2.4 – Big Bad Biases
We began this unit by discussing assumptions and differences that we carry into our class. In “First Contact as Spiritual Performance,” Lutz makes an assumption about his readers (Lutz, “First Contact” 32). He asks us to begin with the assumption that comprehending the performances of the Indigenous participants is “one of the most obvious difficulties.” He explains that this is so because “one must of necessity enter a world that is distant in time and alien in culture, attempting to perceive indigenous performance through their eyes as well as those of the Europeans.” Here, Lutz is assuming either that his readers belong to the European tradition, or he is assuming that it is more difficult for a European to understand Indigenous performances – than the other way around. What do you make of this reading? Am I being fair when I point to this assumption? If so, is Lutz being fair when he makes this assumption?
Contact stories, by definition, are problems concerning definition. For example, if I meet someone raised in English royalty, he probably wouldn’t think it was much of a compliment if I were to tell him his outfit looked “sick.” It means one thing to me (good) and another to him (bad). When framed in the context of contact stories, a singular instance of definition that does not correlate between each side is like a beam of light shone through a prism; it breaks into fragments that we can both see and not see.
The problems and issues that can arise from misunderstood definitions are exactly what Lutz refers to through Marshal Salhins’ and Gananath Obeyesekere’s inability to determine a definition for “reasonable behaviour”.
A key element to understanding Lutz’ assertion — that it is harder for a European to understand Indigenous performances than vice versa — is that of the conjunction fallacy. Take, for example, this study:
Consider a regular six-sided die with four green faces and two red faces. The die will be rolled 20 times and the sequence of greens (G) and reds (R) will be recorded. You are asked to select one sequence from a set of three and you will win $25 if the sequence you chose appears on successive rolls of the die. Please check the sequence of greens and reds on which you prefer to bet.
1. RGRRR
2. GRGRRR
3. GRRRRR
125 undergraduates at UBC and Stanford University played this gamble with real payoffs. 65% of subjects chose sequence (2) (Tversky and Kahneman 1983). Sequence (2) is most representative of the die, since the die is mostly green and sequence (2) contains the greatest proportion of green faces. However, sequence (1) dominates sequence (2) because (1) is strictly included in (2), to get (2) you must roll (1) preceded by a green face.
The inability to see what is directly in front of you is referred to earlier in the same study as the hindsight bias. I believe the combination of these two examples reveal the conclusions to both sides of our argument. Like the conjunction fallacy, Europeans are unable to effectively analyze the traditions of Indigenous peoples.
However, this is not to say that I agree completely with the statement since the other side of the argument then represents the hindsight bias. While it is true that we can learn from history, it is also true that we, “after learning the eventual outcome, give a much higher estimate for the predictability of that outcome than subjects who predict the outcome without advance knowledge.” That is to say, since Indigenous people have been (forcibly) accustomed to Western traditions it is “logical” to assume that they are more likely to understand such traditions.
Most importantly, the study concludes — after revealing a convincing example — that one “cannot simply instruct [others] to avoid hindsight bias,” as the awareness of its presence has no significant effect. How then, with this knowledge, can we assure that similar errors are not made in regards to the assumption of Indigenous futures? Since the outcome of European-Indigenous relations has been the domination of European culture over Indigenous, does that mean we are doomed to repeat the past?
Perhaps, something called repetition compulsion can offer some insight. In the previous link, Kristi A. DeName suggests “that many of us develop patterns over the years, whether positive or negative, that become ingrained” and cause us to act in certain ways, whether we like them or not.
Certainly, there are some interesting considerations in regards to the question of whether it is harder for Europeans to understand Indigenous performances. With the knowledge of repetition compulsion, as well as the contact stories retold by Lutz, would you say you’re more likely to be able to avoid hindsight bias?
