Monthly Archives: November 2017

GEOG 481 Blog 4 – Fukushima: A Geographic Black Hole

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As we near the seven-year anniversary of the 3/11 Disaster, a world of unfortunate memories rears its ugly head. These range from images of tsunami waves engulfing towns, to red-cross campaign advertisements. What characterizes memorable tragedies such as the Tohoku earthquake, subsequent tsunami and nuclear disaster, is a sense that while the pain of such memories lingers, we, as a society, have moved on. We apply a mindset that such events have faded away, and that, while the effects on the lives of human beings may have been significant at the time, a plethora of disasters afterwards has effectively willed the pain of such past events away. However, when it comes to the Fukushima prefecture, and Japan as a whole, like all other disasters, this mindset could not be further from the truth. Six years, eight months, and twenty days later, the lives of hundreds of thousands of people, irrevocably changed that day, are still reeling from the effects of the Nuclear Disaster. The area around the Fukushima-Daiichi nuclear power plant has become something of a geographic black hole. With much controversy surrounding the now-dubbed “exclusion zone”, a world of competing narratives makes it difficult to understand the true extent of the damage, both in nominal and theoretical terms. Some former residents wish to abdicate their refugee status and return home. Others are fearful of the long-term radiation damage to the region. Some corporations are pressuring residents to return home, while possibly fearing that the region is still unsafe, while some researchers claim that the extent of radiation damage is overblown. In short, with so many differing opinions, no one is quite sure what the future of the region holds.

Following the magnitude 9.1 earthquake, the subsequent 40-meter tsunami that struck Fukushima triggered a meltdown at the Tepco (Tokyo Electric Power Company) owned Fukushima-Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant. 150,000 people, living within roughly twenty kilometers of the power plant, were evacuated. Almost seven years on, and the refugees of the disaster face a new dilemma: judging how much radiation in their former homes is safe. Recovery efforts, thus far, have collected roughly nine million cubic meters of contaminated top soil and washed down buildings and roads. The government’s plan is to reduce outdoor radiation exposure to 0.23 microverts per hour. In September 2014, the Japanese government began a process of lifting evacuation orders for the seven municipalities within twenty kilometers of the nuclear plant. Initial estimates expected up to 70% of refugees to be returned home by spring of this year. As that time has come to pass, it is obvious that recovery efforts, and the lives of the displaced, are far from normal.

fig. 1. A map detailing the exclusion zone around the Fukushima-Daiichi nuclear power plant

Many refugees face a difficult decision between safety and compensation issues. Many claim they are being pressured into returning home, despite radiation exposure levels, they fear, are still too high. Moreover, TEPCO has announced a plan to discontinue financial compensation packages to people who do not return to their former homes, in the evacuation area. In an interview, Katsunobu Sakurai, the mayor of Minamisoma, voiced the concerns of former residents in stating, “There has been no education regarding radiation. It’s difficult for many people to make the decision to return without knowing what these radiation levels mean and what is safe”.

In 2015, Akira Ono, the plant manager, tried to qualm these fears, stating that plant conditions are, “really stable”, and that radioactivity from the nuclear fallout has fallen substantially between the time of the disaster and the time of his interview. Cleanup has been anything but smooth, however. It is still mostly unclear where the nuclear fuel is located in the dilapidated former power plant. In 2014, the manager of the plant, outlined a plan to decommission the site over a thirty to forty year course. It would involve removing melted nuclear fuel masses in tandem with demolishing the site’s four main reactors. In total, this plan will cost roughly $9 billion. TEPCO intends to begin the process of removing nuclear debris in 2021. In December 2014, crews removed the last of the 1535 fuel rods stored in the Unit 4 spent fuel pool. In the beginning of 2015, Ono put the recovery effort at, “around 10%”, complete. With much work still to be done, a major topic of concern is whether residents can return to their homes safely, given they are being pressured to do so, despite obvious indicators as to the safety of the former evacuated zones.

Despite the fears of refugees, and the admitted challenges TEPCO faces with disaster recovery, some researchers rebuke the notion that the entirety of the exclusion zone is uninhabitable. Professor Geraldine Thomas, of Imperial College in London, believes that radiation levels are currently safe, and that the perception created by both the Japanese government, and media outlets around the world has scared refugees into returning home. In a 2016 interview with BBC, Dr. Thomas voiced her views on the situation surrounding the exclusion zone, “People have to feel safe to come back. Many will now not want to come back because they’ve made a life elsewhere. But in terms of radiation, the amount we are getting now is very small, and if you were inside a building you’d be getting even less than standing in the open air.” She views media hysteria as having created a fear around the exclusion zone, essentially promoting an idea that despite data saying otherwise, the area is akin to a Chernobyl-esque forbidden city.

fig. 2. Satellite image showing one of the reactors at the Fukushima-Daiichi nuclear power plant as it begins to overheat due to damage from the magnitude 9.2 earthquake & tsunami, on March 11th 2011. (Photo by DigitalGlobe via Getty Images)

On a journalistic inquiry into the safety of Okuma and Namie, Rupert Wingfield-Hayes, a reporter for BBC, found that radiation levels in the exclusion zone were measured at around 3 microsieverts of radiation per hour. These levels were not measured in parts of Okuma and Namie that have been decontaminated either, they were in non-remediated zones. In theory, if one were to stand in this area for twelve hours a day, for a year, they would only receive an annual extra dose of radiation around 13 millisieverts. Although that measure is not insignificant, it is well below what modern data suggests is harmful to long-term health. Most industrial countries allow nuclear facility workers to receive up to 20 millisieverts a year. Contrast this, and Okuma & Namie’s radiation levels, with Ramsar, Iran. Its background radiation rate measures at 250 millisieverts a year.

fig. 3. A map detailing surface radiation levels in the Fukushima region. (February 10, 2012)

Alas, the issue of relocation is much more complex than it initially seems. The exclusion zone surrounding the Fukushima-Daiichi nuclear power plant has become a geographic encircling of controversy. With a plethora of competing narratives as to the safety of the region, the lives of refugees from the region continue to be negatively impacted. Some residents would like to return, feeling a sense of connection to their ancestral homes. Others, still fearful of potential health impacts, find themselves pressured to do so, against their will, by TEPCO. In summation, only time will shed light on how this issue will be tackled. With so many people displaced, all with their own views on the exclusion zone, both TEPCO and government agencies will have to address the viability of returning refugees to the region, sooner rather than later.

Sources

Normile, Dennis. “Five Years After the Meltdown, Is It Safe to Live Near Fukushima?” Science, 2 March 2016.

TEPCO. Fukushima Daiichi NPS Prompt 2017. Tokyo Electric Power Company, 1 November 2017. http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/2017/1464560_10469.html

Wingfield-Hayes, Rupert. “Is Fukushima’s Exclusion Zone Doing More Harm Than Radiation?” BBC News, 10 March 2016.

fig. 1. http://www.safeandgreencampaign.org/action-center/solidarity-with-fukushima-japan/voices-of-fukushima

fig. 2. http://www.vocativ.com/296141/fukushima-five-years/index.html

fig. 3. http://www.japan-reishi.org/news/en_map.html

Featured image: https://imgur.com/gallery/KabxJ

 

 

 

GEOG 481 Blog 2 (Updated for submission) – The Challenges of the 2020 Olympic & Paralympic Games

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As the 2020 Olympic and Paralympic games draw nearer, it becomes clear that the 32nd Summer Olympiad, for all of its benefits, brings with it a myriad of challenges. Among these include the scrapping of a 2-billion-dollar center-piece stadium, an original logo mired with plagiarism allegations, cost overruns, ineffective leadership, finger pointing, and doubts that the Japanese government will be prepared for the games, on time.

This, however, is not unlike recent Olympic Games. Every Olympic Games since 1960 (for which there is data) exceeded its budget by around 179%. The 2014 winter Games, held in Sochi, Russia, came with a whopping 66.7-billion-dollar price tag (More than 5 times over budget and surpassing Beijing 2008 as the most expensive Games of all time).

Tokyo has waded through similar problems before, however, during the preparation of the 1964 Olympics, which could be regarded as one of the most successful Games of all time. The ’64 Olympics kick started a massive urban transformation within the city of Tokyo, lifting it, and Japan as a whole, from the ashes of WWII, and bringing the nation back onto the world stage. Although these Games were successful, they left a troubled legacy many have forgotten, and one that could be unfortunately repeated.

fig. 1. The National Gymnasium complex under construction in Tokyo on June 6, 1964, just a few months before the games were to begin. (Keystone/Hulton Archive/Getty Images)

Tokyo’s 2020 bid relied heavily on the promise of transformation coupled with increased public support. The city’s 2016 bid failed primarily because of the lack of public support. A 2009 poll showed that only 56% of Japanese citizens supported hosting the games (The lowest among the 4 candidate cities). Following the 2011 Triple Disaster, this changed, and the nation rallied together longing for a symbol to lift their hopes. In March 2013, roughly 70% of the Japanese public supported the idea of hosting the 2020 Games.

Similar to the 1964 Games, in terms of Japan looking to lift itself from disaster through the Olympics, yet different to the extent that this time around, the IOC saw Tokyo as a safe bet (In comparison with Istanbul & Madrid), Tokyo was awarded the Games on September 7th, 2013. In mid-January, 2015, allegations surfaced that bribery, on behalf of the Japanese Government, played a heavy role in this decision. This would be the first of many controversies surrounding the 32nd Olympiad.

fig. 2. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe (3-R) celebrates alongside Tokyo 2020 delegation members after IOC president Jacques Rogge announced the Japanese capital to be the winner of the bid to host the 2020 Summer Olympic Games, during the 125th session of the International Olympic Committee (IOC), in Buenos Aires, on September 7, 2013. The three cities bidding to host the 2020 Summer Olympics — Madrid, Istanbul and Tokyo — delivered their final presentations ahead of the expected tight vote by the IOC, though Madrid was eliminated from the race moments after, in the first round of voting. AFP PHOTO / YAN WALTON (YAN WALTON/AFP/Getty Images)

The initial budget proposed sat at only 7-billion dollars, to be used mostly on infrastructure updates. The 1964 Games were characterized by the Japanese Government’s intention to not only rebuild Tokyo, and the nation alike, but to double GDP while modernizing the economy. The 2020 Games, however, are starkly different in this remark, not even adding to Prime-Minister Shinzo Abe’s “Abenomics” plan.

In September 2015, the official logo was scrapped as plagiarism allegations surfaced. Shortly thereafter, the new national stadium’s original design was likewise replaced, due to cost overruns ($1.3 billion to $2.1 billion). The price of the stadium led to such fierce public backlash, that Shinzo Abe’s handpicked sports minister (and political ally), Hakubun Shimomura, officially resigned from his position. In December 2015, a more modest stadium-design was picked, with an expensive price tag of 1.26-billion dollars and fears that it may not be built on time.

fig. 3. This picture taken on July 24, 2015 shows hammer throw gold medalist Koji Murofushi (2nd R) and young athletes attending a ceremony to unveil the new logos of the Tokyo 2020 Olympic (L) and Paralympic Games at the Tokyo city hall. AFP PHOTO / Yoshikazu TSUNO (YOSHIKAZU TSUNO/AFP/Getty Images)

If recent history is an indicator, no nation should expect to come under budget when hosting the Olympics. This is especially worrying for a nation such as Japan, bogged down by a sizeable national debt, and in the midst of a prolonged recession. The 2012 Games in London spent 5 times their initial projection. The 2004 Games in Athens spent 16 times theirs (This contributing to Greece’s financial meltdown and collapse some years later). So far, the estimated cost is expected to exceed 15-billion dollars, higher than the original budget. Furthermore, this figure could rise if the pattern of the last few Games is followed. The increased cost of the Games has had a direct impact on the public, as well. The shohizei (consumption tax) has risen from 5% to 8%, and is expected to climb further to 10% this year. Japan’s national debt already sits at $11-trillion, roughly 245% of GDP. The 2020 Games could be a difficult cost to shoulder if they continue to run over-budget.

fig. 4. Architect Kengo Kuma explains his design of the stadium during a press conference announcing new design of the national stadium in Tokyo on December 22, 2015. Japan Sports Council chose a new, slimmed down 2020 Olympic Stadium design, after an earlier version set off a row over a 2.0 billion USD price tag that would have made it the world’s most expensive sports venue. / AFP / TOSHIFUMI KITAMURA (TOSHIFUMI KITAMURA/AFP/Getty Images)

In many ways, Tokyo is a fantastic host-city for the Olympics. It truly is a city of the future, and a showcase of one of the greatest modernization stories in history. The city has adequate roads, efficient public transportation, and a friendly populace. Yet despite this, fears still loom on what kind of an impact these games will have on Japan’s future. Unlike 1964, Japan is not in a position wherein showcasing itself is the only way to achieve revitalization. In this day and age, such a showcase may spread the nation’s resources too thin. In any case, we will have to wait until the Summer of 2020 to hope for a successful Olympiad, and wait longer to understand its long-term effects.

Sources

Associated Press. “Tokyo 2020 Bid Gains Support”. ESPN. March 5, 2013.

Crouch, Ian. “Tokyo 2020: A Perfect Olympic Vision?” The New Yorker. September 10, 2013.

Himmer, Alastair. “Tokyo Bid Suffers In IOC Support Poll Of Residents”. Reuters. May 2, 2009.

Roberts, David and Robert Whiting. “Are the Tokyo 2020 Olympics In Trouble?” Foreign Policy. February 19, 2016.

Spitzer, Kirk. “Troubled Tokyo Olympics Is Creating An Olympian Headache For PM Abe”. USA Today. December 25, 2015.

Wilson, Stephen. “IOC Asks For Transcripts Suggesting 2020 Olympic Bid Bribery”. Associated Press. January 15, 2016.

Yan, Sophia. “IMF Warns Japan Over Its Staggering National Debt”. CNN Money. July 24, 2015.