a place of mind
THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

Notes For a Recent History of the Faculty of Education at UBC

Stephen Petrina
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On 13 November 2012, the British Columbia (BC) Supreme Court will commence hearings for a racial discrimination human rights complaint filed by Faculty of Education (Education) faculty member Jennifer Chan. She filed a complaint to the BC Human Rights Tribunal in May 2010 for being overlooked for appointment to the Faculty's David Lam Chair in Multiculturalism (Chan v UBC [Beth Haverkamp, David Farrar, Jon Shapiro, Rob Tierney]). This is an indicator of Education's recent history at the University of BC (UBC). One might reasonably ask, how did we get to this point?

In one context, priorities changed through the first decade of the 21st century. For example, in October 1995, the Faculty of Education's *Employment Equity Plan* was adopted as an initiative of the Faculty's Equity Committee, which was formed in 1994. From mid 1995 through late 1998, the University faced complaints of "pervasive racism and sexism" in the Department of Political Science and within this context faculties across the campus were quite sensitized to equity and relevant procedures. In 1998, Education's Equity Committee also drafted, approved, and circulated *Recommended Guidelines for Committee Selection and Practice* to facilitate equity measures. Dean Nancy Sheehan completed her final term (1987-2000) and Rob Tierney was hired in 2000, and gradually by about 2002 the Faculty of Education's *Employment Equity Plan* and *Recommended Guidelines* ceased circulation and the Equity Committee was dissolved. In January 2001, Dean Tierney assembled a Technology Task Force with twenty-two members and by late March had drafted a Technology Policy. Between 2003 and 2006 about $730,000 was spent on technology initiatives and it became clear in the Faculty that this was a "technology" administration, not an "equity" administration as was Dean Sheehan's. Priorities simply changed.

There were early indications and by the end of the decade, various signs pointed to a waning confidence in Dean Tierney's administration. One of the early warning signs was the December 2005 resignation of Sandra Mathison, from Head of the Department of Educational and Counselling Psychology and Special Education (ECPS). In retrospect, her resignation was a signal to the Faculty— a Head with a superb track record pulled her support and effectively expressed 'no confidence' in Dean Tierney's administration. On 23 February 2009 faculty member Wendy Poole described Education as "in crisis." In attempt to capture the sign of the times, on 8 April 2009, I submitted a report to newly inaugurated Faculty Working Group on Governance describing five interlocking crises specific to this Faculty: 1) The crisis of confidence; 2) The crisis of reform; 3) The crisis of administration; 4) The crisis of accountability; and 5) The crisis of faculty governance. In August 2009, Curriculum and Pedagogy Department Head Sumara, after three years, left for a Dean position at Calgary. In June 2009 Educational Studies Department Head

Tara Fenwick resigned and left in December 2009. And in September 2009, Dean Tierney resigned and then left for the University for Sydney in March 2010.

There was quite a bit of denial and turmoil over the final years of this administration and scapegoating or victimizing outspoken faculty members became common. Feedback and critique were often met with arrogance or what some have identified as denial of systemic problems or crises, or a rosy portrayal of realities. For example, on 22 January 2010 Dean Tierney provided a departing update of the Faculty's administrative activities exclaiming that "the faculty seems very well positioned financially as a result of careful budget oversight." But a few months later, upon reviewing the Faculty's accounts, the Provost expressed serious concern for the Faculty's fiscal sustainability and viability and requested that a strategic plan and budget be quickly generated through the summer and within four months. In a context of University budget cuts, the Provost's concerns came with an announcement of a $1.2m deficit in the Faculty. This deficit was deferred by the Dean pro tem until 2011 while large balances of the deficit were paid by the revenue generating Masters of Educational Technology program. Senior administrators in Education demonstrated at key times an inability to acknowledge a problematic management of financial and academic matters or take responsibility for problems. This is one of the reasons the Working Group on Governance report, *Working Together Differently* (17 December 2009), addressed basic things such as how to revitalize a Faculty meeting and establish agendas. To be sure, some of these most basic of functions were mismanaged. A chill ran through the Faculty, heightening concerns that faculty members could not speak on the management of academic matters without fear of reprisal or sanction.

Successor Dean pro tem Jon Shapiro, long-time Senior Associate Dean finally assuming the high office on 1 March 2010, immediately proceeded to launch a series of investigations. March, July, October, and the following March, marked launch dates for systematic investigations of faculty members under the "Statement on Respectful Environment." It seemed more than a coincidence that these investigations were in 3 / 4 Departments or all but his and Dean Tierney's home Department. In one of these cases, the investigation was prolonged over a ten-month period. One faculty member described the frightening scenario as management of a Faculty by Investigation (FbI).

During the first half of 2010, as UBC's Education administrators defended their research chair appointment practices against Jennifer Chan's racial discrimination complaint, they were cracking down on outspoken faculty members and launching investigations. Again, priorities had shifted.

As indicated, there were five interlocking crises that marked the final years of the Tierney administration: The crisis of confidence manifested in increasingly alienated and apathetic scholars, at an all-time high in the Faculty from 2008-2011, had most taking "duck and cover" or "this too shall pass" options toward heavy-handed administrative plans. There was a disquieting number of what Williams et al. call the "copers" and "disengaged," albeit for various reasons including covertly enforced isolation or a

chilling of academic freedom.[1] Participation at the Faculty level was at an all-time low, visibly symbolized by attendance at Faculty meetings. For example, at the first Faculty meeting of 2009, attendance amounted to about 31 FT faculty members, 10 of whom were administrators (Heads and higher), out of a total of about 120 FT faculty members. With signs of waning confidence, conditions and mechanisms related to accountability and governance at the Faculty level have for quite some time actively discouraged initiative, participation, and democratic action. Confidence in reform waned as well, as changes were protracted and arbitrary. The crisis of reform manifested in continuously anxious faculty and exacted a cost in various ways, including cynicism, mistrust, stress, and tense social relations. Reform was unnecessarily protracted in some cases and rushed in others. On the one hand, reform of selected programs was furious and threatening, or arbitrary and with disregard for symmetry or due process (e.g., Ed.D. program review)[2]. Some reforms were facilitated and resourced while others were arbitrarily blocked or undermined. Some units were staged for reform and then neglected, depending on circumstance and preference or partiality. On the other hand, the teacher education program was submitted to over a decade of formal and informal processes of reform, with no substantive changes to the program whatsoever until mid 2010; some say the changes "forced through" following Dean Tierney's resignation. Substantive reform of teacher education became and remains a running joke, with faculty members who know the history dismissing any suggestions that significant changes were immanent.

The crisis of administration manifested in inconsistencies and unpredictability in decision-making, procedure, response, and planning. Similar to the crisis of reform, administrative response and planning seemed capricious; some plans were fast and furious, while others were neglected and deferred; some university procedures were followed while others were transgressed; some faculty members were empowered while others were powered over or disempowered. In late 2008 and early 2009 alone in Faculty level administration, there were arbitrary moratoria imposed on new courses, capricious interference with University procedure, and variable commitments to administrative plans (e.g., 24 credit minimum for Ph.D. programs in the Faculty asserted then abandoned). One result was that operative standing committees and procedures for governance became dysfunctional. The crisis of accountability manifested in increasingly centralized administrative lines of hierarchy that all but eliminated public dialogue, participation, response, and rules of order at the Faculty level. Eroded conditions and mechanisms for public engagement reduced the Faculty commons to a conduit for the unidirectional flow of information from the top, dispersed on what one colleague called 'an as need to know basis (and you don't need to know).' A lack of transparency and flow of information in the Faculty was accompanied by illusive sources and terminals of responsibility, which, coupled with expansive administration and mistrust had proven to be nearly the death knell for collegial governance. The crisis of governance at the Faculty level manifested in two directions: the first toward increasingly concentrated power and expansive administrative intervention via an array of ad hoc and standing committees chaired and

[1] Williams, D., Gore, W., Broches, C. & Lostoski, C. (1987). One faculty's perceptions of its governance role. *Journal of Higher Education, 58*(6), 629-657.

[2] See e.g., the *Response by the EdD Management Committee to the External Review of the EdD Program* (24 September 2008), which was a serious wake-up call for the Faculty.

managed by Associate Deans; the second toward decision-making that was increasingly based on mistrust, paranoia and reaction. Faculty members found themselves neglected or unappreciated as the Dean and Dean's Advisory Committee recommend and decided just-in-time on more and more of the big issues. One indicator of the problem was the fact that, for nearly the entire tenure of Dean Tierney, only one standing committee at the Faculty level was chaired by a faculty member, as opposed to an Associate Dean (i.e., CCASA).

The Case of the Teacher Education Program

Reform of the teacher education became a prime indicator of the crises. A "Community to Re-Imagine Educational Alternatives for Teacher Education" (CREATE) was established in November 2005 as a "Community," which remained without terms of reference but nonetheless a charge of restructuring the teacher education program. From a retreat in December 2005 a speaker's series was launched and numerous committees spun out of CREATE, including the Associate Dean's Advisory on Teacher Education (ADATE), Planning and Development Committee, Program Development Committee, and Curriculum Development Committee. The amorphous nature of CREATE added to confusion about how and when to formally respond or to what one should respond. Only one formal, substantive critique of CREATE's direction for UBC's teacher education program was submitted (i.e., "ECPS Task Force on Undergraduate Programs Report," February 2009) and this was not formally introduced into CREATE's public proceedings or made available to the entire Faculty for consideration and discussion. Indeed, CREATE proceeded without formal mechanisms for soliciting and discussing *substantive* feedback and critique. CREATE documents were circulated for Faculty meetings in November 2007 ("The Call for Renewal: Teacher Education in a Research University") and September 2009 ("Special Faculty Meeting: CREATE"), with motions to approve in principle, but again were not accompanied by any formal, substantive written critique. Both received a lukewarm reception at the Faculty meetings as colleagues voiced serious concerns.

The teacher education program under reform was inaugurated in 1987, a date that generally marked the end of a twenty-year debate in the Faculty over concurrent versus consecutive programs. The 1987 reform created a consecutive, post-baccalaureate program, compressing two years of coursework into one (60 credit B.Ed. program).[3] For various reasons (e.g., too many courses, too little time, too few electives), which remain unresolved, reform of the teacher education program was again begun in earnest in the late 1990s, rejuvenating excitement for renewal. Plans were nevertheless stalled when the BC College of Teachers (BCCT) commented negatively the Faculty's proposal in 2000. A process of reviews and recommended revisions led to a series of cases in the Supreme Court of BC in 2001 and the Court of Appeal in 2002 (Bauman, 2001; Southin, 2002). The legal case between the Faculty and BCCT reduced to the right to determine the curriculum of teacher education. The Supreme Court found that the issue was not justiciable, leaving universities in general and the Faculty in particular with substantial

[3] The 12 month elementary B.Ed. program was actually introduced in 1991.

freedom to determine the curriculum.

It is noteworthy that reform of the Faculty's teacher education program has otherwise been traditionally, or responsibly, submitted to *substantive* critique and debate. In the late 1960s, the Commission On the Future of the Faculty of Education (COFFE) oversaw a formal process of well-documented proposals and task forces charged with written responses offered for critique and circulated in formal channels such as the *COFFE Report*. Similarly, in 1983, the Committee for Undergraduate Program Review (CUPR) was established and solicited numerous formal critiques and responses to the structure of the program through the end of 1986. In 2000, the BCCT provided an extensive, formal review in a document circulated within the entire Faculty. Uniquely, the CREATE process had been much more informal than in the past.

Substantive reform would have included an in-depth and sustained analysis of supply-demand data and forecasts for teachers in BC. Throughout the 2000s, the Provost and VP Academic's Office gave Education a quota to admit around 780-850 teacher education students each year. This agreement or "contract" with the Provost's Office did not mean that Education admit this historical quota of students regardless of eroding job markets for teachers and working conditions in the Faculty. Given the budget and working conditions during this decade, most FT Faculty were likely quite willing to absorb more of a cut to reduce teacher education admissions and reclaim the FT Faculty lines so desperately needed for graduate education and research.

At stake for the Faculty of Education was whether it continued down the road over-committed to teacher education, with fewer and fewer FT Faculty appointments and more and more Sessional and Seconded Faculty appointments, or whether it emphasized graduate education and research. In the province in the late 2000s, it was questionable that UBC should be over-extended toward over-supplying a shrinking market for teachers (i.e., elementary teachers, social studies teachers, etc.). The Vancouver School Board, for example, reported in early January 2008 that the district had 10,000 empty seats and was closing schools: "The total enrollment (elementary and secondary) population has declined 7.5% (4,300 students) since 1997. Using enrollment projections from census Canada, BC Statistics, and school district and city databases, it was expected that city enrollment would continue to decline until 2011 to about 52,500 students from over 57,000. The "decline in the city's school-age children meant there is, and will continue to be surplus space in many schools" (Vancouver Board of Education, 2008, p. 2). Declines in school enrollments across the province overall were only slightly better.

The best teacher supply-demand data we had at the time for BC suggested that there were about 8,500 part time and registered surplus teachers ("teachers on call" or TOC), and 90% of these are elementary teachers. Elementary teachers often queued up on TOC lists, if they could get listed, for five years waiting for FT jobs (Hawkey, 2006). Many teacher education graduates saw the poor prospects and dropped out of the education job market altogether, and were not counted as surplus within the BCTF's records. UBC produced about 45% of all new teachers in BC each year. Reducing the supply of teachers at UBC to this market is something that necessarily should have been on the agenda of teacher education and graduate program reform, and debate, within Education,

but it was not. When, at a Faculty meeting in October 2007, Dean Tierney was asked if Education should scale back the teacher education program in order to scale up the graduate program, the response was that we had not modeled that scenario yet. Even if one overlooked an over-supply of UBC teacher education graduates to a saturated (or flooded especially for the elementary teachers) market, this seriously impinged on FT hiring trends within the Education.

In 2008, it was acknowledged that the percentage of Education's Faculty salary budget committed to Sessional and Seconded Faculty shot up to about 22.4% from the previous year. By September 2010, the number of PT faculty members had ballooned to 281, with 144 teaching 3 credits or less. In the MET graduate program, these PT faculty members, or sessionals, were teaching 85% of all courses taught!

Education was over-extended when it came to hiring— one could easily have modeled a scenario that returned to Departments at least 16 FT lines subsumed by the PT Faculty commitments to teacher education and diploma programs. The result of commitments was obviously a decline in new FT Faculty hires (Figure 1), progressively severe through the Tierney administration.



Figure 1. Faculty of Education FT appointments. Note: Data per faculty member are not necessarily actual start dates. 2008 data are projected based on anticipated searches. HKIN was not included, as the School draws from a special budget. Source: UBC Faculty Relations and Faculty Association.

There was a trend of declines in FT Faculty overall (Figure 2) since the mid 1990s. With sustained increases in graduate education over the last decade in the Faculty (e.g., 1986 = 345 total grad students; 2006 = 1,544 total grad students; 1986 = 77 doctoral students; 2006 = 362 doctoral students) a decreasing cohort of FT Faculty had picked up the

increases in Supervision *and* continued with their teaching commitments (see CUST e.g., Figure 3).



Figure 2. FT Faculty in Education. Note: Due to reporting mechanisms, there is a lag between FT Faculty hires and retirements and *Calendar* data. Declines in FT Faculty hires and retirements for 2006-07 and 2007-08 will be reflected in the 2008-09 and 2009-10 calendars. HKIN was not included, as the School is not included under the Faculty in the *Calendar*.



Figure 3. CUST Grad students and faculty. Note: Data from 1991 are from the departments of Mathematics and Science Education (MSED) and Visual and Performing

Arts Education (VPAE), which, along with parts of Social and Educational Studies (SEDS) and Physical Education (PHED), were combined to form CUST in 1994. The increases in Sessional and Seconded Faculty hires decade from the late 1980s had been primarily employed to keep the teacher education and diploma programs afloat (see CUST e.g., Figure 4). Again, more and more Sessionals were being called upon to the keep the graduate program afloat (e.g., 85% of all MET course sections and an increasingly large percentage of off-campus cohort M.Ed. courses were taught by Sessionals).



Figure 4. CUST FT & PT faculty trends. Note: Data from 1991 are from the departments of Mathematics and Science Education (MSED) and Visual and Performing Arts Education (VPAE), which, along with parts of Social and Educational Studies (SEDS) and Physical Education (PHED), were combined to form CUST in 1994.

However, PT Faculty did not have membership in the Faculty of Graduate Studies and over-commitment had brought the Faculty to a point where it had to seriously consider a reduction in graduate admissions because we it did not have the FT Faculty for Supervision. FT faculty members were struggling to cope with business as usual across the Faculty under severe budget crisis conditions— a 7.5% General Purpose Operating Fund budget cut between 2005 and 2008 was severe by any measure. Yet, Education continued with commitments of a sizable amount ($4,358,762 in 2007-08 and growing) of its salary budget to maintaining an over-extension toward teacher education and diploma enrollments.

More than likely, most of the FT Faculty felt that the legacy of teacher education of over 850+ per year was a good one (874 teacher education students per year averaged across 2002-2008). This was the same legacy of the days of 775+ diploma and certificate students per year. But with severe budget cuts, declining FT appointments, and

unsustainable workloads, most likely wanted to balance out commitments by reducing the teacher education and diploma programs and increasing graduate program enrollments. Something like a 50% reduction of the elementary majors and a 25% reduction of the secondary majors and diploma students would have rolled the Faculty back to enrollment figures of the late 1980s and early 1990s and allowed it to sustain the teacher education program primarily with FT Faculty and graduate students. If asked, most FT Faculty would likely have voted for change and an intensive focus on graduate education and research. As described, this chance to vote or weigh in never came.

The Case of the Centre for Cross-Faculty Inquiry (CCFI)

The Centre for the Study of Curriculum and Instruction (CSCI) was established as a product of a report submitted by the Northwest Regional Educational Laboratory (NWREL) in June 1975. The NWREL report, headed up by Arliss L. Roadin & James R. Sanders in Portland along with Blaine R. Worthen in Tennessee, was commissioned by UBC's Faculty of Education in 1974 to provide direction in curriculum and instruction. Within "A Design for Program Development in Curriculum and Instruction" are specific recommendations for CSCI and its concomitant graduate program. Ted Aoki was appointed the first Coordinator of CSCI, beginning 1 July 1976. Extremely influential in curriculum theory to this day, Ted directed the Centre until 30 June 1978, when he left to Chair the Department of Secondary Education at the University of Alberta.

Through the 1980s, CSCI's "General Curriculum and Instruction" Ed.D. included fifteen specializations, and was the de facto unit for doctoral degrees in curriculum (including language education). By 1993, at the height of the Ed.D. era in the Faculty, a student could choose among 11 Ed.D. programs with 21 different specializations. The Curriculum and Instruction Ph.D. was introduced in 1992. The Ph.D. became more restrictive for specialization, but was preferable. CSCI was immediately called into question as redundant once the Department of Curriculum Studies (CUST) was formed as the aggregate of a number of units in 1994. On the surface, intellectual differences between CSCI and CUST appeared minimal. As co-Directors John Willinsky and Hillel Goelman acknowledged in 1994, "the emphasis in C&I [and CSCI] has been on what might be better termed Curriculum Studies" (p. 3). And once the Ph.D.s in Language Education and Curriculum Studies were approved in 1994 and 1995, the CSCI Ph.D. became redundant as well. Note that both unit and degree became redundant in the mid 1990s.

Distinction from CUST dissolved through the final days of CSCI, and under the leadership of Karen Meyer the Centre was pressed to establish a unique identity. She described the mandate as follows: "the Centre is committed to inquiry into pedagogy as it is lived with the purpose of deepening understandings and re-imagining curriculum and pedagogical practices" (Meyer, 2003, p. 21). But if CUST's mandate reiterated the Department of Curriculum's (Dept. in the 1960s, predating CSCI) mandate of teacher education *and* graduate work in curriculum studies, then in effect, CSCI was redundant.

An observation made by Dean Tierney in 2002 was that the perception of CSCI among the Faculty was that it was "an enclave that competes with departments for resources" and "a

unit that overlaps in ways that might be viewed as duplication rather than intermeshed, complementary or supplemental." These observations made by the Dean were reflective of trends that developed throughout the mid to late 1990s. For example, in 1997, the Department of Educational Studies communicated to Dean Sheehan that plans at the time for CSCI reinforced it as "a well-resourced Faculty superstructure with all of the autonomy of a Department and none of the accountability." Following this nonetheless came a high point of reform, an exciting process in which I was an active participant. Karen was outstanding as Director, but with momentum CSCI rivaled or exceeded two of the Department's and a School's graduate course FTE and students. For certain, there will always be something unworkable when a centre or service unit, which technically has only one faculty member, rivals or exceeds some Departments or Schools in FTE or graduate students (at this moment, the CCFI's graduate FTE is nearly that of the Department of Language and Literacy Education, but it operates with 1 Faculty member).

For historical reasons and those echoed by Dean Tierney, on 12 June 2002 the CSCI Futures Committee led by Jean Barman recommended restructuring the Centre by curtailing enrollments, effectively a recommendation to close the Centre as it stood (recall that this committee actually included Karen as a member). Dean Tierney briefly closed admissions but then for some reason reversed the decision. Associate Dean Deborah Butler was appointed to implement an administrative plan for "cross-faculty inquiry" qua CCFI within the Faculty. In 2003, a partially scaled down CSCI was converted into a "Centre for Cross-Faculty Inquiry in Education" (CCFI). But the new plan for "cross-faculty inquiry" never materialized, and nor will it ever materialize. Since the reversal of the decision, students were nonetheless admitted, and continue to be admitted, into the CCFI's M.Ed., M.A., and Ph.D. (albeit with a cap) programs, new courses are designed and offered, and new "cross-faculty" or "cross-border" programs may be planned as if nothing had ever happened or as if the Centre actually succeeded. Departments had to justify programs in context of another administrative plan for CCFI, "cross-faculty inquiry" or "cross-border collaboration."

Since 2002, the Faculty has not entertained a single open discussion of the CCFI. First, questions of its redundancy were off limits when Associate Dean Deborah Butler revived the unit as CCFI in 2003 and 2004. Very few liked the name (what in the world of scholarship and careers is "cross faculty inquiry"?) or the administrative plan for reviving a Centre of centres. Who could argue with the Associate Dean and Dean? Second, questions of CCFI's maintenance were off limits when senior faculty member Graeme Chalmers was appointed Director in 2005 and remained through the summer of 2007. Who wanted to argue with Graeme at the end of his career? Third, given the history and revival, many of us were surprised when we were not given pause to discuss the unit's purpose and utility in the Faculty prior to the search for a new Director initiated in the spring of 2007. Prior to searching and upon Graeme's announcement that he was retiring, this would have been the perfect time for again taking into account the voices and mandate of the majority of FT faculty members. One conclusion to be made is that neither the innovation of the unit nor the administrative plan that underwrote it was a good idea.

That is the short history of how the CSCI became redundant and subsequent repurposing of the unit as the CCFI.

One is tempted toward a second conclusion that there are five very basic things wrong with the Centre for Cross-Faculty Inquiry in Education— the word "Centre," the word "Cross," the word "Faculty," the word "Inquiry" and the hyphen in the middle (to paraphrase Latour). Somehow, post 2002 there has been established a fiction or myth that a/cross-faculty inquiry, programs, collaboration, etc. are undoable or inoperative without a large mediating structure called CCFI. There is something wrong where on one hand manifests a failed "Centre for Cross-Faculty Inquiry" within the Faculty, and on the other hand are many examples of robust models of interdisciplinary graduate and research programs within the Departments that do perfectly well without the mediation of CCFI. And, with its plan and mandate of "cross-faculty *inquiry*," etc., CCFI is no more a "centre for inquiry" or "research centre" (see Faculty list of research centres) than is any Department or School within the Faculty a "research centre."

One of the reasons underwriting a lack of support was that many FT faculty members learned and continued to learn that the work they do for the CCFI as Supervisors, Instructors, and etc. was always used as a defense of the CCFI. Hence, I, and many of our colleagues, opted out of the unit for various reasons. When I co-designed and taught a CCFI course (EDCI 601) in Winter 1, 2004, ironically there were no students from the unit enrolled. It was unclear how this constituted "cross-faculty inquiry," but it was still tallied up as such. Eventually, many of us realized how backwards things were— the Departments were in the service of CCFI rather than the other way around.

Given basic evaluative criteria, or its mandate, CCFI was a failed innovation. With a decade to fulfill the administrative plan for "cross-faculty inquiry" (programs, research, space, etc.), there was little that is "cross-faculty" or "cross-border" in CCFI to speak of, except for a small group of faculty members from the Departments who teach a CCFI course or two (*this last criterion is equally met by faculty members teaching cross-departmentally).

The reason that "cross-faculty inquiry" never materialized and failed in the CCFI was in the redundancy of the unit, and not because *we* failed to put the right person in the Director's position or the right Plan, Budget, or Network in place, or because the Dean capped Ph.D. admissions once the admissions decision was reversed. Nor was it the operating budget, revenue, space, staff lines, and students, etc. that could be going to the Departments at this point at issue. Given redundancy and a caveat that faculty members' confidence in the unit eroded, plans for "cross-faculty inquiry" and "cross-border collaboration" simply could not materialize.

Despite a troubling possibility of administrative decree or fiat, the new mantra for faculty members became: 'we can do interdisciplinary, (a/cross-this or that) collaboration, research, and programs without a Centre of centres— without CCFI.' To do interdisciplinary research, and joint programs, the Faculty did not need a mediating Centre (infrastructure is necessary, the infrastructure for joint programs and interdepartmental collaboration is in place, but it is in the Departments and HKIN).

It is indicative that CCFI did not have a research focus yet shadowed nine other centres in the Faculty *and* there was not another Faculty on campus that had anything even remotely like the CCFI as a quasi-Departmental "Centre." None of the other *research centres* in the faculty had plans or visions of mediating programs a/cross the Faculty. It was increasingly

unnecessary that the Faculty needed what Dean Tierney envisioned in 2003 during the CCFI revival as an "in-between space" and "a site that creates synergies around research and theory across the departments and units within the Faculty." Upon the Dean's resignation, it had to be acknowledged that this "in-between space" called CCFI did not "create synergies around research and theory" and nor was there a need for a Centre to mediate graduate programs and research. CCFI was mistakenly shaped by a plan that included course FTE, students, specialized programs, and etc., and effectively rivaled the size of Departments and HKIN. Comparatively, for obvious reasons, including budgetary implications, there were no other Faculties on campus that would tolerate a "research Centre" with academic programs and numbers of FTE and students that matched or exceeded the size of some of the Departments in that Faculty.

Dean Tierney's decision to create the Network of Centres and Institutes in Education (NCIE) in 2002 was another mistake, and this was compounded by the related decision to make the CCFI the Centre of the NCIE, and by default the Centre of centres.

CSCI had a rich, very rewarding purpose and history in the Faculty, but it became redundant. The subsequent reviving or repurposing of the CSCI into a unit for "cross-faculty inquiry" failed. Understandably, CCFI Directors wanted to expand and build (e.g., Graeme Chalmers for arts education, Mary Bryson for digital education, etc.), increase enrollments, and attract more resources, but became draining and counter-productive for the Faculty. It made little sense to generate yet more ideas, develop more plans, take more courses of action, and allocate more resources to revive "cross-faculty inquiry," which in the wake reinforced yet more problems, etc. yet the dean's administration continued despite sound arguments made that it was academically and fiscally irresponsible to further invest in CCFI with programs, resources, students, etc. to do what it the unit failed to do in about a decade (viz., cross-faculty inquiry, collaboration, programs, etc.). Tellingly, Dean Tierney could not make the hard decision on this administrative unit for "cross-faculty inquiry" that should have been made in 2002 or again in 2007.

To cover the budget crisis between 2005 and 2008, collectively the Staff absorbed hard cuts, the Departments' operating and capital budgets were reduced, and the Faculty met the deficit only by expending hard earned revenue from the MET program. Departments went through painful reviews and internal restructuring. Despite the Dean's failure to make a decision on this unit for "cross-faculty" or "cross-border" programs, it became clear that Education did *not* need a mediating Centre. Those days were over, given the reduction of FT faculty lines, budget crisis, and a new era and new Dean.

The Case of the Office of External Programs and Learning Technologies (EPLT)

The LT in EPLT is also a good example of failed "infrastructure and governance models" in Education. In 1987, the Faculty of Education's Field Development Office (established in 1975) became the Distance Education Office (DEO). The DEO was changed to the Office of Continuing Professional Education (OCPE) and expanded to the Office of External Programs and Learning Technologies (EPLT) in January 2003. The expansion to EPLT was part of a larger restructuring of the Faculty that included the change of the CSCI to CCFI (see above).

In June 2004, following a reshuffling of Directors, Jim Gaskell was appointed Associate Dean of the Office. The Associate Dean eventually assumed administrative control over Computing and Media Services (CMS), which consolidated Media Services (MS) and Education Computing Services (ECS) in 2003. It was made clear that "EPLT is not an academic department or centre— [the] work is primarily that of facilitation and brokering" (*Snapshots*, 2008, p. 49; also *Faculty Self-Study*, 2005, p. 153).

Perhaps most faculty members took LT for granted or wondered what LT means. Did it refer to tools and instrumentalities? Or did it refer to a discipline? Or both? The phrase "learning technologies" was coined in 1993 when the Association for Learning Technology (ALT) was established in England. The ALT represented a new disciplinary configuration generally as a response to changes in interrelationships between learning and technology, economic imperatives in human resource development (HRD) and the waning currency of "educational technology" (Petrina, et al., 2008). Reflective of changes in England, the Canadian Office of Learning Technologies (OLT) was created in 1996 to centralize affairs relating to HRD and the new technologies— to address "challenges and benefits of technology-based learning and to act as a catalyst for innovation in the area of technology-enabled learning and skills development." Provincial ministries and universities eventually aligned themselves with funding and policy. For example, the UBC Office of Learning Technology (UBC OLT) was established in 2002 and began to centralize resources on campus, including e-portfolio initiatives. Recognizing the politics of this change, UBC's Faculty of Education fell in line. This can be read as both a top down attempt to centralize policy and bottom up alignment with politics.

Hence, the LT in EPLT was manifested in two directions. The first was the Master of Educational Technology (MET) degree and program, which commenced in September 2002 and derived from faculty members' initiatives within CUST, EDST, and administrators in UBC's Distance Education & Technology (DE&T) unit. The second was an innovation called the Director of Digital Learning Projects (DLPs), which included the appointment of the Director on 1 April 2004 and derived from the Dean's Office (DNSO). The MET program provided a cost-recovery or revenue-generating locus for LT while the Director of DLPs was charged with "initiating, encouraging and showing leadership in digital learning projects that build the professional, research and infrastructure capacity of the Faculty" (Gaskell, 2004).

Master of Educational Technology (MET) program

In 1997, UBC's DE&T inaugurated a post-graduate certificate (15 credits) program between the Department of Educational Studies (EDST) and Tec de Monterey, and within a few years, began to explore the logistics of a graduate degree program. The initial *Business Plan* for a joint Master of Educational Technology (MET) program between UBC and Tec de Monterey was drafted by DE&T Director Tony Bates and introduced to the Faculty of Education in April 2001. The MET *Business Plan* spelled out details for a 30 credit, course-based master's program. Students would pay tuition of $12,500 for the program. Within a fully cost-recoverable model, the program, assuming 40 students per course, would yield "a comfortable annual profit of $220,000 per year, by year 7" (i.e., 58% return on expenditure) (p. 15). Sixty

students per course would increase profits to $440,000 per year (i.e., 94% return on expenditure). The sessional piecemeal wage would be $220 per student, "with a tutor to student ratio of 1:20, or $4,400 for a class of 20 students." To centralize control, the program was housed within the OCPE (EPLT in 2003), an office or service unit, rather than within a department or departments within the Faculty.

In effect, the MET program was established as what David Noble called a Digital Diploma Mill (Noble, 2004; Petrina, 2005).[4] Regardless, it did not have to be that way. In the late 2000s, with about 150 students per year, the bulk of the program was taught (26 / 32 or more than 80% of ETEC course sections) by sessional instructors earning a few toonies more than the piecemeal per student wage introduced in the original *Business Plan*. Despite the fact that the program had paid off its debts and was operating in the black, exploitation of sessionals continued. In 2006, a formal request from the sessionals teaching in the MET program, for an increase in piecemeal wages, was denied by the Associate Dean of EPLT and the MET Finances Committee. A MET sessional had to bear the burden of not just X, but X + Y, numbers of students to feel properly remunerated. After calculating the time that MET sessionals spent in attending to the everyday demands of online courses, wages for teaching MET courses disintegrated into the average national minimum wage ($7.30 per hour) or worse. The MET Finances Committee had full control over these wages, which are the lowest in Canada for online course instructors.[5]

Appointments were part time, meaning that benefits stopped and started, and were often delayed, commonly leaving sessionals teaching without standard benefits. When necessities, such office space, a monthly photocopy allocation, and a phone budget were requested, the Associate Dean of EPLT asserted that these niceties are unnecessary for online courses (Gaskell, 2005). Laptop and workstation requests were similarly denied. Requests to EPLT for office space for or by the MET sessionals continue to be denied to this moment.

Through a series of misdirected, costly MET arbitrations and court appeals between 2002 and 2006, administrators lost their power assumed to circumvent academic freedom and the academic exception in copyright law by centralizing control of the curriculum and unbundling courses in EPLT and removing faculty members who refused to sign contracts for course assignments (see Petrina, 2005). The MET program's curriculum and finances continued to be nevertheless centralized within EPLT's two MET committees. The MET Finance Committee controled financial decisions and the flow of budget information while the MET

[4] Noble, D. F. (2002). *Digital diploma mills: The automation of higher education*. Toronto: Between The Lines; Petrina, S. (2005). How (and why) digital diploma mills (don't) work: Academic freedom, intellectual property rights and UBC's Master of Educational Technology program. *Workplace: A Journal for Academic Labor, 7*(1), 38-59.

[5] The OLT's online tutor wages and the Public Sector Employer's Council (PSEC) have nothing to do with increasing MET sessional salaries above the minimum scale. PSEC establishes bargaining mandates and provides some guidelines that allow universities to redress compensation problems. In other words, individual departments and faculties can choose to pay sessionals above the minimum scale. This was confirmed by Tammy Brimner (Faculty Relations) in a special feature on sessional salaries and working conditions published on 21 February 2006 in the *Ubyssey*. When sessional salaries are suppressed to minimum rates, they are suppressed by individual departments and faculties.

Advisory Committee operated removed from the Faculty's standing Graduate Curriculum Advisory Committee (GCAC) and from accountability to faculty members teaching and researching in the MET program. Although one of the largest in the Faculty, the MET program had never been represented on, nor was it accountable to, the GCAC of Graduate Advisors / Coordinators. Instead, it is effectively served as a second GCAC. The administration of MET simply contradicted Associate Dean Gaskell's reiteration, over and over, that EPLT was "not an academic department or centre— [the] work is primarily that of facilitation and brokering." It has yet be reviewed.

Besides CCFI, the MET program was Education's signature, flagship "cross-faculty" or "cross-border" initiative. Evidently, it was rather easy for administrators to paint rosy pictures, as the Associate Dean of EPLT did in his Annual Report dated 25 April 2008. The MET program was, by 2008, financially successful (debt was paid and it was generating revenue that covered expenses and left a substantial positive balance); it had some academic merit as well. But this came on the backs of sessional labor, disregard for FT faculty, and at an expense of academic accountability. This seemed too easy to tolerate within a Faculty that ought to take pride and lead in equity and accountability. Cost-recovery or revenue-generating bases were no excuse, and the program failed on those two criteria. It is no mystery why the MET program had to be administrated separate from and unlike every other program in the Faculty at the time.

Director of Digital Learning Projects (DLPs)

Although the Dean and Associate Dean of EPLT anticipated responsibility toward "conceptualizing, negotiating and establishing a Digital Learning Research Unit that would be funded by contracts from e-learning businesses and other sources and that would provide a salary for a director and research opportunities for other faculty members and graduate students" (Gaskell, 2004), this never transpired. On the surface, a Director of DLPs looked administratively attractive, but most with expertise in learning technologies knew there was something misleading in the rhetoric. It remains unclear whether this was a faculty or newly minted staff appointment, but most of us assumed faculty and expected disciplinary research, teaching, and service, with basic things such as refereed publications and work with graduate students to follow, as promised. However, after 4+ years and $458,084+ in salary for the Director of DLPs, the Dean is hard-pressed to point to a single "research opportunity for other faculty members and graduate students" generated by the Director of DLPs. To date, the Director of DLPs has not directed a single digital learning project within the Faculty.[6] Predictably and sadly, the vast majority of faculty members and graduate students in the Faculty do not even know we have a Director of DLPs; nor could they identify the Director or a DLP if necessary. Evidently since 2004, no one had really bothered to ask what a Director of DLPs should be doing, just as few bothered with accounting for how little was accomplished or brokered over points in time.

[6] I am well aware of the Director's Mobile Muse project, which was funded ($1.6m) in 2004 by Canadian Heritage and Western Economic Diversification, which involves few from UBC. It does fund SFU faculty and students. The Director's commitment to "multisector R&D initiatives" is fair enough, but this has had no bearing on what faculty members were promised upon this appointment.

As indicated, the Director of DLPs is an empirical example of "cross-faculty" or "cross-border" innovation in Education. And as an innovation that was promised to establish "leadership in digital learning projects that build the professional, research and infrastructure capacity of the Faculty," it was nonetheless a failure. Of course, with a budget crisis certain to intensify and the reduction of FT faculty, most were getting at least slightly annoyed with faculty salary lines extended to administrative innovations with little or no accountability. But this was secondary to concerns that the LT in EPLT was the exemplar or model with which learning technologies programs and research materialized when transferred from departments to offices and service units in the Faculty. Understandably, there continued to be administrative plans to model "cross-faculty" or "cross-border" initiatives on the LT in EPLT, despite the failures.

We know that the personal is political and vice versa. It is impossible to analyze administrative innovations or policy without either political or personal dimensions. Certainly in the social sciences one cannot be empirical without implicating the political or personal. I understand this, perhaps imperfectly, as I draw conclusions of accountability.