On April 6, 1994 after years of civil war and in-fighting, the tension between the Tutsi-majority Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and the Hutu-majority Rwanda Government Forces (RGF) reached a breaking point (1). The plane of Hutu president Juvenal Habyarimana was shot down by unknown perpetrators, however, the RGF and Hutu militias, or Interahamwe, blamed it on the Tutsis and used it as justification to begin violently targeting the Tutsi population and non-Tutsi sympathizers (2). Genocide ensued and roughly 1 million Tutsis were murdered between April 7th and July 18th 1994, all while the international community and the UN stood by paralyzed and hesitant to intervene (3). In the aftermath of the genocide, various truth and reconciliation mechanisms (TRCs) were established to seek justice for the victims and their families and to promote healing throughout the nation. Reconciliation is itself a contested term, but Johan Galtung describes it as “a theme with deep psychological, sociological, theological, philosophical, and profoundly human roots—and nobody really knows how to successfully achieve it” (4). In the Rwandan context, TRCs were established on the international, national and local levels: the UN created the International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda (ICTR) and the new Rwandan government under RPF leader Paul Kagame implemented a system based on the framework of traditional courts, known as gacaca (5). The gacaca are small community-organized courts that were traditionally used in Rwandan communities to resolve interpersonal disputes by emphasizing restorative justice, rather than punitive justice (6). In the following analysis, we will be focusing primarily on the gacaca rather than on the ICTR and the national courts.

1 Taylor, Christopher C. Sacrifice as Terror: The Rwandan Genocide of 1994. London, Routledge. 1999: 1.
2 Taylor, Christopher C. Sacrifice as Terror: The Rwandan Genocide of 1994. 12.
3 Dona, Giorgia. “‘Situated Bystandership’ During and After the Rwandan Genocide.” Journal of Genocide Research, 2018: 2.
4 Galtung, Johan. “After Violence, Reconstruction, Reconciliation and Resolution.” In: Abu-Nimer M (ed) Reconciliation, Justice and Coexistence: Theory and Practice, 2001. 4.
5 Burnet, Jennie E. “The Injustice of Local Justice: Truth, Reconciliation, and Revenge in Rwanda.” Genocide Studies and Prevention, 2008: 173-174.
6 Burnet, Jennie E. “The Injustice of Local Justice: Truth, Reconciliation, and Revenge in Rwanda.” 176.

TRCs and other peacebuilding mechanisms should be constructed differently depending on the nature of the conflict as well as the geographical, cultural, and social context and will similarly have to address varying issues. The UN in Security Council Resolution 955 stated that the main goal of the ICTR was “prosecuting persons responsible for genocide and other serious violations of international law.” (1) On the other hand, Burnet says that the main issues to be addressed by the gacaca were ending impunity, promoting reconciliation, and determining the “real truth of what happened during the Genocide.” (2) Thus, on the international level, the greatest issue to be addressed was taking legal action against the leaders and perpetrators of the genocide, while the gacaca placed more emphasis on offering both survivors and perpetrators a mechanism to engage in a more holistic healing process.

1 United Nations Security Council Resolution 955, [Establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda]. 1994: 2.
2 Burnet, Jennie E. “The Injustice of Local Justice: Truth, Reconciliation, and Revenge in Rwanda.” Genocide Studies and Prevention, 2008: 174.

Before presenting the various institutional bodies or armed groups that represent the primary domestic actors, it is essential to understand the role of ethnic groups in shaping the domestic environment in both the context of the genocide and the reconciliation period. The conflict is usually understood as a clash between Hutus and Tutsis, the two primary ethnic groups whose identities were constructed through obscure and racialized Belgian colonial policies. Prior to the genocide, the ethnic makeup of the country was as follows: 80-85% Hutu, 15-20% Tutsi, and less than 1% Batwa, or Twa (1). It is incredibly important to note that the distinctions between the different ethnic groups are widely superficial and were only made relevant by the Belgian colonists: most Rwandans, whether Hutu, Tutsi, or Twa, are Christian, engage in cattle herding and agriculture and have similar physiognomy (2). Thus, it must be recognized that much of the hatred between Hutus and Tutsis that culminated in the genocide was greatly fabricated by colonialism so as to create a divided, and more easily governable population. Not only is it crucial to understand that these ethnic divisions were greatly manufactured, but it is also important to approach the genocide as not solely a conflict in which Hutus were always the perpetrators and the Tutsis were always the victims (3). While the primary target of the genocide was definitely the Tutsi minority, Hutu sympathizers, members of the political opposition, and Twa people were killed as well. It is estimated that 10,000 Twa, or 30% of the total Twa population in Rwanda, was killed during the genocide (4). Similarly, many Rwandans, no matter their ethnic affiliation, cannot be considered as perpetrators or victims, but should be analyzed as “situated bystanders”, or those who were not victims of direct violence but who did not attempt to stop acts of violence being committed against others (5). Thus, while these three ethnic groups should certainly be considered as prominent domestic actors, their identities should not be understood as fixed along the lines of perpetrator or victim.

RPF (The Rwandan Patriotic Front): The RPF is a Tutsi-majority military force comprising and supporting the post-genocide government (6). They support all government mandates and were exempt from the gacaca trials regardless of their crimes during the genocide. The RPF pushes a national unity agenda, one that idealizes a “docile and obedient” population where any attempts at disagreement are quashed with the large amount of political power held by the RPF (7).

National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC): Set up in 1999 by the government and confirmed in the 2003 constitution, the NURC is made up of various governmental actors and bodies with the goal of promoting unity and reconciliation through education, legislation, and other means (8). Most importantly, the NURC was consulted in the development of Organic Law No. 40/2000 which established the gacaca court system, and was the primary body responsible for organizing and coordinating the ingando (9).
Inyangamugayo: In the gacaca courts, the elected judges, or inyangamugayo (‘‘persons of integrity,’’ i.e. community elders), are responsible for serving as both judge and jury (10). The exact rules, expectations, and internal makeup of the inyangamugayo are laid out in Rwandan Organic Law No. 40/2000.

AVEGA: The Association of Genocide Widows, or AVEGA-Agahozo, was formed by a group of widows in 1995 to provide services to other widows, rape victims, orphans, and vulnerable members of Rwandan society. AVEGA-Agahozo has been a vital organization at the center of helping Rwandans navigate the new post-genocide reality by providing essential resources like health care, counselling, and legal services to the most marginalized in society.

Abunze Ubumwe Association: Founded in 2007, Abunze Ubumwe Association is an organization that strives to promote unity and reconciliation amongst Rwandans in the Mukura Sector. Its members created the association after being trained in conflict prevention and management techniques by the organization La Benevolencija, with a particular focus on economic cooperation and reparations.

1 Taylor, Christopher C. Sacrifice as Terror: The Rwandan Genocide of 1994. London, Routledge. 1999: 39.
2 Taylor, Christopher C. Sacrifice as Terror: The Rwandan Genocide of 1994. 40.
3 Dona, Giorgia. “‘Situated Bystandership’ During and After the Rwandan Genocide.” Journal of Genocide Research , 2018: 5.
4 Collins, Bennett, Meghan C. Laws and Richard Ntakirutimana. “Becoming ‘Historically Marginalized Peoples’: examining Twa perceptions of boundary shifting and re-categorization in post-genocide Rwanda.” Ethnic and Racial Studies, 2020: 6.
5 Dona, Giorgia. “‘Situated Bystandership’ During and After the Rwandan Genocide.” 2.
6 Sullo, Pietro. Beyond Genocide: Transitional Justice and Gacaca Courts in Rwanda. International Criminal Justice Series, vol 20, 2018: 231.
7 Burnet, Jennie E. “The Injustice of Local Justice: Truth, Reconciliation, and Revenge in Rwanda.” Genocide Studies and Prevention, 2008: 376-377.
8 Sullo, Pietro. Beyond Genocide: Transitional Justice and Gacaca Courts in Rwanda. 169.
9 Ibid, 232.
10 Burnet, Jennie E. “The Injustice of Local Justice: Truth, Reconciliation, and Revenge in Rwanda.” 174.

The large majority of work on Truth and Reconciliation in Rwanda occurred domestically. But due to the response to the genocide, international actors do play an important role in the Truth and Reconciliation trajectory. The actor most involved, developed in part and operated in part by an external actor, was The International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda which had the initial task after the genocide of organizing the post-conflict response and courts due to Rwanda’s lack of a robust judicial system (1). Offices were located in Kigali, Rwanda, Arusha, Tanzania, and The Hague, Netherlands. It was established by the UN and worked through the late 1990s to prosecute genocide crimes and set international precedents regarding the criminal prosecution of genocide (2). The United Nations has assisted Rwanda on these large projects since the beginning of the reconciliation process.
Additionally, individual countries played important roles in post-genocide reconstruction. Extradition of Rwandan genocide perpetrators has been going on since the end of the genocide. Most recently, Rwanda is calling on the Netherlands to extradite a reported ‘mastermind’ of the genocide so he may be retried after originally going through the Gacaca courts (3). Some international actors, such as Canada have tried Rwandan genocide perpetrators on their own soil (4). During the genocide, most international actors stood idle. In addition to the countries that have acted as bystanders or participated in extradition, Belgium is one of the actors that has attempted to try Genocide perpetrators within their territorial borders (5).

More immediate neighbours of Rwanda have had roles to play in the extradition process or have been drawn into the greater political turmoil in the aftermath of the genocide because of their geographical proximity. In particular, Zaire (later renamed the DRC), Tanzania, Burundi, and Uganda found themselves becoming deeply involved in domestic Rwandan legal issues related to the genocide as so many Rwandans had been forced to flee as refugees and now lived within their borders (6). The government’s of these countries also had to navigate a new regional political order, and to some, the prospect of a weakened Rwandan state was actually ideal.
Organizations unaffiliated with the Rwandan Government or foreign governments also contributed to the analysis of the Rwandan reconciliation programs by providing assistance or commentary. In 1998, the Organization of African Unity developed the International Panel Of Eminent Personalities (IPEP): Report On The 1994 Genocide In Rwanda And Surrounding Events which investigated the Rwandan genocide and what could have been done to prevent it. In addition, it was to “recommend measures aimed at redressing the consequences of the genocide and at preventing any possible recurrence of such a crime” (7).

1 Sullo, Pietro. Beyond Genocide: Transitional Justice and Gacaca Courts in Rwanda. International Criminal Justice Series, vol 20, 2018: 101.
2 Burnet, Jennie E. “The Injustice of Local Justice: Truth, Reconciliation, and Revenge in Rwanda.” Genocide Studies and Prevention, 2008: 174.
3 Mutanganshuro, Lavie. “Genocide: Rwanda seeks Ndereyehe extradition from Netherlands” New Times, September 9, 2020. https://www.newtimes.co.rw/news/genocide-rwanda-seeks-ndereyehe-extradition-netherlands.
4 Burnet, Jennie E. “The Injustice of Local Justice: Truth, Reconciliation, and Revenge in Rwanda.” 175.
5 Ibid, 174.
6 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). "Chapter 10: The Rwandan genocide and its aftermath". In: The State of the World’s Refugees 2000: 50 Years of Humanitarian Action. 2000: 246.
7 “International Panel Of Eminent Personalities (IPEP): Report On The 1994 Genocide In Rwanda and Surrounding Events (Selected Sections).” International Legal Materials, 2001: 142.

The TRC in Rwanda experienced structural issues with the power dynamics in play with the gacaca system. The Tutsis had a large amount of power over the creation of gacaca and the appointment of judges (1). The perpetrators who went through the Gacaca system, and then the ingando in many cases, to then be released back into their home communities tended to find the process to be one-sided and largely ignored the atrocities committed against the Hutu population (2).
Aside from the power dynamics, the gacaca courts were also largely not supported by the international community. The courts do not conform to traditional judicial standards. The international human rights community were particularly critical of the gacaca as many believed it violated the rights of the accused by barring them from seeking proper legal counsel, cross-examining witnesses of the prosecution, or calling their own witnesses to support their defence (3).

Another barrier to the success of the gacaca was the geopolitical issue related to the refugee crisis in the aftermath of the genocide. After the genocide and the establishment of the RPF-led government, it was estimated that roughly two million Hutus fled the country to neighbouring Zaire, Tanzania, Burundi, and Uganda (4). As many of these refugees were ex-Rwandan Government Forces or members of the Interahamwe, the new government faced the issue of bringing them back to Rwanda to try them at the gacaca. The issue of enacting justice now involved multiple state actors, making the legal context more complex as the Rwandan government had to respect the domestic laws of its neighbouring countries. Repatriation of suspected genocidaires also became increasingly political: for example in the DRC, President Mobutu actually wanted the Hutu refugees and militias to stay in the eastern part of the country as he hoped their presence would deter any political dissent by the Congolese in that region (5).

The gacaca framework widely relied on the presumption that the genocide was enacted by perpetrators against victims, however, Dona (6) notes that understanding identities in the genocide as a binary is limiting and inaccurate. The issue did come up whether bystanders or those who did not explicitly engage in violence but similarly did not take action to stop it, could be brought before the gacaca and potentially accused of crimes of neglect or complicity (7). Actions like standing at roadblocks or attending meetings to discuss anti-Tutsi violence were some examples of potentially insidious conduct, however, they could not be tried through legal mechanisms because of their inexplicit nature (8). Ultimately, the greater gacaca system did not choose to address the role of bystanders, however, the issue still remained a question for many Rwandans in the post-conflict, reconciliation context.

1 Sullo, Pietro. Beyond Genocide: Transitional Justice and Gacaca Courts in Rwanda. International Criminal Justice Series, vol 20, 2018: 195
2 Clark, Phil. In The Gacaca Courts, Post-Genocide Justice and Reconciliation in Rwanda: Justice without Lawyers, 2010: 123.
3 Burnet, Jennie E. “The Injustice of Local Justice: Truth, Reconciliation, and Revenge in Rwanda.” Genocide Studies and Prevention, 2008: 176.
4 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Chapter 10: The Rwandan genocide and its aftermath. In: The State of the World’s Refugees 2000: 50 Years of Humanitarian Action. 2000: 246.
5 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Chapter 10: The Rwandan genocide and its aftermath. 252.
6 Dona, Giorgia. “‘Situated Bystandership’ During and After the Rwandan Genocide.” Journal of Genocide Research, 2018: 16.
7 Dona, Giorgia. “‘Situated Bystandership’ During and After the Rwandan Genocide.” 16.
8 Ibid, 17.

The Truth and Reconciliation Process in Rwanda provided small communities with the opportunity to hold genocide perpetrators responsible, attempt to heal the emotional wounds, and discover the truth of the actions during the genocide. The degree to which it delivered is heavily criticized as the aftermath of the proceedings is debated within Rwanda and in the international peacebuilding community. Critics indicate that although framed as such, Rwanda’s gacaca courts do not exemplify “transitional justice”, but rather an addition to the institutionalized power dynamics that aim to tell a particular truth (1). P. Sullo highlights the gacaca system did not ensure fair trials “in substantive terms” (2). The gacaca courts had problems with investigations, inconsistent or inefficient punishments, and intimidation against witnesses (3). Genocidaires, or perpetrators of the genocide, who engaged in the gacaca were often given reduced sentences for simply confessing, thus many individuals before the gacaca would confess to lesser crimes for a shorter sentence (4). Burnet describes this deviation from the truth as being in part informed by actions of groups known as ceceka, or “keep quiet,” who advocate for a code of silence before the gacaca courts (5). Actions undertaken in Rwanda in the name of memorializing have also contributed to the disconnectedness of the Hutu community. As Jennie Burnet identifies that “The Rwandan government’s genocide commemorations and national mourning practices generate a polarizing discourse that defines all Tutsi as genocide victims and all Hutu as genocide perpetrators”(6). Both the gacaca courts and the memorializing thus reinforce Tutsi power, even in the supposedly more community-based approaches, and make the reconciliation process less effective. In this sense, the gacaca has become a system of “victor’s justice,” where the “winning” side (in this case the Tutsi) can manipulate the process to enact retribution (7).

Because of these asymmetric power dynamics and inter-ethnic divisions that informed the process, the gacaca court system was ultimately used by many to enact revenge rather than to achieve reconciliation. Burnet gives one example of a Tutsi man accusing the widow of a Hutu man of crimes of genocide through gacaca but only because he held a personal grudge against her husband from years ago as he thought the man had received a job promotion meant for him (8). This is one of many instances where individuals used the gacaca to exploit their personal grievances or voice old grudges that were not always related directly to the genocide. Even if individuals did not use gacaca to enact explicit revenge, many still understood the process as a way to punish, rather than reconcile: as one survivor, Gilbert Masengo Rusayisire, said, “Here is what I want: all people who hurt us should be punished. If not, I don’t see where this unity and reconciliation will come from.” (9)

Another aspect of the reconciliation process that has been criticized was its general inadequacy in addressing gender-based violence (GBV) and trying suspected perpetrators of rape through the established legal mechanisms. After the genocide, it was determined that sexually motivated crimes would be tried by the ICTR and the national courts, rather than the gacaca (10). During this period, it was found that 90% of convictions handed down by the ICTR contained no reference to GBV and, whatsmore, there were twice as many acquittals for rape charges, as there were rape convictions (11). Jurisdiction over GBV-related crimes was passed on to the gacaca in 2008 however this did not solve the issue: it was estimated that roughly 250,000 women, both Hutu and Tutsi, were raped during the genocide however only 6608 cases were given to the gacaca to administer (12). The reason that such few cases were passed on to the gacaca could be in part due to the public nature of the courts: many felt that testifying in such a public setting could be traumatizing and embarrassing for victims of GBV (13). However, there were greater structural issues with the gacaca that led to the sidelining of GBV issues. As gacaca was meant to be a local, community-based system, the judges, or inyangamugayo, were chosen from the civilian population, however, this came with issues of its own: reports have shown there were some cases where rapists were actually on the judges panel overseeing cases related to GBV (14).
Susan Thomson highlights that the local, community focus of the Rwandan reconciliation attempts mask the power dynamics at play and that the gacaca system, although “local” is a state-run system of justice (15). Steps towards reconciliation and justice, (as Sullo indicates is of high importance to Rwandans) have been made, with the adoption of Organic Law No. 08/1996 which organized and set out punishments and procedures for convicting the crimes of genocide (16), the 2003 Rwandan Constitution, and the installment of the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission. However, these efforts have mostly fallen short as the system has glaring holes regarding Gender-Based Violence and the gacaca courts were susceptible to manipulation.

1 Geraghty, Mark Anthony. “Gacaca, Genocide, Genocide Ideology: The Violent Aftermaths of Transitional Justice in the New Rwanda.” Comparative Studies in Society and History, 2020: 591.
2 Sullo, Pietro. Beyond Genocide: Transitional Justice and Gacaca Courts in Rwanda. International Criminal Justice Series, vol 20, 2018: 220.
3 Sullo, Pietro. Beyond Genocide: Transitional Justice and Gacaca Courts in Rwanda. 216-218.
4 Burnet, Jennie E. “The Injustice of Local Justice: Truth, Reconciliation, and Revenge in Rwanda.” Genocide Studies and Prevention, 2008: 179.
5 Burnet, Jennie E. “The Injustice of Local Justice: Truth, Reconciliation, and Revenge in Rwanda.” 179.
6 Ibid, 184.
7 Ibid, 179.
8 Ibid, 184.
9 Masengo Rutayisire, Gilbert. “A testimony of Gilbert Masengo Rutayisire” Video - Genocide Archive of Rwanda. December 21, 2001.
10 Amick, Emily. “Trying international crimes on local lawns: the adjudication of genocide sexual violence crimes in Rwanda’s Gacaca courts.” Columbia Journal of Gender and Law, 2011:2-3.
11 Mibenge, Chiseche Salome. Sex and International Tribunals: The Erasure of Gender from the War Narrative, 2013. 66.
12 Amick, Emily. “Trying international crimes on local lawns: the adjudication of genocide sexual violence crimes in Rwanda’s Gacaca courts.” 3.
13 Ibid, 3-4.
14 Ibid, 47.
15 Thomson, Susan. “The Darker Side of Transnational Justice: The Power Dynamics Behind Rwanda’s Gacaca Courts.” Africa, 2011: 373-374.
16 Rwanda: Organic Law No. 08/1996 of 1996 on the Organization of Prosecutions for Offenses constituting the Crime of Genocide or Crimes Against Humanity committed since 1 October 1990, 1 September 1996.

“International Panel Of Eminent Personalities (IPEP): Report On The 1994 Genocide In Rwanda and Surrounding Events (Selected Sections).” International Legal Materials, vol. 40, no. 1, 2001, pp. 141–236. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/20694080. Accessed 28 Nov. 2020.

Masabo, Alexis. “A testimony of Alexis Masabo.” Video - Genocide Archive of Rwanda. Date N/A. https://genocidearchiverwanda.org.rw/index.php?title=IBUKA00015&gsearch=gacaca.

Masengo Rutayisire, Gilbert. “A testimony of Gilbert Masengo Rutayisire” Video - Genocide Archive of Rwanda. December 21, 2001. https://genocidearchiverwanda.org.rw/index.php?title=Kmc00006-sub1-eng-glifos&gsearch=gacaca.

Mutanganshuro, Lavie. “Genocide: Rwanda seeks Ndereyehe extradition from Netherlands” New Times | Rwanda, September 9, 20202. https://www.newtimes.co.rw/news/genocide-rwanda-seeks-ndereyehe-extradition-netherlands .

The New Times, “Re-Integration of Ex-Prisoners Back into Society: What More Can We Do?” The New Times | Rwanda, 26 Oct. 2009, www.newtimes.co.rw/section/read/12648.

Penal Reform. “Monitoring and Research Report on the Gacaca: Testimonies and evidence in the Gacaca Courts” August 2008. https://cdn.penalreform.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Gacaca-Report-11-testimony-and-evidence-1.pdf.

Rwanda: Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda and its Amendments of 2 December 2003 and of 8 December 2005, 4 June 2003, available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/46c5b1f52.html [accessed 28 November 2020].

Rwanda: Organic Law No. 08/1996 of 1996 on the Organization of Prosecutions for Offenses constituting the Crime of Genocide or Crimes Against Humanity committed since 1 October 1990, 1 September 1996, available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b4f64.html [accessed 29 November 2020].

Rwanda: Organic Law No. 40/2000 of 26/01/2000 Setting Up Gacaca Jurisdictions and Organizing Prosecutions for Offenses constituting the Crime of Genocide or Crimes Against Humanity committed since October 1, 1990 and December 31, 1994, 26 January 2001, available at: http://jurisafrica.org/docs/statutes/ORGANIC%20LAW%20N0%2040.pdf [accessed November 29, 2020].

UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 955 (1994) [Establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda], 8 November 1994, S/RES/955 (1994), available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/3b00f2742c.html [accessed 28 November 2020].

Burnet, Jennie E. “The Injustice of Local Justice: Truth, Reconciliation, and Revenge in Rwanda.” Genocide Studies and Prevention 3, no. 2 (Summer 2008): 173-193.

This article thoroughly investigates the way in which the gacaca court systems were often used by individuals or groups in unjust ways that actually promoted suspicion and inter-ethnic divisions. Burnet credits this corruption of the gacaca system to changing conceptions of justice: prior to the genocide, gacaca was used to promote restorative justice within communities, however, once gacaca was implemented to address post-genocide grievances, the emphasis shifted to punitive justice and thus gacaca was transformed into a more negative mechanism based on revenge and retribution.

Clark, Phil. “The Gacaca Journey: the Rough Road to Justice and Reconciliation.” Chapter. In The Gacaca Courts, Post-Genocide Justice and Reconciliation in Rwanda: Justice without Lawyers, 98–131. Cambridge Studies in Law and Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511761584.006.

In this chapter of Clark’s book, he focuses on what he refers to as the “gacaca journey” or the process which suspected perpetrators of the genocide went through in the aftermath of being accused. Clark identifies six steps in this process: primary period of imprisonment, release of chosen prisoners to attend reeducation camps (ingando), the subsequent three month period at the ingando, return to their home communities, trial through gacaca, and then sentencing and a return to prison. Using interviews and firsthand accounts, Clark describes each stage comprehensively and effectively illustrates how both the greater Rwandan community and the suspected perpetrators reentering society understood and responded to the entire process.

Dona, Giorgia. “‘Situated Bystandership’ During and After the Rwandan Genocide.” Journal of Genocide Research 20, issue 1 (2018): 1-19.

Dona’s article is an extremely valuable source as it expands on mainstream narratives of the genocide and describes the conflict and the subsequent reconciliation efforts as being more than just Hutu versus Tutsi issues. Dona does so by referring to what she calls “situated bystanders” or individuals who were neither victims or perpetrators, but who had fluid identities and fit into both categories in different spaces or at different points in time during the genocide. She identifies how the ambiguous and unfixed nature of bystander’s identities created the normative issue of if and how gacaca should address those complicit, but not actively involved in violence.

Jessee, Erin. “Promoting Reconciliation through Exhuming and Identifying Victims in the 1994 Rwandan Genocide.” Centre for International Governance Innovation - Africa Initiative, Discussion Paper Series. 2012.

Jessee’s article identifies a major issue of reconciliation for the Rwandan people that the gacaca did not sufficiently address, which was the location, exhumation, and identification of genocide victims’ bodies. Jessee notes that some attempts have been made to locate and exhume victims’ bodies: the ICTR commissioned Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) to perform exhumations and the Rwandan government also launched their own initiative, however, for the most part, survivors were left to engage in this painful process alone. Jessee brings to the attention of the reader the importance of spiritual beliefs surrounding the dead and proper burial procedures in Rwandan culture and notes that a huge part of the grieving and reconciliation process cannot be fully achieved for many Rwandans without the bodies of their loved ones.

Penal Reform. “Monitoring and Research Report on the Gacaca: Testimonies and evidence in the Gacaca Courts” August 2008. https://cdn.penalreform.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Gacaca-Report-11-testimony-and-evidence-1.pdf.

This report written by Penal Reform International analyzes the gacaca system. It was written in 2008, nearing the official end of gacaca. The report determines that the gacaca process lacks evidence and the people lack trust in the system. Penal Reform International indicates corruption within the system and an inefficient group of judges who are improperly trained. Their report ends by describing the necessity of improvements in the final months, and that there will remain distrust in gacaca and the Inyangamugayo without these improvements.

Sullo P. (2018) "The Reconciliation Process in Rwanda." In: Beyond Genocide: Transitional Justice and Gacaca Courts in Rwanda. International Criminal Justice Series, vol 20. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague.

In this chapter, Sullo dives into the debate surrounding the ambiguity of the term reconciliation and ultimately determines through his own gathered data that the understanding of reconciliation in the Rwandan context centers on truth, justice, reparation and healing. Sullo argues that the government, through reconciliation mechanisms such as gacaca, has widely failed to address these four major concerns identified by Rwandans, both on a theoretical level and a practical one. We cite other important chapters of this work as well.

Thomson, Susan. “The Darker Side of Transnational Justice: The Power Dynamics Behind Rwanda’s Gacaca Courts.” Africa, vol. 81, no. 3, 2011, pp. 373–390., doi:10.1017/S0001972011000222.

Thomson’s article focuses on the negative aspects of the gacaca, in particular how the system was established in the post-genocide setting as a state-sponsored, institutional body rather than a local, bottom-up mechanism, which thus perpetuated asymmetric power structures between the individuals and the court. Thomson ultimately concludes that the gacaca has been influenced and manipulated by the Rwandan state, and its success has been exaggerated as a way for the RPF to maintain their legitimacy and claim an entirely effective truth and reconciliation process has been enacted. Thus within the context of gacaca, many individuals feel pressured to forgive or openly accept others to fulfill the government’s desire for the image of a unified Rwanda.

Amick, Emily. “Trying international crimes on local lawns: the adjudication of genocide sexual violence crimes in Rwanda’s Gacaca courts.” Columbia Journal of Gender and Law 20, issue 2 (Summer 2011): 1-97.

Brouneus, Karen. “The Trauma of Truth Telling: Effects of Witnessing in the Rwandan Gacaca Courts on Psychological Health.” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 54, no. 3 (June 2010): 408-437 DOI: 10.1177/0022002709360322.

Broneus, Karen. “The Women and Peace Hypothesis in Peacebuilding Settings: Attitudes of Women in the Wake of the Rwandan Genocide.” Signs: Journal of Women and Culture in Society 40, no. 1 (Autumn 2014): 125-151.

Burnet, Jennie E. “The Injustice of Local Justice: Truth, Reconciliation, and Revenge in Rwanda.” Genocide Studies and Prevention 3, no. 2 (Summer 2008): 173-193.

Collins, Bennett, Meghan C. Laws and Richard Ntakirutimana. “Becoming ‘Historically Marginalized Peoples’: examining Twa perceptions of boundary shifting and re-categorization in post-genocide Rwanda.” Ethnic and Racial Studies (2020): 1-19. https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2020.1767798.

Dona, Giorgia. “Situated Bystandership’ During and After the Rwandan Genocide.” Journal of Genocide Research 20, issue 1 (2018): 1-19.

Galtung Johan. “After Violence, Reconstruction, Reconciliation and Resolution.” In: Abu-Nimer M (ed) Reconciliation, Justice and Coexistence: Theory and Practice. Lexington Books, Lanham (2001): 3-23.

Geraghty, Mark Anthony. “Gacaca, Genocide, Genocide Ideology: The Violent Aftermaths of Transitional Justice in the New Rwanda.” Comparative Studies in Society and History, vol. 62, no. 3, 2020, pp. 588–618., doi:10.1017/S0010417520000183.

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