Animal Ethics
By Tiffany Tong
Peter Singer is right in arguing that sentient animals should be treated ethically, although I disagree with where he draws the lines between sentient animals and those that may not be. I mostly agree with his explanation of why sentience equals to rights, why rights require ethical treatment from humans, and what kind of treatment is warranted.
Singer’s argument is that the basis for having rights, or the criterion for having an interest, is whether a living being experiences suffering, in other words, if the being is sentient (Singer 2003). “There can be no moral justification for refusing to take [the being’s] suffering into consideration” if they have an interest in whether they are suffering (Singer 2003: 136). For example, it does not make sense to give stones interests, for if someone kicks the stone, it will not suffer; however, a sentient being, such as a mouse or a human, will suffer from the kick. How can one deny an organism rights when the content of the rights pertain to them? All other criteria, such as the “use of a public, rule-governed language” (Singer 2003: 137) or intelligence, for granting rights are irrelevant because the capacity for suffering is a prerequisite for having any interests.
Furthermore, if one agrees to his criterion for having rights, then his claim that humans and animals should have equal rights is also legitimate (Singer 2003). Humans are not completely equal in abilities or intelligence, yet everyone is guaranteed equal moral consideration – no infant or mentally challenged person have their rights retracted from them. Why should moral consideration be different with animals? Physical abilities should not be the basis of how our interests are constructed: “moral equality is distinct from factual equality (Singer 2003: 136).” One quote that I particularly resonated with is “if possessing greater intelligence does not entitle one human to exploit another, why should it entitle humans to exploit nonhumans? (Singer 2003)”
I, however, disagree with him on where the boundaries are between sentient and non-sentient animals. Singer claims that we do not know if molluscs and insects suffer with our current state of knowledge. I believe they do. These boundaries between taxa are man-made and thus arbitrary. For example, octopi are intelligent and expressive about their pain; few people would deny that they are sentient creatures, yet they are classified as “lowly” molluscs by Singer. Whether a nervous system of a being is central or not does not warrant different levels of rights, especially when pain is a “mental event” and cannot “be directly observed (Singer 2003: 136).” The very fact that some beings have a nervous system means that they are built to feel pain, and thus deserve rights and ethical treatment. Personally, I think Singer is failing in to the same trap he denounced: moral equality is different from physical similarity.
In addition, I believe Singer is not completely correct in what he considers as ethical treatment. On one hand, I agree that it is morally wrong to use animals in experiments which include inducing pain and that animals should not be slaughtered for meat, because nonhumans are not means, but rather “ends in themselves (Singer 2003: 142).” Also, each organism’s interests “are to be taken into account and treated equally with the like interest of any other being,” therefore no animal should have more rights or consideration than another animal (Singer 2003: 136). Just because a panda is more visually and emotionally appealing than a worm does not mean the worm is less worthy of consideration for interests.
On the other hand, from his subsequent publications, Singer promotes a utilitarian way of deciding which animal’s rights are worthier to all others. He holds that the rights of particular individuals can be forfeited if, and only if, it provides better welfare for a greater number of beings. I think a utilitarian way of thinking is directly opposite to the concept of rights: utilitarianism gives humans particular rights to makes decisions that impact other organisms, which means an unequal distribution of rights. However, overall, I think Peter Singer offers a good explanation for the reasons and methods for morally correct treatment of fellow animals.
References:
Singer, P. [1973] 2003. “Animal liberation,” pp. 135-142 in VanDeVeer, D. and C. Pierce (eds.). The Environmental Ethics and Policy Book (Third Edition). Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.