a multi-track diplomacy which incorporates all Track I, II, and III diplomacies (Ramsbotham 25). The incorporation of all three tracks allows the corporation between government level officials, non-governmental organizations, and citizens creating a mutual understanding between them. Therefore, this method creates the possibility for achieving a positive peace where all levels of the society are in agreement. The importance of achieving the highest level of track diplomacy was the pivotal moment in the peace talks. The continuous failed peace processes between Bougainville and PNG illustrated the idea of a hurting stalemate where there was a mutual deadlock creating disadvantages for both parties (Zartman 1). However, with New Zealand’s usage of a third party intervention, it eventually led to the creation of a ripe moment where unreachable proposals are obtainable due to the usage of a mediator (Zartman 1). Therefore, after the occurence of the ripe moment, Track I negotiations began between Bougainville and PNG which illustrated the turning point in the peace processes. It is evident that after the incorporation of Track I diplomacy, the efficiency of the peace talks between the two parties increased. Government officials are situated into discussion during Track I diplomacy allowing for discussion of important national issues regarding autonomy, independence and weapons disposal in a political arena. Subsequently, this allowed for Track II and I diplomacies to occur peacefully between the two nations. Church leaders among the nations, representing track II are cooperating while local citizens representing track III are uniting. With the participation and agreement between all three levels of diplomacy, a sustainable peace is able to develop as all levels of society are in unity. The illustration of multi-track diplomacy has created a positive peace in Bougainville.

The success of the peace talks is illustrated through the unity of Bougainville and PNG after decades of conflict. Disputes over identity, autonomy and independence created the foundation of the Bougainville conflict. Ultimately, it is the resolution of these unconquerable controversies which demonstrates the success of the peace talks. Additionally, the usage of multi track diplomacy creates agreement through all levels of society which has the potential for sustainable peace in Bougainville. The ability to resolve the conflict ridden history between Bougainville and PNG ultimately illustrated the substantial success of the peace talks.

Bougainville Copper Agreement(June 1967):

http://www.paclii.org/pg/legis/PG-consol_act_1986/mcaa344.pdf

Endeavour Accord(August 5, 1990)

https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/PG_900805_EndeavourDialogueServicesBougainville.pdf

Tambea Accord (August 27, 1994): https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/PG_940827_TambeaRecord.pdf

Honiara Declaration (January 23, 1997) http://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/fullpeace/PNG%2019910123.pdf

Burnham Declaration(July 18, 1997) https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/resources/collections/peace_agreements/bougain_19970718.pdf

Lincoln Agreement(January 23, 1998)

https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/PG_980123_LincolnAgreement.pdf

Arawa Agreement (April 30, 1998):

http://theirwords.org/media/transfer/doc/1_pg_big_bra_brf_1998_03-4f272744f60ed481787d5fe189c67ae4.pdf

Matakana and Okataina Understanding(April 22, 1999): 

https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/PG_990422_Matakana%20and%20Okataina%20understanding.pdf

Bougainville Peace Agreement(August 30, 2001)

http://www.abg.gov.pg/uploads/documents/BOUGAINVILLE_PEACE_AGREEMENT_2001.pdf

Hammond, Timothy G. “Resolving Hybrid Conflicts: The Bougainville Story.” Foreign Policy Jounal. 22 December 2012.

Hammond provides a summary of the Bougainville conflict, and describes the “hybrid” form of warfare that has waged on for years, portraying the complexity of the conflict. Despite the social and natural resource disruption, peace building mechanisms for the re-building and resource management of Bougainville was achieved due to the Western model of political order. Furthermore, Hammond states that peace-building is most effective and long lasting when it is valued by communities and individuals at the grassroots level. Grassroots movements legitimized the success of Bougainville by incorporating their own traditional and cultural norms into the western methods of peace-and-state-building. In addition, Hammond emphasizes the role women played in peace process as they were key actors in peacemaking and negotiations, and put aside their differences in order to come together to create one Bougainvillean voice. The case of Bougainville provides hope and possibility for the peaceful resolution of intrastate hybrid conflicts, as long as people remain innovative and dedicated.

“Chronology of Bougainville Civil War” Pacific Island Report. Pireport.org. Accessed 26 March 2018.

This is a brief timeline that shows the key dates of the Bougainville civil war up until 1998. It also includes how Bougainville got its name, and the Japanese occupation in 1942.

Lees, Sean. “Bougainville Peace Agreement, The Burnham I and II Dialogues” UNDP Pacific Center. Accessed 26 March 2018.  

This journal article on the Bougainville Peace Agreement, focuses largely on Burnham I and II talks. The chronological layout of the article is effective, starting with context, problem, process, actors, challenges, breakthroughs, and results and values. It explains the the issues pertaining to the mine and the already-existing conflict over Bougainvillean identity and sovereignty that ignited a rebellion which turned into a destructive struggle for power; thereafter the decades long civil war. It also provides a comprehensive, in-depth description of the main grievances that were caused by the conflict and how the peace process attempted to address the issues. While the article mainly presents an overview of the Bougainville problem and peace process, illustrates the many levels of actors from Tracks 1, 2 and 3 that made trust, unity and eventual peace possible in the region.

Phillips, Keri. “Bougainville at a crossroads: independence and the mine.”  2 June 2015. http://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs. Accessed 26 March 2018.

Phillips provides historical background of the Panguna mine to explain the present repercussions that still occur in Bougainville, as it leads up to the referendum on independence from PNG. She states that the island’s mining is controlled by the ABG, whereas the others are controlled by the national government. However, the island is still divided regarding the issue of mining as landowners are concerned about the reopening as well as environmental effects. The issue is yet to be determined; the government faces pressure how to proceed with the matter, especially with the impending referendum. 

“Papua New Guinea– Bougainville.” Conciliation Resources. 2002. http://www.c-r.org/accord/papua-new-guinea%E2%80%93bougainville. Accessed 27 March 2018.

The PNG Accord is a negotiated settlement and outlines the efforts made to succeed at bringing greater unity to the Bougainvillean government and ending the organized violence. It describes the indigenous peace process that was incorporated with the western peace model, drawing on the strengths of Melanesian traditions. By merging the two values, strengths from both benefited from the roles of third parties. The Accord also includes the chronology of events, agreements and profiles of key people and institutions involved.

“Joint Creation, the Bougainville Peace Agreement– and beyond.” Accord 12. 2001. http://www.c-r.org/downloads/Accord%2012_10'Joint%20creation'_2002_ENG.pdf. Accessed 27 March 2018.

Wolfers reviews the process of Bougainville’s legitimate and successful peace process (the Burnham talks). The reviews the principles and activities covered in the Lincoln agreement and how this impacted the public and private sectors. Many of the other journal articles speak positively of the progress made, however Wolfers also acknowledges subsequent misunderstandings, frustrations and modest confrontations that arose during the peace process. This is important because some articles provide the false perception that Burnham peace process onwards were smooth sailing. Wolfers highlights the small bumps in the peace process that were eventually overcome. While the Bougainville agreement was large achievement considering the region’s extensive historical conflict, Wolfers states that peace-building is an ongoing process that does not stop at the peace agreement. Permanent peace in the region requires ongoing process of consultation and cooperation in establishing, developing and operating the ‘joint creation’ established in the agreement.

Antonino Adamo (2017) A Cursed and Fragmented Island: History and Conflict Analysis in Bougainville, Papua New Guinea, Small Wars & Insurgencies, 29:1, 164-186.

No single factor can best explain the civil war; Adamo uses history, economy and traditional social aspects of the island, the effects of colonization, to identify the various factors that led to the civil war. The main assumption is that the conflict cannot be explained by just one reason. Adamo considers the ecological factor, further investigates this through the resource curse theory;– the presents of natural resources leading to economic failure; the existence of ethnic cleavages, etc.

Nisira, Patrick. “Leadership Challenges for the Autonomous Bougainville Government.” Australian National University. 2017

Based on the speech by Hon. Patrick Nisira, this paper discusses the leadership challenges of the ABG. Even though the bloody civil war has ended, there still various forms of conflict, tension and divisions that continue in the region. The paper states the various leadership challenges (and are of special importance to Bougainville’s future) such as divisions/factions, the infant Bougainville police force, capacity of the public service and the transfer of powers from the National Government to the ABG, etc. While the ABG faces these issues, the discussion sheds light on finding realistic ways to address them.

Carl, A. & Garasu, L. Weaving consensus, the Papua New Guinea–Bougainville peace process. Conciliation Resources. 2002

This article discusses the matrix of the Bougainvillean negotiation options and maps the major language groups of Bougainville. This article is particularly distinct from others because it discusses the perspective of a local Bougainvillean, James Tanis, in the peace building process. Tanis focuses his experience of reconciliation in his own Nagovisi community (southwest of Bougainville): conflicts can be passed down from one generation to the next, which would often be communicated to the other side through a mutual party. It was common for a conflict to escalate due to the involvement of other parties. His article this provides us the understanding of the nature of traditional conflicts and conflict resolution.

Carl, A. & Garasu, L. Weaving consensus, the Papua New Guinea–Bougainville peace process. Conciliation Resources. 2002

This document lists all the key texts and agreements relating to the PNG-Bougainville peace process. It starts with the Bougainville Agreement in 1976 and ends with the 2001 peace agreement. It even includes minor statements and letters by written by the President of the Security Council and the UN Secretary General. Furthermore, the document lists the role and status regarding the peace agreement.

Zartman, W. “The Timing of Peace Initiatives: Hurting Stalemates and Ripe Moments.” The Global Review of Ethnopolitics. September 2018. P8-18

In this article, Zartman recognizes the importance of timing of efforts for reconciliation. A ripe moment is often accompanied by hurting stalemate; parties are able to resolve the conflict only when they are mutually ready to do so. Zartman states that as the notion of ripeness implies, MHS can be a very fleeting opportunity, a moment to be seized lest it pass, or it can be of a long duration, waiting to be noticed and acted upon by mediators. Finding the ripe moment is a skill to be provided in negotiations.

References

Antonino Adamo (2017) A Cursed and Fragmented Island: History and Conflict Analysis in Bougainville, Papua New Guinea, Small Wars & Insurgencies, 29:1, 164-186.

“Bougainville Peace Agreement.” (August 2001).

Carl, A. & Garasu, L. Weaving consensus, the Papua New Guinea–Bougainville peace process. Conciliation Resources. 2002

“Chronology of Bougainville Civil War” Pacific Island Report. Pireport.org. Accessed 26 Mar 2018.

Hammond, Timothy G. “Resolving Hybrid Conflicts: The Bougainville Story.” Foreign Policy Journal. 22 December 2012.

“Joint Creation, the Bougainville Peace Agreement– and beyond.” Accord 12. 2001. http://www.c-r.org/downloads/Accord%2012_10'Joint%20creation'_2002_ENG.pdf Accessed 27 March 2018.

Lees, Sean. “Bougainville Peace Agreement, The Burnham I and II Dialogues” UNDP Pacific Center. Accessed 26 Mac 2018.   

“Matakana & Okatania Understanding” (April 1999). Accessed 25 March 2018.

“Mining(Bougainville Copper Agreement).” (June 1967) Accessed 25 March 2018.

Nisira, Patrick. “Leadership Challenges for the Autonomous Bougainville Government.” Australian National University. 2017

Nisira, Patrick. “Leadership Challenges for the Autonomous Bougainville Government.” Australian National University. 2017

“Papua New Guinea– Bougainville.” Conciliation Resources. 2002 http://www.c-r.org/accord/papua-new-guinea%E2%80%93bougainville. Accessed 27 March 2018.

Phillips, Keri. “Bougainville at a crossroads: independence and the mine.”  2 June 2015. http://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs. Accessed 26 March 2018.  

Spriggs, Matthew. “Endeavour Accord on Dialogue And Return of Services to Bougainville.”

(August 1990). 25 March 2018 Accessed.

“Tambea Accord.” (August 1994). Accessed 25 March 2018.

“The Arawa Agreement.” (April 1998). Accessed 25 March 2018.

UCDP. “The Honiara Declaration.” UCDP. (January 1991). Accessed 25 March 2018.

United Nations. “Lincoln Agreement.” Security Council. (March 2018). Accessed 25 March 2018.

United States Institute Of Peace. “Peace Agreements Digital Collection.” United States Institute

of Peace. (April 2002). Accessed 25 March 2018.  

Zartman, W. “The Timing of Peace Initiatives: Hurting Stalemates and Ripe Moments.” The Global Review of Ethnopolitics. September 2018. P8-18