• Sierra Leone Government:
  • Represented by key figures: Solomon Berewa - minister of Justice and attorney general; Sahr Matturi ( foreign minister); Sylvester Rowe ( permanent representative in the UN); Sheka Mansaray, ( National security advisor); Colonel Tom Carew ( senior army officer).
  • At that time under the regime of Kabbah. Characterized as weak, corrupted and badly held. Constantly threatened by military coups, previously ousted in 1997 by the AFRC.
  • Government initiative to propose full amnesty to the RUF members as an opening to the discussions and incentive to move things forward.
  • Truth and Reconciliation Commission: Pushed forward the UN led initiative which was meant to recommend prosecutions for the worst perpetrators and pointed out the RUF  as the only entity to face it.
  • The government was in favor of the Creation of a Special Unit for War Victims as part of the reparations plan.
  • Regarding power-sharing, the government was willing to give 2 of the ministries to the rebels which nearly collapsed the agreement. After talks with Nigerian representatives and the Lomé president, the government finally agreed on conceding 4 ministerial positions but maintained that the appointment of the ministries had to be done by the President and not through negotiations.

• Revolutionary United Front( AFRC - RUF alliance) 
  • Represented by: Solomon YB Rogers, loyal to Foday Sankoh; Allo Bangura ( foreign minister RUF); Omrie Golley ( legal adviser); Sahr Kalibanja ( education minister); Colonel Idrissa, Agnes Finoh ( higher ranking RUF combatant).
  • Wages war against government because of the political ideology, massive corruption, failure to represent the rural society.
  • Although AFRC was to be represented there were growing tensions between both parties especially after the Freetown attack in 1999 that increased the groups  unpopularity. The AFRC leader, Johhny Paul Koromah, was not invited for the preparatory meetings for the Lomé talks that produced most of their subsequent demands.
  • Lasting Peace in Sierra Leone: the Revolutionary United Front Perspective and Vision: demanded, a blanket amnesty for all RUF and AFRC fighters; the release of all prisoners; a power-sharing arrangement based on a four year transitional govt until the next elections; recognition of AFRC-RUF control over certain areas of the country; participation in a new Sierra Leonean army; the withdrawal of ECOMOG troops; and the creation of an independent peacekeeping force. It set a single pre-condition for the commencement of negotiations, the immediate and unconditional release of Sankoh
  • Truth and Reconciliation Commission: the RUF was against the idea as they felt targeted as the only party to be prosecuted, moreover it feared that it would serve as a Court. By the end of the negotiations they accepted the point due to the broadening of the language used in the agreement by the mediators.
  • Power-sharing: RUF demands transitional government, with the form of a national unity and requested half of the ministerial positions. They requested the expansion of the government cabinet to 20 members and for 11 ministerial and 4 deputy ministerial positions, including vice president, defence a finance, as well as 6 diplomatic posts such as ambassador to the US.  When the talks looked that were going to collapse, the role of the Nigerian Government representative to mediate both parts on the issue helped. The government agreed in conceding 4 ministry positions but the RUF could not appoint them.
  • Demanded ECOMOG withdrawal and a transitional government, at the end of the talks they retreated from this position in order to achieve peace. 
• Government of Togo:

1. • Official mediator of the Lomé peace talks. The Togolese foreign minister Joseph Koffigoh led the talks in a day-to-day basis.
   • Togo was the chair of ECOWAS and was perceived as a neutral country which was never directly involved in the conflict, therefore it was chosen to host the negotiations and assume the mediator role.
   • Gnassingbé Eyademá, President of Togo at the time, had a regular and active participation in the talks. Holding a neutral position was key in some critical moments. During the power-sharing part of the negotiations, Eyadéma contacted the Nigerian president Obasanjo, who was also interested in withdrawing the troops from SL, pulled the parties together to agree on Sankoh new position in the Commission for the Management Strategic resources. He also  took the idea to turn the conflict in regional diplomacy by contacting to more regional leaders Comparoé and Taylor to create balance and put pressures in the parties to compromise. The four parties agreed on Sankoh's new position, ECOMOG participation in peacekeeping, and afterwards met Kabbah and Sankoh to convince them to accept the deal.

• ECOWAS Countries:  ( Economic Community of West African states)

1. • Regional economic union formed by 16 West African countries.
   • Hold a neutral position also considered to have a mediator role. Even if it is supposed to be a strong supporter of the government not all the countries  hold the same position. The countries that were more relevant in the talks were Togo, Liberia, Burkina Faso, Libya and Nigeria.
   • ECOWAS was a key actor in the peace talks, having representatives in the mediation group, including ECOWAS General Secretary Lansana Kouyate and diplomats from the ECOWAS Committee of Six on Sierra Leone (Guinea, Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Liberia, Ghana and Mali) and Libya; and its diplomats also joined the ‘facilitating committee’ that formed during the talks. Subsequently, it became the chair of the Joint Implementation Committee, which was established by the Lomé talks.
   • Burkina Faso, Libya and  Liberia were secretly perceived  supporters of the RUF whist at the same time they were contributing to the ECOWAS troops, namely because of the diamond dealing and financing.
   • The leaders of Burkina Faso, Liberia and Nigeria had a key role in convincing to their allies in the conflict during the collapse of June 1999 to agree in the Power-sharing outcome of the agreement.

• Inter religious council of Sierra Leone ( IRCSL)
  • Formed by the unity of Muslims and Christians of Sierra Leone, who worked together to end the violence after the outbreak for the war.
  • This non governmental player between the warring factions and the population.
  • A first role on making the peace negotiations possible by convincing both parts to sit and open negotiations. They were invited to the talks as informal mediations to provide guidance.  
  • Throughout the process they remained neutral and supportive of the mediation prove, encouraging cooperation and return to the table.
  • During hard times where the main parties didn’t share the opinion such as power sharing, the Council were reported to preach to be resistant hard liners.
  • They important role during the process was recognized in the agreement by the creation of the Council of Elders and Religious Leaders. In the aftermath of the negotiations were also involved in reconciliation, human rights training, democratization and disarmament programs.
  • Didn’t share the amnesty  nor Sankoh’s pardon like the UN.

• UN
  • The UN had a neutral role in the Lomé talks and the Abidjan talks, taking the position as a moral guarantor and witness and representing human rights.
  • The UN senior representative was Francis Okelo who served as deputy chair of the Lomé talks and helped the draft of provisions relevant to different key issues. The UN peacekeeping mission UNAMSIL was a significant actor in the conflict, especially after 1999.
  •  Other representatives from the UN included officials from the UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.
  • The UN commission came with the Idea for a Truth, Reconciliation and Justice Commission. However due to the refusal of the RUF, the reference to justice was dropped to make the language broader.
  • A key and controversial issue for the UN was the provision of amnesty. The UN typed a document in 1999 which was mean to provide the representatives “the  Guidelines for the UN representatives on certain aspects of negotiations for conflict resolution”. This paper clearly stated that indicated that the UN “could not condone amnesty to war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide.” However, the UN representatives who hold a position against amnesty during the talks, agreed to sing in the end, against the guidelines provisions. Francis Okelo reported that he heard about the guidelines 2 days before the signing and if they refusal to sign would have collapsed the talks. At that point it considered more urgent.

• The US
  • Neutral position and mediating position,  the US ambassador to SL, Joseph Melrose, served as a chair in the final session of the talks.
  • US backed the controversial  amnesty proposal and the inclusion of 8 RUF leaders in the cabinet to the new government as to achieve peace. Clinton addressed the UN general assembly , "I know that some are troubled that the United States and others cannot respond to every humanitarian catastrophe in the world," he reiterated, "We cannot do everything everywhere." ( The Washington Post Company,1999).
  • Advocated for a dual track approach during the conflict: military and diplomatic to end the war.
  • Contributed to the 18th May ceasefire. Instigated by the Rev. Jesse Jackson, US Special Envoy for the Promotion of Democracy in Africa, whose intervention in Sierra Leone had been influenced by Donald Payne, the chairman of the US Congressional Black caucus.
  • Did not sign witness to avoid implying a commitment to resources of implementation.

• The UK
  • Really active role in the talks as Sierra Leone was an old protectorate of the region.
  • Often seen sympathetic to the Sierra Leonean government, the UK supported it before and after the 1997 coup; and important in  rallying the UN member states and international governments to support the elected Kabbah government.
  • Along with US, was one of the largest providers of humanitarian assistance to Sierra Leone; and also advocated for a dual track track approach in ending conflict.
  • Judicial reform effort, the Government committed to a major  judicial reform after the Lomé accord was signed.
  • Declined to sign as witness of the talks.
  • Major actor in putting international pressure to both parties to start negotiations by providing military aid on a commitment form from the SL government. Proposed a two track diplomacy, by suing dialogue but also military efforts.
  • Supported the Sierra Leonean Government even if they were meant to be neutral and represent democratization, rather than been partisan.
• Organization African Unity (OAU)
  • Represented by Adwoa Coleman.
  • Mediator role in order to ensure the continuation of Dialogue between the parties.
  • The OAU had been an important external actor during the Abidjan talks and Lomé talks during conflict, having sent delegations that tried to mediate between the government and the RUF on many occasions. This occurred frequently during 1995-1996, as it was  largely overseeing the Abidjan talks.
  • During the Abidjan talks the OAU they took relieve of the International Alert NGO.
  • The OAU was one of the key external actors, being one of the ‘moral guarantors’ of the talks and directly facilitated the Lomé peace agreement.
• Commonwealth
  •  Like the OAU, the Commonwealth was another important external actor that attempted to establish mediation between the two groups by sending delegations to Sierra Leone during the conflict. Also signed as a witness to the accord.
  • Even if was meant to be moral guarantor and mediator, it seems that  endorsed  Kabbah’s government during the duration of the talks.

• Women's Groups ( excluded from both talks)
  • The women’s organizations including the Sierra Leone Association of University Women, the Young Women’s Christian Association or the Women’s Association for National Development, within others, were not invited to the talks being marginalized from the Lomé agreement.  The RUF, the NPR and the Sierra Leonean government ignored their demands to be included in the Peace process.
  • This lack of representation is reflected by the negligence of women's issues in the talks, especially in terms of political and economic terms, although women were one of the primary victims during the war. There is only one reference to women, as being acknowledged as victims of the war ( Art XXVII). But there is no reference to their role in peace-building, political and economical reconstruction.
  • Outside the agreements they played a  crucial role to promote the agenda for the peace process. They were key for the National Consultative Conference held in august 1995 before the Abidjan talks.

• Regional groups: (other military groups)
  • Other groups excluded from the talks were the representatives of the provinces out of Freetown. One of the principle excluded groups were independent army combatants such as the SLA or the West Side Boyz. This resulted in the kidnapping  of around 40 people from the UNAMSIL civilian and military observers by former members of the SLA. They claimed that there were excluded from the Lomé Peace talks and presented some requests.
  • Within these, the incorporation of their soldiers to the new Sierra Leone army and the recognition of the promotions that the AFRC junta made during their position in power ( may 1997-February 1998). To satisfy these demands, the Lomé included the possibility of the ex combatants of the RUF and SLA to join the new army as stated in the Article XVII of Restructuring and Training of the Sierra Leone Armed Forces.

Peace, YES. But at what cost?

The 10 year-long Sierra Leonean civil war came to an end in the 2000s after a series of peace talks held between government of Sierra Leone and Revolutionary United Front (RUF). These talks resulted in the foundation of the newly designed democratic and constitutional state. While the conflict stopped, the agreement failed to develop the proper democratic institutions and political structure to help Sierra Leone transition in a functioning state. This essay argues that while the peace agreements stopped the fighting, there were many serious missteps that resulted in unequal representation, insufficiency in the rolls of the mediating parties, and too much concession given to those who committed crimes against humanity. By adopting a “peace at any costs” ideology, the peace agreements undermined the new government and constitution that was established, resulting in Sierra Leone falling back into cycles of political conflict and corruption.

        The exclusion of key actors throughout the course of the peace agreement caused many issues that played out in the aftermath of deal between the two opposing parties. Many of the groups left out of the peace negations were instrumental in the fostering of peace, with many of them representing side-lined communities that’s voices were lost in the wake of the negotiations. The lines of exclusion were regional, by putting too much focus on Freetown; gender biased, by excluding the Women’s representatives during the process and excluded the civil society initiatives.  The women’s organizations for instance, “played a crucial role in developing a non-partisan voice for peace and democratisation over the past ten years”[1] were largely left out of the peace talks resulting in women being marginalized in the Lomé agreement. The new legislation being put forward at the Lomé agreement “acknowledged women as victims of the war and the agreement provides that 'special attention shall be accorded to their needs and potentials” but they were left out of the “political and economic reconstruction of the country”[2].

       Civil society organizations and groups representing the traditional structures of the Sierra Leonean communities were also largely left out of the Lomé agreement. These isolated community structures were designed to help increase the involvement of the public into the creation of government policy and help the voices of the most marginalized be heard. These traditional structures involved using representative selected by communities that came together and help meetings to discuss potential policy. A large meeting was held prior to the Lomé agreement involving, “representatives from all the provinces who had emerged out of consultations chiefdom by chiefdom, district by district. Yet the recommendations from this meeting were ignored” [3] during the peace agreement.  

        Another critical misstep was the faulty role of the third-party mediator, the Government of Togo. As explained by Ramsbotham, “the entry of a third party may change the conflict structure and allow a different pattern of communication, enabling the third party to filter or reflect back the messages, attitudes and behaviour of the conflictants”[4]. Moreover, a mediator party should also ensure that the interests of the civil society are represented. In this case, it seems that the only goal of the Government of Togo and from other mediator parties such as the UN, was to achieve peace regardless of the terms of the agreement. The main issue at stake is the overlook at the civil societies request of justice to the war atrocities, which was ignored by both the parties, including the mediator, who quickly agreed on full amnesty instead of seeking for alternative solutions.

By observing the current situation of Sierra Leone, one can observe that the main drivers of the conflict back in 1991 are still present: there is frustration for government corruption, limited public services, high unemployment and unprecedented poverty. Solving these issues would be critical to developing a social and political culture that is invested in the legitimacy of the government. Having a functioning system of social infrastructure that could provide a legitimate means for people to live could have helped Sierra Leone get off of its feet and take strides towards being completely independent. Life expectancy is still only near the 50-year-old mark, and the GDP per capita is only at 496 USD. With a national GDP of only just over 3.5 Billion-dollar (4), Sierra Leone is one of poorest countries in the world. The serious lapses of judgement in the peace accords caused by the peace at any cost mentality has left sierra Leone in a position today where there is still inter-conflict between different groups of society, and high levels of political corruption and poverty.

The peace agreements that stopped the civil war in sierra Leone initially achieved their goal in stopping the bloodshed, but ultimately failed to foster a functioning state. While by stopping the conflict the peace agreements could be viewed as somewhat of a success, they failed to establish a function democratic state that has led to Sierra Leone being in a very weak position today. The “peace at any cost” attitude towards the peace agreements resulted in serious lapses of judgement and foresight, that has left Sierra Leone politically corrupt and socially distraught today.

• Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, signed at Abidjan on 30 November 1996

https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/SL_961130_PeaceAgreementSierraLeone-RUFSL.pdf

• Communiqué issued at Conakry on 23 October 1997 at the conclusion of the meeting between the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Committee of Five on Sierra Leone of the Economic Community of West African States and the delegation representing Major Johnny Paul Koromah

https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/resources/collections/peace_agreements/sl_10231997.pdf

• Peace Agreement Between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone Lomé, Togo, July 7, 1999

https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/resources/collections/peace_agreements/sierra_leone_07071999.pdf

• “Lasting peace in Sierra Leone: The Revolutionary United Front Sierra Leone ( RUF/SL) Perspective and vision”  11th may 1999

http://theirwords.org/media/transfer/doc/sl_ruf_08-8b0383b426906a2602263d3afda2c66d.pdf

• Abuja ceasefire agreement

http://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/fullpeace/SiL%2020001110.pdf

1)Barnes, C., Ph.D., & Polzer, T. (2000, September 27). Sierra Leone peace process: Learning from the past to address current challenges. Retrieved from https://reliefweb.int/report/sierra-leone/sierra-leone-peace-process-learning-past-address-current-challenges

This document was focused on the Lomé peace agreement through the eyes of international actors as well as individuals that were present. The document comes direct from Reliefweb.INT, the world leading website on humanitarian information regarding human crisis and natural disasters. The website is owned and operated by the UN office for the Coordination of Humanitarian affairs. The document itself is an expert summary report created following the signing of the Lomé peace agreement in 1999. It breaks down the strengths and weaknesses of the agreement, concentrating on using multiple viewpoints to paint a clearer picture of the successes and pitfalls of the controversial peace agreement. A strength of this document is the use of different viewpoints, giving contrasting points on view on different results of the peace agreement, painting a non-partisan point of view for the reader. Written by Catherine Barnes and Tara Polzer, both have extensive backgrounds in humanitarian and social service work within the African continent. Tara Polzer is a Ph.D. candidate, who studied at the London School of Economics and Political Sciences and Cambridge University. Catherine Barnes is a Ph.D. recipient, she holds a doctoral degree from the Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution and is an independent consultant on peacebuilding. The information in this document was key to highlighting the representation issue that plagued the Lomé peace agreement, showing the points of view of those included and those not included in the peace building processes.

2) Hayner, P. (2011, May 26). Negotiating peace in Sierra Leone: Confronting the justice challenge. Retrieved from https://www.ictj.org/publication/negotiating-peace-sierra-leone-confronting-justice-challenge

This document is a report focusing on the Lomé peace agreement and the impacts of the peace agreement on the 10-year civil war that tore through Sierra Leone. The document comes from the International Center for Transitional Justice, a website dedicated to bringing to the light the most brutal abuses of human rights violations and conflicts. The focus of the sight is to work with the victims, civil society groups and national and international organizations so ensure that the victims voices are heard and to prevent any further atrocities from happening. The documents highlights the implementation of the peace agreement and the results of the deals and commissions created throughout the accords. One of the biggest strengths of this document is its analytical work on the post peace agreement processes and how the agreement was implemented. Written by Priscilla Hayner, the Transitional Justice in Peace Negotiations at the United Nations; a highly awarded social scientist that was schooled at Earlham College, who went on receive a master’s degree in international Affairs and Human Rights from Columbia University. The focus on the post peace agreement applications of the commissions was critical to understanding where the failures and strengths of the Lomé agreement lay. This document provided detailed and essential inside information for our project.

3) Obita, J., Lord, D., Gberie, L., Rashid, I., Bright, D., Jusu-Sheriff, Y., . . . Fortune, F. (2015, July 27). Paying the price: The Sierra Leone peace process. Retrieved from http://www.c-r.org/resources/paying-price-sierra-leone-peace-process.

This 100 page document uses multiple authors to dive into great detail about the brutal Sierra Leone civil war that lasted 10 years. The document uses 8 different authors, each writing a chapter highlight each one of their areas of expertise. The document gives great background information of the conflict, which many other documents do not. As well as this, this document also focuses on the stories of those who were not involved in the conflict, giving light to minority groups such as the women’s civil society groups that were largely left out of the peace agreement negotiations. Financed by the independent Conciliation Resources organization, focused on working with victims of conflict, to help prevent future conflict and promote peaceful societies. Using multiple authors and insight from experts, this document highlights a complete look at the Lomé agreement, as well as the pre and post agreement landscapes of Sierra Leone.  This document was critical to finding the keys of the negotiation period. It specifically highlights how each of the keys were implemented and their results. It was an absolutely instrumental source of information, that covered areas that most of the other sources missed.

4) Kaldor, Mary. Vincent, James. (2006). “Evaluation of UNDP Assistance to Conflict-Affected Countries - Case Study: Sierra Leone”. Retrieved from http://web.undp.org/evaluation/documents/thematic/conflict/SierraLeone.pdf

This document provides an evaluation of the Sierra Leone conflict by the UNDP. After detailing the background of the conflict, the report considers how human security has improved since the peace negotiations, and contribution of international actors, the UN, and the UNDP in upholding human security in Sierra Leone. Mary Kaldor led the UNDP Evaluation team for conflict-affected countries, and James Vincent was the National Consultant for Sierra Leone in the team. A Professor of Global Governance  and the Director of the Conflict and Civil Society Research Unit in the London School of Economics Department of International Development, Mary Kaldor is well qualified in her field. On top of founding organizations such as the EUropean Nuclear Disarmament and Helsinki Citizens Assembly, and authoring books such as Global Civil Society: An Answer to War and Human Security: Reflections on Globalization and Intervention; she directs the Conflict Research Programme in her department that focuses on several countries in the Middle East and Africa, including Sierra Leone. She has also written several reports for the UNDP, including this one, which she co-authored with James Vincent. Accordingly, this report seems to have an academic viewpoint as well as a local one in evaluating the conflict.

6) Human Rights Watch - Sierra Leone - Human Rights Post. “Sierra Leone, Human Rights Development.” Africa 10 www.hrw.org/legacy/wr2k/Africa-09.htm 

This source provides a country profile in terms of human rights, for the Human Rights Watch tenth World Report, 2000. The Human Rights Watch is an INGO that conducts research and advocacy on Human Rights.  The reports’ focus is on the year 1999, and discusses several conflicts occuring in the continents of Africa, South America, Asia, Europe and Central Asia, the Middle East and North Africa, and the United States.It also details special issues such as Academic Freedom, Child Soldiers, Lesbian and Gay Rights, and Refugees, Displaced Persons, and Asylum Seekers.  The Overview on Sierra Leone focuses human rights developments and the involvement of international players, in light of the developments of 1999. It provides brief summaries of what they perceived to be key international players. This includes, ECOMOG and ECOWAS; the United Nations; the European Union, United Kingdom, and United States. Naturally focusing on the human rights aspect, its information on international actors did not seem substantial enough, but provided some useful statistics in terms of the aid they provided.

7)“The Road to Peace: Report of National Consultative Conference on the Peace Process in Sierra Leone” Organized by The National Commission for Democracy and Human Rights and Civil Society Organizations (1999, April) http://www.democracy.gov.sl/images/reports/THE%20ROAD%20TO%20PEACE.pdf

A report of the different consensus views expressed on the peace process of Sierra Leone during the Consultative Conference that took place from April 7-9, organized by The National Commission for Democracy and Human Rights and Civil Society Organization. The Conference occurred under the auspices of the Kabbah’s government and included 250 participants from different civic groups. Among them some groups were: Sierra Leone students, Religious Organizations, Sierra Leone Labour Congress and other Trade Unions, Chamber of Commerce and Indigenous Business Organizations, Local NGOs, Women’s Organizations, IDP Camps and other war victims, and Political Parties in Parliament. It details all the statements, remarks, presentations and discussions that occurred during the conference. Accordingly, it provides good insight to viewpoints of the civic groups who didn’t actively participate in the peace talks. While the resulting conference report wasn’t endorsed by the government, it was sent to the Togolese government who was mediating the Lome talks. Thus, the document presents relevant and contemporary information to the conflict. It has been relevant for our project to see what is the voice of different civil society groups that didn’t participate in the talks, and what was their position on the different issues.

8) Demirag, Elif Gizem. (2014) “Comparative Analysis of Peace Processes: Democratic Republic of Congo and Sierra Leone”.https://ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/dce2ffc1-1e3a-446e-8755-6673b1bd2c7d.pdf

Elif Gizem Demirag was a graduate student at Sabanci University, Istanbul, when this paper was written. Although, it’s credibility may be questionable it is strengthened by the fact that the paper was presented at the  Graduate Student Conference of European Consortium for Political Research in 2014. Moreover, Demirag has held many academic positions including, Graduate and Research Assistant and Training Assistant, and is now a PhD student at Koc University. His paper provides a unique perspective by presenting the Sierra Leone peace negotiations as relatively successful. Through the a comparative analysis of the peace processes in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sierra Leone, it argues that Sierra Leone was relatively successful; and this was largely due to the nature of third party roles and mediation in the process. Using Bercovitch’s mediation approach: the nature of the parties, nature of the issues and the nature of the mediator are interconnected and strongly affect the mediation outcome, the author analyses the nature of conflict and its mediation process. He concludes that peace outcomes are more likely to successful in cases such as Sierra Leone, where the mediator, the Togolese government, was not involved in the conflict. The article provides a positive outlook to the Sierra Leone peace negotiations, as an example of a good theoretical framework for mediation. The use of the paper was relevant for our project when it came to the analysis and assessment of the overall outcome of the conflict. It provided us with a different approach on the conflict that we could contest with our own opinions.

9) Mateos, O. (2009). " Construcció de Pau a Sierra Leone". Fundació Kontrast. Retrieved from http://www.fkontrast.org/documents/Ajut%20a%20la%20recerca%202008.pdf

Oscar Mateos holds a bachelor degree in Political Sciences and a masters degree in Peace Culture and International Relations. This document is part of his PhD thesis on the African conflicts. He worked as a teacher and researcher in the Department of Peace and Conflicts of the University of Sierra Leone in Freetown between 2006 and 2008. Today, he is a teacher at eh University of Ramon Llull in Barcelona.  This paper is part of a study he conducted in 2009 thank to the support of Kontrast Foundation. It gives the reader an analysis and insight of the construction of peace in Sierra Leone through the perspectives and opinions of the students of Peace and Conflict in the University of Sierra Leone. Three main issues are discussed: 1) which measures consolidated the peace process in Sierra Leone? 2) To what extent the idea of local appropriation is respected in the talks? 3) To what extent the reforms of peace construction are adapted to the local context. This source was relevant for our database project especially when we had to evaluate the success/ failure of the talks. It provided us with diverse opinions and perspectives on what might have been the shortages of the conflict to the mind of Sierra Leonean students, who have a first hand experience on the conflict and peace building.

10) BBC:“Sierra Leone Profile - Timeline.” BBC News, BBC, 7 Mar. 2018, www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14094419.

The British Broadcasting Corporation, is one of the best known and trusted world wide public service broadcaster as well as the world’s oldest national broadcasting organization. Since its foundation in 1922 it became a referent on the News and Media sphere. This specific publication provides an overall view on the Sierra Leonean conflict by listing the main events of the conflict and peace process from 1787 until 2016. It was essential for our project as it provided us with an general view on the conflict through which we could research more information as well as compare it to other documents and articles that provided us with similar but not exact timelines of the same issue.

AFRC-RUF. “Lasting Peace in Sierra Leone: The Revolutionary United Front Perspective and Vision”. Sierra Leone Web -  www.sierra-leone.org/AFRC-RUF/RUF-051199c.html

Barnes, Catherine; Polzer, Tara. “The Sierra Leone peace process: learning from the past to address current challenges”, Conciliation Resources (September, 2000)http://www.c-r.org/downloads/TheSierraLeonePeaceProcess_200011_ENG.pdf

BBC:“Sierra Leone Profile - Timeline.” BBC News, BBC, 7 Mar. 2018, www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14094419.

Dago, Jan. "Civil War in Sierra Leone." Alexia Foundation : Jan Dago. N.p., 2001. Web. 24 Mar. 2018.http://www.alexiafoundation.org/stories/civil-war-in-sierra-leone

Demirag, Elif Gizem. "Comparative Analysis of Peace Processes: Sierra Leone and Democratic Republic of Congo." Sabanci University, Istanbul, 2014. Web. 27 Mar. 2018.https://ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/dce2ffc1-1e3a-446e-8755-6673b1bd2c7d.pdf

Horn, Adrian, Funmi Olonisakin, and Gordon Peake. "United Kingdom-led Security Sector Reform in Sierra Leone." Civil Wars 8.2 (2006): 109-23. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13698240600877247?src=recsys

Hayner, P. (2011, May 26). Negotiating peace in Sierra Leone: Confronting the justice challenge. Retrieved from https://www.ictj.org/publication/negotiating-peace-sierra-leone-confronting-justice-challenge

Human Rights Post. “Sierra Leone, Human Rights Developement.” Africa 10, www.hrw.org/legacy/wr2k/Africa-09.htm.

Mateos, O. (2009). " Construcció de Pau a Sierra Leone". Fundació Kontrast. Retrieved from http://www.fkontrast.org/documents/Ajut%20a%20la%20recerca%202008.pdf

Obita, J., Lord, D., Gberie, L., Rashid, I., Bright, D., Jusu-Sheriff, Y., . . . Fortune, F. (2015, July 27). Paying the price: The Sierra Leone peace process. Retrieved from http://www.c-r.org/resources/paying-price-sierra-leone-peace-process.

Pickering, Jonathan, Policy Coherence in International Responses to State Failure: The role of the United Kingdom in Sierra Leone, July 2009, Development Studies Institute London School of Economics and Political Sciences http://www.lse.ac.uk/internationalDevelopment/pdf/WP/WP76.pdf

Ramsbotham, Oliver, Tom Woodhouse, and Hugh Miall. Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The Prevention, Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflicts. 3rd ed. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2016.

SIERRA LEONE: IRIN Focus on the Peace Process.”, University of Pennsylvania - African Studies Centre, www.africa.upenn.edu/Newsletters/irinw_111699.html

“Sierra Leone GDP 1960-2018 | Data | Chart | Calendar | Forecast | News.” Sierra Leone GDP | 1960-2018 | Data | Chart | Calendar | Forecast | News, tradingeconomics.com/sierra-leone/gdp

“The Road to Peace: Report of National Consultative Conference on the Peace Process in Sierra Leone” Organized by The National Commission for Democracy and Human Rights and Civil Society Organizations (1999, April) http://www.democracy.gov.sl/images/reports/THE%20ROAD%20TO%20PEACE.pdf

Mufson, Steven. “The US Backs Amnesty in Sierra Leone.” The Washington Post, WP Company, 18 Oct. 1999, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/daily/oct99/leone18.htm.

Voeten, Teun. "Newton, near Freetown, May 2000." Photography on War and Conflict in Sierra Leone and Liberia. N.p., 2013. Web. 24 Mar. 2018.http://www.teunvoeten.com/photography_conflict_sierraleone_liberia.php?selectedCountry=SierraLeone_Liberia&selectedPage=0