Barthes and Text Gestalt
Barthes’ text was definitely “jouissif” — I had fun reading it, and I am sure he had fun writing it. Our e-version had some interesting typographical errors, especially in that key word at the end: “jouissance”. We got “jotrissance”, and I tried to make sense of it. One interpretation was as a portmanteau word that blends “jouissance” (enjoyment) and “tristesse” (sadness), and that really might be a very fitting word for the text. Barthes was really focusing on “jouissance” and it is left in French in the text because it is a word with very rich connotations. (I also got confused with those / that are in place of I. Hard to tell the difference between a slash and an italic I !)
These e-texts and their inevitable “impeded form” (scanners are poor readers at times) are interesting in themselves. They highlight our error correction module that does not allow impeded form to persist. There is something important and paradoxical in the notion that we correct the text — make sense of it whether it does or doesn’t express itself directly– and yet the text must have its own word to say in the matter, distinct from us. (I do take it as a fact that we make the text coherent and that we seek out coherence.) We shouldn’t shout down what the text has to say.
That same corrective function readies me to detach a bit from what Barthes has to say literally and look for what he should have said. In other words, a text with typos makes us focus not on any particular element of the text, but rather on what generally is there — so the text is a democracy of sentences which produce a Gestalt. It is this paradoxical interplay between the totality and its parts that is difficult to explain.
When Barthes raised the analogy of music, I think he might have developed further his ideas. I do think music is a good metaphor for understanding how texts work, precisely because a musical piece has a coherence, a play of resonance, which creates its over-arching form. The Text is for me that orchestration we find harmonious. Perhaps one way to look a the paradox of Gestalt is through the notion of resonance.
Ferdinand de Saussure & Roland Barthes
So-sure
It is somewhat difficult to accept that a concept is inseparable from a sound image. It is more difficult to accept, although, that this concept and sound image, signified and signifier respectively, have no real basis in the material world, in nature. Nothing has an intrinsic name. Nothing is born with a name to represent it. Nothing, nobody, told us that a ‘dog’ is to be called a dog, nobody said that a mountain has the name mountain, intrinsically born with that name; based on the real, a referent has no name. This situation is what must be understood as the arbitrary nature of the sign; that is to say the signified does not follow any rule or adhesive joining it with the signifier. This of course does not mean that they can live independently; they are always together.
If the author, as Barthes proposes, is not necessary to interpret a text, then does that mean language alone can give meaning to a text? Saussure develops the argument that a person alone cannot change or create language because it is the social, communal, side of speech, that is to say that it is the determining factor of a community and organizer or recorder of the discourses that the speakers articulate. Saussure is conditioning, or better said, untangling, an identity, such as that of an author, to be understood only as a speaker and not as creator. The author, or the speaker involved in a speech act, does not create anything, does not create language and therefore is not, or should not be allowed, the right to subjectively assign meaning to a given text. This situation implies a certain relations of power. The analysis of signs, of language, of text, can disarticulate common acceptances of powers. Revealing its self is something of the nature of power, which may start with a speech act and the intent to name, to create and impose a name, a meaning. This is the act of trying to give an essence before something realizes that that essence is not what it thinks of itself.
All of this points me in the direction of thinking of such issues of what is real or what is truth. Is the reality I live truthful? Is ignorance bliss if aware of the implications that a further analysis might divulge? To a certain extent, when we stop thinking of concepts and ideas as natural or preconceived to the articulation of speech, we may actually discover truths in many aspects of our culture, and our creations.
Barthes
I would like to ask Roland Barthes (or rather, in the spirit of what I understand from his texts, ask his texts) a question: is the analysis of language and other signs the answer to all sociological/political issues or to the pursuits of truths? My question doesn’t have the intention of debating or arguing with Barthes; there is no malignant intent by posing that question. Even though I explain that, posing that question or questions like that could cast doubt on or generate some negativity towards his arguments. The question could be seen as the sweat on the characters in the film Julius Cesar that Barthes analyzes; the question is thinking there is some sort of thought behind a question enunciated in such a way. The aggressiveness in the question is enunciates with by the phrase ‘answer to all’. This is a phrase that is totalizing and, contingent upon a negative, whose answer implies the uselessness of the analysis of language as a possible tool for research. Confusing the sign with the signified is, as Barthes writes, a hybrid inserted into the sign which is made to be perceived as nature. Say we have a signified, this signified is the concept of ‘bad’ or ‘evil’ and the signifier is the color black. The sign would be thus that black= bad/evil. Or the fringe= roman-ness, sweat=thinking, which in turn = crime, the author= answers to the work, a work= a specific meaning, Einstein’s brain= thought machine, foam= no violence etc. Thus, if the analysis of language doesn’t answer all the problems than it is of no use and can be completely disregarded. I was careful although to ask the text for an answer and not the author. According to the very arguments of the texts, the texts would never give me one uniform answer. Thus, the intentions or connotations (positive or negative) of question posed would fail against the text; but they would not fail against the author. The author can give you a straight answer, but that limits the possibilities of discourse, the possibilities of meanings, and the denaturalization of the one and only. In essence, my understanding from the Barthes texts is that there are finger prints around the sign and its meaning(s). The task in language (textual) analysis is to untangle or uncover certain truths (or perhaps better, histories of signs and their meanings). This tool is counter to the power of prescribing, the power of ruling with no limit, the power of ‘creating reality without the real’. The death of author= liberation (of many entities).
Ferdinand de Saussure & Roland Barthes
So-sure
It is somewhat difficult to accept that a concept is inseparable from a sound image. It is more difficult to accept, although, that this concept and sound image, signified and signifier respectively, have no real basis in the material world, in nature. Nothing has an intrinsic name. Nothing is born with a name to represent it. Nothing, nobody, told us that a ‘dog’ is to be called a dog, nobody said that a mountain has the name mountain, intrinsically born with that name; based on the real, a referent has no name. This situation is what must be understood as the arbitrary nature of the sign; that is to say the signified does not follow any rule or adhesive joining it with the signifier. This of course does not mean that they can live independently; they are always together.
If the author, as Barthes proposes, is not necessary to interpret a text, then does that mean language alone can give meaning to a text? Saussure develops the argument that a person alone cannot change or create language because it is the social, communal, side of speech, that is to say that it is the determining factor of a community and organizer or recorder of the discourses that the speakers articulate. Saussure is conditioning, or better said, untangling, an identity, such as that of an author, to be understood only as a speaker and not as creator. The author, or the speaker involved in a speech act, does not create anything, does not create language and therefore is not, or should not be allowed, the right to subjectively assign meaning to a given text. This situation implies a certain relations of power. The analysis of signs, of language, of text, can disarticulate common acceptances of powers. Revealing its self is something of the nature of power, which may start with a speech act and the intent to name, to create and impose a name, a meaning. This is the act of trying to give an essence before something realizes that that essence is not what it thinks of itself.
All of this points me in the direction of thinking of such issues of what is real or what is truth. Is the reality I live truthful? Is ignorance bliss if aware of the implications that a further analysis might divulge? To a certain extent, when we stop thinking of concepts and ideas as natural or preconceived to the articulation of speech, we may actually discover truths in many aspects of our culture, and our creations.
Barthes
I would like to ask Roland Barthes (or rather, in the spirit of what I understand from his texts, ask his texts) a question: is the analysis of language and other signs the answer to all sociological/political issues or to the pursuits of truths? My question doesn’t have the intention of debating or arguing with Barthes; there is no malignant intent by posing that question. Even though I explain that, posing that question or questions like that could cast doubt on or generate some negativity towards his arguments. The question could be seen as the sweat on the characters in the film Julius Cesar that Barthes analyzes; the question is thinking there is some sort of thought behind a question enunciated in such a way. The aggressiveness in the question is enunciates with by the phrase ‘answer to all’. This is a phrase that is totalizing and, contingent upon a negative, whose answer implies the uselessness of the analysis of language as a possible tool for research. Confusing the sign with the signified is, as Barthes writes, a hybrid inserted into the sign which is made to be perceived as nature. Say we have a signified, this signified is the concept of ‘bad’ or ‘evil’ and the signifier is the color black. The sign would be thus that black= bad/evil. Or the fringe= roman-ness, sweat=thinking, which in turn = crime, the author= answers to the work, a work= a specific meaning, Einstein’s brain= thought machine, foam= no violence etc. Thus, if the analysis of language doesn’t answer all the problems than it is of no use and can be completely disregarded. I was careful although to ask the text for an answer and not the author. According to the very arguments of the texts, the texts would never give me one uniform answer. Thus, the intentions or connotations (positive or negative) of question posed would fail against the text; but they would not fail against the author. The author can give you a straight answer, but that limits the possibilities of discourse, the possibilities of meanings, and the denaturalization of the one and only. In essence, my understanding from the Barthes texts is that there are finger prints around the sign and its meaning(s). The task in language (textual) analysis is to untangle or uncover certain truths (or perhaps better, histories of signs and their meanings). This tool is counter to the power of prescribing, the power of ruling with no limit, the power of ‘creating reality without the real’. The death of author= liberation (of many entities).
Mythologies, Ronald Barthes
In reading Ronald Barthes I really found interesting his theories on toys. I believe that as he is explaining and describing his theories on toys, he is really describing his view on children; he mentions that: “Frenchman sees the child as another self”(53). He talks about toy being only being “microcosm of the real word”, he mentions that French toys always mean something it is always depicting something of real life for example medicine and the army. It is a way to prepare the child for real life. It is preparing the child for role it should carry out. He mention “There exist, for instance a doll s which urinate…This is meant to prepare the little girl the casualty of house-keeping, to condition her future role as a mother”(53). This reminds me of what my professor in infant psychology class mentioned that “the job of a child is to play”; so even though we as adults see it as just recreation; a child is learning about real life and his role and social behaviour. Does this mean that all girls who played with dolls should become mother? No, I think that as a child we experiment with all kinds of different roles, and this does not limit what we are going to become. He also brings out a very important point which is that children are no longer creators of game but instead just owners or users, so in a way toys are limiting. But children do like to imitate and this is a way of learning. I remember seeing a picture in a psychology book where a 3 year old boy has put a ball under his shirt and have he mentions he wants to have babies when he grows up and you can see mother in the background and she is pregnant. So my question is how much can you blame toys for limiting children creativity and how much is their own predisposition not to create but imitate?
In the end I find it interesting that he compares bourgeois toys with wooden toys. He calls bourgeois toys the product of chemistry graceless material, compared to the wooden toys that have a natural touch and not a cold metal feel. I think the reason to include this is to highlight the way toys have changed and involved and how the newer toys are more impersonal. In conclusion I think the importance of talking about toys is that they influence our view of children and also t children themselves. And in way children toys can depict society’s view on children.
Mythologies, Ronald Barthes
In reading Ronald Barthes I really found interesting his theories on toys. I believe that as he is explaining and describing his theories on toys, he is really describing his view on children; he mentions that: “Frenchman sees the child as another self”(53). He talks about toy being only being “microcosm of the real word”, he mentions that French toys always mean something it is always depicting something of real life for example medicine and the army. It is a way to prepare the child for real life. It is preparing the child for role it should carry out. He mention “There exist, for instance a doll s which urinate…This is meant to prepare the little girl the casualty of house-keeping, to condition her future role as a mother”(53). This reminds me of what my professor in infant psychology class mentioned that “the job of a child is to play”; so even though we as adults see it as just recreation; a child is learning about real life and his role and social behaviour. Does this mean that all girls who played with dolls should become mother? No, I think that as a child we experiment with all kinds of different roles, and this does not limit what we are going to become. He also brings out a very important point which is that children are no longer creators of game but instead just owners or users, so in a way toys are limiting. But children do like to imitate and this is a way of learning. I remember seeing a picture in a psychology book where a 3 year old boy has put a ball under his shirt and have he mentions he wants to have babies when he grows up and you can see mother in the background and she is pregnant. So my question is how much can you blame toys for limiting children creativity and how much is their own predisposition not to create but imitate?
In the end I find it interesting that he compares bourgeois toys with wooden toys. He calls bourgeois toys the product of chemistry graceless material, compared to the wooden toys that have a natural touch and not a cold metal feel. I think the reason to include this is to highlight the way toys have changed and involved and how the newer toys are more impersonal. In conclusion I think the importance of talking about toys is that they influence our view of children and also t children themselves. And in way children toys can depict society’s view on children.
Impressions on “Course in General Linguistics” by Saussure
In Course in General Lingusitics Saussure separates language from speaking. While language does not depend on the speaker, speaking is an individual act. For Saussure, language is a well-defined concrete homogeneous object that can – and must – be studied separately from the other elements of speech.
Language is a social institution since any relation between an object and its designation by a sound is arbitrary. There is no logical or natural reason that, in English, a tree is actually called a tree, it could as well be called an animal if everybody in a given linguistic community agreed on it. It is from this observation that Saussure concludes that language is social. I find interesting that Saussure announces the invention of a science – semiology – before it has been developed. Usually, it seems that intellectuals develop ideas and theories, and way later a science emerges from this work.
Anyway, semiology – ‘‘the science that studies the life of signs within society’’ – can now grow. Saussure develops a terminology that is at the foundation of semiology ; signified, signifier and sign. A signified is the idea, concept or object to be designated. A signifier is the sound (or drawing) produced to identify the signified. A sign is the association that is made between the signified and the signifier and which meaning is shared by a community. By example, a red circle with a red line crossing it is nothing else than that : a red circle with a red line crossing it. It is only when it is associated with the concept of ‘DO NOT DO SOMETHING’ (the signified) that it carries meaning and becomes a sign. From that, we can easily see that language is a social construction.
When Saussures discusses the concept of value, we can see from where the term Structuralism comes. Each sign finds its value and its limits in the relation to other signs. Therefore, ‘‘language is a system of interdependent terms’’ ; it is structured. The text gives these examples : redouter, craindre et avoir peur are synonyms where each carries a meaning through its opposition to the others. The same is true for inflections and tenses in languages.
This leads to other evidence that language is social. If language was pre-determined, there would not exist differences amongst them such as for inflections and tenses. The idea of past, by example, would be represented in the same way in each language ; which is not the case.
Something that wasn’t clear for me was the extent of Principle II ; it is so ‘‘obvious,’’ that I’m not sure I understand it…
In conclusion, I believe it is worth remembering that this text was created by some of Saussure’s students, that is, not written by Saussure directly. This poses the possibility of bias in the source.
The Value of Knights
We won’t leave Tolstoy’s horse behind, but instead recast it on Saussure’s chess board as a knight (which knight is lighter? This provides the start of an explanation to this puzzle). It is a bit odd that in chess the knight is a horse (isn’t that demeaning for an aristocrat?) rather than the rider. Saussure might say that the horse is the knight’s distinctive feature. (In fact, for Saussure the horse is a symbol and not a sign at all; more later on the double articulation that is necessary for signs.) And that distinctiveness is arbitrary. It could have been a saddle, or a whip, or anything else that might be picked out as different. Saussure seems to say it doesn’t have to be anything at all. In another part of the text that we don’t have he says:
Take a knight, for instance. By itself is it an element in the game? Certainly not, for by its material make-up — outside its square and the other conditions of the game — it means nothing to the player; it becomes a real, concrete element only when endowed with value and wedded to it. Suppose that the piece happens to be destroyed or lost during a game. Can it be replaced by an equivalent piece? Certainly. Not only another knight but even a figure of any resemblance to a knight can be declared identical provided the same value is attributed to it. We see then that in semiological systems like language, where elements hold each other in equilibrium [my emphasis] in accordance with fixed rules, the notion of identity blends with that of value and vice versa.
Although both the signified and the signifier are purely differential and negative when considered separately, their combination is a positive fact; it is even the sole type of facts that language has, for maintaining the parallelism between the two classes of differences is the distinctive function of the linguistic institution. [my emphasis]
Everything that has been said up to this point boils down to this: in language there are only differences. Even more importantly, a difference generally implies positive terms between which the difference is set up; but in language there are only differences, without positive terms. [my emphasis and Saussure’s] Whether we take the signified or the signifier, language has neither ideas nor sounds that existed before the linguistic system, but only conceptual and phonic differences that have issued from the system. The idea or phonic substance that a sign contains is of less importance than the other signs that surround it. Proof of this is that the value of a term may be modified without either its meaning or its sound being affected, solely because a neighboring term has been modified (see p. 115). [ “Course”, from the Internet Archive]
Saussure seems to be pointing to the fundamental puzzle of Gestalt psychology: the totality determines the value of the parts, but the parts make the totality what it is. In this image, it is the perception of a shadow that makes us interpret shades of colors, and at the same time the shades of color that lead us to perceive the shadow.
This is confusing for me, both in Gestalt psychology and in Saussure’s model of language. Saussure (his students?) say: “in language there are only differences, without positive terms”. He also says that combination is a “positive fact”. How does “positive fact” relate to no “positive terms”?
More later on the double articulation, which may offer another piece to the puzzle.