(Disclaimer: Since this topic is frequented with Fake News and political biases, the author selects the sources he thinks trustworthy, however does not vouch for their authenticity.)
In 2010, the suicides of eighteen Chinese assembly-line workers aging between seventeen and twenty-five (resulting fourteen deaths and four survivors with crippling injuries) drew the global attention to the world’s largest electronics assembly company Foxconn (Pun et al. 2016). Since then, a wide range of social forces such as (scholarly) grassroots and media coverages has been committing themselves for bettering working conditions in Foxconn. There have been some changes. For example, workers’ wages have allegedly risen above the threshold of Chinese minimal wages (Lüthje and Butollo 2017).
However, Foxconn production mechanism, which is by design detrimental to workers, persists in China to this day. Fundamental issues such as incredibly long working hours and high work pressures have not seen any significant changes (short as “Foxconn Issue” in the following). Considering all those tremendous efforts from across a variety of social forces, the persistence of Foxconn production mechanism in China is mind-boggling. This paper addresses this puzzle by explaining why it persists and why state intervention is its ultimate solution.
Founded in Taiwan in 1974 (Qiu and Lin 2017), Foxconn with more than thirty factories in mainland China (Guo and Shen 2012) and more than 1.4 million workers (Pun et al. 2014) assemble more than half of all electronics worldwide (Pun et al. 2016). Being the world’s largest corporate workshop, it is also the dominant outsourced producer of Apple, the world’s richest technology corporation (Pun et al. 2014). Sixty to seventy percent of its revenue generates from producing Apple products (Jim 2013). On the flipside, it is also notorious for adopting an unbearably stringent management style and deliberately deskilling its assembly-line workers to “…facilitate flexible employment of large numbers of workers” (Lüthje and Butollo 2017). A Scholar on this issue, Ngai Pun, comments, Foxconn is “the prototype of twenty-first century capitalism” (Pun et al. 2016).
In previous literature, Foxconn production mechanism is consensually found inhumane. Once demanding orders (especially during Christmas shopping season and the launch of new iPhones) from technology companies like Apple come, Foxconn has two options, either assigning long working hours or hire more workers. The latter option is impossible because there is no way for Foxconn to hire enough new workers before contracted completion time (Pun et al. 2016). Therefore, for the existing workers, Foxcoon adopts the principle of “competition against time” (Pun et al. 2014). In total disregard of workers’ physical and mental health, their average working hours fall between sixty to seventy hours per week, which is in dire contrast with the Chinese laws of maximum forty hours of working hours per week and thirty-six hours of overtime per month (Pun et al. 2016).
The long working hours were also generated from Foxconn’s hierarchical management method: The top of the hierarchy are the company leaders who negotiate contracts with technology companies like Apple and set the production and revenue goals for their inferiors. In the hierarchy, the company leaders are followed by several layers of middle-rank managers who compete among themselves because their lucrative bonuses are distributed to those who achieve the tasks most efficiently and cut the most costs. This competition mechanism trickles all the way down to lowest managers (group leaders of several assembly-line workers). This competition of ultimate efficiency and cost lowering is tantamount to the competition of squeezing the most labour power from and assigning the most overtimes to the bottom of the hierarchy, i.e. the assembly-line workers (Feng 2017). Thus, many workers reported their workload being “absolute unreasonable” (Pun et al. 2016).
These overtimes and stressful workloads cannot be sustained without a strict supervision and punishment system. For supervision, Foxconn has equipped all work places with surveillance cameras and designated supervisors constantly patrol around (Pun et al. 2016) The 2011 Foxconn Factory Code lists 111 items of offenses concerning life discipline, business information security and production safety etc. (Feng 2017). If surveillance cameras or designated supervisors discover any offense, the following forms of punishments are identified in previous literature: demerit (taking away the opportunities of overtime bonuses (Feng 2017)), dismiss (forcing workers to quit by lowering their salaries with a variety of excuses (Zu 2009)), verbal abuse, beating, copying “Terry Guo’s (Foxconn’s CEO) Quotations”, public self-criticism (Pun et al. 2016) and detention (Qiu and Lin 2017). Besides, the managers also encourage other workers to disdain the workers who have breached the rules so that they feel shamed about their “wrongs” (Lüthje and Butollo 2017).
Thus seen, Regardless of their physical and mental health, Foxconn workers are being exploited to the extreme. They are stripped away of their human dignities, and are reduced to the most fungible workers, reminiscent of Marxist proletariats in the nineteenth century: “…the monthly turnover…[is] more over than [twenty percent] and the main body of the work force [is] replaced almost every six months…” (Feng 2017).
In history, Karl Marx urged workers to seize means of production from capitalists through violence. Contemporarily, such revolution is no longer an option—at the end of the day, someone must produce these Apple products to sustain the massive global demand. Still, influenced by Marxism, I believe that in order to really preserve workers’ rights, the fundamental interest of capitalists, i.e. profit, must be harmed. Because this fundamental interest has not much been affected, the current variety of social forces have not brought fundamental changes to Foxconn Issue.
In 2010, students and scholars from twenty universalities in mainland China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, together with a Hong Kong-based transnational campaign group SACOM (Students and Scholars against Corporate Misbehaviour) conducted a collective research on Foxconn working conditions. After the research, they submitted their report and petition to “…Foxconn, Apple, the State Council of the People’s Republic of China and the All-China Federation of Trade Unions” (Pun et al. 2014).
However, why did they draw offshore scholarly supports? Why could not the research be done with domestic academia? Why Taiwan and Hong Kong, whose higher education institutions are as a matter of fact particularly anti-China? If they draw their supports, it in theory would make the research harder to conduct because the Chinese government is particularly sensitive to their movements. On the other hand, Taiwan and Hong Kong-based academia has long been targeting mainland China. Thus, it is not hard to foresee that “…more than three hundred Taiwanese issued another open statement and…held a press conference…”. From there, international grassroots and press took the chance to binge on criticism, particularly in the U.S. (Pun et al. 2014.).
Some international anti-China forces also firmly grasped the chance to condemn China. A case in point is a paper titled “Worker–Intellectual Unity: Trans-border Sociological Intervention in Foxconn” written by Hong Kong scholars published in English, in which the authors condemn Chinese officials of media censorship, a typical channel of western antagonistic criticism:
“…[R]ather than analysing and taking actions to overcome the root causes of suicides, [Chinese officials] moved to [ban] ‘negative’ reporting about Foxconn (China Digital Times, 30 May 2010).” (Pun et al. 2014)
On one hand, when Foxconn suicides came out, Chinese media coverages de facto were all over. This outright defamation is de facto invalid (The authors also played a word game of “negative reporting”, but it is mind-boggling to think that any media would cover any suicide positively). On the other hand, since I never heard the media China Digital Times before. I look it up its website (see: https://chinadigitaltimes[.net]/) and found that it is fraught with provocative anti-China journals. It is also mind-boggling that any serious scholar would quote such dubious source.
If scholars are outright politically biased, it could be reasonably extrapolated that some grassroots and media could also be politically biased. Therefore, rather than really helping Foxconn workers, international grassroots and media to some extent elevates and complicates a worker/capitalist conflict to a combat of political ideaologies. More importantly, the “populist package”, i.e. reports, petitions (including posting memes and hashtags, “i[Slavery]” on social medias (Chan 2011)) and protests, does not hurt the fundamental interest of capitalists much, except mildly damaging their company images.
Worse still, irrational grassroots indignation inevitably leads to international boycott of Apple products (for example, they called on supporters to present the 250,000 signatures to Apple stores in different cities in early 2012) (Pun et al. 2014) without realising that once the demand of Apple products slide, massive Foxconn workers will inevitably lose their jobs.
The mildly damaged company images are compensated by Foxconn and Apple’s public relationship manipulations. Foxconn responded the public condemnations by hiring “psychologists and psychiatrists” only to prove that “’…nine…suicides in five month among a population of more than 500,000 was still far lower than [the national suicidal rate (sic.)]’, ignoring the fact that the suicides took place at a single company in a single city [whose] victims are in the prime of youth” (Pun et al. 2014). Foxconn also promised it would reduce overtime from a hundred hours per month (more than three times of the thirty-six hours legal limit) to eighty hours per month (mathematically speaking, less than two more days off) (Pun et al. 2014). In a survey two years later, fifty-seven percent of interviewees still experienced seventy-hour work in a week (as oppose to sixty hours as promised) (Lüthje and Butollo 2017).
In 2011, Apple released its Supplier Responsibility Progress Report, praising Foxconn for “…hiring a large number of psychological counselors, establishing a [twenty-four]-hour care center [(?)] and [even] attaching large nets to the factory building to prevent [impulsive] suicides” (Apple 2011). Through the wording, Apple attempted to present the suicides as if they are caused by personal psychological problems and the lack of psychological support in Foxconn factories. Apple’s public relationship strategy nicely draws the attention away from Foxconn Issue, and shuns its responsibility. Instead, Apple praises Foxconn in a rather comic way for taking quick (in fact, nonexistent) measures when discovered a problem (“the lack of psychological support”).
In 2012, Apple also became a member of the Fair Labour Association (FLA), and hastily commissioned a “special voluntary audit” to exam Foxconn factories. Apple seemingly turned to a third-party supervisor. In reality, “[the board of FLA] includes representative from Nike and agribusiness giants [(aka. other capitalists)], and is funded by the corporations that comprise its core membership and dominate its decision making” (Pun et al. 2016). In other words, the capitalists have joined together to form a public relation koncern in the disguise of being a “neutral third party”.
Thus seen, the companies never actually intended to really better Foxconn Issue, nor should they be expected because the capitalists are the designers of this issue exclusively to maximise their profit. Therefore, it is their best interest to maintain Foxconn production mechanism so long as no better way of maximising profit comes out to replace it, or no interference is so powerful that their maximising profit could be harmed. International grassroots and media must have helped (or have the potential to) drop the sales of Apple products. Otherwise, the companies would not have taken actions. Since international grassroots and media only harm their company images, they only repair their company images while keeping their profit maximising Foxconn production mechanism intact.
Another frequent grassroots petition is to unionise Foxconn workers. In fact, because Chinese government encourages unionisation in private companies, Foxconn workers do have an existing workers’ union inside the company (Lüthje and Butollo 2017). According to a survey by New Generation Migrant Workers Concern Programme (a domestic team of scholars and students interested in workers’ rights), the majority of Foxconn workers are not even aware of the existence of their union. Among those who know its existence, the majority thinks that it does not actually represent their interests. They report that their union is actually “the boss’s union”, and it is revengeful to those who form complaints (Feng 2017).
Even if the union is actually interested in defending workers, the union should not be expected to solve Foxconn Issue. Because in China, unions can legally organise strikes but shall not and have not organised a single case in the past decade (at least not reported in the media) (they are mainly reserved for workers’ leisure activities (Lüthje and Butollo 2017)). In Chinese politic logics, Chinese government treats most organised resistances including strikes protests, sit-ins and riots alike as threat to social stability, the priority of all priorities. For example, strikes could potentially provoke other strikes in important branches such as public transportation and electric grid, which could further create massive disasters considering the world’s largest population constantly need the supply of these public goods. If Foxconn organises a large-scale strike, no matter its intentions being good or bad, Chinese government, first and foremost, eliminates the threat to social stability. Strikes draw Foxconn workers’ potential ally, Chinese government further away.
Thus seen, it is all too naive to expect (scholarly) international grassroots and media, the involved companies themselves or workers’ union to bring fundamental change to Foxconn Issue: (scholarly) grassroots and media do not hurt capitalists’ fundamental interest while some of their true intensions are at least curious; Because Foxconn production mechanism serves their fundamental interest the best, the involved companies adopt public relation strategies to direct the public’s attention away from Foxconn Issue; Workers union inside the company is a dummy for workers’ virtual consolation while strikes are either almost impractical or draws antagonism from Chinese government. When these options are eliminated, state intervention of Chinese government is the only option left. Also, it could be rather effective.
Notably, the widespread of Foxconn factories is also in part assisted by all levels of Chinese government: In China, the state constantly control the prices of agricultural products—keeping the prices low so that most (including the massive poor) could afford some basic foods. The new generations of rural population finds it unattractive to take care of the fields anymore, so that enormous young rural population migrate into cities for better job opportunities, especially the most developed cities along the west shore such as Guangzhou and Shenzhen. However, these migrants receive lousy, little or even on education, thus unqualified for most “brainwork”. In the cities, they become like Marxist proletariats who can only subsist themselves (sometimes also their families) by selling their labour power. Chinese government does not want massive unemployment in the cities for these migrants. Therefore, Foxconn factories are welcomed. On the other hand, the local governments are also attracted by its potential to boost local GDPs and raise local tax revenues (Lüthje and Butollo 2017). Better still, with the concentration of population in certain places, economic scale effect elicits surrounding infrastructures and businesses (such as, more bus stops or restaurants nearby). Under Chinese government’s “Going West” project (Feng 2017), the State Council therefore approved the establishment of Foxconn factories in more inland cities in Chengdu and Chongqing in early 2011 (Pun et al. 2016).
In my research, some Hong Kong authors condemn the “state collusion with Foxconn” as if Chinese government deliberately intends to exploit these migrants in collusion with Foxconn, without realising that it has been an either-unemployment-or-Foxconn situation. Such condemnations demonstrate nothing but political biases.
Chinese government also takes action according to its interests. But unlike capitalists whose fundamental interest never changes, the interests of Chinese government are by and large determined by its ongoing agendas. In the 2000s, one of foremost economic agendas was to attract as many foreign capitals (together with their technologies) as possible. It provided relatively loose environments and enormous “population bonuses” to foreign capitalists, i.e. massive employment-thirsty cheap labour. In recent years however, Chinese government have made it crystal clear that it wants to very slowly get away from the cheap-labour based and export-driven economy (Feng 2017).
With the constant trade surplus with the U.S., China has stored an overabundance of U.S. dollars and bonds. To rid some of these U.S. dollars and bonds, China must very slowly exit being the world outsourcing hub.
From a social aspect, China is currently expecting an aging population (China Power). If massive young migrant-workers do not move away from cheap-labour jobs, for the Chinese society as a whole, the component of the young population will eventually be overburdened to support the massive upcoming money-demanding old.
The average income in China has been steadily rising (Trading Economics 2018). Marx discovered that capitalists have to at least pay “minimum wage” to cover workers’ basic life subsistence, so that workers do not die, and can keep working. Therefore, Foxconn workers’ wages, despite capitalists’ unwillingness, must also rise. Chinese government prudently observes the trend that the wages will eventually rise to such an extent that comparing to other cheap-labour areas (e.g. Southeast Asia and Africa), the “population bonuses” will fade away in the end.
Also, western anti-China forces have been using Foxconn Issue to falsely condemn Chinese government. By helping the workers, Chinese government could debunk such prominent defamation, and maintain its positive image of a leading country.
Chinese government’s agendas, aka. its interests, has shifted to the side beneficial to Foxconn workers. It indeed has taken effective first steps to throttle the fundamental interests of capitalists: Since 2003, according to different economic situations of different locations, The legal National Minimum Wage refreshes every three years; tax benefits of locating factories in cities along the west shore has been gradually taken away. Because these policy changes directly hurt the fundamental interest of capitalists, capitalists’ reactions are instantaneous: In recent years, Foxconn has been trying to relocate some of its factories to more inland underdeveloped locations where the National Minimum Wage is (sometimes much) lower. Much more workers have been employed in factories closer to their homes, reducing the overpopulation pressure in cities along the west shore (Lüthje and Butollo 2017). Economic scale effect is also expected to happen in these relocated underdeveloped locations, followed by raised National Minimum Wage in the long run.
At the same time, Chinese government also launched a series of countryside development projects such as “Construction of New Socialist Countryside (she hui zhu yi xin nong cun jian she)” (such as building infrastructures like better schools) and the latest “Targeted Poverty Alleviation (jing zhun fu pin)” under chairman Xi’s calling. These projects aim at providing better alternatives for the new generations of rural population than cramming into cheap-labour factories, potentially as close as to their homes.
On one hand, Chinese government gradually withdraws Foxconn’s benefits, raising its costs of producing in China; on the other hand, Chinese government attempts to redirect migrant-workers to other jobs, cutting down Foxconn’s worker supply. Notably, contrary to popular state interventions such as setting quotas, assigning fines and forcible confiscation, because Chinese government does not want to scare away foreign capitals, these state interventions have never actually directly intervened Foxconn. Instead, having understood the fundamental interest of capitalists, they effectively intervene on the periphery, allowing Foxconn to automatically consider relocating to other countries, thus eventually uprooting Foxconn Issue in China.
After 2010 Foxconn worker suicide tragedy, a wide range of social forces including (scholarly) grassroots and media have devoted themselves into helping tackling Foxconn Issue. Since these efforts do not harm much the fundamental interest of capitalists, namely profit, they are seen little success. Besides, some ill-intended social forces take the chance to falsely condemn Chinese government in collusion with Foxconn, which not only does not help correct Foxconn Issue, but also draw unnecessary political tensions. Besides, the much-anticipated workers’ union works in collusion with Foxconn, unable to organise strikes that are, on the other hand, irrational to conduct in China. On the contrary, with the change of its economic agenda from attracting foreign capitals to laying off cheap-labour economy, Chinese government intervene Foxconn peripherally, i.e. raising its labour costs and shrinking its worker supply, which directly hurts the fundamental interest of capitalist, urging them to relocate their factories to other countries where cheap labour is still available.
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