In his article, “Why Iran Should Get the Bomb”, Kenneth Waltz discusses the current instability in the Middle East over Iran’s interest in continuing with its own nuclear program. Although many actors, both regional and foreign have made various speculations over the true reason behind this behavior, most agree that if Iran does develop a nuclear bomb or at the very least the means to do so, the result could be disastrous and therefore it must be avoided at all costs. Thusly, Waltz chooses to begin by focusing the possible ways that the United States and Israel, (two of the powers most concerned about this problem) can respond to Iran’s nuclear aspirations.

Firstly, Waltz notes the option of maintaining the strategy of increasing economic sanctions over the Iranian regime in the hope of dissuading its leaders from continuing with the program through economic pressure. On this point however, he argues that opting for this strategy might exacerbate tensions as economic sanctions have not proven to be the most effective tools in international relations and might additionally increase Iran’s sense of vulnerability and force them to pursue nuclear power with even greater determination. Secondly, there is the option of allowing Iran to go forth with its nuclear program without letting them get to the point of developing a nuclear bomb, thus increasing Iran’s level of security and keeping them from becoming such a major threat in the region. Finally, Waltz’s last option, and the one he favours most, is that of permitting Iran to develop their own nuclear weapon. He claims this course of action is the one that is most likely going to bring instability to the Middle East as it will reestablish a regional balance of power and deter other actors in the region to challenge it.

Nevertheless, I have to say I do not entirely agree with Waltz on this point. It seems he places too much confidence on the ability that balance of power and military capability alone have to act as an effective deterrent in the region. Although of course as a neorealist, this manner of thinking would make sense, I believe that while allowing Iran to get a hold of a future nuclear arsenal would increase its own sense of security in the region, other powers in the Middle East such as Turkey and (most notably) Saudi Arabia would feel less secure. Moreover, these countries among others, have been seeking greater power and influence in the region for nearly as long as Iran and view themselves as direct rivals based not only on the military arena but also on a variety of other factors including, religion, economy and political ideology.

For this reason, I believe that Waltz presents an interesting argument and although I agree that perhaps countries like the United States and Israel base their own foreign policy towards Iran based on possibly exaggerated and inaccurate assumptions, there are or consideration to be taken into account contextually in order to figure out the true repercussions that the rise of a new nuclear power could have in the region.

Alfonso García