

Water Conservation and Persuasion in Kelowna: Persistence Pays.

John Janmaat¹

¹Department of Economics
The University of British Columbia - Okanagan Campus
Kelowna, British Columbia

September 2014

Questions

- What type of behavior is water conservation?
 - Saving money?
 - Environmental concern?
- How are choices connected?
 - Substitutes or complements?
 - Ordered?
- What drives conservation choices?



Questions

- What type of behavior is water conservation?
 - Saving money?
 - Environmental concern?
- How are choices connected?
 - Substitutes or complements?
 - Ordered?
- What drives conservation choices?

Questions

- What type of behavior is water conservation?
 - Saving money?
 - Environmental concern?
- How are choices connected?
 - Substitutes or complements?
 - Ordered?
- What drives conservation choices?

Understanding Conservation

- Behavior and investment
 - Shorter showers
 - Low flow shower heads
- Differing impacts
 - Water saving
 - Money saving?
 - Time saving or using
 - Substitute time for water
 - Invest to save time and water

Understanding Conservation

- Behavior and investment
 - Shorter showers
 - Low flow shower heads
- Differing impacts
 - Water saving
 - Money saving?
 - Time saving or using
 - Substitute time for water
 - Invest to save time and water

Understanding Conservation

- Behavior and investment
 - Shorter showers
 - Low flow shower heads
- Differing impacts
 - Water saving
 - Money saving?
 - Time saving or using
 - Substitute time for water
 - Invest to save time and water

Model

- Choose
 - set of conservation activities and investments ($\mathbf{y} = [y_1, y_2, \dots, y_K], y_i \in \{0, 1\}$),
 - set of other consumption activities ($\mathbf{x} \in (\mathbb{R}^+)^N$),
 - leisure ($l \in [0, T]$).
- To maximize utility ($u(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, l)$)
- Subject to income exceeding sum of
 - cost of water conservation ($c(\mathbf{y})$),
 - cost of other consumption activities ($\mathbf{p}'\mathbf{x}$),
 - value of water savings ($qs(\mathbf{y})$),
 - lost wages from leisure time (wl),
 - net time value of conservation activities ($wt(\mathbf{y})$).

Model

- Choose
 - set of conservation activities and investments ($\mathbf{y} = [y_1, y_2, \dots, y_K], y_i \in \{0, 1\}$),
 - set of other consumption activities ($\mathbf{x} \in (\mathbb{R}^+)^N$),
 - leisure ($l \in [0, T]$).

- To maximize utility ($u(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, l)$)

- Subject to income exceeding sum of
 - cost of water conservation ($c(\mathbf{y})$),
 - cost of other consumption activities ($\mathbf{p}'\mathbf{x}$),
 - value of water savings ($qs(\mathbf{y})$),
 - lost wages from leisure time (wl),
 - net time value of conservation activities ($wt(\mathbf{y})$).

Model

- Choose
 - set of conservation activities and investments ($\mathbf{y} = [y_1, y_2, \dots, y_K], y_i \in \{0, 1\}$),
 - set of other consumption activities ($\mathbf{x} \in (\mathbb{R}^+)^N$),
 - leisure ($l \in [0, T]$).

- To maximize utility ($u(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, l)$)

- Subject to income exceeding sum of
 - cost of water conservation ($c(\mathbf{y})$),
 - cost of other consumption activities ($\mathbf{p}'\mathbf{x}$),
 - value of water savings ($qs(\mathbf{y})$),
 - lost wages from leisure time (wl),
 - net time value of conservation activities ($wt(\mathbf{y})$).

Continuous Choice

- Level of activity increases when
 - ① Cheaper,
 - ② Needs less time (or saves more time),
 - ③ Higher water price
 - ④ More 'feel good' from activity
 - ⑤ Higher income (if marginal benefit of other consumption decreasing with greater consumption).

Discrete Choice

- More likely to choose activity if
 - ① Cheaper,
 - ② Needs less time (or saves more time),
 - ③ Higher water price
 - ④ More 'feel good' from activity
 - ⑤ Higher income (if marginal benefit of other consumption decreasing with greater consumption).
- Discrete choices may interact
 - rain barrels and xeriscape yard (complements?)
 - vs rain barrels and gravel / paved yard (substitutes?)
 - vs high efficiency laundry and dual flush toilet (independent?)



Discrete Choice

- More likely to choose activity if
 - 1 Cheaper,
 - 2 Needs less time (or saves more time),
 - 3 Higher water price
 - 4 More 'feel good' from activity
 - 5 Higher income (if marginal benefit of other consumption decreasing with greater consumption).
- Discrete choices may interact
 - rain barrels and xeriscape yard (complements?)
 - vs rain barrels and gravel / paved yard (substitutes?)
 - vs high efficiency laundry and dual flush toilet (independent?)

Discrete Choice

- Choices may be independent.
- Choices normally not exclusive.
 - high efficiency laundry and dual flush toilet.
 - None, one of, or both.
- Choices ordered?
 - utility benefit per unit cost
 - utility unobservable
 - cost, time saving/cost, water saving, ... weakly observable, dependent on behaviors
- perfect ordering unlikely
 - Evidence for some ordering?

Discrete Choice

- Choices may be independent.
- Choices normally not exclusive.
 - high efficiency laundry and dual flush toilet.
 - None, one of, or both.
- Choices ordered?
 - utility benefit per unit cost
 - utility unobservable
 - cost, time saving/cost, water saving, ... weakly observable, dependent on behaviors
- perfect ordering unlikely
 - Evidence for some ordering?

Discrete Choice

- Choices may be independent.
- Choices normally not exclusive.
 - high efficiency laundry and dual flush toilet.
 - None, one of, or both.
- Choices ordered?
 - utility benefit per unit cost
 - utility unobservable
 - cost, time saving/cost, water saving, ... weakly observable, dependent on behaviors
- perfect ordering unlikely
 - Evidence for some ordering?

Discrete Choice

- Choices may be independent.
- Choices normally not exclusive.
 - high efficiency laundry and dual flush toilet.
 - None, one of, or both.
- Choices ordered?
 - utility benefit per unit cost
 - utility unobservable
 - cost, time saving/cost, water saving, ... weakly observable, dependent on behaviors
- perfect ordering unlikely
 - Evidence for some ordering?

Choice Ordering


- Evidence for ordering.
 - Optimal ordering unique to each household
 - Capital replacement, household composition, ...
 - Enough similarity that data ordered?
- If data ordered, treat like count data
 - Model number as function of exogenous drivers.

Choice Ordering

- Evidence for ordering.
 - Optimal ordering unique to each household
 - Capital replacement, household composition, ...
 - Enough similarity that data ordered?
- If data ordered, treat like count data
 - Model number as function of exogenous drivers.




Location




Location

- Kelowna, British Columbia, Canada
 - Semi-arid: ~320mm annual precipitation.
 - Rapid population growth: 9.3% growth, 2006 to 2011.
 - 107,280 →117,310.
 - Vulnerable to climate change.
 - Five water providers.
 - Volumetric pricing, two.
 - Flat fee, three.

Location



Location



Data Collection

- Mixed mode survey (telephone, internet, mail).
 - Initially telephone and internet, changed to mail and internet.
 - Summer 2009 to autumn 2010.
 - 2273 contacted, 512 completed.
 - Response rate ~25%
 - Not in service, respondent moved, etc.,

Indoor Conservation

<i>N</i>	Tap Aerator	Low fl. Shower	Low fl. Toilet
516	196	366	294
1.00	0.38	0.71	0.57

	Effic. Washer	Effic. D. Washer	Grey System
	245	212	5
	0.47	0.41	0.01

Outdoor Conservation

<i>N</i>	Water Less	Low wat. Grass	Moisture Probe	Timed Irrig	Rain Barrel
516	261	69	12	356	61
1.00	0.51	0.13	0.02	0.69	0.12

	Grey System	Soil Amend	Pool Cover	Gravel	Xeriscape
	2	200	58	164	134
	0.00	0.39	0.11	0.32	0.26

Conservation Behaviors

<i>N</i>	Scrape Dishes	Wash in Basin	Off Teeth
516	257	203	414
1.00	0.50	0.39	0.80

Shower Off	Yellow Mellow	D. Washer Full	Washer Full
74	248	435	455
0.14	0.48	0.84	0.88

By Provider


Variable	BMID	CITY	GEID	OTHER	RWW	SEKID
IN_HSE (516)	2.75	2.62	2.44	2.25	2.43	2.66
ON_YRD (516)	2.52	2.59	2.51	2.69	2.49	2.80
BEHAVE (516)	4.29	4.02	4.01	3.88	3.71	4.29

- Investments (IN_HSE, ON_YRD), no difference.
- Behaviors, no difference.

Choice Sequence

- Start with trial sequence, $y_1, y_2, y_3, \dots, y_N$
- Count matching sequences
 - Matches, $1, 1, 1, 0, 0, \dots, 0$
 - Does not match, $1, 0, 1, 1, 0, \dots, 0$
- Null, data random.
 - Count frequency that random draws match
 - Sample preserving observation counts
 - Sample uniformly across options
- Compare observed to trial and null.
- Also with allowance for perturbations.

Theory of Planned Behavior



Ajzen, 1991.

Variables

Category	Variable
Attitudes and Norms	NEP, GROW_BAD, ABUNDANCE, OTHERS_CONS, LEADER, VOTECON, HEREEND, HEREWETHER, HERELEIS, MALE
Perceived Control	KNOW, EDUC, MSG_PRIV, MSG_SOC, <i>PAY_WAT, INCOME</i>
Intention	COMPULSION, BEHAVE
Behavior	IN_HOUSE, ON_YARD, BEHAVE

Econometric Model

- Two stage least squares
- First stage


$$\text{COMPULSION} = f(\mathbf{X})$$

- Second stage

$$\begin{bmatrix} \text{IN_HOUSE} \\ \text{ON_YARD} \\ \text{BEHAVE} \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} g_{IN}(\text{COMP}\hat{\text{U}}\text{LSION}, \mathbf{Z}_{IN}) \\ g_{ON}(\text{COMP}\hat{\text{U}}\text{LSION}, \mathbf{Z}_{ON}) \\ g_{BE}(\text{COMP}\hat{\text{U}}\text{LSION}, \mathbf{Z}_{BE}) \end{bmatrix}$$

- For system, estimate by SUR and 3SLS.

Choice Ordering



Area Measure

	Sample	Perfect	Column		All	
			$\bar{\mu}^*$	$\bar{\sigma}^*$	$\bar{\mu}^*$	$\bar{\sigma}^*$
Exhaustive calculation						
IN_HOUSE	0.188	0.397	0.101	0.006	0.122	0.008
BEHAVE	0.108	0.318	0.053	0.004	0.074	0.006
Bootstrap, 200 samples of 500 sequences, 39 bootstrap samples						
IN_HOUSE	0.188	0.397	0.101	0.006	0.121	0.008
ON_YARD	0.123	0.340	0.058	0.007	0.077	0.008
BEHAVE	0.108	0.318	0.053	0.004	0.073	0.006

Maximum Match Measure

	Sample	Perfect	Column		All	
			$\overline{\mu}^*$	$\overline{\sigma}^*$	$\overline{\mu}^*$	$\overline{\sigma}^*$
Exhaustive calculation						
IN_HOUSE	239	516	160.12	9.99	80.4	5.87
BEHAVE	232	516	166.94	10.08	54.7	4.24
Bootstrap, 200 samples of 500 sequences, 39 bootstrap samples						
IN_HOUSE	236.0	508.3	158.8	9.48	79.6	5.13
ON_YARD	163.3	361.2	115.0	8.94	51.5	4.59
BEHAVE	214.1	480.8	158.3	9.49	52.3	3.95

First Stage

	COMPULSION		log(BEHAVE)	
	β	<i>se</i>	β	<i>se</i>
(Intercept)	3.1127^{***}	0.6426	0.9782^{***}	0.2120
NEP	0.2027^{**}	0.0701	-0.0187	0.0231
MSG_PRIV	-0.0027	0.0289	0.0190[*]	0.0095
MSG_SOC	0.0779	0.0491	0.0407[*]	0.0162
KNOW	0.1826	0.2496	-0.0288	0.0823
LEADER	0.0228	0.0318	0.0187	0.0105
EDUC	-0.0045	0.0340	0.0035	0.0112
GROW_BAD	0.2083^{***}	0.0611	0.0283	0.0201
ABUNDANCE	-0.1582^{***}	0.0448	0.0005	0.0148
VOTECON	0.1625	0.0945	0.0352	0.0312



First Stage

	COMPULSION		log(BEHAVE)	
	β	<i>se</i>	β	<i>se</i>
OTHERS_CONS	0.1236**	0.0444	0.0399**	0.0146
HEREENV	-0.0193	0.1131	-0.0322	0.0373
HEREWEATH	0.0603	0.1112	-0.0301	0.0367
HERELEIS	0.0238	0.0950	0.0027	0.0313
PAY_WAT	-0.0841	0.0949	-0.0283	0.0313
INCOME	0.8398	0.9625	-0.2634	0.3176
ASSESS	-0.0962	0.1918	0.0931	0.0633
BLDSIZE	2.8228	8.2942	2.8631	2.7367
BLDAGE	0.4110	0.8329	0.1634	0.2748
BLDAGE2	-1.1225	1.1235	-0.1818	0.3707



First Stage

	COMPULSION		log(BEHAVE)	
	β	<i>se</i>	β	<i>se</i>
OCCUPANTS	0.0276	0.0506	0.0620^{***}	0.0167
MALE	-0.1017	0.1010	-0.0188	0.0333
LOTSIZE	0.2347	0.2548	0.0530	0.0841
SCHOOL	-0.0302	0.1293	-0.0870[*]	0.0426
RETIRED	0.1819	0.1215	0.0456	0.0401
YEARS_KEL	-0.4065	0.3424	-0.0781	0.1130
	$R^2 = 0.306$		$R^2 = 0.199$	
	$F_{23,276} = 4.826$		$F_{23,276} = 2.723$	



IN_HOUSE

	3SLS		NLS SUR		NLS 3SLS	
	β	<i>se</i>	β	<i>se</i>	β	<i>se</i>
(Intercept)	0.963*	0.490	0.653*	0.262	0.470	0.612
log(BEHAVE)	0.667⁺	0.398	0.447***	0.124	0.851⁺	0.455
COMPULSION	-0.144*	0.064	-0.057⁺	0.031	-0.141*	0.063
PAY_WAT	-0.001	0.054	0.006	0.054	-0.010	0.057
INCOME	1.436*	0.565	1.132*	0.527	1.432*	0.585
ASSESS	-0.209⁺	0.112	-0.260⁺	0.138	-0.281*	0.141
BLDSIZE	1.312	4.462	2.094	4.791	3.000	4.939
BLDAGE	-0.787⁺	0.434	-1.112**	0.423	-1.009*	0.445
BLDAGE2	1.155⁺	0.594	1.426**	0.544	1.399*	0.566

IN_HOUSE

	3SLS		NLS SUR		NLS 3SLS	
	β	se	β	se	β	se
OCCUPANTS	-0.004	0.027	0.020	0.022	0.004	0.026
MSG_PRIV	0.033⁺	0.017	0.042[*]	0.016	0.030	0.020
MSG_SOC	-0.013	0.030	-0.028	0.027	-0.031	0.032
KNOW	-0.081	0.138	-0.174	0.145	-0.128	0.152
EDUC	0.002	0.018	-0.001	0.019	-0.001	0.020
R^2	0.0849		0.1232		0.0755	



ON_YARD

	3SLS		NLS SUR		NLS 3SLS	
	β	<i>se</i>	β	<i>se</i>	β	<i>se</i>
(Intercept)	0.396	0.448	-0.275	0.299	0.970	0.577
log(BEHAVE)	0.295	0.308	0.534^{***}	0.145	0.008	0.390
COMPULSION	0.001	0.061	0.022	0.036	-0.042	0.077
PAY_WAT	-0.051	0.053	-0.017	0.061	-0.080	0.066
INCOME	0.674	0.526	1.092⁺	0.558	0.864	0.615
ASSESS	0.132	0.105	0.076	0.091	0.131	0.107
LOTSIZE	0.065	0.133	0.062	0.125	0.077	0.134
MSG_PRIV	0.019	0.016	0.007	0.018	0.008	0.020
MSG_SOC	0.085^{**}	0.029	0.092^{***}	0.028	0.124^{***}	0.033

ON_YARD

	3SLS		NLS SUR		NLS 3SLS	
	β	<i>se</i>	β	<i>se</i>	β	<i>se</i>
KNOW	0.179	0.136	0.094	0.161	0.038	0.175
EDUC	0.011	0.018	0.002	0.021	0.001	0.023
R^2	0.1632		0.1547		0.0879	

BEHAVE

	3SLS		NLS SUR		NLS 3SLS	
	β	se	β	se	β	se
(Intercept)	0.993^{***}	0.191	0.827^{***}	0.132	0.936^{***}	0.205
COMPULSION	0.074[*]	0.033	0.065^{***}	0.019	0.055	0.036
PAY_WAT	-0.034	0.031	-0.028	0.031	-0.040	0.032
INCOME	-0.119	0.289	-0.071	0.294	-0.168	0.299
OCCUPANTS	0.059^{***}	0.016	0.055^{***}	0.015	0.053^{***}	0.016
SCHOOL	-0.076⁺	0.040	-0.072⁺	0.041	-0.072⁺	0.041
RETIRED	0.028	0.038	0.028	0.039	0.018	0.040
YEARS_KEL	-0.011	0.098	0.031	0.103	-0.007	0.104
MSG_PRIV	0.017⁺	0.009	0.022[*]	0.010	0.021[*]	0.010
MSG_SOC	0.037[*]	0.016	0.038[*]	0.016	0.042^{**}	0.016

BEHAVE

	3SLS		NLS SUR		NLS 3SLS	
	β	<i>se</i>	β	<i>se</i>	β	<i>se</i>
KNOW	-0.039	0.081	-0.044	0.084	-0.060	0.085
EDUC	0.006	0.011	0.008	0.011	0.006	0.011
R^2	0.1465		0.1588		0.1555	

System Results

- Sargan tests for overidentifying restrictions.
 - Significant without instruments,
 - Insignificant when instruments included.
- Hausmann tests for endogeneity
 - Failed to reject, instruments not endogenous?
- Cragg-Donal tests for weak instruments
 - Instruments weak
- OLS may be just as good as other approaches.

Conclusion

- Conservation activities are weakly ordered.
- Messages about conservation important.
 - Social context of activity and message related.
- Message impact not via compulsion / behavior
 - TBP not supported
 - Endogeneity tests weak
- No evidence for price effect.
 - Price too low?
 - Price dominated by messaging / social pressure.