The relationship between systemic polarity and international stability has provoked a long-standing debate in in the discipline of International Relations (IR). It is safe to say most IR theories have two-cents to contribute to whether a uni, bi or multi-polar system facilitates stability. Moreover, the core of the debate lies between offensive and defensive realists. Dunne (2013), explains that these branches of structural realism host similar foundational assumptions; yet they arrive at different conclusions to the question, “how much power states should aim to control?” p. 80. The threat associated with ‘the rise of China’ makes this theoretical divide relevant. China’s sustainable economic growth since 1978 (The World Bank, 2017), invites discussion about the potential effects and uncertain consequences that may result due to shifts in relative state power. The topic of polarity change and the introduction of the term “easternization” in scholarly IR discourse welcomes a sense of uncertainty in the international system. In analyzing the dynamic relationship between the United States and China, the terms ‘rise’ and ‘decline’ are used strictly as a relative, comparative measure; rather than an absolute measure. This essay will compare offensive and defensive realism in the face of a potential polarity change. Employing the works of Mearsheimer and Waltz, this essay will focus on the dynamic rise of China.
In the discipline of International Relations, offensive structural realists advocate that states should adopt strategies to pursue power in the face of rival states. Furthermore, realists argue that a state’s share of power, both military and latent, must be maximized to ensure survival in the anarchic system. A defining characteristic of Mearsheimer’s offensive realism holds, “the ultimate goal of every great power is to dominate the system”; (2004, p1); a core divide between offensive and defensive realists. In the post-cold war system, the United States has maintained unrivaled global hegemony. Offensive realists argue that in the long-term, the increasing strength of China’s economy, population size and regional dominance has the potential to “fundamentally alter the architecture of the international system” (Mearsheimer, 2014). Although China remains a developing country, it is home to “a population of 1.3 billion people, the world’s second largest economy, and has been the largest contributor to world growth since 2008” (The World Bank, 2017). China has quadrupled its national GDP since 1970 (Ikenberry, 2008), if it continues to develop at an impressive pace the international system could see a re-emergence of great power politics over the coming decades (Mearsheimer, 2014). Understanding that offensive realists’ view international relations through state relations, Mearsheimer holds that China’s rise and establishment as a regional hegemon will “likely engage an intense security competition with the United States” (Ikenberry, 2008). Texts on this topic often characterize the United States in a phase of decline. Nonetheless, the United States very much remains a great, unrivaled world power; thus, allegations of the United States’ ascendance are pre-mature. Mearsheimer emphasizes that insights offered by offensive realism on ‘the rise of China’ are strictly in terms of the long-term balance of power and potential for systemic changes. China’s ability to maintain sustainable growth to eventually develop as a treat to the United States is dependent on a variety of factors; such as policy change, environmental standards and social imbalances, to name a few (The World Bank, 2017).
In contrast, defensive structural realists offer an alternative theory, chiefly advocating for states to maximize security, rather than power. As explained by Dunne (2013), defensive realists respond to offensive realists in suggesting that the system will punish states that aims maximize to their share of world power (p. 78). Existing in conditions of anarchy, Waltz theorizes that states that seek to acquire additional power will jeopardize their own security (Schmidt, 2004, p435). In the case of ‘the rise of China’, defensive realists are more accommodating for the potential for peaceful changes in the system. Maintaining Waltz’s assumptions about state actors, he maintains that not all military decisions are certain to be aggressive or offensive purposes. In Waltz’s text, The Emerging Structure of International Politics, he reasons that the fall and decline of great powers is simply an enduring fluctuation in the structure of international politics; only with the implication of an altered system (Waltz, 1993). Additionally, defensive realists argue that a rise of another great power, inducing a systemic change and a new world order would not be an unfamiliar circumstance (Dunne, 2013).
Waltz maintains that the United States cannot be certain of China’s intentions. Thus, US policy makers should take a more defensive approach to China, provided policy makers are constantly re-assessing whether China poses a legitimate threat to the United States. The defensive realist perspective would hold against advising the United States to increase military power in aims of ensuring attempting to increase security in the chance against China’s fast-paced, consistent and influential development role the global system. However, it must be noted that Waltz insists that defensive realism is purely theory, and does not wish to apply it to the conditional nature of foreign policy (Schmidt, 2004).
A traditional perspective on international relations commonly divides politics, economics and sociology into separate entities. Applying traditional realist assumptions to the heavily interconnected, globally influenced system, seems to be a limiting approach (Legro & Moravcsik, 1999). Considering the impact of the recent technological boom, state-centric analysis of world politics suggested by realists is arguably an unsuitable level of analysis. The traditional assumptions that act as the foundations of realist IR theory prove to be less relevant in this fluid world order. With limitless exogenous state influences on state behavior, preferences and beliefs (Legro & Moravcsik, 1999), is the interdependent international system best analyzed with a realist, state-centric approach? Contemporary IR scholars, Keohane and Nye (2000), emphasize the density of interconnected networks at multi-continental distances. Keohane and Nye note the increasing linkage of capital, ideas and due to the shrinkage of distances fostered by increased systemic globalization (2000). Globalization facilitates a fluid transmission of ideas. This implies a connection between a state’s economic rise to be accompanied by its social and political influences. Thus, China’s growing share of world power, facilitated by its powerful trading, economic and financial investment networks (Petras, 2012), act as empirical indicators or China’s rise. The political and social implications of China’s economic advances are profound. In application, China’s economic rise in combination with the forces of globalization may facilitate “political polarization in Chinese society” (Petras, 2012); which would impact the structure of global institutions and societal norms.
Given the anarchic architecture of the international system, realists a-like theorize to ensure state survival. The offensive and defensive debate within structural realism proves to be relevant for US policy makers when approaching future relations with China. The rise of a hegemon naturally induces questions about the intentions of states and possible consequences of polarity change. In regard to the rise of China, structural realists perceive the threat to the status-quo system differently. Nonetheless, neither rival theories can be solidified until China has made its debut on the as an accepted global hegemon; which is potentially in the long-term cards for China, but not at all a sure thing.
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