



Neoliberalization and Its Geographic Limits: Comparative Reflections from Forest Peripheries in the Global North

Roger Hayter

Department of Geography
Simon Fraser University
Burnaby, BC V5A 1S6
Canada
hayter@sfu.ca

Trevor J. Barnes

Department of Geography
University of British
Columbia
Vancouver, BC V6T 1Z2
Canada
tbarnes@geog.ubc.ca

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abstract

Recently, a number of economic geography studies have emphasized that when neoliberalism is grounded in particular places, it takes on hybrid forms, a result of local contingencies that are found at those sites. This article contributes to this literature by explicating the processes by which hybridization occurs by drawing on a comparative study of neoliberalism in three contemporary forest-based regions in the Global North: British Columbia, Canada; Tasmania, Australia; and the North Island, New Zealand. A key term for us is *geographic limits*, by which we mean regionally specific constellations (assemblages) of institutional and material forms that resist; hybridize; or, at junctures, even offset neoliberalism with alternative agendas. In turn, our idea of geographic limits is derived from our larger conceptual framework that integrates Anna Tsing's (2005) concept of friction with the notion of remapping and a four-leg stakeholder model that consists of different, albeit overlapping, institutional agencies that represent the political, the industrial, the environmental, and the cultural. These institutions provide the animus for a remapping that variously implements, modifies, and occasionally counters neoliberalism.

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One of the livelier disciplinary discussions in human and economic geography over the past decade has been on neoliberalism, especially the “neoliberalization of nature.”¹ A key contribution by geographers is their recognition that as neoliberalism crosses space, it mutates, revealing chameleon-like tendencies, producing hybrid or “mongrel” forms (Peck, Theodore, and Brenner 2009; Brenner, Peck, and Theodore 2010; Springer 2010).

This hybridization should not be surprising. Karl Polanyi (1944) realized even before neoliberalism was named that a pure market could never exist on its own because of internal contradictory impulses. In Polanyi’s (1944, chap. 19 and 20) historical analysis, Roosevelt’s New Deal, Hitler’s National Socialist planning state, and Stalin’s command economy were all responses to the impossibility of a pure (neoliberal) market economy. Likewise, Keynes, in correspondence with the modern founder of neoliberalism, Friedrich von Hayek, questioned how pure the market in neoliberalism could be, given the necessity of state involvement. As Keynes put it to von Hayek, “You agree that the line has to be drawn somewhere, and the logical extreme [of no state involvement] is not possible. But you give us no guidance whatever as to where to draw it” (June 28, 1944, letter from Keynes, quoted in Peck 2008, 12). The larger point is that by its very constitution, neoliberalism cannot exist in the pure form of an unadulterated (unregulated) market. It must be joined to other social and geographic processes and relations that lie outside, creating the mongrel forms of neoliberalism that economic geographers have been so good at identifying.

The purpose of this article is to explicate the processes by which hybridization or mongrelization occur by drawing on a comparative study of neoliberalism in three contemporary forest-based regions in the Global North: British Columbia, Canada; Tasmania, Australia; and the North Island, New Zealand. Specifically, we examine the institutional bases for what we term the geographic limits of neoliberalism. We make no assumption about neoliberalism’s hegemony. To do so would prejudice our argument from the outset. By geographic limits of neoliberalism, we mean regionally specific

¹ While Castree (2008a, 2008b) used “neoliberalizing nature,” versions of this term had been used earlier: see McCarthy and Prudham 2004; Heynen and Robbins 2005; Heynen, McCarthy, Prudham, and Robbins 2007; and Bakker 2009.

constellations (assemblages) of institutional and material forms that resist; hybridize; or, at junctures, even counter neoliberalism with alternative agendas.² It is these limits, we argue, that ensure that neoliberalism will never take on a universal, essentialist form.³ This is not to deny the power of neoliberalism, “the most successful ideology in world history” according to Anderson (2000, 17). But it does mean that neoliberalism is never a single entity, as Polanyi (1944) and Keynes (1944, quoted in Peck 2008) in effect anticipated, and certainly not monolithic. Rather, neoliberalism is pluralized, each specific variant shaped by the geographic limits found at a given place, and created by active, partly autonomous, local institutions and the physical environment in which they are set. Our view of neoliberalism, then, is that it is always coproduced by the very character of the spaces in which it is found. Space is not passive, a mere abstract Euclidean distance over which neoliberalism passes. But it enters into neoliberalism’s very woof and weave.

Although they exhibit significant differences in size, situation, organization, spatial structure, and internal politics, our case study regions of British Columbia, the North Island, and Tasmania share commonalities that justify their investigation and comparison. Most obviously, they share a similar colonial 19th-century settlement history under Britain and a concomitant regime of primitive accumulation in which indigenous peoples were dispossessed and economically and socially marginalized. Furthermore, in the post-World War II period until roughly 1980, all three regions engaged in parallel large-scale (Fordist), export-oriented forest exploitation. And most pertinent for our purposes, all three regions experienced neoliberalism sometime from the early 1980s onward. Neoliberalism was perhaps most well known in New Zealand (Le Heron and Pawson 1996; Larner 2000; Lewis 2004; Lewis, Larner, and Le Heron 2008), but it also occurred in British Columbia both in the 1980s and then again during the first decade of the 21st century (Resnick 1987; McCarthy 2006). In Tasmania, the arrival of neoliberalism is more difficult to date because prodevelopment state governments were historically in control during the entire postwar period.

Our conceptual point of departure is Anna Tsing’s (2005) idea of “friction” Friction refers to the process by which a given idea (in our case, neoliberalism) is reworked, remoulded, and reproduced within a locally, regionally specific institutional and material assemblage (a region’s “geographic limits”). As friction occurs, the idea mutates, reshaped by various local socioinstitutional and material peculiarities. Consequently, neoliberalism becomes different in each place, locally hybridized.⁴ Geography matters, possessing an agentic power to shape neoliberalism, with an ability in some cases even to transform it into something quite different. To make such a claim, of course, requires a belief in neoliberalism as a phenomenon (admittedly one on which some seem to have given up; Barnett 2005; Castree 2006). But accepting the reality of neoliberalism does not mean believing that it has an unchanging “Ur” form defined by a single list of essential characteristics. Rather, as we argue later, neoliberalism is best conceived of as a set of

² The notion of limits to neoliberalism has been recognized before in kindred literatures, for example, by Streeck (1989), with respect to labor markets; by Clarke (2004), in the form of collective social resistance; and by Johnston and Glasmeier (2007), in the form of democratic political movements.

³ The complexities involved in defining neoliberalism are long standing and have been discussed from various positions by Larner (2003), McCarthy and Prudham (2004), Barnett (2005, 2010), Castree (2006); and Peck et al. (2009). Certainly, in the various inventories of neoliberalism’s characteristics, defining elements of neoliberalism are multifarious and different across lists (Ward and England 2007, 4–6); Castree (2008a, 142–43; 2010); Mirowski (2009, 433–40); Brenner et al. (2010, 191, 198, 206, 212).

⁴ There are resonances here with Ong’s (2007, 4) conception of neoliberalism “not as a system but a migratory set of practices.”

“family resemblances” that overlap and vary among different places, thereby denying any essential attributes.

To understand better the causal mechanisms operating at any given place, that is, how geographic limits limit, we supplement Tsing’s (2005) framework with two additional concepts. The first concept is stakeholder theory, particularly as developed in resource peripheries (Ballard and Banks 2003; Hayter, Barnes, and Bradshaw 2003). The theory enables us to locate explicitly the local institutions and material resources that interact with neoliberalism, creating friction, shaping neoliberalism in particular ways. The second concept is remapping, which grounds Tsing’s friction in unambiguously geographic outcomes (Clapp 2004; Hayter 2003). By remapping, we mean alterations in land boundaries, uses, and ownership patterns produced in the friction between neoliberalism and local geographic limits.

200 The article is divided into two parts. After we elaborate on the geographic limits of neoliberalism by integrating Tsing’s notion of friction with stakeholder theory and remapping, we work through the notion of geographic limits for the three forest economies. We outline the various historical phases of remapping in each region, culminating in the emergence of neoliberalism sometime during the 1980s. The working out of neoliberalism on the ground in the three regions is necessarily full of hesitations, gaps, and even reversals. These patterns, we suggest, are a result of friction, the effects of four geographic limits: political, industrial, environmental, and cultural (aboriginal). Our larger argument is that in each of the three regions, these geographic limits hybridize and pluralize neoliberalism and, on occasion, even point to different possibilities altogether.⁵ By necessity, our discussions of the three cases are synthetic and generalized, designed to highlight comparative regional experiences. In particular, they are based on reading the substantive literature on each of the case study regions, long-standing research on British Columbia’s forest economy, and fieldwork in 2005 and 2006 in Tasmania and New Zealand.

Neoliberalism, Friction, and Resource Peripheries

The History of Neoliberalism

The origins, meaning, and diffusion of neoliberalism have received considerable attention in the recent geographic literature and need not be repeated (Peck and Tickell 2002; Ward and England 2007; Peck 2008; Peck et al. 2009; Brenner et al. 2010; Springer 2010, and the references presented in footnotes 1 and 3). Neoliberalism directly descended from 19th-century liberalism and was “an explicit attempt to remake *laissez-faire* for twentieth-century conditions” (Peck 2008, 4).

Originating at least in the 1920s, the first formal enunciation of neoliberalism as “a set of postulates” occurred in 1938 in Paris (Denord 2009). In turn, that meeting provided the prototype for the inauguration in 1947 on a Swiss mountaintop of the Mont Pèlerin Society, for several decades the keeper of the neoliberalist faith (Plehwe 2009). At the Mont Pèlerin meeting, a draft statement of aims was produced, “the ten commandments” (Plehwe 2009, 24), that Hayek, the chair of the meeting, believed defined an “agreement on fundamentals” (quoted in Plehwe 2009, 16). In broad terms, the commandments

⁵ This argument echoes Lewis’s (2009, 113) “call for more nuanced accounts [of neoliberalism] that admit difference, possibility and agency.” For Lewis (2009, 118), it means “scratch[ing] away at the contradictions, incompleteness and *limits of neoliberalism*” (italics added). The possibilities are discussed in Lewis et al.’s (2008, 43) work on “after neoliberalism” in New Zealand.

extolled the virtues of freely competitive markets and private property and derogated governmental control, ownership, and regulation. It was these principles of neoliberalism that the Mont Pèlerin Society wanted to take out into the world, “to effectively organize the power of knowledge and ideas across borders” (Plehwe 2009, 7).

But from its inception, neoliberalism faced difficulties in acceptance. In the early postwar period, Keynesian thinking was dominant, the basis of macroeconomic and planning and international trade in the Global North. Hayek (1949, 417), though, had a counterstrategy to influence “secondhand dealers in ideas,”; that is, people who controlled the distribution of knowledge to ordinary people. The strategy was to develop a new “shadow” network of neoliberal “dealerships,” “think tanks” like the Institute of Economic Affairs, the American Enterprise Institute, and the Fraser Institute (Phillips-Fein 2009). These think tanks would “change the world” (Mitchell 2009, 387) when circumstances were propitious.

In the Global North, that moment came in the late 1970s and early 1980s when energy crises, deindustrialization, a deep-seated recession, and stagflation discredited Keynesianism (Klein 2007; Brenner et al. 2010; Springer 2010). That shift was further facilitated by the elections of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan, respectively, as the U.K. prime minister (1979) and the U.S. President (1980). In the Global South, neoliberalism came even earlier with Milton Friedman’s “los Chicago boys” experimenting with “shock therapy” in Pinochet’s Chile in 1973 (Fischer 2009) and that continued in other forms and in other places in the Global South throughout the 1980s and 1990s. The growing dominance of neoliberalism provoked energetic protests, such as around meetings of the World Trade Organization (WTO). But despite its “malcontents,” as well as a severe financial crisis in autumn 2008, followed by a major recession and changes of government in several jurisdictions, neoliberalism continued (Peck et al. 2009).

Defining Neoliberalism

Although Hayek (1949) believed that neoliberalism was defined by an “agreement on fundamentals,” there was never a concurrence about their exact nature. Even at the 1947 Mont Pèlerin meeting, those “fundamentals” were not carried in a vote (Plehwe 2009, 14). Instead, we suggest that neoliberalism is better thought of as a mix-and-match set of principles, a set of “family resemblances,” as Peck and Tickell (2002, 388, 393) put it, of which only a subset apply for any given geographic case.⁶ Thought of in these terms, it is possible to speak meaningfully about neoliberalism, but not attribute to it essential or monolithic characteristics. Precisely, this variegated nature of neoliberalism has long been recognized by economic geographers. Thus Brenner and Theodore (2002, 361) spoke of “actually existing neoliberalism” to convey its variability; Larner (2003, 511)

⁶ The notion of a “family resemblance” was first systematically deployed by the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein (1953, §65–71) in his *Philosophical Investigations* as a strategy to avoid an essentialist account of language, that is, the claim that language possesses a single bedrock meaning. Instead, connected words, in Wittgenstein’s vocabulary a “language game,” gain their meaning from overlaps with other connected words, or other language games. The overlaps, “the family resemblances,” are the source of meaning that, once understood, enables one to participate in other language games. But there is no single common meaning that holds across all language games. Instead, one must go between each different game and mark off what is similar and what is different for every potential pairing. Likewise, for neoliberalism, there are a series of commonalities among its grounded forms, but these similarities vary between each comparative pair, with no single set of commonalities holding across all forms of neoliberalism. In this way, neoliberalism still has meaning, but only as a set of family resemblances, not as a singular essential definition that holds in every case.

discussed neoliberalism's "multiple material form"; and Peck and Tickell (2002, 383) preferred the verb over the noun, *neoliberalizing*, to indicate its processal, transformative, and *differentiated* character.

While we recognize the central importance of this geographic insight, we think that the argument can be pushed even further theoretically by our notion of geographic limits. We suggest that these limits, represented by a particular local institutional and material assemblage, through their interaction with one or more of the elements of neoliberalism changes these elements, creating hybrid neoliberal forms that may be so hybridized that the neoliberal component all but disappears.⁷ In pursuing our argument, we draw upon Tsing's (2005) idea of friction.

Friction, Remapping, and Institutional Stakeholders

202 Tsing's (2005) contemporary anthropological work on Indonesia's resource frontier in Kalimantan was concerned especially with forestry and mining and its environmental, political, and cultural consequences. Tsing framed her argument as a relationship between what she called "universals" and instances of their local material incarnation. Universals are ideas like freedom, justice, and equality. The meaning of a universal for Tsing is not the strict philosophical definition, an abstract philosophical truth holding for all times and places. Rather, "a universal is an aspiration, an always unfinished achievement" (Tsing 2005, 7). To be finished, to be more than just an aspiration, universals must travel into the world. But, and this is literally the rub, as they travel, they experience friction, losing the purity that defined them as aspirations. Universals instead become "an ethnographic object" (Tsing 2005, 7), taking on additional baggage, given new meanings, accreting institutional relations. Although Hayek's (1949) aspiration was to bring the "agreed fundamentals" (the universal) of neoliberalism into the world unscathed, it was impossible. As soon as these "fundamentals" began coursing through networks, encountering geographic limits, they were changed, scuffed, and marked in new ways by multiple active local forces.

Friction occurs when aspirations to the universal meet local agents, institutions, and material resources in particular places. In Tsing's (2005, 1) evocative phrase, universals are "charged and enacted in the sticky materiality of practical encounters." But these encounters often generate external ("global") and internal ("local") conflicts. This particularly holds for Tsing's (2005, Section 1) focus on the resource commodity chain. Each link on that chain, Tsing suggested, is a point of friction, where the universal aspiration to free market neoliberalism grates against the institutional and material form of a given local site, creating particular types of connections, responses, and clashes. In the process are produced untidy, disordered, hybrid forms of resource capitalism. As Tsing (2005, 4) wrote:

[Commodity] chains are made up of uneven and awkward links. The cultural specificity of capitalist forms arises from the necessity of bringing capitalist universals into action through [such] worldly encounters. The messiness of capitalism . . . exemplifies the encounters in which global capital and commodity chains are formed.

From our perspective, Tsing's framework can be usefully complemented by two additional ideas. The first is remapping, which refers to fundamental alterations in the

⁷ Barnett (2010, 276) raised the same issue: "What remains unclear is why, if neoliberalism never appears in pure form, and when it does appear it is always compounded with other projects and processes, the outcome of any neoliberal ideational project should continue to be called 'neoliberalization.'"

principles governing resource values in terms of land ownership, control, use, and property rights and makes visible the inherent geography of friction (Hayter 2003; Barnes and Hayter 2005; Clapp 2004). When friction is produced along various points of the resource commodity chain, as in Indonesia, British Columbia, the North Island, or Tasmania, remapping ensues. Maps of landownership, control, and use are reshuffled; boundaries are redrawn; and the material landscape is sometimes dramatically remade.

The second is adding institutional stakeholders that make explicit at the local level what neoliberalism rubs against when it creates friction. A recent framework for understanding conflicts in resource peripheries, especially in relation to resource exports, is a four-leg institutional stakeholder model consisting of governments, industry, environmental non-governmental organizations (ENGOs), and aboriginal native groups (Hayter et al. 2003; Ballard and Banks 2003). Each institution represents a diverse set of values, goals, and mandates related to the exploitation of resources. Each institution then tries to remap resources to realize its own best interests. Conflicts are endemic. But there can also be cooperation, sometimes creating strange bedfellows. For example, ENGOs, aboriginal peoples, and even governments may join to oppose industrial interests (Hayter 2003). Important for our purposes, the relationships among governments, industry, ENGOs, and aboriginal peoples provide a systematic basis for analyzing the geographic limits that produce a particular form of neoliberalism. 203

From this perspective, the limits to neoliberalism are geographic because institutional structure varies by type of resource periphery. In this light, a particularly relevant distinction is between resource peripheries of the Global South, studied by Tsing (2005), and the rich peripheries of the Global North, our concern. Poverty is much more widespread in the former, as is political instability, difficulties in enforcing the law, corruption, and violence, although, of course, such issues are also found in the Global North (Peluso and Watts 2001; Le Billon 2003; Springer 2009). In some cases, authoritarian military regimes welcome neoliberalism (severing any supposed link between democracy and the market). Perhaps the best example is the 1973 military coup in Chile that ousted the democratically elected Allende government. General Augustus Pinochet, the leader of the military junta, appointed “a team of young Chilean economists, students of Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman at the University of Chicago, known . . . as ‘the Chicago Boys’ ” (Clapp 1995, 282; Fischer 2009). The privatization of state forests (and associated state companies), along with the removal of barriers to imports and foreign direct investment (FDI), and export restrictions on unprocessed wood, became Chile’s neoliberal agenda. In some other Global South resource peripheries, dangerous, lawless situations provided a brutal context for the export of resources (Tsing 2005; Le Billon and Springer 2007; Peluso and Watts 2001; Springer 2009).

Among resource peripheries in the Global North, remapping is often contentious. Pervasive and systematic physical violence is rare, but sporadic outbursts of aggression certainly occur. In other cases, ENGOs engage in various forms of civil disobedience, including blockades of industrial operations, disruption of corporate meetings, and passive resistance to arrest. They also skilfully use both the media to reveal environmental abuse and to shame perpetrators and the courts to achieve desired ends (Soyez 1995; Hayter and Soyez 1996; Lehtinen 2006).

Neoliberalism in Three Forest Resources Regions

From 1980 onward, various neoliberal-inspired policies were introduced in each of our three case study forest economies. In each case, we argue, the policies were shaped by the geographic limits found in that place, creating something different from at least Hayek’s

(1949) “agreed fundamentals” of neoliberalism. Because of the interpretive character of our study, we cannot offer cast-iron proofs for our thesis. The geographies and histories of the three regions are too complex. In New Zealand and British Columbia, for example, there were periods after 1980 when governments were in office that did not actively support neoliberalism. Even when elements of neoliberal policies were introduced, as defined by Hayek’s “fundamentals,” they were accompanied by other policies that were not informed by neoliberalism and, indeed, were in conflict with it. Similarly, elements of what we now think of as neoliberalism existed before the term came into being. Resource peripheries in general, and certainly in our case study regions, were long dedicated to free trade, private property, and market agendas. Consequently, neoliberalism’s arrival sometime in the 1980s bled into existing attitudes. Ironically, perhaps the greatest era of neoliberalism was the 19th-century beginnings of the forest industry, especially in British Columbia and Tasmania, which featured rampant, largely unregulated, competitive markets.

Before Neoliberalism: The Fordist Remapping

204 British Columbia (Canada), the North Island (New Zealand), and Tasmania (Australia) were established as white settler colonies that effectively developed during the 19th century to exploit resources for exports. In British Columbia and Tasmania, colonization was strongly associated with the exploitation of timber, but much less so in New Zealand, where agricultural production was the priority. The settlement processes were legitimated legally by a property rights system based on British jurisprudence. These rights displaced existing aboriginal peoples, largely marginalizing them. In effect, white settler colonies remapped traditional resource-use patterns in accordance with what Marx (1967) termed “primitive accumulation,” justified by the principle of *terra nulla*.

The first (capitalist) remapping was neither straightforward nor successful even on its own terms. It involved various experiments in constructing property rights regimes for the industrial exploitation of resources. Around the turn of the 19th century, for example, forest policy in British Columbia featured both the privatization of forests and (increasingly) the award of Crown-based leases and tenures. In combination, an extreme form of spatial biopolitics was enacted on the existing First Nations population that occupied the forests. First Nations people were made visible by the colonial state, then removed from their lands, and relocated to small, marginally sustainable reservations. While the process conformed to features of (Foucauldian) governmentality, with the colonial government systematically engaging in surveying, mapping, inspecting, classifying, and counting, it also exercised sovereign power. Harris (1997, 2002) brilliantly demonstrated that British Columbia’s Native population was frequently reduced to “bare life” (Agamben 1998). In Tasmania, conditions for Aborigines were perhaps harsher, subject in effect to genocide, the last survivor dying in 1876 (Blainey 1980). In New Zealand, land was primarily sought for farming and obtained partly by deforestation. Although the Maori (who themselves had arrived 900 years earlier), were marginalized, they were more effective in opposing colonization, including the expropriation of their land, than were the indigenous peoples in the other two regions. Moreover, the Maori were given national recognition and powers of negotiation by the 1840 Treaty of Waitangi. In Canada, the Indian Act of 1876 established aboriginal status and rules for the organization of reserves, but did not provide a similar (national) basis for either reconciliation or the negotiation of rights in British Columbia (or elsewhere). In Tasmania, official aboriginal designation was not recognized until 2005.

The impact of this European settler-driven remapping had devastating consequences. In British Columbia, fears of “forest liquidation” and frenzied land speculation stimulated

the government to establish the first (Fulton) Royal Commission on forestry in 1909. The commission's recommendation, to call a moratorium on the allocation of further timber rights, was accepted. In Tasmania, there were similar concerns about the destruction of forests, as well as alarm over the export of logs to the mainland without local processing. The pioneering States Forest Act of 1885 provided official recognition of the environmental degradation produced by an unregulated forestry. The same act also created the first conservator of forests (appointed in 1888) to manage and control timber. The conservator described the state of forests in his first year as "chaotic" (Gee 2001, ix). Twenty-six years later, not much had changed, with a visiting forest expert concluding that the timber grants were "reckless" (Carron 1985, 65). In New Zealand, between 1890 and 1900, 27 percent of the national forest was removed (Roche 1990, 943).

Out of this speculative, disorganized, and minimally regulated first remapping, the beginnings of a more stable, corporate-dominant Fordist policy were born. This policy was first established in Tasmania and New Zealand. Following the Wood Pulp and Paper Act of 1926, the Tasmanian government granted exclusive pulpwood harvesting rights. In the same decade, the National Forest Commission in New Zealand was established to create exotic plantations on marginal agricultural land. In contrast, British Columbia's commitment to Fordism was not pursued until the end of World War II with the establishment of the second ("Sloan") Royal Commission into Forestry in 1945. The Sloan commission determined the basis of the 1947 Amendments to the Forest Act of 1912. Like Tasmania's concessions, the 1947 act provided companies in British Columbia with immense tracts of timber with long-term timber leases or licenses, initially as tree farm licenses and later as public sustained yield units. In return, companies provided major investments in integrated forest product facilities (Marchak 1983; Hayter 2000; Prudham 2007).

With public ownership of forests maintained in all three regions, the Fordist boom of the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s was most spectacular in British Columbia, where a wide range of wood products (lumber, plywood, shingles, and shakes) and paper and allied products (pulp, newsprint, and paperboard) were produced in large volumes in unionized mills controlled mainly by large, integrated corporations. British Columbia's growth was strongly predicated on exports to the United States, with Japanese markets becoming increasingly significant by the 1970s. Tasmania's Fordist growth was based more narrowly on investment in pulp mills and wood chip exporting facilities, relying considerably on Japanese markets. In New Zealand, the growth of forest products occurred slightly after the other two regions, a result of the later maturation of plantations and the evolution of Japanese markets, especially for pulp and paper products.

Fordism strengthened the regulatory framework of forestry. It focused on the industrial use of timber by setting harvest quotas or annual cuts, fixing stumpage rates (the price charged by the state to firms for the wood they cut on government-owned land), determining the species grown on plantations and their management techniques, and setting preliminary environmental regulations. Continuous clear-cutting (the logging of large timber blocs adjacent to one another in successive years) was the norm in all regions, and there was a widespread belief that old-growth timber needed to be harvested before it became "decadent." Admittedly, a sustained yield was a founding principle of New Zealand's plantations and was espoused in British Columbia and Tasmania as well. The reality of a sustained yield in these latter regions, however, was little more than a belief in natural regeneration and was implemented by granting large tenures that (ostensibly) allowed harvested areas to regenerate in time for the next cut. It was not until the 1970s in British Columbia and Tasmania that serious attempts were made to regenerate harvested forests. In Tasmania, like New Zealand, these regeneration efforts involved

primarily plantation forestry, consisting of a relatively few exotic species, notably radiata pine, while in British Columbia, plantings replaced indigenous species, Douglas fir, cedar, and hemlock on the coast and spruce and pine in the interior.

The Arrival of Neoliberalism

Forest policies in the three regions after the World War II were committed to large-scale, export-oriented corporate forestry based on the Fordist principles of the mass production of standardized products and Taylorized forms of labor control. As export regions, the three welcomed the development of free trade under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. British Columbia and Tasmania were also open to FDI (Hayter 1981). During this period, power and control of resources were held by the state and the large corporations. There were skirmishes with environmental groups and aboriginal peoples, both of which varied with the particular region, but conflict was controlled, never jeopardizing the larger system. Consequently, remapping was directed by the state in accordance with the larger corporate Fordist imperative to provide mass-produced exports at the cheapest price.

By the 1970s, though, Fordism was beginning to run out of steam as a mode of resource production (as it was generally in other industrial sectors). British Columbia and Tasmania also began experiencing supply difficulties (in British Columbia there was recognition of a “fall-down” effect—lower productivity because of prior clear-cutting). The deep recession of the early 1980s, with its mill closures, job losses, corporate losses, and rising debt-equity ratios, signaled a fundamental weakness in the Fordist mode of production (Barnes and Hayter 1997; Hayter 2000). At a time when industry was suffering and in need of relief, the recession provided the context for the rise of neoliberalism, most clearly in New Zealand and British Columbia. Indeed, some commentators, such as Klein (2007), argued that it was precisely crises that enabled neoliberalism to rise and thrive, even the crises that it itself fomented (Brenner et al. 2010).

In Tasmania, debates about forest policies, while controversial, were rarely connected to neoliberal rhetoric. Both the Labor and Liberal governments that held power in Tasmania from the early 1980s were strongly prodevelopment and pro-industry, sympathetic to neoliberal principles that had already directed their policies in many ways before its formal arrival.

When neoliberalism was first articulated in these regions, it was inevitably messy, shaped by history, vested interests, and opportunism. This is not to deny its effectiveness. But in Tsing’s (2005) terms, there was friction. Each of the three case study regions was jarred by controversy, debate, and intense politics as neoliberalism worked itself out against the institutional peculiarities of forest economies and the material character of the resource itself. In addition, neoliberalism had to face the long-running, but increasingly well-organized, environmental and aboriginal opposition to existing Fordist forest policies. At least initially, the prime enemy for ENGOs and aboriginal peoples was Fordism, not neoliberalism. For this reason, it is likely that “wars in the woods” and battles over the remapping of forests would have occurred without neoliberalism, although with neoliberalism, they took peculiar forms. To clarify the messiness of the impact of neoliberalism in the three regions, we summarize in Table 1 the major forest policy and closely related initiatives of recent decades for each of the three regions. Fordism was set in train in Tasmania by the Forest Act of 1920, in New Zealand by the Forestry Acts of 1949 (which came into force as the first plantations were about to mature), and in British Columbia by the Forest Act Amendments of 1947. These policies held until sometime during the 1980s and 1990s, when they were altered with an engagement with neoliberalism.

Table I

Key Forestry and Related Legislation in the Case Study Regions

Legislation	Comment
Tasmania	
Forest Act, 1920	Provided the basis for the Concession Acts in 1926 and 1932 to timber interests. Reinforced by the Forest Act of 1959 and further Concession Acts in 1959 and 1968.
Forest Act, 1980	The Forest Act amended to incorporate the concept of forest management plans. Harvest fall-down recognized.
Forest Practices Act, 1985	Aimed to achieve sustainable management of public and private forests. Reviewed several times, the latest in 2000. Introduced a progressive decline in clear-cutting or felling from about 95 percent to 35 percent of the wood cut.
Resource Management Planning System, 1994	Incorporated the Land Use Planning and Approvals Act 1993 and the State Policies and Projects Act 1993. Incorporated principles of sustainability and reinforced by the Environmental Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act of 1999. Prior to 1995, wood allocations and wood chip export licenses were allocated on an annual basis.
Forestry Tasmania, 1975, 1994	Created in 1975 to invigilate forest guidelines by the state and commonwealth and to balance production and conservation goals. A Forest Code, based on British Columbia's experience, introduced to ensure sustainable forest management and to protect water, soil, biodiversity, archaeological, and geomorphology values. The code applies to all land and is reviewed every five years.
Tasmanian Regional Forest Agreement, 1997	The joint national-state agreement requires land-use plans for different areas and types of production and conserved 80 percent of the native forests.
Aboriginal Lands Act, 1995	Reinforced by the Native Title (Tasmania) Act of 1994. Confirms Tasmania's ownership of resources while providing for Heritage Protection for aboriginal artifacts.
Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act, 1999 (Commonwealth).	Commonwealth legislation to inform and strengthen state legislation in terms of environmental assessment. Anticipated by prior national-state agreements, notably the 1992 National Strategy for Ecological Sustainability. Incorporated the new National Heritage Trust and required the assessment of matters of national environmental significance.
Northern Pulp Mill (Doubts Removal) Agreement, 1989	Left the decision on a proposed new mill to the commonwealth government that used the Foreign Investment Review Board to reject the project (although the controversy was environmental).
Pulp Mill Assessment Bill, 2007	Approval for a \$2 billion kraft pulp mill by Gunns at Bell Bay. This project is yet to start, and environmental opposition remains strong.
Plantations for Australia—2020 Vision, 1997	A commonwealth-state agreement to increase the competitive wood supply for domestic and export consumption. Tasmania's 1998 Forest Growth Plan accelerated plantations.
Tasmania Community Forest Agreement, 2005	Dovetailed into the 1995 RFA (as part of a federal election). A Conservation Fund was established, the size of the reserve area increased, and the share of native trees conserved was increased to 90 percent. Land clearing (by farmers) was to be phased out.
New Zealand	
Forest Department, 1919	The new department organized the first plantation forest plan, 1920s–35, to create 300,000 hectares.
Forestry Act, 1949	The Forest Service formally charged with directing all aspects of forest policy, commercial as well as regulations. The second plantation forest plan launched in 1960 with the goal of an additional 1 million hectares by 1999.
Waitangi Tribunal, 1975	Established to interpret the Treaty of Waitangi (1840), hear Maori objections, and make recommendations for Maori reparation.
National Parks Act, 1980	Regulation of the national park systems, including several in North Island, the two largest being Te Urewera National Park (1954) and Tongariro National Park (1887).
Forest Rights Registration Act, 1983	Facilitated the ability of corporate forestry interests to make agreements with individual land owners to obtain wood.

(Continued on next page)

Table 1

Key Forestry and Related Legislation in the Case Study Regions (Continued)

Legislation	Comment
State Owned Enterprise Act, 1986	State-owned enterprises were established to provide commercial viability to public-sector organizations. The Forestry Corporation was established as a state-owned enterprise with control over state plantations.
Forests Amendment Act, 1987	Privatization of the Forest Corporation and sale of forest assets.
West Coast Accord, 1986	An agreement between the West Coast United Council, environmental and industry groups, conservation groups, and local communities to devise a strategy for west coast forests on South Island. Created a new national park, inventoried reserves, and permitted some native timber to be used for sawmilling.
Conservation Act, 1987	Consolidated conservation and preservation mandates by the government, outside the production mandate of the Forestry Department.
Resource Management Act, 1991	Aimed to embody sustainability in land-use planning. Deregulation and adoption of a results-based approach with a focus on performance standards. Greater permissiveness in land-use decisions, including those with respect to the urbanization of bush-lots.
British Columbia	
Forest Act, 1947	Emphasized sustained-yield principles and the establishment of large-volume area-based tree farm licenses and volume-based Public Sustained Yield Units, now timber licenses.
Forest Act Amendments, 1978	Small and medium-sized enterprises and the like.
Revised Stumpage Formula, 1988	The introduction of a waterbed system that ensures that all forest administration costs are covered by stumpage. In 1992, a revised stumpage policy ratcheted up payments on an annual basis.
Forest Practices Code, 1995	Comprehensive new regulations to meet environmental values, related to wildlife, biotic, and aesthetic considerations. The size of clear-cuts was reduced, and continuous clear-cutting was banned.
Pulp Mill Effluent Standards, 1992	New, tough targets for air and water emissions.
Commission of Resources and Environment 1992	Mandated to establish regional land-use planning throughout British Columbia.
Clayoquot Sound UNESCO Biosphere Reserve, 2000	Clayoquot Sound Compromise, 1993, involving multiple groups, leads to UNESCO designation and protected park status.
Treaty Process, 1993	Established treaties for First Nations people that in British Columbia had largely not been signed in the 19th century.
Forest and Range Practices Act, 2002	Replaced the Forest Code with a "results-based" approach that reduced harvesting regulations to reduce costs while maintaining environmental standards.
Forest Revitalization Plan, 2004	A 20 percent takeback in tenures and reallocation for aboriginal peoples, wood lots and auctions, and community forests. Establishment of a new approach to market-based stumpage. Removal of minimum cut and appurtenancy requirements.
Community forests, 1997	Three proposals requested, and the scheme enlarged in 2002.
Timber auctions	Part of a takeback to be used in market auctions, and prices used to establish market-based stumpage.
Great Bear Rainforest Agreement, 2006	A five-year agreement among multiple stakeholders to remap the Central and North-Central coast of British Columbia from industrial use to mainly nonindustrial use.
Softwood Lumber Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) 1986; Softwood Lumber Agreements, 1996 and 2006	Agreements between Canada and the United States to control softwood lumber exports by export controls, quotas, and or tariffs. The present agreement extends to 2013.

The Reach and Geographic Limits of Neoliberalism

The arrival of neoliberalism was bound up in each of the forest regions with changes in privatization, deregulation, and the deepening of markets. The privatization of plantation forests in New Zealand in 1987 and 1988 was perhaps the most direct expression of neoliberalism in any of the three forest regions. It occurred in New Zealand in two stages and part of the new (1984) national government's embrace of neoliberalism to provide strategic redirection for the economy as a whole (Le Heron 1988; Roche 1990, 1992). First, the New Zealand Forest Service was replaced in 1987 by the Forestry Corporation, a state-owned enterprise mandated to make the agency profitable. In 1988, the second shoe dropped when the government announced the selling of the Forest Corporation's plantations to the private sector, driven by an intent to reduce the national debt. Privatization reversed the long-standing view that forests should be publicly owned and managed for the public good (Roche 1990, 943). That principle was first enunciated in the 1920s, when the first exotic plantations were established to offset anticipated timber shortages from indigenous forests. Public ownership was also thought essential for multiple-use forests and the management of forests on Maori land.

The New Zealand government's rationale for privatization was economic efficiency. Production would be maximized and costs would be minimized provided that forests, along with wood processing, were organized by the free market. Private forests were also not to be encumbered by meeting broader environmental and social goals (Roche 1990). These goals were to be addressed by a new Department of Conservation (the Conservation Act, 1987). Inevitably, the implementation of privatization was complex and controversial. But in two rounds of auctions of sealed bids from 1990 to 1992, much of New Zealand's forests (i.e., trees, not land) were sold on the basis of price and without reference to the nationality of the buyers. Privatization redefined New Zealand's forest sector. Previously, the government owned 52 percent of the forests, with the industry overwhelmingly domestically controlled. By 1995, less than 7 percent was publicly owned, and about half the industry was foreign owned. Although privatization established profitability in the country's plantations, investments in wood-based manufacturing were less than anticipated. For example, Fletcher Challenge, the largest New Zealand-based integrated forestry multinational corporation, (Le Heron 1988, 1990) dramatically restructured, selling its substantial British Columbia-based operations in 2001 (Hayter 2000, 168–70), divesting from pulp and paper, and in 2002–03 changing its name to Tenon, a lumber and moulding-board manufacturer. Meanwhile, raw log exports became more important, and, since 2004, they have been annually 3 to 4 times larger than lumber exports by volume.

The story in British Columbia was different. While neoliberalism came early to the province during the early 1980s, it was never applied to the forest economy (Resnick 1987). Instead, it was almost 20 years later before neoliberal tenets were applied to forestry. In 1983, the provincial British Columbia Social Credit government introduced, in response to a deep recession, a "restraint program" (Allen and Rosenbluth 1986). Ostensibly, the program, like New Zealand's reforms, was directed at minimizing the role of the government in the economy by both reducing public expenditures and regulations and lubricating market-based processes (Donaldson 1986; Resnick 1987). In practice, the sharp end of this program was directed toward reducing expenditures on education, health, and social support programs. The forest sector, although at the center of the provincial economic crisis, was not targeted or reformed by policies of privatization and deregulation. Rather, the government provided a sympathetic administration of existing

forest policies by lowering stumpage fees and relaxing harvesting rules. This initiative was secret, however, and once it was made public, it was opposed and stopped. Ironically, given the neoliberal times, with the election of a left-wing government, the British Columbia New Democratic Party (NDP) in 1991, Fordist forestry interventionist policies became more pronounced. The NDP government significantly *deepened* the degree of regulation covering forest policy, moving further away from neoliberalism during the 1990s, not closer (Wilson 1998).

210 In 2001 the NDP was replaced by a right-wing British Columbia Liberal Party coalition, and neoliberalism finally made a significant impact on the regulation of the province's forests. The new premier, Gordon Campbell, promised deregulation, which was represented by passage of the Forest and Range Practices Act 2002 and the Forest Revitalization Plan 2004. The former removed the Forest Code, withdrew regulations, and replaced process-based requirements in the development of forest harvesting plans with a results-based approach. The Forest Revitalization Plan also removed the long-established appurtenancy clause tying timber supplies to local mills (and communities), removed the minimum cut requirements to give companies more freedom, and reduced tenure allocations to big companies in part to supply market auctions. The removal of appurtenancy, a key element of the 1947 Forest Act Amendments to promote the dispersal of the industry throughout British Columbia, has been deemed a particularly significant signal of the government's commitment to neoliberalism (Prudham 2005, 2008). But while the elimination of appurtenancy meant that some mills lost their local timber supply and closed, others gained access to nonlocal timber supplies and survived.

In Tasmania, it is harder and easier to relate the government's policy to neoliberalism. It is harder because there is no equivalent signal moment of its government's embrace of neoliberal ideology as in New Zealand or in British Columbia. It is easier because the privatization of land was historically stronger in Tasmania than in the other two jurisdictions, with private landowners long opposed to governmental interference and in favor of market forces. In Tasmania, 31 percent of the forests are privately owned, with numerous small landowners as well as large corporate ones. One senior bureaucrat stated that Tasmania's regulatory regime could be described as "self-regulation by the forest sector with oversight and independent enforcement by the government through the Forest Practices Board" (Wilkinson 2001, 222). Especially in comparison to British Columbia, there is greater tolerance for unprocessed exports. Tasmania embarked on a policy of wood chip exports in 1972, especially to Japan. While exports initially used waste wood, chipping subsequently became an independent activity, utilizing indigenous species from specified concessions. Although the concession policy was eliminated in the 1990s, a greater volume of chips with more flexibility in sourcing continued to be guaranteed. The government also sought to help farmers plant trees for forestry if doing so was deemed more profitable than agriculture. All this fits with neoliberalism in which the state plays a substantial role in creating markets.

But while there were these signs of neoliberalism throughout the three forest economies, as a movement, neoliberalism could have gone further, spread more comprehensively, and taken on more of Hayek's (1949) "agreed fundamentals." Why did the New Zealand government not privatize land, rather than trees, and only nonnative, exotic species at that? Why did neoliberalism take almost 20 years to be practiced in the forests of British Columbia, and with no commitment to the privatization of forests? And why did Tasmania not push privatization further? Our suggestion is that there was too much "friction," with geographic limits operating. We now examine four such limits: political, industrial, environmental, and cultural.

Political Limits

Political limits on the privatization of forests were based on historical fears that without state intervention, forests would be liquidated. Since the 1970s, other environmental fears have also emerged. ENGOs in particular have striven to conserve globally unique indigenous timber species that are connected to the identity of the local region. It was telling that the privatization of forestry in New Zealand applied only to exotic plantations, not to indigenous forests. In all three regions, there is widespread political recognition that markets cannot be trusted to uphold nonindustrial values of indigenous forests and require state supervision and oversight.

Tasmania has gone the furthest in deregulation, touting the idea of self-regulation on private lands. According to Wilkinson (2001, 219), by building partnerships with private-sector interests based on “cooperation and trust, rather than coercion and antagonism,” the government could allow forest firms to police themselves. Doing so would optimize skills and resources, avoid duplication, reduce administrative costs and bureaucracy, and meet the provisions of the Forest Practices Act. To facilitate cooperation, the Forest Practices Board enlisted private-sector representation, with policies introduced after consultation. Cooperative partnerships were also a goal of the government, and in the same spirit, the private sector introduced a “Goodwill Charter” that sought to encourage negotiation among interested parties in decisions involving potential conflicts. In these various ways, the Tasmanian government appears to live up to the neoliberal faith. But at best it is partial. There are political limits to neoliberalism stemming from environmental values and the relationship of Tasmania to the larger Australian national state.

The most obvious formal expression of such a limit is the Regional Forest Agreement (RFA) of 1997 that Tasmania signed with the Commonwealth Government in 1997. The RFA is a 20-year plan that seeks to meet developmental and environmental goals of Australia’s native forests, provides a national definition of old-growth criteria for protected (“reserved”) areas, and commits to extend these areas within the RFA. In Tasmania, the RFA significantly increased the extent of reserved areas, providing subsidies to support conservation efforts. It also includes subsidies to industry to aid exports and value-added manufacturing. The RFA was further reinforced by the Tasmanian Community Forest Agreement (2005), a deal struck in the midst of a national election committing Au\$250 million to aid industry and extend reserve areas.

In British Columbia, a different kind of political limit constrained neoliberalism, although it was located outside Canada. On the one hand, the provincial government attempted to deepen market forces by removing appurtenancy, introducing timber auctions, and revising stumpage formulas. On the other hand, freeing up the market was confounded by external politics, ironically around securing free trade. It is a complex story turning on U.S. protectionism and a 30-year “softwood lumber dispute.” During the early 1980s recession, the U.S. forestry industry, represented by the U.S. Coalition for Fair Canadian Lumber Imports (CFCLI), blamed cheap Canadian imports (two-thirds of which originated in British Columbia) for their woes. The CFCLI’s argument was that British Columbia’s forest policy subsidized industry by low stumpage charges. This dispute became part of the 1980s negotiations between the United States and Canada around the 1989 Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), resulting in the implementation of an explicit trade-dispute mechanism.

Despite its existence, and even a substantial increase in stumpage, a free-trade regime was never realized. Neoliberalism met international political limits. Instead, two five-year and one seven-year (the last) softwood lumber agreements between Canada and the

United States (in 1986, 1996, and 2006) were enacted that variously controlled the volume and/or price of Canadian timber exports through tariffs, quotas, and export taxes. The softwood lumber dispute was extraordinarily complex and contentious (see Hayter 1992, 2000). Canada actually “won” key trade-dispute hearings under NAFTA and the WTO, but the CFCLI successfully lobbied the United States to continue to oppose free trade in lumber with Canada.

212 There are at least two ironies here. First, from 1947 to the early 1980s, Canadian softwood lumber exports to the United States were carried out under free trade, but they were stopped following the inauguration of FTA and NAFTA. Second, both U.S. and Canadian lumber firms and their governments claimed deeply felt (neoliberal) commitments to free trade. For the U.S. government, however, the fairness of free trade was realizable only through protectionism! The larger point is that trade in softwood lumber was undertaken contrary to free markets, involving controls and taxes on exports, and extensive documentation of “lumber products,” with the CFCLI made a watchdog of British Columbia’s forest policy. British Columbia’s softwood lumber trade to the United States which was free of restriction for almost 50 years, met its political limits from 1980. If neoliberalism means free trade or, at least, the reduction of trade barriers, the opposite occurred with respect to the trade of British Columbia’s softwood lumber to the United States, and during exactly the period when neoliberalism was supposedly in ascendancy (Hayter 2003).

Industrial Limits

The second limit to neoliberalism is industrial structure. Neoliberalism’s adherence to market forces in the context of trade and FDI is translated as a demand for greater “flexibility” in labor and product markets, input sources, interfirm relations, and environmental regulations. But the realization of flexibility is not straightforward, and in a number of cases, it has not held.

Debates over flexibility are most evident in British Columbia, especially in relation to labor markets, log-supply contracting, and smaller-scale secondary (“value-added”) manufacturing. Such debates reveal both resistances to neoliberalism and ambiguities in relation to flexibility. Since the recession of the early 1980s, big forest corporations have sought more flexible labor relations with less job demarcation and a more open approach to seniority. Predictably, unions opposed this search, especially at existing sites where Fordist collective bargains were long established (Barnes and Hayter 1992; Hayter, Grass, and Barnes 1994; Hayter 1997). The International Woodworkers of America may no longer exist, but its members are now represented by the United Steelworkers and Canadian Auto Workers Union. That is, collective bargaining continues to be important—the last agreement was signed in 2007—representing a potential resistance to the introduction of flexible labor practices. Over the past decade, there has been a series of standoffs over precisely this issue, the last a strike lasting four months.

In New Zealand, the embrace of industrial flexibility is evident in the demand for FDI in the forest sector (combined with a willingness to accept the loss of domestic champions, such as Fletcher Challenge). It is also represented by the privatization of forests and associated cutting rights, with the freedom to harvest and export logs even when the ownership of land rights is under dispute. In Tasmania, investment in exotic forest plantations increased the flexibility of the supply of industrial wood, leading to the renewal of licenses to export wood chips. Flexibility was also introduced by implementing performance-based approaches to environmental goals, although the Tasmanian state continues to regulate the size and nature of clear-cutting, the landscape, aesthetics, wild

life corridors, and the quality of streams. In both New Zealand and Tasmania, there is also the complicating factor of farming communities, literally intermixed with forest plantations. Consequently, views from within the forest industry about, for example, plantation investments, log exports, log markets, and labor unions are highly variegated, with no clear consensus about the virtues of flexibility.

Apart from the uneven character of industrial flexibility, flexibility may not always be flexible. Rigid Fordist styles of production remain and are becoming more fashionable at some sites. There are new “supermills” in British Columbia that operate on exaggerated versions of Fordist mass production and Taylorist labor practices. In part, they were built to process the enormous amount of dying trees resulting from the infestation of pinewood beetles, which is racking the interior of British Columbia’s forests (more than 15 percent of the entire British Columbian forestry stock is affected). In Tasmania, the newly proposed Bell Bay pulp mill is also a massive operation extending economies of scale to new levels. It is being constructed, in part, because of the larger market demand from China and the increased provision of wood chip supplies resulting from the conversion of agricultural land into (eucalyptus) forest plantations. For the industry, Fordist mass production, not flexible production, is the best response, meeting particular local circumstances. Indeed, the critique of Bell Bay has come from environmentalists who are concerned not with neoliberalism but with the deleterious consequences stemming from an enhanced Fordism (Curran and Hollander’s 2008; Gale 2008).

If some kind of industrial flexibility within forestry is a necessary corollary of the arrival of neoliberalism, it has not always gone to plan. Flexibility has not eradicated such market impediments as unions; flexibility comes in radically different forms, varying by place and subsector, and is not always sympathetic to neoliberal ends; and can exist and work alongside a rigid Fordism. The point is that the idea of industrial flexibility like neoliberalism is too simple. It requires complicating by geography. Once it is complicated, its inevitability and force are necessarily qualified.

Environmental Limits

The third limit is the environment and environmentalism, which have been central themes in changes in forest policy over the past several decades in each of the case study regions (see Table 1). In British Columbia, environmental policy escalated in the 1990s. Centered on the Forest Code, the policy included new regional planning processes, additional parks, controls on air and water effluents, and recognition of areas with unusual environmental value. In New Zealand, signature environmental statements were made a decade earlier by the National Parks Act (1980), the West Coast Accord (1986), and the Resource Management Act (RMA) (1991). In Tasmania, pioneering environmental initiatives paralleled those made in British Columbia. A Forest Code was adopted by Forestry Tasmania in 1994 and was strengthened strengthened by the RFA with the commonwealth government in 1997 and the Tasmania Cooperative Forestry Agreement of 2005. Such policies imposed stringent standards on water and air pollution, provided detailed guidelines and restrictions on forestry, and remapped land from industrial to conservation uses. In all three regions, especially in British Columbia and Tasmania, the recognition of nonindustrial values of wood was further promoted by ENGO campaigns.

The birth of Green Peace in Vancouver in 1971 began an explosion of ENGO activity during the 1980s and 1990s (Wilson 1998; Gee 2001; Affolderbach 2011). ENGOs targeted especially the logging of indigenous or old-growth forests by organizing protests at logging sites and pursuing consumers of forest products. Similarly, among the plantations of the North Island, environmentalists raised concerns about soil erosion, the use of chemicals, and appropriate biodiversity.

Environmental responses mutually evolved with neoliberalism, recursively influencing one another. The effect was to dull neoliberalism, partly through remapping. Environmentalist pressure encouraged parts of the forest to be designated as conservation, put outside the market. And partly as a response to environmentalism, the state imposed regulations on forestry operations, restricting the market calculus. We deal with each in turn.

In reaction both to particular campaigns and to a larger environmental sensibility, major new conservation areas within indigenous forests were created during the past few decades, especially in British Columbia and Tasmania. Consequently, market-based logging was disallowed or greatly restricted. In British Columbia, the “protected area” amounted to about 4.6 million hectares, or 5 percent of the land base in 1975. By 1990, it had increased to 6.5 percent and by 1995, to 9.2 percent (8.7 million hectares; Gunton 1997, 67). In 2006, British Columbia’s protected area was 13.1 million hectares, or 13.8 percent of the land base. The increase is a consequence of governmental intervention, the British Columbia Commission on Resources and Environment (1991), and the Protected Areas Strategy (1993). In addition, the Clayoquot Sound UNESCO Biosphere Reserve (2000) and the Great Bear Rainforest (2006) were created. In both regions, logging is permitted on a highly restricted basis (so restricted that in Clayoquot logging has effectively stopped).

In Tasmania, 40 percent of the state’s 3.2 million hectares are now in protected areas, consisting of 19 national parks and 420 “other” reserves. The most famous is the Tasmanian Wilderness World Heritage Area (WHA). Established in 1982, it is only 1 of 13 WHAs that meets all the WHA selection criteria based on the physical environment. The state government further agreed to phase out the cutting of indigenous forests on public land by 2015. The North Island also contains a WHA, the Tongariro National Park, established in 1993.

The second issue is environmental regulation. In British Columbia, changed regulation is best represented by the Forest Practices Code (1995) that restructured logging to meet environmental and cultural values. The code demanded highly detailed plans for each cut block in which the size of clear-cuts was greatly reduced, continuous clear-cutting was eliminated, cutting close to streams and rivers was disallowed, aesthetic values were recognized, and overall harvesting plans were required to preserve biotic and wildlife values. The code further demanded that logging plans be publicly scrutinized and subject to multiple-stage reviews, with firms required to respond to criticisms from local authorities, aboriginal groups, and ENGOs.

More recently, overlaying formal governmental regulation is an informal control, forest certification. Gaining certification on lumber guarantees for customers that certain environmental standards are met. Three different certifications exist: the most stringent is the Forest Stewardship Council, the intermediate is the Sustainable Forestry Initiative, and the weakest is the Canadian Standards Association’s Sustainable Forest Management Standard. As of 2006, 42 million hectares of forest lands in British Columbia have been certified (about 56 percent of the forested land). The significance of forest certification is that it is another layer of environmental intervention in the supposed free market.

In Tasmania, the environmental regulatory framework was ratcheted upward by the 1997 RFA between the state and federal governments and was further extended by the Community Forestry Agreement of 2005 (Russell and Jambrecina 2002; Gale 2008). As one governmental forester in Tasmania noted in an interview with us in April 2006:

There are lots of checks and balances. Water, soil, biodiversity, archaeology, geomorphology values are all protected. But it just seems to have gone to the extreme. The training of forest

practices officers (FPOs) is becoming very specialized. Years ago an [aspiring] forester could become an FPO and do everything, but now training is so specialized that the other day there was a specialist course on the identification of eagles' nests. Foresters can make this identification, but now accreditation is needed. An organization like ours simply cannot afford to send everyone on all the training courses. FPOs have to specialize in different areas.

In the North Island, the trends are more ambiguous. On the one hand, the Resource Management Act (1991) recognized sustainability issues while permitting the relaxation of land-use controls to attract investment. The result, as Coombes (2003a, 206) noted, was a paradoxical "fusion of sustainability and neoliberal discourses." On the other hand, the Department of Conservation actively promoted environmental concerns to restrict logging, including in plantations and on land held or claimed by the Maori.

Once again, local concerns, in this case around the environment, insert themselves into the working out of neoliberalism, giving it at least a regional inflection, constraining some of its traditional features. Privatization and deregulation, two of the tenets of neoliberalism, are clearly contravened because of environmentalist pressures in each of the three regions. New conservation areas are owned and managed by the state and outside the market. And the state formally and informally intervenes to regulate and control forestry practices.

Cultural Limits

The final limit is cultural, by which we mean aboriginal land and resources rights. Native peoples in all three regions have been fighting for such rights since they were displaced by European settlement. These concerns have been heightened, rather than lessened, in recent decades. They were stimulated in New Zealand by the Waitangi Tribunal (1975); in British Columbia by the federal government's Repatriation of the Canadian Constitution (1982) that enshrined aboriginal rights and by British Columbia's Treaty Process (1993); and in Tasmania, by the Aboriginal Lands Act of 1995 (see Table 1). Critical to aboriginal redress in each of the three regions are land claims, the remapping of forest rights, and recognition of the cultural modification of forests.

The issue of aboriginal redress clearly was not directly caused by neoliberalism. But forest policies inspired by neoliberalism are entwined with aboriginal concerns. Also, although environmentalists may cooperate with aboriginals to oppose industrial interests (as in the Clayoquot Sound dispute in British Columbia; Magnusson and Shaw, 2002), the fundamental goals of each group are different. In New Zealand, Maori and environmental groups have even clashed (Coombes 2003b, 338). There is one other point: aboriginal populations are highly varied. Some bands or tribes embrace the goals of capitalist economic development, whereas others do not. In general, though, aboriginal interests in remapping forest resources are inspired by alternatives to market-based solutions, favoring instead aboriginal rights and title, aboriginal identity and control, and redressing historical wrongs.

The actual processes of aboriginal redress vary among the three regions, most notably in British Columbia and the North Island where substantial, expanding extant aboriginal populations live. The redress process is more transparent in the North Island than in British Columbia. In New Zealand, Maori redress is nationally organized, rooted in the Treaty of Waitangi in 1840 that was signed by representatives of the British Crown and most *iwi* (Maori tribes). Although English and Maori interpretations vary, and its legal status has long been disputed, the treaty gained recent legal sanction by the Act of Waitangi (1975) and subsequent 1985 and 1988 amendments. Redress may involve the

courts, direct negotiation, or the Waitangi Tribunal. The process begins with expressions and documentation of historical grievances before proceeding to the issue of financial redress that culminates in compensation (money and/or land), a formal Crown apology, and recognition of the Maori's cultural sites. In return, the Crown expects reconciliation, in effect, the termination of dispute by redress. By 2006, 20 settlements had been made, involving financial settlements of NZ \$700 million.

216 In British Columbia, there is no national equivalent of the Treaty of Waitangi. Rather, during the 19th century, treaties, often of limited scope and substance, were signed with individual First Nations across Canada. In British Columbia only two treaties were authorized. First Nations people in British Columbia were marginalized in reserves and governed by the Indian Act (1876) (Harris 2002). Contemporary attempts to redress this historical injustice began with the Treaty Process of 1993, which was based on a Memorandum of Understanding between the governments of Canada and British Columbia, which envisaged a five-stage process of treaty making. But the process did not work well, and by 2010 only one treaty had been ratified. In British Columbia, the treaty process is messier than in the North Island for various reasons: there is little agreement on basic principles and conditions; there is an ongoing debate about whether to rely on the courts or negotiation to resolve redress; and because the province as well as the federal government are both players there are internal disputes over jurisdiction.

Nevertheless, in British Columbia, there have been several interim agreements, and although final agreements may be remote, First Nations people in British Columbia are gaining increasing control of the forest resource. One mechanism by which such control is occurring is community forestry (Pinkerton, Heaslip, Silver, and Furman 2008; Young and Matthews 2007). First introduced as an experiment in 2000 and made permanent in 2003, community forests have been recognized as an exercise in the devolution of forest policy from the provincial ministry to small communities to stimulate local involvement (Bradshaw 2003; McCarthy 2006). Many of the community forests are controlled by First Nations people, with provisions in the 2003 Forest Renewal Act for British Columbia First Nation bands to be granted up to 20 percent of the forested land leased by corporations. McCarthy (2006, 99) termed community forests a "neoliberal compromise," with "industrial forestry continuing unchanged on the other 99 percent." But this view conflates neoliberalism with industry and forgets that there have been substantial changes to the timber supply in favor of aboriginals. Moreover, with respect to their own legal terms of reference, community forests held by First Nations bands cannot be bought and sold, the antithesis of neoliberalism.

In Tasmania, aboriginal redress has primarily emphasized respect, rather than financial compensation. Nevertheless, there are practical implications for the forest sector, most notably through Heritage Protection and the preservation of sites that reveal signs of aboriginal occupation. Forestry Tasmania has a unit that checks plantations with the authority to prevent planting and harvesting on sites where artifacts, such as small pieces of former tools, are present.

The larger point is that neoliberalism is contorted in various ways by cultural limits. Our three forest economies were not always forest economies. Only in the recent past were they transformed, with the aboriginal peoples who have inhabited the spaces, in some case for thousands of years, forced off the land, given limited access to resources, and harshly treated. Neoliberalism was not the cause, but the consequences of that earlier transformation reverberating historically and literally on the ground. Neoliberalism is necessarily entangled in these consequences, leading sometimes to accommodation and at other times to opposition. The consequences cannot be ignored, nor can the limits they produce.

Conclusion

Brenner et al. (2010) made a case for the chameleon character of neoliberalism. Neoliberalism is variegated not only over space, but over time. It continually morphs into new forms, using crises that otherwise appear fatal as the very means of its rejuvenation. Crises become the source of another neoliberal life. Like the ancient Greek Hydra, cutting off neoliberalism's head leads only to two more appearing.

From this perspective, this article has provided support for the idea of hybrid or mongrel neoliberalism. But we further stress that the issue of geographic limits is essential for assessing the role of neoliberal policy claims and for recognizing alternatives. A problem of portraying neoliberalism as a single, all-conquering beast is that it is not. In practice, debates over resource policy in resource peripheries are extraordinarily complicated and, we argue, are best understood and grounded in diverse institutional structures and material resource realities.

We recognize that the limits we have identified may be interpreted as only temporary stumbling blocks to be overcome in the future. Or given that neoliberalism can never be realized in its pure form, the limits we depict are merely residual impurities, side stories to the main event that keeps rolling along. We hope not. Rather, our aspiration is that the limits we describe really are the limits of neoliberalism, a basis for thinking and doing otherwise, that is, a basis for "after neoliberalism" (Lewis et al. 2008, 43). After all, the Hydra was eventually despatched, but it was (literally) a Herculean task. That is our task, too.

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