

## **Economic rationality meets celebrity urbanology: exploring Edward Glaeser's city**

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Forthcoming in *International Journal of Urban & Regional Research* (2015)

### **Abstract**

*The paper presents a critique of the popular and public-policy work of Harvard economist Edward Glaeser, which has been constructed at the nexus of neoclassical economic rationality and celebrity urbanology. Widely recognized as one of the world's leading urbanists, Glaeser has combined a high-flying academic career with public-policy engagement and extensive work as a newspaper columnist and media commentator—enabled by a long-standing affiliation with the Manhattan Institute, a leading conservative think tank. The critique is pointed, but seeks to exceed argumentum ad hominem by calling attention to sociopolitical and institutional factors that have facilitated the accelerated diffusion and enlarged dominion of this model (and mode) of microeconomically rationalized urbanism, including the production of new forms of intellectual marketing, the construction of colonizing variants of urban-economic expertise, and the ongoing rearticulation and creeping consolidation of market-centric policy norms. The paper argues that a distinctive form of urban-economic orthodoxy is under construction, based on potent fusion of scientific reasoning and pop presentation, combining ideologically disciplined applications of neoclassical economics with dissemination in the register of the 'freakonomics' franchise. Edward Glaeser's intellectual accomplishments have been significant, but the 'Glaeser effect' is more than a story of individual scholarly endeavor, calling for more than a merely 'internal' critique. Its conformity to Manhattan Institute principles testifies to a telling consistency of ideological purpose, contributing as it does to a sustained effort rationalize and normalize lean and limited modes of neoliberal urban governance, fortified by microeconomic reason.*

**Keywords:** Edward Glaeser, urban gurus, economic rationality, celebrity urbanism, Manhattan Institute for Policy Research

### *Acknowledgement*

I am grateful to Josh Akers, Neil Brenner, Brett Christophers, Kevin Cox, Jason Hackworth, Lucas Kirkpatrick, Eric Sheppard, Andrew Shmueli, Tom Stephens, Kevin Ward, and Elvin Wyly for various nudges, comments, and suggestions, and to Matthew Gandy and the reviewers at *IJURR* for their constructively pointed advice. Responsibility for these arguments remains my own, of course.

## Introduction: urban economics, born again

There is an old joke that goes something like this: putting the word ‘urban’ before ‘economist’ is rather like qualifying the expertise of a doctor with the adjective ‘horse’ (Wilson, 1993). Not any more—not since the remarkable rise to international prominence of Harvard University’s Edward L. Glaeser, author of the bestselling *Triumph of the city*, regular contributor to the *New York Times* and other major East-coast outlets, much sought-after advocate for market-friendly policy measures, and today one of the best-known economists in the United States. In the words of the late Gary Becker, one of Glaeser’s former teachers at the University of Chicago, ‘urban economics was dried up’; that is, until the Harvard superstar burst onto the scene with his ‘new ways of looking at cities’ (Becker, quoted in Gertner, 2006: 96). Like Becker before him, Glaeser has made his reputation in part through technical creativity but also by way of provocative extensions of orthodox modes of analysis to new realms of application—effectively colonizing the city as a projected space of economic rationality. In a manner also reminiscent of the Chicago school, this has been translated into sternly market-centric policy advice. As a ‘dashing public advocate for urbanism’, Glaeser brims with ‘a confidence that to some fellow economists borders on arrogance’, although few deny him significant credit for his role in ‘reinvigorat[ing] the field of urban economics’ (Gertner, 2006: 96; Evans, 2008: R6). In tandem with this feat of intellectual resurrection, Glaeser has been recognized by *Governing* magazine, an authoritative source for state and local policymakers in the United States, as ‘one of the nation’s most influential thinkers on urban affairs—and rightly so’ (Buntin, 2011: 1).

Glaeser’s arrival as a (if not *the*) go-to urban theorist, prognosticator, and policy expert can be seen as something of a watershed for the field of urban studies too, the heterodox mainstream of which has long been dominated by an array of critical and pragmatist currents, from which card-carrying economists were for the most part absent. Glaeser has been at the vanguard of an economizing current in urban studies, the reach and range of which is certainly not confined to his particular brand of microfoundations

neoclassicism and stylized policy advocacy, but which otherwise speaks to the mainstreaming of many of his positions and propositions. His work epitomizes an economically-rationalist strain of what Brendon Gleeson (2013) terms the ‘new urbanology’. There has been some critical discussion and evaluation of Glaeser’s claims concerning, for example, amenities-driven growth and ‘consumer cities’, more or less its own terms and terrain (see Storper, 2013). Beyond internalist critique, the concern here is with the constitutive outside of this influential body of work-cum-project, with ‘Glaeser effect’ as a popular and policymaking phenomenon, and with the sociopolitical and ‘infrastructural’ means that account for the production of this distinctive form of celebrity-economist prognostication. The paper engages with Glaeser’s mode of popular urban economics as an institutionally-produced *cultural* phenomenon, properly understood in the company of the *freakonomics* brand of studiously middlebrow economic discourse, which makes a virtue of (over)extending the principles of rational-choice utility maximization onto a wide array ‘everyday’ situations and social puzzles (Levitt and Dubner, 2005; Goodwin and Burr, 2010; cf. DiNardo, 2006; Fine and Milonakis, 2009).<sup>1</sup> The Glaeser effect is also symptomatic of the new style of guru-urbanism, with its sanctification of intensively marketed peddlers of universal fixes *a la* Richard Florida (Florida, 2002; cf. Peck, 2005, 2012; MacGillis, 2010). From the perspective of Glaeser and his colleagues at the Manhattan Institute, the conservative think tank with which he has long been associated, the creative-cities project represents the frivolously liberal wing of the current urban policymaking consensus (Malanga, 2004, 2008b; Glaeser, 2011f: 260; cf. Lemann, 2011), to which *Triumph of the city* should be read as an economically orthodox response—more hard-nosed in both its foundational claims and its policy prescriptions, even if, in expository terms, the book partakes of much the same pop-cultural style as the genre-shaping *Rise of the creative class*.

In a similar vein, Glaeser seeks to inhabit, if not embody, his theories of a better urban life. No shrinking violet, he deliberately (self-)presents as an open book. As an op-ed writer and newspaper columnist, Glaeser’s opinions on a wide range of topics are

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<sup>1</sup> See [www.freakonomics.com](http://www.freakonomics.com). *Freakonomics* coauthor Steven D. Levitt blurred the cover of the paperback version of *Triumph of the city*, anointing the book ‘a masterpiece’.

freely shared as matters of public record and comment,<sup>2</sup> and his eloquent, multi-channel output reaches deeply (and purposefully) into lay as well as expert audiences. Glaeser's pro-market, pro-development, and anti-regulation policy advice, in both broadcast and bespoke form, has been highly consequential—not only chiming with, but actively shaping, evolving positions across a range of national and multilateral agencies (see OECD, 2006, World Bank, 2009; Cities Alliance, 2011). He makes it his business to adopt controversial and attention-grabbing positions, combining uplifting celebrations of urban life, as the pinnacle of human achievement, with the dispensation of sober(ing) advice on the economically conditioned—if not preordained—policy options available to cities today. The pervasive mainstreaming of these positions speaks to more, however, than Glaeser's personal skills as an analyst and advocate, indeed to more than the shrewd marketing and promotional strategies of the Manhattan Institute; it is testament to the generally rightward and market-oriented drift of the urban-policy 'mainstream' itself.

Edward Glaeser's (ideal) city is an 'ordoliberal' one in the sense of an efficiently policed free-market space, gently guided by the enabling hand of a lean and limited state,<sup>3</sup> but otherwise governed by competitive logics, entrepreneurial drives, and consumer choices—naturalistic energies that are only impeded at a price. This is a vision of the city that partakes of the market fundamentalism of the Chicago-school economics, at the same time indulging its interventionist itch whilst correcting for its anti-urban bias (cf. Peck, 2011). It is also very much an East-coast form of urbane libertarianism, closely synchronized with the positions of the Manhattan Institute, and likewise not entirely in step with either the grassroots temper or the national leadership of the Republican Party, but more closely aligned with its (relatively) pragmatic, and rising, cohort of mayors and governors (see Glaeser, 2013c; Malanga, 2010, 2013b). A libertarian centrist with a taste for pro-urban intervention, Glaeser's politics can appear to be vaguely progressive in some lights (see Gleeson, 2012, 2013), but behind his slick presentation and frequent resort to economic proofs is an unbending commitment to the axioms of neoliberal governance—

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<sup>2</sup> Glaeser has worked extensively as a columnist, including for the *Boston Globe*, the *New York Sun*, the *New York Times* Economix blog, and *Bloomberg View*. He has also written essays, articles, and op-eds for the *Wall Street Journal*, the *New Republic*, the *New York Times*, and *Scientific American*, among others.

<sup>3</sup> For discussions of ordoliberalism, see Peck (2010), Dardot and Laval (2014), and Wren-Lewis (2014).

municipal privatization, deregulation, and school 'choice'. It is difficult to escape the conclusion that these policy commitments are more ideological than scientific, since the statistically verifiable case for such interventions is questionable at best. Notably, Glaeser does not stray beyond the ideologically sanctioned terrain of pro-market urbanism, as approved by the Manhattan Institute and its conservative bankrollers, his contribution being to fortify the limited-government cause by way of a popularized style of microeconomic rationalization. Glaeser's is the persuasive voice of orthodox economic reason, pitched at mainstream urban-policy audiences, and occasionally iconoclastic but always catering to that (moving) 'center'.

More often than not, this means a return to the neoliberal basics. Glaeser is famous for arguing for unfettered high-rise construction, liberated from zoning controls, and against redistributive programming and state-subsidized regeneration efforts. Inequality and poverty, he likes to say, are not in themselves 'bad things', but on the contrary should be seen as preconditions for urban-economic vitality, indeed veritable symbols of 'urban strength' (Glaeser, 2011f: 70; 2012b: A11). Glaeser has constructed an elaborate argument, in both public and scholarly venues, against what is portrayed as the artificial (and wasteful) resuscitation of troubled cities like New Orleans and Buffalo, whose productive purpose has apparently been served (Glaeser, 2005b, 2007a, 2010a, 2011b). Notably, he has made what prominent Stanford economist Robert E. Hall (2008: 241) has described as 'a good case for tough love toward cities like Detroit', insisting that the city 'can only come back ... with better education, limited regulations and stricter rule of law' (Glaeser, 2013b: 4, cf. Hughes, 2013; Akers, 2015).

It was testimony to Glaeser's reach and reputation that in 2014 Detroit's then-emergency manager, Kevyn Orr, publicly advocated for the Harvard man to chair a panel of experts to oversee the city's path out of bankruptcy, its aptly named 'Plan of Adjustment'. A submission to the federal bankruptcy court from the beleaguered city declared that the emergency manager's office had 'conducted a review of the work of leading urbanologists and economists, including those who would be appropriate as truly independent and disinterested experts should the Court decide ... to appoint a neutral

expert to assist ... in its evaluation of the feasibility of the Plan', concluding that Glaeser was ideally suited for the role, as a 'world-renowned economist' and 'recognized scholar in the field of municipal economics, crime, housing markets, and other urban issues' (City of Detroit, 2014: 5-6). This denizen of the Eastern seaboard and resident of suburban Boston had not spent much time in Motown, however, reporting with a hint of defensiveness to a local journalist that he had nevertheless come to appreciate the 'city's beauty ... walking around [its] neighborhoods ... visit[ing] a charter school, and deeply enjoy[ing] its museums' (Glaeser, quoted in Svoboda, 2014: 1). Yet despite a public offer to serve on a *pro bono* basis, Glaeser did not get to become Detroit's expert—at least not its official expert.<sup>4</sup>

The economist has made no secret of his opinion that Detroit is an industrial-era anachronism and a 'toxic' expression of municipal-state bloat (Glaeser, 2011f: 57). In *Triumph of the city*, his paean to competitive urbanism, Detroit occupies the role of a recurring foil, as 'the book's prime example of decline' (Economist, 2011, 92). For Glaeser, Motown is an irresistible target for various schemes of deregulation and downsizing, a testbed for the neoliberal notion of 'shrinking [a city] back to greatness' (Glaeser, 2010a: 1; 2013a, 2013b). It is a place that practically invites city-government reform, guided by the principles of long-term fiscal restraint, imposed from above. And it represents fertile ground for the propagation of radical models based on privatized schooling, experimental policing, human-capital intensive development, and the cultivation, by way of systemic deregulation, of an entrepreneurial start-up culture. It is a sign of the times that these positions can be read as 'mainstream', and also that they are advanced and legitimized in the language of economics (Lemann, 2011). Glaeser may have made his name as a 'positive' economist, but he has leveraged this, with the support of the Manhattan Institute and its allies, into a normative project for the rationalization and normalization of neoliberal restructuring, not only in United States but also beyond.

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<sup>4</sup> Judge Steven W. Rhodes 'offbeat' appointment process was more attuned to the technical and political aspects of the case. He chose Marti Kopacz, a public-sector turnaround specialist, and Richard Ravitch, a veteran of New York City's fiscal crises (Yaccino, 2014: A11). Glaeser did not present himself for the 'interviews' for these advisory positions, which were conducted in open court.

The concern of this paper is with production of the ‘Glaeser effect’, understood as the tight interlacing of neoclassical (micro)economic rationality and neoliberal policy preferences, in a manner that is functionally doctrinaire even as appears presentationally benign. This means going beyond the conventions of internal critique, since the career of this public intellectual and policy advocate amounts to much more than a tale of sole-trading scholarly endeavor, raising as it does questions about the politicization of economics and the institutional staging of guru urbanism. The paper begins biographically, with an account of Glaeser’s intellectual and social formation, culminating in his distinctive contribution to the ‘new urbanology’. This first part of the paper follows Glaeser from his New York upbringing out to the home of neoliberal economics, the University of Chicago, and back to the East coast, where *Triumph of the city* was hatched and hawked. The paper then digs into the institutional and ideological substrata of this work, exploring the conditions of production (and circulation) of ‘Glaesernomics’ as a new genre of conservative urban economics.

Not only have the incubation and promotion functions of the Manhattan Institute been manifestly instrumental in the packaging and promotion of Glaesernomics, the ideological consistency (indeed conformity) of the economist’s policy pronouncements should be seen as a normative ‘tell’. What Glaeser has been doing for the city—with and on behalf of the Manhattan Institute—can be paralleled with what Charles Murray did for the welfare state a generation before him. The think tank’s tried-and-trusted strategy for intellectual marketing, for which Murray’s (1984) *Losing ground* was the prototype, was once again put to work with *Triumph of the city*, the reach and impact of which can be attributed to an evidently seductive combination of economics-lite delivery, polished presentation, and ideologically consistent policy advocacy. The underlying economics may be rather austere and unforgiving, and the policy advice may be blunt, but this is a celebratory account that ‘noisily honks the arrival of a new “urban age”’ (Gleeson, 2013: 1841). Finally, the paper’s conclusion returns, just as Glaeser likes to do, to Detroit, and the site of urban-state failure that is the flipside of his triumphalist urban vision. It is in

places like this that Glaesernomics really bites, where its neoclassical abstractions are translated into binding programs of market-oriented reconstruction.

### **Champion of choice**

A perennial point of reference in his writing, Edward Ludwig Glaeser grew up in New York City, where his father, a trained architect, was a curator at the Museum of Modern Art, and his mother, after a spell in the arts-fundraising world, worked in finance. He credits his father for his love of cities (and history), and his mother, who explained marginal-cost pricing to him as a youngster, for his devotion to the cold logic of economics. Glaeser attended Collegiate, an elite prep school for boys, where he developed a lifelong habit of wearing three-piece suits, before heading to Princeton to study Economics. For his doctoral work, he chose the University of Chicago, storied home of the free-market counterrevolution but by this time an establishment bastion in its own right. Here, Glaeser precociously joined the faculty table at the Economics Department's legendary seminars, coming under the influence of Gary Becker (Nobel laureate, former president of the Mont Pelerin Society, and the originator of human-capital theory and the new home economics), Robert Lucas (another Nobel laureate and a pioneer of the microfoundations critique of Keynesianism), Sherwin Rosen (microeconomist of labor and sometime president of the American Economic Association), Edward Lazear (tournament theorist and later chair of the Council of Economic Advisors under George W. Bush), George S. Tolley (urban and environmental economist, with an extensive policy portfolio), and José Scheinkman (his advisor, a mathematical economist working on cities, crime, and applied finance, who served for a while as a vice president of Goldman Sachs). It was at Chicago—with its boundless applications of free-market reasoning, its bold extensions of microeconomic technique, and its abiding distrust of the state—that the intellectual foundations for Glaeser's economics were laid, where his worldview was formed.

Straight out of Chicago, Glaeser was appointed to the economics faculty at Harvard, where he has made his career, including a long association with the National



Bureau of Economic Research and visiting fellowships at the Brookings Institution, the Hoover Institution at Stanford, the World Bank, and the University of Chicago Law School. In 2005, he was nudged out by MIT's Daron Acemoglu for the Bates medal, awarded in alternating years to the leading American (or U.S.-based) economist under 40 (Hilsenrath, 2005), a perceived injustice that would be cited in a (successful) lobbying campaign to convert the prize to an annual one. At Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, Glaeser directed the Taubman Center for State and Local Government from 2004 to 2014, and for more than a decade has been the director of the Rappaport Institute for Greater Boston. He also teaches Harvard's microeconomic theory course, Econ 1011a, which is advertised as the 'hard core, boot camp, track' for those seeking to learn the 'core skill [of] how to sensibly model any real world phenomenon/puzzle' (and certainly not those who are content with the 'watered down version of economics').<sup>5</sup>

The economics profession has little time for diluters, and precious little respect for popularizers either. It is therefore all the more notable for Glaeser to have retained (indeed burnished) his academic credibility while venturing not only unto urban economics but into *popular and applied* urban economics. These were certainly not the obvious choices for a University of Chicago high flier, but Glaeser has cut a new path with remarkable success, quickly emerging as a flag-bearer for the field of urban economics. In the path-breaking contribution to metropolitan growth theory that announced his entrance to this barely occupied territory, a data-crunching exercise for 170 metropolitan regions across the United States resulted in an alternative understanding of the economics of agglomeration space. Contra the fashion for Porterian clusters, founded on local specialisms, Glaeser argued that 'specialization hurts [but] competition helps' as a predictor of employment performance (Glaeser *et al.*, 1991: 25). Building a bridge between two lines of Chicago-school theory (Lucas on the microeconomics of growth; Becker on the dynamics of human capital), verified through statistical means, the urban-agglomeration paper was published by the National Bureau of Economic Research and

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<sup>5</sup> '[T]his is Harvard, and you should have the option of taking an economics course that pushes you', the syllabus bluntly states; otherwise, 'take the other course'. Glaeser, E. (2014) *Economics 1011a: Intermediate microeconomics*. URL <http://www.registrar.fas.harvard.edu/courses-exams/course-catalog/economics-1011a-microeconomic-theory> (accessed 23 June 2014).

'made Glaeser famous in his mid-20's' (Gertner, 2006: 97). It also reclaimed the *competitive* city as a meaningful object of neoclassical analysis.

As the *Economist* magazine's 'free-exchange' columnist, a willing convert to Glaeser's way of thinking, has said of his revelatory oeuvre, 'It [had not been] not obvious, to economists anyway, that cities should exist at all' (Economist, 2013: 64). In contrast to the strict market-fundamentalist position that, 'in a model of perfect competition, cities should not even exist' (Romer, 2008: 245), Glaeser and his collaborators have helped to shape a new orthodoxy of urban economics. Here, the existence of cities is recognized, only to be reinterpreted in the language of maximum parsimony and a social economy as 'the absence of physical space between people and companies' (Glaeser, 2011f: 6). Agglomeration is therefore recovered as an elemental fact of economic life, while unimpeded spatial interaction becomes a growth-enriching policy objective. And so the city goes from being a theoretically indigestible object to a vital cog in an equilibrating system (the eternal, mechanical logic of which is impeded at the cost of inefficiency, or worse). Glaeser's contributions to the new urban economics—the task of which has been plainly described by Arthur O'Sullivan (2010: 885) as 'put[ting] economics and geography together, [based on the] location choices of utility-maximizing households and profit-maximizing firms'—have been vital in stabilizing the following knot of stylized facts:

First, output appears to be subject to agglomeration economies, whereby people are more productive when they work in densely populated areas ... Second, there appear to be human capital spillovers, whereby concentrations of educated people increase both the level and the growth rate of productivity. Finally, the urban system appears to be roughly described by a spatial equilibrium (Glaeser and Gottlieb, 2008: 155).

Founded on this spatial-equilibrium framework, Glaeser has developed a sophisticated version of the 'people go first, jobs follow' argument, a microeconomically rationalized cousin to the creative-class thesis. The model is based on the individually derived but jointly determined locational choices of workers, firms, and developers, and it is verified according to the statistical patterning of metropolitan growth in the United States since the 1960s. Liberal applications of '[s]tandard economic reasoning' yield the conclusion that 'skills induce growth' (Glaeser and Saiz, 2004: 85, 48), prompted by the geographical

pull of suburban amenities and sunny skies. On this account of the superior rates of economic (and population) growth registered by sunbelt cities over recent decades, significant weight is attached to the 'amenity shock' represented by the introduction of air-conditioning, along with improvements to the interstate highway system that facilitated exits from the old, cold cities of the North. The arguments are founded on correlation, not causality, 'explanation' resting on a restrictive array of supply-side variables.<sup>6</sup> Epistemologically sympathetic assessments have found the urban amenities argument to be 'far from convincing', relative to more plausibly causal (demand-side and institutional) factors like productive restructuring and regulatory arbitrage, while questioning the reduction of the the complex issue of metropolitan growth and decline to 'the spontaneous migration decisions of workers and households, [the] supposedly superior amenities' of favored cities (Storper, 2013: 23, 28), or a generalized preference for larger lots and milder winters.

This is the space of *homo urbanis* (Gleeson, 2013: 1841). In a parsimoniously defined world 'driven only by individual decision-making and behaviour', one that is 'devoid of any sort of structural logic', Allen Scott (2008: 81) has remarked, 'this sort of account might be taken at its face value [but] what if the suggested attributes (like sunshine) have a merely incidental relationship to this logic?' Avowed non-specialists in urban and regional economics, like the Brookings Institution's Gary Burtless, admit to being intrigued by Glaeser's arguments about rustbelt decline and sunbelt growth, but are more inclined to look beyond the distribution of skills and sunshine. Burtless (2004: 97) makes a point of highlighting the effects of anti-union right-to-work laws in the Southern and Southwestern states and the accompanying distaste for imposing 'tax and regulatory burdens on employers', observing that 'it seems doubtful that high summer temperatures cause legislators to vote for low taxes, limited regulation, poor unemployment benefits, paltry worker compensation, and modest minimum wages'. Instead, Glaeser's model reads off from a small set of supply-side fundamentals, like skills and urban amenities

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<sup>6</sup> 'The key analytical maneuver [here is] the implication that cities are really only aggregates of free-floating individuals and that they can therefore be restructured simply by appropriate fine-tuning of their amenities so as to keep in place and to attract targeted population groups', Scott (2008: 81) argues. 'Unfortunately, there is much in this kind of analysis that recalls the obdurate tautologies of neoclassical economics'.

(including the weather). Ironically, having first abstracted from the political-economic dynamics of deindustrialization, deunionization, and deregulation (not to mention the path-shaping historical geographies and institutional legacies of industrial urbanism), the supposed virtues of neoliberal regulation, such as low taxes and supply-side tinkering, are then reaffirmed by pointing to the fact of Southern-centric, regulation-averse growth.

The appeal of Glaeser's new urban economics might be put down to the generally receptive political environment that has been created around such facts on the ground, in these times of neoliberalized urban growth. Others might prefer a different kind of supply-side explanation over such circumstantial claims, pegging this outsized influence to an inherently winning combination of analytical brilliance, expositional flair, arresting correlation, and status-quo affirming policy advice. It is not to discount these factors, however, to observe that Glaeser's meteoric rise has coincided with (while recursively shaping) an historically distinctive cultural popularization of economic discourse (see Fine and Milonakis, 2009; Spiegler, 2012). Here, the figure of the economist-savant—who can see what others cannot, the invisible matrix of economic incentives, giving voice to the hard truths of market rationality—has been granted a new kind of public authority.<sup>7</sup> At its most potent, this approach combines presentational accessibility with flashes of statistical wizardry (along with a measure of feigned interpretive innocence), disclosing sometimes uncomfortable truths as way-of-the world facts of competitive life. Glaeser occupies the more scholarly precincts of this universe, but occupy it he does. The *Economist* magazine's evaluation of *Triumph of the city* as 'popular economics of the best sort' adorns the back cover of the book, beneath a plug from the *Daily Show's* Jon Stewart. The book consciously calls upon the 'rhetorical bravura of the [new] urbanologists, marrying this with prose that simultaneously 'shimmer[s] with abstraction' (Gleeson, 2012: 932, 934). Glaeser espouses a lightly socialized version of Chicago-school economics, scrupulously true to the axioms of the founding fathers—Smith, Marshall, and Friedman—

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<sup>7</sup> Spiegler's (2012: 297) perceptive analysis of popular economics, and the economics-made-fun phenomenon, concludes that the genre, far from representing a corruption of orthodox economic theory, rests upon and reaffirms the same ontology, *projecting* an economistic rationality—scientifically, metaphorically, and literally—into the workaday world: 'Rather than revealing a hidden structure of everyday life, it presumes that structure, interprets empirical reality from within the framework of that presumed structure and takes this reinterpretation as evidence of the presumed structures'.

but equally attuned to the give-and-take, faux-populist style of the professional commentariat (see Glaeser, 2009, 2011e). His signal contribution has been to apply this apparatus, suitably lubricated and burnished, to the long-neglected object of the city—understood as a space for the interplay of market forces. Crucially, opportunities to issue nominally ‘evidence-based’ policy advice are never missed, advice that will reliably come (by dint of circular reasoning and restrictive assumptions) in market-friendly form.

This is a formula(tion) that has proved to be predictably appealing to mainstream policy organizations and multilateral agencies (see OECD, 2006; World Bank, 2009). It is a recipe for a spartan approach to market-complementing urban governance ostensibly above the political fray (and ‘bias’), one that nevertheless tilts reliably towards supply-side minimalism (and a default position of ‘no policy is good policy’), unless the economic tradeoffs can be calculated with some degree of confidence (Glaeser, quoted in EconTalk, 2013: 8; Romer, 2008: 246). In the Chicago style, the (logic of the) market is first and ultimate, but the ordoliberal twist is that there is a (circumscribed) role for the state in policing this market order. Stopping short of ‘Ayn Randian individualism’, Glaeser’s prefers to channel his efforts into ‘a passionate commitment to the wonky business of public-sector efficiency’, albeit in the context of an orientation toward neoliberal policy preferences and rolling deregulation, matched by a generalized skepticism towards the ‘traditional tools of taxing and redistributing’ (Glaeser, 2012: A11; 2012a: A17; Glaeser and Sunstein, 2014b). Good governance, in this context, means limited government, both for struggling metros in the United States and for the fast-growing cities of the Global South, lest the course of competitive adjustment be interrupted.

‘Places decline and places grow’, Glaeser has opined, ‘We shouldn’t stand in the way of that’ (quoted in Gertner, 2006: 98).<sup>8</sup> Consistent with this neoclassical economic naturalism, he courted (and found) controversy by speaking out against the impulse to rebuild New Orleans after Katrina (Glaeser, 2005b). A subsequent remark to a reporter, that there was really not much reason for Detroit to be there at all any more, raised the

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<sup>8</sup> ‘[W]e should not freeze urban change or artificially forestall urban decline. People moved to the Sunbelt for good reasons, and there’s no reason why the country as a whole should try to restore Detroit’s peak population ... National government should try to reduce human misery, but it shouldn’t try to stop the great course of urban change’ (Glaeser, 2011f: 255-256).

specter of neoDarwinian economism. In a letter to the *New York Times* magazine, a Detroit resident took exception to what he interpreted as a profoundly ahistorical reading, countering that ‘rust-belt cities ... have cycles, rather than being simply entities to be discarded because they no longer meet [Glaeser’s] urban aspirations’, adding for good measure that ‘the man needs to move from his ivory tower into the real world of cities, rather than offer pronouncements from the perimeters of the far suburbs where he has moved’ (Thibodeau, 2006: 8). Undeterred, Glaeser continues to portray the Motor City as a place stuck ‘on the wrong side of history’, maintaining that only an unprecedented dose of municipal downsizing, public-service triage, and unflinching deregulation stands a chance of being adequate to the task of ‘shrinking Detroit back’ to a market-friendly future (Glaeser, 2010a: 1).<sup>9</sup> Once the streets are much safer and the schools are much better, the market can do the rest—a practically universal prescription that applies to ‘cities of the poor’ everywhere, and which comes down to securing the ‘fundamentals’, like clean water, effective policing, and deregulated property markets (Glaeser, 2013b, 2014).

Cities flourish, the argument goes, under conditions of competitive diversity, liberalized knowledge spillovers, and state restraint, ‘when they have many small firms and skilled citizens’, with the ‘best cities hav[ing] a mix of skills [that] provide pathways for those who start with less to end with more’ (Glaeser, 2011f: 8-9, 224). There is not, Glaeser maintains, a single way to succeed, but there are some sure ways to fail. His ordoliberal ideal combines 19<sup>th</sup> Century entrepreneurial freedoms with Singapore-style political predictability, this being a man who plainly ‘likes autocrats who can get things gone’ (Lemann, 2011: 78).<sup>10</sup> Its antithesis is the unreformed Fordist-Keynesian city, an

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<sup>9</sup> Symbolizing ‘America’s greatest urban tragedy’, Detroit’s bankruptcy declaration in the summer of 2013 consequently represented a ‘necessary next step to bring fiscal sanity to an awful mess created by 50 years of private-sector decline and public-sector irresponsibility. Yet the public policies that helped bring Detroit to this precipice were hardly unique, and the city’s bankruptcy is a warning to the many local governments that pay their workers today with unfunded promises for future pensions and health care’ (Glaeser, 2013a: A11).

<sup>10</sup> ‘Singapore has been effective at providing a clean and safe city’, he reports, ‘because its government operates with fewer constraints than governments in many other places’ (Glaeser, 2011f: 258). Since the Lion City has, by all accounts, been an economic success story, the absent constraints are presumably those associated with multi-party democracies in ‘other places’. Elsewhere, Glaeser *et al.* (2004: 298), in a study

urban anomaly whose time is declared to be ‘over, at least in the West’ (Glaeser, 2011f: 40). The (obvious) lesson—exemplified by those cities that have taken the wrong turn, down the road ‘paved to hell’ (Glaeser, 2011f: 6)—is that high taxes, invasive forms of redistribution, bureaucratic regulation, monopolistic practices, and a preoccupation with grandiose infrastructure projects (over the supply-side ‘basics’ of education and security) are an invitation to urban failure. This is a sclerotic condition for which Detroit serves as the test (or basket) case.

In the practiced style of the guru urbanologist, Glaeser reaches well beyond statistical proofs for positive examples of metropolitan vitality, cherry-picking from Paris and Bangalore, Vancouver and Houston, Tokyo and (of course) New York City. This rigorously systematic economist is liberally selective when it comes to best-practice policy prescription: the secrets of urban success are effortlessly harvested from the sites of that success. As Anne Shlay (2012: 333) remarked in her review of *Triumph of the city*, one of the few robust treatments that the book received, these ‘urban favorites’ represent familiar territory, more than half of the volume being given over to celebratory accounts of New York, London, and Paris: ‘Glaeser’s triumphant cities are globally integrated cities that command resources and wealth disproportionate to other urban areas’, she wrote, although these also have ‘high real estate values [that are] rapidly pricing out working class residents’. Yet this is not the kind of contextualized economics that seeks to explain the conjunctural position of this or that (global) city; it stakes a claim on the (universal) economics of the generic city (see Gleeson, 2012). For Glaeser, it is grassroots entrepreneurial dynamism and relatively free markets that account for urban success. Meanwhile, cities like Detroit are defined by mirror-image deficits—a lack of skills, a lack of entrepreneurialism, a lack of ideas, a lack of decent schools. When pushed by the *New York Times*’ David Leonhardt to explain what (else) Detroit reasonably might do, short of trying to move the needle on its deficits in human capital, Glaeser advised that ‘the best local economic development strategy ... is to work on attracting smart, entrepreneurial people and then, more or less, get out of their way’.

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of the institutional foundation of economic growth, make a case for ‘good-for-growth dictators’ as the optimal configuration for countries with low levels of human capital.

Albeit in the language of supply-side economics, this is an(other) affirmation of the righteousness of middle-class locational, housing, and schooling choices (see Berwick, 2011). The relevant actors in the rational-choice city are consumers, smart individuals, and the bearers of property rights; assuming that government and other enemies of competition ‘get out of [the] way’, it is their choices that make the city. The demand side of the economy—relating to firms, industries, and the requirements of jobs—is essentially reduced to an outcome. It is as if, as Michael Storper has observed, ‘[t]here is no geography of production’, since there is

no systematic consideration—whether it be the finance industry in London or Hong Kong, high tech in San Francisco, cars in Detroit or oil equipment in Houston—of how industries and firms (labor demand) interact with people and household[s] (labor supply), to generate patterns of metropolitan growth and incomes ... Glaeser analyses both why people move from Boston to Dallas ... and why they move from central Boston to its suburbs, and in both cases, it is because they are seeking to maximize their utility through some combination of housing costs and quality of life (2011: 1080).

Allen Scott (2012: 98) has echoed this point, finding much to admire in *Triumph of the city*, but countering that ‘even in a neoclassical equilibrium framework, the critical variables underlying urban growth ... go beyond amenities, house prices, and disembodied ‘wages’’. Richly decorated with historical vignettes and everyday anecdotes, *Triumph* nevertheless remains stubbornly true to this underlying model, properly described as an erudite display of a ‘single-minded way of thinking’ (Storper, 2011: 1081). This is the formula: single-minded, but ‘no dry work’ (Economist, 2011: 92).

If Glaeser ‘spares his readers the equations of his trade’ (Economist, 2011: 92), he also denies them the insights of more heterodox variants of urban theory, the extensive corpus of which is entirely overlooked (Scott, 2012; Gleeson, 2013). That is, with the exception of the mandatory acknowledgment of Jane Jacobs. Although Glaeser prefers to talk about new ideas in tall (as opposed to old) buildings, his celebrations of urban bustle are reminiscent of Jacobs in other respects (Buntin, 2011). He insists, however, that Jacobs ‘got housing prices wrong’, in her wrongheaded advocacy of development controls, an unforgivable lapse, since ‘[t]hat’s not how supply and demand works’ (Glaeser, quoted in Leonhardt, 2011: 4; Glaeser, 2011f: 11). Consistent with the party line among the new



urban economists, Glaeser portrays development controls as a driver of inflated housing prices, leading him to cast Jacobs as the ‘queen of unintended consequences’ (Shea, 2011: B1; see also Haughton *et al.*, 2014). One of his signature arguments is that the best way to bring down house prices is to deregulate supply, and then build high, enabled by relaxed (or removed) zoning restrictions. Since house prices, like everything else, ‘conform to the laws of conventional economics’, the price of downtown regulation is predictably paid in the form of suburban sprawl (Glaeser, 2011f: 188; Glaeser and Gyourko, 2002).

Rationally-acting suburbanites are making predictable choices in opting for more space and better schools, a calculus that will not change until the cities, too, deregulate and privatize their markets for housing and education. This typifies a style of urban reasoning, consistently displayed across Glaeser’s writing and his policy advice, to defer unfailingly to the *law* of supply and demand. ‘He favors market solutions’, Scott (2012: 98) observes, ‘and although he is explicitly deeply suspicious of governmental action, he is sufficiently liberal to think that a bit of light-touch policy can deal with the more stubborn predicaments that cities face’.

Glaeser is also sufficiently liberal to believe that those unfortunate individuals who fail the tests of the market sometimes deserve a helping hand, though he is quick to clarify that this position is a matter of (personal) ethical choice, not (professional) economic reason. ‘[B]elief in the market may seem hard-hearted, but it isn’t’, he states, adding the proviso that ‘my belief in reducing poverty is a personal opinion, not a matter of economic insight’ (Glaeser, 2011f: 250). Engaging the mind, rather than the heart, reveals that competition is more often a force for good, while many forms of public intervention are impugned as ‘terribly inefficient’ practices, tantamount to wanton acts of ‘throwing resources’ about:

[T]he heart of economics is the belief that businesses work best by competing furiously in a market that the government oversees as impartial umpire. The same is true for cities. Competition among local governments for people and firms is healthy. Competition drives cities to deliver better services and keep down costs. The national government does no good by favoring particular places, just as it does no good by propping up particular firms or industries ... [T]hrowing resources at troubled firms or troubled cities is usually a terribly inefficient means of taking care of troubled people (Glaeser, 2011f: 250).

When it comes to the economic rationale for ‘taking care of troubled people’, Glaeser can be at his most iconoclastic. The slums of India and the favelas of Brazil are living proof that the escalator of the urban market (‘the world’s most important market’) is working well, and that the bootstrapping poor are making the right locational choices, since these are essentially ‘good places to be poor’.<sup>11</sup> The paradox of urban poverty is that ‘attempts to improve life for Rio’s poor [result in] more poor people com[ing] to the favelas’, a welfare-magnet effect that means that ‘any attempt to fix the poverty level in a single city may well backfire’ (Glaeser, 2011f: 76). This style of economic rationalization increasingly resonates across mainstream policy discourse, not least on issues like urban poverty, and informality in housing and employment (see World Bank, 2009; Cities Alliance, 2011). Policy should help poor people (in a targeted way), not poor places (in an indiscriminate way). Liberalized markets help the poor; regulation invariably does more harm than good.

There are universal lessons to be learned, as a result, from the deregulated slum. Since workers and households are rationally acting nomads, and firms can pick and choose too, local governments everywhere will have to learn to be lean, and no less instrumentalist.

[T]oday, production is pretty perfectly mobile, and cities thrive by attracting workers with quality of life and excitement. This leads to a focus both on bread-and-butter urban issues—like safe streets and short commutes—and on eliminating any barriers to innovation in the entertainment sector ... Regulations are a direct deterrent to new business, and as cities age, they acquire layer after layer of regulation like the grime that can rest on older structures ... I would urge every older city to set up a task force charged with making sure that their town is about the easiest place in the world to open a new start-up ... Declining cities shouldn’t be building new structures with public funds, but they should make sure that private developers who want to remake urban spaces have a relatively easy time of it ... Almost every city in the U.S. has some form of long-run fiscal problem associated with public-sector pensions and health care that looms like a guillotine over urban revival. The best way toward local fiscal sanity is to follow the private sector (Glaeser, quoted in Leonhardt, 2011: 2).

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<sup>11</sup> In the popularized version of free-market urban economics, everything is about (individual) choice: ‘A city’s population tells you about what the city offers. Salt Lake City is full of Mormons because it’s a good place to be a Mormon. London has many bankers because it’s a good place to manage money. Cities like Rio have plenty of poor people, because they’re relatively good places to be poor. After all, even without any cash, you can still enjoy Ipanema Beach’ (Glaeser, 2011f: 71).

By proffering uncompromising policy advice while partaking, in turns, of a donnish detachment, Glaeser embodies the conceit, usually credited to Milton Friedman, of the distinction between ‘positive’ and ‘normative’ economics. His farewell contribution to the *New York Times* Economix blog reiterated the binary distinction between positive economics, the attempt to ‘understand the world as it is,’ and normative economics as ‘the world should be’, overlooking their practical *combination*, when the law-like nostrums of orthodox economics (complete with restrictive assumptions) are invoked in the service of presentational certitude: ‘Our theories start with the assumption that giving individuals more choice is a good thing ... [always putting] freedom first’, assisted by a classically minimalist and ‘centuries-old approach to public policy’ (Glaeser, 2011e: 1-2).

Glaeser is sufficiently self aware, however, to appreciate that his ‘utilitarian outlook’ is distinctively that of the (orthodox) economist. As he wrote in his father’s obituary, the ‘central conflict between the architect and the economist is [that] between championing beauty and choice’, so the son refused to be judgmental about repetitive suburbia because to ‘an economist, the ability to people to live as they choose is paramount [and so even] if my own tastes are as urban as my father’s, I cannot see imposing those tastes on others’ (Glaeser, 2006b: 8). Glaeser has a marked ‘libertarian bent’, but he is certainly not of the zero-state, anarchocapitalist tribe: the proper role for government is to set the rules, establishing an ‘unbiased’ framework for the maximization of individual choices and utility preferences, in the *ordo* tradition, not to ‘advocate for a particular lifestyle’ (Glaeser, quoted in Goodyear, 2011: 6, 2). This translates (predictably) into across-the-board aversions to rent controls and zoning restrictions, to bad Keynesian habits like ‘picking winners’ in industrial policy, and to bureaucratic models of schooling and urban (re)development, but it also leads to principled objections against the U.S. model of mortgage-interest tax deduction and artificially low gas prices, and against immigration controls and federally funded highway construction, all of which are faulted for subsidizing sprawl while penalizing more efficient modes of living. Glaeser (2011f: 193-197) does not criticize suburban commuters, or those that opt out of urban school systems, for making the wrong choices (after all, he made the same choices himself), but

instead makes the case for public policies that restore a proper balance—which all else being equal should favor city living.

In principle, rather than in personal practice, Glaeser is an enthusiast for skyscrapers and high-rise lifestyles—'up, up, up' was how the *New York Times Book Review* synopsized *Triumph of the city* (Silver, 2011)—especially where these might encourage the bearers of superior forms of human capital to repopulate the city. 'Living in an urban apartment is the least Malthusian thing we can do in the sense that it's imposing the least cost on the overall environment', he has argued, being quick to add that, 'I'm not envisioning the whole world living in a *Blade Runner*-like density, or advocating that every human being should adopt a particular type of living space' (Glaeser, quoted in Gorney, 2011: 1-2). High-rise living works where the appropriate mechanisms of social control are in place. These mechanisms are, in effect, internalized by the middle classes, but concentrations of poor people may present a policing problem, if not a threat to social order:

[P]ublic-housing skyscrapers ... have not been particularly successful ... The combination of height and social disorder can be very, very bad. New York and Chicago built many of those projects, and they proved very unsuccessful. They concentrated large amounts of poor people on very small amounts of land, which made it difficult to create law and order ... [But the] Singapore model ... challenges our view that the high-rise model can't work for public housing. You need to put in place a set of tools—whether it's more police, or doormen, or other factors—that keep the streets safe, and Singapore is remarkably good at creating order and making sure that rules are followed (Glaeser, quoted in Gorney, 2011: 2-3).

From a policing perspective, as the Brazilians have apparently learned, 'it is easier to secure an apartment than a *favela*' (Glaeser, quoted in Gorney, 2011: 3).

It is not difficult to see why Glaeser is sometimes accused of being 'a little tone deaf' in his policy prescriptions (Silver, 2011: L21), which can be intellectually principled and politically asinine at the same time. He sees himself on the economically rationalist wing of a would-be progressive-libertarian alliance for the cities (Leonhardt, 2011). With respect to the spectrum of contemporary Republican politics in the United States, he would be positioned somewhere in the sparsely inhabited center, between the rump of the corporate-cum-country-club conservatives on the one side and those, on the other,

who will defend free-market principles on grounds of rational pragmatism, but not to the point of fiscal nihilism or tea-party nativism. Glaeser might be styled, in appropriately oxymoronic terms, as ‘progressive conservative’, or a member of the ‘libertarian establishment’. He prizes his independence, as a free-thinking and free-speaking intellectual, orbiting (as Milton Friedman famously did before him) between the cloistered world of ivy-league economics and the loosely articulated universe of conservative, libertarian, and pragmatist politics; however, ‘no one accuses him of being a lefty’ (Gertner, 2006: 96).

Glaeser’s (2011a) vision of the ‘radical center’ looks like a (more) conservative version of the third way, leavened with a measure of compassion but fortified by competitively disciplined pragmatism. His is a utilitarian ‘common sense’ attuned to solutions in the problem space defined by fiscal restraint (short of government shutdowns) and regulatory reform (short of total privatization). Glaeser maps his own position in the reasonable center as effectively equidistant from the radical fringes of ‘liberal [and] conservative extremism’, with the tea party occupying a no-go zone on the right and the Obama Administration apparently representing something analogous on the left (Glaeser, 2011a: 2). He has occasionally joined brainstorming lunches at the Obama White House (Kuhnenn, 2014), but this is as close as he will get to the left-wing fringe—arguably revealing more about the President’s ideological flexibility than his own.

Glaeser blanches at the excesses of the tea party (a ‘bitter minority held together by an unpopular, angry ideology’), arguing that a reformed Republican Party should reset its stall around the ‘best parts of the Reagan revolution’ by crafting a package of ‘economic policies [that can] offer the brightest future for middle income Americans’ (Glaeser, 2008: 9).<sup>12</sup> In 2008, offered an early endorsement to John McCain in the Republican presidential primaries, alongside more qualified support for Rudy Guiliani and Mitt Romney (‘three extraordinary men’); there were no good words to say about Hillary Clinton, Barack Obama, or the ‘party of Jimmy Carter’ (Glaeser, 2008: 9). Savvy enough

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<sup>12</sup> He sometimes strikes more conciliatory tones with the tea party: recognizing that the big cities have been mostly alien territory for the movement, he maintains that there are common causes to be shaped, with more progressive libertarians like himself, around the sacred principles of choice and competition, and commonsense policies like charter schools and road pricing (Glaeser, 2011c: 1).

not to align himself too closely to any particular politician or definitive position, Glaeser moves around in an ideological space somewhere between Reagan, Romney, and Rand, taking care not to be seen to be too close to any of them (see Glaeser, 2012a); never the zero-state zealot but instinctively wary of governmental creep, he has proved adept at working the pragmatic center, a center that has been drifting in his right-libertarian direction for some time.

### **Packaging ‘Glaesernomics’**

The phenomenon of ‘Glaesernomics’ cannot be reduced to the economics of Edward Glaeser, even if its performance has been often highly personalized. This particular intellectual entrepreneur, like all entrepreneurs, depends on more than self-propelled brilliance. There is a supporting cast, and enabling *institutions*, to take into account as well. Particularly notable in this context is Glaeser’s ongoing association with the Manhattan Institute for Policy Research, one of the most influential of the now-sprawling network of conservative think tanks, where he is a Senior Fellow and a contributing editor for the widely read house magazine, *City Journal*. It was here that Glaeser first began to popularize a case for ‘why economists [should] still like cities’ in the mid 1990s. In his *City Journal* debut, he drew upon data for U.S. cities since the 1960s (the time of deindustrialization, of course, but there is no mention of such structural-historical processes), to conclude that the decline of manufacturing-reliant metros was ‘unavoidable’ and, based on simple correlations, that the information-age future belonged to those ‘consumer cities’ best placed to capture productivity premiums deriving from the spatial clustering of highly credentialed workers: ‘high-skill cities prosper; low-skill ones stagnate or decline’ (Glaeser, 1996: 72). These were clearly not understood as conjunctural circumstances, but as expressions of eternal economic logic, ahistorically interpreted, and dutifully traced to an immaculate lineage from Adam Smith through Alfred Marshall, with nods to Gary Becker and Jane Jacobs along the way. The ideological

purists at the Manhattan Institute would not have quibbled, either, with the bluntly neoliberal policy conclusions that were drawn, in characteristically unequivocal fashion:

[I]t's vital that urban leaders recognize where the future of cities lies: not in seeking handouts from Washington or trying to resuscitate unskilled industry, but in creating a hospitable climate for high-skill industries and smart, well-educated workers. That means minimizing the tax and regulatory burdens that workers and entrepreneurs must bear, building and maintaining a basic infrastructure that undergirds a vibrant economy, and providing excellent municipal services—from schools to police to sanitation—that make urban life attractive for today's skilled workers (Glaeser, 1996: 77).

In what might have been his pitch for a Manhattan Institute affiliation, Glaeser (1996: 75) noted that, '[s]patial proximity may no longer be important for the delivery of widgets, but it is vital for the transfer of ideas: this is the principle on which universities, think tanks, and industrial parks are built'.

Spatial proximity certainly had a role in the way that the Manhattan Institute was built, a project that began in the late 1970s; but long-distance connections were crucial too. The origins of this pioneering think tank lay in a partnership between a British businessman (and devoted Hayekian), Antony Fisher, engaged in a lifelong mission to build an international network of free-market think tanks, and William Casey, a well-connected Wall Street Republican, who had earlier chaired the Securities and Exchange Commission, and was later to become director of the CIA. Their plan, for which there was no real template at the time, was to 'groom a new generation of right-wing intellectuals', providing 'alternative analyses and policies' to the liberal *status quo*, as epitomized by the New Deal and the Great Society (Moody, 2007: 127; Peck, 2010). They would do so in New York City, on the enemy territory that was the capital of social liberalism, where the 'combination of financial, intellectual and cultural capital [would nevertheless prove to be] essential to the rise of a heterogeneous conservative "counterintelligentsia" and to its eventual success in transforming local as well as national policy debates' (O'Connor, 2008: 335).

The Manhattan Institute has prioritized the long-range and inherently unpredictable challenge of 'turning intellect into influence', particularly by underwriting the production and distribution of well-written and accessible books, preferably with the

cachet of scholarly credibility. Almost from the beginning, the strategy was remarkably successful, as a succession of Manhattan products would become the zeitgeist books of their time, seeding a series of transformative ideas and policy frames. These would cultivate, and then capitalize upon, political controversy and media buzz, making it their business to attack the foundational principles of the liberal policy consensus.<sup>13</sup> It was Charles Murray's *Losing ground*, more than any, that set the pattern. Manhattan gambled nearly all of its resources on the success of this paradigm-busting book, leveraging additional support from conservative-cause bankrollers like Olin, Scaife, and the Liberty Fund, and learning along the way how to 'generate talk and controversy' by keeping Murray and his book 'in the public eye for many months longer than a publishing house typically commits' (Smith, 1991: 192; Alterman, 1999; Medvetz, 2012).<sup>14</sup>

Murray's book eventually sold in the tens of thousands, but it was arguably the 700-plus gratis copies that were placed with prominent journalists, politicians, and policymakers that really made the difference; in retrospect, 'the best indicator of *Losing Ground's* success [was] not how many [had] read it, but *who* [had] read it' (Lane, 1985: 14). Although formulated in the early 1980s, 'We wrote it to inform the debate in [19]88', according to the Institute's founding president William Hammett, inadvertently assuming a degree of shared ownership of the project, if not 'forgetting for a moment, perhaps, that Murray [actually] wrote the book' (Lane, 1985: 14, emphasis added).<sup>15</sup> While it would be roundly critiqued, and often scoffed at, by welfare scholars, *Losing ground* proved victorious in the aerial war of ideas by 'influencing the influential', to borrow a Manhattan Institute tagline. The book's long-range impact has been attributed to 'its journalistic

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<sup>13</sup> See the prefigurative roles played by George Gilder's *Wealth and poverty* (1980), Charles Murray's *Losing ground* (1984), Myron Magnet's *The dream and the nightmare* (1993), and Kelling and Cole's *Fixing broken windows* (1996) in gradual realignments of the policy consensus around the issues, respectively, of supply-side economics, welfare reform, compassionate conservatism, and zero-tolerance policing.

<sup>14</sup> The Institute's president, William Hammett, described Murray as 'a nobody' at the time of his recruitment; 'we were definitely taking a flier on him' (quoted in Lane, 1985: 13). Such were the resources committed to the two-year writing project that, had it failed, the fledgling organization would have almost certainly gone down with it. 'It was a big gamble', Hammett recalled (quoted in Smith, 1991: 192).

<sup>15</sup> The book's critique of welfare dependency did indeed inform the bipartisan 'workfare consensus' that shaped the federal Family Support Act of 1989, but it would exert an even greater influence on the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, the moment that some characterized as 'welfare repeal' (see Peck, 2001, 2010).



style, its provocative, ready-made policy recommendations, and its savvy marketing' (Medvetz, 2012: 198; Alterman, 1999), out of which the Manhattan model was forged: an 'emphasis on good writing, on commercial publishing, on reaching influential audiences, and especially, on selling conventional-wisdom-smashing ideas' (O'Connor, 2008: 348).

The programmatic mission of the Manhattan Institute's calls for nothing less than a new civic order, reconstructed according to the principles of free-market conservatism and realized through a transformed urban-policy settlement (O'Connor, 2008; Peck, 2010). This self-assumed mandate would eventually span the urban policymaking waterfront, from crime control and zero-tolerance policing to school charter, voucher, and 'choice' initiatives; and from the reform of tax and financing systems to the privatization of a wide range of municipal services. The twists and turns of New York politics, as it turned out, provided fertile soil for the propagation of the Institute's rolling critique of New-Deal urbanism, just as the city would subsequently serve as a testbed for a host of conservative policy innovations. Cumulatively, these efforts have advanced the ideologically disciplined yet at the same time experimental project of imagining and then realizing a new urban order, 'envision[ing] New York as it could be—and *should be*' (Scott, 1997: B1). As the first on the scene of what has since become an extensive ecosystem of conservative policy institutes at the state and local level across the United States, Manhattan has remained the most creative, provocative, and productive of the free-market think tanks, in the vanguard of an effort to initiate a new urban agenda, designing and propagating 'policy models that [might be] applicable elsewhere' (Smith, 1991: 222; Clarkson, 2013; Peck, 2014).

Glaeser began his association with the Manhattan Institute at a time when the organization, which had made its reputation as a bastion of sophisticated conservative dissent, was enjoying an unprecedented period of policymaking influence under reforming Republican Mayor of New York City, Rudolph Giuliani (1994-2001). These were the booming 1990s, the time of 'New York's ... Giuliani-era renaissance' (Glaeser, 2007a: 97). All along, Glaeser (2013c: 53) has conscientiously adhered to the Institute's carefully cultivated position that center-right mayors like Giuliani and Stephen Goldsmith of

Indianapolis (1992-2000), together with fellow-traveling Democrats such as Chicago's Richard M. Daley (1989-2011), deserve significant credit for establishing a new 'focus on economic freedom, competition, and law and order'. These were the mayors, Glaeser has argued, that had taken on the teaching unions (those who 'bear much of the responsibility for the failure of our urban public schools'); that had championed the 'crime-fighting revolution'; and that had between them shaped a demonstration effect for how other cities might still 'benefit a lot more ... from right-of-center ideas' (2013c: 53-54, 52). Glaeser maintains that the stubbornly anti-urban orientation of the Republican Party leadership, with its 'cities-as-foreign territory approach', continues to prevent the conservative movement from fully capitalizing upon winning policy ideas like charter schools, 'essentially a variation on ... Milton Friedman's idea of school vouchers', traffic pricing (another Friedman idea), and wholesale deregulation (Glaeser, 2013c: 52, 54).<sup>16</sup>

Crucially, Glaeser's support for these hardboiled staples of conservative policy can hardly be considered to be 'scientific', given that the evaluation record is checkered and contested, to put it mildly. If conservative policy prescriptions do not follow mechanically from neoclassical precepts, then the connection is presumably born of ideological affinity. Manhattan Institute affiliations, so the record shows, are not extended to those that are 'unreliable' on this score (see Scott, 1997; Brustein, 2003; O'Connor, 2008; Peck, 2010). Reliability is demonstrated by a consistent pattern of policy critique and advocacy, circumstances occasionally calling for more forthright displays of free-market fealty. As Glaeser loyally declared on the occasion of Milton Friedman's death, the Chicago economist had to be credited with more than 'destroy[ing] the myths of Keynesian orthodoxy', since his forward-looking policy ideas remained essentially right, even if they were not always popular:

[T]his great and good economist ... was able to use ideas to change the world. Friedman was an intellectual leader in the victorious fight for freedom against communism. No man did more to destroy the myths of Keynesian orthodoxy and to set American monetary and fiscal policy on firmer ground. But Friedman didn't always win, and many of his battles

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<sup>16</sup> Milton Friedman, it should go without saying, has long been a Manhattan Institute favorite (see Friedman, 1991; MIPR, 2007).

remain unfinished. The best tribute to him would be to continue waging his war for liberty (Glaeser, 2006a: 7).

Just as Friedman did, Glaeser dedicates his quick wit to public displays of uncompromising neoliberal logic, the utilitarian bluntness of which is now sufficiently familiar that it often passes without comment, in a climate of popularized free-market rationality. The serious face of this takes the form of convictions-based policy advice, presented as economically justified pragmatism; its rather more playful side involves unrestrained (over)extensions of rational-choice logic, to just about any everyday problem or social puzzle, *freakonomics*-style. Glaeser likes to keep it light by doing a bit of both, switching between the registers of robust rationality and pop commentary as circumstances deem appropriate. For the most part, this is an effective strategy for traversing the right-tilting terrain of 'mainstream' public-policy discourse. There are moments, however, when the candid disclosure of orthodox economic reason can come across as shrill, strident, or unnecessarily tin-eared. Milton Friedman paid a price for this in his own time, never more controversially than in his stalwart defenses of the 'Chicago boys' project in Chile (Valdés, 1995; Peck, 2010). Glaeser (2011e: A15) tactlessly repeats some of the very same mistakes when he makes light of General Pinochet's bloody suppression of political freedom in order to rejoice in the historical achievements of those, 'like me, who received their PhDs at the University of Chicago', and who helped make the land of the Chilean dictatorship an 'economists' paradise'. Like Friedman before him, Glaeser has consulted in Chile, the free-market transformation of which he insists on reading as an indicator of the 'great strengths of the economics field, especially its insights into taming leviathan' (Glaeser, 2011d: A15).

Taming leviathan is the Manhattan Institute's stock in trade, and Glaeser is quite at home there. Having initially found it necessary to recruit its 'experts' from outside the world of the tenured economic and policy sciences (where the underemployed Charles Murray was discovered, among others), Manhattan has since made good use of 'university-based economists of strong libertarian or 'public choice' convictions' (Smith, 1991: 221; Medvetz, 2012), in addition to its own salaried staff of ideologically rigorous scribes. Through such intellectual insourcing strategies, the think tanks have been able to

augment what they already have—policymaking certitude and a well-resourced delivery system—with a measure of ivory-tower credibility.<sup>17</sup> In Glaeser’s particular case, there is also an opportunity to soften the edges of hardline positions with a veneer of ivy-league eloquence and a dash of bow-tied charm. This is consistent with the tone of the Manhattan Institute’s signature publication, the high-design quarterly *City Journal*, its stable of in-house and commissioned authors also endeavoring to be never less than *intelligently* controversial, within prescribed ideological parameters. The writing here must be bold, engaging, and unequivocal, in a heterodox conservative way, but it should not be crass.<sup>18</sup>

As a contributing editor, Glaeser makes regular appearances in these pages, for the most part deftly walking the line for which, after all, he now has editorial as well as authorial responsibility.<sup>19</sup> But from time to time, however, he has been prepared to cross this line, as he did with an arch-neoliberal requiem for the city of Buffalo.<sup>20</sup> With the assistance of location theory 101, Glaeser explained that Buffalo was bound to decline once its canal-era advantages had ebbed away and the city’s economy went literally and metaphorically South—into bankruptcy, or off to the air-conditioned right-to-work states. The sorry fate of such ‘old, cold cities’ was to become ‘magnets ... for poor people,

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<sup>17</sup> This is just one of the ways in which the once largely separate worlds of the think tanks and the universities have been mutually realigned in recent decades, redefining the meaning and practice of ‘expertise’, not to say intellectual freedom, in the process (see Medvetz, 2012). The ‘freedom’ that the neoliberal think tanks espouse does not extend to the freedom to reach politically incompatible policy conclusions. Free-market think tanks know what they think. (Hence their association with what is pejoratively known as ‘policy-based evidence making’.)

<sup>18</sup> ‘No Hillary Clinton jokes’ is how the Institute’s president once summarized the preferred tone of ‘quiet persuasion’ (Lawrence J. Mone, quoted, in Gupta, 2005: B14).

<sup>19</sup> Glaeser was promoted to contributing editor in 2008, since writing a couple of items a year for the journal, usually on issues of urban economics or politics. These are pitched, like the journal’s other material, towards a knowing, been-here-seen-that readership, although Glaeser is notably less prone to indulge in sharp-elbowed political attacks or unvarnished culture-of-poverty critiques than his colleagues on the full-time staff of the Institute, like Heather Mac Donald, Steven Malanga, or Nicole Gelinas. Significantly, not one of these prolific ‘experts’ is cited in *Triumph*, a measure of the care taken to package this product for the mainstream, and perhaps also an indicator of *City Journal*’s still-tenuous claim to authoritative status.

<sup>20</sup> Glaeser’s work on Buffalo was supported by the Brunie Fund for New York Journalism, a pet project of Charles Brunie. Formerly of Oppenheimer Capital, Brunie was a longtime friend of Milton Friedman and a founding board member of the Manhattan Institute (Brunie, 2007; MIPR, 2007). Now chair emeritus of the Institute’s board of trustees, he occupies similar positions at a host of other conservative institutions, including the *American Spectator* magazine, the Hudson Institute, and the Friedman Foundation for Educational Choice.

attracted by cheap housing', a haven for the immobile, the dependent, and the uneducated (Glaeser, 2007a: 97). In the case of Buffalo, federal redevelopment monies had therefore been 'wasted' on a city that had practically no hope of competing in the new economy of skills and ideas:

The federal government shouldn't be bribing [the residents of Buffalo] to stay in the city ... Such bribes are notoriously ineffective ... It's almost impossible to imagine that billions of dollars already spent on urban-renewal projects would satisfy any reasonable cost-benefit analysis for helping reverse the city's decline. The desire of people and firms to move is just too strong (Glaeser, 2007a: 99).

Since the smart and the entrepreneurial had already left the deindustrialized cities, the proper thing to do was to educate the children of those left behind, so that they might 'earn more as adults—whether they stayed in their home-towns or moved to Las Vegas' (Glaeser, 2007a: 99). This was a little rich even for the Free-Exchange columnist at the *Economist*, who found the icy logic 'right on the button', while confessing to having 'no idea how this process is best managed'; apparently advising political discretion over analytical valor, the magazine counseled that Glaeser risked coming across as '[c]old-hearted and fundamentally un-American' (*Economist*, 2007: 2, 1).

In Buffalo, there were certainly those who shared this view, some finding Glaeser's diagnosis and prescription for Buffalo 'unnecessarily harsh and condescending' (Christmann, 2007: D1). But when he was invited to the city publicly to explain himself, he does appear to have won over others—including some of those slogging away in the local economic-development community, where there was an appetite for hard-edged realism. 'I have a tendency to use sharp and consciously provocative language in articles that I write', Glaeser confessed to the upstate audience, 'And quite honestly, seeing the turnout in this room, I cannot say that is a mistake'. There were those that remained unconvinced by his neoliberal shtick, however, preferring to throw in their lot with the (only) other mainstream development fix that seemed to be on offer, Richard Florida's vision of a Torbuff-chester creative mega-region (Vogel, 2007).

This is about being right, however, not about feel-good formulations. Glaeser's tough-love program for Buffalo, if nothing else, is compliant with his (relentlessly

consistent) position on the role of ‘the basics’—low taxes, light-touch regulation, good schools, public order—as attractors of the entrepreneurial pixie dust that makes some cities sparkle with success ... as others rust under the weight of excess regulation. It also marks a sharp distinction between what is essentially a utilitarian position and the liberal bromides offered by Richard Florida, arguably Glaeser’s most formidable competitor in the urban-guru stakes and in the struggle over urban policymaking hegemony. The two tend to respectfully circle around one another, each holding to what are distinct but overlapping positions. Glaeser (2013b: 4) shares Florida’s preoccupation with mobile talent, but balks at the subsidization of hipster amenities, preferring his old-school measures of human capital to fanciful notions of creative capital, together with conservative staples like low taxes and privatized schooling, the ‘best policy for local economic development [being] to attract and train smart people and then get out of their way’.

These competing brands of hard-edged and soft-focus urban economics have come to define the right and left flanks of the post-Jane Jacobs policy consensus (see Buntin, 2011; Lemann, 2011; Shea, 2011; Engelen *et al.*, 2014). In *Triumph of the city*, Glaeser (2011f: 260) first appears to give equal billing to Florida’s ‘vision’ of urban success, based on ‘the arts, tolerance for alternative lifestyles, and a fun, happening downtown’, alongside his own, more austere and pragmatic invocation of the ‘fundamentals’, while gently mocking his rival’s evident ‘fondness for coffeehouses and public sculpture’, and the attention lavished on that idealized creative-urban subject, the ‘twenty-eight-year-old wearing a black turtleneck and reading Proust’. When Glaeser originally reviewed *The rise of the creative class*, however, he seemed to have been in a more reflective mood, displaying an evident willingness to learn from its presentational style, if not its opportunistic policy prescriptions.

The prose is vivid and clear. The pace of the book is excellent. There are plenty of fun anecdotes. I am unable to write in a way that keeps even my closest relatives interested after the first paragraph. Richard Florida can keep tens of thousands interested for a whole book. This skill is to be celebrated, and the rest of us would do well to learn from him ... [But while] Florida acts as if there is a difference between the human capital theory of city growth and [his] ‘creative capital’ theory of city growth this is news to me ... On the

whole, as a piece of popular social science, [this] is good fun and generally dead on (Glaeser, 2005a: 593-594, 596).

Those parts of Florida's book that were 'dead on' were those that chimed with the new growth theory of Paul Romer, with Jane Jacobs' celebration of downtown living, and with the results of the first regressions that Glaeser himself had ever run, back in the early 1990s, which had convinced the young economist of the solid statistical association between skills, innovation intensity, and urban-economic growth. Re-running Florida's regressions, Glaeser neutralized the claim on an independent 'Bohemian effect', dispatching weak correlations between urban growth and the so-called 'gay index' along the way, and suggesting that these eye-catching accouterments served no other purpose than to justify a bundle of policy prescriptions aimed at left-of-center mayors. Tellingly, he observed that it had only been worth the trouble of tidying up Florida's rather loose correlations because the attendant policy prescriptions had 'entered the policy arena' (Glaeser, 2005a: 596).<sup>21</sup>

Glaeser was not alone, of course, in noticing that the Florida thesis had struck a chord with urban policymakers. Elsewhere at the Manhattan Institute, though, 'tolerance for alternative lifestyles' was in much shorter supply. Florida's book was lambasted, at flamboyant length, by Glaeser's fellow senior fellow at the Institute, Steven Malanga (2004: 36), for its failures of 'basic economics', for its credulous regurgitation of tech-boom narcissism, and for its calculating appeals to new-age urban interventionists. The passage of time did nothing to allay this deep skepticism, a subsequent onslaught from the Manhattan Institute finding Florida to be 'far to the left of his own economics, creating a dissonance that makes his work inexplicable, or worse, risible' (Malanga, 2008b: 4). Florida may have stopped reading the *City Journal* by this time, but he certainly paid attention to the first of these broadsides from 'the neo-conservative Manhattan Institute',

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<sup>21</sup> Glaeser cheerfully proposed to replace Florida's trademark 'three T's' formula for urban success (technology, talent, and tolerance) with his own, the three S's of skills, sun, and sprawl. Florida took this critique to be sufficiently substantial and significant that his fawning reply was almost as long as the original, puffing up his 'serious reviewer' from Harvard, 'editor of the prestigious *Quarterly Journal of Economics*', and possessor of mutual friends at MIT, while striving to maintain that their respective approaches (and policy conclusions) 'diverge[d only] slightly' (Florida, 2004a: 1-2). Their relationship is clearly asymmetrical, however, perhaps a reflection of the superior status enjoyed by the Harvard economist: 'the genial Florida repeatedly praises Glaeser in his work', Lemann (2011: 78) notes, 'but Glaeser doesn't return the favor'.

calling out Malanga for grinding an even bigger political axe, the denigration of ‘all forms of public policy, while [promoting] the traditional right-wing notion that tax-cuts, privatization, and unfettered free markets will not only generate economic growth, but also solve virtually every urban ill’ (Florida, 2004b: i-ii). Glaeser, with whom Florida prefers to remain on better terms, promotes these very same positions.

It is difficult to escape the conclusion that the Manhattan Institute learned something, too, from the remarkable success of Florida’s book in the public-policy arena. But if the objective was to reclaim, though an injection of ‘basic economics’, the policymaking center ground—so much of which had apparently become captivated by Florida’s pinkish vision of a state-subsidized creative city—the tone could not be stuffy or hectoring, and neither could the content could be technical or dry. This called for a different kind of Manhattan product, maybe borrowing a presentational trick or two, in pursuit of the same audience. Suitably ‘groomed’, the Institute’s senior fellow from Harvard seemed perfectly placed to rise to the challenge of making an economically robust pitch for the urbanological center ground. Something larger than the author himself, ‘Glaesernomics’ was beginning to take shape. As the face and voice of this project, Glaeser would subsequently credit the ‘tremendous institutional support’ provided by the Manhattan Institute for the production and promotion of *Triumph of the city*, a book that originated from ‘ideas ... first explored in articles in *City Journal*’ (Glaeser, 2011f: 271).

If the underlying economics of *Triumph* were more orthodox, and its policy prescriptions more conventional, the book’s rhetorical triumphalism certainly owes an unacknowledged debt to Florida’s creatively crafted original. Steven Malanga had lampooned Florida’s book for its pop-cultural name-dropping—and its ‘sprinkl[ing] with references to Baudelaire, Bob Dylan, T. S. Elliot, and Isaac Newton’ (2004: 38)—but his own organization’s subsequent pitch for the same urban (policy) audience, fronted by Glaeser less than a decade later, flattered by imitation. The homilies to eternal urban rationalities in *Triumph* are liberally punctuated with cultured references but the touch is always light: ‘Cities ... have been engines of innovation since Plato and Socrates bickered



in the Athenian marketplace', Glaeser (2011f: 1) reports. But there is plenty of middlebrow cultural referencing as well. As such, the book 'makes virtually no demands on the reader', as Allen Scott (2012: 97) has wryly noted. Inevitably, there are walk-on parts for entrepreneurial heroes like Henry Ford and Thomas Edison, cast as shapers of the pre-New Deal city, as well as for silicon pioneers like Frederick Terman, Bill Gates, and Narayana Murthy. But Glaeser also has things to say, *en passant*, about Mahatma Gandhi, judged to be a great man, but an inferior urban economist; William Shakespeare, credited with a good line or two about cities, if an inveterate pincher of others' ideas; Emperor Napoléon III, who may have been distracted by several wars and still more love affairs, but who fortunately had a fine eye for urban planning; Prince Charles and 'Red' Ken Livingstone, separated not only by class and politics and but by their competing visions of neo-urbanist nostalgia and high-rise environmentalism; Haydn, Mozart, and Beethoven, joint builders of Vienna's musical innovation cluster, an effort bearing comparison to the great works of Wall Street's financial engineers; Kevin Spacey, who apparently knows a theatrical agglomeration when he encounters one; and the Kennedys, as bootstrapping role-models only a generation away from the Irish *favelas*.

This is a long way from the stodgy writing style that the author confessed to possessing just a few years earlier (Glaeser, 2005a). Even in his more journalistic ventures, Glaeser had tended to adopt the tone of an 'old school columnist', initially finding challenging the 'easy conversational style' of the blogosphere (Glaeser, 2007b: 11). The adoption of a more fluent, accessible style—anticipated in his *City Journal* articles and given full rein in *Triumph*—came later, a learned skill acquired not from the University of Chicago but afterwards, not least from editorial coaches at the *New York Times*, the *Boston Globe*, and the Manhattan Institute. The accompanying demands of more-than-academic modes of citation prompted Glaeser (2011f: 272) to acknowledge a 'great debt to the anonymous toilers of Wikipedia' in the back of his book. Like Charles Murray's *Losing ground* and others in the Manhattan Institute catalogue, *Triumph of the city* was clearly the work of more than a single pair of hands. The book even included a preemptive disclaimer, oblique recognition of the weight of pop-cultural and historical

referencing in its pages: ‘I apologize if any phrases from [Wikipedia], or any other source, crept into my prose—one research assistant was assigned the explicit task of purging such inadvertent borrowing—but mistakes do sometimes get through’ (Glaeser, 2011f: 273).

In truth, few serious mistakes were ever likely to make their way into what was clearly a well-packaged book. *Triumph* was ‘produced with financial help from [a] number of different centers and foundations, [and] written in association with an array of assistants, prompters, and polishers, and packaged and promoted by a major U.S. talent agency’ (Scott, 2012: 97). In this sense, the book is at one with Gleeson’s (2013: 1848) portrayal of the ‘broadcast journalism of urbanology’. This requires resources. In addition to that ‘tremendous institutional support from the Manhattan Institute’, a concerted marketing and publicity push was subsidized by the Smith Richardson Foundation, a longtime supporter of conservative organizations and causes (Glaeser, 2011f: 271).<sup>22</sup> Clearly, the book benefited from the well-oiled promotion and publicity machine that has been constructed by the Manhattan Institute, which secured reviews, interviews, and commentaries in an astonishing array of media outlets around the world, from the *Australian* to Brazil’s *Zero Hora*, from *Building Design* to *Foreign Affairs*, and from *Development Policy Review* to the *Savage Love* web site (see Table 1). The scale and scope for this ‘aftermarket’ conversation around popular monographs like *Triumph* speaks to the heavily mediatized strategy favored by the Manhattan Institute, which capitalizes on the authoritative status of review-ready books and their articulate advocates by easing their passage into the pages of editorial commentary and into the echo chambers of public chatter. This model has been widely emulated by conservative foundations and think tanks, leading to some notable victories in the war of ideas. Eric Alterman is not alone here in noting the

< Table 1 around here >

ironic fact that in a society as culturally debased as ours, books can have a significant political and ideological impact precisely because they are *not read*. Book reviews and Op-Eds based on the reviews become the currency through which big ideas are traded in the ideological marketplace (1999: 18, emphasis added).

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<sup>22</sup> The Smith Richardson Foundation, which was endowed from the *Vicks VapoRub* fortune, is a supporter of conservative bastions like the American Enterprise Institute, the Hudson Institute, Freedom House, as well as the Manhattan Institute.

Manhattan has become one of the consummate intermediaries in this ideological marketplace, having mastered the approach pioneered with *Losing ground*. Recall that it was a ‘well-funded promotional campaign led by the Manhattan Institute’, with additional underwriting from right-wing foundations such as Olin and Scaife, that had propelled Charles Murray’s book into the public spotlight (Lane, 1985: 14), transforming this ‘nobody’, who had been ‘living in obscurity in Iowa’ into a veritable ‘media celebrity’ (Lane, 1985: 13; Alterman, 1999: 18).

Compared to a ‘nobody’ from Iowa, boosting an established Harvard professor and well-known columnist is not nearly such a lift. Nevertheless, even though Murray and Glaeser are a generation apart, there are compelling continuities in the promotional strategies employed by the conservative organizations, foundations, and think tanks that have been their sponsors and enablers, many of which are the *same* organizations. There have always been divisions of labor across this institutional infrastructure, which have become ever more intricate as it has expanded and matured. The infrastructure itself, though, is not quite as opaque as it once was. When it came to funding a lavish launch party-cum-poverty seminar for Murray’s book at the New York Athletic Club, the Manhattan Institute’s president had found it necessary to call in a favor from ‘an obscure Indiana-based foundation’ called the Liberty Fund (Lane, 1985: 15).<sup>23</sup> This was not really Liberty’s style, which was just embarking on the solemn task of building a library of economic freedom, with an emphasis on the recognized classics, from Burke, Locke, J. S. Mill, and Tocqueville, to Mises and Hayek. Three decades later, the Fund’s commitments to classical liberalism are no less strong, but its Library of Liberty is now online, with virtual branches specializing in the law and economics, as well as an active conference program. There is also a weekly economics podcast, on which Glaeser has been a guest. In an appearance on the show to talk about cities, Glaeser’s comparatively moderate, ordoliberal inclinations were once again revealed, at least relative to those of his

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<sup>23</sup> The Liberty Fund is a private foundation ‘established to encourage the study of the ideal of a society of free and responsible individuals’, its Library of Economics and Liberty being ‘dedicated to advancing the study of economics, markets, and liberty’. URL <http://www.libertyfund.org/about.html> (accessed 3 July 2014).

hyperlibertarian host, Hoover Institution economist Russ Roberts.<sup>24</sup> In this purist company, Glaeser was moved to qualify his position on deregulated urbanism:

[While the] private city [is] not an infeasible thing ... you [do] need some central entity ... So cities do need—because there *are* these negative externalities associated with density—they *actually do need* government. The problem is that governments often do far too much (Glaeser, quoted in EconTalk, 2013: 12, emphasis original).

While Glaeser is clearly on the side of the deregulators, his is not a license for laissez-faire urbanism. He articulates, instead, a neoliberal reform strategy closely aligned with a clutch of Manhattan Institute-approved policy positions, most of which entail restructured and retasked municipal government, not a straightforward retreat of the state.<sup>25</sup> So the deregulation of development means business-friendly zoning, the concern for social order translates into a case for stricter policing, and the privatization of education involves a combination of voucher programs and charter schools.<sup>26</sup> This may look like pussyfooting to Russ Roberts, but it is an agenda oriented to the policymaking mainstream, not the libertarian fringe. It is an agenda that may not win a Misesian debating contest, but one that is calculated to gain traction in the more earthly realm of urban policy, and especially in cities like Detroit.

The strategy for Detroit, Glaeser explained on the EconTalk podcast, must be focused on social control, human-capital investment, and liberalized development—such is the new face of the urban-policy ‘mainstream’. Accordingly, the city must transition

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<sup>24</sup> Roberts, who counts amongst his credits the Keynes-Hayek rap videos, a viral hit on YouTube in the wake of the Wall Street crash of 2008, and a longtime role as curator-cum-protagonist at the Cafe Hayek blog (<http://cafehayek.com/>), once damned Glaeser with the faint praise of being a ‘mere[ly] ardent libertarian’, since he had voiced support (controversially in these purist circles) for a government-funded rescue of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac following the subprime mortgage crisis, concluding that, relative to his Harvard colleague, ‘I’m an *extremely* ardent libertarian’ (Roberts, 2009: 1, emphasis added).

<sup>25</sup> ‘[S]imple-minded nostrums calling for more or less government are foolish’, Glaeser (2013b: 4) says, ‘Government can be helpful ... but also wasteful or worse ... [S]mart government must provide good schools and safe streets, and eschew foolish infrastructure spending and unnecessary regulations’.

<sup>26</sup> Vouchers and charters are the means to enable parental choice, competitive innovation, and performance-related pay for teachers, with the collateral benefit of breaking up a dysfunctional public monopoly and a redoubt of union power. Glaeser (2011b, 2011g, 2013a) has promoted the College for Creative Studies (CCS), a private art school in midtown Detroit which since 2009 has been operating its own charter school. (CCS has benefited from the philanthropic support of A. Alfred Taubman, amongst others, the benefactor of the Center for State and Local Government at Harvard, for which Glaeser served as the longtime director) In his academic writing, too, he touts the ‘remarkable successes’ of charter schools (Glaeser, 2013d: 231).

towards the complete replacement of the public-education system with a network of charter schools; it should be borrowing bold models of crime control from its urban peers in the experimental vanguard; it should 'privatize as much of the dysfunctional space in the city as [possible]', red-lining some neighborhoods as a prelude to the withdrawal of public services or the introduction of fee-based delivery systems; and pockets of land should be annexed for the benefit of developers, like Dan Gilbert, to 'essentially [make] a private town ... free from [C]ity interference' (Glaeser, quoted in EconTalk, 2013: 7).<sup>27</sup> Above all, Glaeser implausibly concludes, this new policy configuration must be free of 'bias'.

### **Conclusion: freedom's foil**

Edward Glaeser has confessed to being in possession of a 'nineteenth century soul' (Glaeser, 2007b: 11). Perhaps this explains his fondness for idealized, neoVictorian readings of urban 'order', and his lionization of entrepreneurs of the pre-New Deal era. Maybe it also accounts for his tendency not only to normalize but to naturalize competitive behavior, by converting neoclassical nostrums into facts of everyday life, if not putative *laws of the city*. One does not need to search hard to detect the 'spectre of naturalism' in Glaeser's writings, a recurring feature of the new urbanology (Gleeson, 2012: 933). In *Triumph*, the productivity of urban populations is variously likened to that of colonies of ants or gibbons; a bicycling homily in the book has it that 'racing men' go faster than solo riders due to the psychological driver of competition, *mano a mano*, rather than anything to do with the aerodynamics of drafting; with Steven Pinker, Glaeser traces the roots of human intelligence to the primordial state of hunting in packs, reinterpreted as a stone-age expression of agglomerative efficiency and a premonition of the contemporary correlation between IQ scores and city living (Glaeser, 2011f: 247, 35, 47, 269). Truckers and barterers all, we are he avers an innately competitive 'urban species'.

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<sup>27</sup> On Dan Gilbert and the targeted privatization of Detroit, see Austen (2014) and Akers and Leary (2014).

This naturalized competitive order is neatly echoed in the uncluttered world of spatial-equilibrium models. This is where rational actors dwell, for whom the city is the optimal location—as long as meddling regulators do not get in the way. But this is a thinly socialized city, comprehended according to a ‘law bound view of urbanization’ (Gleeson, 2013: 1842), in this case the laws of supply and demand. When this order is impeded, disrupted, or corrupted, suboptimal outcomes are certain to follow: so the antithesis of competitive urbanism is that mid-20<sup>th</sup> century aberration, the Fordist-Keynesian city. It is against the realities of such aberrant cities that the utilitarian abstractions of born-again urban economics achieve their traction ... and do their work. Faith is vested in the pristine model of the neoclassical city, the idealized internal logic of which resonates, of course, with affirmative cases harvested from successful places. Suitably dehistoricized statistical correlates can be mobilized to bolster the argument too: post-1970s urban growth in the United States has been fastest where the skilled and successful reside, where the sun shines, and where deregulated development reigns. If cities do not work, the fault is with meddling regulators, not the competitive model.

Hence the importance of Detroit-as-foil: Glaeser’s model is essentially made *for* cities like Detroit, its space of application, where it is also revealed in its true colors, as a receipt for the enforced *restoration* of a competitive order. The ‘irony and ultimate tragedy of Detroit’, Glaeser has argued, ‘is that its small, dynamic firms and independent suppliers gave rise to gigantic, wholly integrated car companies, which then became synonymous with stagnation’, such that by the 1960s this had become ‘a city of middle managers, with little entrepreneurial inclination, and a vast industrial labor force, with little formal schooling’ (2013b: A11). The start-up spirit having been comprehensively stifled, Detroit missed the turn towards ‘urban reinvention’, which began for more nimble cities in the 1970s. Just like the old, the new gifts of the city would not be shared equally; those destined to succeed have repudiated welfare-statism, pulling themselves up by their long-neglected competitive bootstraps. And so it has been that more entrepreneurial cities, like New York and Boston, embraced and profited from the retro-liberal paradigm, while others fell behind:

These places have reinvented themselves by returning to their old, preindustrial roots of commerce, skills, and entrepreneurial innovation ... If Detroit and places like it are ever going to come back, they will do so by embracing the virtues of the great pre- and postindustrial cities: competition, connection, and human capital (Glaeser, 2011f: 43).

Glaeser's devotion to 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> Century economics, from Smithian competition to Marshallian agglomeration, is matched only by his nostalgia for actually existing urban economies of the late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> Century, and the time of 'commercial freedom', in cities like Manchester and Chicago. This reflects an analytical preference—tinged with normative nostalgia—for a lightly regulated competitive order, duly translated into a prescriptive vision for a privatized, post-welfare, self-acting, 'start-up city'. Cities like Detroit 'will recover from their decay only if they're able to attract new start-ups, which (among other steps for the government) means shredding every unnecessary regulation in sight', followed by the unwavering enforcement of 'regulatory discipline' (Glaeser, 2013c: 55; 2010b; Glaeser and Sunstein, 2014a, 2014b).<sup>28</sup> After all, the golden rule of panurban correlation is that, 'Over the last 40 years, sun, skills and small companies have been strong predictors of urban growth' (Glaeser, 2011b: 2).

Maybe there is precious little that Detroit can do about its weather, but there are steps that Glaeser would have the city take to improve its political climate. 'While it would be wrong to attribute much of [such] places' problems to politics', he avers, pivoting to make the opposite point, 'political mismanagement was often a feature of Rust Belt decline' (Glaeser, 2011f: 42). While the triumph of the city is taken to be the zenith of human achievement—'the real city [being] made of flesh, not concrete' (Glaeser, 2011f: 15)—urban failures show that the flesh can also be weak. This means that even if 'Detroit's fall ha[d] more to do with economics than politics, ... the political response to the city's decline only made things worse' (Glaeser, 2011f: 58). Following the predictable path of conservative commentary, Glaeser lays a disproportionate share of the blame for Detroit's decline at the door of Coleman Young (1974-1994), the city's first African-

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<sup>28</sup> The credit-rating logic of this position is that distressed cities should properly face 'stricter rules', relative to those that the market continues to favor, with respect to capital projects and pension entitlements (Glaeser, 2013a: A11).

American mayor.<sup>29</sup> Although he does not descend to the slur of ‘tin-cup’ urbanism, or to the casting of aspersions about ‘feral’ behavior on the part of Detroiters, leaving that to his Manhattan Institute colleague, Steven Malanga (2009, 2010), Glaeser floats a raft of perniciously parallel arguments by proxy of economic reason. Here, it is wise to recall Eric Alterman’s (1999: 19) observation that an essential function of paradigm-moving conservative books, typified by Charles Murray’s interventions on welfare dependency and later on the bell-curve debate (Murray, 1984; Herrnstein and Murray, 1994; cf. Fraser, 1995), is the ‘generous permission [that they provide] to voice resentments that [have] hitherto been unspoken in polite society’.

Glaeser has careened into this territory with the assistance of a pseudo-economic thesis that he dubs ‘Curley effect’, a correction of the Tiebout model—which ironically retains ‘classic’ status in neoliberal circles (Peck, 2011)—wherein rationally calculating electoral strategies produce *bad* urban policies, not better ones (Glaeser and Shleifer, 2005). Boston Mayor James Michael Curley (1914-1918) gives the political strategy of ‘racial favoritism’ its innocuous-sounding name, according to which local political leaders reap electoral rewards by catering (or pandering) to their own ethnic base, to the point of perverting municipal government and driving racial others out of town (in Curley’s case, this meant the exclusion of non-Irish Anglos). What is questionable about Glaeser’s invocation of the Curley effect is not so much its eponymous definition but its racialized application: following several pages of algebraic ‘proofing’, his model of racial favoritism is verified with reference to just two other cases—Robert Mugabe’s Zimbabwe and Coleman Young’s Detroit.<sup>30</sup>

Over Young’s 20 years, surely in part due to his policies, Detroit became an overwhelmingly black city mired in poverty and social problems ... When politicians seeking to stay in power use discretionary policies to force out their political opponents,

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<sup>29</sup> See Jacoby (1998), Wilson (1998), Malanga (2008a, 2013a, 2013c), Mitsotakis (2013), cf. Bomey and Gallagher (2013).

<sup>30</sup> Two negative cases are briefly mentioned. New York City was apparently too big for the model to work, while Chicago’s first African-American mayor, Harold Washington (1983-1987), was only prevented from demonstrating the Curley effect by his premature death, an eventuality blithely judged to have been ‘socially beneficial’ (Glaeser and Shleifer, 2005: 14). Coleman Young, needless to say, did not care for Mugabe comparisons, describing the Zimbabwean leader as ‘A mean sucker. He doesn’t have a civil service, and he can shoot people if he wants to, I guess. I can’t do that’ (quoted in McGraw, 2005: 52).



the more elastic response renders bad policies more, rather than less, attractive. The Curley effect ... shed[s] light on a broad range of government policies that appear too bad to be true from alternative perspectives (Glaeser and Shleifer, 2005: 13, 16).

Coleman Young personified what Glaeser calls the 'edifice complex', a wrongheaded attempt to reverse Detroit's decline through grandiose infrastructure projects, when what the city really 'needed was education and safety, not urban renewal' (Glaeser, 2011b: 3). The mayor is also accused of 'play[ing] Robin Hood' by introducing an income tax, which only 'encourage[d] richer citizens and businesses to leave' (Glaeser, 2011f: 61, 59). There is some acknowledgement of the fact that, '[b]y the time Young was elected, Detroit was far gone, and I suspect that even the best policies could only have eased the city's suffering', although this is followed by the demeaning qualification that 'righteous anger rarely leads to wise policy' (Glaeser, 2011f: 58, 63, 61). With an angry mayor, a riot problem, and rising crime, all was apparently lost: soon, 'civilization had fled the city' (Glaeser, 2011f: 55).

Law and order, in this sense, amounts to more than the mantra 'repression works' (Glaeser, 2011f: 55). Social order is the prerequisite for the proper functioning of economic laws, as ordoliberalists have always argued. Today, *sans* civilizing 'order', Detroit effectively exists in a state of exception (see Kirkpatrick and Breznau, 2015; Peck, 2015)—one that excuses truly exceptional measures (like socially targeted blight removal, the suspension of local democracy, the imposition of emergency management, structural adjustment under the federal bankruptcy code, and the triaging of public services and social rights), while the same time affirming a supposedly more general urban rule. Then, the loop back to the idealized model: 'The failure of Detroit and other industrial towns doesn't reflect any weakness of cities as a whole', Glaeser (2011f: 8) reassures his readers, 'but rather the sterility of those cities that lost touch with the essential ingredients of urban reinvention'. Detroit is paying the price for violating the principles of competitive urbanism. Political translation: Detroit is reaping the consequences of public-sector profligacy, a victim of aggravated local-state failure brought on by the self-defeating tolerance of educational and entrepreneurial deficits, under the sway of racial favoritism. These must be understood as *specific* failings of Detroit, however, because generalized

processes of free-market urbanization, properly functioning in accordance with the model, should work to solve such problems—at least when the Curley effect does not intervene. Detroit therefore exists in a state of political-economic exception, one that nevertheless permits exceptional interventions (in the name of the market). Whatever else is done, there must be no handouts and no bailouts. Tough love and technocratic interventions will be necessary, if social order and market discipline are to be restored. This is an intellectual rationale perfectly consistent with the kind of crisis-driven technocratic governance witnessed in cities like Detroit, where the emergency manager, Kevyn Orr, publicly styled himself as a ‘post-ideological’ actor, as a ‘restructuring professional’ (Peck, 2015). The path to redemption will be ‘long and hard’, Glaeser (2011f: 67) concludes, the stark reality being that, ‘[a]part from investing in education and maintaining core public services with moderate taxes and regulations, governments can do little to speed this process’, short of getting out of the way. Everything else—like social and physical infrastructure investment, progressive taxation, redistributive fiscal transfers—is either wasteful or actively counterproductive. For Glaeser,

the key is to ensure that Detroit’s children have good schools and safe streets. The city needs to have a manageable budget. Revenues need to be high enough to cover those expenses. Tax rates can’t be too high, or they will further deter new business formation. *The key is to find a middle way* that recognizes the real resource limits and responds in a manner that is both humane and pragmatic (quoted in Svoboda, 2014: 1-2, emphasis added).

Not for the first time, objective conditions of urban crisis are creating both the opportunity and the rationale for imposing radical policy measures, promoted as the harbinger of a new normal. This represents a triumph of sorts, a triumph of conservative economic rationality, recalibrated around the governing principles of fiscal restraint, lean administration, and systematic competition. Glaeser’s (re)definition of the ‘middle way’, certainly in principle and perhaps also in practice, is not only indicative of a tendential realignment in the urban policymaking mainstream, it also speaks to the ascendancy of a new stripe of rational-choice urbanology. Characteristically restless and critical, the field of urban studies has hardly been a place for orthodoxies, economic or otherwise. Could this, too, be about to change?

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**Table 1 A triumph of marketing: *Triumph of the city* in review and media**

<i>21st Century Business Herald</i> (China)	<i>Economist</i> (UK)	<i>Joins.com</i> (South Korea)	<i>Real Estate Issues</i> (Canada)
<i>Advertiser</i> (Australia)	<i>El Cronista Comercial</i> (Argentina)	<i>Journal of the American Planning Association</i>	<i>Real Estate Review</i>
<i>Age</i> (Australia)	<i>El Economista</i> (Mexico)	<i>Journal of Economic Geography</i> (UK)	<i>Reason</i>
<i>Agence France Presse</i> (France)	<i>El Pais</i> (Spain)	<i>Journal of Economic Literature</i>	<i>Reforma</i> (Mexico)
<i>Alive</i> (India)	<i>Energy Bulletin</i>	<i>Journal of Planning Education and Research</i>	<i>Regulation</i>
<i>Architectural Record</i>	<i>Enjeux Les Echos</i> (France)	<i>Journal of Regional Science</i>	<i>Richmond Times-Dispatch</i>
<i>Architectural Review</i> (UK)	<i>ENP Newswire</i> (Canada)	<i>Katmandu Post</i> (Nepal)	<i>Roanoke Times</i>
<i>Architects Journal</i> (UK)	<i>Environment and Planning A</i> (UK)	<i>Korea Herald</i> (South Korea)	<i>San Francisco Chronicle</i>
<i>Associated Press</i>	<i>Environment and Planning B</i> (UK)	<i>Korea Times</i> (South Korea)	<i>Savage Love</i>
<i>Atlanta Journal-Constitution</i>	<i>Environmental Law</i>	<i>Labour Uncut</i> (UK)	<i>Scoop</i> (New Zealand)
<i>Atlantic</i>	<i>Esprit</i>	<i>Las Vegas Sun</i>	<i>Sentinel</i> (UK)
<i>Austin American-Statesman</i>	<i>EUR-Lex</i> (Luxembourg)	<i>Les Echos</i> (France)	<i>Seven</i> (Australia)
<i>Australian</i> (Australia)	<i>Euro</i> (Germany)	<i>M2 Best Books</i>	<i>Shanghai Daily</i> (China)
<i>Australian Financial Review</i> (Australia)	<i>Euro am Sonntag</i> (Germany)	<i>Maeil Business Newspaper</i> (South Korea)	<i>Slate</i>
	<i>Evening Standard</i> (UK)	<i>Marketing</i> (UK)	<i>Social Science Journal</i>
	<i>Express Tribune</i> (Pakistan)	<i>Merkur</i> (Germany)	<i>Sonntagszeitung</i> (Switzerland)
		<i>Mail on Sunday</i> (UK)	<i>South China Morning Post</i> (China)
<i>Babelia</i> (Spain)	<i>Financial Express</i> (India)	<i>Metro</i> (UK)	<i>Spiegel Online</i> (Germany)
<i>Bangkok Post</i> (Thailand)	<i>Financial Post</i> (Canada)	<i>Mint</i> (India)	<i>Statesman</i> (India)
<i>Barron's</i>	<i>Financial Times</i> (UK)	<i>Ming Pao</i> (China)	<i>Straits Times</i> (Singapore)
<i>Basler Zeitung</i> (Switzerland)	<i>Folha de São Paulo</i> (Brazil)	<i>Motley Fool</i>	<i>Stuttgarter Nachrichten</i> (Germany)
<i>Beobachter</i> (Germany)	<i>Forbes</i>	<i>Nation's Cities Weekly</i>	<i>Sunday Telegraph Magazine</i> (UK)
<i>Bloomberg</i>	<i>Foreign Affairs</i>	<i>National Business Review</i> (New Zealand)	<i>Sunday Times</i> (UK)
<i>Bloomberg BusinessWeek</i>	<i>Foreign Policy</i>	<i>National Public Radio</i>	<i>Sydney Morning Herald</i> (Australia)
<i>Booklist</i>	<i>Fulton County Daily Report</i>	<i>National Review online</i>	
<i>Boston Globe</i>	<i>Fuseworks Media</i> (New Zealand)	<i>New Haven Register</i>	<i>Tages Anzeiger</i> (Switzerland)
<i>Brand Eins</i> (Germany)		<i>New Statesman</i> (UK)	<i>Targeted News Service</i>
<i>BRW</i> (Australia)	<i>Gentleman</i> (Belgium)	<i>New York Magazine</i>	<i>Time Out</i> (UK)
<i>Buffalo News</i>	<i>Globe and Mail</i> (Canada)	<i>New York Observer</i>	<i>Times</i> (UK)
<i>Business Day</i> (South Africa)	<i>Governing</i>	<i>New York Times</i>	<i>Times-Picayune</i>
<i>Building Design</i> (UK)	<i>Gold Coast Bulletin</i> (Australia)	<i>New York Times blogs</i>	<i>Today</i> (Singapore)
<i>Business Insider</i>	<i>GreenSource</i>	<i>New York Times Book Review</i>	<i>Trends</i> (Belgium)
<i>Business Line</i> (India)	<i>Grist</i>	<i>New York Times Economix</i>	
<i>Business Today</i> (India)	<i>Guardian</i> (UK)	<i>New Yorker Book Bench</i>	<i>Urban Geography</i>
		<i>Newcastle Journal</i> (UK)	<i>USA Today</i>
<i>Cape Times</i> (South Africa)	<i>Hamburger Abendblatt</i> (Germany)	<i>Next American City</i>	
<i>Central Penn Business Journal</i>	<i>Hamburger Morgenpost</i> (Germany)	<i>NZZ am Sonntag</i> (Switzerland)	<i>Vancouver Province</i> (Canada)
<i>Charleston Gazette</i>	<i>Hamilton Spectator</i> (Canada)	<i>Observer</i> (UK)	<i>Vancouver Sun</i> (Canada)
<i>China Daily</i> (China)	<i>Hartford Courant</i>	<i>Ottawa Citizen</i> (Canada)	<i>Voice of America</i>
<i>Chronicle of Higher Education</i>	<i>Hindustan Times</i> (India)	<i>Outlook Business</i> (India)	<i>Výběr zpráv z oblasti makroekonomiky z České republiky</i> (Czech Republic)
<i>City AM</i>	<i>Hong Kong Economic Journal</i> (China)	<i>Philadelphia Inquirer</i>	
<i>City and Community</i>	<i>Hospodarske Noviny</i> (Czech Republic)	<i>Philippine Star</i> (Philippines)	
<i>Choice</i>	<i>Housing Studies</i>	<i>Pittsburgh Post-Gazette</i>	
<i>CNN</i>	<i>Huddersfield Examiner</i> (UK)	<i>Pittsburgh Tribune-Review</i>	
<i>Commercial Appeal</i>		<i>Postmedia News</i> (Canada)	
<i>Corriere della Sera</i> (Italy)	<i>Independent</i> (UK)	<i>Precise Media Planner</i> (UK)	
<i>Crain's New York Business</i>	<i>Independent on Sunday</i> (UK)	<i>Press</i> (New Zealand)	
<i>Crain's Chicago Business</i>	<i>India Public Sector News</i> (India)	<i>Pressetext</i> (Austria)	
	<i>Indian Express</i> (India)	<i>Pretoria News</i> (South Africa)	
<i>Dagens Næringsliv</i> (Norway)	<i>Industry Updates</i> (China)	<i>Property Week</i> (UK)	
<i>DAPD Basisdienst</i> (Germany)	<i>International Herald Tribune</i> (France)	<i>Providence Business News</i>	
<i>Denver Business Journal</i>	<i>International New York Times</i> (France)		
<i>Der Standard</i> (Austria)			
<i>Development Policy Review</i>	<i>Investopedia</i>		
<i>Die Welt</i> (Germany)	<i>ItaliaOgg</i> (Italy)		
<i>DNA Sunday</i> (India)			
<i>Economic Daily News</i> (Taiwan)			
<i>Economic Development Quarterly</i>			
<i>Economic Geography</i>			
<i>Economic Times</i> (India)			

Sources: author's compilation, from Factiva, Web of Science, and Manhattan Institute (Media outlets and journals are US-based unless otherwise specified)