

# *Groundwork for the Metaphysic of Morals*

## Immanuel Kant (1785)

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[Brackets] enclose editorial explanations. Small ·dots· enclose material that has been added, but can be read as though it were part of the original text. Occasional •bullets, and also indenting of passages that are not quotations, are meant as aids to grasping the structure of a sentence or a thought. Every four-point ellipsis . . . . indicates the omission of a brief passage that seems to present more difficulty than it is worth. Longer omissions are reported between square brackets in normal-sized type.] In the title, 'Groundwork' refers not to the foundation that is laid but to the work of laying it.

First launched: July 2005 Last amended: September 2008

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## Chapter 1

Nothing in the world—*or out of it!*—can possibly be conceived that could be called 'good' without qualification except a GOOD WILL. Mental *talents* such as intelligence, wit, and judgment, and *temperaments* such as courage, resoluteness, and perseverance are doubtless in many ways good and desirable; but they can become extremely bad and harmful if the person's *character* isn't good—i.e. if the *will* that is to make use of these •gifts of nature isn't good. Similarly with •gifts of fortune. Power, riches, honour, even health, and the over-all well-being and contentment with one's condition that we call 'happiness', create pride, often leading to arrogance, if there isn't a good will to correct their influence on the mind. . . . Not to mention the fact that the sight of someone who shows no sign of a pure and good will and yet enjoys uninterrupted prosperity will never give pleasure to an impartial rational observer. So it seems that without a good will one can't even be worthy of being happy.

Even qualities that are conducive to this good will and can make its work easier have no intrinsic unconditional worth. We rightly hold them in high esteem, but only because we assume them to be accompanied by a good will; so we can't take them to be absolutely ·or unconditionally· good.

•Moderation in emotions and passions, self-control, and calm deliberation not only are good in many ways but seem even to constitute part of the person's *inner* worth, and they were indeed unconditionally valued by the ancients. Yet they are very far from being good without qualification—·good in themselves, good in any circumstances·—for without the principles of a good will they can become extremely bad: ·for example·, a villain's •coolness makes him far more dangerous and more straightforwardly abominable to us than he would otherwise have seemed.

What makes a good will *good*? It isn't what it brings about, its usefulness in achieving some intended end. Rather, good will is good because of *how it wills*—i.e. it is *good in itself*. Taken just in itself it is

to be valued incomparably more highly than anything that could be brought about by it in the satisfaction of some preference—or, if you like, the sum total of all preferences! Consider this case:

Through bad luck or a miserly endowment from step-motherly nature, this person's will has no power at all to accomplish its purpose; not even the greatest effort on his part would enable it to achieve anything it aims at. But he does still have a good will—not as a mere wish but as the summoning of all the means in his power.

The good will of this person would sparkle like a jewel all by itself, as something that had its full worth in itself. Its value wouldn't go up or down depending on how useful or fruitless it was. If it was useful, that would only be the *setting* of the jewel, so to speak, enabling us to handle it more conveniently in commerce (a diamond ring is easier to manage than a diamond) or to get those who don't know much about jewels to look at it. But the setting doesn't affect the value of the jewel and doesn't recommend it the experts.

...

So we have to develop •the concept of a will that is to be esteemed as good in itself without regard to anything else, •the concept that always takes first place in judging the total worth of our actions, with everything else depending on it, •a concept that is already lodged in any natural and sound understanding, and doesn't need to be *taught* so much as to be *brought to light*. In order to develop and unfold it, I'll dig into the concept of duty, which *contains* it. The concept of a good will is present in the concept of duty, not shining out in all its objective and unconditional glory, but rather in a manner that brings it under certain subjective •restrictions and •hindrances; but •these are far from concealing it or disguising it, for they rather bring it out by contrast and make it shine forth all the more brightly. I shall now look at that contrast.

•My topic is the difference between doing something from duty and doing it for other reasons. In tackling this, I shall set aside without discussion two kinds of case—one for which my question doesn't arise, and a second for which the question arises but is too easy to answer for the case to be interesting or instructive. Following those two, I shall introduce two further kinds of case. (1) I shan't discuss actions which—even if they are useful in some way or other—are clearly *opposed to* duty, because with them the question of doing them *from duty* doesn't even arise. (2) I shall also ignore cases where someone does A, which really is in accord with duty, but where what he directly *wants* isn't to perform A but to perform B which somehow leads to or involves A. For example: he (B) unbolts the door so as to escape from the fire, and in so doing he (A) enables others to escape also. There is no need to spend time on such cases, because *in them* it is easy to tell whether an action that is in accord with duty is done •from duty or rather •for some selfish purpose. (3) It is far harder to detect that difference when the action the person performs—one that is in accord with duty—is what he directly wanted to do, rather than being something he did only because it was involved in something *else* that he directly wanted to do. Take the example of a shop-keeper who charges the same prices for selling his goods to inexperienced customers as for selling them to anyone else. This is in accord with duty. But there is also a prudential and not-duty-based motive that the shop-keeper might have for this course of conduct: when there is a buyers' market, he may sell as cheaply to children as to others so as not to lose customers. Thus the customer is honestly served, but we can't infer from this that the shop-keeper has behaved in this way from duty and principles of honesty. His own advantage requires this behaviour, and we can't assume that in addition he directly wants something for his customers and out of love for them he charges them all the same price. His conduct of his policy on pricing comes neither from *duty* nor from *directly wanting* it, but from a selfish purpose. [Kant's German really does say first that the shop-

keeper *isn't* led by a direct want and then that he *is*. His point seems to be this: The shop-keeper *does* want to treat all his customers equitably; his intention is aimed at precisely that fact about his conduct (unlike the case in (2) where the agent enables other people to escape but isn't aiming at that *at all*). But the shop-keeper's intention doesn't *stop there*, so to speak; he wants to treat his customers equitably not because of what he wants for *them*, but because of how he wants them to behave later in *his* interests. This involves a kind of indirectness, which doesn't assimilate this case to (2) but does distinguish it from a fourth kind of conduct that still isn't morally worthy but not because it involves the 'indirectness' of (2) or that of (3).]

(4) It is a duty to preserve one's life, and moreover everyone directly wants to do so. But because of the power of that want, the often anxious care that most men have for their survival has no intrinsic worth, and the maxim *Preserve yourself* has no moral content. Men preserve their lives *according to* duty, but not *from* duty. But now consider this case:

Adversities and hopeless sorrow have completely taken away this unfortunate man's relish for life. But his fate has not made him passively despondent or dejected. He is strong in soul, and is exasperated at how things have gone for him, and would like actively to do something about it. Specifically, he *wishes for death*. But he preserves his life without loving it, not led by any want or fear, but acting from duty.

For this person the maxim *Preserve yourself* has moral content.

We have a duty to be charitably helpful where we can, and many people are so sympathetically constituted that without any motive of vanity or selfishness they find an inner satisfaction in spreading joy and take delight in the contentment of others if they have made it possible. But I maintain that such behaviour, done in that spirit, has no true moral worth, however amiable it may be and however much it accords with duty. It should be classed with actions done from other wants, such as the desire for honour. With luck, someone's desire for honour may lead to conduct that in fact accords with duty and does good to many people; in that case it deserves praise and encouragement; but it doesn't deserve high esteem, because the maxim on which the person is acting doesn't have the moral content of an action done not because the person *likes* acting in that way but from duty. [In this context, 'want' and 'liking' and 'desire' are used to translate *Neigung*, elsewhere in this version translated as 'preference'; other translations mostly use 'inclination'.]

Now consider a special case:

This person has been a friend to mankind, but his mind has become clouded by a sorrow of his own that has extinguished all feeling for how others are faring. He still has the power to benefit others in distress, but their need leaves him untouched because he is too preoccupied with his own. But now he tears himself out of his dead insensibility and acts charitably purely from duty, without feeling any want or liking so to behave.

Now, for the first time, his conduct has genuine moral worth. Having been deprived by nature of a warm-hearted temperament, this man could find in himself a source from which to give himself a far higher worth than he could have got through such a temperament. It is just here that the worth of character is brought out, which is morally the incomparably highest of all: he is beneficent not from preference but from duty.

...

So an action's moral value doesn't lie in •the effect that is expected from it, or in •any principle of action that motivates it because of this expected effect. All the expected effects—something agreeable for me, or even happiness for others—could be brought about through other causes and don't need •the will of a rational being, whereas the highest good—what is unconditionally good—can be found only in •such a will. So this wonderful good, which we call *moral* goodness, can't consist in anything but *the thought of law* in itself *that only a rational being can have*—with the will being moved to act by this thought and not by the hoped-for effect of the action. When the person acts according to this conception, this moral goodness is already present •in him; we don't have to look for it •in the upshot of his action.<sup>1</sup> [In passages like this, 'thought' translates *Vorstellung* = 'mental representation'.]

So we have a law the thought of which can settle the will without reference to any expected result, and *must* do so if the will is to be called absolutely good without qualification; what kind of law can this be? Since I have robbed the will of any *impulses* that could come to it from obeying any law, nothing remains to serve as a ·guiding· principle of the will except *conduct's universally conforming to law as such*. That is, **I ought never to act in such a way that I couldn't also will that the maxim on which I act should be a universal law**. In this context the ·guiding· principle of the will is conformity to law as such, not bringing in any particular law governing some class of actions; and it *must* serve as the will's principle if *duty* is not to be a vain delusion and chimerical concept. Common sense in its practical judgments is in perfect agreement with this, and constantly has this principle in view.

Consider the question: May I when in difficulties make a promise that I intend not to keep? The question obviously has two meanings: is it •prudent to make a false promise? does it conform to •duty to make a false promise? No doubt it often *is* •prudent, ·but not as often as you might think·. Obviously the false promise isn't made prudent by its merely extricating me from my present difficulties; I have to think about whether it will in the long run cause more trouble than it saves in the present. Even with all my supposed cunning, the consequences can't be so easily foreseen. People's loss of trust in me might be far more disadvantageous than the trouble I am now trying to avoid, and it is hard to tell whether it mightn't be more *prudent* to act according to a universal maxim *not ever to make a promise that I don't intend to keep*. But I quickly come to see that such a maxim is based only on fear of consequences. Being truthful from •duty is an entirely different thing from being truthful out of •fear of bad consequences; for in •the former case a law is included in the concept of the action itself (·so that the

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<sup>1</sup> It might be objected that I tried to take refuge in an obscure feeling behind the word 'respect', instead of clearing things up through a concept of reason. Although respect is indeed a feeling, it doesn't come from outer influence; rather, it is a •feeling that a rational concept creates unaided; so it is different in kind from all the •feelings caused from outside, the ones that can come from desire or fear. When I directly recognize something as a law for myself I recognize it *with respect*, which merely means that I am conscious of submitting my will to a law without interference from any other influences on my mind. The will's being directly settled by law, and the consciousness of this happening, is called 'respect'; so *respect* should be seen as an *effect* of the law's operation on the person's will, not as a *cause* of it. Really, respect is the thought of a value that breaks down my self-love. Thus it is not something to be either desired or feared, though it has something analogous to both ·desire and fear·. The only thing that can be respected is law, and it has to be the law that we •impose on ourselves yet •recognize as necessary in itself.

•As a law it makes us subject to it, without consulting our self-love; which gives it some analogy to fear.

•As imposed on us by ourselves, it is a consequence of our will; which gives it some analogy to preference. ·This is really the only *basic* sense of the term 'respect'. Any •respect for a *person* is only •respect for the law (of righteousness, etc.) of which the person provides an example. Our respect for a person's talents, for instance, is our recognition that we ought to practice until we are as talented as he is; we see him as a kind of example of a •law, because we regard it as our •duty to improve our talents. ·So respect for persons is a disguised form of respect for law·. All moral *concern* (as it is called) consists solely in respect for the law.

right answer to ‘*What are you doing?*’ will include a mention of that law-); whereas in •the latter I must first look outward to see what results my action may have. [In the preceding sentence, Kant speaks of a ‘law for me’ and of results ‘for me’.] To deviate from the principle of duty is certainly bad; whereas to be unfaithful to my maxim of prudence may be very advantageous to me, though it is certainly safer to abide by it. How can I know whether a deceitful promise is consistent with duty? The shortest way to go about finding out is also the surest. It is to ask myself:

•Would I be content for my maxim (of getting out of a difficulty through a false promise) to hold as a *universal law*, for myself as well as for others?

•That is tantamount to asking:

•Could I say to myself that anyone may make a false promise when he is in a difficulty that he can’t get out of in any other way?

Immediately I realize that I could will •the lie but not •a universal law to lie; for such a law would result in there being no promises at all, because it would be futile to offer stories about my future conduct to people who wouldn’t believe me; or if they carelessly did believe me and were taken in •by my promise, would pay me back in my own coin. Thus my maxim would necessarily destroy itself as soon as it was made a universal law.

So I don’t need to be a very penetrating thinker to bring it about that my will is morally good. Inexperienced in how the world goes, unable to prepare for all its contingencies, I need only to ask myself: *Can you will that your maxim become a universal law?* If not, it must be rejected, not because of any harm it might bring to anyone, but because there couldn’t be a system of •universal legislation that included it as one of its principles, and •that is the kind of legislation that reason forces me to respect. I don’t yet *see* what it is based on (a question that a philosopher may investigate), but I at least understand these two:

•It is something whose value far outweighs all the value of everything aimed at by *desire*,

•My duty consists in my having to act from pure respect for the practical law.

Every other motive must yield to duty, because it is the condition of a •will that is good in itself, and the value of •*that* surpasses everything.

## Chapter 2

...

All imperatives command either •hypothetically or categorically. The •former expresses the practical necessity of some possible action as a means to achieving something else that one does or might want. An imperative would be categorical if it represented an action as being objectively necessary in itself without regard to any other end.

Since every practical law represents some possible action as •good, and thus as •necessary for anyone whose conduct is governed by reason, what every imperative does is to specify some action that is

- necessary according to the principle of a will that has something good about it.

If the action would be good only as a means to something else, the imperative is **hypothetical**; but if the action is thought of as *good in itself* and hence as

- necessary in a will that conforms to reason, which it has as its principle,

the imperative is **categorical**.

...

[W]e come at last to one imperative that commands certain conduct •immediately, and not •through the condition that some purpose can be achieved through it. This imperative is *categorical*. It isn't concerned with what is to result *from* the conduct, or even with what will happen *in* the conduct (its •matter), but only with the •form and the principle from which the conduct follows. What is essentially good in the conduct consists in the frame of mind—the willingness to obey the imperative—no matter what the upshot is. This may be called 'the imperative of *morality*'.

...

When I have the general thought of *a hypothetical imperative*, I can't tell just from this thought what such an imperative will contain. To know *that*, I have to know what the condition is. But when I have the thought *categorical imperative*, I know right away what it will contain. For all the imperative contains is

the law, and

the necessity that the maxim conform to the law;

and the law doesn't contain any condition limiting it (•comparable with the condition that is always part of a hypothetical imperative). So there is nothing left for the maxim to conform to except the universality of a law as such, and what the imperative represents as necessary is just precisely that conformity of maxim to law.<sup>2</sup>

So there is only one categorical imperative, and this is it: •Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law•.

Now if all imperatives of duty can be derived from this one imperative as a principle, we'll at least be able to show what we understand by the concept of duty, what the concept means, even if we haven't yet settled whether so-called 'duty' is an empty concept or not.

The universality of law according to which effects occur constitutes what is properly called *nature* in the most general sense, . . . i.e. the existence of things considered as determined by universal laws. So the universal imperative of duty can be expressed as follows: **Act as though the maxim of your action were to become, through your will, a universal law of nature.**

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<sup>2</sup> A *maxim* is a subjective principle of acting, and must be distinguished from the *objective* principle, which is the practical *law*. The maxim contains the practical rule that reason comes up with in conformity with the state the person (the subject) is in, including his preferences, his ignorances, and so on; so it is the principle according to which the subject *acts*. The law, on the other hand, is the objective principle valid for every rational being, and the principle by which the subject *ought to act*; that is, it is an imperative.

I want now to list some duties, adopting the usual division of them into •duties to ourselves and •duties to others, and into •perfect duties and •imperfect duties.<sup>3</sup>

(1) A man who has been brought by a series of troubles to the point of despair and of weariness with life still has his reason sufficiently to ask himself: ‘Wouldn’t it be contrary to my duty to myself to take my own life?’ Now he asks: ‘Could the maxim of my action ·in killing myself· become a universal law of nature?’ Well, here is his maxim:

For love of myself, I make it my principle to cut my life short when prolonging it threatens to bring more troubles than satisfactions.

So the question is whether *this* principle of self-love could become a universal law of nature. If it did, that would be a nature that had a law according to which a single feeling •created a life-affirming push and also •led to the destruction of life itself; and we can see at a glance that such a ‘nature’ would contradict itself, and so couldn’t *be* a nature. So the maxim we are discussing *couldn’t* be a law of nature, and therefore would be utterly in conflict with the supreme principle of duty.

(2) Another man sees himself being driven by need to borrow money. He realizes that no-one will lend to him unless he firmly promises to repay it at a certain time, and he is well aware that he wouldn’t be able to keep such a promise. He is disposed to make such a promise, but he has enough conscience to ask himself: ‘Isn’t it improper and opposed to duty to relieve one’s needs in that way?’ If he does decide to make the promise, the maxim of his action will run like this:

When I think I need money, I will borrow money and promise to repay it, although I know that the repayment won’t ever happen.

·Here he is—for the rest of this paragraph—reflecting on this: ‘It may be that this principle of self-love or of personal advantage would fit nicely into my whole future welfare, ·so that there is no *prudential* case against it·. But the question remains: would it be right? ·To answer this·, I change the demand of self-love into a universal law, and then put the question like this: If my maxim became a universal law, *then* how would things stand? I can see straight off that it could never hold as a universal law of nature, and must contradict itself. For if you take a law saying that anyone who thinks he is in need can make any promises he likes without intending to keep them, and make it *universal* ·so that everyone in need *does* behave in this way·, that would make the promise and the intended purpose of it *impossible*—no-one would believe what was promised to him but would only laugh at any such performance as a vain pretence.’

(3) A third finds in himself a talent that could be developed so as to make him in many respects a useful person. But he finds himself in comfortable circumstances, and would rather indulge in pleasure than take the trouble to broaden and improve his fortunate natural gifts. But now he asks whether his maxim of neglecting his gifts, agreeing as it does with his liking for idle amusement, also agrees with what is called ‘duty’. He sees that a system of nature conforming with this law could indeed *exist*, with everyone behaving like the Islanders of the south Pacific, letting their talents rust and devoting their lives merely to idleness, indulgence, and baby-making—in short, to *pleasure*. But he can’t possibly **will**

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<sup>3</sup> Please note that I reserve the ·serious, considered· division of duties for a future *metaphysic of morals*, and that the present division is merely one I chose as an aid to arranging my examples. . .

that this should become a universal law of nature or that it should be implanted in us by a natural instinct. For, as a rational being, he necessarily wills that all his abilities should be developed, because they serve him and are given to him for all sorts of possible purposes.

(4) A fourth man, for whom things are going well, sees that others (whom he could help) have to struggle with great hardships, and he thinks to himself:

What concern of mine is it? Let each one be as happy as heaven wills, or as he can make himself; I won't take anything from him or even envy him; but I have no desire to contribute to his welfare or help him in time of need.

If such a way of thinking were a universal law of nature, the human race could certainly survive—and no doubt *that* state of humanity would be better than one where everyone chatters about sympathy and benevolence and exerts himself occasionally to practice them, while also taking every chance he can to cheat, and to betray or otherwise violate people's rights. But although it is possible that that maxim should *be* a universal law of nature, it is impossible to **will** that it do so. For a will that brought *that* about would conflict with itself, since instances can often arise in which the person in question would need the love and sympathy of others, and he would have no hope of getting the help he desires, being robbed of it by this law of nature springing from his own will.

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If we attend to what happens in us when we act against duty, we find that we don't (because we *can't*) actually will that our maxim should become a universal law. Rather, we are willing that the opposite of the maxim on which we are acting should remain as a law generally, but we take the liberty of catering to our preferences by making an exception—'just for me, just this once!'. So if we weighed everything from a single standpoint, namely that of *reason*, we would find a contradiction in our own will: willing that a certain principle •be objectively necessary as a universal law and yet •subjectively not hold universally but rather admit of exceptions.

But suppose there were something *whose existence in itself* had absolute value, something which *as an end in itself* could support determinate laws. *That* would be a basis—indeed the *only* basis—for a possible categorical imperative, i.e. of a practical law.

•*There is* such a thing! It is a human being! I maintain that man—and in general every rational being—exists as an end in himself and *not merely as a means* to be used by this or that will at its discretion. Whenever he acts in ways directed towards himself or towards other rational beings, a person serves as a *means* to whatever end his action aims at; but he must always be regarded as *also an end*. Things that are preferred have only *conditional* value, for if the preferences (and the needs arising from them) didn't exist, their object would be worthless. •That wouldn't count against the 'objects' in question if the desires on which they depend did themselves have unconditional value, but they don't! If the preferences themselves, as the sources of needs, did have absolute value, one would want to have them; but that is so far from the case that every rational being must wish he were altogether free of them. So the value of any objects *to be obtained* through our actions is always conditional. Beings whose existence depends not on our will but on nature, if they are not rational beings, have only relative value as means, and are therefore called 'things' [*Sachen*]; whereas rational beings are called '*persons*', because their nature already marks them out as ends in themselves (i.e. as not to be used merely as means)—which makes such a being •an object of respect, and •something that sets limits to what anyone can choose to do. Such beings are not merely subjective ends whose existence as a result of our



action has value *for us*, but are objective ends, i.e. things [*Dinge*] whose existence is an end in itself. It is indeed an *irreplaceable* end: you can't substitute for it something else to which it would be merely a means. If there were no such ends in themselves, nothing of absolute value could be found, and if all value were conditional and thus contingent, no supreme practical principle for reason could be found anywhere.

So if there is to be a supreme practical principle, and a categorical imperative for the human will, it must be an objective principle of the will that can serve as a universal law. Why must it? Because it has to be drawn from the conception of something that is an end in itself and therefore an end for everyone. The basis for this principle is: *rational nature exists as an end in itself*. Human beings necessarily think of their own existence in this way, which means that the principle holds as a subjective principle of human actions. But every other rational being also thinks of his existence on the same rational ground that holds also for myself; and so it is at the same time an *objective* principle—one that doesn't depend on contingent facts about this or that *subject*—a supreme practical ground from which it must be possible to derive all the laws of the will. So here is the practical imperative: **Act in such a way as to treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of anyone else, always as an end and never merely as a means.** Let us now see whether this can be carried out.

To return to our previous examples: (1) Someone thinking of committing suicide will, if he is guided by the concept of necessary duty to oneself, ask himself

- Could my suicide be reconciled with the idea of humanity as *an end in itself*?

• And his answer to this should be No. If he escapes from his burdensome situation by destroying himself, he is using a person merely as *a means* to keeping himself in a tolerable condition up to the end of his life. But a man is not a *thing* [*Sache*], so he isn't something to be used *merely* as a means, and must always be regarded in all his actions as an end in himself. So I can't dispose of a man by maiming, damaging or killing him—and that includes the case where the man is myself. (This basic principle needs to be refined so as to deal properly with questions such as 'May I have one of my limbs amputated to save my life?' and 'May I expose my life to danger in order to save it?' I shan't go into these matters here; they belong to *morals* and not to the metaphysic of morals.)

(2) [Three times in this next paragraph, and nowhere else in this work, Kant writes of someone's 'containing' the end of an action by someone else. Presumably for B to 'contain' the end of A's action is for B to have A's end as *his* end also, to seek what A seeks.] As concerns necessary. . . duties to others, when someone A has it in mind to make someone else B a deceitful promise, he sees immediately that he intends to use B merely as a means, without B's containing in himself the *end* of the action. For B can't possibly assent to A's acting against him in this way, so he can't contain in himself the end of this action. This conflict with the principle about treating others as ends is even easier to see in examples of attacks on people's freedom and property; for in those cases it's obvious that someone who violates the rights of men intends to make use of the person of others merely as means, without considering that as rational beings they should always be valued at the same time as ends, i.e. as beings who can contain in themselves the end of the very same action.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Here I put this proposition forward as a postulate. The reasons for it will be given in the last chapter.

<sup>5</sup> Don't think that the banal 'Don't do to anyone else what you wouldn't want done to you' could serve here as a guide or principle. It is only a consequence of the real principle, and a restricted and limited consequence at that. It can't—as it stands—be a universal law, because it doesn't provide a basis for •duties to oneself, or •benevolent duties to others (for many a man

(3) With regard to contingent (meritorious) duty to oneself . . . , it isn't sufficient that the action *not conflict* with humanity in our person as an end in itself; it must also *harmonize* with it. In human nature there are predispositions to greater perfection that are part of nature's purpose for humanity. . . . ; to neglect these might perhaps be consistent with the *preservation* of humanity as an end in itself but not with the *furtherance* of that end.

(4) With regard to meritorious duty to others: Humanity might survive even if

- no-one contributed to the happiness of others, but also
- no-one intentionally took anything away from the happiness of others;

·and this is a likely enough state of affairs, because· the end or purpose that all men *naturally* have is *their own* happiness. This would put human conduct into harmony with humanity as an end in itself, but only in a *negative* manner. For a *positive* harmony with humanity as an end in itself, what is required is that everyone ·positively· tries to further the ends of others as far as he can. For the ends of any person, who is an end in himself, must as far as possible be also *my* ends, if that thought ·of him as an end in himself· is to have its *full* effect on me.

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would gladly consent to not receiving benefits from others if that would let him off from showing benevolence to them!), or  
 •duties to mete out just punishments to others (for the criminal would argue on this ground against the judge who sentences him). And so on.