Methods of Analysis
Self-Analysis

Stephen Petrina (2020)

> We remain strange to ourselves out of necessity, we do not understand ourselves, we must confusedly mistake who we are… we are not 'knowers' when it comes to ourselves. (Nietzsche, 1887/2006, s. 1)

First-person narrative genres were refined in ancient, sacred texts and defined with second- and third-person genres in grammar texbooks, especially through the 1600s for English grammars (e.g., Jonson, 1640/1909, pp. 89-93). Psychology developed as a discipline in the late 1800s with extensive reliance on introspection and other first-person methods, despite caution and criticism. For example, *A Student's Manual of Psychology*, in addition to two third-person techniques of observation, describes two first-person techniques: 1) one's own self-observation and 2) others' self-observation (Drought, 1888, pp. 53-54). Analysts have nonetheless had good reason to question the reliability of first-person techniques (e.g., "Self-observation mutilates the facts of consciousness in the very act of apprehending them.") (Herbart, 1834/1891, p. 3; Vermersch, 1999). Does one percieve themself or the self's predicates and thoughts? Are we given a report of the person or the *dramatis persona* (i.e., the mask)? Is it the id or ego? Challenges of consciousness and "inner experience" nonetheless continue to leave analysts to rely on a range of first-person methods (Cohn, 1978; Varela & Shear, 1999).

Self-analysis refers to either the disintegration and reintegration of what makes one partial and whole (i.e., systematic reflection) or an application of psychoanalytic techniques to one's own ego identity (e.g., systematic re-education). Self-analysis in this second meaning infers an internalization of techniques and traits of an analyst (Novick, 1976). Criticism of introspection in the late nineteenth century generated skepticism of all first-person methods as reliable for knowledge production. In *The Interpretation of Dreams*, Freud (1900/1913) notes the problem: "I shall certainly be with doubts as to the trustworthiness of these 'self-analyses' [Selbstanalysen]. Arbitrariness is here in no way avoided." Asserting the reliance of psychoanalysis on access to the private and first-person reports, he wagers that "conditions are more likely to be favourable in self-observation than in the observation of others" (pp. 87-88).

Psychoanalysts made unconscious psychic processes central to research into the self and subject. Yet this is unremarkable as the psychoanalytic self is defined as a crystallization of *mental contents*, more or less problematic as a cohesive ego. By 1923, Freud theorized a fragmented self— ego, id, and super-ego or conscious, unconscious, and preconscious selves— that can be provisionally remade cohesive or whole, much as crystals fracturing along cleavages can be reassembled. Kohut (1978) explains that the "*self*, the core of our personality, has various constituents which we acquire in the interplay with those persons in our earliest childhood environment whom we experience as selfobjects" ["objects which we experience as part of our self:" e.g., parent figures, role models, etc.]. Certainly, the self is "crystallized in the interplay of inherited and environmental factors," but is shaped by an "intrinsic pattern of its constituent ambitions, goals, skills and talents, and by the tensions that arise between these constituents." "The adult self may thus exist in states of varying degrees of coherence, from cohesion to fragmentation" (p. 413).

To be sure, fragmentation of the self has historically been integral to law and religion, if not the family (e.g., "private self" and "public self"). For instance, Catholicism had long taught that the human self reflected trinitarian spirituality: "God self-engenders as myself" (Eckhart, ca. 1295/2009, p. 331). In one and the same human is an "unchanging Self," "instrumental Self," and "emotive Self" (*Catholic Brotherhood*, 1800, p. 10). Similarly, nineteenth century philosophers described a self distributed across actor, activity, and object at any given moment of doing, feeling, and knowing. In response to analysts' emphases on psychic processes, Husserl (1913/1931) described a phenomenological self, more diffuse than fragmented. "Our natural wakeful Ego-life is a continuous actional or nonactional perceiving," he observes and then asks, incredulously: "How does, and how can *consciousness itself* become separated out as a *concrete being in itself* [i.e., an extracted self]" (p. 83)? In the late twentieth century, cultural and social analysts claimed that a bounded, autonomous self was ephemeral, and described, instead, a distributed or extended self. With analysts increasingly focused on the diffuse, dynamic, fragmented, incoherent self, the whole self in a whole world was seemingly a thing of the past.

These trends beg pause, as the "prototypic, generalized representation of self that most people verbalize when asked to do so is the *self-concept*." With that, "the only consistent use of the term *self* is to use it as in colloquial speech, to refer to the person (as in *herself* or *myself*)" (Westen, 1992, p. 7). A key challenge is recognizing this while contradicting colloqial assertions that self-analysis and self-study amount to '*my* personal narrative,' 'my study of *myself*,' or narcissism (i.e., the self-analyst "has an unrealistic self-concept" or bloated ego, p. 5). Self-analysis is here, as Sullivan (1940, p. 10) suggested, a series of "reflected appraisals:" "One's personality is what one is; one's self is what one *takes oneself to be*" (Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983, p. 96).

Self-analysis data include "personal documents" or "self-revealing records" ("autobiographies, questionnaire responses, verbatim recordings, diaries, letters, and expressive and projective documents," etc.) (Allport, 1942, p. xii; Ochs & Capps, 1996, p. 19; Strang, 1942, p. 480). As Freud preferred, self-analysts commonly draw on free-association, to generate additional self-revealing records. Free association means expressing or verbalizing beliefs, fantasies, feelings, insights, and thoughts without self-censorship. "It requires that literally everything that comes into the mind be caught hold of and used in observation of the self" (Laswell, 1957, p. 27). Vermersch (1999, p. 32) reminds self-analysts that introspection most effectively is a series of reflections and metareflections on particular experiences. What is this experience as I reflect on it? How or why is this specific experience making me? How or why am I making this experience a meaningful part of my self? What is this self that I'm analyzing? For a second- or third-person analyst, the goal of free association and introspection is to gather factual descriptions from the subjects. However, self-analysts treat their associations, beliefs, etc. as factive to generate self-knowledge (Adler, 2002, p. 275).

Critics often remark that autobiographers and self-analysts tell "only half the story." A partial self can provide only a partial self-analysis and produce only partial self-knowledge. Haraway (1988) extends this to second- and third-person analysts as well: "The knowing self is partial in all its guises, never finished… it is always constructed and stitched together imperfectly" (p. 586). She reasserts an epistemology wherein "partiality and not universality is the condition of being heard to make rational knowledge claims" (p. 589). Mind you, self-analysis generates self-knowledge only inasmuch as one self or another is worth knowing. For Hindu Sannyasi, it's the higher spiritual Self that's worth knowing as the low, egoistic self and world are renounced. Inverted, many also doubt that our spiritual selves are worth knowing.

1. What is analysis?
    a. Schiller (1923, p. 238): [Philosophers work with an] assumption that the nature of the things analysed is more adequately revealed in its simple "elements" than in its subsequent developments. But this appears to be merely a prejudice and an illusion. On the other hand, it is essential to note how relative are the notions of "simple" and "elementary"; they shift with the purpose and the point of view. What is primary, simple, and central for one analysis may well be secondary, derivative, and incidental for another. Thus the central fact in the analysis of human nature made by Freud is sex; in that of Schopenhauer it is the will to live; in that of Mainländer, the will to die. Or, to elaborate an example which Mr. Russell treats as incomprehensible (p. 650), when I said that for biologically-minded "analysis" the minimum unit of psychic action would be a successful response to stimulation, I meant that nothing less and nothing "simpler" could exist as a fact in the life of a viable organism.
    b. Prall (1936, p. 32): In the first place we must remind ourselves explicitly that analysis is not cutting things into pieces and destroying them. It seems gratuitous to make such an observation; for analysis is obviously a theoretical activity, an intellectual process. But it has been so dinned into our ears that analysis destroys instead of explaining, that we are likely to find ourselves believing this, though it could not conceivably be the case.
    c. Foote (1951, pp. 16-17): Just this wrapping of all the particular constituents of a person's identity into one round bundle and labelling it "the self" have long delayed the analysis of the self and of identity. Too-ready generalization of the identities of any given self into indefinitely extensible statuses has led many social psychologists to feel that they must look "behind" the self for the "underlying" motives of the particular kinds of behavior which spring out of it— even to perpetrate such super-generalities as a "drive for self-actualization." We mean by identification appropriation of and commitment to a particular identity or series of identities. As a process, it proceeds by naming; its products are ever-evolving self-conceptions— with the emphasis on the *con*-, that is, upon ratification by significant others.
2. What is the Self?
    a. *Articles of the Catholic Brotherhood* (1800, p. 10): As we ascend in the scale of things, the two variable elements become more complex and constituted; and the invariable element becomes more distinct, self-conscious, and commanding; until we reach Ourselves:— Where we find (1) one absolute, unvarying, inscrutable Personality; (2) one constituted "Person;" and (3) one Personal System of "living powers;"— Or (1), our ultimate, unchanging Self; (2) one manifesting, mediating, organic, or instrumental Self ; and (3) our vital, exertive, emotive Self: with all its conscious and unconscious energies:— "and these three are one." Now, this is our "Image" of the Tri-Unity [God] Above.
    b. James (1890, pp. 371-372): We may sum up by saying that personality implies the incessant presence of two elements, an objective person, known by a passing subjective Thought and recognized as continuing in time. *Hereafter let us use the words* ME *and* I *for the empirical person and the judging Thought*…. The central part of the *me* is the feeling of the body and of the adjustments in the head; and in the feeling of the body should be included that of the general emotional tones and tendencies, for at bottom these are but the habits in which organic activities and sensibilities run. Well, from infancy to old age, this assemblage of feelings, most constant of all, is yet a prey to slow mutation. Our powers, bodily and mental, change at least as fast. Our possessions notoriously are perishable facts…. The identity which the *I* discovers, as it surveys this long procession, can only be a relative identity, that of a slow shifting in which there is always some common ingredient retained. The commonest element of all, the most uniform, is the possession of the same memories. However different the [hu]man may be from the youth, both look back on the same childhood, and call it their own.
    c. James (1890, pp. 400-401): This me is an empirical aggregate of things objectively known. The *I* which knows them cannot itself be an aggregate, neither for psychological purposes need it be considered to be an unchanging metaphysical entity like the Soul, or a principle

like the pure Ego, viewed as 'out of time,' It is a *Thought*, at each moment different from that of the last moment, but *appropriative* of the latter, together with all that the latter called its own.

d. Husserl (1913/1931, p. 83): Our natural wakeful Ego-life is a continuous actional or nonactional perceiving. Incessantly the world of physical things and, in it, our body, are perceptually there. How does, and how can, *consciousness itself* become separated out as a *concrete being in itself*? And how does that which is intended to in it, the *perceived being*, become separated out as "over against" consciousness and as "*in itself and by itself*?"
e. Freud (1923/1960, p. 22): If the ego were merely the part of the id modified by the influence of the perceptual system, the representative in the mind of the real external world, we should have a simple state of things to deal with. But there is a further complication. The considerations that led us to assume the existence of a grade in the ego, a differentiation within the ego, which may be called the 'ego ideal' or 'super-ego', have been stated elsewhere. They still hold good. The fact that this part of the ego is less firmly connected with consciousness is the novelty which calls for explanation.
f. Freud (1933, pp. 84-85): Where pathology displays a breach or a cleft, under normal conditions there may well be a link. If we throw a crystal to the ground, it breaks, but it does not break haphazard; in accordance with the lines of cleavage it falls into fragments, whose limits were already determined by the structure of the crystal, although they were invisible. Psychotics are fissured and splintered structures such as these.
g. Freud (1933, pp. 110-11): I have represented the structural relations within the mental personality [i.e., self], as I have explained them to you, in a simple diagram, which I here reproduce.



h. Sullivan (1940, p. 10): The self may be said to be made up of reflected appraisals.
i. Kohut (1978, p. 413): Depending on the quality of the interactions between the self and its selfobjects in childhood, the self will emerge either as a firm and healthy structure or as a more or less seriously damaged one. The adult self may thus exist in states of varying degrees of coherence, from cohesion to fragmentation; in states of varying degrees of vitality, from vigour to enfeeblement; in states of varying degrees of functional harmony, from order to chaos. Significant failure to achieve cohesion, vigour, or harmony, or a significant loss of these qualities after they had been tentatively established, may be said to constitute a state of self disorder. The psychoanalytic situation creates conditions in which the damaged self begins to strive to achieve or to re-establish a state of cohesion, vigour and inner harmony.
    i. Once the self has crystallized in the interplay of inherited and environmental factors, it aims towards the realization of its own specific programme of action— a programme that is determined by the specific intrinsic pattern of its constituent ambitions, goals, skills and talents, and by the tensions that arise between these constituents. The patterns of ambitions, skills and goals; the tensions between them; the programme of action that they create; and the activities that strive towards the

realization of this programme are all experienced as continuous in space and time—they are the self, an independent centre of initiative, an independent recipient of impressions.

j. Greenberg & Mitchell (1983, p. 96): During the 1930s Sullivan's formulations concerning the self became more specific, and he began to distinguish between the self and the personality. Personality refers to the entire functioning of the person, and is describable in terms of the predominant patterns of behavior and experience. Self refers to a particular organization of experience within the personality, constituted by images and ideas concerning the person's experience of [herself, themself, or] himself. One's personality is what one is; one's self is what one *takes oneself to be*.
k. Geertz (1984, p. 126): The Western conception of the person as a bounded, unique, more or less integrated motivational and cognitive universe, a dynamic center of awareness, emotion, judgement, and action organized into a distinctive whole and set contrastively both against other such wholes and against its social and natural background, is, however incorrigible it may seem to us, a rather peculiar idea within the context of the world's cultures.
l. Polkinghorne (1988, p. 160): We are in the middle of our stories and cannot be sure how they will end; we are constantly having to revise the plot as new events arc added to our lives. Self, then, is not a static thing or a substance, but a configuring of personal events into an historical unity which includes not only what one has been but also anticipations of what one will be.
m. Bruner (1990, p. 100): Ontological questions about the "conceptual Self" were soon replaced by a more interesting set of concerns: By what processes and in reference to what kinds of experience do human beings formulate their own concept of Self, and what kinds of Self do they formulate? Does "Self" comprise (as William James had implied) an "extended" self incorporating one's family, friends, possessions, and so on? Or, as Hazel Markus and Paula Nurius suggested, are we a colony of Possible Selves, including some that are feared and some hoped for, all crowding to take possession of a Now Self?
n. Westen (1992, p. 7): The only consistent use of the term *self* is to use it as in colloquial speech, to refer to the person (as in *herself* or *myself*). This permits a logical definition of *self-schemas* or *self-representations* as mental representations of the self, that is, of the person. These representations may be *conscious* or *unconscious*. The prototypic, generalized representation of self that most people verbalize when asked to do so is the *self-concept*. This prototypic representation is one of many representations in the *self-system*, that is, the system of representations of self stored in memory or currently active.
o. Ochs & Capps (1996, pp. 20-21): Personal narrative simultaneously is born out of experience and gives shape to experience. In this sense, narrative and self are inseparable. Self is here broadly understood to be an unfolding reflective awareness of being-in-the-world, including a sense of one's past and future.
p. Menon (2014, p. 4): Often the self is conceived and conceptualized in the form of 'the self' or 'your self' or 'someone's self'. The form 'my self' is hard to be seen in cognitive sciences' repertoire. Once we accommodate the notion of self as 'my self', the detached and impersonal disregard for the self will reduce, and we will start talking about a living self that is you and me. This is the greatest difficulty faced by sciences such as neuropsychiatry. Since there is a lack of involved participation (of course, the practice of science cannot be involved to begin with!), even the most intimate subject of enquiry, the self, is overlooked, particularly its influence on every single person, even the person who is engaged in scientific enquiry. If at all such an intimate self is recognized, with no time spared, it is dismissed as a fleeting, promiscuous self that is the illegitimate child of sociolinguistics or information processing systems embedded in our brains.
q. Ruiz (2016, pp. 19-20): Fanon might say—that your alienation shows up as such, and your dissatisfaction registers as a language with meaningful questions others can recognize as emanating from a whole self within a life story: an alienated self, but a self nonetheless.... So

the “self” in European existentialism is a very different self than the one in decolonial existentialism. In the former there exists a whole self within a life story who is perhaps fragmented, dislocated, and estranged by the conditions she finds herself in, but there is still a there-ness to her narrative identity that can engage in critical introspection and narrative repair through articulating and rearticulating her life story (to herself and others) with tools that show up as tools and do not further alienate her.

3. What is Self-Concept?
    a. Westen (1992, p. 5): To say that a patient has "narcissistic issues," as is frequently heard in clinical case conferences, could mean any number of things: that he is grandiose, that he alternates between grandiosity and deflation, that he fails to take others' perspectives, that he is only interested in himself, that he has minimal concern for others, that he has an unrealistic self-concept, that he uses people as if they were "put there for him," that he needs others around to mirror his flagging sense of greatness, that he lacks empathy, and so on. The covariation of these possible meanings of "narcissistic is- sues" is an empirical matter and not one to be resolved by failing to distinguish them.
4. What is Self-Analysis?
    a. Drought (1888, pp. 52-54): What is the meaning of psychological observation? All observation— the principal source of induction— is methodical perception. Since psychological observation, without which our science would be impossible, is an *internal* perception, it is distinctly different from the observation in use in natural science. For whilst the latter can coolly and calmly take its stand in relation to objective phenomena, in all psychical phenomena we are at the same time object and subject.... We can arrange all these observations under *four points of view*: (1) the observation of one’s own self; (2) one’s own observation of others; (3) the self-observation of others; and (4) the observation of others by others.
    b. Schiller (1923, pp. 239-240): It befits us, therefore, to approach the problem of self-analysis in a chastened mood. The analysis of the self is very far from being a creditable chapter in the history of philosophy. Yet it has always been an urgent problem; for the self happens to be one of the plain [hu]man's major objects of belief. He [she or they] is greatly interested in himself [herself or themself] and in the relations of himself to other selves, and may fairly require help from philosophy in understanding both. The self, moreover, is undeniable fact linguistically, psychologically, ethically, socially, and if, philosophically, it means nothing, what do these other sciences mean by it? Philosophy, therefore, can not ignore the problem of the self; but its dealings with it have been a series of failures, and have come as near to frivolity as this dignified discipline has anywhere attained. Philosophy has *never* succeeded in explaining the self; it has not even succeeded in explaining it away.
    c. Clement (1987, p. 46): Self-analysis refers to the lonely and anguished quest of Freud as he discovered all by himself— since it was the first time ever— the truth of the unconscious, which he then turned into theoretical generalizations. Self-criticism, on the other hand, refers to political criticism performed in the name of an intellectual collectivity, and it is an implicit rule for everyone who has become politically involved, even though we know that no thought can hold its own without making contact, somewhere, with madness. The only thing they have in common is self-reflection: a project that never fails to remember where it comes from and what its history is, never tries to suppress its own biography, never fails to put into perspective - insofar as that is possible without falling into the myth that one can 'tell all'— what you say, given what you have been from the start. (trans. N. Ball, 1987, p. 46)
        i. It would obviously be going too far to give the terms self-criticism and self-analysis their full meaning, since strictly speaking one implies a failure to toe a line, and the other, strictly speaking, implies a solitary process.
5. Procedures of Self-Analysis
    a. Freud (1922/1942, p. 98): The fundamental technical rule of this procedure of 'free association' has from that time on [i.e., abandonment of hypnosis, ca. 1905] been maintained

in psycho-analytic work. The treatment is begun by the patient being required to put [herself or] himself in the position of an attentive and dispassionate self-observer, merely to read off all the time the surface of [her or] his consciousness, on the one hand to make a duty of the most complete candour [honesty] and on the other not to hold back any idea from communication, even if (1) he [or she] feels that it is too disagreeable or if (2) he [or she] judges that is it nonsensical or (3) too unimportant or (4) irrelevant to what is being looked for. It is uniformly found that precisely those ideas which provoke these last-mentioned reactions are of particular value in discovering the forgotten material.

i. Phillips (2004, p. 66): If the patient makes "a duty of the most complete honesty," in the way Freud prescribes, what will come through— what will in Donoghue's words be "liberated" or "disclosed"— will be in "forgotten material." If you free-associate, Freud says, if you speak freely, what you are speaking about, unbeknownst to yourself, is the past. Honesty is simply memory; truth-telling is remembering what it is you want. What the patient is resistant to, what has made the patient a modeler, a Promethean, rather than a carver or a midwife, is this horror of the past. "When conscious purposive ideas are abandoned," Freud [1900/2010, p. 534] writes, "concealed purposive ideas assume control of the current of ideas." Something else is liberated, something else called "concealed purposive ideas" take over; as though there are hidden counter-intentions awaiting their chance.

b. Foulkes (1948): The basic of group analysis is the group counterpart of free association: talk about anything which comes to your mind without selection. It works out different way from the individual situation, just as in the analytic situation it works out differently from the procedure of self-analysis. Free association is in no way independent of the total situation; the way it works I have described after observing it for a number of years, as free-floating discussion or conversation.

c. Laswell (1957, pp. 26-27): When associations are called "free," an attitude of permissiveness is meant. The technique is to encourage every fantasy and mood to flit across the mind without undergoing the censorship of a grammarian or a stylist or an ethicist. The technique is a method of self-discovery. It requires that literally everything that comes into the mind be caught hold of and used in observation of the self. It is not clear to me how many people are accustomed to think of "free association" as an instrument of everyday usefulness. A few years ago it was common to assume that this device was walled up in the clinic and more particularly that it was connected only with the psycho-analyst's couch.

6. First-Person or Personal Data

a. Allport (1942, p. xii-xiii): The personal document may be defined as *any self-revealing record that intentionally or unintentionally yields information regarding the structure, dynamics, and functioning of the author's mental life*. It may record the participant's view of experiences in which he [she or they] has been involved; it may devote itself deliberately to self-scrutiny and self-description; or it may be only incidentally and unwittingly self-revealing. Defined in this way, personal documents comprise only one class of *case study* materials…. As a self-revealing record of experience and conduct the personal document is usually, though not always, produced spontaneously, recorded by the subject himself [herself or themselves], and intended only for confidential use. Its themes naturally revolve around the life of the writer, its manner of approach is naturally subjective (phenomenological). Such documents vary greatly in candor, scope, authenticity, and psychological value. Sometimes they are deceptive and trivial; but sometimes they represent distillations of the most profound and significant experiences of human life.

b. Strang (1942, p. 480): There are various forms of "first-person human documents" ranging from personal accounts, with no checks or technical aspects, to critical and experimental studies. Included in this category are autobiographies, questionnaire responses, verbatim recordings, diaries, letters, and expressive and projective documents.

c. Strang (1942, p. 481): A high point in the intentionally revealing personal document is represented by the self-analysis of "Clare" reported by Horney (1942). In this case the procedure by which a patient may not only let her thoughts, feelings, and impulses emerge, but also use her critical intelligence in their interpretation, is minutely described.
d.

7. First-Person Methods
    a. Cohn (1978, p. ix)
        i. First-Person Narration (Homodiegetic Narration)
            1. Autobiographical Narrative (Retrospective Narrative)
            2. Autobiographical Monologue
            3. Memory Narrative
            4. Memory Monologue
        ii. Third-Person Narration (Heterodiegetic Narration)
            1. Psycho-narration (what is passing through a character's mind)
            2. Quoted Monologue (direct thought quotation) (i.e., "interior monologue")
            3. Narrated Monologue (interior discourse)
    b. Personal Narrative
        i. Ochs & Capps (1996, p. 19): verbalized, visualized, and/or embodied framings of a sequence of actual or possible life events.
            1. (p. 19): Personal narratives comprise a range of genres from story, diaries and letters to memoirs, gossip to legal testimony, boast to eulogy, troubles talk to medical history, joke to satire, bird song to opera, etching to palimpsest, and mime to dance. Counter to a prevalent ideology of disembodied objectivity, even scientific narratives can be personal in tone.
            2. (pp. 20-21): Personal narrative simultaneously is born out of experience and gives shape to experience. In this sense, narrative and self are inseparable. Self is here broadly understood to be an unfolding reflective awareness of being-in-the-world, including a sense of one's past and future. We come to know ourselves as we use narrative to apprehend experiences and navigate relationships with others.
    c. Varela & Shear (1999, pp. 6-7): We can at this point begin to see for all these traditions what a method is. At this first stage of approximation we can say that there are at least two main dimensions that need to be present in order for a method to count as such: (1) Providing a clear procedure for accessing some phenomenal domain. (2) Providing a clear means for an expression and validation within a community of observers who have familiarity with procedures as in (1). Keeping in mind that the distinction between experiencing (following a procedure), and validation (following a regulated intersubjective exchange) is not an absolute one, the material presented can be outlined thus:

	Method	***Procedure***	***Validation***
1	Introspection	Attention during a defined task	Verbal accounts, mediated
2	Phenomenology	Reduction-suspension	Descriptive invariants
3	Meditation: Samatha; Mahamudra; Zen; TM	Sustained attention; uncontrived awareness; suspension of mental activity	Traditional accounts, scientific accounts

    d. Introspection
        i. Vermersch (1999, pp. 32-33): Now, in order to know in what the act of introspection consists, my attention has to be directed at L2, and the focus of the problem has been shifted. For in order to know how I gain access to L1 with a view to becoming conscious of it and describing it (which is the whole point of carrying through L2), I

have to bring about a new reduction/ mode of givenness which, in a later time t3 is directed at the act of introspection carried out at L2. The content of L2 is the past lived experience L1, while the content of L3 is the past accomplishment of that I did in L2. There has to have been an act of the kind which has come about in L2 in order for L3 to be carried through. In other words, one must first have practised introspection (in time L2) in order to make of it an object of study and so to practise an introspection of an introspection.



8. Reflexivity
    a. Wyka (1990, p. 56): The personal aspects consist of the aforementioned self-control on the part of the researcher, among other things maintenance of a keen awareness of what is affecting him during the study. It might be helpful for the researcher to know some techniques of self-analysis. Some achievements borrowed from humanistic psychology might be helpful as they teach the researcher how to train [her, their, or] his awareness (e.g. Gestalt psychology), how to listen carefully, how to see and observe and, finally, how to communicate effectively with other humans: how to lead real dialogue with others. We are referring here to the meta-knowledge of the researcher.
9. Conceptual History
    a. Freud (1900/1913, pp. 87-88): I must then resort to my own dreams, as an abundant and convenient material, furnished by a person who is about normal, and having reference to many incidents of everyday life. I shall certainly be with doubts as to the trustworthiness of these "self-analyses." Arbitrariness is here in no way avoided. In my opinion, conditions are more likely to be favourable in self-observation than in the observation of others; in any case, it is permissible to see how much can be accomplished by means of self-analysis [Selbstanalyse].
    b. Horney (1942, pp. 17-18): In recent times any number of books have appeared with the purpose of helping people to cope better with themselves and others. Some of these, like Dale Carnegie's *How to Win Friends and Influence People*, have little if anything to do with recognition of self but offer rather more or less good common-sense advice on how to deal with personal and social problems. But some, like David Seabury's *Adventures in Self-Discovery*, definitely aim at self-analysis. If I feel the need to write another book on the subject it is because I believe that even the best of these authors, such as Seabury, do not make sufficient use of the psychoanalytical technique inaugurated by Freud and hence give insufficient instruction. Furthermore, they do not recognize the intricacies involved, as appears clearly in such titles as *Self-Analysis Made Easy*. The tendency expressed in books of this kind is implicit also in certain psychiatric attempts at personality studies. All these attempts suggest that it is an easy matter to recognize oneself. This is an illusion, a belief built on wishful thinking, and a positively harmful illusion at that. People who embark on that promised easy road will either acquire a false smugness, believing they know all about themselves, or will become discouraged when they are blocked by the first serious obstacle and will tend to relinquish the search for truth as a bad job.

c. Foucault (1982/1988, pp. 22, 23, 25, 26): There has been an inversion between the hierarchy of the two principles of antiquity, "Take care of yourself" and "Know thyself." In Greco-Roman culture knowledge of oneself appeared as the consequence of taking care of yourself. In the modern world, knowledge of oneself constitutes the fundamental principle.... The first philosophical elaboration of the concern with taking care of oneself that I wish to consider is found in Plato's *Alcibiades I*.... First, what is the self (r 29h)? Self is a reflexive pronoun, and it has two meanings. *Auto* means "the same," but it also conveys the notion of identity. The latter meaning shifts the question from "What is this self?" to "What is the plateau on which I shall find my identity?" Alcibiades tries to find the self in a dialectical movement. When you take care of the body, you don't take care of the self. The self is not clothing, tools, or possessions. It is to be found in the principle which uses these tools, a principle not of the body but of the soul. You have to worry about your soul— that is the principal activity of caring for yourself. The care of the self is the care of the activity and not the care of the soul-as-substance.... Plato gave priority to the Delphic maxim, "Know yourself." The privileged position of "Know yourself" is characteristic of all Platonists. Later, in the Hellenistic and Greco-Roman periods, this is reversed. The accent was not on the knowledge of self but on the concern with oneself. The latter was given an autonomy and even a preeminence as a philosophical issue.
d. Foucault (1982/1988, pp. 27-28): In Plato's writings, dialogue gave way to the literary pseudodialogue. But by the Hellenistic age, writing prevailed, and real dialectic passed to correspondence. Taking care of oneself became linked to constant writing activity. The self is something to write about, a theme or object (subject) of writing activity.... The new concern with self involved a new experience of self. The new form of the experience of the self is to be seen in the first and second century when introspection becomes more and more detailed. A relation developed between writing and vigilance. Attention was paid to nuances of life, mood, and reading, and the experience of oneself was intensified and widened by virtue of this act of writing. A whole field of experience opened which earlier was absent.