# Introduction<sup>a,b</sup>

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# The idea of transcendental philosophy.

Experience is without doubt the first product that our understanding brings forth as it works on the raw material of sensible sensations.<sup>1</sup> It is for this very reason the first teaching, and in its progress it is so inexhaustible in new instruction that the chain of life in all future generations will never have any lack of new information that can be gathered on this terrain. Nevertheless it is far from the only field to which our understanding can be restricted. It tells us, to be sure, what is, but never that it must necessarily be thus and not otherwise.<sup>c</sup> For that very reason it gives us no true universality, and reason, which is so desirous of this kind of cognitions, is more stimulated than satisfied by it. Now such universal cognitions, which at the same time have the character of inner necessity, must be clear and certain for themselves, independently of experience; hence one calls them *a priori* cognitions:<sup>2</sup> whereas that which is merely borrowed from experience is, as it is put, cognized only *a posteriori*, or empirically.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>#</sup> We first present the introduction as it appeared in the first edition, followed by the revised version that appeared in the second edition. Considerable changes were made in the latter, including some deletions, major additions, and occasional alterations within the passages that were repeated. We will use notes and references to the marginal pagination to show what changes were made from the first to the second editions. The following two paragraphs in the first edition were replaced with the first two numbered sections of the second.

\* In his copy of the first edition, Kant made the following two notes:

"I. On the possibility of a critique of pure reason.

2. On its necessity (not from other sciences).

3. On its division.

4. On its purpose, the science of all principles [*Principien*] of pure reason. (Practical)" (E I, p. 12).

"That reason has its boundaries with regard to its *a priori* principles [*Principien*], concerning both degree and scope.

Division of metaphysics into metaphysics of nature and of morals" (E II, p. 12). The following note is added in Kant's copy of the first edition:

"We cannot infer to any necessity *a posteriori* if we do not already have a rule *a priori*. E.g., 'If many cases are identical, there must be something that makes this agreement necessary' presupposes the *a priori* proposition that everything contingent has a cause that determines its concept *a priori*." (E IV, p. 14)

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Now what is especially remarkable is that even among our experiences cognitions are mixed in that must have their origin a priori and that perhaps serve only to establish connection among our representations of the senses. For if one removes from our experiences every thing that belongs to the senses, there still remain certain original concepts and the judgments generated from them, which must have arisen entirely a priori, independently of experience, because they make one able to say more about the objects that appear to the senses than mere experience would teach, or at least make one believe that one can say this, and make assertions contain true universality and strict necessity, the likes of which merely empirical cognition can never afford.

But what says still more is this, that certain cognitions even abanв6

don the field of all possible experiences, and seem to expand the do-A3 main of our judgments beyond all bounds of experience through concepts to which no corresponding object at all can be given in experience.

And precisely in these latter cognitions, which go beyond the world of the senses, where experience can give neither guidance nor correction, lie the investigations of our reason that we hold to be far more

preeminent in their importance and sublime in their final aim than B7 everything that the understanding can learn in the field of appearances, and on which we would rather venture everything, even at the risk of erring, than give up such important investigations because of any sort of reservation or from contempt and indifference."

Now it may seem natural that as soon as one has abandoned the terrain of experience, one would not immediately erect an edifice with cognitions that one possesses without knowing whence, and on the credit of principles whose origin one does not know, without having first assured oneself of its foundation through careful investigations, thus that one would have long since raised the question how the understanding could come to all these cognitions a priori and what do-

main, validity, and value they might have. And in fact nothing is more A4 natural, if one understands by this word that which properly and

reasonably ought to happen; but if one understands by it that which в8 usually happens, then conversely nothing is more natural and comprehensible than that this investigation should long have been neglected. For one part of these cognitions, the mathematical, has long been reliable, and thereby gives rise to a favorable expectation about others as well, although these may be of an entirely different nature. Fur-

" Here the second edition adds two sentences characterizing the tasks of pure reason. See B7 below.

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thermore, if one is beyond the circle of experience, then one is sure not to be contradicted through experience. The charm in expanding one's cognitions is so great that one can be stopped in one's progress only by humping into a clear contradiction. This, however, one can avoid if one makes his inventions carefully, even though they are not thereby inventions any the less. Mathematics gives us a splendid example of how far we can go with a priori cognition independently of experience. Spaced Now it is occupied, to be sure, with objects and cognitions only so far as these can be exhibited in intuition. This circumstance, however, is 1 easily overlooked, since the intuition in question can itself be given d priori, and thus can hardly be distinguished from a mere pure concept. -Encouraged by such a proof of the power of reason, the drive for ex-A 53 mansion sees no bounds. The light dove, in free flight cutting through "the air the resistance of which it feels, could get the idea" that it could do even better in airless space. Likewise, Plato abandoned the world of BQ Kthe senses because it posed so many hindrances for the understanding, and dared to go beyond it on the wings of the ideas, in the empty space of pure understanding. He did not notice that he made no headway by his efforts, for he had no resistance, no support, as it were, by which he could stiffen himself, and to which he could apply his powers in order to get his understanding off the ground. It is, however, a customary fate of human reason in speculation to finish its edifice as early as possible and only then to investigate whether the ground has been adequately prepared for it. But at that point all sorts of excuses will be sought to assure us of its sturdiness or to refuse such a late and dangerous examination. What keeps us free of all worry and suspicion during the construction, however, and flatters us with apparent thoroughness, is this. A great part, perhaps the greatest part of the business of our reason consists in analyses of the concepts that we already have of objects. This affords us a multitude of cognitions that, though they are nothing more than illuminations or clarifications of that which is already thought in our concepts (though still in a con- A6 fused way), are, at least as far as their form is concerned, treasured as if they were new insights, though they do not extend the concepts that we have in either matter or content but only set them apart from each other. Now since this procedure does yield a real a priori cognition, BIO which makes secure and useful progress, reason, without itself noticing <sup>it, under these pretenses surreptitiously makes assertions of quite an-</sup> other sort, in which it adds something entirely alien to given concepts <sup>a priori</sup>, without one knowing how it was able to do this and without this question even being allowed to come to mind. I will therefore deal

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\* Vorstellung

with the distinction between these two kinds of cognition right at the outset.4

### On the difference between analytic and synthetic judgments.4

In all judgments in which the relation of a subject to the predicate is thought (if I consider only affirmative judgments, since the application to negative ones is easy), this relation is possible in two different ways Either the predicate B belongs to the subject A as something that is (covertly) contained in this concept A; or B lies entirely outside the concept A, though to be sure it stands in connection with it. In the first case I call the judgment analytic, in the second synthetic. Analytic

- judgments (affirmative ones) are thus those in which the connection of A 7 the predicate is thought through identity, but those in which this connection is thought without identity are to be called synthetic judg-
- ments. One could also call the former judgments of clarification and BII the latter judgments of amplification,<sup>b</sup> since through the predicate the former do not add anything to the concept of the subject, but only break it up by means of analysis into its component concepts, which were already thought in it (though confusedly); while the latter, on the contrary, add to the concept of the subject a predicate that was not thought in it at all, and could not have been extracted from it through any analysis; e.g., if I say: "All bodies are extended," then this is an analvtic judgment. For I do not need to go outside the concept' that I combine with the word "body" in order to find that extension is connected with it, but rather I need only to analyze that concept, i.e., become conscious of the manifold that I always think in it, in order to encounter this predicate therein; it is therefore an analytic judgment. On the contrary, if I say: "All bodies are heavy," then the predicate is something entirely different from that which I think in the mere concept of a body in general. The addition of such a predicate thus yields a synthetic judgment.

"Now from this it is clear: 1) that through analytic judgments our cognition is not amplified at all, but rather the concept, which I already A8

" Kant's copy of the first edition has the following note:

- <sup>b</sup> Erläuterungs- and Erweiterungsurteile. These terms are emphasized in the second but not in the first edition.
- ' Kant's copy of the first edition here adds: "'I exist' is an analytic judgment; 'A body exists' is a synthetic one." (E VI, p. 14)
- <sup>d</sup> The next two paragraphs are replaced with a single one in the second edition, the sec ond of which incorporates part of the present one; see BII-I2 below.

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have, is set out, and made intelligible to me; 2) that in synthetic judgments I must have in addition to the concept of the subject something else (X) on which the understanding depends in cognizing a predicate that does not lie in that concept as nevertheless belonging to it."

In the case of empirical judgments or judgments of experience there is no difficulty here.<sup>b</sup> For this X is the complete experience of the object that I think through some concept A, which constitutes only a part of this experience. For although I do not at all include the predicate of weight in the concept of a body in general, the concept nevertheless designates the complete experience through a part of it, to which I can therefore add still other parts of the very same experience as belonging to the former. I can first cognize the concept of body analytically through the marks of extension, of impenetrability, of shape, etc., which are all thought in this concept. But now I amplify my cognition and, in looking back to the experience from which I had extracted this concept of body, I find that weight is also always connected with the previous marks.<sup>d</sup> Experience is therefore that X that lies outside the concept Aand on which the possibility of the synthesis of the predicate of weight B with the concept A is grounded.

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But in synthetic a priori judgments this means of help is entirely lacking.<sup>5</sup> If I am to go outside the concept A in order to cognize another Bas combined with it, what is it on which I depend and through which the synthesis becomes possible, since I here do not have the advantage of looking around for it in the field of experience? Take the proposition: "Everything that happens has its cause." In the concept of something that happens, I think, to be sure, of an existence which was preceded by a time, etc., and from that analytic judgments can be drawn. But the concept of a cause indicates something different from the concept of something that happens, and is not contained in the latter representation at all. How then do I come to say something quite different about that which happens in general, and to cognize the concept of cause as belonging to it even though not contained in it?" What is the X here on which the understanding depends when it believes itself to discover beyond the concept of A a predicate that is foreign to it and that is yet

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<sup>&</sup>quot;On synthetic hypothetical and disjunctive judgments as well as categorical negative judgments." (E V, p. 14)

<sup>&</sup>quot; Kant's copy of the first edition adds here: "Analytic judgments could accordingly be called mere judgments of clarification, synthetic judgments, however, judgments of amplification." (E VII, p. 15)

In Kant's copy of the first edition, this was changed to: "In the case of empirical judgments or judgments of experience there is no difficulty about how they are to be proved synthetically." (E VIII, p. 15)

From here the remainder of the paragraph is incorporated into the second edition. The remainder of this paragraph is changed in the second edition; see B12.

Kant ends this and the next sentence with periods, for which we have substituted question marks.

connected with it? It cannot be experience, for the principle that has been adduced adds the latter representations to the former not only with greater generality than experience can provide, but also with the expression of necessity, hence entirely a priori and from mere concepts.

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Now the entire final aim of our speculative a priori cognition rests on such synthetic, i.e., ampliative, principles; for the analytic ones are, to be sure, most important and necessary, but only for attaining that distinctness of concepts that is requisite for a secure and extended synthes sis as a really new construction.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>b</sup>A certain mystery thus lies hidden here,\* the elucidation of which alone can make progress in the boundless field of pure cognition of the understanding secure and reliable: namely, to uncover the ground of the possibility of synthetic a priori judgments with appropriate generality, to gain insight into the conditions that make every kind of them possible. and not merely to designate this entire cognition (which comprises its own species) in a cursory outline, but to determine it completely and adequately for every use in a system in accordance with its primary sources, divisions, domain, and boundaries. So much provisionally for the pecularities of synthetic judgments.

Now from all of this there results the idea of a special science, which B24

could serve for the critique of pure reason. Every cognition is called AII pure, however, that is not mixed with anything foreign to it. But a cognition is called absolutely pure, in particular, in which no experience or sensation at all is mixed in, and that is thus fully a priori. Now reason is the faculty that provides the principles<sup>d</sup> of cognition a priori. Hence pure reason is that which contains the principlese for cognizing something absolutely a priori. An organon of pure reason would be a sum total of those principles in accordance with which all pure a priori cog-

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\* If it had occurred to one of the ancients even to raise this question, this alone would have offered powerful resistance to all the systems of pure reason down to our own times, and would have spared us so many vain attempts that were blindly undertaken without knowledge of what was really at issue.

" Anbau, changed to Erwerb (acquisition) in the second edition.

<sup>b</sup> The following paragraph, including the footnote, is omitted in the second edition, and replaced with Sections V and VI, B14 through B25.

- At this point the common text of the two editions resumes; in the second edition, how ever, there is here inserted the section number VII and the ensuing heading. In addition, the second and third sentences of this paragraph are omitted, and there are minor changes in the wording of the opening and fourth sentences. See B24 below.
- <sup>d</sup> Principien
- <sup>e</sup> Principien
- f Principien

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nitions can be acquired and actually brought about. The exhaustive application of such an organon would create a system of pure reason. But since that requires a lot, and it is still an open question whether such an amplification of our cognition is possible at all and in what cases it would be possible, we can regard a science of the mere estimation of nure reason, of its sources and boundaries, as the propaedeutic to the system of pure reason. Such a thing would not be a doctrine, but must be called only a critique of pure reason, and its utility would really be only negative, serving not for the amplification but only for the purification of our reason, and for keeping it free of errors, by which a great deal is already won. I call all cognition transcendental that is occupied not so much with objects but rather with our a priori concepts of objects in general.<sup>4,6</sup> A system of such concepts would be called transcendental AI2 philosophy. But this is again too much for the beginning. For since such a science would have to contain completely both analytic as well as synthetic a priori cognition, it is, as far as our aim is concerned, too broad in scope, since we need to take the analysis only as far as is indispensably necessary in order to provide insight into the principles of a priori synthesis in their entire scope, which is our only concern. This investi-B 26 gation, which we can properly call not doctrine but only transcendental critique, since it does not aim at the amplification of the cognitions themselves but only at their correction, and is to supply the touchstone of the worth or worthlessness of all cognitions a priori, is that with which we are now concerned. Such a critique is accordingly a preparation, if possible, for an organon, and, if this cannot be accomplished, then at least for a canon, in accordance with which the complete system of the philosophy of pure reason, whether it is to consist in the amplification or the mere limitation<sup>b</sup> of its cognition, can in any case at least some day be exhibited both analytically and synthetically. For that this should be possible, indeed that such a system should not be too great in scope for us to hope to be able entirely to complete it, can be assessed in advance from the fact that our object is not the nature of things, which is inexhaustible, but the understanding, which judges about the AIZ nature of things, and this in turn only in regard to its a priori cognition, the supply of which, since we do not need to search for it externally, cannot remain hidden from us, and in all likelihood is small enough to be completely recorded, its worth or worthlessness assessed, and subjected to a correct appraisal."

<sup>&</sup>quot; In the second edition, "but . . . " replaced with "but with our manner of cognition of ob-Jects insofar as this is to be possible a priori." See B25 below. \* Begrenzung

Two sentences are added here in the second edition; see B27 below.

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## II. Division of Transcendental Philosophy<sup>a</sup>

Transcendental philosophy is here only an idea,<sup>b</sup> for which the cris tique of pure reason is to outline the entire plan architectonically, i.e. from principles, with a full guarantee for the completeness and certainty of all the components that comprise this edifice.<sup>d</sup> That this critique is not itself already called transcendental philosophy rests solely on the fact that in order to be a complete system it would also have to contain an exhaustive analysis of all of human cognition a priori. Now our critique must, to be sure, lay before us a complete enumeration of all of the ancestral concepts' that comprise the pure cognition in question. Only it properly refrains from the exhaustive analysis of these concepts themselves as well as from the complete review of all of those derived from them, partly because this analysis would not be purposeful, f since it does not contain the difficulty that is encountered in the synthesis on account of which the whole critique is actually undertaken. partly because it would be contrary to the unity of the plan to take on responsibility for the completeness of such an analysis and derivation. from which one could after all be relieved given one's aim. This completeness of the analysis as well as the derivation from the a priori con-

cepts which are to be provided in the future will nevertheless be easy to complete as long as they are present as exhaustive principles<sup>g</sup> of synthesis, and if nothing is lacking in them in regard to this essential aim.

To the critique of pure reason there accordingly belongs everything that constitutes transcendental philosophy, and it is the complete idea of transcendental philosophy, but is not yet this science itself, since it goes only so far in the analysis as is requisite for the complete estimation of synthetic a priori cognition.

The chief target in the division of such a science is that absolutely no concepts must enter into it that contain anything empirical, or that the a priori cognition be entirely pure. Hence, although the supreme prin-

" This number and title are omitted in the second edition, having been replaced by the number and title of Section VII at B 24.

<sup>b</sup> The words "here only an idea" are replaced in the second edition with "the idea of a science"; see B 27 below.

· Principien

d Here the second edition inserts the sentence "It is the system of all principles [Principien] of pure reason." In his copy of the first edition, Kant had added here: "For without this the former must also be without any touchstone, and therefore entirely groundless." (E IX, p. 15)

- <sup>e</sup> Stammbegriffe
- f zweckmäßig
- <sup>g</sup> Principien

ciples of morality and the fundamental concepts of it are a priori cognitions, they still do not belong in transcendental philosophy, since the concepts of pleasure and displeasure, of desires and inclinations, of concer, etc., which are all of empirical origin, must there be presupnosed.<sup>a</sup> Hence transcendental philosophy is a philosophy<sup>b</sup> of pure, merely speculative reason. For everything practical, insofar as it conrains motives, is related to feelings, which belong among empirical sources of cognition.

Now if one wants to set up the division of this science from the general viewpoint of a system in general, then the one that we will now present must contain first a Doctrine of Elements and second a Doctrine of Method of pure reason. Each of these main parts will have its subdivision, the grounds for which cannot yet be expounded here. All that seems necessary for an introduction or a preliminary is that there are two stems of human cognition, which may perhaps arise from a common but to us unknown root, namely sensibility and understanding, through the first of which objects are given to us, but through the second of which they are thought. Now if sensibility were to contain a priori representations, which constitute the conditions under which objects are given to us, it would belong to transcendental philosophy. The transcendental doctrine of the senses will have to belong to the first part A16 of the science of elements, since the conditions under which alone the objects of human cognition are given precede those under which those objects are thought.

" This sentence is revised in the second edition to reflect Kant's intervening argument, beginning with the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals of 1785, that the principle of morality if not its application is indeed entirely a priori. See B28-9 below. Weltweisheit

Bewegungsgründe, replaced in the second edition with Triebfedern (incentives) in order to leave room for the idea that although incentives based on feelings are not adequate for morality, there can be other, more purely rational motives for it (see Groundwork, 4:427).

A14/B28