When Kenneth Waltz states that arming Iran with nuclear power will “restore” stability to the Middle East, he is basking in what seems to be a case of neorealist glory (Waltz, 2012). Back in 2012, there was already alarming discord resulting from economic sanctions and concerns regarding Iran’s supposedly peaceful nuclear program (with aid from the US). The balance of military power in the Middle East can be restored, he argues, just by giving Iran the nuclear weapons it needs and diminishing the tensions from Israel’s long-held nuclear arsenal. In “Why Iran Should Get the Bomb,” Waltz discusses three possibilities that could arise from US claims of Iran’s nuclear proliferation: 1) use diplomacy and sanctions on Iran to prevent all means of attaining nuclear weapons; 2) Iran may achieve a “breakout capability” and 3) Iran ends up publicly testing a nuclear weapon (Waltz, 2012).

At this point, reflecting on the 1979 “Theory of International Politics” by Waltz does not seem irrelevant. With his introduction to the extreme neorealist view in 1979, it is once again clear that Waltz is just presenting his theory, which he believes is the correct one. At a most convenient time, this theory also becomes a lens for how he thinks global stability can be achieved – arming Iran with nuclear weapons. He states that major powers object to smaller countries (or any other country) pursuing nuclear weapons initially, but after a while, they become accepting of it. Waltz then goes on to make the argument that we cannot be certain of Iran’s intentions of pursuing nuclear weapons, however, Iran is likely to consider its security as a major reason. In essence, Waltz seems to use fact-value distinctions by using historical evidence to support his claim that since the same course of action succeeded in for example, Maoist China, Iran will witness a similar pattern. It is important to consider that there may not be a guaranteed law – Waltz may be simplifying the case here by assuming deterrence will automatically apply. I think this is where the concept of Mutually Assured Destruction comes in as a reason for countries in possession of nuclear weapons, such as the US accepting other nuclear-armed countries. Perhaps Waltz could have made a stronger case by elaborating on his statement: “There has never been a full-scale war between two nuclear-armed states” (Waltz, 2012). Certainly there have been many discussions on the paradoxical element of MAD and why states, in an almost law-like manner, understand the extent to which full state annihilation is possible with the application of nuclear capabilities. Further, Waltz applies a defensive realist perspective on the nuclear-armed Iran debate and we can assume that when he mentions major states (US) feel “riled up” in the midst of rising powers, he is also referencing hegemonic states feeling threatened by rising powers. While neoliberal proponents like Keohane recognize the existence of an anarchic society, put less influence on institutional influence and more on cooperation, structural realists like Waltz understand that power (in this case, with the possession of nuclear weapons) is sought as a means to state security. He includes an important point of evidence by saying that Iran did not close the Strait of Hormuz even with a coming oil embargo as they wanted to avoid any negative reaction from the US. From this article, it is quite astonishing how theory can change or influence a view and therefore, it seems to be more important than ever for less obscurantist talk so that we can critically evaluate one IR scholar’s thoughts and contrast it to another.

Kenneth Waltz (2012) “Why Iran should get the bomb,” Foreign Affairs, 91(4): 2-5