“I have heard the mermaids singing, each to each
I do not think that they will sing to me”
T.S. Eliot
T.S. Eliot’s opus “The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock” is certainly not concerned with International Relations (IR). However, the verses quoted above can be used to help one understand a seemingly ubiquitous aspect of the discipline: the mainstream theories (e.g. liberalism, realism and their neo ‘variants’) that have informed and continue to inform most of IR today are Western normative ‘projects.’ To borrow from Eliot’s language, then, these theories ‘sing’ —in the form of “Great Debates”— to each other. They ‘sing’ about Westphalian states and the anarchic conditions under which these exist. They ‘sing’ about great (Western) powers and the threat of the Other (previously the USSR, now China). They ‘sing’ about the necessity of having a ‘core paradigm.’ Crucially, it is the ‘mermaids’ —the West, particularly the United States— who do the ‘singing.’ Thus, the problem is not only that the ‘mermaids’ do not ‘sing’ directly to us Others but that we ourselves do not get to do so.
In this article, I do a critique of ‘mainstream’ IR theories (IRTs). I argue that —given the particular spatial-temporal horizon in which the discipline of IR was formed and its narrow understanding of ‘science’— it is troubling and limiting to understand and treat IR as a science with universal (in an anthropogenic sense) applications. It is important to note that I do not think that this is an inherent and unchanging feature of the discipline. On the contrary, its increasing theoretical pluralism demonstrates that IR is beginning to shift away from a narrow understanding of ‘the international.’ However, with the notable exception of constructivism, these new theories —which are usually post- or anti-positivist— are still considered to be ‘fringe’ IRTs. Thus, they are not meaningfully included. First, I explore the embedded ‘American Parochialism’ in IRT and the discipline’s narrow understanding of ‘science.’ Second, I briefly outline two reasons why an understanding of contemporary IR as ‘science’ with universal applicability is deeply problematic. Third, I bring forth an attempt made by IR theorist Justin Rosenberg —his ideation of ‘multiplicity’— to change the current hegemony in IR.
‘American Parochialism’ and IR’s understanding of ‘science’
In an IR context, ‘American Parochialism’ refers not only to the “persistent Anglo-American domination of the field” but also to the “reasonable conjecture that nationality might also constitute an important, if not ultimate, point of reference for IR theorists.” That is, one’s “particular historical, cultural, and national experiences and circumstances” (Crawford 2001, 2) shape one’s worldview and, consequently, the way one ‘does’ or ‘theorises’ IR. If this is the case, then, this persistent ‘American dominance’ is problematic as it demonstrates that a myriad of different ‘points of reference’ are not meaningfully included in the discipline.
On his influential 1977 article “An American Social Science,” Stanley Hoffmann attributes the development of IR as an American discipline to the convergence of three circumstances: what Hoffmann calls “intellectual predisposition, political circumstances, and institutional opportunities.” The ‘intellectual predispositions’ Hoffmann identifies are a deeply held conviction “that all problems can be resolved [and] that the way to resolve them is to apply the scientific method” (Hoffmann 1977, 45), the assumption that the social sciences can be modelled after the natural sciences, and the transplant of a host of prominent European scholars as a result of WWII. Second, the chief ‘political circumstance’ was to “justify a permanent and global involvement in world affairs” (48). Lastly, the ‘institutional opportunities’ Hoffmann mentions are the “direct and visible tie” between academia and Washington and the vast human and material resources of American universities (50). It is important to acknowledge these presupposing conditions because they form the deeply normative foundation that continues to inform a discipline that claims to be scientific (and non-normative as a result).
Similar to other social sciences, IR has, for most of its history, used positivism as its epistemic foundation (Gunnell 2011, 1451). Epistemology refers to ‘theories or knowledge’ — ‘how we know what we know.’ Positivism is a particular philosophy of science that contends that sensory experience is the exclusive source of all knowledge. Arguably, the positivist ‘dominance’ of IR stems from the American ‘intellectual predisposition’ of modelling the social sciences after the natural sciences.
As a result of IR’s ‘Third Great Debate,’ the meta-theoretical debates of the discipline have been increasingly focused on its epistemic foundations. Thus, anti-positivist — “the position that truth is a function of social and political processes” (Monteiro and Ruby 2009, 17)— and post-positivist —the position that all observation is fallible— epistemologies have, although somewhat marginally, began to contest the positivist ‘epistemic monopoly’ in IR.
It is important to make a crucial distinction that is usually failed to take into account. The philosophy of science (which is the superset of positivism, anti-positivism, and post-positivism) is not science. Gunnell explains that the philosophies of science “are not the foundation of scientific inquiry but, instead, post-hoc reconstructions of what are taken to be the logic and epistemology that underlies the practice of science” (2011, 1450). That is, it is erroneous to understand the philosophy of science as a guide to engage in scientific practice. This is particularly damaging to positivist IRs (i.e. liberalism, neoliberalism, and neorealism), as they are the ones which have been the most preoccupied with ‘making’ IR more scientific.
Why This Understanding of IR as a ‘Science’ is Problematic
There are two reasons why an understanding of contemporary IR as ‘science’ with universal applicability is deeply problematic. What I call the ‘historical problem’ and the ‘inclusivity problem.’ The ‘historical problem’ refers to the aforementioned notion that IR has normative and Eurocentric (or Western-centric) foundations. IR is often conceived to have been ‘born’ in 1919 as a response to the unprecedented devastation caused by the First World War. However, there is another seldom discussed yet important aspect about 1919 that shaped IR: The West’s fear of losing its imperial hegemony (de Carvalho et al 750). The historically hegemonic IR theories (i.e. realism and liberalism alongside with their ‘neo’ variants) are not too concerned with the role colonialism has had in the shaping and structuring of the international system for the last 500 or so years. It seems that —for these theories— colonialism is an ‘elephant in the room.’ That is, they do not acknowledge that their ‘objects’ of study (i.e. states) and the theories themselves are a, in a sense, vestiges of colonialism. Instead of acknowledging and grappling with their cultural and normative origins, these theories conflate The West with the world. If IR is understood as a ‘science,’ then these normative and Eurocentric presuppositions are naturalised, further entrenching the current unequal and oppressive world order.
The ‘inclusivity problem’ is closely linked to the ‘historical problem’ and refers to the non-Western and post-colonial poverty of modern IRT. That is, the vast majority of contemporary IRT “is produced by and for the West” (Acharya and Buzan 2007, 288). Arguably, this would not be a problem for other disciplines, particularly those in the natural sciences. However, given that IR is concerned with the study of the global milieu, the ‘inclusivity problem’ severely limits the scope and the potential of plurality in IR. In their aptly titled paper “Why is there no non-Western international relations theory? An Introduction” Acharya and Buzan provide an insightful overview of why there is a lack of non-Western IRT. They identify five potential explanations as to why this is the case. Due to the constraints of this article, I only delve into one.
Acharya and Buzan elucidate that IRT has acquired a “hegemonic status” and that this has prevented the formation of non-Western IRT. They continue by arguing that this ‘hegemonic status’ “operates largely unconsciously in the minds of others, and regardless of whether the theory is correct or not” (2007, 294). Arguably, this is deeply intertwined with the ‘historical problem.’ Western imperialism and colonialism “not only overwhelmed local traditions of thought and knowledge, but also cut off peoples from their own history by drawing their self-understanding into a Western historical frame” (295). Thus, the ‘inclusivity problem’ stems from the ‘historical problem’ in the sense that the ‘Global South’s’ experience with Western imperialism and colonialism embedded ‘Western’ modes of thought as hegemonic, preventing a host of ‘voices’ from ‘joining the conversation.’
Rosenberg’s Concept of ‘Multiplicity”
Rosenberg argues that IR as a discipline is lacking a fundamental aspect: “the ontological premise for a specialized field of study which nonetheless has general significance for social analysis of all kinds” (2017, 91). An ‘ontological premise,’ Rosenberg posits, is what warrants a field of inquiry to become a fully-fledged discipline. Arguably, this lack of an ‘ontological premise’ is what has made IRTs so contentious and ‘at odds’ with each other. Rosenberg contends that the ‘isms’ of IR (i.e. IRTs) are “middle-range theories” that have been treated as “grand theories.” Middle-range theories are those that “generate and that deploy more specific hypotheses about actual historical events and phenomena” (92) whereas grand theories “provide the orienting assumptions within a given field” (91). Crucially, grand theories “never themselves do the work of empirical examination” (91-92). Thus, for Rosenberg, IR is essentially lacking an ‘ontological premise,’ a ‘grand theory.’ IR is lacking “what space is for Geography, time for History, culture for Anthropology” (91).
Rosenberg identifies ‘multiplicity’ as IR’s potential ontological premise. At its most basic, ‘multiplicity’ refers to “a central feature of human history: namely the fact that social has been multiple and interactive right from the start.” (Rosenberg 2016, 145). Rosenberg posits that ‘multiplicity’ is not exclusively political, is it can be found in “social, economic, cultural and developmental dimensions too” (136).
To better understand ‘multiplicity,’ it is helpful to use Trotsky’s concept of ‘uneven but combined development (UCD). UCD is a “middle-range theory” which inspired Rosenberg’s multiplicity. It posits that “world development was not uni-linear but was rather multiple and interactive” (Rosenberg 2016, 141). It is important to note that ‘development’ in this context does not refer to “the particular forms of socio-historical change associated with industrial capitalism,” but traces a rather a more diffused notion of “cumulative causation of some kind leading to directional change.” This framework hinges on the fact that “radically different forms of society coexisted” (Rosenberg 2017, 100) and that “these social formations were everywhere in interaction with others” (101).
The current sociopolitical ‘world order’ stems from these interactions between coexisting uneven and widely different societies. It is ‘uneven’ because these societies were (and are) radically different from each other and they have been subjects to different consequences as a result of these inter-societal interactions. It is combined because the inter-societal interactions played (and continue to play) a crucial role in ‘development’ (e.g. the explosion of European industrial capitalism would not have been possible without the interactive participation of non-European societies).
By locating IR as the study of multiplicity, Rosenberg is premising the discipline in a non-Western context and is rooting it in a historical reality that far predates the Westphalian state. Thus, doing so resolves the ‘historical problem.’ Moreover, by centering on the ‘multiple’ vis á vis the ‘unitary,’ it embeds and calls for theoretical and cultural pluralism, opening the door for a host of widely different and non-Western voices hitherto neglected from the conversation.
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References
Acharya, Amitav, Barry Buzan. 2007. “Why is there no non-Western international relations theory? An introduction,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 7. 287-312.
Crawford, Robert M. A. 2001. “International Relations as an Academic Discipline: If It’s Good for America, Is It Good for the World?” In International Relations —Still an American Social Science? Towards Diversity in International Thought, edited by Robert M.A. Crawford and Darryl S. L. Jarvis, 1-23. Albany: State University of New York Press.
De Carvalho, Benjamin, Halvard Leira, John M. Hobson. 2011. “The Big Bangs of IR: The Myths That Your Teachers Still Tell You about 1648 and 1919,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 39, no. 3. 735-758.
Gunnell, John G. 2011. “Social scientific inquiry and meta-theoretical fantasy: the case of International Relations,” Review of International Studies 37, no. 4. 1447-1469.
Hoffman, Stanley. 1977. “An American Social Science,” Daedalus 106, no. 3. 41-60.
Monteiro, Nuno P., Keven G. Ruby. 2009. “IR and the false promise of philosophical foundations,” International Theory 1, no. 1. 15-48.
Rosenberg, Justin. 2016. “International relations in the prison of political science,” International Relations 30, no. 2. 127-153.
—. 2017. “The elusive international,” International Relations 31, no. 1. 90-103.