Month: October 2012

Benjamin’s essay discusses the role of technological reproduction in determining aesthetic experience, specifically looking at the effects of film and photography in altering our perceptions of art. In a way, he sees technological reproduction as a means of creating new art, contributing thus to the loss of the aura of a work of art. Benjamin defines the aura as “[a] strange tissue of space and time: the unique apparition of a distance, however near it may be” (23). In other words, the loss of the aura would mean that our perception towards the work of art changes due to the influence of new technologies.

Benjamin begins by stating that the work of art “has always been reproducible” (20). This basic fact leads him to question the extent to which technological reproduction has influenced not only our perception of art, but also the artistic process. He argues that technological reproduction modifies the way in which we perceive all known works of art and thus, this modifies their effect. Benjamin also interestingly mentions how it [technological reproduction] had also “captured a place of its own among the artistic process” (21). As a result, the reproduction of art via technology imposes itself as a new form of art, thus posing a problem for the original or traditional form of art.

This brings us to the problem of authenticity. Benjamin explains that the number one thing lacking in the reproduction of art is “the here and the now of the work of art – its unique existence in a particular place” (21). He explains that in technological reproduction, the work of art loses its full authority because of two reasons. First, the reproduction process is more independent of the original than manual reproduction. Second, technological reproduction can displace a copy of the original to other situations or contexts that are otherwise inaccessible to the original. Therefore, the presence of the original work is crucial for authenticity since the latter is “the quintessence of all that is transmissible in it from its origin on, ranging from its physical duration to the historical testimony relating to it” (22). He explains the difference between the images seen by the naked eye compared to the images reproduced by photography. Evidently, the images taken by a photo can be reproduced whereas the images seen by the naked eye are unique and “escape natural optics altogether” (21).

It appears nonetheless that for Benjamin, it is the reproduction of these works of art that destroys their “aura”. I can understand this distinction when dealing with classic works of art like the Last Supper in that seeing this painting in real life is much different than simply finding the image on Google. However, is it really important that all objects be authentic? The reason I ask is because we live in a world where virtually everything is reproduced and where the original in many cases has been forgotten. Media constantly reproduces the reality and produces something new for example. What is produced often has nothing to do with the truth. Moreover, reproduction and authenticity becomes problematic when thinking of other contemporary examples such as religion. For example, Islam, as interpreted by some of its extreme followers, does not seem to correspond to the authentic word of God found in the Quran. In some cases, the Quran seems to have been reproduced and used as a means for justifying violence. I believe this is what Benjamin meant when he was talking about the politicization of art.

Raymond Williams is probably seen as the founder of cultural studies as his view of culture encompasses classical music, opera, a certain literature and other high culture seen as superior by elitists Englishmen of the mid-twentieth century.

A question that is at the heart of Williams’s Culture is Ordinary is the definition of culture. What is in fact culture ? For people in the teashop, as he calls them, culture is associated to the elite of society, people who are cultivated and know how to appreciated the good culture that are ballet, opera, classical music, literature. To Williams, these arts are only a small part of what constitutes culture ; « a culture is a whole way of life, and the arts are part of a social organization which economic change clearly radically affects » (7). It is to represent this statement that Williams starts his paper by describing what he used to see when taking the bus in his hometown. Not only culture is ordinary, it is everywhere and it takes its source from everywhere. Although he proposes a large definition of culture, his discussion is mainly restricted to cultural products and leaves out important parts of culture that are practices (by examples, sociocultural behaviour) and perspectives (such as worldviews).

In his discussion of culture, great attention is given to bad and good aspects of culture. Consequentely, a question that is as important here is, what is good culture ? How do we define bad culture ? Williams does not offer a definition. This crucially lacks in the paper. « The editions of good literature are very much larger than they were ; the listeners to good music are much more numerous than they were ; the number of people who look at good visual art is larger than it has never been » (13) writes Williams. But what is good literature, good music, good visual art ? At some point, he does mention that we can all agree on what good culture is, but can we ? Who’s the judge ?

The reader may only infer what bad culture is from what is suggested by Williams. From my understanding, The Province, Fifty shades of Grey, American Idol, Call me maybe would probably fall into the category of bad culture. However, as mentions by Williams, the production and consumption of bad culture does not drive out good culture. People who consume bad culture may be culturally literate and also be consumers of good culture. I may indulge myself and watch The Avengers. I am aware it is not the best cultural product, but don’t I deserve a break after reading Bakhtin, Lacan and other Althusser ?

 

An art that is not really mentioned by Walter Benjamin in The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological Reproducibility is music. Since the 20th century, singers and musicians have been recording their art on tapes, discs and digital devices. Where is the authentic piece of art, the unique version ? I believe it is this authenticity, the aura of the original creation that concert goers are looking for when they go see the artists live. That is why people find it unacceptable when singers lip sync while ‘performing’ : the artits may be present, but the authenticity of re-creating the piece at a given place and location is lost, the concert goer’s unique experience would not be complete. That is the same phenomenon that may be observed when tourists take photographs of touristic attractions. The photo I took from the Eiffel Tower is an artefact of the unique experience I had ; it was taken by me at this precise location at this precise time.

Books

Although the piece of art that is some literature has been reproduced for centuries through paper books, it seems like some opponents to electronic books fear the loss of the paper version. It is like, to these people, the paper book has an authenticity, an aura of itself ; each item can only be read at any given time and place by one person. The electronic book, having no tangibility, posesses no aura. An electronic book can be duplicated indefinitely from one file, hence losing all uniqueness and authenticity. Moreover, to paper nostalgic folks, the book has a feel, a smell that enhance the reading experience ; these traits are lost with the cold electronic device. The fact that the first edition of a book is usually more valued than subsequent editions seem to support the assumption of the traditional book possessing an aura. A rare and intact first edition may often sell at a high price in an auction.

Is it then more an economic question than anything else ? The uniqueness or rarety of a piece makes it in high demand, leading to a high price for it. But it is not any unique item that will be valued highly. I may create some piece of art – unique, demanded by no one. It is the artistry of a piece, its aesthetics, its aura that make it special. A first edition would be valued more because of its age, but certainly also because it has been closer in time and location to the creation of the piece of literature it contains.

Technological reproducibility has brought a serious of changes in the domain of art, the transformation of art is, in a large extent, promoted by the development of technology, modern artworks are now endowed with new modes, features and values along with the destruction of traditional specificities.

I noticed that “aura” is a keyword in this article, it plays an important role in Benjamin’s theories. The aura of traditional artworks has three characteristics:

1.Authenticity: the here and now. No matter in which way technological reproduction being accomplished, technological reproduction does not have the authenticity of the original. It is not the one and only object in that specific circumstance.

On one hand, the independence of technological reproduction jeopardizes and devalues the here and now of artwork; on the other hand, its independence seems superior to the nature of authenticity, it detaches the reproduced object from the sphere of tradition, it also helps the original to reach recipients in their won situation. Anyway, authenticity of artwork is irreplaceable, it’s the essential reason and the most important aspect to the aura of the original.

2. The value of cult. The earliest artworks have their basis in ritual, magical or religious function of artworks is always a part of the aura. Because of this traditional artistic concept, repetition or similarity have always been seen as a despised artistic creation, pastiche is often contemplated as a mediocre performance and creativity recession, suffered taunts. With the development of the history and art, this function of worship gradually reduces, but it has always been associated with the production and appreciation of the work of art, just become unconscious from consciousness. Technological reproducibility separates artworks from its parasitic obedience to ritual and its basis in cult, the mystique of artwork is dispelled by numerous reproductions. It is an important driving force behind the destruction of the aura. The artistic function revealed at last, the social function of art is revolutionized.

Besides, the shift of two poles in the artwork itself—cult value and exhibition value—one increases while the other one weakens is a getting increasingly distinct with the development of technological reproducibility.

3. A strange tissue of space and time. The third characteristic is linked closely to the two above characteristics, the distance of space and time comes from the uniqueness and the value of cult of artworks, the distance from the present-day to “the here and now” underlines the uniqueness and permanence of the original. There always exists inaccessibility to the work of art because of this distance.

 

With the passage of time, the annihilation of the aura is inevitable, Williams cherished regret for the disappearance of the aura, but he has taken a more positive perspective on an inevitable historical change—the renewal of original.

 

 

Then, I’d like to talk about film, the seventh art—the integration of other six arts—literature, drama, music, sculpture, painting and architecture. It’s unsurprising that Benjamin takes film as the representative of technological reproducibility, the first art form whose artistic character is entirely determined by its reproducibility, the artwork most capable of improvement. Film is closely associated with technological advancements—after the Industrial Revolution, technologies have made astonishing progress—photography, montage, lighting, synchronism, dubbing, even the apparition of 3D. As the most interpenetration of reality with equipment, filmmaking is highly significant in the realm of artworks and the relation between the masses and the art.

 

However, progressive factors of technological reproduction have not caused sufficient attention; on contrary, it often lead to people’s misunderstanding, and even some degree of hostility. Benjamin’s close friend, the famous scholar of the Frankfurt School, Adorno, thinks that the cultural industry of technology-based replication always meets the needs of consumers, it is prescribed by the community, the consumer is always just the object of the cultural industry. Adorno argues that film inhibits the subjective creativity and imagination of the audience, technological reproduction will hinder people from understanding the world. In my opinion, that sort of criticism is biased. They completely oppose reproduction to creation. In fact, in today’s society, reproduction and creation are not inconsistent or contradictory. Nowadays, cinematography has become mature, an increasing number of excellent films are appreciated by the audience. Technological reproducibility of films leads to profound changes in the way we think about this world and our life, it has a tremendous influence on our apperception of the relation between reality and fiction, the masses and the art are now closely connected by the film.

 

 

Technological reproducibility has brought a serious of changes in the domain of art, the transformation of art is, in a large extent, promoted by the development of technology, modern artworks are now endowed with new modes, features and values along with the destruction of traditional specificities.

I noticed that “aura” is a keyword in this article, it plays an important role in Benjamin’s theories. The aura of traditional artworks has three characteristics:

1.Authenticity: the here and now. No matter in which way technological reproduction being accomplished, technological reproduction does not have the authenticity of the original. It is not the one and only object in that specific circumstance.

On one hand, the independence of technological reproduction jeopardizes and devalues the here and now of artwork; on the other hand, its independence seems superior to the nature of authenticity, it detaches the reproduced object from the sphere of tradition, it also helps the original to reach recipients in their won situation. Anyway, authenticity of artwork is irreplaceable, it’s the essential reason and the most important aspect to the aura of the original.

2. The value of cult. The earliest artworks have their basis in ritual, magical or religious function of artworks is always a part of the aura. Because of this traditional artistic concept, repetition or similarity have always been seen as a despised artistic creation, pastiche is often contemplated as a mediocre performance and creativity recession, suffered taunts. With the development of the history and art, this function of worship gradually reduces, but it has always been associated with the production and appreciation of the work of art, just become unconscious from consciousness. Technological reproducibility separates artworks from its parasitic obedience to ritual and its basis in cult, the mystique of artwork is dispelled by numerous reproductions. It is an important driving force behind the destruction of the aura. The artistic function revealed at last, the social function of art is revolutionized.

Besides, the shift of two poles in the artwork itself—cult value and exhibition value—one increases while the other one weakens is a getting increasingly distinct with the development of technological reproducibility.

3. A strange tissue of space and time. The third characteristic is linked closely to the two above characteristics, the distance of space and time comes from the uniqueness and the value of cult of artworks, the distance from the present-day to “the here and now” underlines the uniqueness and permanence of the original. There always exists inaccessibility to the work of art because of this distance.

 

With the passage of time, the annihilation of the aura is inevitable, Williams cherished regret for the disappearance of the aura, but he has taken a more positive perspective on an inevitable historical change—the renewal of original.

 

 

Then, I’d like to talk about film, the seventh art—the integration of other six arts—literature, drama, music, sculpture, painting and architecture. It’s unsurprising that Benjamin takes film as the representative of technological reproducibility, the first art form whose artistic character is entirely determined by its reproducibility, the artwork most capable of improvement. Film is closely associated with technological advancements—after the Industrial Revolution, technologies have made astonishing progress—photography, montage, lighting, synchronism, dubbing, even the apparition of 3D. As the most interpenetration of reality with equipment, filmmaking is highly significant in the realm of artworks and the relation between the masses and the art.

 

However, progressive factors of technological reproduction have not caused sufficient attention; on contrary, it often lead to people’s misunderstanding, and even some degree of hostility. Benjamin’s close friend, the famous scholar of the Frankfurt School, Adorno, thinks that the cultural industry of technology-based replication always meets the needs of consumers, it is prescribed by the community, the consumer is always just the object of the cultural industry. Adorno argues that film inhibits the subjective creativity and imagination of the audience, technological reproduction will hinder people from understanding the world. In my opinion, that sort of criticism is biased. They completely oppose reproduction to creation. In fact, in today’s society, reproduction and creation are not inconsistent or contradictory. Nowadays, cinematography has become mature, an increasing number of excellent films are appreciated by the audience. Technological reproducibility of films leads to profound changes in the way we think about this world and our life, it has a tremendous influence on our apperception of the relation between reality and fiction, the masses and the art are now closely connected by the film.

 

 

Culture is ordinary, in the society and individual mind. Williams summarized the nature of culture: both traditional and creative; it’s both the most ordinary common meanings and the finest individual meanings. Culture has two senses: a whole way of life; the arts and learning, and Williams insisted on the significance of their conjunctions.

Williams raised his arguments by objecting to Marxists and Leavis：The Marxists indicated that culture is class-dominated, it is restricted to a small class and being passively accepted by the masses. Williams gave strong backing to working people, he argued that the culture in the great working-class political and industrial institutions is the best basis for English society. Leavis thought through education, we can maintain the finest individual values to resist the new vulgarity brought by Industrial Revolution. However, Williams emphasized that Industrial Revolution changed certain social and political modes and values, we can’t deny its satisfactory results and its influence on the working people.

The art and learning should be available to everyone in the society, everyone can have an interest in learning or the arts, culture is the product of a man’s whole committed personal and social experience. At the same time, Williams distinguished the ordinary people and the masses (mob, sometimes ignorant, low in taste and habit). The way of saying of “popular culture” replaces “mass culture”.

The content conveyed by the mass media is always the representation of culture? Williams held a rejection on this opinion. What influence will it bring to the public? The equation between popular education and commercial culture is always changeable in different historical periods, it’s not a true guide to the present state of mind.

Actually, Williams wants to establish “a democratic common culture”, a working- class culture, which contains the fundamental and common social process and practical significance, it stands for the interest and social status of working class. The hierarchy of culture has been removed and the distance between culture and people’s life has been reduced, the sphere of culture will be enlarged, culture represents the various elements of the entire lifestyle. Values and creativity of the ordinary people will be acknowledged, not only those so-called cultivated people or scholars. Then Williams drew a conclusion that the culture is expanding, “common culture” reflects the diversification of culture, the pluralism.

I remember a phrase: “A child should be exposed to culture at an early age.” From a traditional standpoint, it means children should read earlier, get the hang of art, go to museums or a concert as early as possible. Does this phrase still make sense to Williams? First, educational opportunity can be taken equally by everyone in every social stratum; if culture is ordinary, We can find culture everywhere, a child will notice and deliberate every detail in his living environment and his way of life, culture is indispensable to his everyday life, or we can say, culture is life, it’s not an independent art or learning, then children can experience its modes of change, there doesn’t exist anymore the way of saying: ”Children should be exposed to culture as early as possible.” Bring the children to a concert or a museum at an early age can be seemed as just a part of culture infiltration.

The definition of “culture” in Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary has different classifications, the first one is “way of life”, then “art/ music/ literature”, then “beliefs/ attitudes”. I’ve been thinking about a question about culture and civilization, to distinguish their literal notion, I looked up “civilization”–a society, its culture and its way of life during a particular period of time or in a particular part of the world. Does this mean the sphere of civilization is larger than culture? They both need specific social circumstance to develop, to change, since the definition of culture has changed, will it bring any literal or practical changes to civilization?

 

Culture is ordinary, in the society and individual mind. Williams summarized the nature of culture: both traditional and creative; it’s both the most ordinary common meanings and the finest individual meanings. Culture has two senses: a whole way of life; the arts and learning, and Williams insisted on the significance of their conjunctions.

Williams raised his arguments by objecting to Marxists and Leavis：The Marxists indicated that culture is class-dominated, it is restricted to a small class and being passively accepted by the masses. Williams gave strong backing to working people, he argued that the culture in the great working-class political and industrial institutions is the best basis for English society. Leavis thought through education, we can maintain the finest individual values to resist the new vulgarity brought by Industrial Revolution. However, Williams emphasized that Industrial Revolution changed certain social and political modes and values, we can’t deny its satisfactory results and its influence on the working people.

The art and learning should be available to everyone in the society, everyone can have an interest in learning or the arts, culture is the product of a man’s whole committed personal and social experience. At the same time, Williams distinguished the ordinary people and the masses (mob, sometimes ignorant, low in taste and habit). The way of saying of “popular culture” replaces “mass culture”.

The content conveyed by the mass media is always the representation of culture? Williams held a rejection on this opinion. What influence will it bring to the public? The equation between popular education and commercial culture is always changeable in different historical periods, it’s not a true guide to the present state of mind.

Actually, Williams wants to establish “a democratic common culture”, a working- class culture, which contains the fundamental and common social process and practical significance, it stands for the interest and social status of working class. The hierarchy of culture has been removed and the distance between culture and people’s life has been reduced, the sphere of culture will be enlarged, culture represents the various elements of the entire lifestyle. Values and creativity of the ordinary people will be acknowledged, not only those so-called cultivated people or scholars. Then Williams drew a conclusion that the culture is expanding, “common culture” reflects the diversification of culture, the pluralism.

I remember a phrase: “A child should be exposed to culture at an early age.” From a traditional standpoint, it means children should read earlier, get the hang of art, go to museums or a concert as early as possible. Does this phrase still make sense to Williams? First, educational opportunity can be taken equally by everyone in every social stratum; if culture is ordinary, We can find culture everywhere, a child will notice and deliberate every detail in his living environment and his way of life, culture is indispensable to his everyday life, or we can say, culture is life, it’s not an independent art or learning, then children can experience its modes of change, there doesn’t exist anymore the way of saying: ”Children should be exposed to culture as early as possible.” Bring the children to a concert or a museum at an early age can be seemed as just a part of culture infiltration.

The definition of “culture” in Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary has different classifications, the first one is “way of life”, then “art/ music/ literature”, then “beliefs/ attitudes”. I’ve been thinking about a question about culture and civilization, to distinguish their literal notion, I looked up “civilization”–a society, its culture and its way of life during a particular period of time or in a particular part of the world. Does this mean the sphere of civilization is larger than culture? They both need specific social circumstance to develop, to change, since the definition of culture has changed, will it bring any literal or practical changes to civilization?

 

J.L. Austin

Just the title of J.L. Austin’s work, one of this week’s readings, is already saying something of the project which will be undertaken in the text to follow. The title is “How to Do Things with Words.” With this title I start thinking of a type of map; that is to say, that there is a map or a chart of words and what they will materially produce. In essence, what I am trying to say is that there is a physical, a material aspect, or result, of using a word; in a valid atmosphere of course; and Austin is going to divulge this information because this is not in general know. If we can ‘do’ things with words, there is a certain materiality to them; they are tangible. If there is something material than there is a bond, a direct link that presupposes no change or a possible dissociation. There is a right and wrong way of doing the ‘things’ with words. The wrong way is cast out of any proper value because it does not follow the rules, the right way, or the ‘truth’; the referent.

The theory he develops is, at least the way I see it, and perhaps a bit condition by what I understood in Derrida’s critique (I will not discuss this here), more or less how I just explained my view of the title. The big word in this article, excerpt of his book, is “performative”. He describes performative utterances, and their validity, as being conditioned by material conditions outside of the words. ‘I write’ is valid right now because I am performing the act of writing. I n this case I have had a successful performative act. If am speaking to a friend and say, “Yeah, I write,” I have had an unsuccessful performative act, according to Austin that utterance cannot be described as ‘saying anything’; it is a misfired performative act. There are certain infelicities affecting the assertion to my friend. If a judge declares me ‘guilty’ inside of a court room there is no question of whether that is true or false: there is only one outcome, that that was a successful performative utterance because everything material to it happened in the way it was supposed to. If the same judge judges me on the street, and says ‘You’re guilty’, there has been, again, an unsuccessful performative act. But there is also the possibility that a friend of mine says ‘You’re guilty’, and like a judge, slams a gavel. This is a parasitic event on language. This is outside of ordinary language. Austin doesn’t really want to talk much about that.

 

Derrida & Searle

I probably did not understand all the concepts in Jacques Derrida’s articles we read this week; the main one being ‘Signature Event Context’.  I did understand although that there is a very tough intellectual battle going on that John R. Searle starts with Derrida by basically saying in his whole essay, basically what he said specifically to one of Derrida’s arguments: “the answer is a polite but firm, ‘No, it isn’t true.’”. Searle, although it seems, has effectively argued in favor of Austin; this is because he thinks to have very much discovered the true intentions of Austin and the true intentions of Derrida, and Derrida for him is wrong because he misunderstood, could not figure out the true intentions, meaning, of Austin. I will try and look at some of these concepts.

It seems Jacques Derrida is working with, or coming from the perspective of language and signification only on that plane more than Austin is pretending to do. I wouldn’t venture to say that the arguments are flawed from the get go because they are working on concepts that have nothing to with each other. But it can seem that they are indeed working two different realms of language. I will quote a line by Derrida: “He [Austin] then attempts to justify, with nonlinguistic reasons, the preference he has shown in the analysis of performatives… in the final instance, is the reference made therein to what Austin calls the source.” (19). The source is also known as the origin, the author, the referent, or the context (at least that is how I think Derrida uses them). In deed Austin is working, as I proposed in my post for Austin, with a material that directly conditions the validity or meaning of words (remember he said that a performative was not simply to say something but also to do something, be validated by a situation). This here is the fundamental divergence that Derrida takes from Austin’s proposition. He talks about meaning as supplementary. It is precisely Derrida’s project to create a distance from a source, from a referent because that, he says, limits the possibilities of language. Searle, in his response, limits his arguments to basically saying to Derrida that his close reading of Austin was not a correct interpretation. When Searle apposes Austin’s notion of repeatability of writing, he focuses on the material aspect of the reproducibility of a book. This, now in my reading of Derrida, is not what Derrida had in mind when he talked about writing as iterable.

J.L. Austin

Just the title of J.L. Austin’s work, one of this week’s readings, is already saying something of the project which will be undertaken in the text to follow. The title is “How to Do Things with Words.” With this title I start thinking of a type of map; that is to say, that there is a map or a chart of words and what they will materially produce. In essence, what I am trying to say is that there is a physical, a material aspect, or result, of using a word; in a valid atmosphere of course; and Austin is going to divulge this information because this is not in general know. If we can ‘do’ things with words, there is a certain materiality to them; they are tangible. If there is something material than there is a bond, a direct link that presupposes no change or a possible dissociation. There is a right and wrong way of doing the ‘things’ with words. The wrong way is cast out of any proper value because it does not follow the rules, the right way, or the ‘truth’; the referent.

The theory he develops is, at least the way I see it, and perhaps a bit condition by what I understood in Derrida’s critique (I will not discuss this here), more or less how I just explained my view of the title. The big word in this article, excerpt of his book, is “performative”. He describes performative utterances, and their validity, as being conditioned by material conditions outside of the words. ‘I write’ is valid right now because I am performing the act of writing. I n this case I have had a successful performative act. If am speaking to a friend and say, “Yeah, I write,” I have had an unsuccessful performative act, according to Austin that utterance cannot be described as ‘saying anything’; it is a misfired performative act. There are certain infelicities affecting the assertion to my friend. If a judge declares me ‘guilty’ inside of a court room there is no question of whether that is true or false: there is only one outcome, that that was a successful performative utterance because everything material to it happened in the way it was supposed to. If the same judge judges me on the street, and says ‘You’re guilty’, there has been, again, an unsuccessful performative act. But there is also the possibility that a friend of mine says ‘You’re guilty’, and like a judge, slams a gavel. This is a parasitic event on language. This is outside of ordinary language. Austin doesn’t really want to talk much about that.

 

Derrida & Searle

I probably did not understand all the concepts in Jacques Derrida’s articles we read this week; the main one being ‘Signature Event Context’.  I did understand although that there is a very tough intellectual battle going on that John R. Searle starts with Derrida by basically saying in his whole essay, basically what he said specifically to one of Derrida’s arguments: “the answer is a polite but firm, ‘No, it isn’t true.’”. Searle, although it seems, has effectively argued in favor of Austin; this is because he thinks to have very much discovered the true intentions of Austin and the true intentions of Derrida, and Derrida for him is wrong because he misunderstood, could not figure out the true intentions, meaning, of Austin. I will try and look at some of these concepts.

It seems Jacques Derrida is working with, or coming from the perspective of language and signification only on that plane more than Austin is pretending to do. I wouldn’t venture to say that the arguments are flawed from the get go because they are working on concepts that have nothing to with each other. But it can seem that they are indeed working two different realms of language. I will quote a line by Derrida: “He [Austin] then attempts to justify, with nonlinguistic reasons, the preference he has shown in the analysis of performatives… in the final instance, is the reference made therein to what Austin calls the source.” (19). The source is also known as the origin, the author, the referent, or the context (at least that is how I think Derrida uses them). In deed Austin is working, as I proposed in my post for Austin, with a material that directly conditions the validity or meaning of words (remember he said that a performative was not simply to say something but also to do something, be validated by a situation). This here is the fundamental divergence that Derrida takes from Austin’s proposition. He talks about meaning as supplementary. It is precisely Derrida’s project to create a distance from a source, from a referent because that, he says, limits the possibilities of language. Searle, in his response, limits his arguments to basically saying to Derrida that his close reading of Austin was not a correct interpretation. When Searle apposes Austin’s notion of repeatability of writing, he focuses on the material aspect of the reproducibility of a book. This, now in my reading of Derrida, is not what Derrida had in mind when he talked about writing as iterable.

My first question when I faced those four texts was, how can I read them? Then, I realize that there was actually a kind of “order” to do it. Of course, is not the way to do it, but was a guideline. That`s the interesting thing about reading and following a debate or a confrontation of different authors. Sometimes, we read two different texts that talk about similar issues, we can put them to talk between them, and then, to discuss among other texts that discuss similar topics or ideas. Anyway, is always more interesting, at least for me, to read something that is “directed” (of course Derrida would not agree with this) to someone. So, I took the road of read those texts as a discussion. First, I read Austin, then, Derrida`s text called “Signature event context”, then, the Searle`s text (I will keep his name), and finally, the Derrida`s answer to Searl.

 

Following this reading I will not focus on any text to deep, and I will try to figure out how can the big picture looks like (if there is one). Austin (along with Wittgenstein) was one of the first philosophers in start developing a philosophy of language in the XX Century. As we know after his reading, his main focus is in the relation of language and the world that would be outside of it. In other words, and it is what gives the title of his main work, “How to do things with words”. His idea (or at least how I read it) is/was that language can escape the limits of the own language and have a relevant role in some kind of “extra linguistic” circumstances. In other words, some utterance are able to modify reality of people. A good example of this it is when a priest (in a Christian tradition) says “I now declare you man and wife”, and starting from that moment, the couple is actually married. Of course, in order to have a “happy ending” for this situation, Austin says that there is a group of conditions that must be fulfilled. The situation in what this utterance is involved would be the context (for me, one of the most relevant concepts of the discussion). If some of the conditions is not fulfilled, let’s say that the woman was already married or the scene happened on a stage in a theatre, the utterance loose it’s performative force.

 

A few years latter, Derrida spoke in a philosophical meeting about the issue of writing. Then, at least in my read, he made a distinction about writing and spoken language, and didn`t take much care about the last one. His main focus is about written language. But after making his main proposal about it, he started to discuss some issues related to Austin`s work. I think that one of the main points was about his (Austin) notion of context. According to Derrida there is no way to access to any kind of “objective” or “total” context , so there would be no way to establish the circumstances that surround any speech act. But is further than “just the context”, is a matter about intentions. For the French philosopher, there is no way either to access to the “real intentions” of any speaker. That`s one of the main characteristic of writing (for him), that can survive even after the dead of it’s author and the receiver. In order words, the writing exists by it self. Doesn’t need concepts like intentions, author, context of production, etc.

 

After this “aggression” to Austin, one of his disciples decided to reply to Derrida. For Searle, Derrida had a misreading of Austin’s text (actually, for Searle seems to be that Derrida didn’t understand a word). The American philosopher states that all Derrida`s argument are lack of force and make big confusions about concepts like iterability and permanence. For Searle, speech acts do exist and elements such as context and intentions may be accessed in order to study them.

 

Of course, Derrida answered. In his very characteristic style, the French philosopher answer to the short “reply” of Searle with almost a whole book (I can’t unmentioned this element). Derrida starts with an exercise of deconstruction about Serle`s text. First, he discussed the authorship of it making fun of the “copyright” of the text, and finally, reducing him to an acronym that, of course, looks like his name: Sarl. It seems to be that one of the mains point of disagreement about them are the ideas of “truth”, “real”, etc. In some way, and I agree about that, Searle claims to have “the right reading” of Austin. Finally, the text discuss about the notion of context, the role of signature (especially talking about Searle`s copyright and his own signature at the end of his previous text), in other word, going back to the arguments presented in SEC. And of course, never stops of making fun of Searle.

 

More than focus and choosing some positions, I would like to keep the issues that are being discussed here. As I said before, for me one of the main concepts (and that is extremely interesting when we want to think about other disciplines outside literature and philosophy) is the concept of context. Some people believe that knowing the context of an utterance we would be able to get to the “real signification” or the “intention” under it. Derrida, as we saw, doesn’t. And on the other hand appear the concept of writing (can we make a direct relation with the notion of text?). Both ideas are, nowadays, on opposite sides. That’s why for me this debate is interesting. Because show a discussion about something that is still in the arguments in literary theory. That means, at least for me, which is an issue that must be keeping discussed.