

Μ	lodeling Categorical Outcomes	
	 Dependent variable is unordered categories Vote choice Choice of policy instrument Outcome of inter-state interactions (e.g. war, trade) 	
-	OLS doesn't work, except LPM for 2 categories Logit/Probit are also for 2 categories Frequently two outcomes 'closer' together than to other outcomes (see 'IIA' later) Frequently nested choices or selection effects	2
•	outcomes (see 'IIA' later) Frequently nested choices or selection effects	

But first... review Binary Dependent Variables

- Recall the linear probability model, which can be written as P(y = 1|x) = β₀ + xβ
- An alternative is to model the probability as a function, $G(\beta_0 + \mathbf{x}\boldsymbol{\beta})$, where 0 < G(z) < 1
- This G just translates or squishes -- the linear additive model into the 0 to 1 space

Logit

- A common choice for G(z) is the logistic function, which is the *cumulative distribution function* for a standard logistic random variable
- $G(x\beta) = \exp^{(x\beta)}/[1 + \exp^{(x\beta)}]$ or $1/[1 - \exp^{-x\beta}]$
- We're taking numbers from -∞ to +∞ and transforming those numbers using this cumulative distribution function





























Random Utility Model

- Differences in utility of alternatives result in choice / behaviour
- But a random component, so we get a predicted behaviour given characteristics of choices and choosers
- Probability of each outcome for each chooser
- Or: Proportion of each choice within population groups defined by combinations of characteristics





Differences in Utility

- As Golder says: "Only Differences in Utility Matter"
- Because utility is *unobserved* or 'latent', and we only know whether one alternative was chosen as opposed to another, we can only think of systematic influences as *relative*
- So the impact of a characteristic of a chooser (e.g. female) is not that it produces, on average, Θ_{n1} and Θ_{n2} and so on Utilities for the choices.
- Instead, it just tells us about the average *difference* in the utility of the two choices, i.e. Θ₂ Θ₁
- Since we don't observe utility, that Θ₂ Θ₁ is indeterminate, so we just set one of them to ZERO and interpret the Θ_i parameter as the difference in the utility of the *i*th choice from the one choice for which we set all the Θ's to zero.

Logit Models for categorical outcomes
Assume a distribution for the ε
We actually use one that's mathematically convenient rather than substantively justified

Suffice to say it is a logistic dist. for choice btw any two alternatives

e^{ϵnji}/(1+e^{ϵnji}), whereϵϵ = ϵnj - ϵni

BIG assumption is that the unobserved part of the utility of one alternatives is independent of the unobserved part of other alternatives (IIA, more later)
Means you've got a good, well-specificed model: one that includes all systematic influences on the choices

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Multiple Outcome Logit Choice Probabilities

- So the choice of one alternative by a chooser indicates that the error for each other choice was below

 ϵ_{ni} + V_{ni} V_{ni}
- With multiple choices, we need the probability that this is true for all j ≠ i, which is the product of all of the cumulative distributions of the errors for all the non-chosen choices, relative to the distribution of the errors of *I* (that's roughly what Golder's eq. 16 says)
- That's the criterion analogous to 'least-squares' for OLS
- So the MNL choice probabilities are

$$P_{ni} = \frac{e^{x_{ni}\beta}}{\sum_{j} e^{x_{nj}\beta}}$$

And the log likelihood is this over all choices and choosers

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Two models, MNL and CoLogit

- Golder does Conditional Logit before Multinomial Logit
- Weird choice, but it makes a bit of sense
- I'm going to follow him

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Conditional Logit

- Pure Conditional Logit involves only characteristics of choices
- Transportation models involved price, speed, comfort of each of modes of transport
- Notice that the x are subscripted by nj, meaning they are about the decision-maker relative to the alternatives $U_{nj} = V_{nj} + \epsilon_{nj}$ $= x_{nj}\beta + \epsilon_{nj}$
- Like 'distance' from a party on policy, or a country's distance from potential allies or adversaries
- β has no subscript because the effect of this variable is constant across alternatives
 - E.g. 'distance' or higher price makes you less likely to choose something
 - Speed, comfort make choice more likely
 - Next page: same language as leader makes choice more likely
 - distance from parties on corporate tax policy makes choice less likely

Conditional Log	it in Sta	ta				
Vote Choice in Quebec,	, 2011					
 clogit choice same 	elang dist_	_corptax,	group(i	d)		
Iteration 0: log likeli Iteration 1: log likeli Iteration 2: log likeli	hood = -2197 hood = -2196 hood = -2196	.0125 .8142 .8142				
Conditional (fixed-effect	s) logistic	regression	Number LR chi Prob >	of obs 2(2) chi2	s = = =	7428 42.77 0.0000
Log likelihood = -2196.81	42		Pseudo	R2	=	0.0096
choice Coef.	Std. Err.	Z	P> z	[95%	Conf.	Interval]
samelang .5009395 dist_corptax 0933343	.0762589 .0478339	6.57 -1.95	0.000 0.051	.3514 1870	1749 1869	.6504041 .0004184
 Coefficients are cha for one unit change 	nge in log-	odds of cl	hoosing	an alte	ernati	ive,
		ependent	variable			26



MNL identification Attributes of choosers don't vary across alternatives So they can only create differences between alternatives e.g. educ level can only make some parties more likely to be voted for Simple solution: set all coefficients for one alternative to ZerO Coefficients are always about the difference in choice probabilities between two of the choices As a decision-maker becomes more likely to choose one alternative, she is less likely to choose others This just works out to a different set of independent variables. The likelihoods are basically the same.

MNL is binary logits!

- MNL estimates the same parameters as a series of binary logits
- It's slightly more efficient (see Alvarez and Nagler)
- This is because of IIA
- Later, we'll talk about relaxing IIA

Digression: Don't estimate choice versus all others ... unless you have a theoretical reason to Cautionary tale: IS BQ voting influenced by attitude to spending on Envrmt? . logit vote4 sov spend_EN
 Number of obs
 =
 904

 LR chi2(2)
 =
 243.17

 Prob > chi2
 =
 0.0000

 Pseudo R2
 =
 0.2202
 Logistic regression Log likelihood = -430.4643 0.2202 Pseudo R2 _____ vote4 | Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] ______ sov | 2.455879 .179795 13.66 0.000 2.103487 2.808271 spend_EN | .1583196 .1679772 0.94 0.346 -.1709097 .4875489 _cons | -2.592755 .4599843 -5.64 0.000 -3.494307 -1.691202 ------No effect of Environment attitudes? 30

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<pre>mlogit vote sov spend_EN ltinomial logistic regression ltR chi2(8) = 353.81 LR chi2(8) = 353.81 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 Pseudo R2 = 0.1333 vote Coef. Std. Err. z P> z [95% Conf. Interval] beral sov -3.323585 .2804922 -11.85 0.000 -3.873339 -2.77383 spend_EN 0180076 .2244897 -0.08 0.9364579993 .421842 _ cons 1.033057 .6140084 1.68 0.0921703772 2.236492 nservati~s sov -3.063571 .2648611 -11.57 0.000 -3.582689 -2.544453 spend_EN 9299179 .2053723 -4.53 0.000 -1.332445273956 _ cons 3.380755 .5476791 6.17 0.000 2.307323 4.454186 P sov -1.9299275 .2010957 -9.59 0.000 -2.323415 -1.535135 spend_EN .0810441 .1944765 0.42 0.6773001229 .4622111 _ cons .8961252 .5389201 1.66 0.0961601387 1.952389 oc_Quebe~s (base outcome) een_Party sov -1.252255 .3907826 -3.20 0.001 -2.0181754863351 spend_EN 1.313919 .6122771 2.15 0.032 .1138781 2.51396 _ cons -4.987046 1.783435 -2.80 0.005 -8.482515 -1.491578</pre>	MNL in Stata									
ltinomial logistic regression Number of obs = 904 LR chi2(8) = 353.81 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 g likelihood = -1149.7148 Prob > chi2 = 0.1333 vote Coef. Std. Err. z P> z [95% Conf. Interval] beral sov -3.323585 .2804922 -11.85 0.000 -3.873339 -2.77383 spend_EN 0180076 .2244897 -0.08 0.9364579993 .4219842	. mlogit vote	sov spend_El	N							
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IIA - 1

Independence of/from Irrelevant Alternatives

- A **property** of the Multinomial Logit Model
 - It's built into the model by assumption
- Assumption about individual choosers: their own ratio of probabilities of two choices don't depend on other alternatives
- Classic example is Red Bus/Blue Bus from transp. mode choice

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If \frac{\Pr(Car)}{\Pr(RedBus)} = 1, meaning \Pr(Car) = \Pr(RedBus) = 0.5
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then an identical Blue Bus is introduced, we have to keep \frac{\Pr(Car)}{\Pr(RedBus)} = 1
so we get \Pr(Car) = \Pr(RedBus) = \Pr(BlueBus) = 0.33
But we should have had
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Pr(Car) = 0.5, Pr(RedBus) = Pr(BlueBus) = 0.25
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This is a feature of **un**conditional probabilities





Nested Logit Probabilities

$$P_{nB_ki} = \frac{e^{w_{nk}\gamma + \lambda_k I_{nk}}}{\sum_{\iota=1}^{K} e^{w_{n\iota}\gamma + \lambda_\iota I_{n\iota}}} \times \frac{e^{x_{ni}\beta/\lambda_k}}{\sum_{j\in B_k} e^{x_{nj}\beta/\lambda_k}}$$

Probability of choosing alternative *i* in nest *k* is

prob of choosing nest $k \mathbf{X}$ prob of choosing *i* given choice of k

- *I_{nk}* is the 'inclusive value' for the nest for each person: the value of the nest, irrespective of which alternative is chosen
- And the γ_k is how independent (uncorrelated) are the errors for each alternative within a nest
- Note that in the lower-level probabilities, the $X\beta$ utilities for each alternative are divided by γ_k

















Selection Correction (continued)

- We need an estimate of \u03c6, so estimate a probit of s (whether y is observed) on z
- These estimates of *γ* can then be used along with *z* to form the inverse Mills ratio
- Then you can just regress y on x and the estimated λ to get consistent estimates of β
- See Berinsky article

