The Necessary Exclusion of Women in Rousseau’s Concept of Equality

In Rousseau’s Discourse on the Origins of Inequality and “The Education of Women” from Emile, I identify two inconsistencies: In Discourse on the Origins of Inequality, Rousseau argues that humans are set apart from animals because they have the capabilities to acquiesce or resist natural impulsions, self-improve, understand and reason (page 14). However, in “The Education of Women”, he in part rejects these capabilities for women. In Discourse on the Origins of Inequality, he also argues that before the establishments of political institutions, all humans are on average equal (Rousseau, page 6) and slavery is unjustified (Rousseau, page 23). Yet, in “The Education of Women”, he suggests that women should be subservient to their men. By these two inconsistencies, I argue that his methodological difference in these two texts gives rise to the exclusion of women in Rousseau’s concept of equality.

In Discourse on the Origins of Inequality, Rousseau admits that humans receive the same natural impulsions (e.g. hunger, thirst and lust) as animals. Yet unlike animals, humans could choose to acquiesce or resist them (Rousseau, page 14). That is to say, humans have some free agency to reject what is in disfavour (in this case, natural impulsions). On the other hand, in “The Education of Woman”, he withdraws much of this free agency from women: “…it suffices that [women] have little power of resistance”. This is justified by his observations that women are “by nature” weaker than men, and in order to serve nature’s end designated for women, women shall not resist this trait granted by nature (Rousseau, page 260). However, in a status of nature, all men are weaker than their predators. Had all humans served “nature’s end designated for all humans”, humans would have been long extinguished.

In Discourse on the Origins of Inequality, Rousseau argues that self-improvement “…is [inherent] in species as in the [individual]” (page 14). On the other hand, in “The Education of Woman”, he argues that “…[women] should have whatever is befitting the constitution of her species and…sex…”, and their education is aimed to “…please [men], be useful to [men], make themselves loved and honoured by [men]…” (Rousseau, page 263), and “…they are never allowed to place themselves above [men’s] judgments” (Rousseau, page 270). On one hand, according to Rousseau, women, as a component of the human species, do self-improve. One the other hand, they cannot self-improve so much so that their self-improvements overstep men’s.

In Discourse on the Origins of Inequality, Rousseau argues that human passions (i.e., “to will, not to will, to desire and to fear”) bring forth human understanding and reason (page 14). In “The Education of Woman”, he observes that woman could only understand “practical” knowledge (aka. techne) but not “abstract and speculative truths, principles, scientific axioms and whatever else tend to generalise ideas” (aka. episteme) (Rousseau, page 281). Therefore, men should not teach them anything “…whose [utility] they cannot see” (Rousseau, page 267). However, women, as a component of the human species, share the same passions as men. It is inconsistent that the same passions generate different levels of knowledge capacities for men and women respectively.

In Discourse on the Origins of Inequality, Rousseau debunks natural hierarchy, and argues instead that the accumulation of private property and wealth led to human inequality (page 35). Correspondingly, slavery is unjustified because in a status of nature, no man’s survival is entirely dependent on others (Rousseau, page 23). On the other hand, in “The Education of Woman”, he directly contradicts himself: “…dependence being a state natural to women, girls feel that they are [made to obey]” so much as that “…they have…little liberty…to excess the liberty which is [granted to] them” (Rousseau, page 269). Also, he thinks that women’s “duty” of housekeeping is “…special, [indispensable and imposed by nature]” (Rousseau, page 290) so much as that women “…is hardly less a recluse in her house that a nun in her cloister” (Rousseau, page 282). I know no other terms other than slave to describe someone are not only made to obey but also perpetually spatially confined.

Rousseau’s two inconsistencies are straightforward: Women consist de facto a part of the human species while according to Rousseau, they do not possess in their entirety the capabilities thought by Rousseau himself that set humans apart from animals; Rousseau argues that humans are equal in a state of nature and natural slaves do not exist while he also encourages women to accept the inequality between the two sexes. Were these inconsistencies to be workable in some ways, Rousseau has to hold either that women do not belong to the human species or that women are excluded from Rousseau’s concept of equality. I think the latter is the case since the former suggestion is plainly absurd.

In both texts, Rousseau’s methodology is observational/empirical. In Discourse on the Origins of Inequality, he observes historical process leading to inequality, and then reasons about how this process came to be. In “The Education of Women”, he observes women in his time, and summarises their “natures”. The difference is that in Discourse on the Origins of Inequality, he not only just observes the historical facts, but also reasons how these facts came to be, while in “The Education of Women”, he merely “…observes [their] inclinations…” (Rousseau, page 263). This methodological difference contributes to those two inconsistencies: unlike in Discourse on the Origins of Inequality, Rousseau in “The Education of Women” takes his observed “natures” of women for justified without bothering to reason if they really are justified. Notably, when Rousseau opposes slavery in Discourse on the Origins of Inequality, he even rejects his own methodology in “The Education of Women”: “[We cannot…, from the servility of nations already enslaved, judge of the natural disposition of mankind for or against slavery]” (page 32).

If he were to reason, his would have arrived at different conclusions: If humans are indeed equal in a state of nature, why do women by and large appear weaker than men? From there, he would have been befuddled by the lack of natural reason for weaker women. If something is present while it has no reason to be, it is very likely that humans themselves have introduced it (as in the case of human inequality). Indeed, in Rousseau’s time, women behave according to their “natures” merely because their opportunity to behave otherwise is taken from them: It is not because all girls like dolls, but because dolls are the only toys they are given for the expectancy that they will like them, a philosophical phenomenon I term “the self-realisation of narratives”.

Since young, we are told to believe nothing until we see it with our own eyes. From Rousseau’s inconsistencies, another lesson is told: Is what we see always the absolute truth? Or, is it that we are so obsessed with our own predispositions that we cannot see otherwise, so much so that even if an obvious counterexample is present, we automatically treat it as unjustified and false, or worse, oppress what we think unjust according to our own guidelines (or in Rousseau’s words, the “nature”), and assume that justice is done? In short, do we allow our predispositions to be self-realised and run in circles? Karl Marx said, “[t]he philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways. [The point, however, is to change it]”. If we are to always bear the Marxian maxim in mind, nothing is justified because of their mere existence (otherwise, nothing ought to be changed), not even what we see for ourselves, if it has not gone through thorough investigation, deliberation and reasoning.

I identify Rousseau’s two inconsistencies in Discourse on the Origins of Inequality and “The Education of Women”, namely women (while being a part of human species)’s partial dispossession of capacities that distinguish humans from animals and men’s superiority over women while natural hierarchy is non-existent. These inconsistencies are in part resulted from Rousseau’s methodological difference, i.e. the use and absence of reasoning over his observations in respective texts, from which a lesson could be taught: to fend off “the self-realisation of narratives”, the justification of pure observations ought not to be taken for granted without careful investigation, deliberation and reasoning.

Works Cited

Marx, Karl. Eleven Theses on Feuerbach. Goodreads Quotes. Accessible At: https://www.goodreads.com/quotes/17310-the-philosophers-have-only-interpreted-the-world-in-various-ways

Rousseau, Jean Jacques. “Book Fifth: The Education of Women” (Excerpts Distributed On Canvas University Course System Under Course PHIL 330 001, 2018, University of British Columbia). Emile. pp. 259-303.

Rousseau, Jean Jacques. Discourse on the Origins of Inequality, Translated by G. D. H. Cole, The Academy of Dijon. Accessible Online at: https://www.aub.edu.lb/fas/cvsp/Documents/DiscourseonInequality.pdf879500092.pdf

1 thought on “The Necessary Exclusion of Women in Rousseau’s Concept of Equality

  1. Daniel O Zwicky

    The paragraph provides a comprehensive analysis of the inconsistencies in Rousseau’s views on women and equality in his works, “Discourse on the Origins of Inequality” and “The Education of Women.” The author highlights how Rousseau’s methodological differences between the two texts contribute to these inconsistencies and suggests that his observations in “The Education of Women” lack rigorous reasoning. The concluding message about the importance of critically examining observations and predispositions is a thought-provoking insight. Overall, it’s a well-structured and thoughtfully argued critique of Rousseau’s views.

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