By Titus Tan

Cyberbullying is a relatively new form of bullying that is perpetrated through electronic devices (Smith et al., 2018). It has several different characteristics compared with traditional face-to-face bullying: it is not restricted to time and space, its perpetrators operate semi-anonymously, it has potentially innumerable audiences (Grigg, 2010), physical strength is no longer important due to the lack of physical contact (Nocentini et al., 2010), one can be perpetrator and victim at the same time (especially among youth), it is not always intentional (Yang and Salmivalli, 2013), and finally it is more lasting since cyberbullying contents stay online if not deleted (Deschamps and McNutt, 2016). Cyberbullying in Canada is prevalent: it is estimated thirty-five percent of Canadians have been involved with cyberbullying. Considering the problem of non-disclosure, this is likely an underestimation (Hemphill et al., 2012).

A plethora of researches reveal that cyberbullying results in a number of serious harms to its victims including depression, marginalisation, antisocial behaviours, suicide (Deschamps and McNutt, 2016), anxiety, lower self-esteem (Hertz et al., 2013), loss of appetite, sleeplessness, feelings of social  isolation (Sourander et al., 2010) impacts on academic performance, maladaptive behaviours (aggression, smoking, drinking and shoplifting) and absenteeism (Schenk and Fremouw, 2012). Therefore, although there is no offence specifically named cyberbullying in Canadian Criminal Code, a number of offences that break down cyberbullying attempt to stop this harmful phenomenon (Canadian Department of Justice, 2013): Bill C-13 (Protecting Canadians from Online Crime Act) which came into force on March, 2015 criminalises nonconsensual distribution of intimate images through Section 162 of Canadian Criminal Code, and extends Section 372 which prohibits “false messages, indecent [and] harassing telephone calls [which] intend to [harass,] alarm or annoy a person or [which repeatedly] makes indecent communication” to be applicable for “electronic communication” (language slightly modified by the author) (Coburn et al., 2015). Since almost all cases of cyberbullying involve at least one of “harassment, alarming, annoyment, indecency and distribution of intimate images” (Coburn et al., 2015), almost all cases of cyberbullying could potentially be crimes. Therefore, the prevention of cyberbullying is a criminological concern. 

Most scholarly literature on cyberbullying primarily focuses on its perpetrators and victims, while overlooking another role at play, its bystanders (Deschamps and McNutt, 2016), or those who witness cyberbullying taking place between the perpetrators and victims (Cleemput et al., 2014). This is partly because a number of scholars still attempt to understand cyberbullying with the theories of traditional face-to-face bullying (see for example: Cleemput et al., 2014, p.1). Those theories typically identify three typical features of traditional face-to-face bullying, namely “intent, repetition and power imbalance” (Smith et al. 2008), none of which touches on the role of bystanders. While it may be true for traditional face-to-face bullying that bystanders are not very helpful for explaining such phenomenon, it is not to be taken granted for cyberbullying. On the contrary, I argue that from a media studies perspective, bystanders assume an unexpected pivotal position in forming the phenomenon of cyberbullying.

The limited researches around bystanders usually study their reactions to witnessing cyberbullying that are generally divided into three categories, namely ignoring, helping victims or joining in perpetrators (see for example: Cleemput et al., 2014). A consensus of their research results is that the majority of bystanders simply ignore their witnessed cyberbullying. Researchers deliberate a number of reasons for their inaction. The result for the most common reason selected is rather consistent among these researches: the majority of bystanders think, “it is none of my business” (see for example: Cleemput et al., 2014), followed by relatively less common reasons including “I could get bullied myself”, “I did not know how to help the victims” and “I cannot help the victims” (Cleemput et al., 2014). 

However, these reasons, for me, are not actual reasons but rationalisations. If they were to be legitimate reasons, researchers have to assume that bystanders by default are strict moral abiders who tend to help victims, should they not be hindered by the foregoing “reasons”, and that inaction is an anomaly that absolutely requires reasons to help explain. Therefore, these researches could be considered as a form of “moral kidnapping” (“Dao De Bang Jia”, a Chinese concept which means to use others’ morals as leverages to serve our purposes) that allows the scholars to assume random bystanders to be strict moral abiders and to force reasons out of their inaction. This misunderstanding of bystanders’ role is shared by almost all scholarly literature around bystanders.

In reality, as the research results themselves suggest, the majority of bystanders do not intend to interfere in the first place, “It is none of my business” (Cleemput et al., 2014). If bystanders are not to be expected to be “hibernating messiahs” for cyberbullying, instead from a media study perspective, they can be viewed as the audiences of a mass communication event named cyberbullying. Perpetrators as media content producers always cater to bystanders’ needs as their audiences, otherwise for the lack of audiences, their purposes, whatever they may be, cannot be met through cyberbullying. Moreover, statistics show that this potential audience is immerse: an Ipsos poll finds that around twenty percent of Canadian teenagers have witnessed cyberbullying (2013).

To parallel from journalism, a specific type of mass communication event, cyberbullies can be seen as journalists, and victims their stories of interest. Similar to journalists who are expert in digging out the most sensational spectacles, the question that cyberbullies consciously or unconsciously prioritises is: what is “spreadworthy”? In other words, cyberbullies always bear in mind bystanders’ potential interests, sometimes even before intending to cause harm to their victims. This is supported by the finding that cyberbullying among youth more often than not is not intentional, nor do they evaluate them as morally serious as adults (Talwar et al. 2014). In extreme cases, the intention to cause harm may have never even crossed cyberbullies’ mind, all they have in mind may just be: “Owh! This is interesting, let me put it online!”. That is to say, cyberbullies may detect the “spreadworthiness” of certain contents before, if ever, realising the harm of spreading. Although no scholar has reported such extreme cases so far (possibly because no one has thought of this way), impulsivity is known to have a high positive correlation with joining in cyberbullying (Erreygers et al., 2016). 

David S. Byers finds that bystanders’s justifications of whether to help victims are often based on victims’ social identities such as race, class, gender identity and sexual orientation (2016). He offers the following example: Tyler Clementi’s sexual encounter with another man is videotaped by his roommate Dharun Ravi and posted on Twitter and Facebook (Foderaro, 2010). Consciously or unconsciously, Ravi knew that homosexual videoes were going to become a “hit”. Many bystanders indeed wrote on Ravi’s page to express their homophobic disgust. Had Clementi been a heterosexual, Ravi would have been much less motivated to videotape, since there would have been nothing sensational with which Ravi could attract bystanders, even if Ravi intended to harass Clementi. 

Katrien Van Cleemput et al finds that almost two thirds of victims are schoolmates of bystanders (2014). In other words, contrary to the false impression brought by news reports of rare but sensational cases, Canadian youth are far more likely to be cyberbullied by people they frequent in real life than random strangers with superior technology skills who are located far away from their targets (Deschamps and McNutt, 2016). Although perpetrators who frequent victims in real life are much easier to have intent to cause harm to them (e.g. they get into a conflict of romantic relationships) than random strangers, they are also more easy to be identified and stopped, should victims do not have reasons for concealing their victimisation. 

However, Qing Li’s survey shows that over forty percent of Canadian youth do not tell anyone about their victimisation, and nighty percent do not inform an adult (2006). This is because of another important facet of the question, what is “spreadworthy”?: what can spread longer? Consciously or unconsciously, I suggest that perpetrators who frequent victims in real life know they are easy to get caught. Therefore, they need to find cyberbullying contents that are unlikely to be revealed by victims, such as their innermost secrets (especially concerning sexualities). More sophisticated perpetrators act as vigilantes and suggest that for some (especially moral) reasons, their victims deserve to be cyberbullied. To illustrate with Clementi’s case, Clementi only told a selected few about his victimisation because he had not come out as a homosexual by the time of cyberbullying, and those who wrote on Ravi’s page to express disgust obviously think that Clementi had deserved to be exposed (Byers, 2016).

Most current countermeasures of cyberbullying (criminological aspect) fall into the category of educating perpetrators, victims and bystanders (especially students, parents and teachers in school settings) about the harms of cyberbullying. For example, after the suicide of victim Rehteah Parsons, the third cyberbullying suicide in Nova Scotia, the provincial government requires schools to collect incident data and monitor [(cyber-)]bullying activities with the new Bill 30 (Promotion of Respectful and Responsible Relationships Act). Besides, in early 2014, Canadian Federal Government introduced “Stop Hating Online” four-million-dollar national campaign distributing a variety of television and internet advertisements against cyberbullying among youth (Deschamps and McNutt, 2016). The main rationale behind this is that since researches arrive at a consensus that empathy has a high positive correlation with bystanders’ helping victims (Cleemput et al., 2014), it is expected that education aimed at inducing empathy leads to more bystanders’ helping victims (Davis and Nixon, 2012). 

While there is little to no research on the efficacy of these educational countermeasures, I list several reasons why I suspect that they may not be as effective. Although it is well researched that empathic bystanders are very likely to help victims (Cleemput et al., 2014), it is still unclear whether education is able to effectively make the majority of indifferent bystanders become empathetic. Furthermore, if the majority of bystanders already feel indifferent about helping victims, it is highly doubtful whether they would take educational countermeasures seriously, if not feeling reluctant or even a complete waste of their time. Besides, Cyberbullying is not limited to the underaged. For example, almost eighty percent of university students in Columbia have witnessed cyberbullying (Sarmiento et al., 2019), a percentage way higher than any percentage documented for youth age groups. Since the older people are, the more reluctant they feel about “being educated”, I am pessimistic about the efficacy of educational countermeasures on people who have already gone through teenagehood. Finally, if roughly thirty-five percent of Canadian youth has witnessed cyberbullying (Hemphill et al., 2012), an abundance of other Canadians may have never witnessed cyberbullying. Unlike advertising something that concerns every Canadian such as wearing helmets for cyclers, the cost efficiency of four million dollars (Deschamps and McNutt, 2016) for advertising anti-cyberbullying that only concerns some Canadian is rather low.

From a media studies perspective, like all mass communication events, cyberbullying has three crucial components, namely perpetrators (media producers), victims and bystanders (media consumers) and the internet (means of communication), and respectively three general types of countermeasures, namely stopping perpetrators, redirecting bystanders and victims and monitoring the internet. All ongoing education countermeasures belong to the first two categories, and are expected to be ineffective as explained above. Indeed, the first two categories of countermeasures are usually effective when the media producers or consumers are known or at least highly predictable, which is clearly not the case for cyberbullying. This leaves us only the last type of countermeasure, monitoring the internet. 

While it is unrealistic to expect random bystanders to help victims, most media technology companies already have paid monitors to watch for contents posted on their sites. Still, it is unrealistic to monitor all contents, nor are most contents culpable of cyberbullying. For example, although Bill C-13 criminalises nonconsensual distribution of intimate images (Coburn et al., 2015), consensual distribution of sexual contents are permitted by the Canadian Criminal Code, which makes it almost impossible for monitors to filter out nonconsensual ones from an ocean of sexual contents online. However, Cleemput et al.’s research shows that 4.6 percent of youth have helped victims and almost one fifth of youth claimed that their inaction had been because “I did not know how to help the victim” (2014). These research results implies that a small amount of bystanders already with high empathy wants to help. Plus. Cleemput et al. also find that part of the reasons why some bystanders did not know how to help the victim is due to technical difficulties (2014). Indeed, from my personal experience with Facebook, Facebook does not highlight the section where I can report suspicious contents. Therefore, should media technology constantly highlight their report functions and take down cyberbullying contents where they deem necessary, perpetrators will automatically back off for their inability to reach a broad audience.

Cyberbullying, or bullying with electronic communication, is a new form of bullying prevalent in Canada. Since it can result in a series of serious harms, Canadian Criminal Code attempts to stop it through a number of offenses. Therefore, criminology studies such as this one aims at finding feasible ways of its prevention. In current scholarly literature, almost all scholars either downplay the role of bystanders in forming cyberbullying, or potentially mistake bystanders’ role as strict moral abiders. From a media studies perspective, I have demonstrated bystanders’ pivotal position as audiences of perpetrators, since perpetrators always need to cater to their audiences to maintain the further spreading of their cyberbullying contents. Finally, unlike most ongoing educational countermeasures that are expected to be ineffective, I suggest that cyberbullying should be stopped by setting barriers to its means of communication, that is monitoring the internet by paid monitors of technology companies looking more carefully into reported contents on their sites.

Bibliography

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By Titus Tan

The traditional debate around civil disobedience is whether the moral obligation to obey the law exists. John Rawls argues that it does because in just societies, it is their members’ duty to further their just institutions (argument specified below) (319-327). Lyons objects Rawls’ argument, because among historical exemplars of civil disobedience, social groups, to which disobedients belong, face such deeply entrenched injustice that the moral obligation to obey the law can be in no way assumed (argument specified below) (337-344). However, I do not intend to join this traditional debate. Instead, I argue that they both have looked into the wrong direction: they assume that civil disobedience is resulted from social injustice, while it is in fact caused by the damage to social interests. From my argument, it will eventually be clear that this debate is irrelevant from the topic of civil disobedience.

Rawls starts with his Two Principles of justice:

Principle One: Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all. Principle Two: Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged […], and attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity. (319)

Societies that are in principle organised according to the Two Principles are termed “just societies” (Rawls 321). In these societies, their members have a moral obligation to obey the law, because it is only fair when societal members assume the burden of obeying the law in exchange for enjoying the benefits guaranteed by the Two Principle through legislation (Rawls 319-320).

Still, some unjust laws (laws that violate the Two Principles) inevitably exist in societies that are by and large organised according to the Two Principles. These societies are termed “societies of near justice” (Rawls 321). However, since the basic structure of the societies is just, attempts to bring changes to unjust laws, that is civil disobedience, are bound by a series of strict conditions: civil disobedience must be, or reasonably believed to be, the last resort of resistance, after using out all other legal means (Rawls 324-325), done in public because they have to address those in power, nonviolent because otherwise it is unjust for Principle One is violated, and finally whose participants willingly accept their legal consequences because like in “just societies”, they are bound by a moral obligation to obey the law (Rawls 322). In short, civil disobedience is justified insofar as it is exclusively motivated by and aimed at storing justice back to the societies (Rawls 322).

In light of historical exemplars of civil disobedience, Lyons finds that the social injustice towards the social groups, to which disobedients belong, is so deeply-entrenched that the moral obligation to obey the law can be in no way assumed (337-344). Although disobedients, like other members of the society, share some benefits provided by social institutions, the burdens they assume are significantly greater than their peers (such is the case for black people under Jim Crow (Lyons 340)) (Lyons 339), which clearly violates the Two Principles. This in turn makes the society outrightly unjust, rather than being “nearly just”, as contemplated by Rawls (321) (Indeed, Lyons points out that Rawls misses a crucial component in his theory of justice: in no place does he clarify how to differentiate “societies of near justice” (Rawls 321) and outright unjust societies (339)). Provided that the society is unjust, the moral obligation to obey the law does not apply. Moreover, Lyons extends his argument to all societies: since few, if any, societies is free of deeply-entrenched injustice towards certain social groups, the moral obligation to obey the law cannot be assumed in any given society (343).

Historical exemplars of civil disobedience such as the case of Martin Luther King Jr. match somewhat perfectly Rawls’ conditions above, which seems to suggest that disobedients in these cases sincerely believe that they have a moral obligation to obey the law (Lyons 340). However, Lyons reveals that these cases match Rawl’s condition not because they follow Rawls’ reasonings, but out of pragmatic and tactical concerns (341). For example, civil disobedience under King’s leadership was nonviolent, not because King believes that he has a moral obligation to obey the law to be nonviolent, but because the use of violence would have led the declines in the number of his financial supporters and potentially a total crackdown of his movement, considering that his fellow disobedients and financial supporters are seriously outnumbered by the American police and their opposers (same is true for other conditions in the last paragraph) (Lyons 342).

I shall clear out the mystery of whether King sincerely believes that he has a moral obligation to obey the law. In his “Letter From Birmingham Jail”, he clearly stated, “we [(referring to his fellow disobedients)] realise that we were the victims of a broken promise” (311). To understand what this “promise” refers to, Lyons finds that King praised the central values of the Declaration of Independence and American Constitution, but condemned the American government’s actual practice of them (343). From this claim, I reasonably think that this “promise” refers to the promises written in these two documents. Since King praises this “promise”, I also reasonably induce that he believes that the promises written in these two documents are just. However, King also deems such promise “broken”, that is to say, American government has not fulfilled the promises written in the two documents that ought to yield:

…[I]n the long run, the burden of injustice should be more or less evenly distributed over different groups of people in society, and the hardship of unjust policies should not weigh too heavily in any particular case. (Rawls 321)

Therefore, King believes that American society is simply unjust, rather than being “near just”, as contemplated by Rawls (321). It follows that King’s case is not an example of Rawls’ theory of civil disobedience.

However, King also underscores that “[o]ne has a moral [obligation] to obey just laws [and] to disobey unjust laws” (312). This sets King aside from Lyons’ total negation of the moral obligation to obey all laws. However, it is logically unsound (it challenges the law of non-contradiction) to conclude that King does not believe that he has a moral obligation to obey the law (not Rawlsian), and at the same time he also does not believe that he has not a moral obligation to obey the law (not Lyonsian). My solution to this logical fallacy is that King’s reference to law in this context does not mean the American law, and indeed not any existing law, but his version of philosophical natural law. Below is a direct written testimony from King in support of my solution:

A just law is a man-made code that squares with the moral law or the law of God. An unjust law is a code that is out of harmony with the moral law. To put in the terms of St. Thomas Aquinas: An unjust law that is not rooted in eternal law and natural law. (312)

In this light, his division between just and unjust laws is such: Just laws are laws that are consistent with his version of philosophical natural law, and vice versa. It follows that when particular American laws only happens to be consistent to his version of philosophical natural law, he believes that he has a moral obligation to obey them, and vice versa. Besides, this also explains why King believes one has a moral obligation to disobey unjust laws (312): all natural law theorists more or less expect that natural law can be gradually revealed in existing laws. Thus seen, King is not a suitable example to support either Rawls’ or Lyons’ theory of civil disobedience, since they discuss about different kinds of laws, one is existing laws, the other is a kind of philosophical natural law.

Some principles of King’s version of natural law are revealed when he wrote the distinctions between just and unjust laws, since just laws are consistent with his version of natural law: his version of natural law “uplifts human personality” (rather than humiliating human personality), is binding to all (rather than being binding to social groups and not others), and is open for anyone to take part in its enacting or devising (rather than being enacted and devised exclusively by the ruling), and finally whose application must be as just (in the sense of obeying some of the foregoing principles just now) as is written in the books (312-313).

Although, similar to Rawls, King appeals to justice to determine whether he has a moral obligation to obey the law, King’s conception of “justice” is drastically different from Rawls’: King’s conception of justice is closely bound to the real-life situation of the social group of black American community. For example, King’s requirement of just laws to be binding to all is a direct response to laws like Jim Crow that clearly violates this requirement (same is true for all the other principles in the last paragraph) (312). It can be seen from this example that King’s “justice” is anything that supports the interests of black American community (their “natural laws”). Therefore, the damage to the interests of a certain social group, in lieu of Rawlsian justice, is what actually gives rise to civil disobedience. If civil disobedience has no necessary connection with the conception of justice, the moral obligation to obey the law that is derived from the conception of justice is also irrelevant from the topic of civil disobedience.

Rawls’ theory assumes that the reason for civil disobedience is a sense (or duty) of justice among the disobedients (Rawls 322), thus creating a misleading impression that disobedients are a group of justice vigilantes, who constantly carry the burden of justice, and restlessly use it as a touchstone of measuring their actions. Instead, my theory suggests that civil disobedience is a natural reaction when some laws damage ordinary people. Lyons, albeit rejecting Rawls’ presumption of the moral obligation to obey his version of philosophical natural law, does not challenge Rawls’ conception of this fundamental motive of civil disobedients. Meanwhile, Lyons commits a naturalist fallacy: just because the historical exemplars of civil disobedience show that the moral obligation of obeying the law does not exist (fact), it does not automatically yield that it ought not to exist (value). These are the reasons why Rawls’ and Lyons’ theories fail and my theory stands.

The traditional debate around civil disobedience is whether the moral obligation to obey the law exists. This debate is misled by Rawls presumption that in “just or nearly just societies” (Rawls 321), civil disobedience exclusively serves the purpose of restoring justice back to societies (322). Lyons discovers that Rawlsian “just or nearly just societies” (321) simply does not exist (343). Correspondingly, the moral obligation to obey the law does not exist. However, his opposition still acquiesce that agreeing with Rawls, the sense of justice is the reason that leads to civil disobedience. In light of King’s case of civil disobedience, I illustrate that the damage to the interests of social groups (their “natural laws”), rather than Rawlsian justice, elicits civil disobedience. If justice has little to do with civil disobedience, its derivative, the moral obligation to obey the law, will be irrelevant from the topic of civil disobedience.

Work Cited

King, Martin Luther Jr.. “Letter from Birmingham Jail” (Inside “Chapter Twelve: The Duty to Oppose Injustice”, “Part Three: Civil Disobedience and the Obligation to Obey Law”). Classic Readings and Cases in the Philosophy of Law, Edited by Susan Dimock, Published by Routledge, 2016, pp. 310-317, https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/e/9781315509655.

Lyons, David.. “Moral Judgment, Historical Reality and Civil Disobedience” (Inside “Chapter Fifteen: Civil Disobedience and the Presumption of an Obligation to Obey the Law”, “Part 3: Civil Disobedience and the Obligation to Obey Law”). Classic Readings and Cases in the Philosophy of Law, Edited by Susan Dimock, Published by Routledge, 2016, pp. 337-344, https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/e/9781315509655.

Rawls, John.. “Civil Disobedience and Conscientious Refusal” (Inside “Chapter Thirteen: Civil Disobedience and Conscientious Refusal”, “Part 3: Civil Disobedience and the Obligation to Obey Law”). Classic Readings and Cases in the Philosophy of Law, Edited by Susan Dimock, Published by Routledge, 2016, pp. 319-327, https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/e/9781315509655.

By Titus Tan

Cultural relativism is a value theory in philosophy that all values (that is, what is good and bad) are only determined by what the majority of the cultures, to which one belongs, think. Therefore, this theory necessitates the absolute denial of any universal value (that is, values applicable to all humans regardless of which cultures they belong to). 

I acknowledge that the majority opinions on what is acceptable vary greatly from culture to culture. For example, homosexuality is considered as one of the quitessential means to the good life in ancient Greece, whereas it remains criminalised in some countries to this day (Benedict 2). However, I question whether these differences are indeed value differences, so much as that they have to deny the existence of any universal value. If universal values by all means did not exist, the almost universal condemnation of faschism would not exist (Gensler 45). 

To reject this absolute denial of any universal value, I argue for a modified version of cultural relativism that universal values are represented in different forms in different cultures. It is these representational forms rather than values themselves that are relative to cultures. Any value that challenges these universal values (faschism for example) should itself also be challenged as bad values.

To give an example for cultural relativism, some people in Canada are perfectly accustomed to saying “thank you” to bus drivers upon exiting buses. As a Chinese international student, I found this rather intriguing, because people in China will rarely say “thank you”, if the benefactors help us out of their duties. I imagine a cultural relativist would say to this case there is no universal principle to compel one to say “thank you” or not to, and that both actions are appropriate in their respective cultures.

However, if one examines this case according to my argument, there will be a different picture. By dint of a thorough understanding of Chinese culture, these two seemingly distinctive responses serve in fact a universal value despite being represented differently in their respective cultures, that is respect. In China, people will sometimes feel disrespected, if people say “thank you” to their performance of duties, because they feel that those who say “thank you” actually imply that their performance of duties is aimed for some less honorable ends other than duties themselves. Thus seen, although these two cultures represent the universal value respect in different representational forms, they are not to be mistaken as being values themselves.

I think that the reason why some western people adopted cultural relativism is due in large part to their shared guilt of historical cultural imposition (except the minorities such as white supremacists): In history, western cultures had fostered the first civilisation and industrialisation, thus they were convinced that their cultures are superior to other cultures, which further justified their cultural imposition onto other “uncivilised” cultures in the name of “doing good” for them. 

To exemplify, western psychiatry has a long history of pathologising people with trance and catalepsy. However, anthropologist Ruth Benedict revealed that these “abnormal” people by western standards are revered by people from some other cultures, in which these “abnormal” people actually perform pivotal social characters such as shamans (2). 

In the present day, the west has by and large realised this historical wrongdoings and is in the process of reconciling with people from other cultures. In this process, cultural relativism constantly works as a caveat attempting to stop replaying such historical wrongdoings: If all western people share some degree of cultural relativism, they are more likely to curb from telling people from other cultures what is right or wrong.

This may seem persuasive, especially to those who have the implacable guilt at the back of their minds. However, to accept cultural relativism in wholesale is tantamount to jump from one extreme to another: it is either that western values are by default right, therefore totally justified to subvert other cultures’ values or that values are invariably relative to cultures, therefore western people are never entitled to judge for people from a different culture, even if they belong to an almost universally-condemned culture such as faschism. 

My modified version of cultural relativism, on the other hand, is aimed at reconciling this conflict: it holds true belief that universal values are identifiable across the majority of cultures, enabling its adopters to condemn faschism alike, while respecting the different representational forms in different cultures. Therefore, it also urges people from different cultures to seek commonalities in those universal values and restore differences in their representational forms.

In Benedict’s examples, shamans are key political characters in their cultures. Unlike in western politics, shamans’ powers are conferred neither by royal status nor by the popular vote, but by (one possibility) the shared belief among all members of the culture that people with trance and catalepsy are gifted to receive messages from their divinities. However, regardless of which political forms people from different cultures choose to adopt, these variants all serve a universal value in politics, that is social stability and well-functioning.

Harry Gensler (in the voice of Ima Relativist) summerises that if someone morally criticises another person from a different culture, his/her criticism must be based on certain underlying criteria that determine what is good or bad. According to cultural relativism, these criteria in turn are based on the values of the majority of people in one’s culture. Therefore, moral criticism against people from different cultures must always be equivalent to value imposition (45). 

In order for this argument to work, it must be accepted that value imposition is universally bad and tolerance is universally good (Ima Relativist argues for this) (Gensler 45), which directly contradicts cultural relativism itself. Indeed, any value judgement in support of cultural relativism must resort to some universal values. This reveals that even cultural relativists themselves make advantage of universal values to prove the validity of their theory. However, my modified version of cultural relativism could undergo this nightmare of cultural relativism: cultural relativism itself is a kind of representational form of universal values.

Cultural relativism, or the theory that values are the same as majority opinions in a given culture, together with its absolute denial of universal values, cannot be justified because cultural relativism disables the possibility of condemning some de facto already-universally-condemned cultures such as faschism. Besides, all arguments attempting to prove the goodness of cultural relativism have to benefit from some universal values, which by definition run contrary to cultural relativism itself. Meanwhile, my modified version of cultural relativism that acknowledges the existence of universal values and their different representational forms in different cultures not only passes the counter-arguments above, but also promote intercultural understanding by its implication of seeking commonalities while restoring differences.

Work Cited

Benedict, Ruth. “Anthropology and the Abnormal”. 1934, pp. 1-4. https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/abc3/24dfdd6839b7d47ebc707ebda5e1cd99f79a.pdf

Gensler, Harry. “Cultural Relativism” (Inside Part One: The Status of Morality). Ethical Theory : An Anthology, Edited by Russ Shafer-Landau, Blackwell Publishers Ltd., pp. 44-47

Titus Tan

Christoph Heins „Die Vergewaltigung“ (1994) beschreibt eine Frau, die durch die Erfahrung der Vergewaltigung ihrer Großmutter von den Sowjetsoldaten während der Besetzung Deutschlands nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg traumatisiert ist. Trotzdem ist sie danach so erfolgreich in einer amtlichen Karriere, dass sie eingeladen wird, die Ansprache zu einer Jugendweihe zu halten. In ihrer Ansprache rühmt sie durchaus den damaligen Beschützer Deutschlands, die Sowjetunion, ohne die Vergewaltigung zu erwähnen. Nachdem ihr Mann Jürgen fragte, warum sie absichtlich die Vergewaltigung in der Ansprache vermieden hatte, beschimpft sie ihn als einen Faschisten (Hein 131-138). Merkwürdig ist es, dass sie auf Jürgens Fragen mit so intensiven Überreaktionen reagiert. Um diesen heftigen Emotionsausbruch zu erklären, argumentiere ich, dass Ilona ihr wahres Trauma aus der Vergewaltigung mithilfe der von sich selbst erfundenen alternativen Geschichten unterdrückt.

Am Anfang berichtet Hein die allgemeine Begebenheit der Vergewaltigung:

Zwei Tage nach dem siebzehnten Geburtstag von Ilona R., Tochter eines Landarbeiters in einem Dorf östlich von Preuzlau, wurde ihre vierundsechzigjährige Großmutter im August 1945 von zwei marodierenden Soldaten der sowjetischen Streitkräfte vergewaltigt. (131)

Bemerkenswert ist der nachrichtenartige Beschreibungston mit extrem präzisen Einzelheiten, z.B. , dem genauen Datum, dem genauen Ort, den genauen Identitäten der zwei Täter. Anschauend distanziert Hein als ein gefühlloser Betrachter absichtlich von seiner menschlichen Anteilnahme zu seinen Charakteren.

Bei der Schilderung des Verlaufs der Vergewaltigung geht dieser distanzierte Beschreibungston weiter. Obwohl Hein die Gräueltat detailliert beschreiben könnte, um die Hässlichkeit der Täter und den Kummer des Opfers auszudrücken, fasst er zusammen: „Die angetrunkenen Soldaten vergewaltigten […] die Bäuerin und verließ danach das Gehöft“, als wäre die Vergewaltigung nur eine Belanglosigkeit im Verlauf ihres Marodierens (131).

Gewöhnlich nimmt man an, dass Hein diesen nachrichtlichen Beschreibungston anwendet. Indessen gibt es eine andere Hypothesenmöglichkeit: Was wäre, wenn der Erzähler nicht der Autor, sondern Ilona ist? Um ihr wahres Trauma zu unterdrücken erzählt Ilona sich eine trivialisierte alternative Geschichte als einen Ersatz für die Wahrheit, dass die Vergewaltigung zu einem ganz üblichen und gewöhnlichen Geschehen während der Kriegszeite gehört.

In der Geschichte benutzt Ilonas Großmutter ähnliche (Selbst-)Troststrategie: kurz nach der Vergewaltigung sagt sie ihren jüngeren Verwandten, „Was heult ihr dummen Küken? Hab ich mir ein Bein gebrochen?“ (Hein 132). Darin lässt es sich entdecken, dass die Trivialisierung der grausamen Wahrheiten als eine übliche Troststrategie der vom Sowjetregime unterdrückten Deutschen gilt.

Im Gegensatz dazu ist dieser Beschreibungston bei Ilonas Ansprache mit dem vorigen nachrichtlichen Beschreibungston stark kontrastiert:

Ihren Berichte beendete sie mit der Mahnung, stets die Freundschaft mit anderen Völkern zu pflegen, besonders mit jenen, die Deutschland vom Faschismus befreit hatten, damit diese finsteren Jahre der deutschen Geschichte endgültig und unwiederbringlich vorbei seien. (Hein 131)

Ersichtlich ändert Hein hierbei den Beschreibungston. Durch die Beschreibung der detaillierten Ausschnitte aus Ilonas Ansprache ist der Beschreibungston viel leidenschaftlicher als früher, um ihre Leidenschaft bei der Ansprache auszudrücken.

Es gibt zwei widersprüchliche Geschichten. Einerseits unterdrückt Ilona ihr wahres Trauma als eine Belanglosigkeit, sie überzeugt sich von der von ihr selbst erfundenen alternativen Geschichte, dass die Sowjetunion als der lobenswürdige Held Deutschland vom noch grausameren Naziregime emanzipierte, um im von der Sowjetunion unterdrückten Deutschland zu überleben. Im Bereich von Psychoanalyse heißt es Rationalisierungsverteidigungsmechanismus, der darauf ziele, mithilfe einer erdichteten Erklärung einer Angelegenheit, die leichter als die wirkliche Ursache zu akzeptieren ist, ihre Angst abzunehmen (Larsen et al. 213).[1]

Inmitten der Geschichte gibt es eine Nebengeschichte, die auf dem ersten Blick irrelevant für Ilonas Geschichte ist: Nachdem die Sowjetunion nach Deutschland kam, verbessert die Sowjetunion einerseits den Bau: „[Glückliche] Mieter waren in die fertiggestellten Wohnungen der Allee eingezogen.“ Andererseits wurde der Streik der Bauarbeiter, der einen landesweiten Aufstand auslöst, „mit der [Hilfe] sowjetischer Panzer beendet“ (Hein 134). Selbstverständlich meint Hein das ironisch. Aus diesen zwei gegensätzlichen Haltungen über den neuen Bau ist Ilonas widersprüchliche Geschichten auch zu sehen. Die folgenden Beschreibungen beweisen es:

[…D]as Leben ging seinen Gang in dieser [schönen und grimmigen] Welt, und die Zeitungen des Landes [berichteten von der schönen Welt] und [schweigen über die grimmige]. (Hein 131)

Aber nicht alle Deutschen verwenden den Rationalisierungsverteidigungsmechanismus. Ein Beispiel dafür ist Ilonas Mann Jürgen. Nach der Ansprache fragt er Ilona, warum sie nur die positive Seite der Wahrheit hervorhebt, und gleichzeitig mühsam die andere mit der folgenden alternativen Geschichte überdeckt, die gerade das Gegenteil des Marodierens und der Vergewaltigung ist:

Sie erzählte, daß sie selbst als junges Mädchen von den Soldaten häufig etwas Eßbares zugesteckt bekommen habe und daß ihre Großmutter, als diese bei der Stallarbeit von einer Kuh unglücklich getreten würde, vom Kommandanten

persönlich ins Prenzßlauer Krankenhaus gefahren worden sei. (Hein 131)

Erregt beharrt Ilona darauf, es sei alles die Wahrheit (Hein 137). Aber diese Wahrheit ist offenbar einseitig. Dennoch geht es leichter, dass sie sich selbst mit einer einseitigen Wahrheit überzeugt, als mit einer durchaus Lüge.

Nachdem ihr Mann sie fortwährend fragt, erwidert Ilona, sie könne nicht den Kindern die entsetzliche Vergewaltigung erzählen, besonders an diesem festlichen Tag (Hein 137). Aber ihr Mann weiß, dass es nicht ihr wirklicher Grund ist. Sie erdichtet sofort einen scheinbar vernünftigen alternativen Grund, um sich selbst zeitweilig zu trösten. Aber ihr Mann enthüllt ihre Selbstlügen weiter, „[…] aber dann hättest du das andere auch nicht erzählen müssen“ (Hein 137).

In diesem Punkt kann Ilona es nicht mehr aufhalten, psychologisch zusammenzubrechen. Nach einer Reihe von Überreaktionen (das Körperzittern, das Weinen, und das Zerschellen eines Glases) beschimpft sie ihren Mann als einen Faschisten (Hein 138). Vielleicht sollte Jürgen beschuldigt werden, weil er Ilona hartnäckig auffordert, dass sie ihr Trauma direkt konfrontiert. Dennoch ist er nicht so hässlich, dass er einen Titel als Faschist verdient. Aber warum beschimpft Ilona ihren Mann als Faschist, besonders unter der Bedingung, dass sie noch weiß, dass ihr Mann es tut, weil er sich wirklich um sie sorgt?

Um diesen Mythos zu erklären sollte eine ihrer alternativen Geschichten genauer analysiert werden. Durch die Ansprache zeigt sie den Jugendlichen diese Geschichte. Sie beginnt damit:

Sie berichtete, wie sie als Halbwüchsige die Niederlage der deutschen Wehrmacht erlebt hatte, vom Einmarsch der Sowjetsoldaten in ihrem Dorf und von der Erleichterung der Bauern , daß die Jahre der Nazibarbarei endlich vorbei waren. (Hein 135)

Durch diese Erzählung lässt es sich entdecken, dass Ilona die Sowjetsoldaten als die Helden gegen die Nazibarbarei positioniert. Damals war diese Denkweise, die den Kommunismus als das Gegenteil des Faschismus präsentiert, nicht ohne Präzedenzfall. Zum Beispiel beschreibt Bertolt Brecht in seinem Gedicht „O Deutschland, bleiche Mutter“ (1933) die Nationalsozialisten als die bösen Söhne, die Deutschland „besudelte, erschlagen, beschuldigt, zugerichtet“ und die Kommunisten als die guten, deren Hände gegen den Nationalsozialisten erheben. Daraus lässt es entdecken, dass diese Denkweise schon vor der Sowjetbesetzung existiert hatte.

Laut dieser einfachen antagonistischen Denkweise ist jeder Gegner des Sowjetregimes ein Faschist. Es bedeutet jedoch nicht, dass Ilona diese Denkweise vollkommen annimmt. Stattdessen gerät sie in ein psychologisches Durcheinander. In diesem Durcheinander ist sie nicht in der Lage, richtig zu denken. Deshalb wendet sie sich an diese einfache Denkweise. Aber diese selbstlügende Denkweise hilft ihr an diesem Punkt nicht mehr, weshalb sie diesmal ihren emotionellen Ausbruch überhaupt nicht kontrollieren kann.

Nach meiner Analyse dieser Erzählung sind die widersprüchlichen Geschichten Ilonas offensichtlich: Ilona wendet sich an den Rationalisierungsverteidigungsmechanismus, um ihr von der Erfahrung der Vergewaltigung entstandenes Trauma mithilfe der von ihr selbst erfundenen alternativen Geschichten zu unterdrücken. Diese Geschichten heben ausschließlich die positive Seite des Sowjetregimes hervor, um im vom Sowjetregime unterdrückten Deutschland zu überleben: Die Sowjetsoldaten haben nicht nur die Nazis aus Deutschland weggetrieben, sondern auch die verletzen Deutschen ins glückliche Leben gebracht. In einer einfachen Denkweise, Kommunismus gegen Faschismus, gehören alle Gegner des Sowjetregimes zu den Faschisten. Infolgedessen beschimpft Ilona ihren Mann als einen Faschisten, nachdem er von ihr fordert, ihren Selbstbetrug zu konfrontieren.

[1] Das originelle Zitat auf Englisch: [… T]he Goal is to reduce anxiety by coming up with an explanation for an event that is easier to accept than the real reason (Larsen et al. 213).

Zitierte Werke

Brecht, Bertolt. „O Deutschland, bleiche Mutter“ (Dicht). 1933. http://www.tenhumbergreinhard.de/taeter-und-mitlaeufer/lieder-und-gedichte/o-deutschland-bleiche-mutter.html

Hein, Christoph. „Die Vergewaltigung“. Exekution eines Kalbes und andere Erzählungen, Aufbau Verlag, Berlin, 1994, Seite 131-138.

Larsen, Randy J. et al.. „Psychoanalytische Methode zur Persönlichkeit: Die Dynamik der Persönlichkeit: Die Verteidigungsmechanismen: Rationalisierung“ innerhalb des neunten Kapitels, „Das intrapsychische Reich“ (“Psychoanalytic Approaches to Personality: Dynamics of Personality: Defense Mechanisms: Rationalisation” inside “Chapter 9: Intrapyschic Domain”). Die Psychologie der Persönlichkeit: die Reiche der Wissen über die menschliche Natur (auf Englisch) (Personality Psychology: Domains of Knowledge about Human Nature), erste Auflage, McGraw Hill Education, Transcontinental Printing Group, 2017, Seite 213.

Sehr geehrte Damen und Herren,

Guten Tag.

Der Titel meines Vortrages ist „Zersetzung der Genreerwartungen als die Fahne des Postmodernismus: eine Fallstudie der Kurzgeschichte, Rosalie geht sterben“. Innerhalb meines Titels ist der Terminus, Postmodernismus, möglich am furchtbarsten. Aber es ist unglücklicherweise der Terminus, wovon mein Vortrag handelt.ù

Es macht schwer, dieses Konzept allein durch einen Theorietext zu verstehen. Deshalb probiere ich eine andere Annäherungsmethode: Zuerst suche ich ein Literaturwerk, das zu der postmodernen Literatur gehört. Sodann suche ich die hervorragenden Eigenschaften aus diesem Literaturwerk, die von den anderen von mir gelesenen Literaturwerken unterscheiden. Daher fand ich eine Kurzgeschichte, namens Rosalie geht sterben, aus dem deutschen Roman, Daniel Kehlmanns Ruhm.

Daniel Kehlmann, ein deutscher Schriftsteller 1975 geboren, gewinnt seinen Weltruhm mithilfe seines bekanntesten Romans, die Vermessung der Welt. Aber heute besprechen wir über eine seiner Kurzgeschichten, Rosalie geht sterben, aus seinem späteren Roman, Ruhm. Dieser Roman besteht sich aus neun überlappenden Geschichten mit ihren jeweiligen Hauptfiguren und Handlungen. Aber sie sind gleichzeitig auf geschickte Weise miteinander verknüpft. Zum Beispiel ist der Autor dieser Kurzgeschichte, Leo Richter, gleichzeitig die Hauptfigur einer vorigen Kurzgeschichte im Roman.

Diese Kurzgeschichte bezieht sich auf eine alte Frau, Rosalie, die durch Sterbehilfe ihr Leben zum Ende bringen will. Der ganze Prozess, dass Rosalie aus Deutschland nach Schweiz, wo das Sterbehilfeinstitut ist, fährt, und ihre innerlichen Bewegungen während ihrer Reise werden detailliert geschildert.

Mithilfe meiner Analyse dieser Kurzgeschichte entdecke ich, dass die postmoderne Literatur immer diese Genreerwartungen zersetzen, also die Fahne des Postmodernismus. Aber was sind die Genreerwartungen? Wenn wir ein bestimmtes Mediengenre (nicht nur Literatur) konsumieren, erwarten wir als Medienkonsumenten schon seit dem Begin des Medienkonsums (z.B. lesen oder ansehen) beispielweise die folgenden Handlungen, die Geschichtenstrukturen oder die Geschichtenmoralen.

Am Beginn dieser Kurzgeschichte wird Rosalie als eine sehr gelassene Frau beschrieben. Sie werde nichts beeinflusst, wenn ihr Arzt sie über ihren Pankreaskrebs informiert. Nach mühsamen Schilderung ihrer gelassenen Persönlichkeit am Beginn dieser Kurzgeschichte erwarten die Leser, dass diese gelassene Persönlichkeit zum Ende beigebehaltet werden wird. Ein paar psychologische Fluktuationen sogar mit einem totalen Nervenzusammenbruch in den folgenden Handlungen sind auch akzeptabel, d.h. innerhalb der Erwartungen der Leser. Aber wichtig ist es, dass ihre Gelassenheit am Ende zu ihr zurückkehren muss. Andernfalls machen die vorigen Charakterbildungen gar keinen Sinn.

Aber die postmoderne Literatur zielt nicht darauf, einen Charakter aufzubauen, sondern zu zersetzen, weil die Erwartung der vollständigen Charakterbildungen zu einer Form der Genreerwartungen gehört. Dann ist es nicht unvorhersehbar, dass Rosalie am Ende ihre gelassen Persönlichkeit umkehrt, und verzweifelt ihren Entwerfer, Richter droht, „Sie können mich noch retten. Sie können mich wieder jung machen. Sie machen es mühelos.“ Durch diese Drohung legt der Charakter, den der Autor am Beginn dieser Kurzgeschichte mühsam aufgebaut hat, plötzlich zugrunde. In diesem Punkt sind die Genreerwartungen des Charakters zerschellt. Kehlmann macht die Genreerwartungen zu einem Gespött.

Bisher haben Sie vielleicht schon lange gezweifelt, wäre der Autor dieser Kurzgeschichte nicht Richter, sondern in der Tat Kehlmann? Ganz am Anfang schreibt der Autor, „[i]nnerhalb aller von mir erdichten Charaktere ist Rosalie die klügste“. Dessen Leser weiß keinesfalls, dass der Erzähler Richter ist, statt Kehlmann, weil es nicht ungewöhnlich ist, dass der Autor am Anfang durch Ich-Erzählung die Geschichte einleitet, z.B. Friedrich Schillers der Verbrecher aus verlorener Ehe. Ich könnte sogar erraten, dass die meisten Leser aufgrund ihrer Genreerwartungen annehmen müssten, dass der Erzähler Kehlmann ist.

Bemerkenswert kann Rosalie in der Geschichte mit ihrem Autor sprechen, und ihn darum bitten, dass er sie aus ihrem Schicksal des Selbstmords entlässt. Wenn der Autor sich entschuldigt, dass er nicht imstande ist, ihr zu helfen, sagt Rosalie, „[w]arum bist du nicht imstande, es ist deine Geschichte“. Plötzlich sind die Leser verwirrt, wer eigentlich die Kurzgeschichte schreibt, da diese Autorposition, dass der Autor und sein Charakter miteinander in der Geschichte diskutieren kann, fast unerhört ist, also außerhalb der Genreerwartungen der Leser.

Nach einem langen Monolog zieht der Autor eine Folge, er weiße gewiss, wie seine Geschichte enden werde. Er fragt, „[j]etzt nun, was soll ich tun?“ Aber kurz danach verkündet er, „[n]un, ich zerstöre meine Denounment. Ich mache den Vorhang auf, ich will in der Geschichte erscheinen […]“. Fortan tritt der Autor einfach in die Geschichte ein, und macht Rosalie jung wie sie gewünscht hat.

Was für eine Geschichte ist es? Diese Kurzgeschichte macht doch kein Sinn! Was ist die wirkliche Persönlichkeit Rosalies? Wo positioniert der wirkliche Autor Kehlmann in der Geschichte?

Jedoch ist diese Verwirrung das Ziel der postmodernen Literatur. Sie fragt an, warum die vorherige Literatur so viele von Menschen selbst erfunden Regeln und Einschränkungen, die durch ihre unzähligen Wiederholungen in verschiedenen Literaturwerken die Genreerwartungen der Leser entstehen, zu sich zieht? Wie sieht die Literatur aus, wenn sie sich außerhalb dieser Regeln und Einschränkungen befindet? Oder, Funktionieren Geschichten, wenn der Autor absichtlich diese Regeln und Einschränkungen zersetzt? Wie reagieren die Leser auf die zersetzten Geschichten anders als auf ihre gewöhnlichen?

Immanuel Kant diktiert, die Aufklärung sei der Ausgang aus der von Menschen selbst verschuldeten Unmündigkeit. In seiner Zeit schränkten vor allem die Religionsgedanken den menschlichen Verstand ein. Ähnlicherweise stellt diese Kurzgeschichte eine andere würdige Frage: Welche Regeln und Einschränkungen der Literatur mit ihren entsprechenden Genreerwartungen schränken heutzutage die menschliche Kreativität ein.

Vielen Dank.

(Disclaimer: Since this topic is frequented with Fake News and political biases, the author  selects the sources he thinks trustworthy, however does not vouch for their authenticity.)

In 2010, the suicides of eighteen Chinese assembly-line workers aging between seventeen and twenty-five (resulting fourteen deaths and four survivors with crippling injuries) drew the global attention to the world’s largest electronics assembly company Foxconn (Pun et al. 2016). Since then, a wide range of social forces such as (scholarly) grassroots and media coverages has been committing themselves for bettering working conditions in Foxconn. There have been some changes. For example, workers’ wages have allegedly risen above the threshold of Chinese minimal wages (Lüthje and Butollo 2017).

However, Foxconn production mechanism, which is by design detrimental to workers, persists in China to this day. Fundamental issues such as incredibly long working hours and high work pressures have not seen any significant changes (short as “Foxconn Issue” in the following). Considering all those tremendous efforts from across a variety of social forces, the persistence of Foxconn production mechanism in China is mind-boggling. This paper addresses this puzzle by explaining why it persists and why state intervention is its ultimate solution.

Founded in Taiwan in 1974 (Qiu and Lin 2017), Foxconn with more than thirty factories in mainland China (Guo and Shen 2012) and more than 1.4 million workers (Pun et al. 2014) assemble more than half of all electronics worldwide (Pun et al. 2016). Being the world’s largest corporate workshop, it is also the dominant outsourced producer of Apple, the world’s richest technology corporation (Pun et al. 2014). Sixty to seventy percent of its revenue generates from producing Apple products (Jim 2013). On the flipside, it is also notorious for adopting an unbearably stringent management style and deliberately deskilling its assembly-line workers to “…facilitate flexible employment of large numbers of workers” (Lüthje and Butollo 2017). A Scholar on this issue, Ngai Pun, comments, Foxconn is “the prototype of twenty-first century capitalism” (Pun et al. 2016).

In previous literature, Foxconn production mechanism is consensually found inhumane. Once demanding orders (especially during Christmas shopping season and the launch of new iPhones) from technology companies like Apple come, Foxconn has two options, either assigning long working hours or hire more workers. The latter option is impossible because there is no way for Foxconn to hire enough new workers before contracted completion time (Pun et al. 2016). Therefore, for the existing workers, Foxcoon adopts the principle of “competition against time” (Pun et al. 2014). In total disregard of workers’ physical and mental health, their average working hours fall between sixty to seventy hours per week, which is in dire contrast with the Chinese laws of maximum forty hours of working hours per week and thirty-six hours of overtime per month (Pun et al. 2016).

The long working hours were also generated from Foxconn’s hierarchical management method: The top of the hierarchy are the company leaders who negotiate contracts with technology companies like Apple and set the production and revenue goals for their inferiors. In the hierarchy, the company leaders are followed by several layers of middle-rank managers who compete among themselves because their lucrative bonuses are distributed to those who achieve the tasks most efficiently and cut the most costs. This competition mechanism trickles all the way down to lowest managers (group leaders of several assembly-line workers). This competition of ultimate efficiency and cost lowering is tantamount to the competition of squeezing the most labour power from and assigning the most overtimes to the bottom of the hierarchy, i.e. the assembly-line workers (Feng 2017). Thus, many workers reported their workload being “absolute unreasonable” (Pun et al. 2016).

These overtimes and stressful workloads cannot be sustained without a strict supervision and punishment system. For supervision, Foxconn has equipped all work places with surveillance cameras and designated supervisors constantly patrol around (Pun et al. 2016) The 2011 Foxconn Factory Code lists 111 items of offenses concerning life discipline, business information security and production safety etc. (Feng 2017). If surveillance cameras or designated supervisors discover any offense, the following forms of punishments are identified in previous literature: demerit (taking away the opportunities of overtime bonuses (Feng 2017)), dismiss (forcing workers to quit by lowering their salaries with a variety of excuses (Zu 2009)), verbal abuse, beating, copying “Terry Guo’s (Foxconn’s CEO) Quotations”, public self-criticism (Pun et al. 2016) and detention (Qiu and Lin 2017). Besides, the managers also encourage other workers to disdain the workers who have breached the rules so that they feel shamed about their “wrongs” (Lüthje and Butollo 2017).

Thus seen, Regardless of their physical and mental health, Foxconn workers are being exploited to the extreme. They are stripped away of their human dignities, and are reduced to the most fungible workers, reminiscent of Marxist proletariats in the nineteenth century: “…the monthly turnover…[is] more over than [twenty percent] and the main body of the work force [is] replaced almost every six months…” (Feng 2017).

In history, Karl Marx urged workers to seize means of production from capitalists through violence. Contemporarily, such revolution is no longer an option—at the end of the day, someone must produce these Apple products to sustain the massive global demand. Still, influenced by Marxism, I believe that in order to really preserve workers’ rights, the fundamental interest of capitalists, i.e. profit, must be harmed. Because this fundamental interest has not much been affected, the current variety of social forces have not brought fundamental changes to Foxconn Issue.

In 2010, students and scholars from twenty universalities in mainland China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, together with a Hong Kong-based transnational campaign group SACOM (Students and Scholars against Corporate Misbehaviour) conducted a collective research on Foxconn working conditions. After the research, they submitted their report and petition to “…Foxconn, Apple, the State Council of the People’s Republic of China and the All-China Federation of Trade Unions” (Pun et al. 2014).

However, why did they draw offshore scholarly supports? Why could not the research be done with domestic academia? Why Taiwan and Hong Kong, whose higher education institutions are as a matter of fact particularly anti-China? If they draw their supports, it in theory would make the research harder to conduct because the Chinese government is particularly sensitive to their movements. On the other hand, Taiwan and Hong Kong-based academia has long been targeting mainland China. Thus, it is not hard to foresee that “…more than three hundred Taiwanese issued another open statement and…held a press conference…”. From there, international grassroots and press took the chance to binge on criticism, particularly in the U.S. (Pun et al. 2014.).

Some international anti-China forces also firmly grasped the chance to condemn China. A case in point is a paper titled “Worker–Intellectual Unity: Trans-border Sociological Intervention in Foxconn” written by Hong Kong scholars published in English, in which the authors condemn Chinese officials of media censorship, a typical channel of western antagonistic criticism:

“…[R]ather than analysing and taking actions to overcome the root causes of suicides, [Chinese officials] moved to [ban] ‘negative’ reporting about Foxconn (China Digital Times, 30 May 2010).” (Pun et al. 2014)

On one hand, when Foxconn suicides came out, Chinese media coverages de facto were all over. This outright defamation is de facto invalid (The authors also played a word game of “negative reporting”, but it is mind-boggling to think that any media would cover any suicide positively). On the other hand, since I never heard the media China Digital Times before. I look it up its website (see: https://chinadigitaltimes[.net]/) and found that it is fraught with provocative anti-China journals. It is also mind-boggling that any serious scholar would quote such dubious source.

If scholars are outright politically biased, it could be reasonably extrapolated that some grassroots and media could also be politically biased. Therefore, rather than really helping Foxconn workers, international grassroots and media to some extent elevates and complicates a worker/capitalist conflict to a combat of political ideaologies. More importantly, the “populist package”, i.e. reports, petitions (including posting memes and hashtags, “i[Slavery]” on social medias (Chan 2011)) and protests, does not hurt the fundamental interest of capitalists much, except mildly damaging their company images.

Worse still, irrational grassroots indignation inevitably leads to international boycott of Apple products (for example, they called on supporters to present the 250,000 signatures to Apple stores in different cities in early 2012) (Pun et al. 2014) without realising that once the demand of Apple products slide, massive Foxconn workers will inevitably lose their jobs.

The mildly damaged company images are compensated by Foxconn and Apple’s public relationship manipulations. Foxconn responded the public condemnations by hiring “psychologists and psychiatrists” only to prove that “’…nine…suicides in five month among a population of more than 500,000 was still far lower than [the national suicidal rate (sic.)]’, ignoring the fact that the suicides took place at a single company in a single city [whose] victims are in the prime of youth” (Pun et al. 2014). Foxconn also promised it would reduce overtime from a hundred hours per month (more than three times of the thirty-six hours legal limit) to eighty hours per month (mathematically speaking, less than two more days off) (Pun et al. 2014). In a survey two years later, fifty-seven percent of interviewees still experienced seventy-hour work in a week (as oppose to sixty hours as promised) (Lüthje and Butollo 2017).

In 2011, Apple released its Supplier Responsibility Progress Report, praising Foxconn for “…hiring a large number of psychological counselors, establishing a [twenty-four]-hour care center [(?)] and [even] attaching large nets to the factory building to prevent [impulsive] suicides” (Apple 2011). Through the wording, Apple attempted to present the suicides as if they are caused by personal psychological problems and the lack of psychological support in Foxconn factories. Apple’s public relationship strategy nicely draws the attention away from Foxconn Issue, and shuns its responsibility. Instead, Apple praises Foxconn in a rather comic way for taking quick (in fact, nonexistent) measures when discovered a problem (“the lack of psychological support”).

In 2012, Apple also became a member of the Fair Labour Association (FLA), and hastily commissioned a “special voluntary audit” to exam Foxconn factories. Apple seemingly turned to a third-party supervisor. In reality, “[the board of FLA] includes representative from Nike and agribusiness giants [(aka. other capitalists)], and is funded by the corporations that comprise its core membership and dominate its decision making” (Pun et al. 2016). In other words, the capitalists have joined together to form a public relation koncern in the disguise of being a “neutral third party”.

Thus seen, the companies never actually intended to really better Foxconn Issue, nor should they be expected because the capitalists are the designers of this issue exclusively to maximise their profit. Therefore, it is their best interest to maintain Foxconn production mechanism so long as no better way of maximising profit comes out to replace it, or no interference is so powerful that their maximising profit could be harmed. International grassroots and media must have helped (or have the potential to) drop the sales of Apple products. Otherwise, the companies would not have taken actions. Since international grassroots and media only harm their company images, they only repair their company images while keeping their profit maximising Foxconn production mechanism intact.

Another frequent grassroots petition is to unionise Foxconn workers. In fact, because Chinese government encourages unionisation in private companies, Foxconn workers do have an existing workers’ union inside the company (Lüthje and Butollo 2017). According to a survey by New Generation Migrant Workers Concern Programme (a domestic team of scholars and students interested in workers’ rights), the majority of Foxconn workers are not even aware of the existence of their union. Among those who know its existence, the majority thinks that it does not actually represent their interests. They report that their union is actually “the boss’s union”, and it is revengeful to those who form complaints (Feng 2017).

Even if the union is actually interested in defending workers, the union should not be expected to solve Foxconn Issue. Because in China, unions can legally organise strikes but shall not and have not organised a single case in the past decade (at least not reported in the media) (they are mainly reserved for workers’ leisure activities (Lüthje and Butollo 2017)). In Chinese politic logics, Chinese government treats most organised resistances including strikes protests, sit-ins and riots alike as threat to social stability, the priority of all priorities. For example, strikes could potentially provoke other strikes in important branches such as public transportation and electric grid, which could further create massive disasters considering the world’s largest population constantly need the supply of these public goods. If Foxconn organises a large-scale strike, no matter its intentions being good or bad, Chinese government, first and foremost, eliminates the threat to social stability. Strikes draw Foxconn workers’ potential ally, Chinese government further away.

Thus seen, it is all too naive to expect (scholarly) international grassroots and media, the involved companies themselves or workers’ union to bring fundamental change to Foxconn Issue: (scholarly) grassroots and media do not hurt capitalists’ fundamental interest while some of their true intensions are at least curious; Because Foxconn production mechanism serves their fundamental interest the best, the involved companies adopt public relation strategies to direct the public’s attention away from Foxconn Issue; Workers union inside the company is a dummy for workers’ virtual consolation while strikes are either almost impractical or draws antagonism from Chinese government. When these options are eliminated, state intervention of Chinese government is the only option left. Also, it could be rather effective.

Notably, the widespread of Foxconn factories is also in part assisted by all levels of Chinese government: In China, the state constantly control the prices of agricultural products—keeping the prices low so that most (including the massive poor) could afford some basic foods. The new generations of rural population finds it unattractive to take care of the fields anymore, so that enormous young rural population migrate into cities for better job opportunities, especially the most developed cities along the west shore such as Guangzhou and Shenzhen. However, these migrants receive lousy, little or even on education, thus unqualified for most “brainwork”. In the cities, they become like Marxist proletariats who can only subsist themselves (sometimes also their families) by selling their labour power. Chinese government does not want massive unemployment in the cities for these migrants. Therefore, Foxconn factories are welcomed. On the other hand, the local governments are also attracted by its potential to boost local GDPs and raise local tax revenues (Lüthje and Butollo 2017). Better still, with the concentration of population in certain places, economic scale effect elicits surrounding infrastructures and businesses (such as, more bus stops or restaurants nearby). Under Chinese government’s “Going West” project (Feng 2017), the State Council therefore approved the establishment of Foxconn factories in more inland cities in Chengdu and Chongqing in early 2011 (Pun et al. 2016).

In my research, some Hong Kong authors condemn the “state collusion with Foxconn” as if Chinese government deliberately intends to exploit these migrants in collusion with Foxconn, without realising that it has been an either-unemployment-or-Foxconn situation. Such condemnations demonstrate nothing but political biases.

Chinese government also takes action according to its interests. But unlike capitalists whose fundamental interest never changes, the interests of Chinese government are by and large determined by its ongoing agendas. In the 2000s, one of foremost economic agendas was to attract as many foreign capitals (together with their technologies) as possible. It provided relatively loose environments and enormous “population bonuses” to foreign capitalists, i.e. massive employment-thirsty cheap labour. In recent years however, Chinese government have made it crystal clear that it wants to very slowly get away from the cheap-labour based and export-driven economy (Feng 2017).

With the constant trade surplus with the U.S., China has stored an overabundance of U.S. dollars and bonds. To rid some of these U.S. dollars and bonds, China must very slowly exit being the world outsourcing hub.

From a social aspect, China is currently expecting an aging population (China Power). If massive young migrant-workers do not move away from cheap-labour jobs, for the Chinese society as a whole, the component of the young population will eventually be overburdened to support the massive upcoming money-demanding old.

The average income in China has been steadily rising (Trading Economics 2018). Marx discovered that capitalists have to at least pay “minimum wage” to cover workers’ basic life subsistence, so that workers do not die, and can keep working. Therefore, Foxconn workers’ wages, despite capitalists’ unwillingness, must also rise. Chinese government prudently observes the trend that the wages will eventually rise to such an extent that comparing to other cheap-labour areas (e.g. Southeast Asia and Africa), the “population bonuses” will fade away in the end.

Also, western anti-China forces have been using Foxconn Issue to falsely condemn Chinese government. By helping the workers, Chinese government could debunk such prominent defamation, and maintain its positive image of a leading country.

Chinese government’s agendas, aka. its interests, has shifted to the side beneficial to Foxconn workers. It indeed has taken effective first steps to throttle the fundamental interests of capitalists: Since 2003, according to different economic situations of different locations, The legal National Minimum Wage refreshes every three years; tax benefits of locating factories in cities along the west shore has been gradually taken away. Because these policy changes directly hurt the fundamental interest of capitalists, capitalists’ reactions are instantaneous: In recent years, Foxconn has been trying to relocate some of its factories to more inland underdeveloped locations where the National Minimum Wage is (sometimes much) lower. Much more workers have been employed in factories closer to their homes, reducing the overpopulation pressure in cities along the west shore (Lüthje and Butollo 2017). Economic scale effect is also expected to happen in these relocated underdeveloped locations, followed by raised National Minimum Wage in the long run.

At the same time, Chinese government also launched a series of countryside development projects such as “Construction of New Socialist Countryside (she hui zhu yi xin nong cun jian she)” (such as building infrastructures like better schools) and the latest “Targeted Poverty Alleviation (jing zhun fu pin)” under chairman Xi’s calling. These projects aim at providing better alternatives for the new generations of rural population than cramming into cheap-labour factories, potentially as close as to their homes.

On one hand, Chinese government gradually withdraws Foxconn’s benefits, raising its costs of producing in China; on the other hand, Chinese government attempts to redirect migrant-workers to other jobs, cutting down Foxconn’s worker supply. Notably, contrary to popular state interventions such as setting quotas, assigning fines and forcible confiscation, because Chinese government does not want to scare away foreign capitals, these state interventions have never actually directly intervened Foxconn. Instead, having understood the fundamental interest of capitalists, they effectively intervene on the periphery, allowing Foxconn to automatically consider relocating to other countries, thus eventually uprooting Foxconn Issue in China.

After 2010 Foxconn worker suicide tragedy, a wide range of social forces including (scholarly) grassroots and media have devoted themselves into helping tackling Foxconn Issue. Since these efforts do not harm much the fundamental interest of capitalists, namely profit, they are seen little success. Besides, some ill-intended social forces take the chance to falsely condemn Chinese government in collusion with Foxconn, which not only does not help correct Foxconn Issue, but also draw unnecessary political tensions. Besides, the much-anticipated workers’ union works in collusion with Foxconn, unable to organise strikes that are, on the other hand, irrational to conduct in China. On the contrary, with the change of its economic agenda from attracting foreign capitals to laying off cheap-labour economy, Chinese government intervene Foxconn peripherally, i.e. raising its labour costs and shrinking its worker supply, which directly hurts the fundamental interest of capitalist, urging them to relocate their factories to other countries where cheap labour is still available.

Bibliography

Chan, Jenny. 2011. “iSlave”. New Internationalist, vol. 441, April: 19-21.

“China Average Yearly Wages”. 2018. Trading Economics, December. https://tradingeconomics.com/china/wages

China Digital Times. Website Address.

https://chinadigitaltimes.net/

“Does China Have an Aging Problem?”. 2017. China Power, August 11. https://chinapower.csis.org/aging-problem/

Feng, Xiaojun. 2017. “Manufacturing Conflict: The Experience of a World Factory in a Changing China”. Modern China, vol. 43 (no. 6): 590-619.

Jim, Clare 2013, “Apple Is Snubbing Foxconn after iPhone 5 Production Problems”. Reuters, May 13. http://www.businessinsider.com/apple-moving-from-foxconn-to-pegatron-2013-5?international=true&r=US&IR=T.

Lüthje, Boy, and Florian Butollo. 2017. “Why the Foxconn Model Does Not Die: Production Networks and Labour Relations in the IT Industry in South China”. Globalisations, vol. 14 (no. 2): 216-31.

Pun, Ngai et al.. 2014. “Worker–intellectual Unity: Trans-border Sociological Intervention in Foxconn”. Current Sociology, vol. 62 (no. 2): 209-22.

Pun, Ngai et al.. 2016. “Apple, Foxconn, and Chinese Workers’ Struggles from a Global Labour Perspective”. Inter-Asia Cultural Studies, vol. 17 (no. 2): 166-85.

Qiu, Jack Linchuan, and Lin Lin. 2017. “Foxconn: The disruption of iSlavery”. Asiascape: Digital Asia, vol. 4 (no. 1-2): 103-28.

Zu, Cuijun. 2009. “Firing and Hiring Tens of Thousands of Employees at Will? Foxconn Is Good at Playing with Human Resources). China Computer Daily, March 25.http://big5.huaxia.com/tslj/qycf/2009/03/1365869.html.

By Titus Tan

Dressed in last-century flamboyant style, a pair of crystalline eyes always glimmers with mystic melancholy on his/her blanched face—the protagonist, Lili Elbe/Einar Wegener (Eddie Redmayne), of the film, The Danish Girl, not only appalls her beholders by her incredible beauty, but also inspired many audiences to live true to themselves despite societal biases (Short Comments). The film upliftingly narrates her strenuous journey in pursuit of her trans* identity in the 1930s when such identity was yet to be widely accepted. On the other hand, only if you were an experienced trans* activist, the film would not fit your tastes.

Unlike many positive feedbacks from audiences strange to trans* activism, trans* activists (among whom are many trans* people themselves) almost unanimously backlash this film soon after its debut: they collectively condemn that this film whitewashes, depoliticises and oversimplifies the history of trans* activism, that it divorces from a variety of actual trans* experiences by homogenising them into one fantasised grand narrative (Keegan, 2016, p. 51) and upholding trans* norms and stereotypes (Solomon and Kurtz-Costes, 2018, p. 37), and that it replaces trans* aesthetics with that of dominant culture’s by mostly cisgender, heterosexual, male, white, elitist and bourgeois filmmakers to capitalise from global/mainstream receptive (i.e., young educated women) demographics of audiences who might fall for its misrepresentations (Keegan, 2016, p. 52 and 55; Solomon and Kurtz-Costes, 2018, p. 34 and 44).

Other than their lucrative profitability, these condemnations however do not address other possible roots as to why cinematic misrepresentations of trans* lives, exemplified by The Danish Girl, are so prevalent. Or, why are they so alluring to the audiences, which leads to this lucrative profitability? Among other reasons, I postulate that the misrepresented trans* woman characters satiate the needs of cisgender, heterosexual males to rescue “the girl” in dismay.

It almost becomes classical as much as cliché that in films, the male hero wins the charismatic girl after saving her from dangerous situations, such as in Superman films (and many other male superhero film alike). These films inflate the delusion of some male individuals that their dream girls would somehow by all means desperately fall for them so long as they find the perfect opportunity to save them from distress. Similarly, Einar/Lili in this film elicits great yet again delusional sympathy from these individuals. Only this time, the dangerous situation is no longer failing airplane, but “a girl trapped in a wrong body”.

In history, in order to receive Sex Reassignment Surgery (SRS), one has to be diagnosed with Gender Identity Disorder (GID, now renamed Gender Dsyphoria (GD) in the latest DSM-5) whose typical symptoms include feeling trapped in a body of the opposite sex (Stryker, 2017, p. 17-20). While certainly many trans* people do feel this way, many more recite this narrative so that their doctors could prescribe SRS for them. To this day, it is somewhat acknowledged among trans* communities and activists that the tremendous diversity of trans* people overwhelm this single grand narrative generalised by medical professionals. Yet in the film industry, many filmmakers seem to be rather oblivious of this fact, and continue to sustain this idea.

A paradigm of such is The Danish Girl. On the onset, Lili/Einar’s paintings are said to repeatedly involve a scene that three trees stand before a seashore, which, as a male Lacanian psychoanalyst, Sans (2015), interpreted, ”…[are] the recourse that [Lili/]Einar uses in order to produce a fantasy…[and] a metaphor of what is irrevocably lost, leaving partial traces that the subject pursues” (p. 86). In short, Lili/Einar projects his/her inner desire, i.e., to be a woman, onto this repetitive scene of his paintings. Paintings, granted with so much fame from psychoanalysis as one of the “windows to the unconscious”, could be used to infer the woman trapped in his/her unconscious mind.

In the ball scene, Lili/Einar is solicited by Henrik Sandahl (Ben Whishaw) for a deep kiss. On one hand, his/her delighted face of being solicited as a woman could be rewarding as well as falsely affirmative for some male audiences; on the other hand, such rewarding is challenged by a third intruder, the solicitor. The tension between these two feelings invokes these audiences’ drive to save her from a solicitous man, peaking at the moment of the unjustified nose bleeding in face of Henrik’s coercion.

Another scene in which Lili/Einar elatedly trysts Henrik, further escalates the tension. As Henrik urges to have sex with Lili/Einar, and s/he hesitantly rejects (particularly when touching his/her penis, which reinforces the genital resistance explained below), he accidentally blurts out the name of Lili/Einar man identity, Einar. This accident discloses Henrik’s hypocrisy of disguising his homosexual identity so as to have sex with Lili/Einar. What could be more sympathy-enticing than an already-despondent girl being further exploited of her despondency? Plus, analogous to classic male superhero films, there is finally an outright and straightforward “enemy” to whom some male audiences could direct their anger.

In another scene, Lili/Einar secretively realise his/her woman identity by undressing him/herself in front of the mirror in the women’s dress room and observing his/her feminine body by hiding his/her penis underneath his/her crotch. While some trans* women do irritate their penises, this irritation is by no means universal. However, to fully actualise the idea of “the girl trapped in the wrong body”, it becomes irresistible to illustrate this stereotypical resistance of the male body, especially the male genital. Similar case occurs during which Lili/Einar imitates the erotic feminine performance in the closet.

If the above misrepresentations are somewhat problematic, the blatant distortion of history in the scenes of Lili/Einar’s hospitalisation could be pernicious. Keegan (2016) found the absence of trans* communities in Berlin where Lili/Einar is hospitalised rather curious:

When the real Lili[/Einar] travelled to Berlin in 1930, the city was a global hub for sex and gender minorities: there were so many people traveling to see Hirschfeld that by 1909 German authorities had begun to issue a special form of identification called a ‘transvestite pass’ (Transvestitenschien) to those utilising the institute’s services, which included medical treatment as well as social networking and job placement (Beachy 2014:172-80). (p. 55)

From my perspective, this absence is explicable: this unjustified isolation is a crucial component of Lili/Einar’s manually-enhanced misery, which tells the fantasised story that not only is Li/Einar “a girl trapped in the wrong body”, but she also has to endure this entrapment without any peer support.

Filippo (2016) also suspected the generosity of Dr. Kurt Warnekros (Sebastian Koch) during a time when the medical establishment is by and large transphobic (p. 404). Still more curious is that before the performance of Lili/Einar’s surgery, s/he proposes to Dr. Warnekros in hope for marriage and children. Curiously, s/he gives herself up to seemingly any man closely available to him/her (that happens to be Dr. Warnekros) in an almost irrefutable posture (sickly effete women appear highly attractive to some men). To this point, some male audiences have long been covetous to receive this free gift—At the end of the day, superman gets the girl.

These fabrications apart, it is such a relief that the film does not opt for an all-out Disney show—they all live happily thereafter. Instead, it does align with the history that Lili/Einar dies after surgical failure. However, rather than dying of an unknown ailment as the film suggests, his/her death is explicitly attributed to organ rejection following his/her uterus implant (Filippo, 2016, p. 403). But the true-to-life representation of his/her death would only end messily: in the end, s/he would be seen fighting torturously against the tremendous agony; there would be no space for him/her to calmly comment on his/her poetic “rebirth”—the ultimate resolution stage of the grand narrative, “the girl is rescued by getting out of her wrong body”.

Originated from universalising medical presumption, the idea of “a girl trapped in the wrong body” is deliberately and reiteratively sustained in The Danish Girl in part to elicit some male audiences’ sympathy. Were the idea legitimate, trans* people would all have to be gender-binarised (i.e., either man or woman). Yet, the whole idea of transgender is in large part to defy this dichotomy, and instead to acknowledge the fabulous diversity existing in-between. That being said, for people who understand trans* identities, the idea is invalid from the start, as it runs contrary even to some basics in this field.

The message is once more clearer again: in films, regardless of which dangerous situation the girl is put in, it is always the man who would rescue the girl, who in turn, would unconditionally give herself up to him. This is one of the reasons why misrepresented trans* woman characters sell.

References

Bevan, T. (Producer) and Hooper, T. (Director). (2015). The Danish Girl [Motion Picture]. United Kingdom: Working Title Films.

Filipo, M. S. (2016). Female trouble: representing transwomen in The Danish Girl and The New Girlfriend. In Journal of Bisexuality, 16(3), 403-407. Retrieved from https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/15299716.2016.1199843?scroll=top&needAccess=true

Keegan, C. (2016). History, disrupted: The aesthetic gentrification of queer and trans cinema. Social Alternatives, 35(3), 50-56. Retrieved from http://ezproxy.library.ubc.ca/login?url=https://search.proquest.com/docview/1868510469?accountid=14656

Sans, A. A. (2015). “This is truly me”: a Lacanian approach to The Danish Girl. In Journal of Comparative Literature and Aesthetics, 40(1), 83-94. Retrieved from http://go.galegroup.com/ps/i.do?ty=as&v=2.1&u=ubcolumbia&it=DIourl&s=RELEVANCE&p=LitRC&qt=SN~0252-8169~~TI~%22This+Is+Truly+Me%22%3A+A+Lacanian+Approach+to+The+Danish+Girl+%282015%29~~VO~40~~SP~83~~IU~1&lm=&sw=w

Short Comments (of The Danish Girl). Douban (a Chinese film Catalogue). Retrieved from https://movie.douban.com/subject/3071604/

Solomon, H.E. and Kurtz-Costes, B. (2018). Media’s Influence on Perceptions of Trans Women. In Sexuality Research and Social Policy, 15(1), 34–47. Retrieved From https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs13178-017-0280-2

Stryker, S. (2017). Contexts, concepts and terms”. In Transgender History: The Roots of Today’s Revolutions (Second Edition), Chapter 1, 1-44.

By Titus Shuangquan Tan

Comparing to the near past, counselling services are becoming increasingly more inclusive of trans* people. Today, many trans* people who rejected counselling services before may start seeking them again (Austin and Goodman 30). To achieve this somewhat more positive reputation of counselling services among trans* population is not easy: a number of factors have simultaneously been reserving trans* people from seeking counselling services. These factors include (but is not limited to) the high costs, previous bad experiences with healthcare, fear of horrendous treatments, gender stigmatisation, gender discrimination, lack of gender knowledge and insensitivity to gender needs (Shepherd et al. 94 and 96), gender bias, (structural) oppression towards trans* people (Austin and Goodman 18) among counsellors, difficulty to find suitable counsellors (McCann 79) and even outright refusal of care (Mizock and Lundquist 148).

A number of proposals have been put forward for counsellors to address these issues, including in-service trainings (Singh and Burnes 250), peer consultations/mentorship (Singh and Burnes 131) and supervisions (McCann 80) and collaborations with LGBTQA communities. Notably, a new trans-friendly method of counselling, namely affirmative care, is proposed in an attempt to replace the current system: “…a [feminist, multicultural and social justice-related, (Singh and Burnes 126-127)] non-pathologising and non-judgemental (Mizock and Lundquist 153) approach [and settings (Austin and Goodman 29), based on client resilience and conceptualisation (Singh and Burnes 126) of their genders, whose practitioners possess requisite gender knowledge]…that accepts, validates, and supports the full spectrum of gender expressions, experiences [and healthcare or other needs]” (Austin and Goodman 18 and 30).

Although these strategies have brought some valuable changes, two intrinsic shortcomings are identified: first, they highly depend on the personal wills of the counsellors: counsellors who are originally prone to trans* activism are likely to engage in these efforts; second, the availability of these strategies rules out counsellors in underdeveloped (in other researches, “rural”) areas since there are simply very few in-service trainings or accredited peers to consult with. Thus seen, the discrepancies between activist and/or city-based counsellors and other and/or country-based counsellors may be further polarised without adopting a more overreaching strategy. To universalise affirmative care with trans* clients, I argue that this overreaching strategy could be to incorporate Trans* Studies in counselling educations.

The misconceived preconceptions of clients’ genders are prevalent among counsellors. These preconception include (but not limited to) the irrelevance between mental health issues and gender (Shepherd et al. 95), ahistorical perspectives (i.e. “gender is a new or fashionable thing with no history”) (Singh and Burnes 251), generalisations from gender-binary conceptualisations (i.e. “trans* clients are exclusively either MtFs or FtMs”) (Austin and Goodman 18), assumption of a universal narrative in gender experiences, gender pathologisation (i.e. perceiving minority genders as diseases to be cured through medical interventions), gender inflation (i.e. attributing all trans* clients’ mental health difficulties solely to gender) (Mizock and Lundquist 151), gender narrowing (i.e., counsellors have a set of limited conceptualisations of gender and are not willing to accept clients’ conceptualisations), (Mizock and Lundquist 151-152), misconceived universal desire for SRS surgeries (Austin and Goodman 19).

Through the compilation of misconceived preconceptions, three roots are identified that may contribute to them. First, these counsellors are unaware of the tremendous diversity among trans* clients (i.e. “… the heterogeneity of identities, experiences…[medical and/or emotional] needs…gender identities [and expressions], sexual orientations, and degree of “outness” to others [among trans* clients]” (Austin and Goodman 26-27 and 29)). Second, these counsellors are unaware that gender knowledge constantly updates itself. Correspondingly, Anneliese A. Singh & Theodore R. Burnes suggest that “[counsellors] must acknowledge the [many new voices and perspectives]…” (131). Third, these counsellors are unaware that since each trans* client has unique conceptualisations and experiences of their genders, they have the duty to listen to what trans* clients have to say about themselves.

These unawareness could be tackled in class settings with the instructors constantly emphasising trans* diversity, gender knowledge updating and varied individual gender conceptualisations and experiences. Plus, by digging into transgender history (such as the one written by Susan Stryker), these key features would be made even clearer. However, if counsellors were to learn these from their clinical experiences, they may well be confused, and generate new misconceived preconceptions of their own. Thus seen, rather than fixing the so-called gender knowledge into counsellors’ heads, the ultimate goal of the incorporated Gender Studies courses is to allow counsellors to validate and trust their trans* clients while effacing trans* clients’ burden to educate their counsellors from absolute scratch. Sing and Burnes describe the ideal outcome of such incorporation:

“…[E]very trans[*] client who walks into a counse[l]lor’s office finds not only an environment where the client does not have to educate the counse[l]lor, but also an environment that mirrors their strengths and supports their future wellness.” (133)

The incorporated Trans* Studies courses could be the start-points to push forward the process of depathologisation, in which the legitimacy of Gender Dysphoria diagnosis could be questioned. Unfortunately, Gender Dysphoria (or its earlier version, Gender Identity Disorder) has not yet been ridded from DSM-5 (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders) (Austin and Goodman 18) (one of its author, Doctor Kenneth Zucker, is trans-hostile outright (Plett)), which compels many trans* people to be diagnosed as such in order to pursue Gender Affirmation Surgeries (Mizock and Lundquist 148). This pathologisation has been questioned for a long time, but medical professionals hesitate to completely disengage with it. Some argue that such diagnosis allow trans* people to be “visible”: Singh and Burnes summarises:

“…[H]aving a diagnosis of [Gender Identity Disorder] can facilitate issues of accessing health care and supporting transgender youth and adults in family, school, community, and employment settings among providing other access to important resources for transgender people.” (127)

McCann adds that without such “visibility”, insuring trans* medical services would by all means put off the table. Plus, McCann also points that Gender Dysphoria may still be applicable to those who experience “…psychological distress…in the incongruence between one’s gender identity and birth sex” (153). In effect, these arguments are highly problematic in that trans* people should not be pathologised to be seen, and McCann’s application of “distress” (153) should not be to such extent that it has to be pathologised.

However, insofar as APA (American Psychology Association) does not repeal Gender Dysphoria from DSM, counsellors are practically still “gatekeepers”. Lauren Mizock and Chrstine Lundquist find that many counsellors are not well prepared for this role: they either overfocus on controlling access to gender affirmation surgery so much so that trans* clients feel compelled to reserve their true feelings to and deceive counsellors, or perform in permissive and/or perfunctory manners that letters are prescribed as unattended routines (152). The incorporated Trans* Studies courses could be good platforms for counsellors to negotiate their gatekeeper roles in the context that all participants are well informed of the role’s historical and current implications such as power structures. A possible positive outcome is demonstrated in Sand C. Chang’s enactment:

“From the start, I make it clear that I have a dual role: first and foremost, as a [counsellor] who can provide emotional support and psychoeducation with a consideration of the client’s [needs], and second as a evaluator of the request for [gender affirmation surgeries]…what I can include in the letter [depends] on a detailed conversation about information and expectations concerning the requested medical intervention. I talk about the power imbalance…[I am willing to] document Gender Dysphoria…when it helps the client achieve their goals…” (48)

This enactment could be a model because it clearly shows support to trans* clients’ needs (as required by affirmative care) while explicitly articulating on the workings of the current unfortunate system. In sum, transparency is the key.

Another controversy is whether trans* people’s mental health issues are in all manners related to their genders. Many counsellors believe that since researches have shown that trans* people’s mental health issues are similar to others’, counsellors could treat these issues in isolation to or in total disregard of trans* clients’ genders (Shipherd et al. 95). However, affirmative care, which should be acquired through the incorporated Trans* Studies courses, requires counsellors to trust their trans* clients’ perceptions (that is, if the trans* client thinks they are relatable, they are, and vice versa).

In Mizock and Lundquist’s research, trans* participants reported that they felt obliged to educate their counsellors about basic gender knowledge (153). It may take sessions before counsellors who are completely innocent of such knowledge could superficially apprehend the basics (Mizock and Lundquist 151), let alone those who blatantly reject them. Educating counsellors may be burdensome to some trans* clients since the time of sessions always costs money. Also, when they perceive the counsellors incapable of providing the assistance they need, they are likely to cancel further sessions. In this respect, having each counsellor to acquire some fundamentals of gender knowledge is absolutely necessary.

By educating counsellors with gender knowledge, McCann notes, “[c]ounselling can help people [explore] gender…” (80). Many may seek counselling services because in a yet-still cisnormative world, they feel confounded by gender and the lack of its knowledge thereof, which may further cause (mild) self-doubt and/or depression. This is particularly common in areas where gender awareness is nearly absent, as famous Japanese novelist Keigo Higashino describes in his novel One-sided Love:

“…‘[A]ccepting you interviews, meanwhile overcoming various worries. What you can eventually hear comes nowhere but from those who already have overcome multiple barriers. Recently, several non-fictions have been published about this [in Japan], all of which describe strong-minded protagonists, [it seems like trans* population] is full of strong-minded people. In fact, it is relatively not so, [much more [trans*] people cannot even overcome the first barrier].’” (220)

Noteworthy is that “helping people [explore] gender” (McCann 80) is not tantamount to (nor are counsellors ever entitled to) didactically teaching clients about their genders. Affirmative care requires counsellors on one hand to be affirmative about what they are confounded of themselves, on the other to stop such exploration as soon as their trans* clients show even the subtlest sign of irritation and/or rejection.

Many counsellors may perceive that counselling trans* clients is mostly individual-based. In effect, McCann notes, “family [and/or partners] were deeply affected[, especially] by the transitioning process. There [is] a lack of support [from] family members [and/or partners]” (79). Therefore, counselling trans* clients are very likely to involve familial and/or group counselling to address mainly three concerns, namely successfully “coming out” to (or sometimes hiding from) familial members and/or partners (Austin and Goodman 27), differentiated future expectations (e.g. “As much as she knew I was trans, she certainly didn’t think I would go the whole way with it”), preconceptions of family members and/or partners (like those of counsellors) (McCann 78). Thus seen, the incorporated Trans* Studies courses may also be good platforms on which counsellors’ familial and/or group counselling competencies could be reinforced by engaging in the practical topic of bridging the gaps between trans* clients and their family members and/or partners.

Negative experiences with counselling services almost without exception occur negative reputation. Tremendous effort has been taken before counselling services is somewhat re-gaining its reputation among trans* people, therefore crucial to preserve it. To counter the misconceived preconceptions and the lacuna of gender knowledge that together have been driving trans* clients away, affirmative care is expected to be acquired by counsellors through incorporated Trans* Studies courses in their counselling educations which not only incessantly underscore trans* diversity, gender knowledge updating and varied individual gender conceptualisations and experiences, but also actively engage in topics of depathologisation, negotiation of gatekeeper role and familial and/or group counsellings in class settings. Although this paper specifies the positive side of such incorporating, it does not mention the practicalities of its implementation (such as financing these courses). Besides, I identify a vacancy of scholarship about the relationships between trans* people’s medical treatments and their mental health statuses (for instance, how hormone therapy affects trans* people’s emotions), which, if studied, could also shed significant light on counselling services for upcoming trans* clients.

Works Cited

Austin, Ashley and Goodman, Revital. “Perceptions of Transition-related Health and Mental Health Services Among Transgender Adults”. Journal of Gay & Lesbian Social Services, Volume 30, Issue 1, 2018, pp. 17-32.

Chang, Sand C.. “Confession of a Gender Specialist”. The Remedy: Queer and Trans Voices On Health and Health Care, edited by Zena Sharman, Arsenal Pulp Press, 2016, pp. 45-52.

Higashino, Keigo. One-sided Love (Kataomoi, 片想い), Translated By the Author From Chinese Version, Kindle E-book, Second Edition, Hainan Publication Corporation, 1 October, 2016.

McCann, E.. “People Who Are Transgender: Mental Health Concerns”. Journal of Psychiatric and Mental Health Nursing, Volume 22, Issue 1, 2014, pp. 76-81.

Mizock, Lauren and Lundquist, Christine. “Missteps In Psychotherapy With Transgender Clients: Promoting Gender Sensitivity In Counseling and Psychological Practice”. Psychology of Sexual Orientation and Gender Diversity, American Psychological Association, Volume 3, Issue 2, pp. 148–155.

Plett, Casey. “Zucker’s ‘Therapy’ Mourned Almost Exclusively By Cis People.” Harlot, 11 April, 2016.

Shipherd, Jillian C. et al.. “Transgender Clients: Identifying and Minimizing Barriers to Mental Health Treatment”. Journal of Gay & Lesbian Mental Health, Volume 14 Issue 2, 2010, pp. 94-108.

Singh, Anneliese A. and Burnes, Theodore R.. “Introduction to the Special Issue: Translating the Competencies for Counseling with Transgender Clients into Counseling Practice, Research and Advocacy”. Journal of LGBT Issues in Counseling, Volume 4, Issue 3-4, 2010, pp. 126-134.

Singh, Anneliese A. and Burnes, Theodore R.. “Shifting the Counselor Role From Gatekeeping To Advocacy: Ten Strategies For Using the Competencies For Counseling With Transgender Clients For Individual and Social Change”. Journal of LGBT Issues in Counseling, Volume 4, Issue 3-4, 2010, pp. 241-255.

Stryker, Susan. Transgender History: The Roots of Today’s Revolutions, Second Edition, Published By Seal Press, New York, 2017, pp. 1-44.

Titus (Shuangquan) Tan

Professor Kevin McNeilly

ENGL 232 001

23 November 2017

An Introduction to Danmaku, a New Genre of Commentary Media

Originated from a Japanese anime video website, NicoNico Douga in 2006, a new system of video commenting that overlays “flying” “written texts” (Liu et al. 284) on video displays and synchronises them to the video timeline, or Danmaku, is gaining large-scale popularity in East Asia. With Danmaku, viewers simply pause and post comments during whatever moment of the video, the comments will usually, but not limited to, “move[s] from right to left” (Liu et al. 284) in accordance to Japanese literal accustoms (even after its appropriation in China). According to Alexa Traffic Ranks, Bilibili, the biggest Chinese Danmaku video sites (started as an anime video site like NicoNico Douga), whose users are mostly under twenty-five (67%) and on which around a hundred million users are constantly active, ranked the 305^th place among the world’s most successful sites in 2015 and the fourth most popular online video service in China despite its late launch and lack of financial support (Liu et al. 284). In recent years, its competitors, the traditional video sites such as iQiyi, Tudou (Liu et al. 284) and Youku (Chen et al. 731), almost without exception adopted Danmaku. In academia, the initial scholarly studies about Danmaku are foregrounded in their myopic understanding that Danmaku is instrumental and subsumed exclusively to the media genre of video. However, I argue that Danmaku should be understood as a stand-alone genre of commentary media separable from videos with its own textual decorum and modal designs.

Danmaku’s textual decorum is different from traditional comment section: its language is closely bounded to ACG (Anime, Comics and Games) because Danmaku, from its birth, is an offshoot of ACG subculture (NicoNico Douga). Therefore, many “clubby” ACG jargons are frequented in Danmaku, one of which is “Early Warning For High Energy Ahead”, derived from Gundam series (originally to warn Super Robot riders of approaching enemies), that heed other viewers of impending graphic scenes in the video. Although, many of these jargons have been adopted into general Danmaku use, they may remain prohibiting for new users.

Unlike traditional comments that centre on “general” or “post hoc” impressions (Chen et al. 732), Danmaku centres on entertainment (Chen et al. 738). Put simply, most people post Danmaku comments or watch videos with Danmaku to have fun. In extreme cases, “people watch a poor-quality video just for…ridiculing the content…with other[… viewers] through Danmaku…” (Chen et al. 733). On this basis, the three reasons for Danmaku opponents, namely “excess of information”, “information pollution” and “bad looking” (Chen et al. 736) may result from the lack of understanding that Danmaku is meant to be neither informative nor aesthetic but entertaining. Besides, statistics have shown that its frequent users do not consider “…low-quality information is…a major concern [for them]” (Chen et al. 740).

However, this is not to deny that some Danmau comments (although quantatively way less than entertaining ones) are informative that answer other viewers’ questions (concerning i.e. history backgrounds of the on-going scene or name of the on-going background music) and help viewers to “…find hidden messages and understand obscure plots” (Chen et al. 739). Nevertheless, such information sharing is seldom motivated by warm-heartedness but by self-complacency, so much so that a vainglorious hierarchy is demonstrated between informants as the “insiders” (particularly of the ACG circle) and information beneficiaries as the “outsiders”, not least by intentionally posting “spoiler information” (Chen et al. 736). As Scholars Yue Chen et al. notice, “by supplying information…the users may believe that they have an impact on others.” (734)

Danmaku’s modal designs are different from traditional comment section: Danmuku is synchronised to the video’s timeline, which makes it appear “live” and “simultaneous” (Liu et al. 289). Notwithstanding, this “co-viewing” (Chen et al. 731) is actually a simulation because different people may have been watched the video in drastically different time, or they may drag the video bar to add Danmaku comments whenever they feel like to (Liu et al. 289). Albeit this “pseudo-synchronicity”, Danmaku “provides…[a] common ground for discussing issues specific to the current…content” (Chen et al. 732), which is sometimes otherwise nonsensical with traditional commenting system. For example, the aforementioned jargon would not make sense in comment section since the idea of “Ahead” is non-existent if not placed in a certain moment of the video.

Since new Danmaku comments may be added to a video as more people watch it over time, some is reported to have watched the same videos for multiple times just for the new Danmaku comments (Chen et al. 735). Rarely would anyone “re-watch” a video simply motivated by the comment section. In this sense, Danmaku creates a unique motive for viewers to “re-watch” videos.

Each Danmaku comment flies through the video display in about three seconds (if not otherwise adjusted by the poster/viewer). Such short appearance encourages viewers to share their instantaneous feedbacks (Chen et al. 732) in that as the videos plays, their Danmaku comments will soon be taken out of the evoking context. This drive-force by instantaneity is particularly eminent during climactic moments of the video (Chen et al. 735) wherein, owning to viewers’ shared catharsis, a plethora of Danmaku comments jam the video display.

Danmaku is also equipped with a unique keyword filtering mechanism: Danmaku comments that contain undesired keywords set by the user are singled out in Danmaku. Although Chen et al. see the need to develop a “…smarter filtering mechanism…that [presents] the most interesting comments to viewers” (741). So far, alternative mechanism has not been adopted, possibly because the grassroots Danmaku forerunners like Bilibili are not financially and human-resource-wise capable of more complex and costly optimisation that potentially entails Artificial Intelligence. However, the current keyword filtering mechanism is actually effective: for example, if a user does not want to see fans’ quarrels over a film star, s/he could block the name of the star, and will still be able to enjoy other Danmaku comments. Plus, since Danmaku is a collective system, viewers often post Danmaku comments to suggest others to block certain keywords or temporarily turn off Danmaku.

Unlike the epidemic scholarly presumption that Danmaku is a part of the media genre of video, Danmaku, by virtue of its nonpareil textual decorum and modal designs, deserves a stand-alone genre of commentary media. To specify, such textual decorum includes its language connection to ACG, its focus on entertainment and its occasional provisions of valuable information; such modal designs include its “pseudo-synchronicity” (Chen et al. 732), its fleeting appearance that prompts transitory feedbacks and its keyword filtering mechanism. Admittedly, Chen et al. acknowledge that “…videos [with Danmaku] become…a re[-]creation of the original video[s]…contributed by both the video developers and the viewers” (741), the scholars do not realise that Danmaku, as a stand-alone genre of commentary media, have already been extended from videos to other media, such as online manga and live streaming videos. Nevertheless, such extension is occurring mainly within ACG subculture and East Asian territories, it, to this point, becomes somewhat foreseeable for Danmaku to be put in more general use in the near future. In this respect, the sooner scholars identify Danmaku as a new genre of commentary media, the better they will develop a closer understanding towards Danmaku.

Works Cited

Alexa – Website Traffic, Statistics and Analytics. Statistics and Rankings Retrieved in 2014. Newer Statistics and Rankings Accessible At

https://www.alexa.com/siteinfo/bilibili.com

Chen, Yue, et al.. “Watching a Movie Alone Yet Together: Understanding Reasons for Watching Danmaku Videos”. International Journal of Human–Computer Interaction, Volume 33, Issue 9, 2017, pp. 731-743.

Liu, Lili, et al.. “Watching Online Videos Interactively: the Impact of Media Capabilities In Chinese Danmaku Video Sites”. Chinese Journal of Communication, Volume 9, Issue 3, 2016, pp. 283-303.

Situated on the lower flower floor of Irving Barber Learning Center, Rare Books and Special Collections of University of British Columbia, a giant ship model seats solemnly in the glass showcase. Under the lukewarm light, its white hull, large funnels and rounded stern appall any visitor by its delicacy upon entering the Chung Collection Exhibition Room.

The original ship, Empress of Asia, is said to be almost 600 feet long and could accommodate 1200 passengers in different tiers of compartment. From its maiden voyage in 1913 to last sail in 1942 when it was sunken by Japanese Navy during a British reinforcement to Singapore, it was recruited in both World Wars and performed military excellence with its fellow battleships.

Since its birth, this ship is closely bound with Asia. During First World War, 1937, it evacuated civilians in Shanghai during the Sino-Japanese War. While at peacetimes, it served as cargo freight or passenger cruiser linking Vancouver and some major Asian cities such as Shanghai, Yokohama, and Nagasaki.

The elderly who led the interviewers down to the exhibition room recalled, “It crosses from Hong Kong with three other Empresses, so there’s a ship leaving Vancouver every two weeks.” For him, this ship comprises another layer of emotional attachment—This is the ship with which his mother emigrated from China to Canada in 1919.

The elderly aforementioned is Dr. Wallace Chung, the former head of UBC Hospital’s Surgery Department, and also one of the vanguard Chinese Canadian doctors. To the interviewers however, he is more of a “collector” than a medical professional.

At the age of six or five, his father owned a tailor shop in Victoria Chinatown, partly because the immigration law exempted head tax for merchants. In the shop, a poster of a steamship hanging on the wall remains refreshing in his memory, as he remarked, “Steaming out of the sunset towards the new world. It indicates such a romantic type of story.”

The steamship was indeed Empress of Asia, also his initial inspiration to cut clips from newspapers, collecting photographs and other artifacts about Canadian cross-Pacific liners. This collection eventually turned into the Chung Collection in UBC today, to which he has continuously dedicated to donate from 1960 to 1999.

Some 40,000 items, including particulars like a bone mahjong set, a man’s head tax certificate, and a photo collage of a Chinese businessman’s family, collectively records a history of early Chinese immigration to Canada with hope, patience, and perseverance.

The collection was a result of a quandary: It was safely stationed in his house until his family decided to move into a condominium. Therefore, two options stood before him: to sell his collection or not. Dr. Chung elaborated on his pausing thoughts, “…I thought the collection—the picture, the model—tells an entire story. And you don’t want to break it up. So I decided to get all the literature, the models, the pictures, and donate [them] to the library here.”

Something as tangible as a model of his incipient inspiration was what Dr. Chung had been seeking for years. Until 1990, a woman, having accidentally seen a poster of early Chung Collection Exhibition at Vancouver Maritime Museum, informed him that its builders’ model was restored in a private condominium basement in Toronto, however, in a rather poor condition.

Dr. Chung recollected his first sight onto the model heartbrokenly, “It had been left for thirty years in an unheated garage…paint flaking, rusted, funnels broken, and pieces pulled off by children.”

Despite its serious dilapidation, Dr. Chung was determined to repair it completely. At first, he resorted to professionals but was told that the cost would be as high as 105,000 CAD. The price obstacle, however, did not deter him from pursuing the reparation. Instead, he decided to fix it by himself.

Dr. Chung began by finding references. He went to Scotland where the ship was built. In an antique store, he found the twelve-feet-long original builders’ plans with great details. Besides, whatever the plans could not specify, he would refer to his second source, the model of its sister ship, Empress of Russia, preserved at Vancouver Maritime Museum.

Even with these two handy references, the reparation was certainly no easy work. He adopted his dedication to medical precision to repairing the ship, which he demanded himself that everything pieced back to the model had to be handmade using the same materials and in the same manners as the original model builders had done before him.

To name a few details, the lifeboats, stolen by children when the model was found, had to be completely redone. Each lifeboat was made of fifty-seven tiny pieces that were hallowed from a square block of wood, curved into handles or paddles, and attached to each other piece by piece with Shishkabob stick glue.

Another toil was for the anchor. With both big chains missing, the anchor also had to be curved from another piece of wood. “…[Then] you get a piece of wire and around and around…and you cut one edge so each link drop out. You put the links together…[to] make a chain” As he spoke, Dr. Chung winded his hands around and around to show the interviewers how the work is done. And here is not to articulate on the also meticulously restored turnbuckles, stanchions, ladders, vents and funnels etc.

Fortunately, Dr. Chung was never alienated from work that requires extra precision. In several different interviews, he reiterated that his medical career helped him with repairing the ship, “Luckily, I have lots of micro instruments, surgical practice. So I was able to use them.” We felt privileged to look at his curving tools, some of which, especially the tweezers, knives, and magnifying lenses, are clearly for surgical purposes.

The reparation was eventually finished in 1991. The whole process proved to be arduous as well as time-consuming: It took him six years (1993-1999), accumulatively 4000 hours, according to his journals. In the same year, Dr. Chung added the model Empress of Asia together with more than 25,000 other artifacts to the Chung Collection at UBC.

In the dim-lighted exhibition room, through his face, I could tell that he started to immerse into numerous cherished memories. “[Night after night, a]bout eight or nine o’clock on, I start[ed] doing the model. I usually finish around right after midnight. But if it’s going very well and smoothly, and I’m not sleepy, sometimes I’ll go to two or three.” As I was pondering on such perseverance, his mother somehow caught my mind.

In 1915, his father went back to China and married his mother. His father wanted to bring his wife over, but the World War I happened. It was not until 1919 that Empress of Asia carried her to Canada, along with enormous other first Chinese immigrants.

Without the ship, all the rest story—the tailor shop, the poster, the collection and the model ship—would not have taken place. I wonder how great a variety of other family stories, some told while others yet to be, commenced at the exact moment when Empress of Asia set sail at sunset, leaving Hong Kong at faraway rearview—exactly as how it appeared on the poster that inspired Dr. Chung.

Suddenly, I understood and appreciated his perseverance better: It is about paying homage to the history of Canadian Chinese, and finding his places among them all.