Disclaimer: Knowledge and resources regarding specific details and events about the Uganda Commission of Inquiry into Violations of Human Rights (CIVHR) are lacking. Information regarding specific actors, records, meetings, processes and other important events were never widely released to the public by the Government of Uganda, and thus, many of the particular details regarding the work of the Commission remain unknown. Furthermore, while some scholarly research has been done on the Commission, greater research and analysis on this Commission would be beneficial.

After Uganda attained independence in 1962, a succession of violent regimes occupied the country [1]. Under Obote’s rule from 1962-1971, brutal crimes, arrests and displacements were carried out towards those that threatened his reign [2]. In 1971, Idi Amin overthrew Obote, and turned Uganda into a dictatorship where his government carried out an expulsion against Asians, as well as “arbitrary arrests and detention, torture, and killings” towards Ugandans [3]. In 1979, Amin was overthrown and three different transitional governments acted as the head of state in Uganda within the next 8 months, until Obote regained power in 1980. Obote’s second reign lasted until his own army turned against him in 1985. Finally, in January 1986, Yoweri Museveni and the National Resistance Movement (NRM) seized control of the government and he made it a commitment to restore democratic and human rights. Under the previous regimes, and specifically under Amin and Obote, “democracy and the rule of law had been suspended” [4], leading to violations of basic human rights. Thus, Museveni appointed the CIVHR to investigate and offer possible resolutions regarding the injustices of past regimes. For 8 years, this Commission travelled across Uganda, researching, gathering testimonies, and compiling evidence for their final report, which was published in 1994 and offered insight into human rights violations and possible recommendations moving forward [5].

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[1] Sarkin, Jeremy. “Ensuring Justice, Reparations and Truth through a Truth Commission and Other Processes in Uganda.” Law and Politics in Africa, Asia and Latin America, 2015: 391.
[2] Glentworth and Hancock, “Obote and Amin: Change and Continuity in Modern Uganda Politics”, African Affairs, 1973, 239-242.
[3] Hayner, Priscilla B. Unspeakable Truths: Transitional Justice and the Challenge of Truth Commissions. Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2011: 243.
[4] Quinn, Joanna R. “The Politics of Acknowledgement: An Analysis of Uganda's Truth Commission.” YCISS Working Paper, 2003: 1.
[5] United States Institute of Peace. “Truth Commission: Uganda 86.” United States Institute of Peace: Making Peace Possible, 1 May 2013, www.usip.org/publications/1986/05/truth-commission-uganda-86.

The Uganda CIVHR was created by Museveni and his government to address the violence that occurred under previous governments [1]. This was closely tied to Museveni’s Ten-Point Program, which had the goal of rebuilding Uganda so that it would be more democratic, and ensure the protection of human rights. The Commission was assembled to investigate the origins and circumstances regarding incidents of “mass murders, arbitrary arrests, the role of law enforcement… and state security agencies, and discrimination” that took place under the previous governments [2]. Nine categories of human rights violations were to be investigated: mass murder, arbitrary arrests, unfair trials, crimes of official law enforcement, torture, displacement and expulsion, discrimination, and denials of any human rights, and protecting someone who committed one of the aforementioned crimes [3]. Specifically, a focal point of the commission was to identify the role of state actors in perpetuating these incidents of human right atrocities [4]. Furthermore, the Commission was to report the findings and conclusions of their investigations to the government and outline potential changes that could be made to safeguard human rights and democracy moving forward, as well as suggesting potential reparations that could be offered to victims. The government assured citizens that the results of the investigation and suggestions offered by the Commission would be taken seriously and implemented [5].

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[1] Hayner, Priscilla B. Unspeakable Truths: Transitional Justice and the Challenge of Truth Commissions. Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2011: 243.
[2] Quinn, Joanna R. “The Politics of Acknowledgement: An Analysis of Uganda's Truth Commission.” YCISS Working Paper, 2003: 2.
[3] Quinn, Joanna R. “Constraints: The Un-Doing of the Ugandan Truth Commission.” Human Rights Quarterly, 2004: 408.
[4] Nowrojee, Binaifer. Protectors or Pretenders? Government Human Rights Commissions in Africa. Human Rights Watch, 2001: 357.
[5] Quinn, Joanna R. “The Politics of Acknowledgement: An Analysis of Uganda's Truth Commission.” YCISS Working Paper, 2003: 2.

Apollo Milton Obote

Obote was the first President of Uganda after the country gained independence from Britain, and he was known for committing crimes such as the removal of Bugandan people from their land [1]. Obote had been overthrown by Idi Amin during his first term as president, but he was later reinstated in 1980, where he led the country to a brutal civil war known as the Ugandan Bush War.

Buganda Kingdom

The Buganda Kingdom is a historic community that consists of the Baganda ethnic group present in Central Uganda, and were subjected to mistreatment by the Obote Government [2]. The Buganda Kingdom is also comprised of a governing body with ministers and a cabinet, but also the king (Kabaka), who ensures that the traditions and norms of the Baganda people are being preserved.

Constitutional Commission

The Constitutional Commission was appointed in 1989 by the NRM with the purpose of offering recommendations, along with the CIVHR, for the new constitution. This Constitutional Commission surveyed the view of citizens and communicated changes that they hoped for in the new constitution to the NRM [3].

Commission of Inquiry into Violations of Human Right (CIVHR)

The Commission of Inquiry into Violations of Human Rights was the official truth and reconciliation of Uganda and was appointed in 1986. There were a total of 6 members and their mandate was to look into previous human rights abuses and compile a report of their findings [4].

Idi Amin

Idi Amin was initially appointed as the Commander of the Ugandan Army shortly after the country had gained independence from the UK. After Obote had planned to arrest him due to corruption and the misappropriation of funds that were allocated for the national army, he staged a coup in 1971, which would lay down a path of numerous human rights violations and conflicts [5].

National Resistance Movement (NRM)

The National Resistance Movement, earlier known as the NRA, was a guerilla group that originated and operated in the Bush region. Under Yoweri Museveni’s leadership, the group became a political party and was responsible for appointing a truth and reconciliation commission in Uganda [6].

Uganda Army (UA)

The Ugandan Armed Forces were responsible for the military takeover of Uganda’s Government on the 25th of January 1971. The Uganda Army was under the control of Idi Amin, and under his rule the army had full state power, deeming Uganda to be a military dictatorship [7].

Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLF)

The UNLF was a political amalgamation of individuals who were exiled during the time of Idi Amin’s rule, and fought as a collective group to overthrow Amin [8]. The UNLF had also fought as an ally with Tanzania during the Uganda-Tanzania War.

Uganda Human Rights Commission (UHRC)

After the CIVHR finished their truth and reconciliation report, a permanent Uganda Human Rights Commission was appointed in 1995 and was in large part due to the recommendations of the CIVHR’s final report. Their duties include looking into violations of human rights, furthering the citizens’ information and education regarding human rights, compiling annual reports, and providing parliament with recommendations on how to improve the state of human rights [9].

Yoweri Museveni

Museveni is the leader of the NRM and has been president of Uganda since 1986 [10]. When Museveni became president in 1986, he made it his goal to restore Uganda’s social, political and economic institutions that had degraded over time under previous rulers.

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[1] Golooba-Mutebi, Frederick. “Collapse, War, and Reconstruction in Uganda: An Analytical Narrative on State-Making.” Crisis States Working Papers Series, 2008: 8.
[2] Buganda Kingdom. “Welcome to the Kingdom of Buganda.” The Kingdom of Buganda, www.buganda.or.ug/.
[3] Tripp, Alli Mari. Framing the State in Times of Transition: Case Studies in Constitution Making. US Institute of Peace Press, 2010: 158.
[4] United States Institute of Peace. “Truth Commission: Uganda 86.” United States Institute of Peace: Making Peace Possible, 1 May 2013, www.usip.org/publications/1986/05/truth-commission-uganda-86.
[5] Golooba-Mutebi, Frederick. “Collapse, War, and Reconstruction in Uganda: An Analytical Narrative on State-Making.” Crisis States Working Papers Series, 2008: 10.
[6] Darnton, John. “Secret‐Police Records Reveal Vast Paranoia Of Idi Amin's Regime.” The New York Times, 18 Apr. 1979, www.nytimes.com/1979/04/18/archives/secretpolice-records-reveal-vast-paranoia-of-idi-amins-regime.html.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Darnton, John. “Uganda Charges a Tanzanian Invasion.” The New York Times, 28 Nov. 1978,
www.nytimes.com/1978/11/28/archives/uganda-charles-a-tanzanian-invasion-fighting-said-to-be-in-tanzania.html.
[9] Uganda Human Rights Commission. “About UHRC”, Uganda Human Rights Commission, 15 June 2010, www.uhrc.ug.
[10] Golooba-Mutebi, Frederick. “Collapse, War, and Reconstruction in Uganda: An Analytical Narrative on State-Making.” Crisis States Working Papers Series, 2008: 21.

Australian and German Governments

Australian and German Governments provided an undisclosed amount of financial provisions and aid to the Commission. Involvement arose from the international community as actors were advocates of Museveni’s plan to implement democratic and restorative initiatives and were hoping to create new relationships in return [1].

British Government

The British Government had vested interests and as a result of its foreign policy initiatives had considerable influence in the events that had occured in the Uganda-Tanzania War. While Britain had taken a public stance on remaining clear of the conflict, it’s actual policy was that it secretly intervened to favour Tanzania, where the country’s aim was to insert Western influence in the region to eradicate rising communist ideas in Central East Africa [2].

Danish Centre for Human Right

The Danish Centre for Human Rights is a state-funded organization by the Danish government and aided in the reconciliation process by providing funding to set up the Uganda Human Rights Documentation and Education Centre [3]. This centre holds documents and reports regarding human rights and the previous crimes that have occurred in the country’s history.

Danish Development Organization

The Danish Development Organization was the “largest external donor” and had funded approximately $363,000 towards the CIVHR in order for it to finish its necessary work [4]. The Organization had also provided equipment and expertise in advising the Commission so as to ensure a well-founded operation of the Commission.

Ford Funding Foundation

The Ford Foundation, an American private organization that is centred around advocating for human welfare, had funded $93,000 towards the CIVHR Commission, therefore allowing the Commission to recommence their hearings [5].

Swedish International Development Agency

The Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) had donated $90,000 for the CIVHR, which benefited and allowed the Commission to purchase basic equipment, such as office supplies [6].

USAID

USAID had provided activities and support related to numerous land issues that were present in Uganda, and had undertaken research initiatives that assisted policy makers who were interested in reforming land legislation during the 1980s and 1990s, leading to land rights being reinstated to the Buganda peoples. USAID had also given $25 million plus an additional $8 million to increase agricultural exports, as well as bring about educational reforms [7].

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[1] Quinn, Joanna R. “Constraints: The Un-Doing of the Ugandan Truth Commission.” Human Rights Quarterly, 2004: 414.
[2] Skaar, Elizabeth Stennes. “Great Britain's Policy on the Uganda-Tanzania War (1978-9).” Norwegian University of Science and Technology, 2015: 25.
[3] Danish Centre for Human Rights. “Mid-Term Review: The Uganda Human Rights Education and Documentation Centre” Yumpu.com, 1 Feb. 1999, www.yumpu.com/en/document/read/4458353/mid-term-review-the-uganda-human-rights-education-and-.
[4] Quinn, Joanna R. “The Politics of Acknowledgement: An Analysis of Uganda's Truth Commission.” YCISS Working Paper, 2003: 11.
[5] Ibid., 11.
[6] Ibid., 11.
[7] Lastarria-Cornhiel, Susana. “Uganda Country Brief.” Land Tenure Center, 2003: 2.

Lack of Capacity

The Commission was tasked with uncovering 24 years of abuses and violence under a total of 8 different regimes. Hundreds of thousands of instances of human rights violations had taken place within this time span, and the identity of the perpetrators and victims changed with each regime that was in power [1]. To inquire into these violations, a Commission of only 6 people was established and only a small amount of the members had training on human rights, while others had little to no formal training on monitoring human rights [2]. Ultimately, there was a lack of knowledge and overall number of people, which directly impacted the capacity of the Commission to conduct a successful investigation.

Shortage of Resources and Funding

There was a lack of funding put forward by Museveni and the NRM towards the Commission from the beginning. The government had other projects that were occurring at the same time, and thus, the CIVHR became subordinated in favour of other priorities. Due to the lack of funding, the Commission would face problems with transportation, shortages in staff, lack of storage space for their work, and trouble in even attaining basic supplies [3]. The Commission would often have to periodically stop their investigation until they received the funding they needed to continue [4]. Eventually, due to the donations from international actors, the Commission was finally able to complete its work.

Length of Time

Another barrier was that it took 8 years for the CIVHR to complete its report. The original goal for the Commission was to complete a report in 3 years, however, due to obstacles that arose, this took 8 years [5]. Throughout this period, much of the evidence had been either lost or destroyed, some people who testified had either died or moved away to other countries, and the memories of numerous people regarding events that had taken place had degraded.5 This point is related to other barriers of capacity and lack of funding, which ultimately contributed to why it took so long for the Commission to complete their report.

Lack of Political Will

A lack of political will was a significant barrier in the truth and reconciliation process. Once Museveni laid out his Ten-Point Program and appointed the CIVHR, he promised that the Commission would be prioritized and that recommendations would be taken seriously and implemented [6]. However, the government did not provide adequate funding, they did not publicly disperse the findings of the Commission, and many of the Commission's recommendations went overlooked. Aside from providing funding, many international actors also seemingly lost interest with the Commission’s work and moved onto other projects [7]. A lack of active governmental support became a significant barrier that the Commission had to overcome.

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[1] Quinn, Joanna R. “The Politics of Acknowledgement: An Analysis of Uganda's Truth Commission.” YCISS Working Paper, 2003: 10.
[2] Nowrojee, Protectors Or Pretenders?: Government Human Rights Commissions in Africa, Human Rights Watch, 2001: 359.
[3] Quinn, Joanna R. “The Politics of Acknowledgement: An Analysis of Uganda's Truth Commission.” YCISS Working Paper, 2003: 12.
[4] Hayner, Priscilla B. “Fifteen Truth Commissions -1974 to 1994: A Comparative Study.” Human Rights Quarterly, 1994: 619.
[5] Quinn, Joanna R. “Constraints: The Un-Doing of the Ugandan Truth Commission.” Human Rights Quarterly, 2004: 415.
[6] Sarkin, Jeremy. “Ensuring Justice, Reparations and Truth through a Truth Commission and Other Processes in Uganda.” Law and Politics in Africa, Asia and Latin America, 2015: 393.
[7] Quinn, Joanna R. “Constraints: The Un-Doing of the Ugandan Truth Commission.” Human Rights Quarterly, 2004: 417.

The Uganda CIVHR was a process that consisted of both successes and shortcomings. While a truth and reconciliation commission to investigate and resolve past human rights abuses was necessary, ultimately sustainable peace remains to be achieved in Uganda, and a portion of this can be attributed to the shortcomings of the CIVHR in guaranteeing that human rights would not once again be violated.

First, it is important to highlight the successes associated with the CIVHR, as it brought much-needed recognition of the crimes that overshadowed Uganda’s history. One extremely effective aspect of this truth and reconciliation process was that victims were given a forum to voice their experiences. This was the first time that victims had the chance to truly explain what they were subject to and what they had to witness [1]. The Commission gathered testimonies from over 600 victims, who came from a variety of different ethnic and socio-economic groups, as the victims of human rights violations changed from one regime to the next. This was an extremely successful part of the truth and reconciliation process as people from nearly every region across Uganda testified and no particular group was discriminated against throughout the investigation [2]. This part of the process finally gave victims a therapeutic outlet to voice their grievances [3]. Furthermore, another success was that this process legitimized victims' experiences by creating a public record of what had occurred. This created a sense of collective memory as victims were finally acknowledged and these abuses of human rights were recognized as a part of Uganda’s history by the state, which was something that was unprecedented in Uganda. Lastly, another success of the Commission was the fact that it inspired some structural change in Uganda. Some, but not many, of the CIVHR’s final report recommendations, were implemented into Uganda’s 1995 Constitution, which now ensures democratic practices and basic human rights [4]. Due to the CIVHR’s recommendations, a permanent Uganda Human Rights Commission was also created to overlook and ensure that past atrocities would not be repeated [5]. Without these structural changes, Ugandans would continue to have virtually no protection of their freedoms and rights.

Though the Commission was successful in some aspects of the peacebuilding process, it also fell short in others. Much of the country still remains unaware that the Commission even existed. Aside from a few exceptions, there are “virtually no monuments to the fallen victims in Uganda” and nothing in the public education system that mandates teaching about these crimes [6] . Even public hearings and public information “surrounding the Commission… are difficult to find both within and outside Uganda… and as a result, the work of the Commission remains virtually unknown” [7]. This has led to much of this truth and reconciliation process either being forgotten or never recognized altogether. In addition, many victims feel that the outcomes of the reconciliation process were not sufficient. Aside from testimonies, victims were relegated to a fairly minor position and did not have a discernible presence throughout the entirety of the reconciliation process. They did not have a strong influence on deciding what structural changes were required or what types of reparations they expected [8]. There is debate among victims that the changes made as a result of the Commission are not sufficient to protect human rights. Some wanted further action, such as security sector reform, to accompany the truth and reconciliation process, but since their position was relegated to only truth-telling, many personal recommendations were overlooked by the government [9]. Victims were never offered a formal apology from their perpetrators or given reparations, and there were few trials of perpetrators. One final shortcoming of the CIVHR is that “very few of the CIVHR recommendations have ever been implemented” [10]. There were a wide range of recommendations the CIVHR suggested, such as having human rights education, democratic development, constitutional guarantees, prosecutions of perpetrators, and reforming the military. However, aside from a few changes, such as a new constitution and the formation of a permanent human rights commission, much of this went ignored.

With the conclusion of the Commission, violations of human rights in Uganda remain a prominent issue, as even with Museveni and the NRM in power, democratic and human rights crimes have continued to occur in Uganda. For instance, in Uganda’s 2001 election, Museveni resorted to similar tactics of previous rulers by overlooking the constitution and conducting arbitrary arrests, attacks and intimidation mechanisms against his opposition [11]. Under his regime, there have also been further complaints of human rights violations. Ultimately, the truth and reconciliation process that occurred in Uganda is one that shows progress from previous regimes but further steps are needed to ensure that past atrocities will not recur and relationships between victims and the state are adequately rebuilt. The successes include offering victims a forum to voice their stories, providing legitimacy to victim’s experiences and inspiring certain structural changes. However, there are also shortcomings, such as a lack of public awareness, the relegation of victims, and the overlooking of recommendations from the Commission.

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[1] Quinn, Joanna R. “Constraints: The Un-Doing of the Ugandan Truth Commission.” Human Rights Quarterly, 2004: 408.
[2] Quinn, Joanna R. “Dealing with a Legacy of Mass Atrocity: Truth Commissions in Uganda and Chile.” Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, 2001: 394.
[3] Brahm, Eric. “Uncovering the Truth: Examining Truth Commission Success and Impact.” International Studies Perspectives, 2007: 20.
[4] Moehler, Devra C. “Participation and Support for the Constitution in Uganda.” The Journal of Modern African Studies, 2006: 277.
[5] Quinn, Joanna R. “Dealing with a Legacy of Mass Atrocity: Truth Commissions in Uganda and Chile.” Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, 2001: 395.
[6] Quinn, Joanna R. “The Politics of Acknowledgement: An Analysis of Uganda's Truth Commission.” YCISS Working Paper, 2003: 20.
[7] Brahm, Eric. “Uncovering the Truth: Examining Truth Commission Success and Impact.” International Studies Perspectives, 2007: 18.
[8] Quinn, Joanna R. “The Politics of Acknowledgement: An Analysis of Uganda's Truth Commission.” YCISS Working Paper, 2003: 5.
[9] Quinn, Joanna R. “Constraints: The Un-Doing of the Ugandan Truth Commission.” Human Rights Quarterly, 2004: 412.
[10] Ibid., 412.
[11] British Broadcasting Corporation. “AFRICA | Suspicion at Ugandan Army Role.” BBC News, 6 Mar. 2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/1205100.stm.

Amnesty International. “Uganda: The Human Rights Record 1986-1989.” Amnesty International Publications, 1. Mar. 1989, https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/AFR590011989ENGLISH.PDF.

Central Intelligence Agency. 1972, “Wider Implications of Uganda's Expulsion of Its Asians.” www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP79R00967A000500030017-9.pdf.

Danish Centre for Human Rights. “Mid-Term Review: The Uganda Human Rights Education and Documentation Centre." 1 Feb. 1999, www.yumpu.com/en/document/read/4458353/mid-term-review-the-uganda-human-rights-education-and-.

Government of Uganda. “Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, 1995.” ULII, 1995, https://ulii.org/ug/legislation/consolidated-act/0.

Government of Uganda. “The Uganda Human Rights Commission Act.” Uganda Human Rights Commission, 1995, www.uhrc.ug/download/uganda-human-rights-commission-act/.

Government of Uganda. “The Amnesty Act, 2000.” 2000, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl-nat.nsf/0/7d2430f8f3cc16b6c125767e00493668/$file/ugandan+amnesty+act+2000.pdf.

Lumu, David. “Museveni Hands Over 80 More Buganda Titles.” National News, 1 July 2015, https://archives.visiongroup.co.ug/vision/NewVisionaApi/v1/uploads/NV010715pg03.pdf.

Mbayo, Hon Esther. “Press Statement for Heroes Day Celebrations.” Uganda Media Centre, 5 June 2019, www.mediacentre.go.ug/media/press-statement-heroes-day-celebrations.

Mulenga, Joseph Nyamihana. “Uganda: Legal Notice of Creating the Commission of Inquiry into Violations of Human Rights.” 1 May 1986, www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/resources/collections/commissions/Uganda86-Charter.pdf.

Uganda Human Rights Commission Human Rights. “UHRC 21st Annual Report”, Uganda Human Rights Commission, 22 July 2020, www.uhrc.ug/download/uhrc-21st-annual-report/.

Ugandan Diaspora News. “Liberation Day 1986: Revisiting President Museveni's Inaugural Fundamental Change Speech 31 Years Later!” Ugandan Diaspora News Online, 26 Jan. 2015, www.ugandandiasporanews.com/2015/01/26/liberation-day-revisiting-president-musevenis-inaugural-fundamental-change-speech-29-years-later/.

United Nations. “Reporting Status for Uganda.” OHCHR, www.tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/TreatyBodyExternal/Countries.aspx?CountryCode=UGA&Lang=EN.

Bernard, Pauline. “The Politics of the Luweero Skulls: the Making of Memorial Heritage and Post-Revolutionary State Legitimacy over the Luweero Mass Graves in Uganda.” Journal of Eastern African Studies, vol. 11, no. 1, 2017, pp. 188–209.

This article discusses the sentiments revolving around the Luweero Skulls Memorial. Initially, the monument had been created by the villagers who were residing in the area during the previous civil war, and had erected the skulls monument to honour the individuals who lost their lives. Bernard argues that Museveni transformed this monument into a political ploy to remind the citizens of Uganda of their past history and the malice associated with prior governments, thus, trying to prove why his regime should stay in power. Ultimately, this article illustrates the disconnect between local people and government actors that can arise during a truth and reconciliation process.

Glentworth, Garth, and Ian Hancock. “Obote And Amin: Change And Continuity In Modern Uganda Politics.” African Affairs, vol. 72, no. 288, 1973, pp. 237–255.

Glentworth and Hancock’s article offers a comprehensive analysis of Ugandan politics from the nation’s independence in 1966 to when the article was written in 1973. The article delves into how Amin’s military expertise ultimately worsened the state of human rights within Uganda as he was able to use this expertise to carry out military attacks, arrests, imprisonments, and other crimes. Furthermore, the authors detail and compare Amin’s initiative of an all-black Uganda to the likes of the Aryan Race notion in Nazi Germany. This article provides an in-depth explanation of the Amin regime in Uganda during the early 1970s, and provides a backdrop for the reasoning behind the Asian expulsion.

Golooba-Mutebi, Frederick. “Collapse, War, and Reconstruction in Uganda: An Analytical Narrative on State-Making.” Crisis States Working Papers Series, vol. 2, no. 1, 2008, pp. 1–27.

In Gooloba-Mutebi’s article, he goes into an in-depth analysis of the conflict and violence that has persisted throughout Uganda’s history, even before they gained independence. His article is extremely helpful for getting an understanding of the underlying ethnic and social divisions that existed in Uganda and the constant struggle for power between different groups. It also covers and captures the human rights violations that took place between 1962-1986, such as the killing of Buganda’s citizens and stripping of king’s titles under Obote, the expulsion of Asians and suspension of the constitution under Amin, and other instances of violence, war and death under these regimes and others.

Martin, Michel L. “The Uganda Military Coup of 1971: A Study of Protest.” Ufahamu: A Journal of African Studies, vol. 2, no. 3, 1972, pp. 81–12.

In this article, Michel L. Martin describes contextual information that pertains to the social and political systems that are present in Uganda, as well as its army. He explains that the cause for the Uganda military coup was not due to societal tribalism or the domination of a specific ethnic group, but rather the simple rise in frustrations within the army, as well as the breakdown of institutional procedures that would give rise to the military coup in 1971. This article analyzes the various social and political aspects of Ugandan society, and aims to provide the reader with a more comprehensive judgement on the context and reasoning for the 1971 coup in Uganda.

Nowrojee, Binaifer. Protectors or Pretenders? Government Human Rights Commissions in Africa. Human Rights Watch, 2001.

Binaifer Nowrojee’s book focuses on analyzing Commissions in African countries. Specifically, Nowrojee has a chapter focused on the Uganda CIVHR and it outlines some specific details of the Commission such as information about the specific members, the challenges that the Commission faced, the activities that they conducted, and some of the changes that they were able to create. He also emphasizes the permanent Uganda Human Rights Commission that was established as a result of the truth and reconciliation process and the important role they play in trying to counteract human rights violations that still occur in Uganda to this day.

Quinn, Joanna R. “Constraints: The Un-Doing of the Ugandan Truth Commission.” Human Rights Quarterly, vol. 26, no. 2, 2004, pp. 401–427.

In this article, Joanna R. Quinn dives into the circumstances surrounding the Uganda CIVHR. Her methodology consists of travelling to Uganda and interviewing the members of the Commission and analyzing reports and evidence compiled by the Commission, which are scarce. She then emphasizes some of the successes of the Commission and some of the obstacles that hindered its effectiveness. This resource is particularly useful as Quinn was able to get first hand interaction with members of the Commission and get insight into the specific details of the Commission, which is something that not many other scholars have been able to achieve.

Quinn, Joanna R. “Beyond Truth Commissions: Indigenous Reconciliation in Uganda.” The Review of Faith & International Affairs, vol. 4, no. 1, 2006, pp. 31–37.

Joanna R. Quinn’s article primarily focuses upon how reconciliation methods and processes that have been developed in a Western setting have proved to be fruitless and ineffective due to their foreignness to these particular societies. She explains that, often reconciliation and reconstruction of society requires public acknowledgement, but also forgiveness, which in Uganda, seemed to only occur during the 1980s and at a minimal scale that proved to be somewhat ineffective. Lastly, she explains that mechanisms that had been used were ultimately a failure, as a more grassroots and indigenous method would be more appealing to the public.

Sarkin, Jeremy. “Ensuring Justice, Reparations and Truth through a Truth Commission and Other Processes in Uganda.” Law and Politics in Africa, Asia and Latin America, vol. 48, no. 3, 2015, pp. 390–401.

Jeremy Sarkin’s article highlights the need for further steps in order to achieve peace in Uganda. Even after the CIVHR completed their report and offered their recommendations, human rights abuses continue to occur even under Museveni and the NRM’s governance. Sarkin emphasizes how Uganda needs another truth and reconciliation commission in order to achieve transitional justice and sustainable peace. He argues in favour of widespread public truth telling, offering of reparations to victims, further reconciliation, as well as putting in place mechanisms to ensure these abuses do not continue to occur. This article ultimately captures the shortcomings of the original Commission and potential further initiatives to undertake.

Aminzade, Ronald. Race, Nation, and Citizenship in Postcolonial Africa: the Case of Tanzania. Cambridge Univ. Press, 2015.

Amnesty International. “Uganda: The Human Rights Record 1986-1989.” Amnesty International Publications, 1. Mar. 1989, https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/AFR590011989ENGLISH.PDF.

Bernard, Pauline. “The Politics of the Luweero Skulls: the Making of Memorial Heritage and Post-Revolutionary State Legitimacy over the Luweero Mass Graves in Uganda.” Journal of Eastern African Studies, vol. 11, no. 1, 2017, pp. 188–209.

Borzello, Anna. “Uganda's Museveni Leads in 'Rigged' Elections.” The Guardian, 14 Mar. 2001, www.theguardian.com/world/2001/mar/14/2.

Brahm, Eric. “Uncovering the Truth: Examining Truth Commission Success and Impact.” International Studies Perspectives, vol. 8, no. 1, 2007, pp. 16–35.

British Broadcasting Corporation. “AFRICA | Suspicion at Ugandan Army Role.” BBC News, 6 Mar. 2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/1205100.stm.

British Broadcasting Corporation. “Uganda Profile - Timeline.” BBC News, 10 May 2018, www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14112446.

Buganda Kingdom. “Welcome to the Kingdom of Buganda.” The Kingdom of Buganda, www.buganda.or.ug/.

Central Intelligence Agency. 1972, “Wider Implications of Uganda's Expulsion of Its Asians.” www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP79R00967A000500030017-9.pdf.

Danish Centre for Human Rights. “Mid-Term Review: The Uganda Human Rights Education and Documentation Centre.” Yumpu.com, 1 Feb. 1999, www.yumpu.com/en/document/read/4458353/mid-term-review-the-uganda-human-rights-education-and-.

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