Martha Craven Nussbaum’s capabilities approach is a theory of social justice: a society is just, only if it succeeds in developing and eventually fulfilling some capabilities (or “what […] each person [in this society is] able to do or to be”) equally to each one of its societal members to certain levels (in Nussbaum’s words, “thresholds”) (18).

Nussbaum differentiate different kinds of capabilities: before birth, infants possess basic capabilities, or “innate powers or faculties” that make their later cultivations possible (23 and 24); if properly cultivated, these basic capabilities then develop into internal capabilities (21). Also, there has to be certain social, political and economic conditions, without which the functioning of these internal capabilities is impossible. For example, if a society trains its members of their critical thinking capability, but does not allow them to actually think critically about their social and political situations, this capability is still not fulfilled.

In this theory, the capabilities used to determine a just society  are combined capabilities, i.e. the combination of internal capabilities and the social, political and economic conditions that allow them to function properly (Nussbaum 22). Nussbaum exemplifies ten combined capabilities, such as life, bodily health and bodily integrity (32-34).

In this theory, social justice is failed, if a society fails to equally develop internal capabilities of each one of its members to certain thresholds, if a society forces its members to function their internal capabilities, and if a society fails to provide the social, political and economic conditions that allow those internal capabilities to function properly

In China, to allow students to attend school near to their residences, students who live near a school are granted priority to attend the school, which gives rise to a boom for the so-called “school-district estates”. Rich families buy these estates so that they can send their children to their desired schools. As a result, many outstanding students from poor families have to cede their deserved seats in good schools to less competitive students from rich families (see for example: 72-80 Wen et al.).

Applying capabilities approach, this is obviously a failure of social justice: Chinese society fails to provide the fair social condition that allows the internal academic capability of those students from poor families to function properly in good schools. To rectify this injustice, schools must inspect whether the students have actually been living in their proximity, or whether their families have bought “school-district estates” expediently.

While this theory successfully illustrate the injustice in the case of Chinese “school-district estates”, I still argue that capabilities approach is an incomplete theory of social justice, because it does not sufficiently elaborate on how to select combined capabilities, which challenges the demonstration of injustice in cases more ambiguous than the one above. However, I do not reject the justness of Nussbaum’s ten capabilities. My focus is on the obscurity of the methods in which Nussbaum selects them. While Nussbaum does not explicate her methods (17-45), in the following, I list all the possible methods extracted from her text and attempt to show that none of them justify the selection of combined capabilities.

Nussbaum repetitively stresses that capabilities are generated from the respect of “inherent and equal (31) human dignity (26)” in relation to “active striving” and “freedom” (31)  and “living conditions worthy of it” (29). However, there is no consensus of the meanings of the quoted abstract terms, nor does Nussbaum ever explain their meanings anywhere in her text (17-45). Without such explanations, there is no way to tell how to select combined capabilities, because people interpret those terms sometimes drastically different from each other. Thus seen, a conglomerate of abstract terms that bear no consensus of their meanings does not justify the selection of combined capabilities in this theory.

Nussbaum claims that “[s]ometimes it is clear that a given capability is central [because] the world has come to a consensus” (32). However, this is a naturalistic fallacy: just because something has come to a consensus does not mean that it should come to a consensus. Hence, universal consensus also does not automatically justify the selection of combined capabilities. Indeed, capabilities approach should have explained why some combined capabilities should or have come to a worldly consensus.

Where cases are less “clear”, Nussbaum urges for debates:

…[T]he debate must take place, and each must make arguments attempting to show that a given liberty is implicated in the idea of human dignity. This cannot be done by vague intuitive appeals to the idea of dignity all by itself [but] by discussing the relationship of the putative entitlement to other existing entitlements…showing, for example, the relationship of bodily integrity… (32)

As explained earlier, since there is no consensus of the meaning of “human dignity”, nor does Nussbaum explains it anywhere in her text (17-45), the debaters have to “intuitively appeal to their ideas of dignity all by themselves”. Also, Nussbaum also asks them to bear in mind other “existing entitlements”. These “existing entitlements” cannot be people’s existing preferences, because Nussbaum claims that “…the approach does not derive value from people’s existing preferences” (32). Therefore, they must be her “existing entitlements”, which is exemplified by one of her selected capability (in the list of ten), bodily integrity. In other words, she asks the debaters to debate in light of what is supposed to be the results of the debate.

Ultimately, if this theory of social justice is to debate about what is socially just, it is questionable whether there is indeed a theory, because a theory of social justice is supposed to take a stance in this debate, rather than simply gesturing that somehow the debate itself is its solution. The same wonder is applicable to the fact that Nussbaum permits political processes (27) and constitutional laws (40) to decide how to select combined capabilities when “…situations are not so grave…” (27) and “…freedom is not that central…” (31-32), because a theory of social justice is also supposed to evaluate the justness of political processes and constitutional laws, rather than assuming these two in themselves manifest social justice by default. Thereby, none of the above justifies the selection of combined capabilities.

Nussbaum’s capabilities approach is an incomplete theory of social justice: a society is just, if it manages to unbiasedly cultivate the combined capabilities (the compound of internal capabilities and their social, political and economic conditions that allow them to function properly) of each of its members. This theory is able to clearly identify the injustice of Chinese “school-district estates”. However, since this theory does not specify its methods of selecting combined capabilities (therefore, incomplete), its potent to efficiently point out injustice may be challenged in more ambiguous cases. Extracted from Nussbaum’s text, I list a few possible candidates of her methods (although it is unclear whether Nussbaum actually adopts them for her ten capabilities), namely universal consensuses, debates, political processes and constitutional laws and clarify the reasons why none of them justifies the selection of combined capabilities. To rectify its incompleteness, this theory has to come up with legitimate methods of selecting combined capabilities.

Work Cited

Nussbaum, Martha Craven. “Chapter Two: The Central Capabilities”. Creating Capabilities, the Human Development Approach, Published By Harvard University Press, July, 2011, pp. 17-45, https://www.degruyter.com/view/books/harvard.9780674061200/harvard.9780674061200.c2/harvard.9780674061200.c2.xml

Wen, Haizhen, et al.. “School district, Education Quality, and Housing Price: Evidence From a Natural Experiment In Hangzhou, China”. Cities, Volume 66, June 2017, pp. 72-80, https://reader.elsevier.com/reader/sd/pii/S0264275116306977?token=5CC419013FE489C34E6160087F3D19B43C93D662CCF53D10E85F0415F375F1A8C2077505604750546A2A1F52C847BC2A