Not sure if Prof. Crawford got my email on my first post, but here’s a link to my site with both blog posts.

https://blogs.ubc.ca/notjas0n/

link to post

I accidentally sent a link that doesn’t work to Professor Crawford’s email on Monday.

Here’s the link that works:https://blogs.ubc.ca/tbarrozo2018/2018/10/14/this-is-america-saviour-of-the-world/

Link to my second post here: https://blogs.ubc.ca/siena/

SECOND BLOG-Grace Kim

Here’s the link of my 2nd blog post!

Hegemony and After: What can be said about the future of American global leadership.

Veronica Mondragon

Student ID: 75962340

https://blogs.ubc.ca/waesoph/2018/10/17/blog-post-2/

POLI 367B has deconstructed my previous categorization of IR theory as a dichotomy between realism and idealism, and, in its place, created a complex structure based on theoretical pluralism. This theoretical pluralism can be disorienting and overwhelming. However, Holsti, in The Dividing Discipline, gave me some clarity to this theoretical pluralism, for, instead of focusing on the divisions and debates within international theory, Holsti argues for its continuity and similarity (Holsti 1985, 37).

Holsti begins his work by stating that “International theory is in a state of disarray” (Holsti 1985, 1). Holsti defines international theories as “descriptive and explanatory statements about the structure, units, and processes of international politics that transcend time, location, and personality” (Holsti 1985, 3). He then explains how some scholars have organized the theoretical field into such categories as pluralist (state-centric), functionalist (multiple actors), or structuralist (constructed horizontal hierarchies), among others (Holsti 1985, 5). Nevertheless, he argues that there is no single answer to the continuing debates within international theory (Holsti 1985, 7).

However, in the following pages, he proposes three key threads which hold international theories together, namely: 1). The causes of war and conditions for peace, including the concept of power, 2). The actors and units of analysis, and 3). The images of the world or system of states (Holsti 1985, 8). With these three criteria, Holsti examines the classical tradition, liberalism, and the behavioural revolution. His goal is not to create a winning paradigm, but to illustrate how all three criteria are present in all three approaches to the study of international theory from the classical tradition to liberalism (Holsti 1985, 27). Even the behavioural revolution did not alter these three threads, for it still examined these three fundamental characteristics. Indeed, Holsti explains that the behavioural revolution altered methodologies but not the essence of international politics and theory, for only normative priorities can create different paradigms (Holsti 1985, 39).

Holsti acknowledges that he is examining the discipline in broad strokes which can lead to generalizations and marginalization of certain theories. Furthermore, this narrow categorization may label some ways of thinking as non theoretical. Despite these potential shortcomings, this categorization of theory can help one to better understand the world of international theory. Holsti’s perspective or approach is different from other works and authors which choose to focus on the debates within the field concerning such concepts as positivism, realism, or quantitative research, for example. These divides and differences between paradigms and perspectives can create an understanding of the discipline that is chaotic. Holsti’s work, however, brought some uniformity to my understanding of international theories.

Kal Holsti. The Dividing Discipline. Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1985.

Poli 367B Blog Post #2

The field of International Relations has always been permeated by a lack of consensus around how to analyze world politics, such as what issues matter the most (e.g. identity, gender, power) and what truly impacts global politics (states, international organizations, capitalism, etc). This resulted in the proliferation of a variety of different theories and ways of looking at the world. The particular ways in which International Relations scholars analyze world politics through their own preferred paradigm enables others to see not only how a particular theory applies to “real world” politics, but also the author’s initial assumptions about the world that led them to favour that theory and come to their conclusions. In the article Why Iran Should Get the Bomb, the neorealist Kenneth Waltz analyzes the world’s concerns around Iran’s nuclear activities and explains the political dynamics of this scenario in light of neorealist assumptions. Nevertheless, Waltz not only illuminates key principles of structural realism (aka neorealism), but also makes use of his own initial assumptions of what constitutes world politics and cooperation issues within it. In other words, the reader is able to not only observe the key features of Structural Realism, but also notice how they are grounded in Waltz’ beliefs about international relations, and how some gaps in his reasoning could be better explained by other international relations theories.

Structural Realism diverges from Classical Realism in the way it perceives power in the international system: while Classical Realism sees power as an end in itself (pursued by humans due to their own nature), Neorealists believe that states seek power in order to maximize their security in an anarchical, self-help system. Therefore, for neorealists, international relations is still governed by power politics and states should still be the main unit of analysis; however, the pursuit of power is done so in order to increase the security of a state, a process which is conditioned by the anarchical structure of the international system. Since states can never be sure about the intentions of other, states are always competing for power in order to give them a sense of security, which constitutes the tragedy of power politics. In addition, this also creates a security dilemma since states aiming to maximize their power leads to other states feeling less secure by default – this, as a consequence, results in an endless competition for power in the international system.

According to Waltz, the reason Iran is looking to increase its nuclear arsenal likely to increase its own security (and not increase its offensive power). Based on the Middle East nuclear crisis and the neorealist view of states operating under an anarchical self-help system, Waltz highlights that Iran is likely only trying to maximize its power in order to increase its own security (a key feature of state behaviour under structural realism). In addition to this, Waltz also argues that imposing sanctions on Iran as an attempt by the US, European Union, and Israel to persuade Iran to cease its nuclear activities could make Iran feel even more vulnerable, giving it more reason to seek protection from their nuclear arsenal under an anarchical system. This argument also highlights one of the key features of structural realism, which is that the pursuit of power is governed by a need states have to maximize their power in order to increase their own security in a self-help system. On a different note, it also illuminates one of Waltz’ arguments as a “defensive realist” that states should not look to maximize their power because of the prevalence of balancing behaviour. Just like the US, European Union, and Israel have imposed sanctions on Iran, Waltz argues that threatened states will band together to form a balancing coalition against an aspiring power and attack it.

Since Iran is then considered by Waltz as a revisionist state (i.e. a state determined to use force to change the balance of power), Waltz also uses the Iran example to exemplify how the pursuit of power in international politics is a zero-sum game. The increasing of power of one state will come at the expense of the decreasing of power (and increasing of feeling of insecurity) of another state in the international system. After ruling out the possibility for diplomatic solution, the two possible outcomes provided by Waltz illustrate the zero-sum nature of this situation: even if Iran only develops the capacity to build a nuclear weapon (but not an actual nuclear bomb), Israel would consider this an insufficient deterrent and an attack on its security. As a result, Israel would likely continue trying to subvert Iran’s nuclear plans through sabotage and assassination. Nevertheless, if Iran were allowed to continue with its nuclear expansion program, this would cause a shift in the balance of power and decrease the security of the US, European Union, and Israel (or at least equate their destructive power). In summary, in all possible outcomes, Iran’s maximization of power comes at the expense of the decrease of security of other states under an anarchical system, which explains the zero-sum nature of this security dilemma (another key discussion of neorealism).

Furthermore, besides the article highlighting the key assumptions of neorealism, it also provides an insight into Waltz’ own assumptions about world politics and how other theories could help explain this scenario. When analyzing all the possible outcomes of this situation, Waltz argues that the Neoliberal Institutionalist assumption that states could come together through diplomatic cooperation to persuade Iran into abandoning its nuclear plans is unlikely. This demonstrates an underlying assumption that interstate cooperation is often difficult and, in some cases, even impossible. Similarly, Waltz also explores the impact of Iran being portrayed as an irrational actor for the US and Israel to argue that the logic of nuclear deterrence does not apply to the Islamic Republic. Here, the neorealist thinker misses an opportunity to incorporate traces of Constructivism to explain the power of identities (and the creation and manipulation thereof) and how it can influence world politics.

Studying the reasoning of international relations scholars then enables us to notice not only how theory is applied to real world politics to find observable implications and causal factors, but also how the initial assumptions of authors influences their analysis of world politics and impedes other theories from contributing to their arguments. Lastly, the article Iran Should Get the Bomb also illuminates other key discussions in Structural Realism, such as how polarity (distribution of power) influences the potential for conflict in the international system and how reducing imbalances in military power can decrease the potential for conflict by creating a threat of mutually assured destruction (MAD).

Kenneth Waltz (2012) “Why Iran should get the bomb,” Foreign Affairs, 91(4): 2-5

Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki, and Steve Smith International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity, 3rd Edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.

Henrique Fernandes – 51392165